The Evolution of Water Governance in South Africa

10THE EVOLUTION OF WATER

GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

LESSONS FROM A RESILIENCE THEORY-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE KHOISAN AND GOLD MINING

SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

Nikki Funke, Karen Nortje, Jeanette Rascher and Anthony Turton

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we present an historical description of the evolution of water governance in South Africa, which details the transition from Dutch, British colonial and apartheid style control and command governance of water resources to the decentralised and adaptive type of governance that South Africa’s post-1994 water legislation demands. We pay particular attention to the National Water Act’s principles of equity and efficiency. Both of these principles are crucial if the legislation is to be successfully implemented; equity, in particular, should be accorded primary consideration given the country’s history of inequitable access to natural resources. Nonetheless, it appears that these two principles may possibly be pitted against each other, especially as South Africa is likely to become more water scarce in future.

According to Ashton et al. (Chapter 9, this volume), research indicates that the diminishing significance of agriculture and forestry could lead to a decreased demand for water in these sectors. Such a tendency, in combination with increasing levels of water scarcity and the imperative for economic growth, particularly through industrial production, is likely to lead to a situation where water that was previously used by sectors in the rural areas will be re-allocated to urban areas. As a result, the

146 EXPLORING SUSTAINABILITY SCIENCE – A SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

resilience of South Africa’s rural areas will probably become increasingly stressed and as the ecological support system for the communities living in these areas declines, the country could see the continuing migration of rural people to its urban areas. If this situation is realised and efficiency is promoted at all costs to realise short-term economic development and achieve the immediate greatest good for the most number of people, the consequences could be severe for rural communities.

To illustrate this point, the adverse effects of a situation where South African governments have previously prioritised efficiency over equity, rather than looking at equity considerations first, are analysed. This is done by focusing on two social-ecological system (SES) case studies with the Khoisan and the gold mining industry as key system elements. We recognise SESs as complex adaptive systems that are characterised by interdependence between humans and nature (Walker and Salt, 2006). SESs comprise ecological systems (in our case studies, elements of freshwater systems) that are intricately linked with and affected by one or more social system (Anderies et al., 2004). South Africa’s SES of water governance can be viewed as a larger system in which the SESs that we describe are nested and to which they are connected by cross-scale linkages (Gunderson and Holling, 2002).

The Khoisan and gold mining industry case studies were selected because of the very firm links that both of these key system elements have with freshwater ecosystems. Whereas the Khoisan’s life style used to be characterised by almost complete dependence on untransformed natural resources, South Africa’s gold mining industry has made considerable use of the country’s managed water resources to extract much of the country’s wealth and thereby contribute substantially to its economy. In addition, the Khoisan embody South Africa’s early history and the potentially valuable, but under-explored, contribution of indigenous knowledge to present-day water governance in the country. The Khoisan can also be seen as an historical equivalent of a contemporary marginalised, poor rural community, whereas the gold mining industry fits into the industrialised, financially lucrative and highly developed ‘urban’ sector of the economy. The current state of the gold mining industry indicates the potential consequences of a situation where water is only allocated to promote short-term economic growth, but does not take into account the need to plan for and enable long-term sustainable development. Furthermore, the many water-related environmental, economic and health issues associated with the gold mining industry also make this case study extremely relevant for contemporary water and environmental governance in South Africa.

Both of the case studies are analysed by making use of resilience theory. Such an analysis assists in understanding how the two case study SESs have changed over time, how this has impacted upon their resilience, and which conclusions can be drawn to illustrate the lessons that history teaches us in a case where efficiency was deemed more important than equity. These lessons may be of value and serve as a piece of cautionary advice to the South African government in its efforts to implement the new water legislation in an increasingly water scarce environment.

THE EVOLUTION OF WATER GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 147

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter was written by political scientists and anthropologists. We have used knowledge from our respective disciplines to examine the evolution of water governance in South Africa and to illustrate the resilience of the two case study SESs and lessons learned from these analyses. Political analysis enables both an in-depth interpretation and discussion of historical and current water governance, in particular its political implications, and the formulation of recommendations about the changes needed to ensure greater effectiveness in the implementation of effective governance. Anthropology brings to the fore a context-driven analysis, which allows for holistic and multi-dimensional understandings and interpretation, primarily at a local level.

The Hydropolitical history of South Africa’s international river basins (Turton et al., 2004), an annotated bibliography that focuses on the history of water politics in Southern Africa, formed the basis of a Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) report that is entitled South Africa’s hydropolitical history: Actors, actions, roles and responsibilities (Findlater et al., 2007). Both documents constitute a point of departure for this chapter and are supplemented by a literature review that includes journal articles, books and a doctoral thesis.

The historical approach to the evolution of water governance that we employ in this chapter focuses on a description of water governance during the Dutch, British colonial and apartheid regimes (Figure 1).1 This is followed by a discussion of the key principles of South Africa’s new water legislation. Subsequently, the case studies, used to illustrate lessons from a situation in the past where efficiency took priority over equity in terms of natural resource allocation, are approached through reference to resilience theory. This provides a useful approach to understanding aspects of complex SESs that are situated within South Africa’s SES of water governance. An increased understanding of the functioning of such systems, particularly their current and possible future states within the adaptive renewal cycle, as well as the dimensions of connectedness, potential and resilience, provides valuable lessons to caution decision-makers and water management practitioners against prioritising efficiency over equity. While resilience theory has traditionally been applied more commonly to understand ecosystems, it nonetheless provides a useful framework for the analysis of social-ecological systems (Folke et al., 1998; Scheffer et al., 2002; Berkes et al., 2003; Walker et al., 2006; Burns, 2007). For the purposes of this chapter, resilience theory is applied to the case studies using an approach based on that which Burns (2007) employs in an analysis of the petroleum energy economy, a sector that is in many ways similar to the gold mining industry in South Africa.

Our resilience analysis comprises three key terms that should be clarified upfront. The first is ‘potential’, which describes the development possibilities of systems (Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Burns, 2007) and controls the number of alternative


options that are open to a system (Holling, 2001). For example, an SES with high potential is able to develop in a rich economic, cultural or social sense through breadth of access to its environmental and social resource bases. Importantly, the realisation of an SES’s potential is determined by the form and influence of its governance systems.

Secondly, ‘connectedness’ is defined as the strength of internal connections that mediate and regulate influences between the inside processes of a system and the outside world. It is, therefore, linked to the degree of internal control that a system can exert over external variability (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). High levels of connectedness within a system, in the form of mutually supportive relationships between actors, can increase resilience as long as the actors are still able to function with a measure of independence. However, as soon as this connectedness takes the form of rigid inter-dependencies and decreased self-reliance, system resilience is compromised (Walker and Salt, 2006). Diminished resilience results, for example, when there is a high level of human dependency on a narrow, or shrinking, band of ecosystem goods, which increases system vulnerability in the form of social and economic stresses within livelihood systems (Adger, 2000).

Thirdly, ‘resilience’ is taken to mean the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, including major shocks (such as droughts and conflict), and to adapt to change in order to still retain the same function, structure and identity (Resilience Alliance, 2006; Walker and Salt, 2006). In addition, it relates to the ability of a system to tolerate disturbance without transforming into a different state – transformation being an event that can be more or less desirable, for example, in terms of advancing the ideals of sustainable development (Burns, 2007). Adger (2000) defines social resilience as the ability of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental change. Similarly, in order for a system to be resilient it has to be able to self-organise and to undergo a substantial degree of learning and adaptation (Carpenter et al., 2001). Finally, it is important to understand which factors most strongly influence SES resilience, for example, in the context of crossing phase-state thresholds; i.e. resilience in terms “of what to what” (Carpenter et al., 2001).

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

THE DUTCH, COLONIAL AND APARTHEID GOVERNMENTS’ CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES

Subsequent to the European settlement of the Cape in 1652, one of the approaches adopted by the Dutch and subsequently the British colonial and apartheid governments to consolidate their power was to control the country’s scarce water


resources, the freshwater ecosystems within which they are embedded and the land on which they are situated (Turton, 2000).

Dutch rule

When Jan van Riebeeck and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) arrived in the Cape in 1652, the intention was to establish only a trading post. However, due to the inability of the Khoikhoi (pastoralists indigenous to the area) to supply the VOC with sufficient supplies, the company soon realised that in order to sustain its maritime trade with the east Indies, greater control would need to be taken over the territory (Thompson and Lamar, 1981; Ross, 1999).

Under the VOC, formal water law was established for the first time in South Africa. The maintenance of the Cape settlement and the efficient execution of the VOC’s ventures superseded individual water rights as strict control was exercised over access to land and water (Hall, 1937; Hall and Burger, 1957; Gildenhuys, 1970). Two periods of water control in the Cape existed under Dutch rule. The first took place between 1652 and the 1750s, when the Cape Dutch government controlled water use through a series of orders known as placcaets. In the second half of the 18th century, the government continued exercising control over water by granting entitlements for water use from shared streams and by regulating the resolution of disputes. Water law in the Cape was based on Roman-Dutch law, which indicated that water was common to all. The government, however, had the right to control the manner in which water was used (Thompson, 2006).

The introduction of Roman-Dutch law, despite its underlying principle that the Cape’s water resources belonged to all who inhabited the area, resulted in a situation where those in possession of land and economic and political power had far more rights and greater access to water resources than those who were poor or landless (Ross, 1983). In a relatively water scarce environment, considerable political power thus lay in the hands of those who controlled the water, establishing the foundation for what is now known as the “Pipelines of Power Thesis” (Turton, 2000). This thesis postulates that political power plays an important, and potentially discriminatory, role when pipelines are constructed to convey water to people, especially in a water-constrained country such as South Africa where water resources are often situated far away from human settlements (Turton, 2000)

British colonial rule

The British government succeeded in taking over the rule of the Cape in 1806 and introduced several new laws. One of these resulted in the gradual formalisation of the riparian principle over the first few decades of British influence. This principle is based on the notion that all owners of land along rivers have common rights to the water in those rivers (Republic of South Africa, 1997; Thompson, 2006). It,


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therefore, privileged landowners by allowing them considerably more access to water resources than those without land. The Native Land Act (Act No. 27 of 1913) lent a racial dimension to the link between access to land and access to water, as it formalised the Native Reserve system in the Union of South Africa and allocated only a little more than 13% of the country’s land area for occupation by the Black population (Haysom, 1983; Turton, 2006).

A strong focus was also increasingly placed on the importance of irrigation and agriculture, which eventually culminated in the promulgation of the Union Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act in 1912 (Thompson, 2006). Under British rule, missionaries introduced Black people to the practices of irrigation and intensive agriculture. This contributed to the destruction of a way of life rich in culture and indigenous knowledge about the environment that would never be recovered (Khan, 1994).

The discovery of gold in 1886 led to the migration of a large number of people to the mining town of Johannesburg (Turton et al. 2006b). Today Johannesburg is one of the few major cities in the world located on a watershed/divide, which means that water flows away from the city and not towards it. The Rand Water Board, established in 1903, was tasked with solving this problem (Tempelhoff, 2003; Turton et al., 2006b) and satisfying the demand for water supply and sanitation services in the greater Witwatersrand area. Soon afterwards, legislation was passed that granted water rights to mining operations with priority over other uses (Lewis, 1934). While the government made great efforts to supply water to the mineral-rich, financially lucrative areas of South Africa, vast numbers of rural South Africans were neglected (Funke et al., 2007).

Apartheid rule

In 1948 the National Party was voted into power by the white minority population and apartheid was officially introduced. A number of laws were subsequently promulgated that solidified the new policy of segregation and separate development, including the Group Areas Act (Act No. 41 of 1950) and the Bantu Education Act (Act No. 47 of 1953). These resulted in increasingly deteriorating living conditions for the majority of the Black population, especially with the creation of the so-called homelands that would house millions of disenfranchised people (De Wet, 1995).

Water governance under apartheid rule was determined by the Water Act (Act No. 54 of 1956), which led to the formation of the Department of Water Affairs (DWA). This department was predominantly mandated with the provision and allocation of water for development in the agricultural sector (Mackay, 2003). Increasingly, the DWA also focused on the industrial use of water as the country shifted from an irrigation-centred economy to one that became somewhat more diversified (Bohensky, 2006; Thompson, 2006). The apartheid government placed


great importance on the future of agriculture in South Africa, as it was here that its electoral support base was located. Since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, a number of legislative instruments were used to increase the status of White-administered agriculture by, for example, encouraging farmers to develop their holdings and providing capital for water conservation and irrigation (Phillips, 1974). In addition, subsidising the agricultural sector, and thereby creating job opportunities for rural Black people, enabled the government to discourage migration away from rural to urban areas (Mackay, 2003). This supported the apartheid policy of segregating South Africa’s population and focusing its energy on developing White-dominated urban areas.

Apartheid was given an even stronger boost when South Africa declared itself an independent republic in 1961, previously having still officially been under the British crown. More so than ever, control over access to water within the Black homelands, which was managed by the DWA (Republic of South Africa, 1975), became a powerful tool in the hands of the apartheid government. The policy of the government was to regulate the kind of economic development it envisioned for the homelands – which was predominantly agricultural, with a gradual introduction of an industrial sector (Turton et al. 2004) – and to simultaneously deny the population of the homelands the most basic of services (Republic of South Africa, 1997). This policy resulted in serious deficiencies in water supply and sanitation, which the country’s current democratic government is trying hard to remedy.

In essence, the apartheid era was characterised by a centralised system of management, which was informed by science that resided largely in state departments. The laws that were promulgated under this system placed water-related decision-making squarely in the hands of the state as well as private landowners (Turton, 2000). In addition, the government dealt with the country’s river flows, which were of a variable and inconsistent nature, by means of predominantly technical responses – including the construction of several large impoundments and inter-basin water transfer schemes. These proved to be environmentally unfriendly (Bohensky, 2006) as is evident in the drastic modification of natural river flows and the loss of several ecosystem goods and services originally provided by South African rivers (see Ashton et al., Chapter 9, this volume).

INTERPRETATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF WATER GOVERNANCE PRIOR TO AND POST 1994

What becomes evident from the water governance practices described above is that South Africa’s Dutch, British colonial and apartheid governments distinguished between the functioning of social systems and ecosystems, rather than recognising the extent to which they are intertwined. This point of view is not unique to South Africa, however, but has, until quite recently, traditionally persisted in science and society world-wide (see du Plessis, Chapter 3, this volume). Successive South


African governments seem to have adopted a command and control approach, which centred on the idea that humans can and should dominate nature (Holling and Meffe, 1996) – see Audouin and Hattingh (Chapter 7, this volume) for a discussion on the characteristics of technocentric approaches to natural resource management.

This attitude towards nature has changed considerably since 1994, when democracy was introduced in South Africa and new environmental and water legislation was promulgated. Under the democratic government, a very progressive approach to water governance has been adopted, and subsequently endorsed world-wide, which emphasises the provision of basic water supply and sanitation to the majority of South Africans, and focuses on redressing the inequities of the past when it comes to water allocation (Mackay, 2003). A key piece of legislation in this regard is the National Water Act (Act No. 36 of 1998), which can be summed up by means of the slogan: “some, for all, forever”. This idea suggests that South Africa’s water resources should be managed in a way that is sustainable and that benefits all South Africans. Four key principles2 that underpin this legislation aim to ensure that South Africa’s water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable way (Republic of South Africa, 1998b).

The principle of decentralisation conforms to South Africa’s Constitution (Act No. 108 of 1996) and the stipulation therein that people should participate in the country’s decision-making processes when they are affected by them. Another important element that is drawn from the Constitution is the subsidiarity principle. This stipulates that if functions can be more effectively carried out at lower levels of government, they should be delegated down to the lowest appropriate level (Mackay, 2003).

In order to give effect to the decentralisation principle, the National Water Act calls for the establishment of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) in the country’s 19 Water Management Areas (WMAs). These CMAs are envisaged to perform certain management functions that have been delegated to them (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004). They will also have to co-operate and seek agreement on water-related matters amongst various stakeholders and interested parties (Raven, 2004), and will form governing boards to ensure that different groups of stakeholders are represented. In addition, CMAs have a mandate to progressively develop catchment management strategies (CMSs) to realise the protection, use, development, conservation, management and control of water resources in the respective WMAs they operate in. Until such time as CMAs have been formally established, however, the regional offices of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) will continue to manage the water resources within the WMAs (Mackay, 2003).

The sustainability principle recognises the interrelationship between social, ecological and economic sustainability and makes provision for the “reserve”, which


comprises two components (Mackay, 2003). In essence, the “reserve” is a quantity of water that cannot be allocated to specific water users and that gives effect to two basic rights as stipulated in the South African Constitution. The first is the right of South Africa’s people to enough water to meet their basic needs, while the second is the population’s right to an environment that is sufficiently protected by legislation and other measures to secure socio-economic development that is also ecologically sustainable (Stein, 2002).

The principle of equitable access focuses on the notion of common ownership, whereby South Africa’s water resources belong to all its inhabitants and DWAF serves as their custodian. In practice, this principle is to be realised by means of DWAF regulating the volumes of water that are abstracted for specific, large-scale water usage purposes (Turton and Henwood, 2002) – for example, industry. The aim of this regulation is to reallocate water usage within the country to ensure that all South Africans will be able to meet their basic needs in terms of food preparation, drinking water and sanitation (Mackay, 2003). Reallocation is particularly important given South Africa’s past, which has resulted in the unequal allocation of water resources.

The principle of efficiency implies that it is necessary to consider the social and economic benefits and costs, as well as the environmental costs of competing water uses. In South Africa, this means that when decisions are made regarding water allocation under the licensing system, the interests of all water users (including the environment) have to be taken into account (Stein, 2002).

While the necessity for considering the interests and needs of competing water users sounds very promising in the legislation, in practice there is a real possibility that government initiatives geared towards short term development (de Lange et al., Chapter 8, this volume) – and, as discussed earlier, aimed at supplying urban areas with the necessary water allocation – will take precedence over equity considerations. This is likely to be the case as government will have to try and cope with supplying water to larger urban populations as a result of increasing levels of migration from South Africa’s rural areas, while continuing to support economic growth, in particular through industrial production (Ashton et al., Chapter 9, this volume). Such a situation would negatively affect the well-being of the country’s rural population and would not be conducive to ensuring the implementation of the principle that should be regarded as the most important, which is equity.

The following section uses resilience theory to highlight a situation in the past where efficiency considerations took precedence over considerations related to equity, and the lessons that these case studies hold for the South African government.


CONTEXT AND HISTORY FOR THE CASE STUDIES

Khoisan

The first case study to be discussed is that of the Khoisan,3 who are made up of the Khoikhoi and the San, pastoralists and hunter-gatherers respectively. The Khoisan have a history dating back some 27 000 years (Blundell, 2006). Today, little remains of these people, with their numbers dwindling and their cultural heritage virtually extinct (Barnard, 2004; Blundell, 2006).

A number of explanations have been posited for the decline and near extinction of the Khoisan, a process which began in 1652. One explanation, which is entirely discredited, is the view that they were uncivilised and intellectually underdeveloped (Marks, 1972; Gilman, 1989; Strother, 1999). Another attributes the decline of the Khoisan to the effects of smallpox (Theal, 1909; Wilson, 1968). It is maintained that the disease not only killed thousands of these people, but was also the cause of the break-up of the tribal organisation – a situation that later served as a useful legitimisation for the colonisation of Khoisan territory (Ross, 1977). Many authors argue that, although smallpox was a contributing factor, the demise of the Khoisan is attributable to a range of other specific causes (Marks, 1972; Elphick, 1977; Guelke and Shell, 1992; Penn, 2005), in particular related to the direct impact of settler and colonial territorial expansion. Described as the “cyclic ecological decline of the Khoisan” (Guelke and Shell, 1992), such an explanation has as its foundation the vulnerability of these people. This was attributable to the fact that they were denied access to natural resources, noticeably water, although these were critical to their survival.

The Khoisan mostly lived in low-rainfall and drought-prone areas in the south-western parts of Africa, including the Cape interior (Penn, 2005). In this situation of climate-induced relative scarcity, their cultural, social, political, economic and even religious life centred on securing adequate resources, including water, for everyday survival. To this effect, neither the Khoikhoi nor the San placed much importance on the value of individual ownership of land (Elphick and Malherbe, 1982; Ross, 1986), but instead valued the communal use and conservation of natural resources. This of course included ensuring that they had sufficient access to water resources.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the geographer and ethnographer Siegfried Passarge noted the extermination of game and impacts on other natural resources that had occurred in the preceding decades, including water, and attributed these to the Dutch stock farmers (trekboers) and the pathological effect this had on the social structure of the Khoisan (Passarge, 1905). As the influence of the trekboers manifested, initially in the form of an external disturbance to long-established SESs and later as an internal disruption, the vulnerability of the Khoisan was exposed and their population declined. This was aggravated by a strong drive for territorial expansionism by the Dutch, from the 18th century onwards (Penn, 2005), which


was met by an ineffectual resistance by the Khoisan (Marks, 1972; Penn, 2005). As a consequence, the Khoisan were denied access to essential ecosystem services, including water. The San were forced to retreat into increasingly arid parts of the African sub-continent, which had the effect of further reducing their population (Skotnes, 2001; Blundell, 2006). The Khoikhoi were eventually absorbed into a life governed by Dutch culture, in which they provided cheap labour for newly established settler farms (Beinart and Delius, 1986; Guelke and Shell, 1992).

In the decades that followed, the Khoisan were systematically alienated from history and their humanity as a result of the groundwork laid by the Dutch settlers and their British colonial counterparts’ expansionist actions and attitudes, and later on, the racially exclusionary practices of the apartheid government (Gilman, 1989; Strother, 1999; Skotnes, 2001; Barnard, 2004). A case in point is the tragic life-story of the Hottentot Venus, Sara Baartman, a young Khoisan woman who was taken from South Africa to Europe in 1810, where she was put on display as part of the so-called “ethnological shows” in London. After an official request by the South African government to France in 1995, where her body had been taken after her death, her remains were eventually repatriated to South Africa (Gordon, 1992; Qureshi, 2004).

The current government of South Africa is making attempts to better the lives of the Khoisan by granting them rights to land ownership and presumably, at the same time, greater access to water resources. Thus, for example, in 1999 the Khomani San were awarded a land claim of 38 000 hectares of farmland (Working Groups for Indigenous Minorities South Africa, 2007). Negotiations are also currently underway regarding the extension of the land rights use to the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park. However, the same relative levels of success in regaining land have not been experienced by all San groups, notably the so-called “Secret San”, who are scattered across the eastern seaboard of South Africa in KwaZulu Natal (Working Groups for Indigenous Minorities South Africa, 2007).

Mining

After gold had been discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886, the British colonial government promulgated legislation that allowed the gold mining industry to maximise its profits (Adler et al., 2007a, b; Turton, 2008). As gold mining expanded throughout the Far West Rand region in the following years, the long-term consequences of insufficient governmental regulation of that particular sector became evident. Gold deposits that lay at great depth made extraction complex as they were overlain by large dolomitic aquifers. In order to extract the maximum amount of gold, mining companies employed sophisticated pumping systems to draw groundwater from the shafts. The consequences of this action included a lowered natural water table, compromised ground stability, and led to the exposure of groundwater to iron pyrites and other minerals, which had an adverse impact


on water quality through acidification and subsequent heavy metal contamination (Adler et al., 2007a, b).

Farmers started filing complaints about diminished water quality and quantity in the Far West Rand as early as 1905. These concerns were dismissed as unfounded allegations and the government, therefore, did not make any changes in its policy regarding the dewatering of mines (Anonymous, 1960; Adler et al., 2007a, b). Several actions were, however, taken by the government to reduce the costs related to the dewatering of mine shafts and transporting of polluted mine water to the gold mining industry (Adler et al., 2007a, b).

In 1948 the National Party took power and started building the apartheid state, while significantly profiting from its predecessor’s close relationship with the gold mining industry. In fact, the South African government had few reasons to challenge the status quo because apartheid policies were resulting in international isolation and the revenue streams from the gold mining industry mainly sustained an increasingly embattled pariah state (Adler et al., 2007a, b). The long-term results were environmental degradation and negative impacts on a large number of communities due to governmental policies that supported unequal access to the country’s natural resources (Adler et al., 2007b; Funke et al., 2007).

When the South African government’s role changed from that of a partner of the gold mining industry to a regulator in 1994 (Adler et al., 2007a, b), the objectives of sustainability and social justice were incorporated in the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996a) and the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (Act No. 28 of 2002; Republic of South Africa, 2002). The link between land, water and mineral resource ownership was severed and South Africa’s natural resources became the people’s collective property, with government acting as the central custodian. In addition, stakeholders were given the right to access information and to inform the policymaking process. There is now also an emphasis on the development of new mine closure strategies and policy guidelines (Adler and Rascher, 2007; Turton, 2008). For these policy frameworks to be consistent with international standards (IIED, 2002) and the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996a), gold mines now have to minimise their long-term environmental, social and financial liability.

One aspect of mine closure that is related to mine water management addresses the large quantities of mine-polluted water, referred to as acid mine drainage. The industry faces a challenge in providing technical solutions to this problem (USEPA, 1994; Mitchell, 2000; Boocock, 2002; Adler and Rascher, 2007), but so does the government in managing it successfully, since failure to do so could potentially result in reduced levels of confidence in the state and an associated internal security risk, as people might start protesting against the non-realisation of their basic right to clean water (Adler et al., 2007a, b; Adler and Rascher, 2007; Turton, 2008). Although South Africa has made considerable progress in shifting policy frameworks to


address mine closure and mine water management, weaknesses in the current system remain that are exploited by the mines and enable them to continue externalising some of their costs (Adler and Rascher, 2007; Adler et al., 2007a).

RESILIENCE THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

The metaphor of the “adaptive renewal cycle” (see Figure 2) is closely coupled to resilience theory and schematically depicts and explains the phase states through which many systems evolve in response to external and internal controlling variables. The possibility for novel and changing system composition, structure and functioning is accommodated in various phases of the cycle. Although the concept of the adaptive renewal cycle originated within the field of ecology (Holling, 1986), it is increasingly being applied as an analytical framework for understanding SESs (Carpenter et al., 2001; Folke, 2006).

Figure 2 The four phases of the adaptive renewal cycle. Adapted from Holling and Gunderson (2002).

The exploitation phase of a system’s adaptive renewal cycle is characterised by the dominance of r-strategists that use available resources to exploit every possible ecological or social niche. In this phase, a system’s components are weakly interconnected and its functioning is regulated more by external, rather than internal, controls. Many r-strategists fail because of low levels of connectedness, which make them vulnerable. However, some have strong competitor characteristics


that provide them with a degree of resilience. System potential during this phase is low (Walker and Salt, 2006).

During the conservation phase of the adaptive renewal cycle energy is stored and materials slowly accumulate as system potential increases. System functioning becomes increasingly internally controlled as a result of a high degree of connectedness in the form of supportive relationships between so-called K-strategists, the main actors in this phase (Walker and Salt, 2006). For example, many dominant business entities within SESs are defined in terms of their efforts to anchor themselves within this cycle phase and to accumulate assets and capital (Redman and Kinzig, 2003). As connectedness increases between both social and ecological system entities, strong dependencies on existing structures and processes tend to develop. This introduces rigidities, diminishes resilience and makes SESs vulnerable, in particular to changes in external controlling variables (Walker and Salt, 2006).

A transition, experienced by an SES, from the conservation phase to the release phase of the adaptive renewal cycle typically occurs quite rapidly as it is exposed to some perturbation that exceeds its resilience. The system’s web of reinforcing interactions and connections between its components are broken and its capacity to mediate the influence of external controls, such as changes in climate or markets within the economy, breaks down as a result. During the transition the system may lose many of its attributes – for example, species, social memory (Carpenter et al., 2001) – although latent potential may persist, from which novel systems can form (Burns, 2007).

In the chaotic release phase poor connectedness between entities of previously well-structured systems, and exposure to external drivers of change, create conditions for the elimination of some entities and novel recombination of others (Walker and Salt, 2006).

Application of resilience theory to the Khoisan-defined social-ecological system

An analysis of the Khoisan’s history suggests that the SES to which this group has long contributed currently exists in the release phase of its adaptive renewal cycle (Figure 3). This is in contrast to the long period – more than 27 000 years (Blundell, 2006) – during which the Khoisan culture contributed to the conservation phase of the SES of which they were an integral part. Historically, the Khoisan existed with high levels of societal and environmental connectedness, and specifically had a close connection to water on which they depended for survival. Evidence of this, as well as evidence of high levels of past system potential, is captured in the rock-painted records that express the Khoisan’s rich social and cultural life (Blundell, 2006). The historical record of Khoisan existence under what might be regarded as extremely limiting environmental conditions indicates a well-developed capacity for adaptation and self–organisation under these conditions and, therefore, a high


degree of resilience. In addition, as K-strategists in their contribution to their SES transition from an exploitation to a conservation phase, the Khoisan did not face much competition – as the Bantu-speaking groups, such as the Xhosa, were not able to adapt to the harsh environmental conditions of the regions they occupied (Blundell, 2006).

Figure 3 The Khoisan social-ecological system’s current position within the release phase of the adaptive renewal cycle

With the introduction of new actors into the overarching SES of water governance in South Africa, the situation of the Khoisan changed dramatically. Governance under the Dutch and British colonial governments contributed to the Khoisan steadily moving closer to a sustainability threshold and eventually forced a transition of the SES of which they were part into the release phase of its adaptive renewal cycle. This took the form of policies that deprived the Khoisan of access to land and, particularly, water as a critical ecosystem service. The policies also contributed to dramatic changes to the environment with which they were so intimately connected and dependent upon (Passarge, 1905). The example of the Khoisan crossing the threshold into the release phase of the adaptive renewal cycle illustrates how a high level of connectedness and dependency within an SES as well as low levels of competition with other population groups, can have a negative impact on the resilience of certain actors within the system. The Khoisan’s demise, for instance, can directly be attributed to the arrival of the Europeans and the resulting negative impact of their influence on their resilience. When the Khoisan’s co-existence with the environment became threatened by the European settlers, neither their resilience nor their potential to develop in the way that Western culture would


enforce and demand permitted them to manage their situation and remain within the conservation phase of their SES adaptive renewal cycle.

The Khoisan’s current sustainability situation is highly precarious and it is unlikely that they will be able to significantly influence the re-organisation phase of the transformed SES of which they are now part – to the extent that a desirable outcome might be achieved. The SES to which they might wish to contribute would seem to be too resilient in its current state to permit this form of reorganisation; i.e. the Khoisan appear trapped within an undesirable phase of an adaptive renewal cycle that holds benefits for other population groups rather than their own. Hopefully, the current government will nonetheless deliver on its mandate to provide access to basic rights such as water and sanitation for all and thereby improve the standard of living of the Khoisan community.

The injustices of the past still weigh heavily on the Khoisan, who are fighting a constant battle in their attempts to retain and regain their cultural heritage, identity and humanity. However, events within the release phase of adaptive renewal cycles are unpredictable and reorganisation can be a very slow process. As such, the Khoisan may still stand a chance to influence such reorganisation if they manage to take advantage of certain trends, such as, for example, the favourable shift in international politics towards the rights of indigenous groups (Barnard, 2006) and the current political climate in South Africa, which supports retribution for past injustices.

Application of resilience theory to the gold mining industry-defined social-ecological system

South Africa’s gold mining industry, a key actor in the SES of which it forms a part, currently seems to be at the threshold between the conservation and the release phase of the adaptive renewal cycle (Figure 4). The industry itself has for a long time been situated within the conservation phase of this cycle. Since its emergence more than 120 years ago, the SES has been dominated first by a number of strong r- and later, K-strategists, including large gold mining companies.

The gold mining industry’s substantial contribution to the South African economy – 6.5% of the country’s gross domestic product; 33.5% of total export revenues (Viljoen and Reimold, 1999; Boocock, 2002) – explains the high levels of connectedness that for many years characterised its relationship with successive South African governments. This connectedness entailed a privileged position for the gold mining industry and relieved the gold mining companies from any onerous social or environmental responsibilities. The fact that the gold mining industry was so closely supported by (and dependent on) the South African colonial and apartheid governments for so long helped it maintain a high level of artificial resilience (which could, however, not be sustained in the long term). This is evident in its profitability


and high degree of operational freedom enjoyed during the apartheid era, but also in its inherently unsustainable nature – the effects of which have become evident in the post-1994 era. The industry’s “artificial” resilience did at the time help it survive against external shocks to the system, such as the political and economic sanctions that were imposed on apartheid South Africa by the international community. In addition, it also managed to accumulate considerable potential during its cross-over from the exploitation to the conservation phase and during the decades that it has subsequently been situated within the conservation phase of the adaptive renewal cycle. The system’s potential was at a relatively low level during the industry’s early exploitation phase, when gold products were limited in their use for jewellery and decoration. It has, however, evolved to a much higher level as gold has once again become a precious and stable commodity on the world market, especially given the unstable and unpredictable nature of the petroleum industry.

Figure 4 The gold mining industry’s social-ecological system’s current position within the conservation phase of the adaptive renewal cycle

Governance under the British colonial and apartheid regimes involved decision-making processes and trade-offs that clearly favoured the mining industry over other sectors, thereby increasing the possibility of conflict between competing water users. As is evident from the discussion above, the principles of accountability, sustainability and equity were all but ignored in the period prior to 1994. This situation has now changed, as according to new legislation South Africa’s democratic government is attempting to become a regulator of the gold mining industry (Funke et al., 2007). The high levels of initial connectedness and later dependence


between the gold mining industry and the government are thus being loosened. Under the new political order, mining companies are expected to begin operating in a manner that will provide a sustainable future for the environment they are affecting, as well as for the mine workers and communities who are dependent on the mines and whose well-being must persist once mining operations cease (Turton, 2008). Accountability and equity are thus also high on the new government’s list of priorities.

What becomes evident here is that the gold mining industry’s resilience is now much lower than what it seemed to be under apartheid. Today, instead of being supported by the government at every turn and being accorded laissez-faire privileges as far as its operations are concerned, the SES of which it is an integral part is experiencing a number of external shocks. These include pressures by civil society, the media, the government and science organisations that it “clean up its act”, both environmentally and socially. Additional factors include the government’s inability to enforce mining-related legislation, and an unwillingness or refusal of the mining companies to accept responsibility for their actions and manage their operations in a more sustainable way. The results of such a scenario might be increased levels of civil unrest, as South Africans would continue feeling the brunt of irresponsible environmental policies by the mines, for example, in the form of the increased manifestation of polluted ground water. Many former mineworkers would likely also be forced into unemployment following mine closure.

It remains to be seen whether the SES that is defined by the gold industry will manage to remain in the conservation phase of its adaptive renewal cycle. In order for this to happen, the system will have to comply with the conditions of the new legislation (Republic of South Africa, 2002). If these conditions are realised and increased compliance with social, economic and environmental regulations is shown, the gold mining industry might be able to improve its reputation and thus strengthen its connectedness, both internal and external in the form of mutually supportive relationships, with important actors other than government. This might in turn increase its level of resilience as the industry will be self-reliant rather than chronically subsidised. A more responsible approach on behalf of the gold mining industry will also enable it to develop other forms of potential, such as the socio-economic development of mining communities and post-mining environmental capacity to deliver a range of ecosystem services.

CONCLUSIONS

What becomes evident from the case studies above is that both actors, the Khoisan and the gold mining industry, find themselves in less than desirable positions within the adaptive cycles of the SESs to which they contribute. The Khoisan’s culture and way of life seems to have irrevocably been destroyed and they will probably have


great difficulty in contributing significantly, or in a way that is beneficial to them, to the re-organisation of the complex SES of which they now form a very small part. The gold mining industry has a long way to go before successfully complying with the post-apartheid mining legislation and developing higher levels of social and environmental responsibility. It thus appears that the decision of past South Africa governments to endorse a type of efficiency that favours short-term economic development at all costs can have severe consequences both for the industry being subsidised (reduced levels of resilience in the long-term, over-dependence on the government, and ultimately, the need for drastic restructuring) and the communities who are overlooked in the process. Here it is important to remember that it is the poorer groups in society who are particularly prone to suffering from increased levels of water scarcity and, therefore, are vulnerable and lack resilience (Ashton et al., Chapter 9, this volume). The fate of the Khoisan is a prime example of what might happen to South Africa’s rural communities if, as is anticipated, the bulk of the country’s water allocation will be directed at the fast-growing and developing urban areas and industrial sector. A decline in the social cohesion, cultural identity, possibilities for economic development and natural resources sustaining rural communities would not only make South Africa poorer, but would severely undermine sustainable development in the country – in this regard, it is essential that both rural and urban areas are accorded the necessary attention by the government for this to be achieved. If equity considerations are neglected, it is likely that we will continue seeing sprawling, over-crowded and continuously growing, impoverished cities, which the government will never be capable of servicing adequately; simultaneously, the country’s rural areas will continue deteriorating.

It is thus clear that if the ramifications of such a situation are to be avoided, equity considerations need to take priority. This means that both South Africa’s rural communities, often directly dependent on rivers for ecosystem goods and services (Ashton et al., Chapter 9, this volume), and its urban communities that rely on impoundments and inter-basin transfer schemes for their water supply need adequate attention from the government to service their needs. South Africa, of course, faces no easy task in this regard, as is evident in the many institutional challenges currently facing the implementation of the new water legislation. These include the capacity problems experienced by the CMAs (Roux et al., Chapter 18, this volume), high staff turnover within DWAF and the likelihood that the current envisaged CMA system might revert to a centralised model if it is found to be unsuccessful. This would be problematic as decentralisation and the concomitant reliance on accumulating local knowledge are very important to effectively managing crises in SESs. Information is required to flow not only from the top to the bottom, but also from the bottom up. An effective exchange of information between local and higher-level institutions is only possible if there is a sufficient level of co-ordination and co-operation between different actors to replace their previously independent functioning (Bohensky, 2006; also, see Cundill and Fabricius, Chapter 16, this volume).


Nonetheless, it is imperative that everything possible be done to resolve the water allocation challenge in South Africa. Considering the probability of more frequent water shortages in future, well-designed contingency plans in the form of crisis/disaster management based on an SES approach are necessary to enhance social resilience (Ashton et al., Chapter 9, this volume). Such plans would have to be based on pro-active measures being taken, which, in turn, would be informed by continuous monitoring and evaluation of the possibility and ramifications of potential water shortages (Ashton et al., Chapter 9, this volume; also, see Will, Chapter 17, this volume), as well as the implementation of existing policies. With particular reference to the rural communities (or sub-system) whose interests need to be protected, several factors should be taken into account when implementing policies in order to manage towards a new, sustainable state for these communities. These include the application of good science and other sources of knowledge, bottom-up participation at all stages (policy design, monitoring and evaluation) and opportunities for adjustment and application of learning as and when the results of policy implementation ‘experiments’ manifest themselves (Roux et al., Chapter 18, this volume).

ENDNOTES

In the context of this chapter, governance is interpreted as ”the process of informed 1.

decision-making that enables trade-offs to be made between competing users of a given resource so as to mitigate conflict, enhance equity, ensure sustainability and hold officials accountable” (Turton et al., 2007a). This definition incorporates both the process of decision-making involving different actors and the aim of this process, which is to manage conflict and to uphold the principles of equity, sustainability and accountability. Although different forms of governance historically controlled resource use and allocation in South Africa, it is only since the country’s transition to democracy in 1994 that a strong emphasis has been placed on the inclusion of civil society and stakeholders in decision-making. South Africa’s government is now fully accountable to the country’s citizens for resource use decisions, which, in terms of the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996a) and legislation must, in a sustainable way, redress past inequities in terms of access to resources.

Added to the interpretation of governance is the concept of adaptive governance. This requires the establishment and maintenance of learning, doing and communication networks that connect individuals, organisations, agencies and institutions at multiple organisational levels. Adaptive governance allows decision-makers to act in the face of change, to employ scientific and other forms of knowledge to reduce uncertainties, and to draw up policies that respond to and possibly even take advantage of unanticipated events (Moberg and Galaz, 2005). When linked to resilience theory, adaptive governance can be interpreted as an approach that acknowledges that humans are incapable of controlling natural variability and that the focus of governance should be on alternate


system regimes and thresholds and the capacity to avoid or manage them (Walker and Salt, 2006).

Note, that this discussion is based on a similar one that appears in: Funke, N., Nortje, 2.

K., Findlater, K., Turton, A., Burns, M. and Weaver, A. (2007a). Redressing inequality: South Africa’s new water policy. Environment, 49(3): 12-27.

The term Khoisan is used in this chapter as a collective term for San and Khoi peoples. 3.

While there have been many disputes especially in the anthropological field as to the “correctness” of the terms “San”, “Khoi” and “Khoisan” (Barnard, 1992; Barnard, 2004; Blundell, 2006; Penn, 2005), it is acknowledged that they are changing concepts applied to a continually contested group identity of these peoples. For now, however, these terms are generally viewed as being culturally sensitive and are used in the spirit of cultural relativism.

The Evolution of Water Governance in South Africa

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