The Epistemic-Teleologic Model of Deliberate Self-Persuasion

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DOI: 10.1177/1088868306294589 2007; 11; 46 Pers Soc Psychol Rev

Gregory R. Maio and Geoff Thomas The Epistemic-Teleologic Model of Deliberate Self-Persuasion

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46

The Epistemic–Teleologic Modelof Deliberate Self-Persuasion

Gregory R. MaioGeoff ThomasCardiff University

committee; people in the pursuit of a healthy lifestyletry to lose their affection for junk foods; and fans of arelatively poor sports team sometimes wish they couldavoid feeling bitterness toward the team after the con-stant dejection of losing. In these situations, peopleexperience a high amount of conscious, internal conflictor ambivalence, because their attitude contains desir-able as well as undesirable elements. People in these sit-uations may hope that their job would become morefulfilling, their spouse would become more responsiveto their needs, or their team would start winning. Peoplemay even take concrete steps to help bring such changesabout. They might try talking to their boss, convincingtheir spouse to change, or cheering more vociferouslyfor their team. Often, however, people find that none oftheir interventions work: They are stuck in their job,their spouse won’t change, and their team keeps losing.Thus, people may remain mired in situations that arereminders of their ambivalence.

According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger,1957), this situation should elicit an aversive state oftension. Indeed, there is evidence that ambivalencetoward ethnic groups in particular is associated withincreased aversive arousal (Britt, Boniecki, Vescio,Biernat, & Brown, 1996; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, &Moore, 1992). As a result, people are often motivated

Authors’ Note: This research was supported by a grant from theEconomic and Social Sciences Research Council of the UnitedKingdom. The authors thank Eliot Smith, Geoff Haddock, MariaLima, Jim Olson, Ulrich von Hecker, and three anonymous reviewersfor their comments on prior versions of this article. Please address cor-respondence to Gregory R. Maio, School of Psychology, CardiffUniversity, Cardiff, Wales CF10 3AT, United Kingdom.

PSPR, Vol. 11 No. 1, February 2007 46-67DOI: 10.1177/1088868306294589© 2007 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Although past theory and research point to the impor-tance of understanding deliberate self-persuasion (i.e.,deliberate self-induced attitude change), there have beenno empirical and theoretical efforts to model this process.This article proposes a new model to help understand theprocess, while comparing the process of deliberate self-persuasion with relevant theory and research. The corefeature of this model is a distinction between epistemicprocesses, which involve attempting to form new validattitudes, and teleologic processes, which involve self-induced attitude change but with minimal concerns forvalidity. The epistemic processes employ tactics of reinter-pretation, reattribution, reintegration, retesting, changingcomparators, and changing dimensions of comparison.The teleologic processes include suppression, preemp-tion, distraction, and concentration. By mapping theseprocesses, this model helps to generate many novel andtestable hypotheses about the use of deliberate self-persuasion to cope with ambivalent attitudes.

Keywords: Self-persuasion; attitude change; persuasion;ambivalence; reasoning; suppression

I know of no more encouraging fact than the unques-tionable ability of man to elevate his life by a consciousendeavor.

—Henry David Thoreau

People frequently find themselves possessing attitudesthat are disconcerting and uncomfortable: Individualswith low self-esteem wish they could like themselvesmore; unhappy employees want to like their jobs; dis-satisfied romantic partners want to feel more positivelyabout each other; minority opinion holders in a com-mittee may wish they held the same opinion as the



to resolve ambivalent attitudes in a positive or negativedirection (Bell & Esses, 2002; I. Katz & Hass, 1988;MacDonald & Zanna, 1998) and more carefully processrelevant persuasive information that can help them toachieve this aim (Jonas, Diehl, & Bromer, 1997; Maio,Bell, & Esses, 1996).

Nonetheless, such unbiased resolutions of attitudesin a positive or negative direction do not help peoplewho have a preference for a specific nonambivalent atti-tude. For example, people know that they would ratherlike their job, their partner, and their favored sportsteam; their preference is to rid themselves of the unde-sired (negative) attitude elements rather than reducetheir ambivalence in either direction. How can peoplecope with their ambivalence when they have a specificattitudinal preference? This situation is difficult because,in general, ambivalence occurs when the negative andpositive dimensions of the attitude are coactivated frommemory (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; M. M.Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995), and this coactiva-tion makes it difficult to focus on one dimension to theexclusion of the other.

On occasion, people expect that they can escape thispredicament with help from others, such as family,friends, religious authorities, or even psychologists. Atother times, people may try diverse internal coping tech-niques without seeking external guidance. For example,people can consciously decide to hold in mind aspects ofthe job that they like, mentally elaborate on the ways inwhich the spouse is great, or contemplate the team’sadmirable persistence in the face of repeated losses.Sometimes, people may even receive explicit cues toattempt these processes. For instance, one of the authorsrecently opened a fortune cookie containing relevant(yet unnecessary) advice, “Try to value useful qualitiesin one who loves you.” The advice was obviouslydirected at people who are experiencing at least somelevel of ambivalence in a close relationship. While heed-ing such advice, people are aware of their ambivalenceand their attempts to deal with it, and if these efforts aresuccessful, their attitude will become less ambivalentand more consistent with the preferred attitude.

Such covert, self-directed, intentional attitude changemay be labeled deliberate self-persuasion, and this processis the focus of our article. To our knowledge, this arti-cle is the first to examine deliberate self-persuasion.Hence, it is useful to begin by giving a brief overview ofthe concept and of our model and then move quickly toa full description of the model. Next, we consider howit compares to several models in attitudes and socialcognition that examine relevant but distinct processes(e.g., dissonance, self-control). Finally, we summarizesome of the model’s features and several implicationsfor further research.

OVERVIEW

Deliberate self-persuasion can occur only when peopleconsciously recognize a discrepancy between how theyactually evaluate aspects of an object and how theywould like to evaluate it. If people are motivated andable to resolve this discrepancy, then they can employ avariety of covert mental strategies, and these strategiesvary in how they balance the need to possess a correctattitude and the need to possess a desired attitude.

According to our model, some strategies simultane-ously aim for the correct and desired attitude by usingreasoning processes to alter mental representations ofthe object of judgment and the standard of comparison.These epistemic strategies include processes that reinter-pret undesired attributes of the attitude object or thatchange the comparators of judgment.

Other strategies, however, are not constrained by themotive to be accurate. These tactics focus solely on thedesired outcome and use mental control processes tosimply raise the accessibility of desired feelings, beliefs,and behaviors or to inhibit the accessibility of undesiredfeelings, beliefs, and behaviors. There are several dis-tinct ways in which people may manipulate this accessi-bility, and we label these strategies as teleologic tactics.

The pursuit of epistemic tactics does not rule out theuse of teleologic tactics: People can alternately use epis-temic and teleologic tactics in the deliberate pursuit ofself-persuasion. Nonetheless, we expect that teleologictactics will be preferred in circumstances that make theepistemic processes unnecessarily effortful (e.g., becauseexposure to the attitude object is fleeting), unimpor-tant, threatening, or ineffective and when the teleologicstrategy can be supported by the existing attitude struc-ture and ego-control resources. Nonetheless, the epis-temic processes may exert more powerful and long-termeffects.

These aspects of our model are elaborated below.Our description begins by outlining the conditions thatact as prerequisites to deliberate self-persuasion. Next,we describe our distinction between the epistemic andteleologic strategies. Finally, we describe factors thatshould predict which type of strategy is chosen and theprobable outcomes of each strategy.

PREREQUISITES TO DELIBERATESELF-PERSUASION

Self-Recognition of an Attitudinal Discrepancy

For deliberate self-persuasion to occur, people mustconsciously recognize a discrepancy between how theyactually evaluate aspects of an object and how theywould like to evaluate it.

Maio, Thomas / DELIBERATE SELF-PERSUASION 47



A volitional process initiates deliberate self-persuasion.That is, there is some self-awareness of a gap betweenundesired attitudinal elements and desired attitudinalelements, which permits self-regulation toward reduc-ing the gap.

Provocative support for a role of awareness wasobtained in Murray and Holmes’s (1993; Murray &Holmes, 1999) investigations of the effects of experi-mentally induced concerns about partners’ faults onsubsequent efforts to reorganize beliefs about the part-ner in a more positive manner, which is one of theroutes to deliberate self-persuasion that we describebelow. Not only did the experimentally induced con-cerns spontaneously increase these reorganizationefforts, the induced concerns also led, first, to lowerreported feelings of relationship closeness and satisfac-tion. Thus, the conscious perception of undesirable atti-tude elements existed prior to the use of the deliberateself-persuasion strategy.

More recently, Doria (2005) examined awareness ofself-persuasion more directly and across more attitudeobjects. In her study, participants were given detaileddescriptions of three scenarios that involved resistingtemptation. These scenarios involved either resistingchocolate while on a diet, resisting social pressures todrink alcohol, or being attracted to an alternativeromantic partner in an intimate setting. Participantschose a scenario that was closest to their own past expe-rience and then answered using Likert-type scalesassessing how they dealt with it. Responses to the itemsrevealed that participants had experienced similarepisodes in the past, were highly aware of “trying topersuade yourself to dislike” the tempting object, andfelt that they were generally successful at this self-per-suasion. Also of interest, the questionnaire asked par-ticipants whether “they considered this self-persuasionto be a good or a bad thing,” and the majority of par-ticipants (71.4%) chose “a good thing” over “a badthing” (11.4%) and “don’t know” (14.1%). From theseresults, it was clear that participants were highly awareof their efforts to talk themselves into a more negativeattitude toward the tempting object and felt justified indoing so.

Two additional hypotheses are relevant to thisawareness prerequisite. First, as noted above, deliberateself-persuasion should occur only when the desired atti-tude is held as a personal goal, over and above any feltcompunction from rules or from others. This emphasison the personal goal is important because, if the per-sonal goal is not formed, people can merely alter all out-ward demonstrations of their attitude, thereby meetingrules and other people’s wishes. Second, although delib-erate self-persuasion involves a conscious and intendedgoal of attitude change, elements of this process can

occur outside of awareness. The gap between the actualand desired attitudes may be bridged very quickly andnonconsciously by any routes to deliberate self-persua-sion that have become highly practiced and automaticfor the individual. This prediction is consistent withabundant theory and research demonstrating theautomatization of psychological processes (Chartrand& Bargh, 1996). The gist of this prediction is that,despite being aware of the gap between their undesiredand desired attitude elements, people may not be com-pletely aware of every way in which they are movingtoward their desired attitude.

Ability and Motivation

Deliberate self-persuasion processes occur when peopleare able and motivated to reduce the discrepancy betweentheir actual and desired attitude elements.

Deliberate self-persuasion is not the only means ofdealing with an attitudinal discrepancy. Just as peoplechronically experience discrepancies between how theyactually see themselves and how they would like to be(Higgins & Spiegel, 2004), people may often decide toabide discrepancies between their current and desiredattitudes toward other people, objects, and issues. Alter-natively, extreme disillusionment may cause people toabandon the desired attitude altogether, as when indi-viduals leave a relationship or revoke membership of agroup that consistently fails to meet expectations. Insome circumstances, the current attitude may become sosalient and compelling that the previously desired atti-tude is changed to conform to the person’s currentexperience of reality. For example, Fletcher, Simpson,and Thomas (2000) found that satisfied couples in theearly stages of a new romantic relationship changedtheir ideal standards for a partner to meet the attributesof their current partner. Consistent with numerousprocess models in research on social judgment and atti-tudes (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener,1999; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990; E. P. Thompson,Kruglanski, & Spiegel, 2000), our second postulateasserts that the decision to pursue deliberate self-per-suasion over these other options depends on the indi-vidual’s ability and motivation to achieve the desiredattitude: People will accept an attitude discrepancywhen they cannot change the discrepancy or are nothighly motivated to change it.

The effects of ability on deliberate self-persuasiondepend on the way in which ability is conceived, becausepeople’s subjective perceptions of the ability to changetheir actual attitudes may differ from their objective abil-ity to do so. People often have limited awareness of manyof the factors that actually shape their attitudes (Nisbett

48 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW



& Wilson, 1977). This lack of meta-awareness may causepeople to feel that they can change their attitudes evenwhen their attitudinal knowledge and ongoing situa-tional factors (e.g., unwanted distraction) do not allowthem to consolidate a new attitude. Alternatively, thelack of meta-awareness may cause people to feel that theycannot change their attitudes even when their relevantknowledge and ongoing situational factors (e.g., abilityto concentrate) do support a change. Perception of highsubjective ability initiates deliberate self-persuasion, butthe success of deliberate self-persuasion also depends onthe person’s objective ability to sustain it. Factors thatcan inhibit this objective ability include unintended dis-traction, time constraints, and arousal. When these fac-tors are present, the effect of the elements of the desiredattitudes should be diminished, because the elementsmust compete with conflicting reactions and cannot befurther elaborated and sustained in memory. Thus, thepresence of these factors favors the status quo, whereasthe absence of these resources facilitates the use of mentalprocesses to support the desired attitude.

Support for this reasoning has been obtained inresearch on forgiveness and on dissonance-induced atti-tude change. With regard to the research on forgiveness,people who are motivated to forgive a relationship part-ner are less likely to do so when they lack time to reflecton the positive elements of their attitudes (Kachadourian,Fincham, & Davila, 2005). In addition, early research onpostdecision dissonance effects revealed a role for subjec-tive ability. This research found that attitude change wasgreater when participants were led to believe that theyshould be highly competent at making the dissonance-inducing decision than when they were led to believe thatthey lacked the relevant expertise (Gerard, Blevans, &Malcolm, 1964). In other words, self-persuasion in thiscontext was set in motion by participants’ high subjectiveability to justify their decision, regardless of their actualability. Nonetheless, attitude change also depended onthe absence of distraction after making the choice (seealso Ebbesen, Bowers, Phillips, & Snyder, 1975; Johnson,Maio, & Smith-McLallen, 2005; Zanna & Aziza, 1976).

The performance of deliberate self-persuasion shouldalso depend on the motives that underlie the actual andthe desired attitudes. Perhaps the most basic determinantof the motivation to pursue deliberate self-persuasion iswhether people expect the attitude object itself tochange. People possess many implicit theories aboutchanges in themselves and others (Dweck & Legget,1988; Ross & Wilson, 2000). If a person’s implicittheory about an object is that it will change positively inthe future, the need for deliberate self-persuasion is elim-inated because the discrepancy between the actual anddesired attitudes will be reduced as the positive changeoccurs. Deliberate self-persuasion processes should

ensue primarily when the individual expects no naturallyoccurring positive change to the attitude object and nofuture exposure to more desirable information about it.

In such cases, deliberate self-persuasion can be elicitedby several motivations. Relevant motives are highlightedin theories of attitude function, which examine the psy-chological needs that attitudes fulfill (Maio & Olson,2000). Among these needs are strivings to (a) hold atti-tudes that separate the things that hurt us from the thingsthat help us, (b) preserve the self-concept, (c) enhancesocial relations with others, and (d) affirm personalvalues (D. Katz, 1960; M. B. Smith, Bruner, & White,1956). Attitudes may be based on all of these motivationssimultaneously or more on one type of motivation thanon others. The role of each motive depends on thechronic (DeBono, 2000) and acute needs (Murray,Haddock, & Zanna, 1996) of the individual. Whenthese chronic and acute needs support the desired atti-tude more than the actual attitude, deliberate self-per-suasion should ensue. For example, relationship partnerswho have joint financial interests, strong family values,feelings of mutual esteem, and a public life in the com-munity should be more motivated to retain their positiveattitude toward each other than partners who have onlyjoint financial interests (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996).

TACTICS FOR DELIBERATE SELF-PERSUASION:EPISTEMIC VS. TELEOLOGIC STRATEGIES

Overview of the Strategies

Many theories of social cognition distinguish betweentwo motives that guide reasoning processes: the motiveto reach a correct conclusion and the motive to reach adesirable conclusion (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen,1996; Kruglanski, 1989; Kunda & Oleson, 1995;Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). Self-persuasion is not anissue when the only goal is accuracy, because accuracydoes not imply a particular attitude a priori. Althoughpeople might occasionally feel that their current attitudeis inadequate because it is based on dubious or insuffi-cient information, their attempts at seeking more validinformation would not guarantee arrival at a differentattitude. The primary goal in such instances is the pur-suit of an accurate attitude, per se, and not attitudechange. Thus, the adoption of a more desirable net atti-tude as a personal goal is the unique ingredient in theprocesses of deliberate self-persuasion.

Nonetheless, an important issue is whether this goalis incompatible with the pursuit of an accurate attitude.Arguments concerning the predominance and effects ofthese two motivational sets have been endemic in psy-chology over the past few decades, in the literature on




self-appraisals, in particular (Colvin & Block, 1994;Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and relationship appraisals(Gagne & Lydon, 2004; Mussweiler, 2003). It is nowclear that both motives can operate simultaneously andseparately. For example, people appraise themselves,their relationships, and their future in a relatively even-handed and accurate manner when they are in situa-tions that require a deliberative consideration of positiveand negative aspects; yet after decisions are made, suchimpartiality is reduced as people focus on ways toimplement and service their desired goals (Gagne &Lydon, 2001; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989). Prior theoryand research have also indicated that people often pur-sue a desired conclusion while maintaining an “illusionof objectivity” (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kunda &Oleson, 1995). That is, people seek a desired attitude,but not with the belief that this attitude will be whollyinaccurate.

Our model encompasses these simultaneous strivingsfor the correct and desired attitude and labels them asepistemic tactics. Epistemic judgments are influenced bymental representations of the object of judgment andthe standard of comparison (Kahneman & Miller,1986). They use reasoning processes to comprehend(a) the undesired attitude elements in some way thatweakens their perceived validity or (b) the desired atti-tude elements in some way that strengthens their per-ceived validity. In other words, epistemic tactics attemptto understand the currently experienced reality in a waythat promotes the more desirable net attitude. Thesetactics employ biased reasoning to achieve this aim andwill push this reasoning as far as possible, until obviousmismatches with reality are detected.

People’s attempts to support the desired attitude neednot always be constrained by the motive to be accurate,however. Our second route to deliberate self-persuasionincludes strivings for the desired attitude alone and labelsthem as teleologic tactics. Teleology refers to an empha-sis on final causes or ultimate purposes. These tactics arefocused solely on the desired outcome; they use mentalcontrol processes to bring about the desired attitude andavoid the undesired attitude elements, without any con-cern for the validity of the desired attitude. By mentalcontrol, we mean processes through which people try toincrease accessibility of desired feelings, beliefs, andbehaviors or inhibit the accessibility of undesired feelings,beliefs, and behaviors. According to Wegner (1994),mental control is “a paramount function of human con-sciousness, an ability we have that arises from our capac-ity to reflect on our own mental activities and influencetheir operation” (p. 35). With such control, we can suc-cessfully perform a variety of activities, such as studyingnew material, managing our moods, and restraining neg-ative impulses (Wegner, 1994). Teleologic tactics attempt

to implement a new reality altogether, based on theimplicit assumption that a valid judgment is one that ispsychologically and pragmatically useful (Swann, 1984);that is, the end justifies the means. Indeed, in one self-help guide to attitudes, motivation, and lifestyle change,this idea is stated explicitly: “The belief that becomestruth for me . . . is that which allows me the best use ofmy strength, the best means of putting my virtues intoaction” (Gide, cited in Robbins, 1991).1

Another example of teleologic processes is providedwithin Gottman and Silver’s (2000) best-selling book, TheSeven Principles for Making Marriage Work. Drawing ontheir extensive research on married couples, Gottman andSilver suggest that most couples have gripes or complaintsabout each other and that the key difference between mar-riages that work and those that fail is whether the partnerscan draw on positive sentiments to outbalance the nega-tive. These researchers outline several steps to help couplesbuild and maintain their “love maps,” which subsume theattitudes that partners have toward each other. As inmany self-help books, the emphasis is not on helping part-ners derive an accurate appraisal of whether their rela-tionship should succeed or fail; the emphasis is onbuilding positive attitudes (love maps). People who under-take the steps within the book are explicitly striving tochange their relationship attitudes from their current stateto a more positive state. In contrast, an accuracy goalwould require some openness to “hate maps,” which arenot proposed, nor would married partners find themattractive and useful. Other forms of clinical therapy, suchas cognitive behavioral therapy, also rely directly on tele-ologic tactics (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1969).

Extant dual-process models provide part of the ratio-nale for this distinction between epistemic and teleo-logic processes. The introduction of a distinctionbetween epistemic and teleologic strategies is consistentwith extant dual-process distinctions between proposi-tional and associative processes (see Smith & DeCoster,2000, for a review). The epistemic processes focus onaltering propositions, that is, assertions about the valid-ity or invalidity of links between an object and variousattributes (E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack &Deutsch, 2004). The aim is to reject undesired proposi-tions and accept desired propositions. These proposi-tions can have implications for spontaneous associations,which do not involve assertions of truth or falsehoodbut may nonetheless be desired (e.g., positive feelingstoward a spouse) or undesired (e.g., negative feelingstoward a spouse). Nonetheless, these associations arenot the direct targets of the epistemic route; any effecton them is simply a by-product of propositional changes(e.g., creating an unfavorable belief can elicit negativeemotional associations). In contrast, the teleologicprocesses focus on reducing the activation level of the




undesired propositions and associations linked to theattitude. In this route, all that matters is that undesiredattitudinal elements of any type are kept from con-sciousness and that desired attitudinal elements are keptin consciousness; it does not prioritize assertions thatimply claims of validity or invalidity.

Other aspects of our model are distinct from theextant dual-process approaches. In particular, the modelmay be unusual in its argument that both constructs aresubjected to meta-cognitive control. Most extant dual-process models emphasize ways in which propositionalprocessing is more effortful than associative processing(E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). In contrast, the teleo-logic strategy focuses on a special case where people are“effortfully” attempting to activate or deactivate associa-tions. This focus does not deny that associations typicallybecome influential in an automatic, effortless fashion; itsimply draws attention to a context wherein this effort-lessness is disrupted, similar to the way that automaticmotor sequences can be disrupted when people attemptto learn new motor habits (Wegner, Ansfield, & Piloff,1998). In fact, this difference is relevant to the frequentdual-process assumption that greater effort followshigher motivations to be accurate or valid (see E. R. Smith& DeCoster, 2000, for a review). Conversely, our modelassumes that a high degree of effort occurs both whenvalidity concerns are prominent (epistemic route) andwhen they are not prominent (teleologic route).

In the text below, we describe tactics within eachroute and highlight evidence that helps to describe them.The model includes a variety of routes within eachprocess, which are considered together for the first time.

Epistemic Tactics

One set of epistemic tactics attempts to reach a moredesirable net attitude by changing the current mentalrepresentation of the object of judgment. People attemptto achieve this change by (a) reinterpreting undesiredattributes of the object, (b), reintegrating undesired withdesired attributes, (c) reattributing undesired attributesto unstable factors, and (d) retesting the validity of unde-sired attributes. Other epistemic tactics involve changingthe standards for evaluating the object of judgment by(a) changing the comparators of judgment or (b) chang-ing the dimensions on which the judgment is based.

To discover epistemic strategies, our theoretical start-ing point was that evaluations of an object depend on(a) perceptions of its attributes and their causal historyand (b) comparisons of it with other objects. This assump-tion was derived from classic perspectives on social judg-ment. Heider’s balance theory indicates that attitudes arebased on perceptions of the properties of the attitudeobjects and beliefs about the objects’ relations to the

broader social context. This principle helped to spawnseveral major approaches to the study of social judg-ments, including dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957),attribution theory (Heider, 1958), and social comparisontheory (Festinger, 1954). Across these theories, percep-tions of the object can be changed by adding or subtract-ing attributes from it, and these additions and subtractionscan be achieved either by adding new information (rein-tegration below), by reinterpreting the meaning of theattributes (reinterpretation below), or by explaining theattributes in a congenial way (reattribution below). Inaddition, comparisons can be shaped by changing theobject of comparison or the dimension on which thecomparison is made. In our view, this scheme works wellfor most of the research that we have examined. How-ever, one epistemic process—motivated hypothesis test-ing (below)—is unique and potentially relevant to all ofthe other tactics we expected (because people’s hypothe-ses could focus on and reinitiate any of them). Thus, thisepistemic tactic was also added to our model.

There is abundant evidence relevant to understand-ing these tactics. This evidence illustrates how the tac-tics work, although not always in the context ofdeliberate self-persuasion. Below, we describe howthese mechanisms may also be used in a deliberate man-ner (see also Table 1).

Motivated interpretation. People idiosyncraticallyinterpret their own behaviors in ways that enable themto maintain a positive attitude toward the self (Dunning,Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). For example, peoplewho like to visit museums alone are more likely to denythat this behavior is aloof than are people who wouldprefer to go with someone else (Dunning, Perie, & Story,1991). In addition, people can interpret their relation-ships in ways that facilitate a positive conception of theself or the relationship (Cameron, Ross, & Holmes,2002; Dunning et al., 1989). Similarly, Murray andHolmes (1993) found that seemingly negative partner


TABLE 1: Components of the Epistemic Route

Epistemic Tactic Description

Motivated interpretation reinterpret undesired attributes into moredesired attributes

Motivated integration reintegrate undesired attributes withdesired attributes

Motivated attribution reattribute undesired attributes to benigncausal factors

Motivated hypothesis retest the validity of undesiredtesting attributes

Changing comparators change the comparators for evaluatingthe attitude object

Changing dimensions change the dimensions on which thecomparison is based



attributes (e.g., argumentative) can be interpreted as pos-itive characteristics (e.g., partner’s willingness to con-front important issues), and this process may increaserelationship positivity over time (Murray et al., 1996).

In addition, research has examined how reinterpreta-tions can be employed to shape emotions (Gross, 1998).Specifically, people can change how they understandtheir emotional responses as a function of their situation.For example, athletes may attempt to cope with anxietybefore an important competition by focusing on thecompetition’s potential to yield success, thereby helpingto reinterpret arousal as excitement (Skinner & Brewer,2004). In fact, Gross and John (2003) have predictedand found that people are aware of such consciousmanipulation of emotion, because they can reportchronic tendencies to engage in this reinterpretationprocess on self-report items (e.g., “When I want to feelless negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinkingabout the situation”). In theory, this same process can beused to change affective responses to attitude objects,above and beyond more diffuse emotional reactions.

Reinterpretation can even be applied in the con-text of very salient and strong stimuli. For example,although people with chronic or acute pain tend toattempt pain management by self-distraction (see below),they can also focus on the pain and reinterpret it in away that makes it less threatening (Ehrenberg, Barnard,Kennedy, & Bloom, 2002; Spanos, Horton, & Chaves,1975). This reinterpretation can involve a process ofaccurate reality testing, wherein people manage to rec-ognize that the painful stimulus (e.g., a cold-pressorstimulus) is less self-threatening than it feels (Lazarus &Folkman, 1984). As a result, they can self-generate amore positive attitude toward the stimulus than theyhad beforehand.

The process of reinterpretation might be understoodwith reference to Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) descrip-tion of how attitudes can change when people alter theperceived desirability and likelihood of consequencesthat they associate with the attitude object. A painfulstimulus may be perceived as evoking a highly undesir-able sensation, but after concentrating on and reinter-preting the symptoms, people can downplay theundesirability of the pain. For other stimuli, it may beeasy to alter the likelihood with which a consequencewill arise. For instance, people who want to give upfatty foods might attempt to exaggerate the likelihoodthat the foods will immediately “hit their waistline” orbe visible as body fat. This type of exaggerated percep-tion is a hallmark of various eating disorders (Fairburn,1995; Polivy & Herman, 2000). Thus, reinterpretationmay affect the perceived desirability and likelihood ofattributes of the object, in addition to affecting thesemantic meaning of these attributes.

Of course, it is not always possible to relabel unde-sired attributes without seeming grossly inaccurate. Theundesired attribute may be patently obvious on occasion,and relabeling the attribute would be psychologicallydifficult. For instance, it may be difficult (and maladap-tive) to label a spouse’s lasciviousness as evidence ofgregariousness or to reinterpret a painful stimulus thatis serious and life threatening (e.g., cardiac pains). Ingeneral, some attributes cannot be flexibly interpreted(Hayes & Dunning, 1997), and people must decide topursue other routes to deliberate self-persuasion or toabandon this goal altogether.

Motivated integration. When it is not possible to rein-terpret an attribute, it may still be possible to reconstruethe attribute by placing it in a broader context. As notedby Murray (1999), this process is akin to saying, “Yes,but. . . .” In other words, the attribute is acknowledgedbut directly embedded among desired attributes that min-imize the effect of the undesired attribute. Murray andHolmes (1993) described examples of this process in thecontext of intimate relationships. They asked couples towrite narratives about the development of their relation-ships and about their partners’ greatest faults. The narra-tives revealed many serious personality faults, such asjealousy, inexpressivity, and immaturity. Yet these faultswere recast by integrating them with virtues (e.g., caring).

Such integrative thinking has important conse-quences for views of the attitude object. In Murray andHolmes’s (1999) research, individuals who linked theirpartners’ greatest faults to virtues exhibited the strongestpositive views of their partners and more stable rela-tionships than did individuals who clustered the faultsand virtues separately. In addition, Showers (1992) hasfound that people who link their own faults to virtueswithin a specific domain report higher levels of self-esteem in that domain, when negative information isrelatively important or frequently accessed. Thus, bene-fits of an integrative self-structure occur when the neg-ative self-aspects are central to the self.

Another interesting example of reintegration comesfrom research examining persistence on boring tasks.Long ago, the famous fictional character of MaryPoppins instructed the children in her care to turn theirchores into games by adding fun elements to them. Itturns out that Mary Poppins’s advice was sage, becausethis addition of fun elements enables workers to derivemore satisfaction from their jobs (Sansone, Weir,Harpster, & Morgan, 1992). In other words, couplingan undesired attitude toward a task with desired attri-butes can aid the formation of a more positive attitudetoward the task and, as a consequence, facilitate persis-tence on the task. The Mary Poppins effect, and reinte-gration in general, work by creating linkages to desired




attributes that color the perception of the undesiredattributes (Asch & Zukier, 1984; Murray, 1999). Asstated by Murray (1999), “stubbornness combined withcaring may not be the same attribute as stubbornnesscombined with selfishness” (p. 29). The more highlyintegrated representations may also make the desiredattributes accessible when the undesired attributes areprimed (Showers & Kling, 1996). As a consequence, theeffect of salient undesired attributes might be automati-cally muted when they are linked in memory to desiredattributes. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there issome evidence that people are aware of using this tactic(Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1999).

Motivated attribution. Undesired characteristics of theattitude object can be discounted by attributing them toanother factor. Rather than using the “yes, but . . .”approach described above, this approach is akin to say-ing, “Yes, because. . . .” Sometimes the cited explanationcan be a desired attribute. For example, Murray (1999)describes how some people attribute their romantic part-ner’s greatest faults to important virtues. For instance,one woman indicated that her partner’s jealousy revealed“how important my presence is in his life” (p. 28). Peoplecan also discount the flaws in attitude objects by findingevidence that the flaws are reflections of some temporary,extraneous causal factor. For example, a person who hasjust bought a car might attribute some mechanical break-downs to bad luck or a missed tune-up, rather thanaccept that the car is a lemon. The general tendency tomake such congenial causal attributions is well docu-mented (Pollard, Anderson, Anderson, & Jennings, 1998;Reiss, Rosenfeld, Melburg, & Tedeschi, 1981).

More relevant, such congenial attributions can resultfrom an extensive consideration of relevant information.According to several models of attributional processes,people spontaneously draw dispositional inferences fromsalient behavior, and people correct these automaticinferences only when they are sufficiently motivated andable to conduct a systematic consideration of relevantinformation (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993; Trope& Alfieri, 1997).2 Thus, when undesired attributionsoccur, one way to “correct” them (i.e., make them morecongenial to current motives) involves a more exhaustiveconsideration of the extent to which different people dis-play the attribute in different situations across time(Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).

Motivated hypothesis testing. The desired attitudemay be achieved when salient motivations inspirepeople to form and test particular hypotheses (Kunda &Oleson, 1995). For example, people who desire to seethemselves as introverted should be likely to test thehypothesis that they are introverted. As described by

Kunda and Oleson (1995), this motivated selection ofhypotheses is important because people tend to testhypotheses by looking for evidence that supports them(Klayman & Ha, 1987). For example, people who havebeen motivated to see themselves as introverted are morelikely to recall their introverted behaviors and less likelyto recall their extroverted behaviors than are people whohave been motivated to see themselves as extroverted(Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). People also tend torecall instances of an acquaintance’s introverted behav-iors to test the hypothesis that the person is introverted,whereas people tend to recall instances of an acquain-tance’s extroverted behaviors to test the hypothesis thatthe person is extroverted (Gordon, Baucom, & Snyder,2000). This hypothesis confirmation process extends toactual social interactions: People who are interactingwith a stranger tend to ask biased questions that helpconfirm their prior hypotheses about the stranger(Gordon et al., 2000). Thus, people gather evidence tosupport the hypotheses that they are motivated to form,which may help people to gain confidence in the valid-ity of the hypothesis that they are testing (Kunda &Oleson, 1995). Not only did the participants reportmore happy responses and fewer unhappy responseswhen they were asked whether they were happy (asopposed to unhappy), the participants rated themselvesas happier after responding to the question about hap-piness than after responding to the question aboutunhappiness. These results indicate that the leadingquestions affected evaluations of the object of judgment(i.e., one’s social life) by making hypothesis-confirmingthoughts, feelings, and behaviors more accessible.

Changing the comparators of judgment. All of theabove processes may alter mental representations of anattitude object relative to a salient standard of compar-ison. For example, when evaluating the reasons forpoor performance on a test, students might constructattributions that explain their performance relative to acomparison that is salient in the situation (e.g., “I hadless sleep before the exam than John Smith”). Theirstandards of comparison may range from being a closefriend or an unknown group of people (e.g., Mensamembers) to being simply the person himself or herselfat another point in time. In situations where the salientstandard of comparison elicits undesired elements of anattitude, the standard of comparison can be shifted toanother person, group, or even the self at another pointin time (Albert, 1977; Masters & Kiel, 1987). Forexample, to facilitate a positive self-view, people com-pare themselves with others who make them look good(Wills, 1981). Thus, failed students may choose to com-pare themselves to students who performed worse thanthey did (i.e., downward comparison). It is also possible




that they will choose to compare themselves withstudents who performed slightly better, as a means ofself-improvement (i.e., upward comparison; Collins,1996; Huguet, Dumas, Monteil, & Genestoux, 2001).Similarly, people in relationships can sustain positiveattitudes toward their relationships by retrospectivelyperceiving improvement in them (i.e., backward com-parison; Sprecher, 1999). These choices of comparisonare often uniquely suited to salient goals.

Changes of comparators are also described withinTesser’s (1988) Self-Evaluation Maintenance (SEM)model, which illustrates how perceptions of relationswith others can be used to maintain positive attitudestoward the self. In the SEM, people’s self-evaluationsdepend on judgments of their performance relative toothers who may be close friends or distant acquaintances,and these judgments are formed for tasks that are rele-vant or irrelevant to self-conceptions. Tesser has pre-dicted and found that people may alter the perceivedcloseness of others to maintain a positive self-evaluation:If a person performs worse than someone else on animportant task, the person may diminish the sense of con-nection with the other individual to maintain self-esteem.This process is assumed to occur because the person isuncomfortable with the other individual as a standard ofcomparison, and increasing psychological distance mayhelp make this comparison less salient.

Changing the dimensions of judgment. The SEMmodel also indicates that people can change the per-ceived self-relevance (or importance) of an attributewhen other individuals possess higher levels of theattribute, in particular when the other individuals arepsychologically close to the subjects (Tesser, 1988).Tesser and Paulhus (1983) tested this prediction by giv-ing participants information that another participanthad performed better or worse on a task assessingcognitive–perceptual integration. To manipulate the psy-chological closeness of the other individual, participantswere given information that the other person was simi-lar or dissimilar to themselves. Participants then com-pleted self-report and behavioral measures of their beliefin the importance of this ability. Results indicated thatparticipants saw the task as less important when a simi-lar participant performed better than when a dissimilarparticipant performed better, whereas participants sawthe task as more important when a similar participantperformed worse than when a dissimilar participant per-formed worse. Presumably, participants shifted theirjudgments of the relevance of this ability dimension tofacilitate a positive attitude toward the self.

Early cognitive consistency theories are also consistentwith this notion that people can shift standards of judg-ment to suit them (within accuracy constraints). Cognitive

dissonance theory posited that people can reduce the per-ceived importance of conflicting cognitions, therebyreducing the dissonance arising from internal conflict, andseveral experiments have found that people can adroitlymanipulate the perceived importance of conflictingelements (J. Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Simon,Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). In addition, people supporta positive self-view by valuing the positive qualities thatthey possess and devaluing the positive qualities that theylack (Frey & Stahlberg, 1987; Hill, Smith, & Lewicki,1989; Kling, Ryff, & Essex, 1997), and they can sustain apositive view of their relationships by valuing the positivefeatures of the relationship and devaluing the negativefeatures (Neff & Karney, 2003). Similar processes areevident at a group level. To feel positively about thegroups to which they belong, low-status group membersmay change the importance that they attach to dimen-sions of comparison between groups (Blanz, Mummendey,Mielke, & Klink, 1998; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke,Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; H. J. Smith & Tyler, 1997). Forexample, East Germans are prone to devaluing the impor-tance of the material resources dimension of their socialidentity, due to unflattering comparisons on this dimen-sion with West Germans (Mummendey et al., 1999). Thecommon feature of all of these processes is a flexible shiftin dimensions used to compare between the focal attitudeobject (e.g., the self) and some other attitude object (e.g.,friends).

Summary. There are at least six epistemic tactics avail-able for downplaying undesired attitude elements andenhancing desired attitude elements. All of these processesare compatible with the epistemic need for validity. Thiscompatibility is revealed by the fact that the processes areconstrained by the available evidence (Kunda & Oleson,1995). For example, people espouse desired views of them-selves only to the extent that their prior self-knowledgefurnishes enough evidence to support the desired views(Sanitioso et al., 1990; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993).People also retain some fear of invalidity during theseprocesses. For instance, hypothesis testing is biased whencomparing questions of similar diagnosticity, but peopleprefer diagnostic questions over nondiagnostic ones(Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke, 1990). The fear of invalidityshould constrain the epistemic routes to deliberate self-persuasion because these routes all involve musteringdesired evidence. People can persuade themselves only tothe degree that the available evidence supports the desiredpoint of view without seeming wholly inaccurate.

Teleologic Tactics

Teleologic tactics attempt to reach the desired attitudeby one of four mental control processes: (a) suppression




of undesired attitude elements, (b) distraction fromundesired attitude elements, (c) concentration on desiredattitude elements, and (d) preemption of the loss ofdesired attitude elements.

The four teleologic routes that we propose integratecurrent models of regulatory focus (Carver & Scheier,1998; Higgins & Spiegel, 2004) and ironic processes(Wegner, 1994; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). The fourteleologic routes are exhaustive of the possibilities con-veyed by the extant models. In our description of theseroutes, we show how they yield a useful integration ofboth models.

Each of these routes may use two psychological mech-anisms for achieving mental control: (a) an operatingsystem to activate particular cognitions, emotions, orbehaviors and (b) a monitoring system to detect theintrusion of other cognitions, emotions, or behaviors(Wegner, 1994). Each system is analogous to similarcontrol systems that exist in the physical world. Forexample, an effective home heating system requires acomponent process that elicits heat (i.e., a burner/boiler)and a component process that monitors the actual heatobtained (i.e., a thermostat). Consistent with this view,our model suggests that the four teleologic routes varyaccording to their use of an operating and monitoringmechanism (see Table 2).

Attitudinal suppression. The effects of people’s con-scious attempts to avoid activation of undesired attitudeelements are revealed in research that has examined theeffects of suppressing particular emotions, cognitions,and behaviors. Because emotions, cognitions, and behav-iors are the basic building blocks of attitudes, suppress-ing undesired attitude elements requires an attempt toactivate emotions, cognitions, and behaviors that arenot part of the undesired attitude (a distracter), whilemonitoring for intrusions of emotions, cognitions, andbehaviors that are undesired (the suppression target).We label these attempts as attitude suppression.

Some research on this process has examined the sup-pression of emotions in particular. For example, Wegner,Erber, and Zanakos (1993) asked participants to remi-nisce about a sad event or a happy event. Participantswho were asked to think about a sad event were thenasked to try not to be sad, were asked to try to be sad,or were given no additional instruction. Similarly, par-ticipants who were asked to think about a happy eventwere asked to try to be happy, were asked to try not tobe happy, or were given no additional instruction. Asexpected, results indicated that participants who wereasked to suppress a sad mood became less sad, whereasthose who were asked to suppress a positive moodbecame less happy.

It is important, however, that this experiment includeda condition that asked participants to perform an irrele-vant cognitive task (e.g., rehearsing a number sequence)while attempting to control their emotions. Participants inthis condition were unsuccessful at controlling their emo-tions: Those who were asked to suppress a sad mood sub-sequently became sadder, whereas those who were askedto suppress a positive mood subsequently became happier.Similar ironic effects have been obtained in studies ofpeople’s attempts to control their beliefs and behavioralimpulses (Czopp, Monteith, Zimmerman, & Lynam,2004; Wegner et al., 1998; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000).When cognitive resources are consumed, people find it dif-ficult to avoid specific feelings, beliefs, and behaviors.Instead, people simply become more aware of them.

By implication, suppression may often be only aneffective stopgap or short-term strategy. However, it isworth noting that resources may often be sustained overtime, and other real-life contexts can ensure that post-suppression rebound is not inevitable (Czopp et al.,2004). For example, Simpson, Ickes, and Blackstone(1995) created an experimental setting in which datingcouples experienced differing levels of threat to theirrelationship. They found that when individuals viewedtheir relationship as close but insecure and threatened bythe situation, they seemingly tried to protect themselvesby avoiding or otherwise failing to attend to their part-ner’s true feelings of attraction to potential alternativepartners (i.e., suppressing elements of the undesired atti-tudes). Furthermore, all of the highly threatened/lowaccuracy couples were still dating 4 months later,whereas 28% of the remaining couples in the sample hadbroken up. These findings suggest that such suppressionmay occur over time and be an effective strategy.

Moreover, there is ample precedent for believing thatthe use of suppression can be quite deliberate and pur-poseful. For example, researchers examining emotionregulation have assumed that people can be highly awareof their motivated use of suppression. This assumptionled Gross and John (2003) to develop self-report items tomeasure individual differences in attempts to suppressundesired emotions, in addition to aforementioned itemsto measure attempts at reinterpreting the context of anemotion. For example, one item for assessing emo-tion suppression indicates, “When I am feeling negative


TABLE 2: Components of the Teleologic Routes

Regulatory Method

Regulatory Goal Operating Monitoring

Undesired elements out of awareness distraction suppressionDesired elements in awareness concentration preemption



emotions, I make sure not to express them.” These self-reports exhibited predictive validity; as these investiga-tors expected, people who report high use of thisstrategy tend to hold negative views of others and areless liked by them. Thus, self-driven suppression doesnot always have positive consequences; when it involvessuppression of emotional communication with peers, itmight actually prevent positive social interactions.

Attitudinal distraction. People may avoid any activi-ties that elicit the current, undesired attitude elements,and they can do so by occupying their mind with irrele-vant goals, thoughts, behaviors, or stimuli. Numerouscolloquial expressions refer to the general process, suchas “I want to take my mind off things” or “I need to getaway for a while.” We label these attempts as attitudi-nal distraction.

Yet as with attitudinal suppression, attitudinal dis-traction requires an attempt to activate cognitions, emo-tions, or behaviors that are not part of the undesiredattitude, while monitoring for intrusions of cognitions,emotions, or behaviors that are undesired. Nonetheless,suppression and distraction differ in their focus on theoperating versus monitoring processes. In the suppres-sion route, people primarily exercise vigilance againstthe undesired attitude elements, while also pursuingcontent irrelevant to the undesired attitude elements. Indistraction, however, primary effort is focused on occu-pying the mind with material that is irrelevant to theundesired attitude elements, while less energy is devotedto vigilance against intrusions of the undesired attitudeelements (see Table 2).

Evidence indicates that even nursery school childrenappear capable of using distraction to lower the activa-tion of undesired attitude elements: They resist tempta-tion and delay gratification longer when they use overtor covert distractions to stop thinking about the attrac-tive object (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, & Raskoff-Zeiss,1972). In theory, this approach should work as long asthe distraction is maintained, and potentially longer. Ifthe distraction lasts long enough for the undesired ele-ments of the current attitude to fade, then the desiredattitude elements can be reasserted more easily. Thisfading process can occur through natural decay in recallof cognitions and behaviors that contribute to the atti-tude and the natural ebbing of relevant emotions (e.g.,A. E. Wilson, Smith, Ross, & Ross, 2004). After thisebbing has taken place, elements of the desired attitudeelements might potentially be reasserted through otherteleologic or epistemic routes.

Attitudinal concentration. The above teleologic tacticsfocus on avoiding elements of the undesired attitude,but people can instead choose to focus on elements of

the desired attitude. That is, people may specificallyseek thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that support themore desirable attitude, and attitudinal concentration isa useful label for this process. Approach of desired atti-tude elements is different from avoidance of the unde-sired attitude elements because these mechanisms fordeliberate self-persuasion differ in the content of theoperation versus monitoring processes. As describedabove, the suppression and distraction routes devotedifferent amounts of effort to the pursuit of thoughts,feelings, and behaviors that are irrelevant to the unde-sired attitude elements and vigilance against the unde-sired attitude elements. In contrast, the concentrationroute involves the pursuit of the desired attitude ele-ments and vigilance against intrusions of thoughts, feel-ings, and behaviors that are irrelevant to the desiredattitude elements. This difference in content is impor-tant because the elements that are subsumed in thedesired attitude should be narrower in scope than thevariety of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that areirrelevant to the undesired attitude. Thus, the use of theoperating process to focus on elements of the desiredattitude (i.e., a feature-positive search) in the concentra-tion route should be simpler and easier than the use ofthe operating process to focus on irrelevant elements(i.e., a feature-negative search) in the suppression route.

This concentration process is easily applied to achievedeliberate self-persuasion. Self-help volumes are repletewith tasks that help people to retrieve and elaborateinformation that supports their desired (usually positive)attitudes toward themselves, their lives, or their partners(Gottman & Silver, 2000; Robbins, 1991). Note thatthis process is different from the epistemic strategy ofbiased hypothesis testing. In motivated hypothesis test-ing, the aim is to answer a question: Are there feelings,beliefs, or behaviors that support a desired attitude? Inthe teleologic strategy of attitudinal concentration, theaim is to bring to mind feelings, beliefs, or behaviors thatsupport a desired attitude because of their utility—noquestion is posed and the retrieved elements are notcompared with oppositely valenced elements.

There is ample evidence that people spontaneouslyretrieve and elaborate information that is congenial totheir motives, and this process may often reflect the tele-ologic process of attitudinal concentration. For example,people recall positive feedback or self-aspects that mayelevate their current self-esteem and mood (Boden &Baumeister, 1997; McFarland & Buehler, 1997). Inaddition, people seize an opportunity to elaborate theirvalues following a self-esteem threat, presumably to reaf-firm their self-esteem (Tesser, Crepaz, Beach, Cornell, &Collins, 2000). Furthermore, people selectively exposethemselves to new information that supports their priordecisions, provided that the decisions are nonreversible




and that new dissonant information is not useful andnonrefutable (Frey, 1986; Jonas et al., 1997). The evi-dence of selective exposure to new information supportsthe notion that people concentrate on information sup-porting a desired attitude when (a) it is useful to do soand (b) questions of attitudinal validity have becomeirrelevant (e.g., because of decision irreversibility).

More important, there is also evidence that sustainedmental rehearsal of information can bring about changesin attitude. For example, some research has used tasksthat elicit counterstereotypic mental imagery as a meansof reducing prejudice on measures that tap automaticstereotyping (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001). The imagerytasks appear to function by strengthening new connec-tions with the desired, but relatively inaccessible, coun-terstereotypic attitudinal elements (Blair et al., 2001).Direct training in stereotype negation has a similareffect (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin,2000). From our perspective, mental imagery and stereo-type negation training both focus simply on increasingthe simple activation of particular information, withouteffortful attempts to understand the meaning of theinformation. We also suspect that both methods canpotentially be self-directed, although this speculationremains an issue for further research.

Attitudinal preemption. Some thoughts, feelings, orbehaviors may be avoided because they lead to theabsence of the desired attitude, and this process can belabeled attitudinal preemption. Preemption differs fromthe previously described strategy of concentration in itsfocus on the operation versus monitoring processes. Theconcentration route devotes effort primarily to the pur-suit of the desired attitude elements, while also exhibit-ing low vigilance against content that is not desired. Inpreemption, however, primary effort is focused on beingvigilant against intrusions of material that is not part ofthe desired attitude, whereas less energy is devoted tooccupying the mind with the desired attitude elements.

In the domain of close relationships, partners proac-tively employ a range of overt and covert tactics thatconsciously or unconsciously help them to avoid orminimize potential threats that, if left unaltered, coulddestabilize the relationship (Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif,1957; Simpson, Ickes, & Orina, 2001). Such preemptiverelationship maintenance acts as a veritable “first line ofdefense” that perceivers can use to avoid the erosion ofthe desired attitude. For example, Miller (1997) foundthat satisfied partners in a relationship are unlikely tothink about and look at attractive alternative partners.Presumably, satisfied couples worry that merely lookingat an attractive alternative partner may lead to feelingsof attraction that could have a detrimental effect onfeelings about one’s current partner. Notice that the

positive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward some-one else may be seen as reducing positivity toward one’scurrent partner but not necessarily as leading to nega-tivity. Potential negative outcomes may not be salientfor satisfied couples; they may simply be concernedabout creating a less positive state for their relationship.Thus, this avoidance of a challenge to the desired atti-tude involves some degree of vigilance, but it is differentfrom the simple avoidance or suppression of an unde-sired attitude element.

Summary. We have outlined four teleologic routes formoving from an ambivalent attitude to a more desirablenet attitude. As shown in Table 2, the strategies possessdistinct goal orientations and distinct methods. Peoplewho strive to keep specific, undesired attitude elementsoutside awareness can do so by suppression of them or byachieving distraction from them. Alternatively, peoplewho strive to keep desired attitude elements in awarenesscan do so by concentrating on them or by preemptingtheir absence (i.e., by being vigilant against any but thedesired elements). In both pairs of routes, one routefocuses on operating processes that maintain sought-afterinformation in awareness (distraction, concentration),whereas the other route focuses more energy on moni-toring processes that guard against information that isnot sought in consciousness (suppression, preemption).

All of these processes attempt to maintain the accessi-bility of particular content as an end in itself. Unlike epis-temic processes, the teleologic processes do not check thevalidity of the sought-after attitude, because there is noconcern about potential inaccuracy. For example, aperson who is stuck in an undesirable job might attemptto keep the good aspects of his or her job in awarenessbecause they are reassuring but not because they aredefinitive evidence. Similarly, a person might attempt tokeep negative facts about his or her job outside of aware-ness because they are disconcerting and interfere withfunctioning but not because the facts are faulty or inac-curate. In contrast, epistemic processes require thatpeople are wary of obvious invalidity and use reasoningprocesses to assuage concerns about invalidity.

Comparing the Strategies

As shown in Table 3, the differences between thesetwo routes are varied. First, as described above, the useof mental control tactics can be functionally indepen-dent of any need to achieve epistemic validity. Forexample, although it is likely that people who engage instereotype inhibition or activation occasionally believethat they are being objective, the inhibition or activationof stereotypes can be elicited by task demands (e.g.,direct instruction to inhibit) that have nothing to do




with epistemic validity (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne,& Jetten, 1994). Similarly, there is evidence thatchildren devalue forbidden toys as a means of mentalcontrol (to resist temptation), contrary to assumptionsthat this devaluation occurs because of dissonancereduction (Ebbesen et al., 1975). Such uses of mentalcontrol are reflected in classic distinctions between real-ist and pragmatic approaches to social judgment: Adher-ents to the realist approach maintain that an objectivetruth exists but can only be perceived via multiple cuesthat possess uncertain validity; pragmatists define accu-racy in terms of the successful completion of the desiredgoal (Funder, 1995; Swann, 1984).

The difference between the epistemic and teleologicapproach is akin to two ways of negotiating an accordbetween warring parties. One method attempts to getthe parties to understand each other positively (seeTable 3). A second method focuses on setting a basis forthe future, rather than explaining the past, by askingthem to “bury the hatchet” and focus on how they cancoexist peacefully in the future. The goal of movingfrom an ambivalent attitude to a more desirable attitudeis central to both strategies, but they move toward it indifferent ways: People may use reasoning to discounttheir undesired attitude elements and validate theirdesired attitude elements, or they may try to put theundesired attitude elements out of mind, while rehears-ing and acting out their desired attitude elements.

Both strategies require effort, but the epistemic strat-egy is infused or somewhat constrained by an attempt tounderstand reality (albeit in a biased manner), whereasthe teleological strategy simply attempts to manipulatethe accessibility of relevant thoughts and feelings. Inboth processes, there is a meta-awareness of the need tochange the person’s attitude and the bias that this needcreates, but only the epistemic processes retain a simul-taneous check with reality. A pithy example of this will-ing pursuit of bias and truth is the anecdote about twowomen who notice a very attractive woman walk pastthem and then laughingly quip, “fat ankles.” This pre-sumably makes them feel better; they know it’s a biasedcomment, and they feel no remorse about responding

this way. In other words, they deliberately shape thecomparison with the full realization (and hope) that itwill make them feel better. The epistemic strategyattempts to change the organization and meaning of atti-tude elements in a similar way. In contrast, the teleologicstrategy merely attempts to strengthen the activation andchronic accessibility of the elements of the desired atti-tude (e.g., by trying to ignore the woman’s presence alto-gether). In essence, then, the epistemic strategy attemptsto recomprehend elements in the undesired attitude,whereas the teleologic strategy simply tries to reduce theaccessibility of these elements and potentially increasethe accessibility of elements of the desired attitude.

This distinction between epistemic and teleologicalstrategies encourages researchers to consider that prag-matic, association-focused thinking is a potential meansof achieving deliberate self-persuasion. Previously,researchers have assumed the existence of epistemicprocesses in self-persuasion, without recognizing thepotential for people to strive (with great effort) to alterthe level of activation of their undesired and desiredattitudinal elements. By juxtaposing the epistemic andteleologic routes, we can achieve a more complete pic-ture of how people perform deliberate self-persuasion.

DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY

Choosing Between the Epistemicand Teleologic Tactics

People who undertake deliberate self-persuasion mayalternately use epistemic and teleologic tactics, but teleo-logic tactics will be preferred when (a) exposure to theattitude object and the undesired elements of the attitudeis fleeting, (b) people believe that epistemic processes maybe unimportant, too threatening to the self, or ineffective,and (c) the teleologic strategy can be supported by theexisting attitude structure and ego-control resources.

In general, people should prefer to begin deliberateself-persuasion with epistemic strategies because thisapproach strategy simultaneously satisfies the goals ofachieving a desired as well as an accurate attitude,rather than simply achieving either goal alone. Thus, theteleologic route becomes more feasible primarily whenthe epistemic route fails to yield the desired outcome.Nonetheless, several additional factors should influencethe choice between epistemic and teleologic tactics.

People should move toward the teleologic route whenthey face only fleeting exposure to the attitude object. Inthis context, the epistemic processes entail an unnecessarydegree of effort and some added risk. The effort is unnec-essary because it should be easier to employ a temporary


TABLE 3: Characteristics of the Epistemic and the TeleologicRoutes

Epistemic Teleologic

Attitudinal objectives truth and desired desiredattitude attitude

Philosophical orientation realist and pragmatic pragmaticTemporal orientation explain past support futureMental process comprehension attentionFocal constructs propositions propositions and

associations



shift in attentional focus (i.e., teleologic route) than todeliberately “unpack” and re-form their attitudes. In addi-tion, this unpacking entails added risk because it mayinadvertently yield information that is noncongenial to thedesired attitude, whereas the temporary shift in atten-tional focus would not risk this exposure.

People should use the teleologic route when epistemicvalidity seems unimportant. Epistemic questions mayappear unimportant when there are no objective criteriafor the questions of evaluation. Indeed, many problemsof evaluation can appear intractable because answers toglobal evaluative questions (e.g., “Is my partner worthloving anymore?”) can depend on the chosen compara-tors and dimensions of comparison, and people canmanipulate these factors endlessly. Situational factorsand individual differences can influence whether peopleperceive this difficulty and give up on the idea of validityaltogether, endorsing the notion that the correct answeris whatever is right or useful for them (i.e., whatever feelsgood or desirable). For example, after reading a bookabout philosophical problems with the value of art,people might experience heightened awareness of prob-lems finding objective criteria for favoring some pieces ofart over other pieces. A person might wish to share his orher romantic partner’s positive attitude toward anabstract painting but know that it is impossible to drawon logical, verifiable arguments to support one attitudeor another—all that matters is that the desired attitude isheld. Furthermore, individuals may not care as deeplyabout epistemic validity when they are low in personalitydimensions that predict thoughtfulness and the system-atic scrutiny of information, such as conscientiousness(McCrae & Costa, 2003), need for cognition (Cacioppo,Perry, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), need for closure(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), or the desire to ensureoptimal judgment quality (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Inthese instances, people can choose to attain the desiredattitude through any of the teleologic routes, withoutattempting to unpack and recreate their attitude.

People should move toward the teleologic routewhen epistemic processes potentially threaten the self-concept. Experiments testing Sedikides and Green’s(2000) inconsistency–negativity neglect model are con-sistent with this hypothesis. In these experiments, partic-ipants showed little evidence of detailed processing oftrait stimuli that were self-threatening; instead, there wasevidence that the self-threatening trait information waskept from active attention (similar to our teleologicroute of suppression; see below). In theory, this self-threat should be elicited in situations that provide nega-tive feedback about the self or by chronically lowself-esteem (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Steele, 1988). We

expect that such situations’ effects on self-threat shouldact to inhibit epistemic deliberate self-persuasion.

People will be more likely to use the teleologic routewhen they possess higher levels of ego-control ability.Deliberate self-persuasion can work only if people pos-sess sufficient self-control reserves. Several studies indi-cate that self-control processes tap a reserve of energythat helps people to overcome a dominant response infavor of an alternate response (Baumeister & Heatherton,1996). Presumably, this energy is required because self-control requires sustained attention on the task; oncethis attention has lapsed, habitual responses take over(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). The epistemic routesneed sustained attention until the chosen routes havemanaged to embed new content into the attitude,whereas the teleologic routes need sustained attention atmany points in time. Initially, they can help drive theundesired content from awareness, but this attitudecontent might reemerge later. Such reemergence mustagain be met with sufficient use of a teleologic route.Factors such as distraction and an inability to delaygratification, which is positively related to self-controlabilities (Funder, Block, & Block, 1983), may interferewith people’s attention to and deployment of theseroutes and cause the routes to fail (Wegner, 1994).

OUTCOMES OF DELIBERATESELF-PERSUASION

Epistemic deliberate self-persuasion should affect attitudescores on explicit and implicit measures of attitude.Teleologic deliberate self-persuasion should affect explicitmeasures, but its effect on implicit measures shoulddepend on the extent that these measures are tapping onlythe evaluative associations in long-term memory.

The process of deliberate self-persuasion may takelittle time or a long time. In situations where deliberateself-persuasion is relatively easy to accomplish, the unde-sired attitude elements will gradually be supplanted bythe desired attitude elements or at least made less acces-sible from memory. In other situations, the undesiredattitude elements may be activated frequently and peoplemay experience little success at replacing them. Forexample, prejudice reduction has been conceptualizedas a gradual, rather than all or none, process (Devine,1989; Devine & Monteith, 1999). This process may begradual because people often encounter situations thatreactivate the prejudice (e.g., stereotypic media cover-age, disparaging humor).

Some outcomes should differ for epistemic and teleo-logic processes. Independent of the time used for delib-erate self-persuasion, success at implementing epistemic




processes should often be evident in both explicit andimplicit measures of attitudes. Explicit measures assessattitudes using self-report scales, whereas implicit mea-sures assess attitudes without relying on participants’introspective access of their attitudes (Fazio & Olson,2003). After epistemic deliberate self-persuasion, paral-lel change should occur because the desired attitude ele-ments are consistent with conscious desires, therebypermitting their expression at the explicit level. If thesedesired attitude elements are also acceptable to others ingeneral, explicit measures of attitude should detect theattitude (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The desired attitudeshould also be evident in implicit measures of attitude,because the epistemic processes involve mental changesthat should affect the long-term mental representationof the attitude object and its undesired and desired ele-ments. Thus, although some amount of explicit–implicitdiscrepancy may occur after deliberate self-persuasion(cf. Gawronski & Strack, 2004), epistemic self-persuasionshould tend to exert parallel change in attitudes that aremeasured explicitly and implicitly.

In contrast, teleologic processes involve changing therelative accessibility of the undesired and desired atti-tude elements. These processes should move the unde-sired elements to a lower level of accessibility and causethem to be less evident in explicit measures of attitude.Nonetheless, the elements should be detectable by mea-sures that tap their presence in long-term memory. Inother words, the teleologic processes should lead to thekind of self-deception envisaged by Sackheim and Gur(1979), resulting in divergent attitude elements at non-conscious and conscious levels (A. E. Wilson et al.,2004). After repeated and successful attempts at thisdifferentiated storage, conscious attempts at deliberateself-persuasion should cease, but the discrepancy in con-tent at conscious and nonconscious levels shouldremain. Nonetheless, it is not yet clear that any particu-lar implicit measure taps this long-term memory storeand not recent, short-term interventions (Blair, 2002;Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). If an implicit measure wereto tap only the long-term memory store, then teleologicdeliberate self-persuasion should have less of an effecton it.

An important outcome of both routes to self-persuasionis a reduction in feelings of ambivalence toward theattitude object. As the undesired attitude elements arereplaced by desired ones, the conflict within the individ-ual’s attitude decreases, resulting in lower feelings ofambivalence. This effect is important because ambiva-lence has its own important consequences. For example,people who are highly ambivalent toward an object aremore strongly influenced by features of their environ-ment that make salient its positive or negative attributes,causing them to behave much more favorably toward it

when the positive elements are salient than when thenegative elements are salient; nonambivalent people areless strongly influenced by the acute salience of the pos-itive or negative attributes (Bell & Esses, 2002; I. Katz &Hass, 1988; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998). In theory,then, successful deliberate self-persuasion should causeattitudes to become more stable across contexts.

Of course, attempts at deliberate self-persuasion couldfail altogether. This outcome will depend on the precur-sors described above (e.g., ability and motivation). In thisevent, the person’s attitude should appear unchangedusing implicit and explicit measures, as the individualgrows to accept the current attitude rather than fight it. Aperson may then accept the current attitude as unchange-able and adapt in other ways. In particular, people maytransfer the motivational goals that are the basis of thedesired attitude to other attitude objects. This processcould occur in any situation where the attitude object hasbeen linked with an extreme undesirable attribute. Forexample, a switch in motivational goals may occur whiletrying to forgive a romantic partner who has had anaffair. The victim may have tried to restore a positive atti-tude toward the partner because the victim has a strongneed for romantic affiliation. If the attempts at deliberateself-persuasion are unsuccessful at fulfilling this need, thevictim may accept the new negative attitude and resolveto channel the need for romantic affiliation elsewhere(i.e., “rebound” to someone else who fulfills this need).Thus, the motivation that drove deliberate self-persuasioncan be transferred to another target, thereby fulfilling themotive in a different way.3

RELEVANCE TO OTHER RESEARCH ONATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION

Our description of the model helps to lay the founda-tion for describing ways in which deliberate self-persuasionis relevant to and distinct from research examining thebroader notion of self-persuasion, self-regulation, andmotivated social cognition. First, research on the tradi-tional notion of self-persuasion has focused on the man-ner in which behaviors can shape attitudes. This emphasisbegan with classic experiments on the effects of role-playing. These experiments found that self-derived argu-ments in support of a role-play caused attitudes to changein the direction of the arguments (Janis, 1954; King &Janis, 1956), even 18 months after the role-play (Janis &Mann, 1965). There is a variety of theories that can helpto explain such effects. One of the more prominent expla-nations is provided by dissonance theory (Festinger,1957), which proposes that people are motivated to formattitudes that are consistent with their past actions,because inconsistency elicits an aversive internal arousal




(Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978). Another prominentexplanation is provided by self-perception theory (Bem,1972), which suggests that people logically infer attitudesthat are consistent with their actions. For example, “If Ilaughed, I must find it funny” (Olson, 1992). Current evi-dence supports both the dissonance (Fazio, Zanna, &Cooper, 1977; Hamilton & Zanna, 1974; Zanna, Higgins,& Taves, 1976) and the self-perception explanations(Brinol & Petty, 2003; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976),while also indicating that the effects of behavior are par-ticularly likely to occur when the behavior is threateningto the self-concept (e.g., Brody, Stoneman, & McCoy,1994; Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Holland,Meertens, & van Vugt, 2002).

Although attitudes researchers have routinely labeledboth perspectives as theories of self-persuasion, there areimportant differences between the focus of these theoriesand the current focus on deliberate self-persuasion.Although both processes involve self-induced changes inattitudes, the traditional analysis of self-persuasion hasfocused on the change in attitudes following a specificbehavior, whereas the process of deliberate self-persuasionfocuses on how people might change their attitudesthrough covert mental processes. Behavior change isonly one theoretical antecedent of change identified inthe attitude research. Changes in affective and cognitiveresponses are also important in contemporary models ofattitude (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Maio, Haddock,Watt, & Hewstone, in press; Zanna & Rempel, 1988)and, therefore, a model of deliberate self-persuasionmust consider all of the covert mediators of self-inducedattitude change from diverse sources. In addition, thetraditional processes of self-persuasion have not shown(or needed to show) that participants fully recognize thatthey are in possession of undesired attitude elements andthen deliberately attempt to change them. In contrast,deliberate self-persuasion requires awareness of theundesired feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that contributeto the individual’s attitude.

Deliberate self-persuasion is also unique from modelsof self-control and self-regulation. Some research onself-control focuses on situations wherein a cool, cogni-tive response to the object of temptation is in competi-tion with the more attractive, hot, affective properties ofit. For example, a person might have a cognitive repre-sentation of the properties of chocolate (e.g., sweet, fat-tening) and an affective representation (e.g., craving,desire). Metcalfe and Mischel’s (1999) model of self-control describes how people can deal with this conflictby overtly or covertly reducing the salience of the hotaspects, and this is achieved through suppression anddistraction mechanisms that are similar to ones wedescribe above. They also describe a mechanism thatdeals with this conflict by altering the salient meaning

of the stimulus, similar to an approach that we describeabove (i.e., our epistemic route). However, the key dif-ference between this model and the pursuit of deliberateself-persuasion is that the notion of self-persuasionfocuses on conflict between positive and negative ele-ments of attitudes, which explicitly include both thecool, cognitive, and hot, affective systems (Eagly &Chaiken, 1993; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). For example,a person may wish to form more favorable cognitionsand feelings about his or her partner while trying to for-give the person for having had an extramarital affair,rather than merely try to subdue the affective systemwith the cognitive one. Thus, the Metcalfe–Mischelmodel focuses on a specific, special type of evaluativediscrepancy (affective versus cognitive), whereas ourmodel deals with any type of evaluative discrepancy. Inaddition, our model elaborates on a few additionalways to achieve this alteration through shifts in atten-tional focus (in teleologic routes) and numerous ways toachieve this transformation through changes in seman-tic representation of an attitude (in epistemic routes).

This focus on movement from undesired (cognitiveand affective) attitude elements to a more desired netattitude is relevant to other research on self-regulation.One relevant topic is illustrated by the fact that move-ment toward the desired attitude is something thatpeople desire of their own accord. This emphasis onthe self-chosen nature of the desired attitude is relevantto a distinction proposed by Higgins (1987; Higgins &Spiegel, 2004) to understand self-regulation in general.Specifically, Higgins distinguishes between standardsthat are adopted from a personal point of view andthose that are adopted from the standpoint of others(see also Czopp et al., 2004). He also indicates that aself-guide can reflect a personal ideal, desire, or wish(i.e., an ideal self-guide) or a personal sense of obliga-tion or duty (i.e., an ought self-guide). In our model, thedesired attitude is held as a personal ideal.

Perhaps the most relevant model of self-regulation isBaumeister and Newman’s (1994) elegant description ofhow people often attempt to reach specific, preordainedconclusions, in a manner similar to our emphasis onpeople’s attempts to move to a more desired attitude:

When a particular conclusion is preferred, the conclu-sion (rather than the process) guides the self-regulatoryefforts, and one monitors the process by repeatedlychecking implications of incoming evidence against thepreferred outcome. The goal is to marshal the best avail-able evidence for the preferred conclusion, or against theunwanted conclusion. The idealized model of the lawyermay serve as a model for this sort of reasoning, insofaras lawyers seek to build the best possible case for theirclient, irrespective of the client’s objective innocence orguilt. We suggest that the research literature (which is




after all, created by scientists), may have exaggerated theimage of scientist relative to lawyer as an integrative,heuristic image for human information processing. Tobe sure, researchers have documented many specific pat-terns in which people do bias or distort the evidence infavour of preferred conclusions, but the theoretical liter-ature has not articulated any broad vision of the humaninformation processor as guided by preset conclusions,in contrast to the intuitive scientist model. In everydaylife, however, people’s actual decisions and inferencesmay often involve trying to make the best case for a pre-ordained conclusion. (p. 5)

Baumeister and Newman’s model focuses on threeprocesses used to obtain a preordained conclusion: con-trolled overriding of unacceptable conclusions, selectivecriticism of unwelcome evidence, and the setting of cri-teria to emphasize desired evidence. As we have shown,our model encompasses these processes, while describ-ing many others (e.g., reattribution, concentration).Our model also makes a novel distinction between epis-temic and teleologic processes.

A more basic difference between Baumeister andNewman’s (1994) approach and our model is that theprocess of deliberate self-persuasion begins with a dif-ferent level of conscious awareness. At the outset ofdeliberate self-persuasion, people are aware of unde-sired and desired elements of their attitude. Consistentwith this assumption, people are more likely to reportfeelings of ambivalence when the negative and positiveelements of their attitude are easy to retrieve simultane-ously (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). Incontrast, Baumeister and Newman explicitly focus on aprocess that involves the avoidance of conscious aware-ness, stating that “it may not be desirable to be fully delib-erate, conscious, and explicit about one’s self-regulatoryinterventions” (p. 5). Their emphasis is similar toGur and Sackeim’s (1979) description of self-deceptionprocesses. These researchers obtained evidence thatpeople can simultaneously hold conflicting beliefs, withdesired beliefs held at a different level of awareness thanthe undesired beliefs. In essence, then, people can main-tain undesired and desired elements of attitudes at dif-ferent levels of conscious awareness.4 This processcreates something akin to the “dual attitudes” proposedby Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000). In the dualattitudes model, people can hold an undesired attitudeat a nonconscious level, whereas a desired attitude isstored at a conscious level.

As noted above, our model does not attempt to exam-ine the reconciliation of attitude elements that are storedat different levels of awareness. Instead, we focus on acontext wherein people are initially aware of conflictingattitudinal elements. In this context, people possess aconscious feeling of ambivalence and intend to move

from possession and endorsement of the undesired ele-ments to the desired elements.5 Over time, people maymanage to separate the undesired and desired attitudinalelements or to force the undesired elements to a lowerlevel of awareness, but as described in our model, thisis only one potential outcome of the deliberate self-persuasion process and not the starting point.

This emphasis on conscious discrepancies (i.e., feltambivalence) also distinguishes deliberate self-persuasionfrom general research on motivated social cognition. Thisresearch has yielded consistent evidence that people formbeliefs and judgments congenial to their motives (Kunda& Oleson, 1995; Newman, 1999). In most (but not all)social cognition paradigms, people’s judgments of the selfor some other entity (e.g., the efficacy of toothbrushing,a relationship partner) are changed by manipulations thatalter salient motivations, but it is not clear whether par-ticipants initially recognize that they are in possession ofan undesired attitude and then consciously seek to changeit (Manstead & Fischer, 2000).

SUMMARY

We have pointed out the need for theories of when,why, and how people perform deliberate self-persuasion.Our model is intended to serve as a guide to some testabledistinctions among the diverse routes to deliberate self-persuasion, helping to elucidate important differencesbetween the routes, possible determinants of choicesbetween them, and effects of the routes. Moreover, themodel attempts to describe and address these issues in amanner that is applicable across multiple domains ofinvestigation. Indeed, our examples have pertained to theself, spousal relationships, decision making, coping withemotions, painful stimuli, task persistence, personalitytraits, judgments of well-being, social groups, employ-ment, sports teams, unhealthy foods, addictive behaviors,and even toys. The applicability to diverse objects helpsto form novel predictions for a range of psychologicalissues (e.g., forgiveness, coping with addiction, prejudice)across subdisciplines in psychology and to stimulateresearch looking at common processes for all of these tar-gets, thereby addressing a strong need for coherenceacross domains of psychological research (Trope, 2004).Moreover, by describing how people can play a moreproactive and prominent role in their own attitudechange, the model meets recent calls for more research onthe human potential for self-change and advancement(Seligman, 2003).

At the same time, the model may ultimately help toaddress some core issues about the nature and extent ofdeliberate self-persuasion. T. D. Wilson and Brekke(1994) have argued that this inner-directed persuasive




control is not possible or, at least, is more difficult toaccomplish than control of specific action tendencies.First, they note empirical evidence that it is difficult forpeople to control their thoughts and feelings (e.g.,Wegner, 1989). Second, they cite a difficult example ofbelief change from William James, who asserted thatone cannot look at a clock and say, “When the secondhand reaches 12, I will believe that the wall is yellowinstead of green and that the sun revolves around theearth.” Finally, they cite evidence that beliefs can perse-vere when people fail to decompose the causal explana-tions that support the belief.

In our view, T. D. Wilson and Brekke’s (1994) argu-ments are important, but mainly as signposts to potentialconstraints in the exercise of deliberate self-persuasion.The arguments do not demonstrate that people (a) do notattempt it and (b) cannot achieve it. For example, animportant (but often ignored) caveat to the finding thatthoughts and feelings are difficult to control is the findingthat control is, in fact, successful when people are able todevote their full mental resources to the control process(Wegner, 1994). In addition, an important qualification toJames’s anecdote is that some beliefs are much less open toperceptual and empirical validation than are others, andwe should only expect deliberate self-persuasion on themore subjective of the beliefs (Festinger, 1957, 1964). Tocontrast with the cited example of James, we may not beable to will ourselves to believe that a yellow wall is green,but we might be able to will ourselves to believe that ourcurrent job is far better than unpalatable alternatives.Finally, as described in our model, it is quite likely that thereconstruction of causal explanations is one importantpotential mechanism for deliberate self-persuasion.

A model of deliberate self-persuasion is vital toaddressing these issues. As Newman (1999) puts it,people may sometimes assess evidence with the “expressgoal of arriving at some preordained conclusion. . . .People talk themselves into things” (p. 62). Individualshave the capacity to try shaping, with a subjective sen-sation of willpower, their attitudes to meet desiredgoals. Research on deliberate self-persuasion lets usunderstand people in this role.

NOTES

1. The process of mental control has been examined in abundantpast and contemporary theory and research. Anna Freud (1966) illus-trated the notion of mental control in psychoanalytic defense mecha-nisms, such as reaction formation. Later, Bruner (1957) suggested thatmotivations and expectancies can determine which information comesto mind, and not just how information is interpreted. For example,people perceptually defend against seeing taboo words (Blum, 1955;McGinnies, 1950; Postman, Bronson, & Gropper, 1953). Morerecently, research has demonstrated that motives affect the spontaneousactivation of out-group stereotypes (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Sinclair &Kunda, 1999).

2. In some contexts, people may initially draw inferences about thesituation and then correct these inferences under conditions of highmotivation and ability (Wegener & Petty, 1997). Such contexts areless relevant to our examples, however, which focus on cases wherepeople wish to alter their attitude toward a particular object that hasundesired attributes.

3. Failure at deliberate self-persuasion might cause people to focuson biased mechanisms of persuasion from others. For instance,research on persuasion from others has found that people are moreinfluenced by sources that are expert, likable, and familiar (see Maio& Haddock, in press). It is conceivable that people can use these fac-tors as tools to shape their own attitudes, based on lay theories of howpersuasion works. For example, if people seek to develop a more pos-itive attitude toward exercise, they could seek out the opinions of per-sonal trainers, who will have expert information that can supporttheir desired attitude. Nonetheless, there is no comprehensive descrip-tion of lay theories that might guide deliberate self-persuasion,although evidence indicates that lay theories are important for pre-dicting people’s attempts to correct the biasing effects of factors thatthey believe are unduly influencing their attitudes (Friestad & Wright,1999; Wegener & Petty, 1997; T. D. Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Inother words, there is a shortage of evidence describing the effects ofthese lay theories when people actually desire their biasing effects.

4. It is also interesting that Sackeim and Gur (1979) found thatpeople with higher levels of self-deception were less likely to exhibitpsychopathology, consistent with later speculations about the benefi-cial effect of positive illusions on mental health (Taylor & Brown,1988; Sackeim and Gur focused on self-report biases as an explana-tion for this link, however.)

5. It could be argued that people enter a mind-set akin to theimplemental mind-set described by Gollwitzer and his colleagues (e.g.,Gollwitzer, Fujita, & Oettingen, 2004). This mind-set helps people toprepare for an action by summoning thoughts and feelings that sup-port the action, and it preempts further deliberations about the mer-its of the action. In the case of deliberate self-persuasion, people startsummoning resources to support an attitude and stop focusing exclu-sively on deliberating its validity—the focus is on changing an attitude(with its affective, cognitive, and behavioral components) rather thancontrolling a particular action.

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The Epistemic-Teleologic Model of Deliberate Self-Persuasion

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