"The oppressed people of the world must not succumb to the temptation of becoming bitter or engaging in hate campaigns. We must somehow come to see that this leads us only deeper and deeper into the mire; to return hate for hate does nothing but intensify the existence of hate and evil in the uni- verse."

Martin Luther King, "On Nonviolence"

Correspondence should be sent to Cheryl Koopman. Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sci- ences. Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5718. E-mail: koopman@stanford.edu

PEACE AND CONFLICT: JOURNAL OF PEACE PSYCHOLOGY, 12(2), 139-156 Copyright O 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

The Effects of Watching Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 on Voting

Intentions, Mood, and Beliefs About Why President Bush and His

Administration Initiated War in Iraq

Cheryl Koopman, Lisa D. Butler. and Oxana Palesh Stanford University

Rose McDerrnott UniversiQ of California, S a ~ ~ t a Barbara

Tatiana Forero-Puerta and Bibi Das Stanford Universi~l

Tracy Poindexter and Patrick Endress Universit). of California, Santa Barbara

This study evaluated the effects of viewing Moore's film Fuhrrnheit 9/11 with a sur- vey conducted in 4 California theaters. Seventy-three prefilm participants completed surveys as they were about to see the film, and 127 postfilm participants completed surveys as they exited the theater (N = 200). Compared to prefilm participants, postfilm participants were more likely to attribute the war to President Bush. Vice President Cheney, oil companies, defense contractors, and the Saudi leaders. Also, postfilm participants were more likely to see a desire for oil and global domination as motivations behind the Bush administration's initiation of the war and less likely to endorse the Bush Administration's rationales. Furthermore, postfilm participants viewed President Bush more negatively. reported less likelihood that they would vote for Bush for President, and they felt angrier, more fearful, and sadder. These results indicate that a documentary film can have significant il~lmediate effects in the direc-

1 40 KOOPMAN ET AL.

tion intended by the fdm's creators on political beliefs about war, voting intentions, and mood.

President George W. Bush and his administration's motives for initiating the war in Iraq were the subject of the financially successfi~l and critically acclaimed docu- mentary film Fahrenheit 9/11 (Moore, Czarnecki, & Glynn, 2004). When Disney refused to distribute the film for its subsidiary Miramax, it set off a tsunami of pub- licity that made the director, Michael Moore, an American icon to some, an icono- clastic anathema to others, and catapulted the movie to cult status. On its release, it set off a box office record for documentaries by earning more than $100 million (Smith, 2004), despite the fact that many theaters refused to screen it. Its populist, no-h~lds barred attack on President Bush, its allegations regarding the Administra- tion's political motives and relationships to the house of Saud, defense contractors, and the oil industry, and the timing of its release in the year prior to the 2004 elec- tions made Fahrenheit 9/11 a national and even international sensation that won the coveted Palme d'Or at Cannes (Ascociated Press, 2004) and the People's Choice award for best documentay film (CBS News, 2005).

Much was published in the popular press about Fahrenheit 9/11 and, depending on political perspective. the film was lambasted as blatant propaganda or hailed as a passionate j'accuse. For example, journalist Christopher Hitchens (2004) damned the film as "a sinister exercise in moral frivolity, crudely disguised as an exercise in seriousness" (m3). In contrast, editor and author Geoffrey O'Brien (2004) praised it saying, "Simply by making the recent past visible-by bringing these little pieces of reality into the movie theater-Moore unleashes a reservoir of feeling. It's almost like the symbolic breaking of a spell: we can begin to remember everything that we had almost started to forget" (m22).

Also contributing to the controversy was Moore's avowed desire-and his mo- tivation for making the film- that Fahrenheit 9/11 have an impact on the outcome of the upcoming 2004 U.S. presidential election. In an interview just after the film's release, Moore confirmed that the reason that he pushed for Fahrenheit 9/11 to be released on June 25,2004 (and to have the DVD released that October), was that he hoped to tip the balance of the election by moving votes away from the Re- publican candidates and toward the Democrats (Fierman, 2004). To this end, Fahr- enheit 9/11 lampooned the reasons President Bush and his administration pre- sented for initiating the war in Iraq and marshaled and framed evidence to support Moore's view that the Bush administration's motives were to seek revenge, to nourish corporate greed, and to extend U.S. political power abroad.

Given the national furor that disputatious films such as Moore's can apparently provoke, it is surprising that so few studies have examined whether such films have their intended effects on viewers' political views and actions. In one such study (Butler, Koopman, & Zimbardo. 1995), Oliver Stone's 1991 political film, JFK (Stone & Ho, 1991), was found to induce changes in mood, beliefs, and political

EFFECTS OF WATCHING FAHRENHEIT 9/11 141

behavioral intentions, in some cases corisistent with the themes and messages of the film. Comparisons of adults who had just viewed the film with those who were entering the theater revealed the film's immediate emotional and cognitive impact on viewers: After viewing the film, participants reported heightened feelings of an- ger and hopelessness and enhanced beliefs in the film's broad conspiracy hypothe- sis of multiple agents and agencies involved in the Kennedy assassination and its cover-up. However, viewing the film was also associated with significantly de- creased intentions to vote in the 1992 U.S. presidential election or make monetary political contributions. The authors of this study interpreted these results as indica- tions that the film induced, albeit unintentionally, a general sense of helplessness and cynicism.

Although the Butler et al. (1995) study of JFK examined the political and psy- chological effects of viewing a political film in the natural field setting of a theater, a number of other published studies have also examined the political and psycho- logical impact of movies made for television. These include studies of Roots (Margulies, Chomsky, Erman, Greene, & Moses, 1977), which described the im- pact of racism by focusing on an African American family's history from slavery to the mid-1970s (e.g., Surlin, 1978); Holocaust (Berger & Chomsky, 1978), a film that portrayed the Nazis' treatment of the European Jews in World War I1 (Ameri- can Jewish Committee, 198 1; de Bock & van Lil, 1981; Diem, 1981); The Day Af- ter (Papazian & Meyer, 1983). a movie that showed the horrific effects of a nuclear war (Feldman & Sigelman, 1985; Oskamp et al., 1985; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1985); and Amerika (O'Connor & Wrye, 1987), which portrayed terrible long- term effects of a Soviet takeover in the Midwest of the United States (Lenart & McGraw, 1989). This research has generally focused on the educational effects of political movies in raising awareness, making political issues more salient, and conveying information. In addition, studies have found other influences of politi- cal movies along the "cognitive-affective-behavioral dimension" of media effects (Perse, 2001, p. 17), including effects on political beliefs (in Lenart & McGraw's, 1989, study of Anzerika), emotions (in Surlin's, 1978, study of Roots), and political behavior intentions (in Schofield & Pavelchak's, 1985, study of The Day After).

Films are thought to inlluence viewers by eliciting emotional states (Carroll, 1999; Plantinga & Smith, 1999); consequently. the impact of Fahrenheit 9/11 may be due in part to its power to educe intense emotions in audiences. Careful orchestra- tion of events and facts-by means of meticulous editing, thoughtful choice of mu- sic, and other special effects-may be employed by filmmakers to emphasize salient scenes that are emotionally distinct (see also Butler & Palesh, 2004). Emotions evoked in movies contrast with the experience of emotions of everyday life, where the significance of the event and response are not prefocused for the individual (Carroll, 1999). In Fahrenheit 9/11, Moore often framed viewers' interpretations of visual scenes in ways apparently intended to elicit anger or disgust directed at Presi- dent George W. Bush and other members of his administration. For example, early in

142 KOOPMAN ET AL.

the film, Moore presents footage of President Bush sitting before a classroom, hold- ing the book My Pet Goat, and looking fearful after being informed of the initial re- ports of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York; this scene was accompanied by a voice-over by Moore suggesting, in a sarcastic voice, that Presi- dent Bush may be worrying about how these events would affect reactions to his Middle East policies that pandered to special interests.

The influence of the mass media is heightened during times of crises (Butler, Garlan, & Spiegel, 2005). Therefore, the social context in which Fahrenheit 9/11 was released, namely a time of political turmoil in which U.S. involvement in the war in Iraq was highly divisive, is likely to have enhanced the film's significance. We hypothesized that, for Fahrenheit 9/11 viewers, this significance may have re- sulted in changes in intended political behaviors such as voting, in addition to changes in emotions and beliefs regarding why the U.S. initiated war in Iraq.

These hypotheses are supported by the literature on film effects, which argues that by eliciting strong emotions as well as cognitive changes such a medium is ca- pable of influencing decisive action (Perse, 200 1). Emotions are more than just a bodily state. They entail an intentionality that requires an object (Carroll, 1999; Plantinga & Smith, 1999) as well as one or more specific beliefs (Carroll, 1999). Clearly, the filmmaker may provide both the object and belief. In the case of Fahr- enheit 9/11, Moore promoted beliefs that President Bush and his administration initiated war against Iraq for reasons that benefited special corporate and political interests over the interests of the American public. Consequently, the emotional re- actions one would expect such beliefs to elicit in viewers would include anger, sad- ness, hopelessness, fear, and agitated excitement. In addition, the behavioral inten- tions that should follow from these changes in emotions and beliefs would include being less likely to vote for Bush and more likely to vote for a presidential candi- date other than Bush in the next election, as well as engaging in other political ac- tions and becoming better informed.

This study examines the effects of viewing Fahrenheit 9/11 in a natural setting on political attributions regarding responsibility and motivations for the war in Iraq, as well as effects on political behavioral intentions, and mood. Based on the previous literature, we predicted that adults who had just viewed the film Fuhren- heit 9/11 (postfilm participants), compared to those who had not yet viewed it (prefilm participants), would more strongly endorse attributions for the initiation of war on Iraq to U.S. corporate interests and Saudi agentstagencies, both of which are portrayed in the film as having their own special interests for going to war. Con- versely, we predicted that postfilm participants, compared to prefilm participants, would be less likely to attribute the initiation of the war to factors such as promot- ing freedom or the actions of Saddam Hussein and A1 Qaeda. We also hypothe- sized that postfilm participants would be more likely to attribute revenge, a desire for oil, and an agenda of global domination to President Bush and his administra- tion as motives for initiating this war, rather than the justifications mentioned by

EFFECTS OF WATCHING FAHRENHEIT 9/11 1 43

the Bush administration, such as the promotion of democracy and the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, we hypothesized that those who had seen the film, com- pared to those who had not, would be less likely to intend to vote for President Bush in the 2004 presidential election and also less likely to take political action and become better informed.

METHODS

Procedure

The study was conducted at four theaters, each located in a different city in Califor- nia. Three theaters were in the San Francisco Bay Area in northern California and one was in Orange County in southern California. Data were collected from July through October of 2004. Attempts were also made to also distribute the survey at theaters in Nashville, Tennessee, and Washington, DC, but several large theater chains failed to return repeated phone inquiries and respond to letters requesting permission to conduct the survey at their theaters showing Fahrenheit 9/11. Where possible, survey times were chosen to maximize the numbers of persons attending the film (e.g., weekend evenings). After obtaining permission from the theater management to conduct the survey, surveyors (1-3 at each theater) approached each movie customer who appeared to be over age 18 as he or she entered or exited the theater. These efforts resulted in the collection of surveys from 73 participants as they entered a theater (prefilm participants) and another 127 participants as they exited a theater (postfilm participants). Respondents were asked separate ques- tions about whether they were about to see the film or had already seen the film. Two respondents endorsed both, and therefore they were categorized as postfilm participants. This restricted the definition of prefilmparticipants to only those who had never previously seen the film. The surveys for pre- and postfilm participants were identical, with one exception: Those who had seen the film were also asked the extent to which they thought the film was false or misleading. Due to practical constraints in recruiting participants, on-site surveyors were unable to record with precision the numbers of persons who refused to participate. However, estimated refusals constituted approximately one quarter of those persons approached at the Northern California sites. In Southern California, the number of people who re- fused was estimated to be fewer than 10% of those approached.

Informed consent was obtained from each participant by having him or her read an informed participation statement that had been approved by an appropriate in- stitutional review board. This statement invited the respondent to participate in "a survey of personal and political opinions and predictions . . . to examine movie- goers' views regarding the film Fahrenheit 9/11 ." No payment was provided as in- ducement for participation. Participants were assured that their participation was vol~lntary and that their answers would be completely confidential.

144 KOOPMAN ET AL. EFFECTS OF WATCHlNG FAHRENHEIT 9/11 1 45

Participants

participants included 88 males, 110 females, and 2 persons who did not report their gender. Their ethnic backgrounds were 67% European American/White, 5% La- tinoIHispanic, 8.5% AsianPacific Islander, 7% African American, 1.5% Native American, 7% other. and 4% did not answer. Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 85 (M= 41.3, SD = 15.2), and levels of completed education were 6.5% high school or less, 25 % some college, 30.5% college degree. and 30% graduate degree. with an ad- ditional 7.5% reporting their education level as other and .5% not responding. The majority (53.5%) of participants reported their political affiliation as liberal, with 19.5% describing themselves as moderate, 8% as green, 5% as conservative. 4% as libertarian, 8.5% as other, and 1.5% did not respond. There were no significant dif- ferences between prefilmparticipants and post film participants on gender, ethnicity, level of education, or political affiliation. However, an independent sample t test comparing prefilm participants to postfilm participants found a significant differ- ence in age between the two groups, t(198) =- 2 .76 ,~ < .O l , withprefilmparticipants being somewhat younger than postfilm participants. Therefore, age was included as a covariate in the analyses of the data, as described in the Data Analysis section.

Measures

Overview. The survey instrument contained 9 general questions (comprising 46 specific items) designed to assess participants' present emotional state, political views, political behavioral intentions, attributions of responsibility for going to war in Iraq, judgments regarding the concerns that motivated the Bush administra- tion to go to war (and confidence regarding those motivations), and an evaluation of George W. Bush's overall performance as president. These questions are de- scribed subsequently. Additional items assessed whether or not the respondent had seen Fahrenheit 9/11 and, for those who had already seen the film, the extent to which they believed the film to be false or misleading. The survey also included items to elicit participants' gender, age, education, and ethnicity and to assess po- litical orientation (by checking "liberal," "conservative," "moderate," "libertar- ian," "green," or "other"). The survey was developed from the one created for the Butler et al. (1995) study of the effects of viewing the film JFK. Initial drafts of our survey were developed by the first two authors and reviewed by the remaining au- thors and several other persons who had seen Fahrenheit 9/11, with their feedback used to revise the instrument.

Mood. Five items assessed how hopeful, angry. fearful, sad, and energized respondents felt at that moment. For each, respondents indicated their present emotional state by placing an X on a 0 to 10 analog scale that ranged from not at all through nloderately to extremely.

Responsibility for the war in Iraq. To assess the impact of the film on viewers' attributions of responsibility for the war in Iraq, respondents were asked to rate the degree of responsibility they attributed to each of the following 10 indi- viduals/groups: Saddam Hussein, A1 Qaeda. George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and/or other advisors, CIAPentagon, oil companies, defense contractors, Saudi Arabian leaders, the news media, and other (specify). Respondents made ratings using a 5-point scale that ranged from 0 (not czt all resporzsible) through 2 (nzoderatelv re- sponsible) to 4 (extreinely resporzsible).

The Bush Administration's motives for initiating war in Iraq. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree of the likelihood. in their view, that each of 10 possible concerns motivated the Bush administration to go to war and to rate their level of confidence for each. All respondents were provided with possible motives for war in the following sequence: "Promote democracy," "Eliminate weapons of mass destruction," "Respond to the 911 1/01 terrorist attacks," "Fight terrorism," "Increase security," "Support human rights," "Protect U.S. interests," "Revenge," "Desire for oil." and "Part of a global domination strategy." For each, the respon- dent indicated their view of the likelihood of that motivation, on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not very likely) through 2 (somewhat likely) to 4 (tlery likely), and also their degree of confidence in that assessment on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not a t all con,fident) through 2 (soinewhat corzfident) to 4 (very confident).

Evaluation of the President's performance. Respondents were also asked to rate George W. Bush's overall performance as President by checking one of five options: "very poor," "poor," "fair," "good," or "very good."

Political behavioral intentions.. Two domains were assessed to gauge polit- ical behavioral intentions. One question asked, "How likely is it that in November you will vote for . . . " "George W. Bush," "John Keny," and "A third party presi- dential candidate" (each was rated separately). Response options included 1 (very low), 2 (low), 3 (fair), 4 (high), and 5 (very high). In addition, respondents were asked the following: "Which of the following political activities, if any, do you plan to do in the next year'? (Please check all that apply)." Response options in- cluded "vote," "donate money," "volunteer," "attend a protest or political func- tion," "become better informed about political issues/candidates," "try to persuade others to my political viewpoint," and "other (specify)."

Evaluation of the film's accuracy Respondents who had seen the film were also asked to rate the degree to which they believed that the film was false or mis- leading. Respondents reported their opinion by placing an X on a 0 to 10 analog scale that ranged from 0 (thefilm was conzpletely false and inisleading) through 5

146 KOOPMAN ET AL. EFFECTS OF WATCHING FAHRENHEIT 9/11 1 47

(thefilm was moderately false and misleading) to 10 (tlzefilm was not a t all false arzcl misleading).

Data Analysis

Analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs), with age as the covariate, were performed to evaluate whether there were differences between prefilm participants and postfilm participants (the independent variable) in current mood states, attributions of re- sponsibility for the war in Iraq. endorsed motivations for the Bush administration's initiation of war i11 Iraq, confidence ratings for these motivation endorsements, a rating of Bush's performance as president, and the likelihood of voting for Bush, Keny, and a third party candidate. Partial eta squared was computed in each ANCOVA to assess the effect size for the difference between prefilm and postfilm participants. Logistic regression analyses, also including age as a covariate, exam- ined the significance of the differences between prefilm participants and postfilm participants (again as the independent variable) in their intentions to engage in spe- cific political actions in the coming year.

RESULTS

Mood

Viewing the film strongly affected respondents' ratings of their current emotional state (see Table 1). Compared to prefilm participants, postfilm participants re- ported that they felt significantly more angry, fearful, and sad. Prefilm participants and postfilm participants did not differ significantly in feelings of hopefulness or being energized.

TABLE 1 Prefilm Participants' and Postfilm Participants' Emotional States

- -

Pr~$l~n Po)ostfilm Participants Particrpants

Elnotion M SD M SD df F-Test Value Partial 112

Anger 5.0 2.9 7.0 2.7 1, 195 21.16 ** .10 Sadness 4.4 2.9 7.0 2.6 1. I94 37.82'" .16 Fear 3.9 2.7 5.1 3.3 1, 192 5.96* .03 Hopeful~less 4.7 2.8 4.0 2.4 1, 190 2.10 .O 1 Energized 5.3 2.2 5.8 2.7 1, 186 1.59 .01

Attributions of Responsibility for the War in lraq

Table 2 presents the results comparing prefilm participants to postfilm participants on their attributions of responsibility for the war in Iraq. Compared to prefilm par- ticipants, postfilm participants attributed significantly less responsibility for the United States going to war in Iraq to Saddam Hussein and significantly more re- sponsibility to George W. Bush, Dick Cheney andlor other advisors. Saudi Arabian leaders, oil companies, and defense contractors. Prefilm participants and postfilm participants did not differ significantly in attributing responsibility to A1 Qaeda, CIAIPentagon. or the news media.

Beliefs About the Bush Administration's Motives for Going to War in lraq

Table 3 presents the results comparing prefilm participants to postfilm partici- pants on their assessments of the likelihood that specific factors motivated Presi- dent Bush and his administration to initiate war in Iraq. Compared to prefilm participants, postfilm participants endorsed significantly higher levels of likeli- hood that the desire for oil and for global domination were the concerns that mo- tivated the Bush administration to go to war. Postfilm participants also thought that it was significantly less likely that the Bush administration was motivated to initiate the war to promote democracy, eliminate weapons of mass destruction, respond to the 911 1/01 terrorist attacks, fight terrorism, increase security, or sup- port human rights.

TABLE 2 Prefilm Participants' and Postfilm Participants' Attributions for the lraq War

PreJilm Poslfilm Partici~~ants Participants

F-Test Partial M SD M SD df Value r2

Saddain Hussein 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.3 1:188 6.83:k* .04 Al Qaeda 2.1 1.5 1.7 1.4 1,185 3.04 .02 George W. Bush 3.7 0.7 3.9 0.3 1. 191 10.65*** .05 Dick Cheney or other advisors 3.5 0.9 3.8 0.5 1, 193 10.87*** .05 CIA or Pentagon 2.9 1.0 3.1 1.0 1, 191 1.22 .01 Oil companies 2.9 1.2 3.4 0.9 1: 191 10.88**" .05 Defense contractors 2.6 1.0 3.4 0.9 1. 186 23.46::** .11 Saudi Arabia leaders 2.4 1.1 2.8 1.2 1:187 4.36" .02 The news media 2.4 1.3 2.6 1.2 1, 189 0.88 .01 Other 2.5 1.6 3.3 1.1 1: 30 0.67 .02

":p 2 .05. **p 5.01, *:!:*p 5 , 001.

148 KOOPMAN ET AL. EFFECTS OF WATCHlNC E4 HRENHFlT 9/I I 1 49

TABLE 3

Prefilm Participants' and Postfilm Participants' Assessments of the Likelihood That Specific Concerns Motivated President George W. Bush and His Administration to Initiate War in lraq

Prefilm Puslfilrn Participarzts Participants

F-Test Portia1

Concrr~z M SD M SD df W ~ I I ~ q2

Promote demucracy 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 1 , 189 9.93"" .05 Eliminate weapons of mass 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.2 1 : 185 8.10"" .04

destruction Respond to9/11/01 terrorist attacks 2.1 1.4 1.5 1.4 1, 184 4.72" .03 Fight terrorism 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1 . 183 17,l4::'.~':* .09 Increase security 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.3 1, 180 10.06':* .05 Support human rights 1.3 1.2 0.6 1.0 1,186 11.17':'*' .06 Protect U.S. interests 3.1 1.3 3.0 1.5 1,178 0.21 .OO 1 Revenge 3.0 1.1 2.8 1.3 1, 176 0.86 .O 1 Desire for oil 3.0 1.1 3.6 0.9 1,176 12.48-1*-L. .07 Part of a global domination 2.3 1.4 3.0 1.2 1 : 174 7.90:':" .04

strategy

:!:p < ,05, < ,01. "Wp 2 , 0 ,

Confidence in Beliefs About the Bush Administration's Motives for Initiating War in lraq

Compared to prefllm partlcipants, postfilm participants were significantly more confident that they were accurate in their assessment that President Bush and his administration's motivations to go to war were based on the desire for oil, F(l. 172) = 7 . 1 4 , ~ < .Ol, partial q* = .04, and for global domination. F(1, 168) = 6 . 1 9 , ~ < .05. partial q* = .04. They &ere also significantly more confident in their assess- ment that supporting human rights was not a likely motive for the war, F(I , 161) = 5 . 4 3 , ~ < .05. partial q* = .03. No other differences in confidence levels were statis- tically significant.

Overall Evaluation of President George W. Bush's Performance as President

President Bush's performance was rated as significantly less favorable by those who had seen the film, compared to those who had not, F(1, 194) = 4.44, p < .05, partial q2 = .02 ( M = 1.4 , SD = 0.8: M = 1.7, SD = 0.9, respectively). This change primarily reflected an increase in Bush's ratings as very poor. Among postfilm par- ticipants, 74.8% rated Bush's performance as very poor, compared to 55.7% of prefilm partlcipants.

Political Behavior Intentions

Respondents who had seen the film indicated that thcy were significantly less likely to vote for George 'Mr. Bush (with M = 1.1, SD = 0.3), compared to prefilm participants (A4 = 1.5. SD = 0.9), P(1, 172) = 13 43. p < ,001, partial q2 = .07. Prefilm participants and postfilm participants did not differ significantly on other intentions to vote or to donate money, attend political protests/functions, persuade others, or become better informed.

Perception of Film's Accuracy

Overall the respondents who had just viewed the film felt that it was not misleading (on the 0-1 0 scale, M = 7.9, SD = 1 .8).

Age Differences

In most of the analyses, age did not show a significant relationship to the depend- ent variable. Where age showed a significant relationship to the dependent variable (e.g., evaluation of Bush's performance as president), it was in the direction of older participants endorsing more liberal views than did younger viewers (e.g., older viewers evaluated Bush's performance more negatively than did younger viewers). However, because this study was not designed to systematically study age effects. the findings related to this variable may be an artifact of this particular study and of little further interest.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study suggest that a polilical documentary film with a clear point of view and self-stated objective to influence the audience not only in the theater but also in the larger political arena can significantly affect the way moviegoers feel, think, and intend to act with respect to the issues being portrayed through the director's lens. In this case, viewing the film Fahrenheit 9/11 (Moore et al.. 2004) was associated with significant changes in mood, including increases in anger, sadness, and fear. Similarly. and distinctly paralleling the themes of the docurnen- tary, viewing the film was associated with effects on beliefs related to the content of the film, specifically alterations in beliefs, or the strength of them, about the ap- propriate assignation of responsibility for the U.S. initiation of war in Iraq. After watching the film, moviegoers were significantly more likely to believe that those responsible for the war were President Rnsh, Vice President Cheney, oil compa- nies and defense contractors, and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabian leaders, and they were less likely to assign responsibility to Saddam Hussein. Interestingly, rat-

150 KOOPMAN ET AL.

ings for A1 Qaeda and other potentially responsible parties (including the intelli- gence and military communities and the news media) did not significantly differ between pre- and postfilm participants.

The film also influenced moviegoers' views regarding the motivations-official and otherwise-that may have prompted the Bush administration to take military action against Iraq. After seeing the film, viewers held a somewhat different range of beliefs regarding the motivations behind the invasion. Prior to viewing the film, moviegoers endorsed (as somewhat to very likely) the motivations of responding to the 911 1 terrorist attacks, fighting terrorism, increasing security, protecting U.S. interests, and seeking revenge. With the exceptions of protecting U.S. interests and revenge, beliefs in each of these concerns as motivations for the war declined sig- nificantly after viewing the film, as did beliefs that the invasion was motivated by the objectives of promoting democracy and eliminating weapons of mass destruc- tion. However. after seeing the film, filmgoers more strongly endorsed two other factors as motivating the Bush administration to engage in the war in Iraq: the de- sire for oil and the invasion as part of a global domination strategy. These latter two changes in ascribed motives for the war in Iraq were also reflected in significant in- creases in viewers' confidence about these assessments.

In addition to the shifts in mood and beliefs, viewers also reported one signifi- cant change in the political actions they intended to take in the future. Specifically, after viewing the film there was a significant decrease in participants' reported likelihood that they would vote for George W. Bush for president in 2004. This finding was quite remarkable given that prefilm participants' scores were rather skewed to start with, with most reporting that there was a low or very low likeli- hood they would vote for Bush. On the other hand, people who viewed this film were not found to significantly differ from people who had not seen the film on other kinds of political intentions. including to vote for Kerry or a third party can- didate for president. whether to vote at all (regardless of candidate), donate money, attend political protests/functions, persuade others, or become better informed. Therefore, the results restrict the implications that can be drawn about the film's effects on political intentions to the one positive finding on reducing viewers' in- tentions to vote for Bush. Although this study did find a significant effect in sup- port of Michael Moore's avowed goal of using this film as a vehicle to reduce view- ers' intentions to vote for Bush, it did not find generalized effects across intentions to engage in other kinds of political actions.

It may be that to affect other kinds of political behavioral intentions, there must be specific encouragement in the content of the film. It is notable that in addition to the negative messages throughout the film about Bush as president, the issue of voting for him was specifically highlighted early in the film with material suggest- ing that he may have stolen the previous presidential election. That may have added to the film's power to affect viewers' intentions to vote for him in the next election, making such voting decisions more salient. It is also possible that other

EFFECTS OF WATCHING FAHRENHEIT 9/11 1 5 1

kinds of political intentions actually were affected by viewing Fahrenheit 9/11 but were not detected because the single items assessing each of the political behaviors may have elicited insufficient variance to detect such effects. Furthermore, it is un- known whether the film would show a greater impact on a more politically diverse sample of movie goers than the participants in this study.

Indeed, the changes in mood, belief, and voting intentions found in this study are particularly noteworthy because those who choose to see such a film are by that fact self-selected, and presumably, therefore, more likely to already agree with Moore's point of view and intended message. As mentioned for voting intentions. if moviegoers' views are already generally in line with those of the movie director. the audience has little room on average for a shift in thoughts and intended actions. yet significant changes were found following the film. In other words, the film did not just "preach to the converted," as it significantly altered people's beliefs about the political reasons for the Iraq war.

In examining these results. we were struck by the coherence in the constellation of changes that viewing this film seemed to bring about. This contrasts with the ef- fects of Oliver Stone's (Stone & Ho, 1991) JFK, which also changed some mood states and beliefs in ways generally consistent with the director's objectives, but ul- timately summed to what appeared to be a syndrome of political helplessness as evidenced by the significant postviewing increases in hopelessness, decreases in intentions to vote or make political contributions, and the general cynicism regard- ing the political sophistication of the American public (Butler et al., 1995). Mi- chael Moore's documentary, on the other hand, seemed to anger. persuade, and motivate its viewers to take their views into the world with the intention to vote the scoundrels-as they saw them-out of office.

A number of differences between these two films may account for their distinc- tive effects on their audiences. In the first place, as Butler and colleagues (1995) noted, JFK concerned political history rather than contemporary political con- cerns, whereas Fahrenheit 9/11 was released in the 6 months prior to a presidential election that was poised to debate many of the issues raised in the film (such as the motivations for and wisdom of invading Iraq). In short, JFK "did not imply a course of action, political or otherwise, for the viewer inspired to act" (p. 251), but for viewers of Fahrenheit 9/11, the route from mood, belief, and behavioral inten- tion change to action in the world tnay have seemed much more clear and efficacious.

In addition, although both films were tendentious and intended to persuade, JFK was a docudrama mixing fact with reenactments and patent creations of con- tent, whereas Fahrenheit 9/11 held more closely to strict documentary criteria, even though Moore marshaled evidence in support of his interpretations. Viewers of the latter could. for the most part, make their own judgments and draw their own conclusions regarding the accuracy of the material; whereas, viewers of JFK were not given sufficient guidelines to separate the fact from the fiction interpolated

152 KOOPMAN ET AL EFFECTS OF WATCHING FAHRENHEIT 9/11 153

throughout the film, possibly leaving them less able to draw firm conclusions that they felt comfortable acting on.

Although the findings of this study appear quite striking, several limitations need to be coilsidered in interpreting the results. First, the effects found in this study were small to moderate. This is consistent with a growing body of research on media effects reviewed by Perse (2001). On the other hand, Perse also noted that such research is likely to underestimate the potential effects, given the impre- cision of our current theories and methods for doing such research. For example, the strongest effect of viewing media may be in reinforcing and stabilizing preex- isting views, which is difficult to ascertain with our current research methods. Fur- thermore, if this is the case, it may be a highly important media effect, as stabiliz- ing preexisting views is not to be confused with having a null effect (Perse, 2001).

A second limitation of this study is that generalizing the findings to the Ameri- can populace is questionable, given that the sample comprised individuals who were recruited in urban areas of California, and who were predominantly White, exceptionally well-educated, overwhelmingly liberal or moderate in political ori- entation, and politically active (at least by self-report). Indeed, as mentioned previ- ously. the self-selection of this natural moviegoing sample likely accounts for the extreme endorsements of some survey items. It would have been desirable to ex- amine the effects of viewing this film specifically on persons who may be less po- litically sympathetic to its message, particularly those who are moderate or conser- vative in their self-described political orientation. The sample did not include sufficient numbers of participants in these orientations to warrant such sub- analyses. Also, although one might expect a well-educated sample to be less sub- ject to media influence, this is contradicted by previous research that examined whether education affected soldiers' tendencies to be swayed by army indoctrina- tion films (Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949). That research found that the highly educated soldiers were more influenced by viewing indoctrination films than were the less educated soldiers, perhaps due to differences in attentiveness and comprehension of the material. Thus, highly educated moviegoers may be par- ticularly influenced by viewing political films more than the general population

Another important limitation to this study is that, although we found that view- ing the film changed reported voting behavior intentions, we have no evidence that it actually changed behavior. That is. we did not follow participants to see how they voted. Although research has established that general attitudinal tendencies are typically good predictors of subsequent behaviors (Zimbardo & Leippe. 199 l), re- search js needed to definitively demonstrate a relationship between the reported immediate impact of a film such as Fahrenheit W l I on voting intentions and actual casting of votes in the election. Furthermore, this study was not designed to be able to determine whether such changes persisted over time. It is conceivable that with- out further support, the reduction of viewers' intentions to vote for Rush could be short lived and revert back to earlier intentions. Also, the effects on mood states

would be expected to be short lived, as moods are thought to be transient in nature. On the other hand, given the logical consistency of the changes in specific beliefs about why the Bush administration initiated war in Iraq, it would be worthwhile to further investigate the duration of such changes. Therefore, more research is needed to examine the duration of such afilm's effects, particularly on political be- liefs, behavioral intentions, and actual behavior. For example, it would be desirable to conduct a study in which postviewer participants are assessed at intervals mea- sured in days and weeks after viewing such a film. Then comparisons could be made to determine whether the film's effects tend to dissipate at a particular point in time after viewing the film.

For activists who seek to influence citizens' views about politicians' decisions to go to war, Moore's Fahrenheit 911 I may provide a model of effective strategies. This raises an interesting question about the appropriateness of using emotion- eliciting political influence strategies, as many similar tactics have been used with the support of the Bush administration to justify involvement in the Iraq War (Schechter, 2004). Although social critics such as Michael Moore have been chas- tised for using emotion-arousing tactics (Sullivan, 2004), peace activists have en- dorsed the use of such tactics to try to counter the much larger and socially sanc- tioned program of prowar propaganda (Miller, 2004; Schechter, 2004; Snow, 2004) such as found in the Pentagon's Joint Vision 2020 (as cited in Miller, 2004). This document directs the U.S. military to pursue "information dominance" (p. 7) that prevents parties with opposing viewpoints from influencing policy. Further- more, the Pentagon is pursuing a persuasion strategy that they describe as "interoperability" (p. 8), wherein multiple information systems are fully integrated to have maximum impact on the populace's views. Clearly there are vastly differ- ent scales of resources behind activists (such as Moore) and the U.S. Department of Defense for creating messages to try to influence public opinions about war. In this context, Snow (2004) argued that questious about using emotion-eliciting per- suasion strategies are overshadowed by larger concerns regarding the need for ex- posure to alternative viewpoints about decisions to engage in war.

In the early 1920s, U.S. filmmakers produced a number of films conveying a va- riety of political messages spanning the political spectrum (Starr, 2004). Subse- quently, the film industry became consolidated under the control of a limited num- ber of film production companies and moved away from producing films with a political message (Starr. 2004). The two world wars of the 20th century also had inhibiting effects on films promoting messages of political dissent, although prowar films were plentiful. However, to promote democratic values, it is essential to provide open and inexpensive exposure to communications with diverse politi- cal viewpoints (Stan, 2004). Given the findings of this study as well as previous studies on the effects of political movies (American Jewish Committee, 1981 ; But- ler et al., 1995; de Bock & van Lil: 1981; Diem, 1981 ; Feldman & Sigelman, 1985; Lenart & McGraw, 1989; Osltamp et al., 1985; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1985;

154 KOOPMAN ET AL.

Surlin, 1978), it appears that films with political messages have a role to play in contributing to the public's debate about issues of import, including whether or not to engage in war.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We express our gratitude to Robert Garlan, Glen DeMaria, Jonathan Cowden, Karina Prayjemski, and Xin-Hua Chen, who provided helpful feedback on earlier versions of the survey instrunlent and manuscript, to James S. Smith and Suzanne Vybourney, who assisted with data collection, and to the managers of the four the- aters who allowed us to conduct the survey, as well as the persons who participated in this study.

A previous version of this study was presented in July 2005 at the Annual Meet- ing of the International Society of Political Psychology in Toronto.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Cheryl Koopman is Associate Research Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. She does research in traumatic stress and stress management as well as political psychology.

Lisa Butler is a Senior Research Scholar in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University School of Medicine. Her research ar- eas include trauma, dissociation, paranoia, resilience, and the effects of popular media.

Oxana Palesh is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Psychiatry and Be- havioral Sciences at Stanford University. Her research interests are in traumatic stress. dissociation, cross-cultural issues and medical illness.

Rose McDermott is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She works on political psychology in international rela- tions.

Tatiana Forero-Puerta obtained her Bachelor's degree from Stanford University in Philosophy and Religious Studies. She is currently pursuing graduate work at New York University in Continental Philosophy and Creative Writing.

Bibi Das, M.D., is Clinical Educator and Research Scholar of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. She does research in Obsessive Com- pulsive Disorder and Impulse Control Disorders.

Tracy Poindexter is a Ph.D. student at the University of California at Santa Barbasa. She is currently researching political psychology, particularly signaling, bargaining and negotiation in crisis management.

EFFECTS OF WATCHING FAHRENHEIT 911 1 155

Patrick Endress has a B.A. in Government and History from Cornell University. He is currently collaborating with Professors Rose McDermott and Aaron Belkin at the University of California on research in international relations and military policy.

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PEACE AND CONFLICT: JOURNAL OF PEACE PSYCHOLOGY. 12(2). 157-174 Copyright 0 2006, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Understanding Peace Through the Lens of Colombian Youth and Adults

Stella Sacipa, Blanca Patricia Ballesteros, Juanita Cardozo, M6nica M. Novoa, and Claudia Tovar

Pontificia Urliversidad Javeriana de Bogota, Colombia

This study sought to understand how youth and adult men and women in different so- cial groups in the city of Bogoti express their understanding of peace. The specific objectives of the research included (a) the identification of values related to peace, (b) the analysis of dispositions toward the construction of peace cultures, and (c) the comparative analysis of the meanings of peace by gender and generation. Eight focus groups with 4 to 10 participants each were conducted with people in preexisting pro- jects or organizations. Findings were organized and analyzed through intragroup and intertextual matrices based on 6 analytic categories: reconciliation, leadership. per- sonal well-being, social peace: new global ethics, and negative peace. Findings showed that the participants' multiple and varied understandings of the meanings of peace are related to personal and social well-being. Some differences by gender and generation are consistent with developmental literature and contextual conditions.

The framework for this study about peace building and cultures of peace derives from the literature on peace, war, and protracted internal conflict, informed espe- cially by the work of Ignacio Martin-Bar6 (1989, 1990), a widely recognized ex- pert, Latin American social psychologist, and victim of political violence in El Sal- vador. There are interesting convergences among Martin-Bar6 (1989, 1990), Galtung (1996), Lederach (1995), and Fisas (2001), suggesting the importance of dismantling dominant ideology and underlying social structures of power. These theorists have discussed the potential for a progression from violent relationships to peaceful relationships. They agree on the importance of understanding this pro- gression and on the importance of clarifying distinct peace-building processes as

Correspondence should be sent to Stella Sacipa, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Facultad de Psicologia, Edificio Manuel Briceiio, Oficina 209. Carrera 5a, No. 39-00. Bogota 56710 Colombia. E-mail: ssacipa@javeriana.edu.co