The Enigma of Identity Making. Geert Wilders and the rise of right-wing populism in the Netherlands

The Enigma of Identity Making

Geert Wilders and the rise of right-wing populism in the

Netherlands

Masterarbeit

ZUR ERLANGUNG DES AKADEMISCHEN GRADES MASTER OF ARTS (M.A)

IM FACH RELIGION AND CULTURE (MRC)

AN DER THEOLOGISCHEN FAKULTÄT

DER HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN

VORGELEGT VON

Noreen Josefa van Elk

MATRIKEL-NR. 542025

Erstgutachter: Dr. Fernando Veliz

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Andreas Feldtkeller

BERLIN, den 30.07.2012

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The motivation for this paper is a result of personal concerns about the changes within the

political and socio-cultural situation in the Netherlands and Western European in the last couple

of years supported by intensive research in the field of religion, nationalism and politics. The

concrete idea for this project grew out of the involvement in a seminar on nationalism which I

took during the second semester of my studies. Within the context of this seminar I wrote a first

paper on right-wing populism in the Netherlands. During my research for this first paper, I got

increasingly interested in the analysis of right-wing populist politics in Western Europe. In the

aftermath of the seminar I stayed in close contact to the seminar supervisor Dr. Veliz and in the

course of the months a concrete idea for this thesis emerged. Therefore in the first place I want

to thank Dr. Fernando Veliz for his ongoing support, enriching ideas, motivating and helpful

advice.

Furthermore I got a lot of inspiration, ideas and research possibilities during my internship at

the University of Roehampton in London. I would like to thank the whole Center for Research

on Nationalism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism (CRONEM) and special thanks go to Prof. John

Eade, Dr. Michal Garapich, Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, Dr. Stephen Driver, Dr. Michele

Lamb for giving me the opportunity to make this internship a very interesting, diverse and

intellectually challenging experience and for providing me with lots of support, cooperation,

input and feedback for my thesis.

At last off course, the writing of this thesis wouldn’t have been possible without the

feedback and loving support of my friends and family.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

Presentation of the problem and research question ................................................................... 1

Approach and methodology ...................................................................................................... 4

Structure .................................................................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................. 7

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 7

Socio-economic and immigration-based explanations ............................................................... 8

Structural and systematic explanations.. .................................................................................... 11

Demand and supply explanations ............................................................................................... 13

Evaluation .................................................................................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 2. POLITICAL CULTURE, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS .......... 17

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 17

Political culture ......................................................................................................................... 17

Politics in the Netherlands ......................................................................................................... 18

Depillarisation and the continuation of accomodationist politics ............................................. 21

Party system in the Netherlands ................................................................................................. 23

CHAPTER 3. THE RISE OF GEERT WILDERS PVV ....................................................................... 28

List Pim Fortuyn ....................................................................................................................... 29

Geert Wilders PVV ................................................................................................................... 30

Nature and content of the PVV ................................................................................................. 34

CHAPTER 4. THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY ..................................................................................... 41

Nationalism ............................................................................................................................... 42

Ethnicity ..................................................................................................................................... 45

Ethno-nationalism ..................................................................................................................... 47

Immigration in the Netherlands ................................................................................................. 54

Europe and its Muslim minorities ............................................................................................. 57

The threefold identity reification ............................................................................................... 61

Conclusion.................................................................................................................................. 74

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 76

EPILOGUE ................................................................................................................................... 80

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................... 82

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Right-wing populist parties in Western Europe 1981-2010......................................... 1

Figure 2 Political culture between micro- and macro level of the political system ................... 18

Figure 3 The structure of the Dutch pillars ................................................................................ 20

Figure 4 Dutch political parties at a glance ................................................................................ 25

Figure 5 Electoral results 1998-2010 ......................................................................................... 30

Figure 6 Results Dutch parliamentary elections 2010 ................................................................ 32

Figure 7 Dutch political landscape 2010 according to Kieskompas .......................................... 39

Figure 8 Expected rate of non-Western immigrants 2010-2040 ................................................ 60

1

Introduction

Presentation of the problem and research question

The political situation in western European democracies is in motion. Since the midst 1980s

there has been an apparent emergence of parties that seems to belong to a new political family, a

couple of them even became part of the government. In mainstream media and public discourse

these parties have been described with the term “right-wing populist”. Nevertheless, it seems

that the real political nature of those parties is difficult to grasp and if those parties indeed form

a new political family, this family is marked by a high degree of internal differentiation. At first,

when the so-called right-wing populist parties started to gain electoral support like for example

the Lega Nord in Italy, Vlaams Blok in Belgium, FPÖ in Austria and the List Pim Fortuyn in

the Netherlands, those parties were rather conceived as temporary protest movements than as

solid ideological parties. Furthermore, as a result of the presumed reactive character of those

parties, the parties were expected to disappear as fast as they appeared. On the contrary in the

course of the next years, right-wing populist parties were able to gain a stable position within

the political landscape in many countries and similar parties even started to appear in countries

on the European periphery like for example in Great Britain and Ireland. Figure 1 shows the

emergence of the so-called right-wing political parties in several European countries and its

government participation.

Figure 1. Right-wing populist parties in Western Europe 1981-2008

Country Party Parliament

affiliation

Government

participation

Austria Freiheitliche Partei

Österreichs

1956- 1983-1986; 2000-

2003; 2003-2005

Bündnis Zukunft

Österreich

2006- 2005-2007

Belgium Vlaams Belang 1978-

Front National 1991-

Lijst Dedecker 2007-

Denmark Fremskridtspartiet 1973-2001

Dansk Folkeparti 1998- 2001-2005; 2005-

2007; 2007-

France Front National 1986-1993; 1997-

2002

2

Italy Movimento Sociale

Italiano / Alleanza

Nazionala / Popolo

della Liberta

1948- 1994-1995; 2001-

2005; 2008-

Lega Nord 1992-2001

2006-

1994-1995; 2001-

2005

Forza Italia / Popolo

della Liberta

1994- 1994-1995; 2001-

2005; 2008-

The Netherlands Centrumpartij /

Centrumdemocraten

1982-1986

Lijst Pim Fortuyn 2002-2006 2002-2003

Partij van de Vrijheid 2006- 2010-

Norway Fremskrittpartiet 1973-1977; 1981- 2001-2005

Sweden Ny Demokrati 1991-1992

Despite the importance of the topic, the spectacular electoral gains of the new parties got little

or scarce attention in the first decade of their appearance. Only after the first ten-year period, by

the end of the 1990s the publications and literature on right-wing populist politics in Western

increased. Especially concerning the right-wing politics in the Netherlands and concerning the

case of Geert Wilders, there is a major lack of academic research and interest. The increase of

publications that refer to the rise of right-wing politics in Western Europe also shows a clear

content wise differentiation. Whereas earlier publications tended to explain the phenomenon

from out of party system analysis, latest publications focus on the socio-cultural conditions of

nowadays society and the ideological content of the new parties as an explanation for its

popularity. In short, most of the literature on the rise of right-wing politics in the European

political landscape questioned the different societal background of the emergence of this novel

politics. Despite this increase of publications, most theories remain explicitly one-sided and

only focus on a very specific regional, ideological, social, economic or cultural perspective.

The fast emergence of right-wing politics throughout Europe fascinated many and quickly

became part of the public discussion. The most fascinating about the phenomenon is the

widespread and suddenly high electoral support of right-wing populist parties even in countries

that are known as being moderate and tolerant. A good example is the Netherlands, a country

that traditionally is perceived as having a stable immunity against right-wing and right-wing

populist phenomena. Until the millennium change, parties on the right-side of the political

spectrum scarcely became support and didn’t have significant influence on the public

discussion. Right-wing politics in the Netherlands traditionally have been marginal. Therefore

the political changes at the beginning of this era that is described as the ‘Fortuyn-revolt’ - which

indicate a sudden upsurge of radical right-wing politics - are even more unconventional than in

other Western European countries. When in 2001 the List Pim Fortuyn became the second

biggest party in the Netherlands and immediately became part of the coalition, this implied a

radical redefining of the political landscape. After the assassination of Pim Fortuyn the party

3

disappeared again but it apparently left its marks on the Dutch political space and ever since the

chapter of right-wing populist politics still goes on, since the 2010 elections with Geert Wilders

Party for Freedom as its main protagonist.

This study necessarily needs to take the existing literature on the rise of right-wing populist

politics in Western Europe into account and logically needs to deal with the different features or

right-wing populism in general. Nevertheless this study merely focuses on the discursive and

ideological aspects of these party politics and takes the situation in the Netherlands as its focal

point. Furthermore, this study is based on the presumption that the fast and smooth emergence

and the resonance of the right-wing populist party politics is on the one hand due to what will be

called the ‘identity politics’ of those parties, including a discourse on national identity and

national culture, and to the post-secular and post-Christian socio-cultural reality in western

Europe.

The reconstruction of European and national identity as it is promoted in the populist right-

wing politics is one that conflates citizenship with ethnicity in a way that non-natives are

perceived as a threat to the national culture. As a result of this conflation in especially right-

wing political discourses, the xenophobia against non-Europeans (in this case often Muslims)

increases. The attempts to define the national identity from a cultural perspective contain

ethnocentric assumptions about what constitutes the national culture. These attempts typically

present a partial and selective conception of the national legacy, one that depicts the history in

terms of a glorious evolutionary ascent and moral success story. Under this schema the national

history is presented as a kind of historical progress beginning with classical Greek civilisation,

Roman law and Christianity passing through Enlightenment secularism and culmination in

Fukuyamas End of History with liberal democracy, capitalism and the rule of law. The efforts to

define the national or Western-European identity create new boundaries and a Manichean

opposition of identities. The national identity as such is being contested in order to define what

distinguishes ‘native’ from the ‘non-native’. What this study tries to point at is that the current

tide of xenophobia and protectionist right-wing politics which get a concrete face in the new

populist right represents primarily a retreat into ethnic reasoning, national and religious identity

construction, fostered by a search for security in time of social, cultural and political

disorientation. Hobsbawn, referring to Miroslav Hroch, states that ethnicity and nationalism are

“the ultimate guarantee when society fails.”1 Concluding, this research will thus draw upon two

major ideas: at the one hand the idea that various narratives in the new right populist’s politics

represent a recurrence of ethnicity and nationalism in political discourse and on the other hand

the idea that our public space is a post-secular space where religion plays and increasingly

visible and important role.

1 E.J. HOBSBAWN, Nationalism and Ethnicity Today in: Anthropology Today, vol 8, no 1, p.7.

4

Approach and methodology

A sound methodology is necessary for a coherent conduct of research. For this study, the case

study methodology has emerged as an appropriate tool. Case study is a broad term that

identifies quantitative, qualitative and mixed-method research. Several attempts have been

undertaken in order to define a case study. Even though multiple definitions exist, they all have

in common that case study research focus on the complexity of real life situations. Simons

concludes: “Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity

and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a real life

context.2 Stake states: “Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be

studied. . . . By whatever methods we choose to study the case. We could study it analytically or

holistically, entirely by repeated measures or hermeneutically, organically or culturally, and by

mixed methods—but we concentrate, at least for the time being, on the case.”3

Case study methodology is appropriate when one wants to know how, what (descriptive) or

why (causal) certain phenomena take place.4 Even though case study research thus can function

as a functional tool when trying to explain sociological phenomena, there are several problems

inherent to this research methodology that need to be taken into account. Most of the problems

are connected to the question of case selection and the scope of the case selection. Before

proceeding with a case study research, it is important to know why and with which goal the

cases are selected. Because of the complexity of case study selection scholars has been actively

searching to categorize different kinds of case studies. According to Yin case studies can be

exploratory, explanatory or descriptive.5 George and Bennet identify six types of case studies.

Most of the classifications are made on the basis of general distinction between theoretical and

non-theoretical case studies.6

The most appropriate tool for this research is a single case study. Drawing on the simple

classification of Yin, the single case study has a descriptive nature. Descriptive case studies

have the goal of developing hypotheses on cause-effect relationships. A descriptive case study

doesn’t have the intention to test or produce theory nor to give the opportunity to causal

inference.7 The subject of this research could also possibly be approached with a comparative or

2 H. SIMONS, Case Study Research in Practice, London, Sage publications, 2009, p.21.

3 R:E STAKE, Case studies in: N. K. DENZIN & Y. S. LINCOLN (EDS.), Strategies of qualitative inquiry,

2003, p. 134-164. 4 R. YIN, Case Study Research, Design and Methods, London, Sage Publications, 2008.

5 R. YIN, Applications of Case Study Research, London, Sage Publications, 1993.

6 A.L.GEORG & A. BENNET, Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Science, Cambridge, Belfer

Centre for Science and International Affairs, 2004. 7 R. YIN, Applications of Case Study Research, London, Sage Publications, 1993.

5

contrasting case study. But the common problem with a larger-N or cross-case case study would

be the high risk for selection bias and choosing cases in a purposive fashion. Furthermore, a

larger-N case study would go beyond the scope of this research. Therefore the approach to the

subject will be a descriptive within-case analysis. According to Collier a within-case study ‘‘is

concerned with diverse forms of internal evidence about causation that are brought to bear on

explaining a single, overall outcome within that case.’’8 Implicitly, no broader generalisation is

implied—the focus instead is on process tracing within the case. And for this sort of analysis,

they argue, it may be highly appropriate to select on outcomes. Indeed, the selected case is

descriptive because the case is selected in the context of the research question and presumed

theoretical outcome. The restriction to one case thus has several implications. The chosen case

claims to be representative only insofar as the electoral support of right-wing parties makes the

case representative for the rise of electoral support of right-wing parties throughout Western

Europe and insofar as the geographical space coincides with the reference framework of

Western Europe. The aim of the study will not be to deduce any causal or theoretical

information nor to make general statements about the rise of right-wing politics in Western

Europe, but to identify and describe the different aspects of a specific representative case. This

descriptive within-case analysis therefore will not allow any inference in the form of “if it is

(not) true in this case, it is true for any (no) cases”. But whilst identifying the various factors of

the phenomenon in a specific case it will allow the statement “if it is (not) true in this case, it

might (not) be true in other cases.” Or: “if it is (not) true for this case in respect of the variable

x,y,z it is (not) true for other cases if the variable x,y,z are present.”

Structure

The first chapter of this paper will be an extensive review of the existing literature on the rise of

right-wing populist politics in Western Europe. The purpose of this review is to confront the

Dutch case with the different theories that try to explain the rise of right-wing populist from a

political, economic or cultural perspective and why these theories apply or don’t apply to the

Dutch case and might apply to other, but not necessarily do so. This chapter will try to focus on

the mentioned one-sidedness and the presumed incompleteness of the existing literature and

criticizes those theories that perceive the rise of right-wing populism merely as a reaction to a

socio-cultural, economic or political crisis. The second chapter focusses on the political culture

of the Netherlands and points at the different features of political life, political tradition and

political system. There are two main reasons for the importance of the analysis of the political

culture. On the one hand, there have been attempts to explain the sudden rise of right-wing

8 H. E. BRADY & D.COLLIER, Rethinking Social Inquiry. Divers Tools. Shared Standards, Oxford,

Rowmann and Littlefield Publishers, 2004, p.93

6

politics in the Netherlands as a result of the political system and the political culture. In order to

be able to say whether this is coherent or not, it is important to understand the political culture at

first. On the other hand, the rise of right-wing politics in the Netherlands constitutes a

discontinuity with the political history of the Netherlands. In this chapter it will be discussed

why these politics are rather an odd man out. In a third chapter, the rise of Geert Wilders Partij

voor de Vrijheid (PVV) will be analysed and an attempt to define the nature of right-wing

populist politics in Western Europe and in the specific case of the Netherlands will be included.

In a fourth chapter, this paper discusses what will be called the identity politics within right-

wing populist politics. Due to the fact that those identity politics draw upon anti-immigration

polemics of Dutch right-wing politics the migration movements and the migration policies in

the Netherlands will be discussed as well. Subsequently a systematic overview will be given of

the themes which are part of the current right-wing politics in the Netherlands, including a

discussion on the representation of the Other, the so-called failure of multiculturalism, the neo-

ethnic depiction of Muslim community and neo-racism. After covering those different topics,

this paper will discuss the second major idea upon which the main argument of this paper is

built, namely the idea that post-Christian and post-secular space as a context in which the

popularity of right-wing populist parties is fostered. These paragraphs will thus talk about the

post-secular space and post-Christian culture. In this chapter the main argument will be

developed. In a conclusion the results of the third chapter will be compared with the formulated

critique on the existing literature in the first chapter and the results of this comparison attempts

to build the argumentative fundament for the hypothesis that the sudden rise of right-wing

populism in the Netherlands can be explained through the rhetorical content of this ideology,

which brings together features of nationalism, populism and liberalism and which is appealing

because of its reference to identity and value within a post-secular and post-Christian context.

7

CHAPTER ONE

Literature review

Introduction

In general, one could say that the publications on the rise of right-wing politics and more

specifically of right-wing populism in Western Europe particularly increased during the last

decade, even though the political phenomenon itself can be dated back earlier. Like has been

mentioned before, the academic interest for this phenomenon was rather low in the beginning.

The existing literature can broadly be categorized in four categories. A first category is the

literature that focuses on the socio-economic situation in Western-Europe which is perceived as

a well-known breeding ground for right-wing politics. A second category merely focuses on the

changed constitution of Western European society, namely the increasing immigration from

non-Western countries and how these movements increase feelings of anxiety and insecurity.

Those publications rather believe that right-wing politics are a reaction to these feelings of

anxiety and xenophobia and are able to provide an illusionary security and stability. The

immigration thesis believes, alongside the economic insecurities, that the social effects of

immigration benefitted right-wing politics. In this perspective, right-wing parties are a

representation of the popular xenophobia. A third category, which is also the smallest category,

merely focuses on the political culture and the political system of certain countries. In this

perspective, right-wing populism is perceived as a reaction to the so-called deficit of liberal

democracy and as an answer to the people’s dissatisfaction and alienation with traditional

politics. To a last category belong those authors who offer a more “holistic” explanation. In this

perspective, the rise of right-wing populist politics is explained by connecting the content of

right-wing populist politics and the societal premises. In short, there are publications that

dominantly focus on the socio-economic opportunity structures and those who focus on the

structural political conditions. The categorisation is off course artificial and the literature often

combines different aspects in order to try to explain the rise of right-wing populist politics.

There is another possible categorisation that is more useful and to which will be referred on

several points in this paper, namely the distinction between research that focuses on the

demand- side and research that focuses on the supply-side of the “electoral market.” This

distinction thus corresponds with the market metaphor distinguishing between demand-side and

supply-side factors. In this perspective political parties offer (supply) goods (ideas) to the public

8

and the public demands certain goods (ideas) under given circumstances. Demand-side research

often emphasizes the socio-economic processes as factors that influence the preferences of the

electorate. According to Muis, the demands of the electorate can then be “articulated and

mobilized by existing social movements, interest groups or political parties, or lead to the

emergence of new political organisations.”9 On the supply-side, the electoral success of right-

wing populist parties can be explained through the internal party organisation and opportunity

structures. In the following paragraphs a selection of existing publications in the different

categories will be reviewed.

Socio-economic and immigration-based explanations

One of the earlier and often referenced publications on right-wing populism in Western Europe

is a book called Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe from Hans-Georg Betz.10

According to Betz, politics and social reality in Western Europe has changed radically in the last

couple of years. A widespread disaffection with the political system is “symptoms of severe

crisis in post-war Western European settlement”.11

In this perspective, right-wing populist

politics have taken advantage of this crisis and have been able, through their ideologies and

programs to connect to the insecurity that result out of this economic, social and cultural

transformation. Betz states that the majority of radical right-wing populist parties are radical in

their rejection of established socio-cultural and socio-political system and their advocacy of

individual achievement. Betz develops his argument based on a couple of case studies and

generally combines the immigration thesis with arguments on economic insecurity and political

alienation. “The rise of radical right-wing populist parties has coincided with a marked increase

in public disaffection and disenchantment with the established political parties, the political

class, and the political system in general.”12

Concluding, according to Betz the sudden rise of

radical politics in Western Europe is a result of on the one hand the dissatisfaction with

established political system and on the one hand of the effects of economic and social changes.

The radical right in response claims to be able to give an answer to the existing socio-cultural

problems, the need of the people and reacts on the negative emotions of the electorate.

According to Betz, the populist right promotes itself as “the advocates of a cultural and

economic fortress Europe protecting Western Europe’s cultural identity and economic

prosperity”13

and is therefore highly appealing in times of social insecurity, political and

9 J. C. MUIS, Pim Fortuyn. The Evolution of a Media Phenomenon, U., p.27,

http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/33030/1/dissertation.pdf (access 28/06/2012). 10

H.-G. BETZ, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 11

Ibid., covertext. 12

Ibid., p.169. 13

Ibid., p.189.

http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/33030/1/dissertation.pdf

9

economic instability. Therefore, according to Betz a disappearance of those right-wing populist

parties is rather improbable “given the not unlikely prospects of steadily rising mass

unemployment and with it the expansion of the marginalized segments of the labour force; the

likely prospects of new distributional conflicts (…); and the almost certain prospects of

dealignment, public political disaffection, and a fundamental lack of ideas on the part of the

political class as to new strategies to lead Western Europe our of its socioeconomic

predicament.”14

In connection to the thesis that the economic and social changes in society are a breeding

ground for the development and rise of right-wing populism, Tim Spier offers another important

publication that mainly focuses on the nature of the electorate within the context of increasing

modernisation.15

According to Spier, the highly differentiated populist parties in Western

Europe all are a reaction to the crisis which is a result of the modernisation processes. The

important economic, cultural and political changes result in feelings of insecurity and fear with

the people which lead to dissatisfaction and protest. Spier claims that modernisation implies

populism. The electoral success of right-wing populist parties though is not only a result of the

fact that those parties present themselves as a solution to the socio-cultural and economic crisis

but, according to Spier, mainly attract a large segment of the electorate which experiences a

negative outcome of modernisation in their everyday life. Processes of modernisation always

lead to major transformations in society and these changes also have important influences on the

life of the people. Spier then differs between the people who benefit from these changes and the

part of the population that loses on behalf of these changes. So perceived, modernisation never

is a neutral process but have it’s ‘winners’ and its ‘losers’. Spier claims that the social situation,

in which people become ‘losers’ of modernisation, is one of the factors that might lead to

political protest. According to Spier there are four features of current right-wing populism

which enable those parties to appeal to the modernisation losers. First of all, traditionally

populism is perceived as a movement that tries to connect to the people, the simple man. The

people are perceived as a homogeneous, highly positive entity. The positive perception of the

simple man appeals to those people who often feel ignored or perceive themselves as victims of

the modern system. In addition to this, the polarisation between the people and the elite which is

often made by right-wing populist politicians appeals even more to those people who also often

tend to blame the elite and the political system for their problems. The right-wing populist

politics also argue that the elite can and should be blamed for the fact that they have lost the

connection to the people and are doing all the work from above. The right-wing populist

politician presents himself as someone who listens to the people and as someone who is part of

14

H.-G. BETZ, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994,

p.189. 15

T. SPIER, Modernisierungsverlierers? Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistische Parteien in Westeuropa,

Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010.

10

the “simple and honest people” and not of the “corrupt elite”. A third feature that Spier

mentions are the charismatic figures that presumably always represent the populist parties.

Those representatives claim that the exactly understand what is going on amongst the people.

Tim Spier believes that the insecurity of the modernisation loser implies a need for leadership

and political transparency. A last element that Spier mentions is the isolation of the populist

against a certain part of the population, often a minority of the people. This believes Spier, also

appeals to the modernisation loser because of the fact that through the isolation against other

groups, a very strong in-group is created and this promotes the development of strong social

identities and this provides psychological security.16

Concluding, for Spier abovementioned

elements of right-wing populist politics relate to the negative outcome of modernisation

processes and provide those parties with an electorate of modernisation losers.

Another very important author on right-wing populist political analysis, especially in

Germany, is Frank Decker. In his book Der neuen Rechtspopulismus (the New Right-Wing

Populism) Decker also tries to give a theoretical explanation on the rise of right-wing populist

parties throughout Western Europe. His main research question is whether right-wing populism

is a necessary correction to the political system or a threat to democracy. Decker compares a

total of eight parties in eight different countries to come to the conclusion that the current right-

wing populist movements, especially because of their endurance, are a substantial threat to

stable democracy in Western Europe.17

Deckers analysis includes five categories that might

explain the rise of the right-wing populist in Western Europe: protest, anti-modernisation, the

changes of social structure and social values, opportunity structures and agent level. According

to Decker, protest is a helpful category to explain the rise and success of right-wing populist

parties in Europe. Right-wing populist parties in this sense are “discontent parties” or “protest

parties” and “are marked by the expression of political discontent”.18

Secondly, for Decker, as

for Spier, what is the same in all populist parties is the reaction against the consequences of

modernisation processes and the dissatisfaction with the system or the political elite. Decker

differs between economic, cultural and social modernisation. Economic modernisation implies

the technical development and industrial society, cultural modernisation is the decrease of

religiosity, the pluralisation of society and political modernisation implies nation building,

segregation of public and private space, mass communication etc. Populist parties now present

themselves as a solution to the problems that go along with those three sides of modernisation.

In the realm of economic modernisation, populist parties defend and protect the welfare state, in

the realm of cultural modernisation they promote the reconstruction of (national) community

16

T. SPIER, Modernisierungsverlierers? Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistische Partein in Westeuropa,

Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010. 17

F. DECKER, der Neuen Rechtspopulismus, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2004, p. 271- 279. 18

Ibid., p.281.

11

and in the realm of political modernisation they promulgate a redefinition of democracy.19

A

third category of explanation of the rise of right-wing populist parties is the pluralisation of

society. The pluralisation of society also resulted in a pluralisation of values, ways of life,

religions, etc. When more people with different perspectives come together, the need for

belonging grows. The right-wing populist parties have a highly stable and constant value system

and therefore constitute a stable social group which is able to provide the electorate with social

and psychological security.20

Concerning opportunity structures, Decker points at three

processes that paved the way for right-wing populism in the 80s to develop. At first, the balance

of power moves to the right, secondly the complex political problems diminish the strategy- and

act competences and thirdly the so-called “plebitarian transformation” of the political

processes.21

Ultimately Decker claims that also on behalf of the agents within right-wing

populist parties, the electoral success of these parties can partially be explained. This means that

leading politicians within those parties often are highly charismatic and that there is a

“precarious relation between leader authority and institutionalisation.”22

Most often those

charismatic leaders then present themselves as representatives of the interests of the people

which make them easily popular. Concluding, the social structure and socio-cultural

environment of society constitutes a larger demand for party politics like the right-wing populist

politics and additionally the political opportunity structures paved the way for the emergence of

these parties. The fundamental changes within society benefit the populist parties in two ways:

they collect the occasional protest electorate and the ones that are long-term dissatisfied with the

social structures.23

Decker thus gives a coherent and convincing overview of the different

factors that might explain the success of right-wing politics in nowadays Western Europe, with

a strong emphasis on the structural elements of political and social transformation.

Structural and s systemic explanations

In his book Rechtspopulismus in Belgien und den Niederlanden (Right-Wing Populism in

Belgium and the Netherlands) Gerd Reuter makes an analysis in line with Decker et al. but with

a rather strong emphasis on political culture and political structure instead of socio-cultural

environment of Western European countries as a possible explanation for the development of

right-wing politics.24

Reuter compares the rise of right-wing populism in the Netherlands with

the rise of the right-wing in Belgium, focusing on the differences in political system and

19

F. DECKER, der Neuen Rechtspopulismus, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, 2004, p.197-198. 20

Ibid., p.247-248. 21

Further reading Ibid., p.263. 22

Ibid., p.265. 23

Ibid., p. 271-279. 24

G. REUTER, Rechtspopulismus in Belgien und den Niederlanden, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für

Sozialwissenschaften, 2010.

12

political culture. According to Reuter, there is an apparent deficit in consociational democracies

which bring forth a niche for right-wing populist politics that proclaim this deficit. According to

Reuter the political structure didn’t react appropriately to the changes in political culture and

therefore created a gap between politics and social reality. As a result of this deficit and in

connection to the already existing “cultures of protest” in Belgium and the Netherlands, people

were prone to vote for those parties that emphasis several themes of protest. Reuter thus

presents a highly emotional electorate behind the electoral success of right-wing politics in

Belgian and the Netherlands, an electorate that is emotionally affected by events and feels the

need to protest against the sensed lack of appropriate connection between people and politics.

Furthermore, Cas Muddes theory of the “pathological normalcy” needs to be mentioned.

Mudde criticizes many analyses of the rise of right-wing populist politics because they mainly

focus on the demand-side. With his theories, Mudde wants to focus more on the supply-side.

Mudde: “Today the politics of the radical right is the politics of frustration – the sour impotence

of those who find themselves unable to understand, let alone command, the complex mass

society that is the polity today.”25

The thesis of pathological normalcy implies that the radical

right constitutes a pathology in post-war Western Europe. Additionally, its success can be

explained by extreme conditions, for example an economic or socio-cultural crisis.26

Mudde

emphasizes that the thesis of pathological normalcy should be distinguished from what he calls

the thesis of “normal pathology”. As a normal pathology, populism is an ideology that has

values which are alien western democratic values. Nevertheless a small potential for them exist

in all western societies. As a third feature of this normal pathology thesis the electoral support

of right-wing populist parties is “based on ‘structurally determined pathologies’” which means

that right-wing populist parties will only gain electoral success in times of crisis. Klingeman

says: “as they fail to fulfil their functions of coping with everyday life, the individual with a

rigid value and orientation system reacts to changes in the environmental conditions with

increasing worry (anxiety, aggressiveness, etc.). Mudde mentions Decker and Betz as the

representatives of this normal pathology thesis and furthermore claims that the thesis of normal

pathology have dominated Western European research on the rise of the right-wing populist

politics.27

In opposition to what the normal pathology thesis claims, Mudde claims that the

existence, spread and support of right-wing populist politics should be understood as a

pathological normalcy. This means that the values of the right-wing populist ideology are not

opposed to the democratic values and even shared by many other parties throughout the political

spectrum, that the views and opinions of the right-wing populist ideology are not only supported

by a small minority, but by many and thirdly, that those parties not only emerge in times of

25

C. MUDDE, the Populist Radical Right. A pathological Normalcy in: West European Politics,

Vol. 33, No. 6, 1167–1186, November 2010, p.1167. 26

Ibid. p.1168 27

Ibid. 1171.

13

crisis but that its emergence can be observed independent from socio-cultural or economic

extreme conditions. Mudde: “The pathological normalcy thesis does not entail that the populist

radical right is part of the mainstream of contemporary democratic societies. Rather, it holds

that, ideologically and attitudinally, the populist radical right constitutes a radicalisation of

mainstream views.”28

This paradigmatic shift has large consequences for the research on the rise

of the populist right in Western Europe. Mudde thus claims that a high potential can be found

on the demand side or that “demand is a given in contemporary western democracies.”29

In this

perspective, to explain the rise of the populist-right cannot be sufficiently explained by only

focusing on the demand of the electorate, but rather on what the populist right supplies and on

an analysis of the right-wing parties itself. The success of those parties can then be explained

through four party related elements: the successful “issue position ownership” on immigration,

security, etc. of the right-wing populist parties, their internal organisation, their leadership and

their propaganda.30

Demand and supply explanations

There are two more mentionable publications that present a particular different and more

‘holistic’ perspective on the rise of the right-wing populist parties in Western Europe and focus

more on the rhetorical content of right-wing populist politics concerning identity and nation and

how this rhetoric can mobilize a large electorate. First of all, Mabel Berezin who in her book

Illiberal Politics in neoliberal Times claims that the emergence of right-wing populist politics is

an implicit result of the intensification of “cultural and economic Europeanization”.31

Berezin

mainly focuses on the “no” to the European constitution in France and in the Netherlands as an

indicator for the changing perspective on national identity where the populist right can play

upon. Contrary to the majority of literature on right-wing politics that focus on electoral

behaviour, socio-cultural or economic environment and current opportunity structures, Berezin

tries to understand the populist movements within a broad spatial and temporal perspective.

Berezin claims that in order to understand the popularity of those parties now, it is necessary to

consider the historical legacies. The fundamental idea of Berezin´s book is the transition from

what she calls an “Old Europe” in which there are still strong ties to the nation-state which

provides a sense of social security to the “New Europe” of the Maastricht Treaty which results

in an increasing globalisation and diffusion of the nation-state. In the New Europe then, there is

28

C. MUDDE, the Populist Radical Right. A pathological Normalcy in: West European Politics,

Vol. 33, No. 6, 1167–1186, November 2010, p.1167. 29

Ibid., p. 1181 30

Ibid. p. 1181. 31

M. BEREZIN, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. Culture, security and populism in the New Europe,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.5.

14

a space for right-wing populist parties to develop because the supranational structure of

European political life cannot provide the same solidarity, security and stability as in the Old

Europe.32

European integration forces the nation-sate to “rewrite cultural and social contracts to

the advantage of some citizens and the disadvantages of others.”33

Berezin built her argument

upon a comparison between the French and Italian right-wing populist politics. Berezin uses the

term “consolidation” to describe the process in which culture and organisation are connected

and which it “at the core of the nation-state project and productive of national identity.”34

Now,

In France, there is a so-called “hegemonic consolidation regime” which means that there is a

tight fit between nation and state, culture and institution. Therefore the national identity could

become something to react against the difference and promoted a defence of tradition and

national culture. This protectionism wasn’t only part of the right-wing populist politics but also

become part of other parties throughout the political spectrum. Berezin now claims that exactly

because of this hegemonic consolidation, national identities that are challenged by factors such

as Europeanization and globalisation promote a “reassertion of nation-ness on the cultural an

institutional level.”35

As a counterexample Berezin describes the situation in Italy as a situation

of “flexible consolidation regime”. Berezin believes that in Italy multiple identities could co-

exist under the umbrella of Italy, making its identities “malleable and ready for cultural and

political contingencies.”36

Europeanization in Italy fosters the national identity but in an

inclusive way. Whereas in France the strong national identity is challenged by supranational

structures, in Italy the weak national identities are enforced by those structures. Concluding, for

Berezin the challenge to modern democracy is the destabilizing effects of globalisation and

Europeanization. The destabilisation of the nation-state have fostered social and cultural

anxieties and the right-wing populist have been the most successful in reacting on those

anxieties through making those anxieties the keystones of their party programs and offer a

reconstruction of national identity as social security. Depending then on the degree of

interconnection between culture and institution under influence of the increasing supranational

structure of political life, a space emerges for the right-wing political parties to develop and gain

electoral support.37

A last author who also focuses on the importance of national identity in the right-wing

politics which can be perceived as one of the main reasons for the electoral success of right-

wing populist politics is Jens Rydgren. Rydgren is one of the few authors who perceive the rise

of the right-wing in Europe as an ethno-nationalist phenomenon. His first publication in 2002

32

M. BEREZIN, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. Culture, security and populism in the New Europe,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.17-19. 33

Ibid. 34

Ibid. p.248. 35

Ibid., p.248. 36

Ibid 37

Ibid., p.248-258.

15

focuses on the Front National in France which Rydgren describes as ethno-nationalist

mobilisation.38

Rydgren thus presents a new model for explaining the emergence of the extreme

right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. According to Rydgren those parties combine

ethno nationalist xenophobia with anti-elite and anti-establishment populism.39

This politics is

what Rydgren calls a new master frame which replaces the old master frame of the pre-World

War extreme right. This innovation enabled those parties to: “(1) mobilize on xenophobic and

anti-immigration attitudes without being stigmatized as racists and (2) mobilize on political

discontent without being stigmatized as antidemocrats.”40

Evaluation

The literature review above tried to discuss the main publications in the field of right-wing

populist politics analysis and tried to give a coherent impression of the different perspectives

and opinions that are being represented within this field. It is obvious, that the plurality of

opinions, theories and perspectives indicates the complexity of the emergence of this new party

family in Western Europe. Because of the complexity of this phenomenon, it might be the case

that none of those theories is false and that a plausible argument can be found for every

explanation mentioned above. Nevertheless, those theories that try to explain the rise of right-

wing populism based on only the socio-cultural, economic or political crisis or mainly focus on

so-called opportunity structures within society, do not sufficiently take the discursive content of

right-wing populist ideology into account. In line with the distinction between demand and

supply side, the mere focus on the demand-side doesn’t sufficiently take the complexity of the

socio-cultural and political reality into account. Furthermore, Decker, Reuter, and Betz seem to

simplify the nature of the new parties and reduce them to “old-fashioned” populism. Off course

the new parties have a mentionable populist side, but the nature of those parties goes far beyond

the features of traditional populism. Furthermore, the interplay between socio-cultural,

economic or political changes and the emergence of right-wing populist politics should not be

ignored, but it should be noticed that those parties do not solely gain their electorate because

they present themselves as a solution to a societal crisis. In this regard, the viewpoint of Cas

Mudde is helpful and a supply-side explanation might be more effective than a demand-side

explanation because it signalizes that a focus on the socio-cultural and economic conditions are

not sufficient to explain the success of those parties. Nevertheless, to claim that the success of

38

J. RYDGREN, The Populist Challenge. Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobilisation in France,

Stockholm, Berghahn Books, , 2004. 39

J. RYDGREN, Is extreme right contagious. Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family, U.,

Cornell University Brown Bag Lunch Seminar, October 18, 2004. (Written citation permission from J.

Rydrgen 15.7.2012) 40

Ibid. p.30.

16

those parties can be explained through issue position ownership, party organisation and

leadership might also miss out on important rhetorical content which increase the electoral

support of those parties. The opinion that this paper presents goes more in the direction of

Rydgren and Berezins theses that observe the identity politics and the role of nation, ethnicity

and national identity as an important key stone of the right-wing populist political discourse and

that perceive this discourse as one of the main explanations for the high electoral support. In this

perspective, the right-wing populist parties supply ideas that resonate with the electorate

because the support of these ideas is widespread within the electorate. Eventually, the

conclusion might be that the explanation for the rise of the right-wing populist parties in

Western Europe is a result of both a demand which resulted from several social, cultural and

economic changes and of what those parties supply.

17

CHAPTER 2

Political culture, politics and governance in the Netherlands

Introduction

The literature review in the first chapter offered a brief overview of the different explanations

on the rise of right-wing populism and implicitly already pointed at the complexity of the

phenomenon. Because of this complexity an elaborated analysis of right-wing populist politics

in the Netherlands is mandatory. However, before proceeding with this analysis, the description

of the political culture in the Netherlands is important. The discontinuity between the traditional

politics, the political culture and the relatively rapid rise of the right-wing populist parties in the

Netherlands need to be considered in order to better understand the phenomenon. Only through

an analysis of political culture and political tradition, it will become clear that the rise of right-

wing politics in the Netherlands is a political oddity and should therefore be observed.

Political culture

Political culture according to the definition of Almond and Verba is “the particular distribution

of patterns of orientation towards political objects among the members of the nation”.41

The

political culture bears upon the existing attitudes in society. This definition of political culture

though seems to be rather flexible and changing throughout different publications. In a later

publication it is said that the “political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs and feelings about

politics current in a nation at a given time.”42

Political culture in this definition is a subjective

actuality, but not solely individual. The political culture can be understood as a macro-

sociological agglomerate of the different individual orientations and dispositions.43

Political

culture in this heuristic understanding is able to describe the subjective dimension of politics

and points at the existing attitudes. The concept of political culture nowadays is understood as a

41

G.A. ALMOND & S. VERBA, Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, London,

Sage Publications, 1989, p.13. 42

G.A.ALMOND & G.B. POWELL, Comparative Politics. System, Process, and Policy, Boston, Little

Brown, 1978, p.25. 43

G.A. ALMOND & S. VERBA, Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, London,

Sage Publications, 1989, p.397.

18

flexible and changeable factor that is of utmost importance for the political structure. The

political culture is in an on-going interaction with the political structure and should therefore be

taken into consideration in every analysis of political structures and political processes.44

The

strong aspect of this theory of political culture is the fact that it is able to integrate the macro-

and micro level of political reality. Figure 2 shows this specific interaction.

MACRO LEVEL

Institutions

Political Culture

Attitudes

MICRO LEVEL

Figure 2. political culture between micro- and macro level of the political system45

For the discussion on right-wing populism in Western Europe the existing political attitudes on

a micro level appear to be of high importance to understand the emergence and spread of those

parties. The changes in the political landscape can not only be perceived as a logical result of

changes in the political system. It is even more important to look at the existing political culture

and the changes that appear in the political culture that influence the face of the political

landscape.

Politics in the Netherlands

Even though the spread of the new kind of parties take place throughout Europe, the fact that

right-wing politics in the Netherlands increased vehemently in the last couple of years is even

more stunning because of the Dutch reputation of being liberal, tolerant and open. Dutch

governance and politics always has been of high interest for political scientists. Dutch (political)

culture is widely perceived as one of the most tolerant, flexible and liberal cultures throughout

Western Europe. The Dutch political system traditionally has been an example of the fact that

social and political division, not necessarily lead to political instability. The so-called “polder-

model”, a term that describes a culture of deliberation and consensus, is perceived as the recipe

44


Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, p.49. 45

Adapted version according to G. REUTER, Rechtspopulismus in Belgien und den Niederlanden,

Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, p.50.

19

for success on political and economic level. Furthermore the fascination for Dutch political

culture stems from the fact that the Dutch political system is one of the most proportional in the

world.46

Contrary to other countries, in the Netherlands there is no special electoral threshold

that a party must cross in order to achieve representation in the Parliament. The only threshold

is the electoral quotient formed by dividing the number of votes cast at an election by the

number of seats in Parliament. This quotient only amounts to 0,667 per cent of the vote. The

different districts play no role in allocating the number of seats to each party out of which

follows that depending on the turnout, approximately 60.000 votes nationwide is sufficient to

gain a seat.47

The proportional distribution of seats is as close as possible to the proportion of

the vote that the parties have achieved.

As a result of this highly proportional electoral system, the parliament consists of a number

of minority parties. As mentioned before, the political and social division in the Netherlands

apparently doesn’t preclude stability. This peacefulness and stability of Dutch politics actually

constitute a major achievement because, according to Andeweg & Irwin, historically, there have

been three potential threats to stable government in the Netherlands.48

First of all, the

Netherlands is a country of minorities, which is without doubt the single most important

characteristic of Dutch politics. No political party has ever succeeded in winning an electoral

majority. The largest percentage ever received by a single part is 35.5 percent. The reason that

the Dutch political system is characterized by minorities mirrors the social situation in the

Netherlands. Dutch society in general is a whole of many minorities. According to “cleavage

theory”, one could say that Dutch society is divided alongside two cleavages: a social-cultural

and a religious one. This means both religion and class play an important role. This double

divide is a second challenge to stable democratic politics. Furthermore, the religious/secular

cleavage makes it impossible to order the political parties along a single ideological dimension.

The term left-wing and right-wing could as well apply to the religious dimensions as to the class

divide. In a highly divided society one could opt for a minority government or, the only

alternative, a coalition government. But when we consider that coalition governments need to be

built upon ideological consensus, in the case where no party has a majority and the parties are

not ordered alongside a single ideological dimension, coalition building is a real difficult

process. The main question namely remains on which ideological dimension should be focused.

This almost unsolvable question undoubtedly leads to following conclusion: “whatever coalition

will be formed, there is a built-in source of conflict between the governing parties.” 49

46

R.B. ANDEWEG & G.A. IRWIN, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, New York, Palgrave

Macmillan, 2005, p.82. 47

Ibid.,.82. 48

Ibid.,, p.19. 49

Ibid., p..23.

20

A third destabilizing element to political life in Dutch society is the existence of manifold

strong subcultures. The social and religious minorities in Dutch society not only are clearly

connected to the five major political parties, but built a strong organized social group

themselves.50

The different subcultures in Dutch society not only structure the political

spectrum, but influence the whole of social, economic and culture life. This phenomenon is a

typical feature of Dutch and Belgian society and is known as “pillarisation”. According to

Lijphart, there are 4 pillars within Dutch society: the Catholic, Protestant, Socialist and Liberal

pillar. Though there is a lot of discussion about the number of pillars and the confusion is based

on different definitions of the concept. According to Andeweg & Irwin, the Structure of Dutch

Pillars can be perceived as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3. The structure of the Dutch pillars51

CATHOLICS PROTESTANTS SOCIALISTS LIBERALS

Dutch Reformed

/ Gereformeerd

PARTY KVP CHU / ARP PvdA VVD

TRADE UNION NKV CNV NVV White-collar

unions

EMPLOYERS

ORGANISATION

NCW - VNO

BROADCASTING KRO NCRV VARA AVRO

HEALTHCARE White/yellow

cross

Green/orange

cross

Green cross Green cross

SCHOOLS Catholic schools Schools “with

bible”

State schools State schools

UNIVERSITIES Nijmegen,

Tilburg

Free University,

Amsterdam

State and

municipal

universities

State and

municipal

universities

NEWSPAPERS Volkskrant Trouw Het Parool NRC

Handelblad

A segmented society is a threat to political stability. According to Lijphart, normally a

segmented or pillarised society inevitably leads to instability. But, when the threat to stability by

social division is offset by a politics of accommodation at the elite level, like it is the case in the

50



Ibid., p.26.

21

Netherlands, we have a consociational democracy. In the Dutch case, this means that the pillars

of society do not clash but stand next to each other, held together at the top by the Dutch state.52

Lijphart dates the beginning of the consociational democracy in the Netherlands back to the

period of 1913-1917 when there were some major issues that needed to be settled concerning

for example suffrage and the financial position of religious schools (which is known as “the

school struggle”). These struggles were settled with the so-called Great Pacification in 1917.

The Great Pacification included universal suffrage, equalisation of the qualifications for

membership of the First and Second Chambers of parliament, proportional representation, the

equal funding for all schools both secular and religious and compulsory attendance at the

polls.5354

The Great Pacification ever since is perceived as an example for the character of Dutch

politics.

“The rule of proportionality is of fundamental importance to the success of the politics of

accommodation in Holland. The establishment of the accommodation pattern of politics by the

peaceful settlement of 1917 was intimately related to this rule: both the suffrage and the schools

questions were settled based on the basis of proportionality. The rule has been faithfully adhered

to ever since.” 55

The four basic principles of Dutch politics that can be derived from the happenings of 1917,

according to Lijphart are: firstly, executive power-sharing or grand coalition, secondly a high

degree of autonomy; thirdly, proportionality and final, minority veto.56

Concluding those four

principles combined with the politics of accommodations always managed to solve conflicts in

peaceful means.57

Depillarisation and the continuation of accomodationist politics

Important for the existence of a pillarised consociational democracy thus is the fact that political

stability isn’t destabilised through societal plurality. The stability related to the consociational

democracy hasn’t been a continuous success story and the political system has been questioned

many times. Nevertheless, a major political reform didn’t take place.

52



Ibid.,, p.29-31. 54

K. GLADDISH, Governing from the Centre. Politics and Policy-Making in the Netherlands, London,

Hurst & Company, 1991, p.25. 55

A. LIJPHART, The Politics of Accomodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley,

University of California Press, 1975, p.129. 56



Ibid., p.30.

22

During the Second World War for example, plans were made to renew Dutch politics and

resulted in an attempt to break through the pillarisation. Despite those plans, in the post-war

years the respective pillars have been rebuilt quite quickly. These years even became the

flourishing days of consociational democracy and political stability. The concept of political

culture partially might explain why reform ideas on the institutional level were difficult or

almost impossible to implement. The stable period came to an abrupt end in the second half of

the 1960s. The movements of social changes also influenced the public sphere in the

Netherlands. Secularisation, individualisation, pluralisation, etc. were the fundamental societal

changes and had their impact on political culture. There were large-scale demonstrations and

riots in big cities. The changes in political culture ultimately led to changes in the character of

politics and society. These changes in Dutch society have been called the “depillarisation

process”.58

The process of depillarisation is characterized by a total of five processes according

to Andeweg and Irwin. Firstly, there is a decline of importance of religion within the

subcultures. This implies that there is a decreasing degree of religiosity and of expression of

religious identity within the different pillars. Secondly, as the density and size of the pillarized

organisational infrastructure was a measure of pillarisation, the increasing number and size of

non-pillarized organisation are an indication for depillarisation. Thirdly, the cohesiveness of

pillars diminished. Fourth, the segregation of society based on class declines. There is a

transition from closed to open competition in elections and there also appears an emergence of

organisations formerly belonging to different subcultures. The fifth and final indicator of

depilarisation is the fact that pillarisation is no longer encouraged by the elites.59

Now what are the concrete consequences of the depillarisation process? According to

Lijphart, depillarisation fundamentally changed Dutch society. Also the elitist character of the

politics of accommodation came under increasing critique. Since the existence of the respective

pillars was the key stone for the politics of accommodation, the disappearance of those pillars

would imply a breakdown of these stable politics. Despite depillarisation though, the politics of

accommodation remained the leading model for Dutch politics. The question still remains how

the continuation of these politics is to be explained. Andeweg and Irwin suggest that the

pillarisation as the biggest threat to stable democracy might have been overemphasized. As has

been mentioned before, Dutch society and political culture has been generally characterized by

minorities. The pillars within society weren’t the only destabilizing factor to the consociational

democracy. Even if society changed on a socio-cultural level, on a political level all political

parties are still far removed from a parliamentary majority. This might be an explanation for the

58



Ibid., 37-39.

23

continuation of accommodation without pillarisation. After all, “the Netherlands remains a

country of minorities which entertain no hope of becoming majorities.”60

Party system in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is a clear example of a multi-party system. The plurality of parties can be

better structured by the concept of political families. According to Mair and Mudden parties

within a political family share many aspects of a similar origin and ideology. Although they are

distinct entities, they may be seen as variation of a common theme.61

In the Netherlands, as has

been mentioned before, those political families originally were connected to the different pillars

of Dutch society.

During the 20th century, several catholic, protestant and Dutch reformed parties have been

founded. Together, those religious based parties form the family of Christian democrats.

Historically, the parties within this family changed a lot throughout the years and especially the

protestant parties faced many schisms based on the religious distinction between the Dutch

Reformed and the Gereformeerden. In 1980 the CDA was founded, a result of the merging of

the three main religious parties: the gereformeerde Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), the Dutch

Reformed Christian Historical Union (CHU) and the Catholic Peoples Party (KVP). Until today,

the CDA is an important political actor.62

A second political family is formed by those parties related to the socialist pillar. Socialism

could initially only appeal to non-religious, who although growing were still only a minority of

the population. Nevertheless, socialist were a challenge to those traditional religious

organisations and competed with them on a societal and political level. The first socialist

political party was founded in 1882 and was called the SDAP (Social Democratic Workers

Party) which later would merge into the PvdA. Because of the major influence of religious

parties in the government, the socialists for a long time were perceived as an inappropriate

coalition partner. Only on the brink of the Second World War, a new cabinet was chosen in

which two socialist ministers were elected.63

It was only after the Second World War, that the

socialist pillar was able to gain more influence through emphasizing on the rebuilding of a

stable, safe and prosperous society. In 1946 the SDAP merged with the smaller Christian

democratic and liberal parties into the Labour Party (PvdA). Together with the SP, the PvdA is

one of the most important socialist players within Dutch politics. Another important socialist

60

Ibid., P.44. 61

P. MAIR & C. MUDDE, The Party Family and its Study, in: Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1

(june 1998), p. 211-229. 62


Macmillan, 2005, p. 48-57. 63

K. Gladdish, Governing from the Centre. Politics and Policy-Making in the Netherlands, London,

Hurst & Company, 1991, p.30.

24

party in this post-war period which later on with several other parties merged to GreenLeft, is

the Pacifist Socialist party. The party was founded on January 22, 1957. Focal point of PSP

politics were the total absolute distortion of violence and furthermore combined democratic,

communist and socialist ideals.64

Like the Christian democratic parties, the socialist parties have

been facing several schisms and split-offs during the 20th century, based on ideological

differences. In the course of the years, several parties split from the PSP and in 1989 the PSP

merged with the Communist Party and Evangelical Peoples Party. The current socialist party SP

was founded after a split-off with the communist party.65

The SP was founded on October 22,

1972. Concluding, even though at the beginning socialist were often perceived as a rival for the

traditional religious parties, they were able to build out an autonomous pillar and gain a solid

position within Dutch politics.

A third political family is the liberal family. At an institutional level, a social and political

system was developed that was primarily open and tolerant. An example for this tolerance was

the freedom of religion which made the Netherlands an attractive country for several groups of

people. The liberal social and political climate became breeding ground for philosophies of

liberalism. Liberals played a very important role and were prominent both in politics and many

areas of social life such as the universities, media and business. The liberals were never highly

organised, but nevertheless had an important impact on the political culture. In 1948 the biggest

liberal party was founded: the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (the People's Party for

Freedom and Democracy, VVD). Alongside the VVD, as a result of the social unrest in the

1960s a new party emerged. This party called itself D66 and pursued a radical change of politics

and society. Even though D66 never gained major electoral support in the beginning years,

together with the VVD it shaped the character of liberal politics in the Netherlands.66

Before proceeding to the analysis of right-wing parties in the Netherlands, one party still

needs to be mentioned. GreenLeft is a party that merged out of four existing parties – the

Comunist Party, the Pacifist Socialist, The Radical and the Evangelical Peoples Party. This

party was the first and only party to be categorized as a green party, even though there is a lot of

ideological overlap with socialist parties. Figure 4 shows an overview of the most important

current political parties.

64

Documentation centre Dutch political parties, http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/themas/beginselProgrammas/psp/begprog.pdf 65

Ibid., p.52. 66


Macmillan, 2005, p.53.

http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/themas/beginselProgrammas/psp/begprog.pdf

25

Figure 4. Dutch Political parties at a Glance67

Abbrev Name Founded Description

CDA Christian Democratic

Appeal

1980 Formed as a merger

of ARP; CHU and

KVP

SGP Political Reformed

Party

1918 Orthodox Calvinist

CU Christian Union 2000 Orthodox Calvinist.

Merger of GPV and

RPF

PvdA Labour Party 1946 Social-democratic

party

SP Socialist party 1972 Former maoist, now

leftist populist party

GL Green Left 1989 Ecologist and leftist

part. Merger of CPN,

PSP, PPR and EP

VVD Liberal arty 1948 Major conservative

liberal party

D66 Democrats 66 1966 Progressive-liberal

reform party

PVV Party for Freedom 2002

A last political family deserves some more attention in the context of this paper: the populist

and extreme right parties. Generally, one could state that parties of the extreme right have

seldom been of great electoral importance in the Netherlands. Throughout the 19th and 20

th

century only a few right-wing or populist parties emerged that only were of small importance.

As will be discussed later, the small impact of right-wing or populist politics in the Netherlands

could be partially explained by the existing political culture and the elements of political life

discussed above. In the 1960s a party emerged that was often referred to as a rightist party. This

party called itself “The Farmers party” and had its roots in the dissatisfaction of farmers with

the economic and political situation. The party had a short electoral success which is according

to Andeweg and Irwin to be explained by the fact that the party appealed to people who wanted

to make a change to the traditional pillarised political system. The Farmers gained seven seats in

67

Ibid., p.64.

26

the parliament after the elections of 1967 but they left the Parliament in 1981 due to internal

conflicts.68

Furthermore, as result of societal changes and the decreasing economic welfare, small

groups have more often tried to thematise the existing fears and hatred against immigrants and

other minorities. The size of such radical groups has in general been smaller in the Netherlands

than in other countries, but because of the low electoral threshold such groups succeeded on two

occasions in electing a representative to Parliament.69

Besides from abovementioned parties,

List Pim Fortuyn and Wilder's PVV which will be intensively discussed below, a last relatively

new party in the right-wing spectrum needs to be mentioned, namely Trots op Nederland (Proud

of the Netherlands) from Rita Verdonk. The Party was founded on October 17, 2007 and

described itself as “right-wing, but not conservatist.”70

Verdonk stated: “the political elite in the

Netherlands has had its chance. It is more than time for a new approach. ToN is the political

movement for the rest of the Netherlands, a movement that places the interests of the Dutch

people before the interests of the party-bobos.”71

On the level of socio-cultural policy, ToN does

have a merely conservatist program, with the emphasis on social security, the reduction of

immigration for only well educated people that are necessary for the labour market and for “real

political refugees”.72

Furthermore ToN wants to strive for a society where the “character of the

Netherlands” will become central again. 73

ToN only participated in the parliamentary elections

of 2010 and became a poor result of only 0.56 per cent of the votes.74

In general one could thus summarize the situation as follows. For decades, the Netherlands

has been governed from the centre, consisting of a stable coalition of between two and four

parties from the centre-right or centre-left and no right-wing political party ever gained high

electoral importance. Furthermore, politics in the Netherlands are traditionally marked by the

cooperation between several minority parties and even though political and public life is

characterized by high degree of differentiation, the government has always been able to

guarantee and maintain social and political stability. The current increasing electoral success of

right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands is an unexpected phenomenon that is difficult to

explain through the analysis of political structures or political history. Such an analysis would

68



Ibid., p.56. 70

F. VAN DEIJL & J. NIEMÖLLER, “Ik ga weer lekker stevig terugkomen…yes!”, in: HP/De Tijd,

08/06/2007, p.20. 71

Trots op Nederland – De nieuwe beweging van Rita Verdonk’, www.stemrita.nl, 21 oktober 2007. 72

A.M.P. LUCARDIE, Rechts-extremisme, populisme of democractisch patriotisme? Opmerkingen over de

politieke plaatsbepaling van de Partij voor de Vrijheid en Trots op Nederland, in : Jaarboek

Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, 2007, p.176-190. 73

R. VERDONK, De visie van trots op Nederland, http://www.trotsopnederland.com/2009/05/de-visie-van-trotsopnederland/# (access: 01.06.2012). 74

http://www.kiesraad.nl/nl/Actueel/Nieuwsberichten/(2047)-Actueel-Nieuwsberichten-

2010/Uitslag_verkiezing_leden_Tweede_Kamer_van_9_juni_2010.html

http://www.trotsopnederland.com/2009/05/de-visie-van-trotsopnederland/


http://www.kiesraad.nl/nl/Actueel/Nieuwsberichten/(2047)-Actueel-Nieuwsberichten-2010/Uitslag_verkiezing_leden_Tweede_Kamer_van_9_juni_2010.html


27

namely rather come to the conclusion that Dutch political structure and political culture isn’t

prone to the emergence of right-wing politics at all. It would for example be plausible to say

that the moderate importance and small electoral representation of right-wing parties in the

Netherland could partially be explained by the fact that there is a consociational democracy in

the Netherlands. The aforementioned inherent striving for integration and consensus

safeguarded a balanced stability despite the presence of parties in the right-wing spectrum. But

since the democracy still is consociational and parties still exist as minorities, this is not a

sufficient explanation for the sudden popularity of right-wing politics. The heritage of the

pillarized society furthermore could be seen as promoting a mentality where minorities can live

next to each other without the existence of bigger conflict. The process of pillarisation excludes

the possibility of an egalitarian society and is inherently connected with an image of society

where a lot of different views can have their autonomous space, would also prevent the

emergence of right-wing politics which often have a vision of an egalitarian society. At least

this is what one would expect when taking political history into account. The question then is

how it is possible that at a sudden anti minority politics are increasingly supported. Concluding,

after this discussion of political structures and political culture it is a remaining question how it

could be explained that if traditionally the emergence of right-wing or populist parties in the

Netherlands broadly has been prevented by the political culture, currently there is a strong

presence of right-wing politics in the Netherlands even though the political structure didn’t

change. In aforementioned understanding of political culture, the political culture is a

changeable concept that derives from the individual attitudes within society. A possible answer

to the question is that changing attitudes and following a changing political culture are

responsible for the imbalance in an ever-so balanced political system.

28

CHAPTER 3

The rise of Geert Wilder's PVV

The first chapter showed the different explanatory perspectives on the rise of right-wing

populism in Western European democracies, and subsequently the previous chapter tried to

outline the different features of Dutch political culture in order to draw the background for the

analysis of right-wing populism in the Netherlands. It should be clear by now, that Dutch

political culture can be described with several key words such as: minority politics,

accommodation, proportionality, governing from the centre, etc. Furthermore the political

culture obviously didn’t change much despite several socio-economic changes and pressure.

This stability despite minorities, threats and internal political differences is remarkable and gave

Dutch political system a reputation as gidsland (model/mentor country).75

Since the millennium

change however, the stability of Dutch governance appears to be under high pressure. The 2010

conquest of Wilders PVV resulted in a right-wing instead of centre-right government and like

has been mentioned before, dealt the deathblow to the stable polder-politics in the Netherlands.

Explanations based on socio-cultural or economic parameters as has been discussed in the first

chapter might not be applicable to the Dutch case, since the mentioned stability in the course of

at least eighty years never really suffered under external changes. The current appearance and

rise of right-wing politics is mainly unconventional because of its quite solid position and

relatively high electoral support. This relatively high electoral support and the right-wing nature

of the new politics constitute a political oddity and discontinuity with an age-old political

culture and tradition. Because the appearance of right-wing populist politics is to such an extent

out of line, it deserves even more attention and implies the insufficiency of socio-economic and

immigration based explanations of the phenomenon. This chapter now offers an analysis of the

rise of right-wing populism in the Netherlands from the beginning of this millennium until now.

Whereas since 2006 the electoral success of Geert Wilders Freedom Party is the clearest sign for

the radical change of the traditional political space and for the important influence of right-wing

politics in the Netherlands, the increasing popularity of the PVV cannot be explained without

the first episode of populist right popularity with Pim Fortuyn as its protagonist

75 The term “Gidsland” is often used to describe Dutch role within humanitarian aid policy and is

elaborated by for example J. HERMAN in: The Dutch Drive for Humanitarianism: Inner Origins and

Development of the Gidsland Tradition and Its External Effects, in: International Journal 61(4): 859-874.

Jozef Batora and Erik Fossum furthermore elaborates the concept of Gidsland extensively in Gidsland. Is

there a Mentor State? in: International Journal Vol. 61, Nr. 4, Canadian institute for international Affairs,

2006.

29

List Pim Fortuyn

Pim Fortuyn, a columnist and a former sociology professor, founded his party List Pim Fortuyn

in 2002 after he was expelled from the newly formed party Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar

Nederland) because of his statement that he often is perceived as a right-wing extremist.

Fortuyn reacted against the coalitions that had been formed in 1994 en 1998 between the red

Labour Party (PvdA) and the liberal parties VVD and D66. His party could immediately count

with a big electoral support. Fortuyn was an extravagant and charismatic person that reacted

against all conventions and against the established order. Pim Fortuyn main topics of protest

were concerning the political elite and minorities. Fortuyn claimed that the power should be

given back to the people in the country. Concerning immigration and integration, Pim Fortuyn

attracted most of attention. According to his party, the increasing immigration to the

Netherlands was to be blamed for the increasing social tensions and economic problems.

Fortuyn claimed to pursue the protection of Dutch liberal values like for example freedom of

speech, freedom of religious and the tolerance towards homosexuality etc. which he believed to

be under attack by the increased immigration from Muslim countries. Fortuyn believed that it in

a multicultural society, those typically liberal Dutch values were under pressure. The popularity

of Fortuyn for a short period of time was very high, mainly also because of the way in which

Fortuyn used the media to be visible and because of his brute and vulgar speech. The way in

which Fortuyn presented himself as a man of the people and the way in which he was able to

translate the existing fears and concerns on a political level, made his popularity rise

enormously. But Fortuyn would never see the success of his party, because he was murdered on

the 6th of May 2002, shortly before the elections. Initially, the media believed that Fortuyn was

murdered by a Muslim activist as a reaction against his anti-Muslim statements, but as it

appeared later, Fortuyn was murdered by an environmental activist. Nevertheless, Fortuyn’s

murder in the media and public sphere increased the negative perception on the Muslim

community and other minorities. The event resulted in a wave of unrest and confusion in the

political space, but the elections weren’t cancelled as was expected and the remaining LPF

member also decided to participate despite of the dramatic event. The LPF won 17 percent of

the vote which equals twenty-six of hundred-fifty seats in the parliament (see figure 5). As a

result, the coalition partners of the existing “purple” suffered a substantial defeat. The LPF

formed a coalition with CDA and VVD, but the coalition didn’t hold long: only after eighty-

seven days of governing, the coalition was split again because of unsolvable internal conflict.76

76

S. VAN KESSEL, Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties, p.75, U.Diss.,

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/7521/1/Van_Kessel%2C_Stijn_Theodoor.pdf (access: 01.06.2012)

http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/7521/1/Van_Kessel%2C_Stijn_Theodoor.pdf

30

Figure 5. Electoral results 1998-2010

Party 1998 2002 2003 2006 2010

Labour Party (PvdA)

Liberals (VVD)

Chr. Democrats (CDA)

Democrats 66 (D66)

GreenLeft (GL)

Socialist Party (SP)

Christian Union (CU)

List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)

Liveable NL (LN)

Freedom Party (PVV)

Other

Total

29.0%

24.7%

18.4%

9.0%

7.3%

3.5%

3.2%

4.9%

100%

15.1%

15.4%

27.9%

5.1%

7.0%

5.9%

2.5%

17.0%

1.6%

2.5%

100%

27.3%

17.9%

28.6%

4.1%

5.1%

6.3%

2.1%

5.7%

2.9%

100%

21.2%

14.6%

26.5%

2.0%

4.6%

16.6%

4.0%

0.2%

5.9%

4.4%

100%

19.6%

20.4%

13.7%

6.9%

6.6%

9.9%

3.3%

15.5%

4.1%

100%

New general elections took place in January 2003, now with Mat Herben as the leader.

Nevertheless, during these elections the LPF lost most of its support and their seats in the

Parliament dropped from twenty-six to eight and also the traditional parties recovered quite well

from their defeat one year earlier.77

In 2006 the party didn’t even gain any seats anymore and

the party dissolved in august 2007.

Geert Wilders PVV

Less noticed, in 2006, Geert Wilders would enter the party system. Wilders, who originally was

part of the Liberal Party, founded his Freedom Party on February 22, 2006 as a statement

against the discussion about the Turkish EU-membership. Wilders split with the VVD not only

indicates a political step, but also important ideological radicalisation. Geert Wilders was born

in 1963 in Venlo as the son of a catholic, middle-class family. Wilder´s political vision was

influenced as he claims himself by his obsession with the Israel-Palestine conflict. Wilders

claims to have travelled to Israel and the Arabic neighbor countries “more than 40 times”. As a

teenager, Geert Wilders has even lived in Israel for two years. His stay in Israel made Wilders a

fervent pro-Israel politician which often becomes clear throughout his campaigning.78

Besides

that, Wilders started as a politician under supervision of Frits Bolkenstein in the VVD. Wilders

became member of the Second Chamber in 1998. Bolkestein has been of major influence for

Wilders thoughts. Bolkestein is perceived as a rather unconventional, atypical Dutch politician

77

Ibid., p.75. 78

For example see: G. WILDERS, Marked for Death. Islam´s War against the West and Me, Washington

DC, Regnery Publishing, 2012.

31

and was the first to question multiculturalism and minority politics in the Netherlands.

Bolkenstein claimed that the elite should let go of its cultural relativism and instead should

focus on the superiority of western values and the fears and anxieties that exist within society.79

According to Prins, Bolkenstein introduced “a new speech about the multicultural society.”80

As

VVD politician, Wilders thoughts show a direct link to Bolkenstein´s ideas.

In the following years, the ideas Wilders developed throughout his years at Bolkenstein's

VVD started to radicalise and was called a “populist” more often. Wilders wrote an extensive

report in 1999 to the Second Chamber in which he explained what the dangers of Islam are for

Dutch society. The report basically stated that the religious extremism in the Middle East was a

threat to the stability in Europe and the Netherlands and is going to be the biggest problem in

the next decade. Furthermore, Wilders stated that this extremism is already part of Dutch

society, but is being ignored by the most of the politicians.81

In 2004, Wilders wrote an essay in

cooperation with his colleague Gert-Jan Oplaat in order to increase the discussion about VVDs

party program. With the manifest, they wanted to sway the party more to the right side of the

political spectrum. The manifest stated that radical Muslims should be thrown out of the country

without any juridical process, furthermore they promoted the “three strikes and you are out”-

policy, indicating that who commits several crimes will get life sentence.82

The manifest

resulted in a vehement discussion about the character and the agenda of the VVD, but then party

leader Gerrit Zalm claimed not to perceive the positions written in the manifest as the position

supported by the majority of the party members. The manifest was what finally led to the split

between Wilders and the VVD. Parliamentary leader Van Aartsen first threatened Wilders with

expelling him from the party because of his right-wing thoughts, but finally Wilders decided

himself to leave the party on September 3, 2004. 83,84

Still, he remained a member of the

Parliament and in the following years Wilders was occupied with the founding of his own party.

In September 2004, the first steps towards the new party were being taken by founding a group

called Stichting Geert Wilders (Association Geert Wilders) which actually only consisted of

Geert Wilders and Martin Bosma. This group officially didn’t function as a party, but mainly

focused on getting more attention and support for Wilders views. During those years of

Stichting Geert Wilders, Wilders got strongly influenced by some neo-conservative thinkers,

especially after he paid a visit to the USA where he got into contact with some important neo-

79

K. VOSSEN, vom konservativen Liberalen zum Nationalpopulismus, in: F.Wielenga & F. Hartleb,

Populismus in der modernen Demokratie. Die Niederlande und Deutschland im Vergleich, Münster,

Waxmann Verlag, 2004, p.84. 80

B. PRINS, The Nerve to Break Taboos. New Realism in the Dutch Discourse on Multiculturalism, in :

Journal of International migration and integration, 3/3-4 2002, p.363-379. 81

E. LAMMERS, Het is leuk, die heftige reacties, niew in de kamer, in : Trouw, 17/12/2009. 82

“VVD-pleidoor voor ruk naar rechts” in: Trouw, 03/07/2004. 83

J. HOEDEMA & F. PORTHUIS, VVD heeft genoeg van rechtse taal Wilders, in: De Volkskrant,

01/08/2004. 84

“Wilders vertrekt uit VVD, blijft in Kamer”, in : De Volkskrant, 03/09/2004

32

conservative thinkers like for example Grover Norquist and people at the American Enterprise

Institute.85

A document published shortly after his visit to the USA called Kies voor de Vrijheid

(choose freedom) shows the ideological development and Wilders radical choice for neo-

conservative thoughts.86

The thoughts and ideas that are at the basis of this autobiographic

manifesto will form the ideological fundaments for the political program of his party. On 22th

February 2006 it finally became a fact: Geert Wilders founded his Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party

for Freedom). The party at that moment consisted of twenty candidates of which nine were

elected.87

Before the general elections in 2006, the party published its party program which is called

Klare Wijn (clear wine), and which is written in a very clear and popular speech. After the

elections, Wilders PVV received 5.9 percent of the votes allowing him nine seats in the

Parliament. Also the subsequent European election in 2009 showed the high popularity of

Wilders PVV. With four seats in the European Parliament, the PVV became the second biggest

Dutch Party.88

But this was not yet the end of Wilders success story. Four years later it became

clear that Wilders had been able to collect a stable and extensive electorate behind him and had

clearly become more popular. Wilders Freedom Party was the big winner of the 2010 elections

with gaining a total of 15.5 percent which delivered the PVV a total of twenty-four seats in the

Parliament, coming close to the amount of support that the LPF had gathered in 2002. Figure 6

shows the results of the 2010 general elections.

Figure 6. Results Dutch parliamentary elections 201089

Party # of votes Percentage # of Seats

CDA

PvdA

SP

VVD

PVV

GL

D66

CU

SGP

TON

1,281,886

1,848,805

924,696

1,929,575

1,454,491

628,096

654,168

305,94

163,581

52,937

13.61

19.63

9.82

20.49

15.45

6.67

6.95

3.24

1.74

0.56

21

30

15

31

24

10

10

5

2

0

85

L. WYTZE, Geert Wilders: een politiek roofdier, in: Elsevier, 16/08/2007. 86

G. WILDERS, Kies voor Vrijheid. Een eerlijk Antwoord, Groep Wilders, 2005. 87

http://www.parlement.com/9353000/1/j9vvhy5i95k8zxl/vg44wueqiazx?key=hdnfv6c3 88

A. HANKEL, PVV and D66 grote winnaars Europese verkiezingen, in : Elsevier, 04/06/2009. 89

European Election database,

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/

http://www.parlement.com/9353000/1/j9vvhy5i95k8zxl/vg44wueqiazx?key=hdnfv6c3


33

It has been a topic of discussion ever since how the PVV was able to increase its electoral

support in such a relatively short period of time and how it was possible that the traditional

stability and the traditional division of votes among the parties could be brought out of balance

so easily. Because of the unexpected results of the elections and the big ideological differences

between the winning parties, the coalition formation took 125 days. Finally on the 14th of

October 2010, the coalition was sworn. The coalition was formed between VVD, CDA and

PVV. Mark Rutte was appointed prime minister.90

One of the main reasons that the coalition

formation took a long time was the fact that the success of Wilders PVV according to the rules

of proportional democracy gave him the right to be a relevant coalition partner but that most of

the established parties didn’t feel appealed to form a coalition with the PVV because of

ideological differences. The final solution for this conflict was the so-called gedoogbeleid or

parliamentary support agreement. Het gedoogbeleid made it possible to form a stable coalition

on the condition that the inclusion of the PVV in the coalition was restricted to the topics of

ideological consensus. Following statement published on 30th July 2010 gives a better

understanding of the agreement:

“The three parties VVD, PVV and CDA disagree on the nature and character of Islam. The

divide lies in the characterisation of Islam as either a religion or a political ideology. The parties

accept their difference of view and will act upon their own views. However there is a lot that

binds the parties together: to make the Netherlands stronger, safer rand wealthier is a shared goal

and principle. Therefore it is negotiated that – with acceptance of each other’s differences of

opinion and fully allowing each other the freedom of expression about differences of opinion –

the PVV will support parts of the coalition agreement from a position of tolerance. VVD and

CDA will on their part in the parliamentary support agreement honour the requirements of the

PVV. (…)”91

This parliamentary support agreement made it possible to form a coalition after all, even though

such an agreement was a historical unicum. The inclusion of an apparently right-wing party

again is a sign that the spectacular rise of Wilders party made an end to traditional politics in the

Netherlands. The parliamentary support agreement though, is an excellent example of the way

in which is dealt with minority politics in the Netherlands and how the political actors are eager

to always reach a consensus. After this discussion about the rise of Wilders and his party, in the

next part the question about the nature and content of Wilders party will be addressed.

90

http://www.kabinetsformatie2010.nl/kabinetsformatie_2010.html 91

http://www.kabinetsformatie2010.nl/pdf/dsc8d2d.pdf?c=getobject&s=obj&objectid=127492

http://www.kabinetsformatie2010.nl/kabinetsformatie_2010.html

http://www.kabinetsformatie2010.nl/pdf/dsc8d2d.pdf?c=getobject&s=obj&objectid=127492

34

Nature and content of the PVV

There is a lot of discussion about the ideological nature of the PVV. Arguments can be found

for almost every categorisation going from right-wing extremist over fascist to neo-

conservative. According to many the difficult categorisation of the PVV is a result of its rather

eclectic nature.92

Nevertheless, in most of the publications on the PVV, a consensus seems to

exist that at least the party can be categorized as populist.

What exactly is populism and how to categorize the populist Right in the Netherlands? Paul

Lucardie gives a good overview in his paper right-wing extremism, populism or democratic

patriotism?93

Lucardie describes how populism in the first place is a term applied to political

phenomena that are highly diversified. Originally, populism has been perceived merely as a

doctrine and ideology than as a category to designate specific parties. Seen as such, populism is

compared to for example liberalism and Marxism, a so-called “thin-centred ideology” which

means that the ideology is combined with elements out of other ideologies. Populism then is a

combination of different political concepts but with its own main concept. The key concept of

populism then is the opposition populist ideology makes between the people and the elite. Who

belongs to the people also is a rather difficult to define and the category is also used in a varied

way. Nevertheless it is possible to say that generally the people for populists apply to the native

inhabitants of the nation or what Paul Taggart calls “the heartland”. Also the elite are not

defined in a homogeneous way. The category elite might apply to the politicians of the

established parties but might furthermore include intellectuals, investors, plutocrats, etc.94

Even

though populist movements differ concerning the definition of the main concepts, the emphasis

on the opposition between the people and the elite connects them. Populist movements all do

agree on the fact that there is a substantial chasm between the people and the elite. Furthermore,

the people are perceived as a homogeneous entity and with positive categories. The elite on the

other hand are rather something to react against and are often blamed for the social and political

problems. Besides the fact that there is a consensus that the distinction between elite and people

is the main feature of populism, there is a lot of discussion about its other features. Lucardie

mentions five “secondary features” of populism. At first, populist politicians differ from the

established party politicians because of their direct and almost vulgar rhetorical style. Secondly,

the people are seen as a homogeneous entity with a single interest. Thirdly, populist try to look

for an out-group. This out-group is the black sheep that along with the elite is blamed for

several social and economic problems. The marginalisation of minorities enables the politicians

92

See for example Paul Lucardie and Koen Vossen 93




Ibid.

35

to mobilize a big part of the people because the populist politician presents itself as the one who

speaks for the native people instead of the elite who according to the populist politician is

privileging the minorities. A fourth feature is that a lot of populist parties implicitly or explicitly

want to replace the indirect parliamentary democracy by a direct and people-oriented

democracy. Populist politicians often emphasize the distance between the political system and

the people and argue that democracy doesn’t really represent the people’s opinion. Finally, it is

ensure if populism can be combined with other ideologies. Concluding, there still exist a lot of

discussion on the different forms and features of populism but there is one thing where most of

the literature agrees on and which build the fundamental consensus about populism: populism in

the first place designates political movements that emphasise the importance of a united people

that needs to be reinforced against the alienated elite.95

Another important aspect of populism that Lucardie doesn’t mention but on which for

example Gerd Reuter and Frank Decker focuses more is the role of a charismatic leader in a

populist movement.96,97

As has been mentioned before, in the case of the List Pim Fortuyn, it

appeared that the person of Fortuyn as a charismatic leader played an important role in the

popularity of this party. Also Wilders popularity might be enhanced by his “politics of

visibility”. According to Decker, the new right-wing populists in Western Europe are – without

exception – identifiable with the “spiritual father” of the party.98

In this perspective, the

charismatic features of this leader are of essential value for the success of the party: without this

leader, the party would not be able to have further influence. In Reuter’s opinion, this is exactly

what happened with Pim Fortuyn. After Fortuyn assassination, the party lost its initial appeal

that was related to Fortuyn as its charismatic leader.99

M. Canovan connects the importance of

this charismatic leader with what she calls “the populist mood”. This means that what

differentiates populist politics from traditional politics is the importance of emotions. The

positive and strong emotions that are connected with the fact that the people are empowered to

be politically active are often directed towards the initiator of this empowerment.100

Because of

the populist leaders emphasis on the lack of interest that the established elite shows for the

95




F. DECKER, Parteien unter Druck. Der neuen Rechtspopulismus in den westlichen Demokratien,

Opladen, Leske und Budrich Verlag, 2002. 97


Sozialwissenschaften, 2010, p.182-185. 98

F. DECKER, Parteien unter Druck. Der neuen Rechtspopulismus in den westlichen Demokratien,

Opladen, Leske und Budrich Verlag, 2002, p.50. 99


Sozialwissenschaften, 2010, p.182. 100

M CANOVAN, Trust the People. Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, in: Political Studies,

Vol.47, 1999, p.6.

36

people and presents himself as the opposite, a close personal tie is easily developed between

leader and followers.101

In the case of the PVV, Lucardie concludes that the PVV is a “right-wing, semi-liberal

nationalist and populist” party. The combination of these categories indicates the wide

ideological range of the party. According to aforementioned characteristics of populism and the

other aspects of the political agenda of the PVV, this paper agrees with Lucardies definition of

“right-wing, semi-liberal nationalist and populist” party and in the next paragraphs will show

how every ascription is legitimate.

Why the PVV is populist

The assertion that the political and established elite don’t care enough about the people’s

interest is of major importance in Wilders politics. Wilders repeatedly accuses the political elite

to be “selfish” and to have forgotten the “Dutch interest”. He states that “the political elite have

lost whether forgotten the binding with its people.”102

According to Wilders, the elite needs to

be blamed for egalitarism of which the people need to bear the consequences. In his

onafhankelijkheidsverklaring (declaration of independence), which he presented in September

2005 and which he calls a frontal attack on the elite”, Wilders states that “the people should take

their fate in their own hands.”103

In the same document, he also says that “the people are being

kidnapped by the alienated elite”.104

If, according to Mudde and Van Holsteyn, Wilders could

only be called a semi-populist, the statements that Wilders makes in his final election program

might not be taken into consideration. In this document, Wilders already in the introduction

exclusively talks about “the people” and the interests of the “Dutch people.” 105,106

Furthermore

he repeatedly claims that “there is a world of difference between what the elite thinks and what

the people think.”107

Following Paul Taggart's concept of heartland, Wilders only speaks on

behalf of the native Dutch inhabitants of the Netherlands. This brings us to the next polarity,

namely the construction of in-groups and out-groups. Even if a substantial part of the Dutch

101

Ibid. 102

Original quotation in German: „Die Politische Klasse hat die Anbindung an das Volk verloren

beziehungsweise aufgegeben“ in: M.SCHWARZ, Ich lebe in Todesangst. Seit den Morden an Pim

Fortuyn und Theo van Gogh ist Geert Wilders Hollands prominentester Islam-Kritiker in: Junge Freiheit

07/09/2007, p.3. 103

Original quotation in Dutch: “(…) Ons lot als volk in eigen hand nemen (…)“ in: G. WILDERS,

Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring, p.2, http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/politiekepartijen/pvv/verklaring.pdf (access:

01/06/2012) 104

Ibid. 105

C. MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007,

p.23; J. VAN HOLSTEYN, ‘Geert Wilders is hooguit een halve populist’, in: Trouw, 18/03/2005. 106

G. WILDERS, De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd om te kiezen: 2010-2015,

http://pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf (access: 01/06/2012), p. 5-7. 107

For example . G. WILDERS, De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd om te kiezen: 2010-2015,

http://pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf (access: 01/06/012), p.18.

http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/politiekepartijen/pvv/verklaring.pdf

http://pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf


37

population cannot be perceived as the heartland, Wilders seems to have the idea that this native

Dutch population still is a majority but that its superiority and presence is threatened by the

growing presence of minorities. Wilders not only accuses the elite to be at the core of the

economic problems and social tensions but more importantly also the group of (Muslim)

immigrants. Wilders anti-immigrant and anti-Islam polemics is what made him widely known

and notorious. The exact content of this anti-Islam politics will be addressed in the next chapter,

but it is undeniable that the Manichean opposition between the Dutch heartland and the

(Muslim) immigrant out-group is one of the key stones of Wilders ideology which makes it

more than legitimate to call his party a populist party.

Why the PVV is right-wing but not extremist

On some occasions Geert Wilders has been called a right-wing extremist, which he himself

always vehemently disputes. On the contrary, Geert Wilders doesn’t seem to have any problem

with calling his politics right-wing and in Klare Wijn even states that it is time for a “turn to the

right.”108

Before it is possible to say whether Wilders ideology is merely right-wing (populist) or

right-wing extremist, it is important to look at the content of both categories. The confusion

between right-wing populism and right-wing extremism is relevant because of its content wise

overlaps. According to Langenbacher, the following factors of both right-wing populism and

right-wing extremism lay at the basis of their electoral success: “their attempt to make use of

social issues, to picture politics per se as corrupt and to propagate ascriptions of national

identity.”109

Furthermore those parties claim three socio-political crises, namely “the crisis of

distribution and access, the crisis of political representation, and the crisis of identity”110

Langenbacher focuses too much on the ideological correspondence between right-wing populist

and right-wing extremist which makes it difficult to see a clear distinction between those

parties. Lucardie makes a clearer distinction and points at the fact that right-wing and right-wing

extremist parties might share ideological content and want to create social inequality in socio-

economic and cultural perspective, but that a right-wing extremist party wants to establish this

inequality without paying attention to the circumstances. What differentiates right-wing from

right-wing extremist then is the vehemence with which those parties act to reach their political

goals. Even though the polarisation of society is an important part of Wilders politics, he needs

to be perceived as a rather moderate right-wing politician. Even though anti-immigration

108

G. WILDERS, Klare Wijn. http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=410, 31/03/2006 (access: 01/06/2012) 109

N. LANGENBACHER & B. SCHELLENBERG, is Europe on the “Right” Path. Right-Wing Extremism and

Right-Wing Populism in Europe, Berlin, Forum Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011, p.11. 110

Ibid.

http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=410

38

polemics and other radical viewpoints are central to Wilders ideology, this doesn’t necessarily

imply that his ideology has an extremist character. The polarisation of society is as much at the

heart of right-wing populism as it is at the core of right-wing extremism. Right-wing populism

in the definition of Mudde is also characterized by the idea that an ethnic more or less

homogeneous population is perceived to be threatened by immigrants and foreign dominance.111

On behalf of the radical right-wing opinions though, within public space and media Geert

Wilder’s is often stigmatized. A German leaflet from the Amadeu Antonio Stiftung published in

February 2012 even includes Wilders PVV in the category of neo-Nazi movements in Europe.

112 Wilders himself always heavily reacts against this stigmatisation and in several interviews he

states that “the PVV has nothing to do with far-right parties.”113

Following Lucardie, Mudde

and regarding the aforementioned performative differentiation between right-wing and far-right

parties, it can be concluded that it is not correct to categorise Wilders PVV as an extremist or

far-right party but rather as a right-wing populist.

Why the PVV is semi-liberal

What makes it the most difficult to categorize Wilders´ party is the coexistence of apparent

progressive and liberal views on socio-economic topics and neo-conservative views on socio-

cultural themes. Like has been mentioned before, the influence of Wilders membership of the

Liberal Party on the ideology of the PVV should not be underestimated and the founding of its

own party should not be seen as a ultimate split with the ideas of the Liberals. Therefore, again

following Lucardie, it is justified to say that Wilders is a semi-liberal right-wing populist,

however eclectic this definition might sound. The inclusion of liberal ideas within a right-wing

populist perspective causes a lot of confusion about the place giving of the PVV within the

political landscape. This confusion is illustrated in Figure 7. This image is automatically

generated at a website called Kieskompas (election compass). Kieskompas tries to help people

picture the parties that are the closest to their own political preferences. The overview of the

political landscape is generated through the comparison of the parties on several themes. The x-

aces show the range from progressive to conservative, the y-aces the range from left-wing to

right-wing. Surprisingly, Kieskompas positions the PVV indeed on a more conservative position

then the liberals, but in the middle between left- and right-wing. In this overview, even the

established liberal and Christian democratic parties are more at the right side of the spectrum

than Wilders PVV. Following the above mentioned discussion on right-wing populism, the fact

that Wilders by Kieskompas is perceived as a moderate conservative party somewhere in the

111

C. MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007,

p. 32-59. 112

Internet source: http://www.scribd.com/doc/80215448/Netz-Gegen-Nazis2-0-Internet 113

For example: P. COHEN, Merkel is Afraid. Interview with Geert Wilders, in: Der Spiegel (11/9/2010).

http://www.scribd.com/doc/80215448/Netz-Gegen-Nazis2-0-Internet

39

middle between left and right, points at the eclectic nature of the PVV and gives a distorted

image.

Figure 7. Dutch political landscape 2010 according to Kieskompas

Source: www.kieskompas.nl ;

Back to the question what the PVV makes a semi-liberal party. According to Wilders, the

protection of freedom and liberal values lay at the core of the PVV party politics. The freedom

that the people once possessed should be regained. The “essential values of Dutch society” need

to be protected. Those values include for example the freedom speech, the freedom of sexual

orientation and the equality of men and women.114

Concluding, there indeed is a substantial part

of liberal thoughts in Wilders´ politics, but not in a conventional way. Wilders has a very

ambiguous conception of freedom in that sense that the liberal values are restricted in a right-

wing fashion, namely excluding the minorities from the benefits of a liberal system and

restricting it to the Dutch native population. Furthermore the protection of liberal values and the

promotion of freedom exist alongside the restriction on freedom of speech and religion for the

Muslim minorities. This liberalism in right-wing populist fashion leads us to the definition of

the PVV as semi-liberal party.

114

G. WILDERS, De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd om te kiezen: 2010-2015,



40

Why the PVV is nationalist

There are several reasons why it is legitimate to argue that the PVV is a nationalist party or at

least has nationalist features. Wilders himself would not agree with this categorisation on behalf

of the fact that he claims to be a patriot and that his effort for his homeland are a result of his

patriotic love for the country. In this sense, Wilders strives for the freedom and independence of

his country. This independence includes the defence against supranational structures and against

“threats to Dutch values”. The central idea is that the national identity should be preserved and

protected despite the supranationalisation, globalisation and increasing global migration.

Wilders states: “We must cherish our national identity. In Europe, this means we have to restore

the nation-state and reverse the intrusions of the European Union. Our nation-state embodies

our democratic liberties and safeguards our national political freedom. (…) People cannot attain

security or preserve their collective identity without a nation-state, which enables self-

government and self-determination.”115

Nationalism always includes a specific understanding of

the nation and the people that belong that the nation, therefore it is prone to overlap or go in

hand with right-wing populism. In the case of Wilders, the party politics contain a strong

conception of the native people that belong to the nation and the national identity that marks the

heartland. In Wilders words: “The peoples of a free world can defend their liberties only if they

can rally around a flag with which the identity. This flag, symbolizing ancient loyalties can only

be the flag of our nation. We love our nations because they are our home, because they are the

legacy our fathers bestowed on us and which we want to bestow on our children.” In a next

chapter, the nature and content of the nationalist aspects of Wilder's politics will be discussed

in-depth.

115

G. WILDERS, Marked for Death. Islam`s war against the West and Me, Washington DC, Regnery

Publishers, 2012, p.215.

41

CHAPTER 4

The politics of identity

This chapter focuses on what this study claims to be a fundamental feature of the right-wing

populist politics in general and specifically of the PVV. The term politics of identity or identity

politics signify a wide range of political activity and political ideology which is a reaction to an

experience of injustice and inequality of a certain group of people. In the case of the right-wing

populist politics, it will become clear that this group of people consist of the native citizens of a

country or in other words, the national community. As a category, the politics of identity

include politics that focus on race, ethnicity, nation, gender, etc. According to the Stanford

encyclopaedia of philosophy, identity politics thus signifies “a loose collection of political

projects, each undertaken by representatives of a collective with a distinctively different social

location that has hitherto been neglected, erased, or suppressed.”116

In a strict sense the right-

wing populist politics might not be a clear example of identity politics since the defended group

isn’t a minority or group of people which suffers from social exclusion. Nevertheless the

political rhetoric of those parties invent and emphasis the oppression of the national community

and perceives the community as a threatened minority. As a reaction to the claimed social

threat, the establishment of a stable identity becomes a key stone of right-wing populist politics.

This claim for identity goes along with the exclusion of everything which is perceived as alien

to this identity:

“An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become

socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist

as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity. Entrenched in this

indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies, themselves in need of exploration,

to conceal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure

expressed the true order of things. When these pressures prevail, the maintenance of one

identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into

otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires differences in

order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-

certainty.”117

116

Internet source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/#6 117

W. CONNOLLY, Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Minneapolis,

University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p.64.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/#6

42

Concluding, this chapter will show that the (re-)construction of (national) identity in opposition

to what is seen as the “dangerous Islamic Other” is a focal point of the right-wing populist

discourse. It is exactly the securing and reifying of the own identity which makes right-wing

populist politics appealing, powerful and electorally successful.

Nationalism

In this section, the nationalist phenomenon will be discussed. This is important in order to better

understand the nationalist side of the right-wing politics that reemphasise national identity and

national community and recreate a sense of national belonging. Where originates nationalism?

And where does it consist of? Because of the complexity of these questions, uncountable

theories and paradigms developed throughout years of research. The difficulty of identifying the

origins of nationalism is connected to the fact that it is equally difficult to identify the nature

and the origins of the different forms of human organisation. Therefore the plurality of theories

on nationalism inherently goes along with a plurality of conceptions of group, nation, society

and ethnicity. The different theories on nationalism are conveniently categorized within

different paradigms.

A first category consists of those theories that perceive the nation as a natural product that

stems from kinship and ethnicity. Those theories are called primordialist. An exemplary

representatives of the primordialist paradigm are Van den Berghe and Geertz. Van den Berge

claims: “We suggest that there are three mechanism of human sociality: kin selection,

reciprocity and coercion. Ethnic and racial group command unreasoned loyalty because they are

in fact, or at least in theory, super families.”118

Geertz adopt a less biological and more cultural

perspective and talks about different primordial ties that make it difficult to form new states.

Geertz claims that people are naturally inclined to show loyalty based on primordial ties. “(…)

the new states are abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primordial

attachments. By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” – more

precisely as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” – of social

existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly but beyond them the givenness that

stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or

even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices.”119

A second paradigm, the perennialist paradigm, brings together those theories that do not

claim a nation to be part of the natural order though believe that nations have always played a

very important role in history or historical conflicts and are results of those historical

118

P. VAN DEN BERGHE, A socio-biological perspective, in: J. HUTCHINSON & A.D SMITH, Nationalism,

Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 102. 119

C. GEERTZ, Primordial and Civic Ties in: HUTCHINSON, J & SMITH, A.D. Nationalism, Oxford, 1994,

pp. 31.

43

developments. The most known theorist that talks about the key role of nation-states and its

historical development is Hroch. Hroch states that national identity and national loyalties not

only stem from objective relations like for example political, economic, linguistic or religious

ties, but out of combination with the idea of collective consciousness. The nation as it exists is

not a natural product but a result of long processes of historical development.120

Hroch identifies

three prerequisites for the development of a nation: a “memory” of a common past that is

defined as a “destiny” of the people. Secondly there needs to be a density of linguistic and

cultural ties that enable a higher degree of social communication within the group then beyond.

Thirdly the group needs to be understood as a group of equal members organized as a civil

society.121

Even though primordialist and perennialist theories are consistent, the paradigm has

lost his influence under the weight of increasing modernist theories.

Many scholars started to dismiss the idea that a nation-state is a result of primordialist or

biological ties, nor that it will exist forever. The modernist theories perceive the nation-state or

the national identity as a conscious product of human invention and as a result of the socio-

cultural and political situation in the aftermath of the French Revolution. For the modernists,

nationalism is a product of modernisation. “It was then that the ideal of the sovereignty of

people was fused with the drive to cultural homogeneity, to forge self-determining nation of co-

cultural citizens. Nations as well as nationalism are purely modern phenomena, without roots in

the past.”122

There are more than one modernist views on nationalism. Gellner, for example,

uses a socio-cultural perspective and claims that nationalism didn’t exist in pre-modern

societies. Other authors like for example John Breuilly focuses on the role of the state: “I do not

argue that the modernizing state is the cause nationalism. Rather I argue that the concept of state

modernisation provides the key to contextualizing nationalism. The formation of the

specialized, sovereign, territorial, public space is the institutional context within which the idea

of national appears appropriate as ideology, both in intellectual terms as a way of mobilizing

support.”123

In this perspective, nationalism is a modern phenomenon that comes forth out of the

role that institutions play in the formation and shaping of ideas and actions. The ideology that

“fits” the best between the institution and the people, Breuilly says, is the nationalist

ideology.124

On the other hand, there are scholars using some kind of „constructivist argument‟.

120

M. HROCH, From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation. The Nation Building Process in

Europe, in: G. ELEY & R. G., SUNY (eds.), Becoming National , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996,

pp. 61. 121

Ibid. 122

A.D. SMITH, Myths and Memories of the Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p.6. 123

J.BREUILLY, The State and Nationalism in: M. GUIBERNAU & J. HUTCHINSON, Understanding

Nationalism, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001, pp. 51. 124

Ibid.

44

Benedict Anderson for example says that nationalism is a modern cultural product. Its object is

defined as an “imagined political community - imagined as sovereign, finite, and horizontal.”125

The different theories on nationalism focus on a certain aspect and therefore all theories

contribute something to the understanding of nationalism as political ideology, the nation-state

as political subject and national identity as a strong social tie. There might not be something like

the “truth” about the nature and origins of nationalist movements and nationalist feelings. For

what this paper tries to show, the meta-question about the nature and origin of nationalism is not

the central question but the above discussed overview of the different theories and paradigms

should make clear that nationalism is a complex political phenomenon and that there are many

ways to understand the phenomenon. In order to name a political phenomenon a nationalist

phenomenon or not thus also depends on the paradigm one choose to follow. This paper follows

the ethno-nationalist paradigm, which will be elaborated below. Following paragraphs will then

identify the different aspects of Geert Wilder’s politics which according to this paradigm can be

categorized as nationalist which will subsequently reinforce the thesis that Geert Wilder’s

politics is partially nationalist. Especially because there is a strong sense of the people as a

group that Wilders apparently perceives as one and eternal, the question about the role of

ethnicity and nation in Wilders politics needs to be discussed. In this perspective it is mostly

important to try to understand the appeal of nationalist arguments or phrases as “we need to

preserve our national identity.” To explain this aspect there is yet another paradigm that hasn’t

been discussed, namely the ethno-nationalist and ethno-symbolist paradigm. The most known

representative of this perspective is Anthony D. Smith. Smith focuses on the appeal of

nationalist ideology and claims that an analysis of the appealing character of nationalist arguing

is missing most of the (modernist) theories on nationalism. For Smith, the nation can not only

be a result of political processes or conscious constructs. The modernist perspective for example

excludes “any understanding of the popular roots and widespread appeal of nationalism.”126

Therefore, the limitations of the modernist view are the fact that they cannot distinguish

constructs from long-term processes. Secondly, the modernist perspective focuses too much on

the actions of political elite and do not take popular beliefs and action in account. Finally, the

modernist perspective neglects every possible affective dimensions of nationalism. Smith’s

alternative of an ethno-symbolist approach does not discard the modernist perspective per se,

but try to focus on the power of affective constituting elements within nationalism. It integrates

the question which elements of pre-existing culture enable a nationalism to come into being.

Because Geert Wilder’s propaganda explicitly refers to tradition, symbols, myths and the re-

invention of national culture, Smith´s perspective is helpful in order to better understand the

appeal and smooth emergence of Wilder politics. The next section will in the first place discuss

125


Ibid. p.9.

45

the conception of group and ethnicity in Wilders´ ideology and following will show the

different ways in which Wilders uses national symbols, myths and other cultural elements to

increase the resonance of his politics with the people.

Ethnicity

The meaning of the concept ethnicity or ethnic identity just as the concept nation and national

identity is rather uncertain. Therefore the interpretation of those concepts is highly diversified.

Many scholars have tried to formulate a definition of ethnicity and the ethnic community or

ethnie and again several explanatory paradigms can be identified. Sociobiologist and

primordialist theories for example claim that ethnic identity is a given and that ethnic

communities are formed based on blood or primordial ties. Furthermore, the instrumentalist

viewpoint perceives ethnicity as a “social, political, and cultural resource for different interest-

and status groups.” The instrumentalists thus believe that ethnicity is socially constructed.

Alongside the primordialist and instrumentalist theories, other scholars take in a socio

psychological perspective, focusing on the security that ethnic identity can provide.127

This

paper will however further adopt the definition of ethnicity and ethnic identity as it can be found

in the ethno-symbolic approach. According to this approach, instrumentalist or primordialist

theories do not entirely capture the content of the ethnie. The ethno-symbolic perspective thus

emphasizes the importance of other element of ethnic identity. In the definition of Schermerhorn

some of those elements are integrated:

“An ethnic group is defined as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative

common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or

more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such

symbolic elements are: kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or

sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality,

phonotypical feature, or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some

consciousness of kind among member of the group.” Ethnicity or ethnic identity is

defined by a set of characteristics by which an individual is recognizable as a member of

a discrete group united by ties of blood and heritage. Ethnic identity forms the core of

national identity for most of the world's people.128

Smith and Hutchinson further define this definition and state that an ethnie is “a named human

population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements

127

A.D. SMITH & J. HUTCHINSON, Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 7-10. 128

R.A SCHERMERHORN, Comparative Ethnic Relations. A Framework for Theory and Research,

Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p.12.

46

of common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its

member.”129

Concluding, this definition generally identifies six basic elements of ethnic

identity. The definition of Smith and Hutchinson points at the importance of shared myths and

memories on the one hand and of common culture on the other hand. The myths of common

ancestry include an idea of common origin and the common culture for example includes

religion, language, habits, etc.

For Smith, ethnic groupings existed before the nation existed and nationalism is just a way of

ethnic communities to define them. Ethnic communities with their already existing culture form

the basis for the formation of the nation state. Ethnic groupings can be found in every era and

continent and it is said, that those communities have a common ancestry and descent and share

memories.130

According Smith thus the existence of nationalist ideology can draw on this idea

of a pre-existing ethnie. Wilders ideology also implies a certain understanding of the people as a

solid community. This conception of the community could be understood as an ethnic

community. In PVV's ideology the idea of a pre-existing Dutch ethnie is the basis for a

discourse on national identity.

It is not always self-evident to talk about ethnicity as an important category within politics,

especially not within the European context. The term ethnie and ethnicity often invoke images

of violent ethnic conflict or essentialist exclusion. Furthermore, ethnicity often seems to be only

accepted as a category referring to a predefined group of people. According to Brubaker though,

it is important to think beyond the group in order to understand the dynamics of social

organisation. He argues that “groupism” is a dominant paradigm within the nationalism

research. When we are able to think the group as the only form of strong social organisation, it

is not necessary to always talk about ethnic groups to understand an ethnic conflict. The same

can be said about the invented conflict between “the Islam” and “the West”, neither of both

groups is a real group or ethnic group, still there is an ethnic conflict. For Brubaker ethnicity

should not be understood as a substance, but rather as a cultural, social and psychological

process just like the nation is a product of those processes. In this understanding, ethnicisation

equals nationalisation and racialisation. The understanding of an ethnic group, a nation and race

as cultural processes instead of substantial, primordial entities, doesn’t necessarily diminish its

power or questions its existence, it rather helps to understand the flexibility and the dynamics of

those concepts. Brubaker states: “The reality of ethnicity and nationhood – and the overriding

power of ethnic and national identification in some settings – does not depend on the existence

of ethnic groups or nations as substantial groups or entities.”131

If one perceives “groupness”

and ethnicity as a variable and dynamic concept, the process of group-making should be

129

A.D. SMITH & J. HUTCHINSON, Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.6. 130


R. BRUBAKER, Ethnicity without Groups, in: Archives européennes de sociologie, Vol. XLIII (2),

2002, p. 168.

47

understood as a conscious cultural and political process. The most important implication of

Brubakers suggestion is that it makes us aware of possible “elite manipulation.”132

This means

that when something is presented by the leader as an ethnic conflict, or if the people by the

leader are understood as an ethnic group, this does not necessarily means that it actually is about

ethnicity or ethnic groups. For our case, Brubakers thoughts on ethnicity are interesting in that

regard that Geert Wilders tries to reconceptualise the Dutch people as a homogeneous group

which is presented against an equally homogeneous understood Islam. This opposition will be

discussed in following paragraphs.

Ethno-nationalism

As mentioned above, according to the ethno-symbolic approach, an ethnic group or ethnie is

able to distinguish itself through nationalism or nationalist practice. Nationalist practice in this

perspective is concerned with the incorporation of certain ethnic features within the nation.

Smith: “in particular, nationalists feel the need to endow the nation of their dreams with a

common history, based on shared ethnic memories, as well as a sense of common destiny,

emanating from those shared memories. They also wish to strengthen the distinctive cultural

profile of the nation; here too they hark back to those shared components of culture, such as

language or religion and customs, which characterize older ethnies.”133

Those elements of

shared culture, ancestry or history have a rather instrumentalist character in order to back up the

striving for nation-building. Consequently, in accordance to Smith, the formation of a nation or

the understanding of the ethnic community does not always necessarily need to relate to factual

historical events. The history of a nation or the common ancestry of the etnie and narratives

about the emergence of the nation or the ethnie can be invented and emphasized in order to

foster the solidarity and loyalty towards the nation. Invented history along with national

traditions and invented national culture find their way throughout the imaginative depiction of

the nation and are expressed throughout narratives, myths, songs, hymns, etc.

The ethno-symbolic approach is an appropriate approach in order to understand ethno-

nationalist elements of Geert Wilder’s politics, because it tries to explain how narratives,

traditions and symbols play a constitutive role in the process of imagining the ethnic community

as a nation or national community. This paper claims that Geert Wilders adopts a subtle ethno

nationalist practice and anew uses (religious) myths, symbols, myths of common ancestry and

common culture in order to increase the loyalty of the electorate towards the Dutch homeland.

Those ethno-national and religious narratives enable him to emphasise the existence of a

national community and to reify the national identity in the context of a pluralised and

132

Ibid. p.176. 133

A.D. SMITH, Myths and Memories of the Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p.191.

48

diversified world. Concluding, Wilders re-imagination and re-invention of the Dutch homeland

as a nation belonging to a pre-existing ethnic community (ethnie) with a homogeneous culture is

strengthened by the re-emphasis on national symbols, history, national culture, etc. The next

paragraphs will show the different aspects of this re-invention and re-imagination.

First of all, an (imagined) history of the ethnic community is important in the process of

developing the idea of nationality. Ethno-history is not necessarily based on a factual history but

included the memories and understanding of an imagined communal past of the ethnic

community.134

The ethno-history therefore always is contested. This history often is expressed

through myths and myth-memories. The nationalist movement and, as will be shown, also the

ideology of the PVV, contains myths of descent of the national community that are unique und

has no equals. According to Smith the ethno-history consists of five myths. First of all there is

the myth about the temporal origin of the nation (when we were begotten). This myth talks

about the creation of the nation and dates the community’s origins. A second myth talks about

the history of where a people came from and how they got there. Smith says that not all ethnic

communities have a fully elaborated myth of spatial origins, but all have some notions of it.

This myth thus talks about the origin and tries to legitimate why a certain people should have

the control over the state of the land. The idea of homeland has been an important element of

the biblical depiction of Israel and again starts to play an important role in the modern

nationalist ideology in order to counter the “homelessness” that characterizes modern life.135

A

third myth, according to Smith, is the myth about the historical development of the ethnic

community. It contains stories of founding fathers and can be mythical or quasi-historical.

Furthermore, it explains how the people grew larger and talks about kinship ties. The fourth

myth is the myth about the heroic age. These myths contain narratives about how freedom of the

nation was reached and how the nation became glorious. To survive, the nation needs an

element of virtue and heroism and likes to refer to golden or glorious ages. The fifth myth is

about the myth of decline. No nation develops itself without problems. Therefore nation stresses

the reality of retrogression and volition. Myths of decline talk about how a nation lost his

identity, his self-respect or cut loose of its traditional fundaments. The reason could be a lack of

self-respect or the invasion of strange element or oppression. The decline of the nation asks for

regeneration and restoring of the golden age. That is where the last myth of the ethnic

community comes in. The decline of the nation asks for action and restoring of the important

shared values of the ethnic community. In order to be able to regenerate the nation, one needs to

return to the fundaments of the ethnic community and notions of authenticity, freedom and

autonomy. The last myth stresses the importance of self-purification of the nation and the

reawakening of the ideas of common descent and ancestry to be able to build up the nation

134

A.D. SMITH, Myths and Memories of the Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p.16l. 135

Ibid., p.64.

49

again in a way it was used to be.136

The fact that myth histories are part of Geert Wilder’s

rhetoric can easily show by quoting the preface of his electoral program:

“You may call us old-fashioned. But we still believe that the brightest days of the

Netherlands are still before us. That are heading towards a future that is going to be way

more splendid than what we already had. And why not? The Dutchmen are a people that

have no equals. We are born out of a Revolt, a struggle for freedom. Our ancestors have

transformed a boggy swamp delta into something about which the whole world is

jealous. Here, behind the dikes is reached a wealth and solidarity that has no equals,

with freedom for everyone and all along a tolerance to people who are also tolerant.

Here has been written the Acte van Verlatinghe. Where the Dutch States-General gave it

straight to the most powerful man of Europe. The King of Hispanien was told that his

power expired if it wasn’t grounded on the support of the citizens. Our people declared

itself independent and were standing alone when it fought eighty years against the most

powerful power of Europe. For centuries, our flag was waving over every sea and the

tricolour was the symbol of freedom. Of a people that decides about his own fate.”137

National symbols

The paragraph cited above already shows that ethnic myths and memories aren’t the only

important elements of this rhetoric. Narratives and ethno-histories are linked with symbols. The

boundaries of a historical home land have been visualized in stamps, flags, icons, etc. Those

national symbols function as an identity feature and are explicitly present in times of crisis,

revolution, etc. In the modernist perspective, national symbols as the nation itself are

constructed by an elite of political leaders. Because of the constructed character of national

symbols, those symbols are able to engender national sentiments among the population of

nation-states and provide a feeling of “belonging to” the nation or the nation state. The unifying

136

A.D. SMITH, Myths and Memories of the Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 63-69. 137

Original quotation in Dutch: “Noem ons maar ouderwets. Maar wij geloven nog steeds dat de mooiste

dagen van Nederland voor ons liggen. Dat we een toekomst tegemoet gaan die vele malen prachtiger is

dan wat we achter de rug hebben. En waarom ook niet? Nederlanders zijn een volk dat zijn gelijke niet

kent. We zijn geboren uit een Opstand, een vrijheidsstrijd. Onze voorouders hebben een zompige

moerasdelta omgevormd tot iets waar de hele wereld jaloers op is. Hier, achter de dijken, is een welvaart

en een solidariteit bereikt die zijn gelijke niet kende, met vrijheid voor iedereen en met van oudsher een

tolerantie tegen mensen die ook tolerant waren. Hier werd ook de Acte van Verlatinghe geschreven.

Waarin de Staten-Generaal de machtigste man van Europa de wacht aanzegden. De koning van Hispanien

werd medegedeeld dat zijn macht verviel als het niet gestoeld was op steun van de burgers. Ons volk

verklaarde zich onafhankelijk en stond alleen toen het tachtig jaren vocht tegen de grootste macht van

Europa. Eeuwen wapperde onze vlag over alle zeeën en was de driekleur het symbool van vrijheid. Van

een volk dat zelf zijn eigen lot bepaalde.” In: G.WILDERS, De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd

om te kiezen, http://pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf 2010-2015, p.5.

(access 31/05/2012).

50

effect of national symbols explains why there always is an increase of the manifestation of

national symbols in times where there is a sensed need to unify. According to Smith, those

symbols have a social and external function and are able to bring people together. Karl W.

Deutsch identifies six categories of symbols: abstract, pictoral, personal and religious symbols,

symbolic places and symbolic organisations.”138

The function of symbols and symbol systems is relevant for the reflection on Wilders´

national populist ideology. The preservation of national identity or the reinvention of national

identity functions alongside the reinvention and reification of national and/or religious symbols.

Several symbols can be found in Wilders politics, especially references to symbolic historical

events, pictoral symbols and personal symbols. The party’s main symbol is a dove in the colours

of the national flag. As can be concluded from the above mentioned quotation, the flag and the

tricolour are seen as symbols of freedom. The dove as a symbol is an originally religious

symbol, also relating to freedom and salvation. Wilders states: “Our flag doesn’t wave in

freedom anymore and needs is compelled to tolerate another flag, of a European super state.”139

In the new party program 2012, Wilders states: “Our flag is red-white-blue. Out of the EU.”140

In 2009, Wilders even states that he wanted to see a flag waving at every school.

The importance of symbols becomes even clearer in what can be called the “politics of

visibility.” The construction of a sense of national community through emphasizing national

symbols goes alongside the elimination of symbols that are perceived as non-native symbols.

The elimination of foreign symbols and especially of symbols of foreign identity expression

plays a very important role in Wilders politics. Even though Wilders doesn’t explicitly wants to

increase the visibility of Judeo-Christian or Dutch symbols in the public sphere, he explicitly

wants to ban all symbols that refer to Muslim identity. This means that the building of mosques

will be constrained; the wearing of burqas, headscarves, etc. will be prohibited. Implicitly the

re-emphasis on the Dutch Judeo-Christian culture and the visibility of the symbols of this

culture however play an important role. An example therefore is the introduction of a new

commemoration day, namely the “Holocaust commemoration day”.141

138

K.W. DEUTSCH, Symbols of Political Community in : L.BRYSON et all., Symbols and Society.

Fourteenth Symposium to the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, New York, Harper and

Brothers, 2009. 139

Original quotation in Dutch: “Onze vlag wappert niet meer in vrijheid maar moet een vlag naast zich

tolereren van een Europese superstaat.” In: G.WILDERS, De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd om

te kiezen: 2010-2015, http://pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf (access

28/05/2012), p. 5. 140

Original quotation in Dutch:”Onze vlag is rood-wit-blauw. Uit de EU.” In :G. WILDERS, Hun Brussel.

Ons Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012 2017,

http://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/verkiezingen2012/VerkiezingsProgramma-PVV-2012-final-web.pdf

(acces: 16/07/2012), p.14. 141

G. WILDERS, Hun Brussel. Ons Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012 2017,


(acces: 16/07/2012), p.27.

51

Cultural intimacy

The concept of cultural intimacy, which was introduced by Michael Herzfeld can furthermore

help to understand the dynamics of national belonging and national identity and help to explain

the appeal of Wilders´ politics. According to Herzfeld, cultural intimacy expresses those aspects

of a cultural identity that provide insiders with a sense of national comfort, understanding and

self-reflexive, ontological security.142

In this perspective a nation-state exhibits attitudes similar

to emotion because “they represent collectivities shaped by narratives which in turn constitute a

common habitus.” This habitus is an “active residue or sediment of (an actor’s) past that

functions within…present, shaping his perception, thought, and action and thereby moulding

social practice in a regular way. It consists in dispositions, schemas, form of know-how and

competence, all of which function below the level of consciousness.”143

The national group

then, shapes the habitus: “the fortunes of a nation become crystallized in institutions which are

responsible for ensuring that the most different people of a society acquire the same

characteristics, possess the same national habitus.”144

The nation-state thus can influence the

habitus of the national group through referring to national narratives, collective memory,

national symbols, etc. The collective consciousness which is created in the national habitus

promotes a collective self-understanding and understanding of problems. As a result certain

events or attitudes are only intelligible for the people who belong to the national group, because

the group shares a common national habitus.145

If this is the case, the referring to this collective

habitus in politics guarantees a high electoral resonance. Concerning the right-wing populist

politics of Geert Wilders the concept of cultural intimacy is helpful in order to understand why

on the one hand his politics are so popular but on the other hand why people often are not aware

of the right-wing and racist nature of this politics. The national habitus and nation-state identity

of the Netherlands consist of concepts like “freedom, tolerance, domestic commitment to

democracy, progressive values, multiculturalism, moral values, etc.”146

Furthermore the Dutch

people are perceived and present themselves as being open-minded, tolerant and humble: “The

Dutch are known as a tolerant people. Particularly to those of different opinions and

persuasions. They are used to discussing differences of opinion and admire those who stand up

for themselves their ideas and ideals. Freedom is cherished virtue in the Netherlands.”147

142

A. ZARAKOL & J. SUBOTIC, Cultural intimacy in international relations, forthcoming in: European

Journal of International Relation, OnlineFirst,19/06/2011, p.1; .M. HERZFELD, Cultural Intimacy. Social

Poetics in the Nation-State, New York, Routledge, 2005. 143

143


Journal of International Relation, OnlineFirst,19/06/2011, p.5. 144

Ibid.,p.5. 145

Ibid., p.6. 146


Journal of International Relation, OnlineFirst,19/06/2011, p.24-25. 147

The Netherlands Board of Tourism and Conventions, www.holland.com (access: 05/06/2012).

http://www.holland.com/

52

Obviously, this self-perception seems to be radically opposed to the rise of right-wing politics

on behalf of the growing ethnic and religious tensions. It raises the question whether Dutch state

identity has changed and the liberal values and tolerance have been sorted out as constitutive

elements of Dutch identity. Instead of claiming that the self-perception or the contemporary

state identity has changed in the course of the years due to socio-cultural changes, this paper

claims that on behalf of the fact that Wilders and other populist politics claim to defend the

values that are part of this self-perception and national habitus, they are not perceived as being

out of line with tradition or state identity. As will be discussed in depth further on, it will

become clear that the racist features of Wilders politics, the preservation and protection of

national culture and the anti-immigration polemics resonate on high degree with the electorate

because they refer to the value content of collective identity and collective self-understanding.

Furthermore, this is also the reason why many people accept Wilders opinions and viewpoints

because they believe that through supporting his politics, they protect, once again, those aspect

of cultural identity “that provide them with a sense of national comfort, understanding and self-

reflexive, ontological security.”

Anti-Europeanism

In connection to the vehement emphasis on the national community and probably as a result of

the current discussion about the economic situation in Europe, the election program of the PVV

in 2012 appears to be a radical manifesto against all Europeanization and internationalisation

and disclose the nationalist features of Wilders politics even clearer. An elaborated discussion of

the anti-Europeanism of Geert Wilders lies beyond the scope of this paper, but it is important to

notice that the new election program has one goal: the total cultural, institutional and political

autonomy of the Netherlands. This striving for national autonomy and the elimination of all

supranational sovereignty directly connects to the nationalist practice which has been discussed

so far.

“In this election program we present the choses for the Netherlands 2017. As always we are

pragmatic and patriotic. Other parties choose for Islam or EU-nationalism; we choose for

the Netherlands. The choice is clear (…): their Brussels versus our economy, our welfare

state, our freedom, our security, our immigration policy, our healthcare, our quality of

living, our foreign policy, our environment and our finances. We start a quarrel with the

EU-nationalism.”148

148

Original citation in Ducth: “In dit verkiezingsprogramma presenteren wij onze keuzes voor Nederland

2017. Zoals altijd zijn we pragmatisch en patriottisch. Andere partijen kiezen voor islam of

EUnationalisme; wij kiezen voor Nederland. De keuze is duidelijk, en terug te zien in de titels van de

hoofdstukken die volgen: hun Brussel versus onze economie, onze verzorgingsstaat, onze vrijheid, onze

53

The fragile line between patriotism and nationalism

This section tried to show that ethno-nationalism is an important part of the right-wing populist

politics of Geert Wilders. Central to the ethno-nationalism isn’t the preservation of the state for

an ethnic community but the preservation of a national culture connected to an ethnic

understanding of nativeness. Especially because of this emphasis on culture and values rather

than on nation state, Geert Wilders often states that he is not a nationalist, but a patriot.149

In the

above cited paragraph out of the new election program, Wilders further calls his politics

patriotic. Wilders: “I am not a nationalist, but a patriot, because I do not hate, but love – I don’t

want to destruct, but preserve, namely our freedom and our home. The distinction between

patriotism and nationalism though isn’t very clear. Nationalism according to Girardet is an

ideology that emphasis the values and interests of the nation state whereas patriotism merely is

an attitude that doesn’t necessarily has a political or ideological meaning.150

Walker makes

another clear distinction and claims that nationalism implies the loyalty toward one´s national

group whereas patriotism implies a loyalty towards one’s state (country) and its institution.151

Applied to Wilders statements, it should be clear that his loyalty towards the national group is

predominant over his loyalty towards the institutional structure of the country. As has been

shown above, the preservation of the native community or the “Dutch ethnie” is central to

Wilders rhetoric. Furthermore, it should be noted that one of the major topics of Wilders politics

is the presumed problems that are caused by the increasing immigration and his opinions

concerning the preservation of Dutch culture have concrete implications on the level of policy

and political conduct, which makes it more than a mere patriotic attitude. In the next section

immigration and the way in which the topic of immigration plays a role in Wilders politics and

is connected to the protection of the native community will be discussed.

veiligheid, ons immigratiebeleid, onze zorg, onze kwaliteit van leven, ons buitenland, onze omgeving en

onze financiën. Wij binden de strijd aan met het EU-nationalisme.”

http://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/verkiezingen2012/VerkiezingsProgramma-PVV-2012-final-web.pdf,

p.7. (access: 10.07.2012) 149

Original quotation in German: „Ich bin kein Nationalist, ich bin Patriot, denn ich hasse nicht, ich liebe

– ich will nicht zerstören, sondern bewahren, nämlich unsere Freiheit und Heimat“. In: M.SCHWARZ,

Ich lebe in Todesangst. Seit den Morden an Pim Fortuyn und Theo van Gogh ist Geert Wilders Hollands

prominentester Islam-Kritiker in: Junge Freiheit, 07/09/2007, p.3. 150

R. GIRARDET, Le nationalisme, in: P.A. Taguieff, Le retour du populisme. Un defi pour les

democracies europeenes, Universalis, 2004, p. 139-148; U. ÖZKIRIMLI, Theories of Nationalism. A

Critical Introduction, Basingstoke, 2000, p.203, 230. 151

W. CONNOR, Ethnonationalism. A Quest for Understanding, New Jersey, Princeton University Press,

1993, p.196.


54

Immigration in the Netherlands

The constitution of Dutch society in the course of the years has changed radically, primarily

through immigration. The heavy debates on the immigration rate in society give the impression

that immigration is something new to deal with or at least that the character of it has changed.

Immigration though, for Dutch society, is as old as the country itself. Dutch acceptance of

English Separatists, French Huguenots and Portuguese and Spanish Jews during the Second

World War has given the Netherlands a reputation for tolerance.152

In the public perception, the

political tolerance for minorities created a good environment for immigrants. According to

Andeweg and Irvin it has been pointed out that this tolerance is merely a case of pragmatism

than principle. They claim that immigrants were accepted as long as they didn’t affect the life of

the natives too much. Nevertheless, at least since 1600, the Netherlands has been a country of

minorities and opted for a “live and let live” policy. But this “live and let live” discourse

changed mainly on behalf of the fact that increasing (Muslim) migration should be held

responsible for the problems of the country. Even more people were claiming that exactly the

tolerance of the Netherlands would be its demise.

As been mentioned before, a lot of publications on the rise of right-wing populist in Western

Europe focus on the socio-economic conditions and changes in Europe during the last decades.

And indeed regarding to immigration the political and economic situation has always been a

direct influence on how policies were developed. After the Second World War, Western Europe

entered a new phase that asked for political reorientation and the re-establishing of political

stability. In post-war Western Europe, immigration was promoted as a response to the labour

shortage, due to the rapid economic development. Therefore, in the 1950s and 1960s, the most

of the immigrants had been immigrant workers. Post-war migration thus was dominated by two

types of migration: migrants from the former colonies and labour migrants. The Dutch colonial

empire began to fall when Indonesia claimed its independence in 1945, leading to the

immigration of two large groups of persons: Dutch-Indonesian repatriates and Moluccans.

During the first two decades after the independence of Indonesia, 300,000 repatriates arrived. In

1975 the left-wing Den Uyl government decided to grant independence to another Dutch

colony: Suriname. This decision again caused a new wave of migration, because many

inhabitants feared that the independence would affect the political and economic stability in the

country. The second group of immigrants is the guest workers. In the 1960s workers were

recruited, first from Southern Europe, and later from Yugoslavia, Turkey and Morocco. In 1974

a labour migration stop was implemented, but many guest workers decided to prolong their stay

in the Netherlands and were joined by their families. Because of this it appeared that new

152


Macmillan, 2005.

55

immigration policies were needed. The growing proportion of immigrants now no longer only

consisted of first generation immigrant workers but of their family members and a next

generation of immigrants. Because the initial idea has been that the immigrant workers would

fill the gaps in the Dutch labour market and would afterwards go back home again, the fact that

they didn’t was a new challenge to immigration policymakers. The new policy documents state

that the policies that were made in the 1960 until the 1980s were “not sufficiently regulated”153

and caused waves of migration which are now perceived as being the cause of important socio-

economic and socio-cultural problems. Therefore, the new immigration policies after the 1970s

were highly restrictive.

As a result of the “not sufficiently regulated” policies, there also didn’t exist an integration

policy before the 1970's. As has already been mentioned, the “myth of return” not only

influenced the policies but also lead to the conviction that a real integration in Dutch society

wasn’t necessary since the immigration would eventually return back home. What is perceived

as the traditionally Dutch tolerance towards immigration isn’t much more than a result of the

efforts that has been made in order to provide immigrants with a comfortable environment and

to make the “transition back home as smooth as possible.”154

In the course of the years, it

became clear that the lack of support and the lack of promotion of integration lead to the

disadvantage of immigrants in society. This disadvantaged position was marked by the

existence of segregated neighbourhoods and a low level of socio-economic welfare. The

government realized that in order to make immigration profitable to Dutch society, they needed

to provide the immigrants a stable and prosperous environment. As a result of these concerns,

the first integration policies were developed. A first step in this direction was the “ethnic

minority policy” that was introduced in the 1980s.155

This policy was characterized by its liberal

idea of trying to create a balance between integration and the preservation of the cultural

identity of the migrants. This model of “plurality within unity” was clearly in line with the

political culture of pillarisation. The immigrant cultures were perceived as new “pillars” within

society. This ethnic minority policy resulted in an astonishing support of the socio-cultural life

of immigrants. According to Ersannilli there were consultative councils for ethnic minorities at

the local and national level; mother-tongue teaching was introduced in primary schools; and the

first Muslim and Hindu schools were erected. Aside from stimulating integration through

cultural activities, the policy aimed at equality before the law and equal opportunity in the

153

Towards a modern migration policy. Memorandum on the review of the policy on managed migration

in the Netherlands, www.rijksoverheid.nl (access: 10/07/2012), p.17. 154

E. ERSANILI, Immigration in the Netherlands, International Internet Database Focus Migration:

http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/The-Netherlands.2644.0.html?&L=1 155

E. VASTA, From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy. Multiculturalism and the Sheft to

Assimilationism in the Netherlands, in: Ethnic and Racial studies Vol, 30, Nr. 5 (2007), p.713-740.

http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/

http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/The-Netherlands.2644.0.html?&L=1

56

labour market, housing market and education.156

For the next decades, this multicultural

approach towards immigration and ethnic minorities has been predominant within policy

making. This approach has tried to stress and preserve the own cultural identity of ethnic

minorities which was believed that the socio-cultural support and promotion of foreign cultural

identity would help the minorities to develop a strong identity and self-confidence which would

make them “better equipped to participate in society.”157

The multicultural and pluralist approach concerning immigration and integration towards the

1990s changed. Instead of promoting the own cultural identity of minorities, the promotion of

integration and assimilation became central. This was mainly a result of the crisis which the

Dutch welfare state was facing. The substantial number of people on welfare was no longer

perceived as a result of ineffective policy, but as a result of “lack of effort on the part of

immigrants.”158

From that point on, the policies focused on what is called inburgering

(“integration as a full citizen”). Immigrants were forced to participate in special training

programs, language courses, etc. All those prerequisite officially came into effect with the 1998

law on civic integration of newcomers (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers, WIN). This law states

that “newcomers” are obliged to participate in a Inburgeringscursus (civic integration program)

that consist of language and societal orientation classes for at least 600 hours (§1, Art. 6).159

The

Netherlands, traditionally perceived and perceiving itself as tolerant country of minorities, now

was the first country to introduce a mandatory program that not only aims at integration, but

also assimilation. Several publications state that the policy changes since the end of the 1990s

marks the fundamental change of perception on minorities and immigration and are a proof of

the assimilationist course that Dutch policies have taken. The official governmental website on

integration policy gives a strong illustration of this new approach when stating: “the government

wants to abandon the idea of a multicultural society. Dutch society is constantly changing, in

part under influence of other cultures, but it has its own character and is not interchangeable.”160

This discussion on changing immigration- and integration policies in the Netherlands tried to

make it obvious that the anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism attitudes of right-wing

parties like for example the PVV should not be perceived as extraordinary but as an integral part

of mainstream public and political discourses. Again referring to the concept of political culture

and assuming that what happens on the level of politics and government is a reflection of public

156



H. DE HAAS, Ethnic Minority and Employment Policies in Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, the

United Kingdom, and France. A Comparative Study, Maastricht, European Centre for Work and Society,

1997, p.18. 158



Governmental internet source: http://www.st-ab.nl/wetwin.htm#h3 160

Governmental internet source: http://www.government.nl/issues/integration/integration-policy



http://www.st-ab.nl/wetwin.htm#h3

http://www.government.nl/issues/integration/integration-policy

57

opinion, this implies that the negative perspective on immigrant culture and the reinforced

emphasis on national identity is not just a political strategy, but as politics is as appealing as it is

just because it is part of the public opinion. It should not be neglected that immigration plays an

important role in the resurgence of social conflict and unrest and is therefore often used in right-

wing politics. The Israeli scholar Eytan Meyers describes the influence of global migration on

politics and society as follows:

“Immigration has a tremendous impact on the demography, culture, economy and politics of a

state. It is the key demographic factor responsible for population growth in Western societies, and

the cause of cultural conflicts and of a transformation from relatively homogeneous to

multicultural societies. Immigration has contributed to the rise of extreme right anti-immigration

parties in most EU member states and to attempts to achieve a common migration and asylum

policy. Both US and European policy makers have defined immigration as one of the biggest

domestic challenges and political issues facing their nations.”161

The perception of global migration though is not exclusively negative but primarily targets a

specific migratory grouping. In the following paragraph the focus on this migratory grouping,

namely on the immigration from Muslim countries, and the way in which this negative

perception is expressed, will be discussed.

Europe and its Muslim minorities

The history of immigration in Europe shows that there is always a specific group of people that

is branded “other” and “foreign”. A well-known example is how Jews were perceived as a

threatening presence for a very long time in history. After the drama of the Second World War,

the image of a Jewish person is no longer negatively perceived. The new antagonism that haunts

Europe’s politics is the opposition between modern Europe – the Christian Continent – against

“the new Antichrist”.162

According to Nachmani, Europe has been attractive to Muslim migrants and immigrants for

several reasons. Firstly, the economy in Europe is flourishing, rich and highly developed.

Secondly, Europe requires a high degree of manual labour to maintain itself. Furthermore,

Europe is geographically centrally located and easily reached particularly from North Africa,

Turkey and the Arab States. Fourth, many Muslim states are former colonies of European

161

E. MEYERS, International Immigration Policy. A Theoretical Comperative Analysis, New York,

Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.199. 162

A. NACHMANI, Europe and its Muslim Minorities. Aspects of Conflict. Attempts at Accord, Eastbourne,

Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.9.

58

nations.163

Still, the solemn fact of Muslim immigration doesn’t answer the question why this

migratory grouping at a sudden is as negatively perceived as it is nowadays. Purely statistic data

show that the perception of a vehement and threatening immigration from Muslim countries, or

what Wilders might call “a Tsunami of Islam” is not much more than pure imagination.

An increase of Muslim immigration in Europe and in the Netherlands is a fact, though the

increase is not dramatic and Muslim migrants still are a minority in both Europe and the

Netherlands. Negative reactions on Muslim migration are perceived as a legitimate reaction on

an objective overflow of Muslims in society. This conviction gains support in public opinion

because several politicians, not only from the right spectrum, keep on claiming this overflow.

Therefore, a lot of people get the idea that the subjective resentment has an objective root and is

therefore legitimate. The factual situation in the Netherlands is highly different than the image

that Geert Wilders sketches. The PVV states that the Muslim population in the Netherlands is

taking over the „native Dutch‟ population. In an interview in the Dutch Magazine HP/De Tijd

Wilder says: “We have a huge demographic problem. That is due to immigration, and also

because Muslims procreate faster. But I say then: Send the trouble-causing Muslims back home,

with their families and everything. The demographic development needs to be of a kind, that

there is a tiny chance that they (Muslims) are in the Cabinet. Now, there is too much Islam in

the Netherlands.”164

Geert Wilders believes that there is a negative demographic situation due to

an increase of Muslim immigration and a decrease of ‘native’ population. Therefore, following

Wilders, the number of active Muslims in society and in the public sphere should be reduced.

“But I don’t want more Muslims to come to the Netherlands; I want them to become less. So I

want to close the borders for migrants from Muslim countries and motivate Muslims to leave

the Netherlands voluntary.”165

The following analysis of the statistic demographic situation in the Netherlands draws a

different picture. Current data shows that the Netherlands has an overall population of

16,574,989 people. In the year 2000 2,775,302 of them were „allochtoon‟166

(17.5 pct.) in 2009

this became 19.9 percentage (3,287,706) and last year’s measurements show a result of a total of

163


Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.9. 164

Original quotation in Dutch: “we hebben een groot demografisch probleem. Dat komt door de

immigratie, en ook omdat moslims zich sneller voortplanten. Maar ik zeg dan: Stuur de moslims die

problemen veroorzaken het land uit, met familie en al.” In: J. NIEMOLER, Wilders spreekt: ik capituleer

niet, in: HP/De Tijd, 12/12/2007 ( access 01/06/2012). 165

Original quotation in Dutch: “Maar ik wil niet dat er méér moslims in Nederland komen, ik wil liever

dat het er minder worden. Dus wil ik de grenzen voor migranten uit moslimlanden dichtgooien.

Bovendien wil ik moslims aanmoedigen om Nederland vrijwillig te verlaten. De demografische

ontwikkeling moet zo worden, dat de kans klein is dat er weer twee in het kabinet komen. Er is nu te veel

islam in Nederland.” In: G.VALK, “Het koninkrijk van Allah zal nooit komen” in: NRC Handelsblad,

24/02/2007. 166

Dutch term for non-Duth people or immigrants in contrast with “autochtoon” or “native” Dutchmen,

for further information see the next section on (neo-)racism at p.64.

59

20.3 (3,359,603) percentage of allochtoon people in the Netherlands. A surprisingly low

percentage of the allochtoon people come from “non-Western” countries.167

In 2010 this is only

1,858,294 (55.3 pct.) This means that in total, only 11.21 pct. of immigrants in the Netherlands

come from non-Western countries. Furthermore, almost fifty percent of the total allochtoon

population in the Netherlands is „second generation‟-immigrants. Therefore, the idea that there

is an overflow of Muslim or non-Western people in the Netherlands can be proved wrong. On

the other hand, Wilders also expects an increase of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands.

This expectation, relating to demographic data, cannot easily be proved wrong. In the first 10

years of this era, the amount of non-western allochtons in the Netherlands has increased by

449,527. The increase of autochthon people in the same decade amounts to 126,738. This means

that the amount of allochton people is increasing much faster than the amount of autochthon

people.

167

CBS (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek) uses the taxonomy Western and non-Western in following way:

Western immigrants come from Europe, North America, Oceania, Japan and Indonesia. Non-Western

immigrants come from Turkey, Africa (Morocco), Latin America, Suriname and Dutch Antilles/Aruba.

For more information see: D. YANOW, Race by another name. Categories, counting, and the state – the

case of Netherlands integration policy discourse, presentation at the Global and International Studies

Elliot School for International Affairs, George Washington University, 18/02/2010, p.20-21.

60

Figure 8. Expected rate of non-Western immigrants 2010-2040168

Still, the demographic development expectation as we can see in figure 8 might be

oversimplified and needs to be treated critically, especially because of the fact that „non-

Western‟ immigrants are not per se Muslim. Even if the immigration from non-Western

countries will increase in the fore mentioned way, then this does not mean an a priori increase of

Muslim citizens. Other statistics namely show that in 2004 only 5.8 percent of the Dutch

population is Muslim.169

This means, that of 16,574,989 people of which 3,359,603 are

allochtoon (Western and non-Western), only 944,000 of them are Muslims.

There is another ambiguous part about the anti-Islam and anti-immigration propaganda of

Geert Wilders. The former Dutch Colony of Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim

population. 86.1 percent of Indonesians population is Muslim according to 2011 data.170

The

CBS (Centraal Burau voor Statistiek), sees Indonesia as the home country of “Western” and not

of non-Western immigrants. This in itself is surprising. Due to the colonial history, Indonesians

and Indonesian immigrants are apparently perceived as Western and are not automatically

linked to Islam. The public perception of Indonesians is also explicitly different from the

perception of for example Turks or Moroccans. In 2005 there were 395,800 Indonesian

allochtons in the Netherlands.171

There still exist very important economic and political

168

G. WILDERS, Hun Brussel. Ons Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012-2017,

http://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/verkiezingen2012/VerkiezingsProgramma-PVV-2012-final-web.pdf (access: 10/07/2012), p.15. 169

Internet database Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (CBS):

http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70086ned&D1=0-1,17-

18&D2=a&HD=090710-1521&HDR=T&STB=G1 (access: 10/07/2012). 170

Internet database form the Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, Indonesia

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html(access: 10/07/2010). 171

J. GARSSEN & J. NICOLAAS et all., Demografie van de allochtonen in Nederland, Database from

the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/CCD504EA-9D41-40C2-AE28-

BFB0A51C2045/0/2005k3b15p096art.pdf (acces: 10/07/2012), p.100.


https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html

61

relationships between the Netherlands and his ex-colony, but Wilders propaganda has already

caused various problems with the Indonesian president. The on the one hand positive perception

of Indonesian citizens and on the other hand negative implication of Wilders propaganda on

Dutch-Indonesian economic and political agreements show the ambiguity of Wilders political

program and anti-immigration policy.

The ambiguities shown above raise more questions than they answer. Why are Muslims

perceived as a threat? Why are Muslim migrants at sudden considered foreigners even after

decades of residence or birth in Europe? And why should Muslim migrants cause different or

more problems than other migrants? This paper states that the negative perception of migrants

from Islamic countries cannot be sufficiently explained without discussing processes of identity

making and the reification of identity. In accordance to Nachmani, the negative perception is

related to the opposition that is being made between a modern, enlightened and Christian

identity seeking “fortress Europe” and an unmodern and back warded Islam. The different

aspects of this Manichean discourse, which lie at the heart of right-wing populist politics, will

be analysed more profoundly in the next section.

The threefold identity reification

This section will now come to discuss the central feature of the politics of identity of right-wing

populist politics of the PVV which this paper will call the threefold identity reification.

(Neo-)racism

The negative perception of Muslim citizens primarily emerged since 9/11 and underlies an age

old logic which in sociology has been called “othering”. The concept describes the process of

distinguishing between the own identity which is emphasized and the identity of a specific

group of people which is often perceived in pejorative terms. The “Other” in this perspective

can always be a different group of people and can change over time. Several events can lead to a

change in perception of the other. In the case of the exclusion and discrimination of Muslim

citizens in Western Europe, the change can be mainly explained through the attribution of

terrorist attacks to Muslim extremist actors and the way in which the media reacted on these

attributions. Since 9/11 it seems that “Muslim” and “Terrorist” became synonym. Muslims

became people who are “everything Europeans are not” and with having extreme political

ideologies, religious radicalism and a love for terrorism.172

Ever since 2001, it is not difficult to

find remarks on Muslim terrorist activity in everyday news. Several surveys show this negative

172


Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.43.

62

development. According to the annual report of the world economic forum on the dialogue

between Islam and the West, 67 percent of Dutch people believe that an increasing cooperation

with the “Islamic World” is a threat to Dutch society. 173

Furthermore, 55 percent of the people

believe that the Islamic World doesn’t respect the Western World.174

According to the Muslims

in EU-cities Report of the Open Society Institute, an opinion poll in June 2004 showed that 68

per cent of the Dutch respondents felt threatened by “immigrant or Muslim young people”, 53

per cent feared a terrorist attack by Muslim terrorists in the Netherlands, and 47 per cent feared

that in due time they would have to live according to Islamic rules in the Netherlands.175

Another opinion poll by a Dutch newspaper in 2006, showed that 70.7 per cent of the Dutch

respondents thought that Islam was “unfriendly to women”, 55.9 per cent of the respondents

thought that there was “no room for humour in Islam”, and 54 per cent thought that Islam and

democracy were incompatible.176

The anti-Islam discourse within society is growing larger at a steady pace and gaining ever

more popularity and acceptance. The exclusion of a specific group of people raises the question

whether racism still is playing a larger role then is often thought. In the aftermath of the Second

World War, a taboo on racism and racist rhetoric emerged. On behalf of the development of

several anti-racist and anti-discrimination laws in many countries, many people believed that

racism was a beast that could be tamed. With the emergence of the anti-Muslim and anti-Islam

discourse it should be questioned whether we really managed to control racism. The discussions

about the “problematic” Islam and Islamism are widespread and give the impression that a new

kind of racism imperceptibly emerged. Even though many people want to believe that we live in

a post racial world, racist narratives appear to be very persistent. One of the explanations for the

smooth development of anti-Islamic propaganda might be the fact that it is a racism

masquerading as non-racism. This implies that the racist discourse on Islam and Muslim

communities, doesn’t involve race in a strict sense, but focus on other (cultural) identity

markers. Cultural racisms, in contrast to biological racisms, are hard to recognize.177

Whereas in

“ordinary” racism, the focus lie on the biological race and the people in a strict sense, the racist

rhetoric within Wilders and other anti-Islam politics focus on the religion and the culture of the

people. The cultural racism is as Pierre-André Taguieff names it “differentialist racism”

Differentialist racism sees a culture as uncommon and impossible held common; it maps the

differences instead of the possible commonalities.178

According to Balibar, the culturalist racism

173

https://members.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf 174

Ibid. 175

http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/museucitiesnet_20080101_0.pdf p.38 176

http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/museucitiesnet_20080101_0.pdf p.38 177

G. DIETZKE, Kritik des Okzidentalismus. Transdisziplinäre Beiträge zu (Neo-)Orientalismus und

Geschlecht, Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2009, p.26. 178

E. BALIBAR, Is there a Neo-Racism? In: E. BALIBAR & I. WALLERSTEIN, Race, Nation, Class.

Ambiguous identities, London, Verso, 1991, p.17-28.

https://members.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf

http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/museucitiesnet_20080101_0.pdf


63

can be perceived as “racism without races”.179

Geert Wilders therefore persistently states that

that he doesn’t have any problem with the Muslim people, but with Islam. Wilders: “We do not

support religious exclusion - and certainly not racial exclusion. We have no problems with other

skin colours, nor with Muslims - our problem is with Islam.”180

Or: “(…) I want to make clear

that I do not have a problem with people. I always make a distinction between the people and

the ideology, between Muslims and Islam.”181

The question is: does the content and focus of the

exclusivist discourse change the essence of the phenomenon?

The taboo on racism is a taboo on biological racism. As has been mentioned anti-Islam

rhetoric in most of the cases, does not involve a naturalistic or biologist perspective. Therefore,

it is easy for this neo-racism with its focus on religion and other cultural identity markers to

emerge. The problem is that we often think of racism in an excessively mono-linear way.

Racism though, in Foucauldian terms can be perceived as a discursive practice which is

characterised by a certain logical structure. We can think of the anti-Islam politics as a

discursive practice with the same logic as the “old-fashioned” biological racism. In short: racism

doesn’t need to be linked to biological race to be racist. The cultural racism of Geert Wilders

and many others is as racist as racial racism. The logic behind both differentiating rhetoric is the

same or in other words: “there is a parallel between historic racist ideologies such as slavery,

colonialism and social nationalism and the postulate of hierarchy of cultures.”182

The praxis

which underlies the anti-Muslim reasoning can be called “racialisation.” Racialisation means

that certain identity markers are (re)-constructed concerning a certain group of people which

makes them “identifiable as being different”. According to Arun Kundani in the case of the

racialisation of Muslim people this means that “religious belonging has come to act as a symbol

of racial difference. The new official language (…) largely takes faith to be, like race, a destiny

set at birth and something that someone can observe about you from your appearance.”183

The

perception of the “East”, “Islamic” or “Muslim” World and Muslim citizens as a monolithic

other clearly overlaps with what Edward Said once called Orientalism.184

The colonial

Orientalism contained images of odalisques and “strange-looking” men. The current anti-

Muslim racism therefore can also be perceived as a neo-Orientalism and has leading images

like: burka-wearing women and mosques.

179

Ibid. 180

P. COHEN, Merkel is Afraid. Interview with Geert Wilders, in: Der Spiegel (11/9/2010),

http://pvv.nl/index.php/in-de-media/interviews/3672-spiegel-interview-with-geert-wilders.html 181

G. WILDERS, A warning to America, Corner Stone Church, Nashville 12.05.2011,

http://pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/36-geert-wilders/4303-a-warning-to-america-speech-

geert-wilders-cornerstone-church-nashville-12-may-2011.html; 182

Y. SHOOMAN, Das Zusammenspiel von Kultur, Religion, Ethnizität und Geschlecht im

antimuslismischen Rassismus, in: Ungleichheit, Ungleichwertgkeit, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,

BPP, Nr. 62. Jg, 16-17/2012, 16/04/2012, p.53. 183

A. KUNDNANI, The End of Tolerance. Racism in 21st Century Britain, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p.57.

184 G. DIETZE, Kritik des Okzidentalismus. Transdisziplinäre Beiträge zu (Neo-)Orientalismus und

Geschlecht, Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2009, p.26.

http://pvv.nl/index.php/in-de-media/interviews/3672-spiegel-interview-with-geert-wilders.html

http://pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/36-geert-wilders/4303-a-warning-to-america-speech-geert-wilders-cornerstone-church-nashville-12-may-2011.html


64

The already mentioned opposition between allochotoon and autochtoon people in the

Netherlands as a category which differs between native and non-native citizens needs some

more attention in this discussion on (neo-)racism. Allochtoon and autochtoon are common terms

in Dutch minority and immigration policy. According to Yanow, the Netherlands has no explicit

race discourse, but the usage of those categories might indicate the existence of a concealed race

discourse. The categories allochtoon is used to categorise all people who are not born in the

Netherlands. Nevertheless, a further distinction is made. The distinction that Geert Wilders and

institutions as the CBS make between “Western” and “non-Western” allochtons points even

more in the direction of a normative connotation of the categories. As normative or “racist”

categories, this implies that the country of origin merely becomes an identity marker or a

“surrogate term for ethnicity, as it brings ancient ideas of place and behaviour or character into

play a stand-in for race itself.”185

As a result, allochtons will never be Dutch and indicates a

complex process of othering within Dutch mainstream minority and integration policy on the

one hand and in Geert Wilder’s rhetoric on the other hand. This conflation of ethnic identity and

nationality will be further discussed below.

Concluding, we do not live in a post-racial era. In the following section, this paper wants to

focus on the different perceptions and identity reifications that underlie this new kind of racism

which is predominantly part of many right-wing populist movements in Western Europe.

The reification and essentialisation of ethnic and national identities

Geert Wilders and many other perceive the Muslims and the Muslims in Europe as a

homogeneous body. They tend to equalise, essentialise and reify culture, religion and group. In

terms of culture, social, religious and political differentiations though, Islam can impossibly be

seen as a homogeneous body. Major distinctions separate the small radical Muslim minority that

embraces violence from the large majority of moderate relatively secular Muslims. Wilders

systematically denies this differentiation. For Wilders there is only one Islam, which is a radical

political ideology instead of a religion. According to Nachmani though, only 10-15 percent of

the European Muslim population, perhaps even fewer consist of Islam radicals. Geert Wilders as

well as mainstream media and politicians from the whole range of politics talk about the

problem of “Islam”. The people behind “the” Muslim problem” are “the” Muslim people. In this

perspective, the internal differentiation of “the” Muslim community is completely neglected.

But as McCloud states: “There are at least seventeen distinct communities of Islamic

expression. These communities can be differentiated in terms of (1) Islamic understanding –

how they to what has come to be known in the Sunni Muslim world as the five pillars;…(2)

185

D. YANOW, Race by another name. Categories, counting, and the state – the case of Netherlands

integration policy discourse, presentation at the Global and International Studies Elliot School for

International Affairs, George Washington University, 18/02/2010, p.26.

65

whether the group has nation-building as its focus rather than the wider Muslim community

(here and abroad), and (3) how they acknowledge the leader of the community.186

The

perception of Islam and of Muslims as a homogeneous body is necessary in order to make the

distinction between “we” and “the others”.

As has been mentioned before, the essentialising and reifying of identity concern the group,

the religion and the culture. Concerning the group of people, the interpretation of “we” and the

“others” as a group in Wilders politics can be interpreted as an emphasis on ethnicity. The

Harvard political scientist Joseph Rothschild coined the term ethno politics. He defined it as a

process of “mobilizing ethnicity from a psychological or cultural or social datum into political

leverage for the purpose of altering or reinforcing…system of structures inequality between and

among ethnic categories. In this process ethno politics stresses, ideologises reifies, modifies and

sometimes virtually recreates the groups that it mobilizes.”187

Bauman concludes: “Ethnicity is

thus transformed from a classificatory boundary chosen or imposed as the case may be, into a

substantive and unified group heritage, identified by its supposedly unified culture again chosen

or imposed as the case may be. This process is not entirely new, though twentieth-century ethno

politics politicise quasi-tribal differences within nation-states – precisely those nation-state that

were expected to overcome ethnic divisions through equal citizenship.”188

Just as in Brubaker´s

“Ethnicity without groups” for Baumann, ethnicity is not the product of nature working by itself

but the product of people’s actions and identifications: “ethnic identities can be stressed or

unstressed, enjoyed or resented, imposed or even depend, all depending on situation and

context.”189

Ethnicity thus, is something which in the antagonistically constructed opposition

between the so-called West and Islam is reified, constructed and essentialised. Those politicians

like Geert Wilders, who foster ethnic exclusivist and ethnic chauvinist thinking, can be

perceived as “ethnic entrepreneurs”. Ethnic entrepreneurs are politicians who appeal to a

common ethnic identity or try to reconstruct a sense of common ethnic identity in an attempt to

gain support in their struggle for political power. Concluding, within Geert Wilders politics two

parallel images exist: on the one hand an ethnic interpretation of the Dutch people, which is

characterized by modernity, liberalism and secularism and opposed to it an ethnic interpretation

of Muslim people as being unmodern, conservative, back warded, extremist, etc. Wilders for

example states that: “the spread of Islam led to ages of stagnation, if not inverted progress, in

the occupied territories of Asia and North Africa.”190

Or: “Throughout history, Islam has

186

A.B. MCCLOUD, African American Islam, New York, Routledge, 1995, p.52. 187

J. ROTHSCHILD, Ethnopolitics. A Conceptual Framework, New York, Columbia University Press,

1981, p. 2-3. 188

G. BAUMAN, the Multicultural Riddle. Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities, New

York, Routledge, 1999, p.58. 189

Ibid., p.64. 190

G. WILDERS, Marked for Death. Islam`s war against the West and Me, Washington DC, Regnery

Publishers, 2012, p.57.

66

brought poverty, social strife, backwardness, intolerance and tyranny to societies where it is

practiced.”191

Olivier Roy calls this interpretation “neo-ethnic.” He states that the category Muslim is often

used without any reference to the faith of religious practice. “neo” means that the original

culture is no long important and ethnicity means that the religion isn’t perceived as a faith, but

as a combination of cultural patterns. Neo-ethnicity then means the construction of an ethnic

group that didn’t exist before, based on several identity markers that are extracted from a

complex cultural background.192

Instead of race, a group is defined based on language, religion

or geographical origin.193

Concluding with Olivier Roy Muslim in this neo-ethnic interpretation

is used in following contexts: first, every person with a Muslim background is part of one

Muslim culture, and their real culture of origin is unimportant. This means, that religion isn’t

perceived as the most important part of the culture and therefore can be isolated and constructed

into an individual culture. Secondly, this culture is applied to everyone with a Muslim

background, independent from the religious praxis or level of faith and thirdly, this culture

differs between Muslims and the Others which isn’t perceived as a member of a religious

community, but of a pseudo-ethnic group (Europeans) which inhere neo-colonialist logic.194

Through the opposition of the native ethnic identity against an Islamic ethnic identity one

could say that an ethnic conflict is reconstructed. In line with Brubaker, the reconstruction of a

“Western” against an “Islamic” ethnie can lead to a conflict which can be understood as an

ethnic conflict. Herbert Kitschelt calls this process “ethnic conflict mobilisation”. Ethnic

conflict at first, a process of collective identification in which the collective identities delineate

themselves from others. The ethnic-cultural identities contain definition of group identity based

on particular attributes like for example race, language, region are religion. Sometimes this

group identity goes along with the identification with a nation.195

The essentialisation of ethnic identity thus goes in hand with another essentialisation,

namely the essentialisation of the religious identity. Religion, too, according to Baumann is

“widely essentialised as if it were about immutable sacred texts, rather than the convictions of

living and changeable people.”196

In the following section this second essentialisation of

religious identities will be discussed.

191

Ibid., p.64 192

O. ROY, der Islamischen Weg nach dem Westen, Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2004,

p.129. 193

Ibid., p.129. 194

Ibid., p.131. 195

H. KITSCHELT, Politische Konfliktlinien in westlichen Demokratie. Ethnisch-kulturelle und

wirtschaftliche Verteilungskonflikte, in: D. LOCH & W. HEITMEYER, Schattenseite der Globalisierung,

Berlin, Suhrkamp, p. 419-420. 196


York, Routledge, 1999, p.67.

67

The clash of post-Christian, secular Europe and its Islam: the reification of religious identities

There are two main reasons that underlie the process of transformation of religion in public and

political sphere in nowadays Europe: multi-confessionalism on the one hand and secularism on

the other hand. In the history of Western Europe, Christianity was an age long success story. In

the course of the last decades, this monoconfessional situation changed radically. Christianity is

no longer the only player on the religious market of Europe. In the last decades, European

society became increasingly multiconfessional. On behalf of modernisation there was an

increasing immigration of people who brought new and unknown religions to Europe.

Confronted with this phenomenon, the question rose which political possibilities there were to

enable the integration of different religions and still preserving a stable society. The migration

of Muslims and other non-Christian belief systems to different countries in Europe asked for an

intellectual and public debate on whether the nation should be understood as laic (Judaeo-

Christian) or multi-religious.197

This developing multi-confessionalism until now is a challenge

to European politics and fosters the process of European identity seeking. Because of the

diffusion of religious beliefs and practices in the modern world, the relationship between

religion and the nation became increasingly difficult to define and therefore needed to be re-

thought. Particular parties picked up on this need to rethink the religious identity of the nation.

The confusion caused by the development of multi-confessional and pluralistic societies in

Europe and the question about the own religious nature of the nation, made it possible for right-

wing politics to inhibit efforts to sacralise the nation and Europe again along mono confessional

lines.198

The reaction of Western modern nations and especially the right-wing populist

ideologies thus was to come up with sacralised notions of the nation and its essentialised

religious identity.

Another process which has an important influence on the right-wing populist rhetoric on

religion is secularism. The ideas of enlightenment in Western Europe have diluted faith

communities and resulted in the marginalisation of religion. In its aggressive pursuit of active

secularism, Europe has lost touch with religion as an important factor in public and political

life.199

Even though secularism in the first place is a political concept, indicating the separation

of religion and politics in the public sphere, it now appears that secularism has become an

overarching worldview and identity marker instead. For a long time, people believed that

religion would disappear out of the public into the private sphere in Europe. The situation in

Europe has been perceived as secular, which would imply the dissociation of religion in society.

197

H.-G. HAUPT & D. LANGEWIESCHE, Nation und Religion in Europa. Mehrkonfessionelle

Gesellschaften im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2004. 198

Ibid. 199


York, Routledge, 1999, p.67.

68

For centuries, religion has been the main value bringer to European society, but with the start of

a new Era, societies began to progress in the direction of modernisation and rationalisation. The

secularisation paradigm proclaimed that in this process, religion would become one of the

functional subsystems in society, next to for example politics, economy, etc. but wouldn’t be of

general importance anymore. Religion instead would start to have a solely private importance.

Although secularisation has been the key word in most of the analyses of society and of

Western European culture, in the last few years, more sociologists started to perceive the

secularisation paradigm as falsifiable. The expected disappearance of religion didn’t take place

and it seems that religion is again gaining more importance in the public discourse, be it in

slightly different forms. Secularisation, as Hans-Joachim Höhn sees it, is in crisis.200

Scholars

became aware of the fact that secularisation might not be the right paradigm to describe the

socio-cultural situation in Europe decided that it would be more accurate to call the situation in

Europe „post-secular‟. There is at least no doubt about the fact that religion has become

important again in the public debate as well as on the academic agenda and is finding his way in

different forms and on different levels. In the last decades, surveys showed a decline of

traditional religious activity that seemed to confirm the secularisation. For many people,

religion started to lose personal value or they saw it as an element of a former world. Although

religion might have lost a certain institutional and private value, recent observations show that

religion is gaining public value again. A lot of new debates and discussions on religion are

developing and people are experimenting with non-traditional forms of religion. The new

debates on religion are guided by multiple interests. On political, cultural and social level,

religion is getting involved in various discussions. Especially since 9/11 and the discourse about

“the war against terrorism” a lot of discussion has evolved around the problems with Islam and

the relationship between Christianity and Islam. At least it is clear, that the concept of

secularism is not sufficient to describe the dispersion of religion in the political, cultural and

social sphere nowadays.201

Nowadays, Western European society is marked by a secularism

which is used in a religious discursive way. Therefore, the socio-cultural reality can better be

perceived as ‘post-secular’ the idea of a post-secular society has been proposed by Habermas.

He tries to explain the new relationship between religion and other institutions. In his view,

religion doesn’t lose importance in the public discourse, but becomes one of the players of the

“market”. Religion doesn’t have a right of superiority anymore but can still play a substantial

role in different discourses.202

Secularism in public sphere didn’t mean the disappearance or the

200

H.-J. HÖHN, Krise der Säkularität. Perspektiven einer Theorie religiöser Dispersion, in: K.GABRIEL

& H.-J. HÖHN, Religion heute – öffentlich und politisch. Provokationen, Kontroversen, Perspektiven,

Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich, Schöningh, 2008, p.39. 201

H.-G. ZIEBERTZ & U. RIEGEL, Post-Secular Europe – a Concept Questioned, in: H.-G. ZIEBERTZ & U.

RIEGEL, Europe. Secular or Post-Secular, Berlin, LIT Verlag, 2008, p.31. 202

Ibid., p.62.

69

loss of importance; it rather implied a transformation of religion. Christianity and humanism has

been perceived as the main roots of Western European culture; in a secular age, the direct

influence of Christianity has been declined, but the roots of the culture remain Christian. When

those roots become essentialised and reified, the Christian heritage of European culture and its

secular modernism or modern secularism are seen as everything Islamic culture is not. Since

secularism is perceived as being synonymous to modernism, the religiosity that is inherent to

Islam, like for example their adherence to Koran, is perceived as something being incompatible

with modernity. The implicit message is as follows: if someone is a religious Muslim, it means

that such a person is not open to other views and interpretation and therefore is not able to live

in a Western society. Rudolph Peters states as follows:

“Criticism against Islam is often presented and justified as criticism of religion, which the

critics claim, is part of modernity. The anti-Islamic hardliners argue that Christianity was

subjected to criticism and that that contributed to the reform and modernisation of

Christianity. Why, they ask, should such criticism not have the same effect on

Islam?....The result is that Muslims adopt a defensive stand in face of this criticism and

are unwilling to enter into a dialogue. This contextually determined attitude, however, is

essentialised by the critics, who claim that Islam does not allow any form of

criticism…Moreover the high authority inferred on the text of the Koran makes it difficult

for Muslims to accept criticism of their religion, because Islam is, in the view of the Islam

critics, identical with the Koran ad the Koran contains the word of God.”203

The discussion about the modern-secular and humanist-Christian roots of Western European

nations is not only important in Geert Wilder’s politics, but became important in many countries

and is widely accepted. This discussion has been called the debate on Leitkultur. The Leitkultur

debate emerges around the idea, that Europe has its own values and roots and that those values

are inherently incompatible with the values and roots of other religions and cultures. As Wilders

says: “We are a country with Judaeo-Christian and humanistic roots. Everything we have comes

forth out of that: our wealth, the secularisation, democracy.”204

The identity of a Western

European nation as the Netherlands is defined by those values and for other cultures or religions

to be able to integrate or be part of this nation, means to respect and take over those values.

Post-Christian Europe has given up his institutional Christianity, but therefore reinvented

Christianity in terms of realisation and reification of Christian heritage in terms of roots and

203


Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p. 38. 204

Original quotation in Dutch: “Wij zijn een land met Joods-christelijke en humanistische wortels. Alles

wat we hebben komt daaruit voort: onze welvaart, scheiding van kerk en staat, democratie.” in: G.

WILDERS, De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd om te kiezen: 2010-2015,


70

values. This reification means an essentialisation of the Judeo-Christian identity of Western

European nations and provides necessary drawing of identity borders as a reaction to the sense

growing Muslim presence in society. The culturalist discourse on hierarchy of cultures and the

Leitkultur debate is not restricted to the right-wing spectrum of the political space. It has

become widely accepted to believe and state that Western culture dinstinguishes itself from

Eastern or Islamic culture concerning values and that Western values are higher than other. As

Paul Hartzwig states: “The Leitkultur’s concept of culture was forged on the belief that

different, sequestered cultures should remain separate in order to retain their identities and avoid

otherwise inevitable cultural conflicts. The notion of ‘race’ was replaced by that of culture, as

cultural belonging was essentialised. Culture, as a vague and broadly interpretable changing

cluster of meanings, was able to perform the same exclusionary function as race. This ideology

was central to the agenda of the New Right and its neo-racist discourse, a discourse that also

contains elements of, and works similarly to, anti-Semitism.”205

The idea of establishing a

Leitkultur became part of the political debate in Germany, France, The Netherlands and many

other countries.206

The Leitkultur debate which takes religious roots and heritage as the

dominant value bringer to Western European society shows the way in which religion can, just

like ethnicity, be reified as an unchangeable identity marker.

Culturalism or the reification of cultural identities

The above mentioned reification and essentialisation of religious and ethnic identities are

expressed within a discourse on cultural identity. The third identity reification concerns not the

group (ethnie), not the religion, but the culture. The protection of the national community and

the native Dutch community doesn’t talk about the preserving and protecting state borders, but

about preserving and protecting the national culture and cultural borders of the nation,

connected with a story of shared ethnic descent. In other words, for Wilders the nation is

defined by its culture and not by its borders. Congruent with the essentialisation of ethnic and

religious identities, the cultural identity of the nation or the ethnic group is perceived as a

homogeneous whole. This perception on cultures is called a “culturalist” perspective.

Culturalism states that people are determined by their culture and that those cultures are closed,

organic wholes. As an organic whole, the culture can be connected to the organic whole of the

constructed ethnic group. Culturalism as a political ideology has a lot in common with

nationalism, but where nationalism politicize the culture as a basis for a state, culturalism

essentialises and politicizes the culture. In the Dutch case, it is not a culture as such but a

205

P. HARTWIG, The politics of identity in Germany. The Leitkultur debate. In: Race and Class, Vol. 46,

Nr. 4 (2005), p.40-41. 206

For further reading about the idea of Leitkultur in Europe see for example: B. TIBI, Europa ohne

Identität. Leitkultur oder Wertebeliebigkeit, München, Siedler, 2000.

71

national culture that is essentialised. The culturalist construction of the nation as a solid and

homogeneous national culture enables the parties to claim the cultural higher value of the own

national culture and react against the egalitarian culturalism of the “multiculturalist Utopia.”

Wilders severe critics on multiculturalism are clearly a result of the belief that culture are

unequal and that a multicultural situation is a threat to the superiority of one culture. A solemn

multiculturalism implies the equality of all players and therefore excludes a hierarchical

positioning of cultures. Multiculturalism according to Geert Wilders is something that destroys

the roots of the national culture. The claimed failure of multiculturalist integration in this

interpretation should not be sought on the level of policy-making but should be perceived as an

inherent logic result of the presumed relativist nature of the multiculturalist project. In Wilders

view, the multiculturalist project didn’t manage to create a stable socio-cultural situation

because it didn’t force other cultures to adapt to the “higher” Dutch culture. In this perspective,

the liberal multiculturalist Left should be made responsible for “selling” the national culture to

the multiculturalist project in which it lost its original strength and became weak among the

pluralism of cultures. Therefore, because of this weakening of national culture on behalf of

multiculturalism, it is multiculturalism that fosters the Islamisation of Europe. It becomes very

clear that the hierarchical ordering of cultures imply an essentialised and reified conception of

culture. Concluding: the identity of the Dutch nation consists of a homogeneous Dutch people

which are perceived in ethnic terms and which are marked by a homogeneous Dutch culture

which is formed by modernism, secularism and its humanist and Judeo-Christian roots. In order

to be part of Dutch society then, you either need to be native Dutch, or accept modernism,

secularism and the values that presumably come forth out of the humanist and Judeo-Christian

roots of Dutch culture. In Wilders perspective those values are inherently incompatible with

Islam and if that is the case, there is no place for Islam in the Netherlands.

The already mentioned exception concerning the Indonesian Muslims shows that the

negative perception is not based on religion, but on the neo-ethnic conception of Muslim culture

that is constructed around the purely religious identity. In the case of Indonesian citizens, being

Muslim is not a problem, since Indonesian citizens through colonial history know the

constitutive values and elements of Dutch culture and society. In other terms, Indonesian

citizens are acculturated and therefore not seen as a threat to Dutch society. So apparently, a

possibility exists of being an acculturated Muslim within Dutch society and gaining more

general acceptance than for example Turks or Moroccans, though this implies giving up the

culture of origin. Furthermore, it remains quite an open question whether Wilders would

officially accept the presence of “acculturated” Islam in the Netherlands and agree on the

ambiguous position of Indonesian Muslims.

72

Excursus

The racist logic behind Wilders rhetoric didn’t remain uncriticised and in he was brought to

court for his sharp remarks on Islam. Direct discussion starter was the release of Wilders film

“Fitna.” On March 27, 2008 Fitna was released on the British website liveleak.com. The film

focusses on presumed violence and bloodshed within Islamic ideology and is underpinned by

several Sura quotations. The film ends with the message that Islam “seeks to destroy our

Western civilisation” and “has to be defeated. Stop islamisation. Defend our freedom.”207

The

film ultimately ends with a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed is shown with a ticking bomb on

his head. As a result of the release of Fitna in several countries a vehement parliamentary and

societal turmoil followed. Especially in the Netherlands, dozens of complaints were filed in the

aftermath of the release.208

By the end of June 2008 however, the Public Prosecutor decided not

to prosecute Geert Wilders, because of the fact that the “freedom of expression should be

protected.” This decision shows the tension between two major poles in the discussion about

Wilders rhetoric. On the one hand, since freedom of speech and freedom expression are

perceived as highly important values in Dutch society, the preservation of free speech and free

expression are a priority. On the other hand, according to the penal code, discrimination and the

incitement of hatred need to be criminalized. The question thus is where freedom of speech ends

and insult starts. Ultimately, on January 21, 2009 the decision was taken by Court that Wilders

statements in media could be prosecuted through two articles of the penal code. Firstly article

137c which penalizes “offensive speech regarding a group of persons because of their religion”

and secondly article 137d which penalizes the incitement of hatred. The trial against Wilders

took over a year because on October 22, 2010 Wilders claimed that one of the judges Tom

Schalken had tried to convince a witness in the main trial and asked for substitution and retrial.

On February 7, 2011 the retrial started. Ultimately on June 23, 2011 Geert Wilder was acquitted

from all charges. Wilders acquittal has been possible because of the interpretation of the

aforementioned articles. To judge whether someone can be persecuted according to article 137c,

three steps are taken by Court. First the decision needs to be taken whether the prosecuted

statement is discriminating in itself, secondly the context needs to be determined and thirdly it

needs to be judged whether the prosecuted statement has an unnecessary grieving nature.209

According to the Supreme Court in this case, Wilders statements are not chargeable because

they do not immediately discriminate a group of people on behalf of their religion. Secondly,

207

U. BURUMA, The Wilders Trial. What you Wanted to Know but Couldn’t Ask, Onderzoekscenrtum

voor Staat en Recht Research Papers, Radbout Universiteit Nijmegen, 03/2009; www.ru.nl/rechten/ster

(access: 10/07/2012). 208

Ibid. p.7. 209

Court document: summary of the Wilders complaint, http://www.om.nl/actueel-0/strafzaken/strafzaak_tegen/@155729/requisitoir-wilders/ (access: 10/07/2011).

http://www.ru.nl/rechten/ster

http://www.om.nl/actueel-0/strafzaken/strafzaak_tegen/@155729/requisitoir-wilders/


73

the statements are not chargeable because of the political debate in which the statements are

made. According to the Supreme Court, in a pluralistic democracy “various opinions are

supported and defended” and the political debate is a context in which the discriminating nature

of statements is easily deprived.210

Ultimately, Wilders statements are not chargeable under

137c because of the fact that the functionality of the statement in the political and public debate

is predominant over the unnecessary grieving of a group of people. Concluding, Wilders

statements are perceived as discriminating but not in the same sense in which article 137c talks

about discrimination. Wilders statement would be chargeable if he would directly discriminate

or insult a group of people because of their religion, which is according to Supreme Court not

the case. Secondly the acquittal of charges under article 137d, the incitement of hatred because

of religion and the incitement of discrimination because of religion is approved through

following reasoning. The statements are supposed not to concern Muslims as people but the

religion of Islam and the Koran. In order to be chargeable under article 137d the statements

need to incite hatred against people and thus statements concerning Islam and the Koran isn’t

incitement of hatred against people.

Wilders acquittal has been perceived as a “victory of the freedom of speech”211

but mainly

shows the ambiguity of Wilders rhetoric. After the discussion above about the way in which

identities are polarised, essentialised and (re)-constructed based on ethnicity, culture and

religion, the juridical distinction that the Supreme Court made between faith, religion and

people might ignore the role of religion as a major identity marker. In this sense, anti-Islam

racism cannot be perceived as something substantially different from anti-Muslim racism.

Furthermore, interpretations of Islam as a religion and Islam as a community of people are often

diffuse and overlapping in Wilders statements. Concluding it can be said that the acquittal of

Wilders shows the “masquerading” of the culturalist racism and the power of the reconstruction

of national and foreign culture based on values. In the end, the protection of liberal and national

values such as free speech appears to be predominant over the condemning of insulting,

grieving and discriminating expressions which has been and still is a trigger for heavy political

and public debate.

210

Ibid. 211

“Vrijspraak Wilders: overwinning voor de vrijheid van meningsuiting”, in: De Volkskrant,

23/06/2011.

74

Conclusion

There are a few points this section tried to make. First of all, the emergence of right-wing

populist parties in the European political landscape and especially in the Dutch political space

and the way in which those parties use religion respectively secularism as a constitutive element

of national and (neo-)ethnic identity on the one side and how they oppose this identity to the

religious Islamic identity, show that religion plays an increasingly important role on the public

and political level. Therefore this section showed that the post-secular and post-Christian culture

are a milieu that also fosters the smooth emergence of right-wing populist in Western Europe

like it can be observed in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, this section tried to point out, that the way in which the discourse on national

identity implies an (neo-)ethnic conception of people and group and how this identity is mainly

reconstructed through narratives on cultural roots, cultural tradition and how it is connected to

national symbols, myth memories, etc. should be perceived an ethno-nationalist practice. The

right-wing populist politics of Geert Wilders should therefore be considered as a branch of

nationalism.

Thirdly, this section claims that the depiction of the multiculturalist project as a project

which disowns the national identity and which enables the growing Islamisation of national

culture and the way in which this is connected to the importance of the preservation of national

can be perceived as a culturalist practice. The culturalism within right-wing populist politics

claim that cultures aren’t equal and that Western culture is of higher value than Islamic culture.

The culturalist perspective, which justify a Manichean and racist opposition between Western

Europe and Islamic countries, becomes more widespread throughout the whole of the political

spectrum and therefore it is often ignored as a racist discourse. This paper though claims that the

culturalist rhetoric on cultural supremacy is marked by the same discursive logic as biological

racism and should be perceived as neo-racism or cultural racism.

Concluding, the rise of right-wing populist politics and the key ideas of this politics that gain

increasing electoral support and resonance within the whole of society mainly indicate the

falsification of three widely accepted theses; First of all, nowadays Western European society is

not a-religious nor secular but highly influenced by the dynamics of religion as a constitutive

element of identity. Secondly, the conception and reconstruction of national identity with right-

wing populist politics based on national symbols, myth memories, national narratives, etc.

doesn’t differ from “traditional” nationalist practice, and therefore it should be noted that

nowadays Western European society didn’t conquer the nationalist phenomenon. At last, the

culturalist opposition between Western Europe and the Islamic world as well as the othering

practice which lie at the heart of right-wing populist politics, indicates that even after World

75

War II the appeal of racist rhetoric is appealing as ever and there is no such thing as a post-

racial era.

76

Conclusion

An enigma is a riddle which presents a difficult problem and which is often expressed in

metaphorical or veiled language. As the title of this study indicates, the right-wing populist

politics of Geert Wilders can be understood as an “enigma of identity making”. This means that

processes of identity making lie at the heart of Wilders politics but are difficult to unravel

because of the rhetoric in which they are often concealed. This study thus aimed at unravelling

the enigma and at providing yet another explanation for the rise of right-wing populism in

Western European democracies and especially in the Netherlands.

The limitations of previous research

The sudden emergence and electoral support of right-wing and conservative parties imply a

radical change in the European and Dutch political landscape and culture. Several studies have

tried to explain the emergence of those parties and their ideologies and all tend to adopt a

different viewpoint. Especially concerning the early rise of right-wing populist parties the

theoretical explanations predominantly focus on socio-cultural and economic changes that are

supposed to influence the electorate and to provide a breeding ground for the new parties.

According to the differentiation Cas Mudde and Stijn van Kessel make between demand-based

and supply-based explanations, most theories claim that the changes in the socio-cultural

environment increase the demand for politics that provide the electorate with a sense of security,

belonging, etc. Even though socio-cultural and economic changes doubtlessly have a significant

influence on the changes in party organisation and political culture, this paper claimed that the

rapid rise of right-wing populist parties cannot be sufficiently explained through demand-based

theories. In order to support this thesis, this paper decided to specifically focus on the case of

the Netherlands. Because of the unique character of Dutch political culture with its long

tradition of consensus and tolerance and where right-wing politics never played a significant

role or gained significant electoral support, the sudden solid position and high influence of the

new parties constitute a political oddity and points at the complexity and strength of the

phenomenon. By taking the Netherlands as a single case study, this paper had no aspirations of

making absolute statements about the rise of right-wing populism but rather aimed at providing

an additional explanatory paradigm. Through an elaborated analysis of Dutch political culture

and tradition, this study tried to show that a demand-side explanation is not applicable to the

Dutch situation. Dutch politics namely, because of the high degree of electoral representation,

the tradition of pilarisation and minority politics, were able to hold on to a centre-politics

77

despite several crises and significant socio-cultural and economic changes. Consequently, in

difficult times some right-wing parties emerged and were able to gain some electoral support,

nevertheless the governmental stability remained and never dominantly moved to the right or to

the left. Even if the socio-cultural or economic situation has changed a lot in the last decades,

for the Dutch situation, this not sufficiently explains the sudden radical changes within the

political landscape. Secondly, concerning the explanations that focus on immigration as a

source of insecurity and feelings of anxiety, this paper tried to show that the Netherlands

traditionally has been a country of minorities and immigration and that this equally never

caused significant problems. The Netherlands have been a beloved country for immigration

since its independence. The analysis of the immigration in the Netherlands tried to point at the

fact that even if there is a factual increase of immigration, this increase is not as excessive as is

claimed in Geert Wilder’s politics. Furthermore, the analysis emphasizes that even if anti-

immigration rhetoric is an important part of those politics, it doesn’t concern immigration in

general. The anti-immigration rhetoric of Geert Wilders focuses on immigration from “non-

Western” or “Muslim” countries. This focus reveals that the real problem isn’t the supposed

pressure that immigration lays on the socio-economic situation, but about the increasing

presence of other cultures. A third line of explanations that try to explain the rise of right-wing

populism by focusing on the political culture also isn’t convincingly applicable to the Dutch

case. Even though the low electoral threshold and the tradition of consensus coalition building

are an important part of Dutch governance, it also doesn’t explain the overall discontinuity

between the insignificant role of right-wing politics in Dutch political tradition and its current

relatively high support. Concluding, this paper tried to show that, applied to the Dutch case,

socio-economic, immigration-based, systemic or structural explanations of the rise of right-wing

populism may all explain part of the phenomenon but are missing out on some other important

processes.

Overview of the main argumentation

Because of aforementioned limitation of the existing explanations, this study presented another

perspective, mainly focusing on the supply-side of the right-wing populist party politics. In

order to be able to focus on the supply-side, the demand-side of the electorate needs to be

perceived as a “given”. The main question upon which this research was built is, by taking the

electoral demand as a given, what elements of the new right-wing populist politics resonate with

the demands of the electorate and why they apparently resonate to such a high degree. In order

to answer this question, this paper made an elaborated analysis of the content of Geert Wilder’s

politics. Systematically, this paper discussed nationalism and national identity in order to point

at the different elements of Wilders politics that can be understood as a nationalist practice.

78

Following the ethno-symbolist and ethno-nationalist paradigm, this paper showed that the re-

imagining and emphasizing of Dutch identity and Dutch culture are an important part of

Wilders polemics. Central to this nationalist practice is the idea of the existence of a Dutch

ethnie, conceived in a culturalist perspective. This means that the conception of a Dutch ethnie

is not based on blood ties or origin but rather on shared culture, culture roots and cultural

heritage with its unique values, norms and habits. This sense of national group or ethnie then is

re-created and re-imagined through rhetoric, symbols, etc. The re-making of Dutch identity

includes three processes of identity making and identity reification: the reification of national

identity, the reification of cultural identity and the reification of religious identity. These

processes are strengthened through polarizing this identity against an Islamic identity which is

equally conceived and reified based on ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics. Concerning

the reification of religious identity this paper stated that the Christian tradition is

instrumentalised and perceived as providing the values, norms and habits of the national culture.

Furthermore, the secular paradigm is perceived as normative and loses its original meaning of

indicating the separation between religion and public space and becomes an overall worldview.

As a result, several discourses on Leitkultur can emerge and the conviction that Dutch or

Western European culture has a supremacy over Islamic culture becomes widely represented.

The general implication of aforementioned politics of identity making is that they provide the

electorate with a sense of security and belonging on the one hand and that the content of these

politics resonate with the electorate because it refers to images, values,…that are well-known

and therefore reinforce feelings of security and belonging.

Implications and recommendations for further research

This study pointed at the limitations of existing explanations for the rise of right-wing populism

in Western European democracies and presented a new argumentation for the understanding of

the phenomenon. Because of the limited scope of this research, the study has its limitations as

well. Since the analysis is generally based on one country and one party, it was mainly able to

partially explain the popularity of Geert Wilder's PVV in the Netherlands and not of the

popularity and electoral support of other right-wing populist parties in Western European

democracies. Nevertheless the findings of this study have several implications for the study of

right-wing populism in general. By disclosing the processes of identity making and the several

discourses on national culture, national identity and the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim rhetoric in

Geert Wilder’s politics, this study has provided a model which might be applied to other case

studies. Right-wing populist parties have become a powerful force in Western European

democracies and in order to understand their strength and to predict their electoral persistence,

further research is required. Furthermore, the analyses of this study aims at increasing the

79

consciousness that right-wing populist discourses are becoming more widely accepted and

adopted outside the range of right-wing politics. This implies that further research also should

be done on how those right-wing populist discourses and rhetoric are being used by other

political parties and how they are adopted in the public debate and the mainstream media.

Outlook

Concluding, the study thus offered a new perspective on the rise of right-wing populism in the

Netherlands and introduced new concepts in order to understand the resonance of these politics

with the electorate. The removal of taboos on nationalism and religion as an important influence

on nowadays politics aimed at opening up avoided ways of thinking. In this way, this study

hoped to convincingly show that national and religious identity in a modern era are increasingly

important and should not be perceived as “old-fashioned” or “overcome.” It is important to take

the influence of those concepts into account in order to better understand the motions in today's

political landscape. It is not possible to make any statements about how the political situation in

Europe and the Netherlands will change in the next couple of years and how the movement of

right-wing populist politics will develop. However, within the public sphere there appears to be

an increasing acceptance of anti-Muslim or anti-Islam rhetoric. The new right-wing populist

parties have been able to justify racism and hostility against Muslims, immigrants and other

foreign elements in society on social, cultural, religious and economic grounds. Those

arguments appear to be very convincing and resonate with people´s anxiety which is even more

stimulated by the negative depiction of Muslim citizens in the media. If the new parties are

going to be able to keep on translating the demand for security and stability in terms of the

preservation of national identity into a consistent political program, there is a relevant chance

that those political parties will keep on existing or increase their influence within European

governance.

80

Epilogue

During the finishing of this paper, the government in the Netherlands dissolved. The next

parliamentary elections were forwarded to September 2012 on behalf of the failing of the

Catshuis negotiations on April 21, 2012. After 7 weeks of deliberation, the coalition didn’t

manage to arrange an agreement. Due to the continuing economic crisis it was necessary that

new measures should be taken. The European Union prescribes that the Netherlands deficits

should be reduced to 3%. According to calculations by the CPB the deficit of the Netherlands in

2013, however, would be 4.5%. As a result of these calculations, the coalition partners CDA

and VVD and PVV started on the 5 of march 2012 the so-called Catshuis negotiations. Geert

Wilders finally decided on April 22, to withdraw from the negotiations. The Netherlands needed

to present the budget on the 27th of April 2012. After the PVV gave no support to the package of

measures, Jan Kees de Jager went looking for other parties in order to work with. Eventually he

arrived at the Kunduz coalition, the parties also supported the police mission in Kunduz. This

consists of VVD, CDA, D66, Green Left and the Christian Union. Because of the withdrawal of

the PVV the governmental support agreement a coalition split was inevitable. Following, PvDA

also stated not to support the current government anymore, there was no other option than that

new elections should follow. These elections will take place on September, 12 2012. In the run-

up for the new elections, a new party was formed. The party is called democratic politiek

keerpunt (democratic political watershed, DPK) with Hero Brinkman as party leader. DPK is a

merger party with the former Trots of Nederland (ToN). Hero Brinkman first belonged to the

PVV but left the party. DPK claims to “fill a gap on the right” and to be a “very powerful sound

from the right”. The merger of ToN and BOP is the first right-wing merger in the Netherlands.

The dissolving of the government, the abolishment of the parliamentary support agreement

and the forwarding of the parliamentary elections will possibly have important influence on the

political climate in the Netherlands and will lead to new changes within the political landscape.

In polls just before the breakdown of the negotiations, the CDA is expected to lose nine seats

and the PVV six seats. The labour party is expected to gain eleven and VVD. The loss of seats

for PVV in these polls resulted from the acute dissatisfaction of the electorate after the failure of

the Catshuis negotiations. Media still speculate a lot about the decrease in electoral support for

the PVV. But according to de Hond, last polls show that the PVV will still be the third biggest

Party with twenty-four seats and polls from the end of May even expect a higher support for

Wilders than for the VVD. Apparently the PVV has been able to mobilize a stable electorate,

but with the run-up of the DKP as a strong concurrent it is unforeseeable but interesting what

will happen after the elections in September. One thing though can be said for sure, namely that

81

right-wing populist politics in the Netherlands ever since Pim Fortuyn have become a solid and

stable player within the political landscape, those politics are not likely to disappear within the

foreseeable future and indicate a new era within Dutch political culture.

82

Bibliography

MONOGRAPHS

ALMOND, G.A. & VERBA, S., Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, London,

Sage Publications, 1989.

ALMOND, G.A. & POWELL, G.B., Comparative Politics. System, Process, and Policy,Boston, Little

Brown, 1978.

ANDEWEG, R.B. & IRWIN, G.A., Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, New York, Palgrave

Macmillan, 2005.

BAUMAN, G. the Multicultural Riddle. Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities, New York,

Routledge, 1999.

BEREZIN, M., Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. Culture, security and populism in the New Europe,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

BRADY, H.E. & D.COLLIER, Rethinking Social Inquiry. Divers Tools. Shared Standards, Oxford,

Rowmann and Littlefield Publishers, 2004.

CONNOLLY, W.,Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Minneapolis,

University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

CONNOR, W., Ethnonationalism. A Quest for Understanding, New Jersey, Princeton University Press,

1993.

DEUTSCH, K.W., Symbols of Political Community in : L.BRYSON et all., Symbols and Society.

Fourteenth Symposium to the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, New York, Harper and

Brothers, 2009.

DIETZE, G., Kritik des Okzidentalismus. Transdisziplinäre Beiträge zu (Neo-)Orientalismus und

Geschlecht, Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2009.

GEORG, A.L. & A. BENNET, Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Science, Cambridge, Belfer

Centre for Science and International Affairs, 2004.

GLADDISH, K., Governing from the Centre. Politics and Policy-Making in the Netherlands, London,

Hurst & Company, 1991.

HAUPT, H.-G. & LANGEWIESCHE, D., Nation und Religion in Europa. Mehrkonfessionelle Gesellschaften

im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2004.

HERZFELD, M.,Cultural Intimacy. Social Poetics in the Nation-State, New York, Routledge, 2005.

KUNDNANI, A., The End of Tolerance. Racism in 21st Century Britain, London, Pluto Press, 2007.

LANGENBACHER, N. & SCHELLENBERG, B., is Europe on the “Right” Path. Right-Wing Extremism and

Right-Wing Populism in Europe, Berlin, Forum Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2011.

83

LIJPHART, A., The Politics of Accomodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley,

University of California Press, 1975.

MAIR, P. & MUDDE, C., The Party Family and its Study, in: Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1

(june 1998), p. 211-229.

MCCLOUD, A.B. ,African American Islam, New York, Routledge, 1995.

MEYERS, E., International Immigration Policy. A Theoretical Comperative Analysis, New York, Palgrave

Macmillan, 2004.

MUDDE, C., Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

NACHMANI, A.,. Europe and its Muslim Minorities. Aspects of Conflict. Attempts at Accord, Eastbourne,

Sussex Academic Press, 2010.

ÖZKIRIMLI, U., Theories of Nationalism. A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke, 2000.

REUTER, G., Rechtspopulismus in Belgien und den Niederlanden, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für

Sozialwissenschaften, 2010.

ROTHSCHILD, J. Ethnopolitics. A Conceptual Framework, New York, Columbia University Press, 1981.

ROY, O., der Islamischen Weg nach dem Westen, Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2004.

RYDGREN, R., The Populist Challenge. Political Protest and Ethno-Nationalist Mobilisation in France,

Stockholm, Berghahn Books, 2004.

SCHERMERHORN, R.A, Comparative Ethnic Relations. A Framework for Theory and Research, Chicago,

University of Chicago Press, 1978.

SIMONS, H., Case Study Research in Practice, London, Sage publications, 2009.

SMITH, A.D., Myths and Memories of the Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991.

SMITH ,A.D. & HUTCHINSON, J., Ethnicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.

SPIER, T., Modernisierungsverlierers? Die Wählerschaft rechtspopulistische Parteien in Westeuropa,

Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010.

TIBI, B., Europa ohne Identität. Leitkultur oder Wertebeliebigkeit, München, Siedler, 2000.

WILDERS, G., Marked for Death. Islam´s War against the West and Me, Washington DC, Regnery

Publishing, 2012.

WILDERS, G., Kies voor Vrijheid. Een eerlijk Antwoord, Groep Wilders, 2005.

YIN, R., Case Study Research, Design and Methods, London, Sage Publications, 2008.

YIN, R., Applications of Case Study Research, London, Sage Publications, 1993.

84

EDITED VOLUMES

BALIBAR, E., Is there a Neo-Racism? In: BALIBAR, E., & WALLERSTEIN, I, Race, Nation, Class.

Ambiguous identities, London, Verso, 1991.

BREUILLY, J, The State and Nationalism in: M. GUIBERNAU & J. HUTCHINSON, Understanding

Nationalism, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001.

GEERTZ, C., Primordial and Civic Ties in: HUTCHINSON, J & SMITH, A.D. Nationalism, Oxford, 1994..

GIRARDET, R., Le nationalisme, in: Taguieff, P.A., Le retour du populisme. Un defi pour les democracies

europeenes, Universalis, 2004.

HÖHN, H.-J., Krise der Säkularität. Perspektiven einer Theorie religiöser Dispersion, in: GABRIEL, K. &

HÖHN, H.-J., .Religion heute – öffentlich und politisch. Provokationen, Kontroversen, Perspektiven,

Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich, Schöningh, 2008.

HROCH, M., From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation. The Nation Building Process in

Europe, in: ELEY, G. & SUNY, R.G. (eds.), Becoming National , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.

KITSCHELT, H., Politische Konfliktlinien in westlichen Demokratien: Ethnisch-kulturelle und

wirtschaftliche Verteilungskonflikte, in: LOCH, D. & HEITMEYER, W., Schattenseite der Globalisierung,

Berlin, Suhrkamp.

STAKE, R.-E, Case studies in: N. K. DENZIN & Y. S. LINCOLN (EDS.), Strategies of qualitative inquiry,

2003.

VAN DEN BERGHE, P., A socio-biological perspective, in: J. HUTCHINSON & A.D SMITH, Nationalism,

Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994.

VOSSEN, K., vom konservativen Liberalen zum Nationalpopulismus, in: F.WIELENGA & F. HARTLEB,

Populismus in der modernen Demokratie. Die Niederlande und Deutschland im Vergleich, Münster,

Waxmann Verlag, 2004.

ZIEBERTZ, H.-G. & RIEGEL, U., Post-secular Europe – a concept questioned, in: ZIEBERTZ, H.-G. &

RIEGEL, U., Europe. Secular or Post-Secular, Berlin, LIT Verlag, 2008.

ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS

BATORA, J. & E. FOSSUM, Gidsland. Is there a Mentor State? in: International Journal Vol.61 (4), 2006,

Canadian institute for international Affairs.

CANOVAN, M., Trust the People. Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, in: Political Studies, Vol.

47, 1999, p.2-16.

COHEN, P., Merkel is Afraid. Interview with Geert Wilders, in: Der Spiegel (11/9/2010).

DE HAAS, H., Ethnic Minority and Employment Policies in Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, the

United Kingdom, and France. A Comparative Study, Maastricht, European Centre for Work and Society,

1997.

85

HANKEL, A., PVV and D66 grote winnaars Europese verkiezingen in : Elsevier, 04/06/2009

HARTWIG, P., The politics of identity in Germany. The Leitkultur debate, in: Race and Class, Vol. 46 (4),

2005, p.39-52.

HERMAN, J. in: The Dutch Drive for Humanitarianism: Inner Origins and Development of the Gidsland

Tradition and Its External Effects, in: International Journal 61(4), 2006, p.859-874.

HOBSBAWN, E.J, Nationalism and Ethnicity Today in: Anthropology Today, Vol 8(1), 2009, p.3-8.

HOEDEMA, J. & PORTHUIS, F., VVD heeft genoeg van rechtse taal Wilders, in: De Volkskrant, 01/08/2004,

LAMMERS, E.Het is leuk, die heftige reacties, niew in de kamer, in : Trouw, 17/12/2009.

LUCARDIE, A.M.P., Rechts-extremisme, populism of democractisch patriotisme? Opmerkingen over de


Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, 2007, p.176-190.

MUDDE, C., the Populist Radical Right. A pathological Normalcy in: West European Politics,

Vol. 33(6), 2010, p.1167–1186.

PRINS, B., The Nerve to Break Taboos. New Realism in the Dutch Discourse on Multiculturalism, in :

Journal of International migration and integration, Vol. 3(3-4) 2002, p.363-379.

RYDGREN, J., Is extreme right contagious. Explaining the Emergence of a New Party Family, U., Cornell

University Brown Bag Lunch Seminar, October 18, 2004. (Written citation permission from J. Rydrgen

15.7.2012)

SHOOMAN, Y., Das Zusammenspiel von Kultur, Religion, Ethnizität und Geschlecht im antimuslismischen

Rassismus, in: Ungleichheit, Ungleichwertgkeit, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, BPP, Nr. 62. Jg, 16-

17/2012, 16/04/2012, p.53-57.

SCHWARZ, M., Ich lebe in Todesangst. Seit den Morden an Pim Fortuyn und Theo van Gogh ist Geert

Wilders Hollands prominentester Islam-Kritiker in: Junge Freiheit, 07/09/2007.

VAN DEIJL, F. & NIEMÖLLER, J., “Ik ga weer lekker stevig terugkomen…yes!”, in: HP/De Tijd,

08/06/2007.

VAN HOLSTEYN, J.,‘Geert Wilders is hooguit een halve populist’, in: Trouw, 18/03/2005.

VAN KESSEL, S. Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties, U.Diss.,


VASTA, E., From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy. Multiculturalism and the Sheft to

Assimilationism in the Netherlands, in: Ethnic and Racial studies Vol, 30 (5), 2007, p.713-740.

WYTZE, L., Geert Wilders: een politiek roofdier, in: Elsevier, 16/08/2007.

YANOW, D., Race by another name. Categories, counting, and the state – the case of Netherlands

integration policy discourse, presentation at the Global and International Studies Elliot School for

International Affairs, George Washington University, 18/02/2010.


86

ZARAKOL, A. & SUBOTIC, J, Cultural intimacy in international relations, forthcoming in: European

Journal of International Relation, OnlineFirst (19/06/2011)

“VVD-pleidoor voor ruk naar rechts” in: Trouw, 03/07/2004.

“Wilders vertrekt uit VVD, blijft in Kamer”, in : De Volkskrant, 03/09/2004

“Vrijspraak Wilders: overwinning voor de vrijheid van meningsuiting”, in: De Volkskrant, 23/06/2011.

INTERNET SOURCES AND DATABASES

BURUMA, U., The Wilders Trial. What you Wanted to Know but Couldn’t Ask, Onderzoekscenrtum voor

Staat en Recht Research Papers, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 03/2009. < www.ru.nl/rechten/ster>

ERSANILI, E., Immigration in the Netherlands, International Internet Database Focus Migration.

<http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/The-Netherlands.2644.0.html?&L=1>

GARSSEN, J. & NICOLAAS, J. et all., Demografie van de allochtonen in Nederland, Database from the

Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. <http://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/CCD504EA-9D41-40C2-AE28-

BFB0A51C2045/0/2005k3b15p096art.pdf>

MUIS, J.C. Pim Fortuyn. The Evolution of a Media Phenomenon,

<http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/33030/1/dissertation.pdf>

VERDONK, R., De visie van trots op Nederland. <http://www.trotsopnederland.com/2009/05/de-visie-

van-trotsopnederland/#>

WILDERS, G., Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring.

<http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/politiekepartijen/pvv/verklaring.pdf >

WILDERS, G., De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd om te kiezen: 2010-2015.

<http://pvv.nl/images/stories/Webversie_VerkiezingsProgrammaPVV.pdf>

WILDERS, G., Klare Wijn.

<http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=410>

WILDERS, G., Hun Brussel. Ons Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012- 2017.

<http://www.pvv.nl/images/stories/verkiezingen2012/VerkiezingsProgramma-PVV-2012-final-web.pdf

WILDERS, G., A warning to America, Corner Stone Church, Nashville 12.05.2011.

<http://pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/36-geert-wilders/4303-a-warning-to-america-speech-

geert-wilders-cornerstone-church-nashville-12-may-2011.html>

Towards a modern migration policy. Memorandum on the review of the policy on managed migration in

the Netherlands. <www.rijksoverheid.nl>

Documentation centre Dutch political parties.

<http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/themas/beginselProgrammas/psp/begprog.pdf>

http://www.ru.nl/rechten/ster


http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/1871/33030/1/dissertation.pdf



http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/politiekepartijen/pvv/verklaring.pdf


http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=410



http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/

http://www.rug.nl/dnpp/themas/beginselProgrammas/psp/begprog.pdf

87

Database „Parlament en Politiek”.

<http://www.parlement.com/9353000/1/j9vvhy5i95k8zxl/vg44wueqiazx?key=hdnfv6c3>

Election Results 2010 Elections according to “Kiesraad”.

<http://www.kiesraad.nl/nl/Actueel/Nieuwsberichten/(2047)-Actueel-Nieuwsberichten-

2010/Uitslag_verkiezing_leden_Tweede_Kamer_van_9_juni_2010.html>

European Election database.

<http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/>

Governmental Website on the cabinet formation 2010.

<http://www.kabinetsformatie2010.nl/kabinetsformatie_2010.html>

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/#6>

The Netherlands Board of Tourism and Conventions. <www.holland.com>

Website on social security laws. <http://www.st-ab.nl/wetwin.htm#h3>

Governmental website on integration policy. <http://www.government.nl/issues/integration/integration-

policy

Database Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (CBS).

<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=70086ned&D1=0-1,17-

18&D2=a&HD=090710-1521&HDR=T&STB=G1

Internet database Central Intelligence Agency, the World Factbook: Indonesia.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>

World Economic Forum, Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue.

<https://members.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf>

Open Society Institute monitoring EU monitoring and advocacy Program, Muslims in the EU. Cities

Report. The Netherlands, 2007. <

http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/museucitiesnet_20080101_0.pdf>

Official website of the Public Prosecution Service, Summary of the Wilders complaint.

<http://www.om.nl/actueel-0/strafzaken/strafzaak_tegen/@155729/requisitoir-wilders/>

http://www.parlement.com/9353000/1/j9vvhy5i95k8zxl/vg44wueqiazx?key=hdnfv6c3




http://www.kabinetsformatie2010.nl/kabinetsformatie_2010.html

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/#6

http://www.holland.com/

http://www.st-ab.nl/wetwin.htm#h3



https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html

https://members.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf



The Enigma of Identity Making. Geert Wilders and the rise of right-wing populism in the Netherlands

Documents

Transcript of The Enigma of Identity Making. Geert Wilders and the rise of right-wing populism in the Netherlands