The Domain-Specificity of Creativity: Insights from New Phenomenology

New Phenomenology 1

Running Head: CREATIVE DOMAINS IN NEW PHENOMENOLOGY

The Domain-Specificity of Creativity: Insights from New Phenomenology

Christian Julmi and Ewald Scherm

FernUniversität in Hagen

New Phenomenology 2

Abstract

The question of the domain-specificity of creativity represents one of the key questions in

creativity research. This article aims to contribute to this issue by applying insights from new

phenomenology, which is a phenomenological movement from Germany initiated by

philosopher Hermann Schmitz. The findings of new phenomenology suggest that creativity is a

domain-specific ability and three domains have to be differentiated on the uppermost level:

firstly, the domain of corporeal creativity, whose task is to present atmospheres; secondly, the

domain of hermeneutic creativity, which is characterized by dealing with situations; and thirdly,

the domain of analytical creativity, which refers to dealing with constellations. These domains

can be differentiated further still, so that a high consistency of phenomenological approaches

with other findings with regard to the question of the domain-specificity of creativity emerges.

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The Domain-Specificity of Creativity: Insights from New Phenomenology

People accomplish creative performances in extremely different domains (Lubart, 1994;

Runco 2007). It is therefore not surprising that creativity has been studied in such diverse

domains as poetry (Patrick, 1935; Ludwig 1994; Sundararajan, 2002), visual arts (Patrick, 1937;

Mace & Ward, 2002), science (Patrick, 1938; Root-Bernstein, Bernstein, & Garnier 1995;

Rothenberg, 1996; Diakidoy & Constantinou, 2001; Hu, Shi, Han, Wang, & Adey 2010),

architecture (MacKinnon, 1962, 1965; Dudek & Hall, 1992), cinematography (Domino, 1974),

dance (Alter, 1989; Thomson, 2011), music (Alter, 1989; Sawyer, 1992; Woody II, 1999),

morality (Gruber, 1993; Runco, 1993), acting (Nemiro, 1997), comedy (Pritzker & Runco,

1997), photography (Domino & Giulani, 1997), fiction (Doyle, 1998), negotiations (Kurtzberg,

1998), design (Goldschmidt, 1999; Gero & Kannengiesser, 2011) or culinary art (Horng & Hu,

2008, 2009; Stierand, Dörfler, & MacBryde, 2014). In view of these varied and extremely

different fields, there is a discussion in research as to whether creativity is a universal

phenomenon, or whether the skills, aptitudes, traits, propensities and motivations that underlie a

creative performance achievement must be differentiated as to domains. The question whether

creativity is domain specific or domain general (or something in between) is one of the key

issues in creativity research (Baer, 2010).

A common distinction often implicitly or explicitly made is that between the domains of

scientific and artistic creativity. According to MacKinnon (1962), artistic creativity “results in

products that are clearly expressions of the creator’s inner states, his needs, perceptions,

motivations, and the like”, whereas scientific creativity results in a creative product that “is

unrelated to the creator as a person, who in his creative work acts largely as a mediator between

externally defined needs and goals” (both p. 485). A similar distinction is made by Ludwig

http://www.dict.cc/englisch-deutsch/photography.html

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(1998) who contrasted the personal, subjective and meaningfulness focus of artists with the

impersonal, objective and fact-oriented focus of scientists. Another two-dimensional view of

domains can be traced back to Snow (1959), who referred to the humanities and the sciences as

two disparate cultures.

Beyond these two-dimensional conceptions there are theories of domains offering a more

differentiated view. The theory of the eight intelligences by Gardner (1983, 1993, 1999) is

“probably the best known theory of domain differences” (Runco, 2007, p. 406). Gardner

distinguished between verbal-linguistic, logical-mathematical, musical, bodily-kinesthetic,

visual-spatial, interpersonal, intrapersonal and naturalistic domains. Feist (2004) proposed seven

domains of creative thinking: psychology, physics, biology, linguistics, math, art, and music.

Aside from these horizontal approaches, hierarchical models of creative domains have also been

offered (Ludwig, 1998; Baer & Kaufman, 2005; Simonton, 2009).

The classification system of person and environment from Holland (1959, 1973, 1997)

can also be applied to the question of domain differences. Holland differentiated six types of

personal interest expressible in six corresponding occupational domains: Artistic, investigative,

social, enterprising, realistic, and conventional. In contrast to Gardner and Feist, the six domains

of Holland differ significantly in their relevance to creativity, with the artistic domain showing

the most and the conventional domain showing the least relevance to creativity. The

classification system of Holland has been applied to creativity research, for example, by Helson,

Roberts, and Agronick (1995), or Ludwig (1995). Other interest-related theories concerning

domain differences were developed by Strong (1943) and Kuder (1977).

The present article draws from phenomenology to offer a useful perspective on the

domain specificity of creativity. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to explicitly apply

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phenomenology to this issue. The core of the following phenomenological analysis stems from

the work of the phenomenologist and founder of new phenomenology Hermann Schmitz. Before

the ideas of Schmitz are introduced, however, the phenomenological method and its (potential)

relevance to creativity research need to be outlined.

The Domain-Specificity of Creativity in New Phenomenology

The Phenomenological Method

Generally speaking, phenomenology is the study of phenomena. A phenomenon is a state

of affairs whose factuality appears to someone at a specific time to be unchangeable even with an

arbitrary variation of all possible assumptions, and imposes itself on him in such a way that he is

unable to deny its existence seriously. A phenomenon is, for example, felt pain, because it cannot

be denied through the assumption that it does not exist (Schmitz, 1967, 2009; Schmitz, Müllan,

& Slaby, 2011).

Phenomenology represents a qualitative research method by means of which people’s

subjective experience is investigated. Phenomenology is an empirical method, which, like the

scientific/normative method, initially carries out observations and draws conclusion from them.

In this way, theories in the sense of category systems can be acquired that permit a phenomenon

to be named and described. Quantitative research findings can be validated or rejected by means

of phenomenological analysis (Sanders, 1982). For example, laboratory findings according to

which the patient is healthy can be rejected through felt pain. There are already several theories

in phenomenology that provide a vocabulary with which phenomena can be analyzed and set into

relationship with quantitative research findings. Among the most familiar theories are the studies

by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Hermann Schmitz. In

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Germany, ”Schmitz has influenced a new generation of philosophers and is becoming more

frequently cited by English speaking scholars” (Grant, 2013, p. 16).

The phenomenological method is suited in general for researching into the creative

process, because this represents a significant and unique human experience (Bindeman, 1998;

Nelson, 2011) and it is the task of phenomenology to deal with people’s subjective experience:

Phenomenology seeks to make explicit the implicit structure and meaning of human

experiences. It is the search for “essences” that cannot be revealed by ordinary

observation. Phenomenology is the science of essential structures of consciousness or

experience. (Sanders, 1982, p. 354)

The creative process has, as a phenomenon, been described in extremely different

domains, including natural sciences (Mach, 1898; Einstein, 1952; Poincaré, 1970), literature

(Epel, 1993; Piirto, 2005), painting (Van Gogh, 1952; Zervos, 1952) and music (Mozart, 1970;

Tchaikovsky, 1970). In spite of this, to date there have been only a few phenomenological

analyses of the creative process (Bindeman, 1998; Mace & Ward, 2002; Henderson, 2004;

Nelson & Rawlings, 2007, 2009). Bindeman’s study analyzed the creative process described by

creative personalities (e.g., by Poincaré and Picasso) on the basis of Husserl’s (1913/1962)

phenomenological studies. This article differs from Bindeman’s work in two ways. First, the

present article refers to Schmitz (1965, 1966, 1967, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1994, 2005a, 2005b,

2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2013) and Schmitz, Müllan, and Slaby (2011) instead of Husserl.

Second, Bindeman analyzed the different stages of the highly dynamic creative process to

identify principles inherent in the creative process across domains, whereas the present article

seeks to highlight the differences inherent in all stages of the creative process between domains.

These two approaches do therefore rather complement than contradict each other — at least as

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long as a view recognizing both domain-general and domain-specific aspects of creativity is

accepted. The work of Schmitz is especially useful for a phenomenological understanding of the

domain specific nature of creativity.

The Development of New Phenomenology

The German philosopher Hermann Schmitz developed his system of new phenomenology

to regain “a sensibility for the nuanced realities of lived experience” (Schmitz, Müllan, & Slaby,

2011, p. 241). He developed the greater part of his philosophy in a ten-volume, 5,000 page

system of philosophy from 1964 to 1980, but is still publishing (e. g., Schmitz, 2013, 2014). Key

to this system is the felt body (“Leib” in German) as a constitutive element of human experience:

The system offers a systematic phenomenology of the felt body and the various forms of

embodied experience and subsequently draws out several implications of this broad

approach, resulting in phenomenological theories of subjectivity and personhood, of

emotions and feelings, of space and time, of art, of religious and spiritual experience, of

morals and law — to name just the key themes. (Schmitz, Müllan, & Slaby, 2011, p. 242)

Schmitz’s philosophy is practical and application-oriented and has attracted academics

outside philosophy such as sociology, cultural theory, management theory, the arts, architecture,

psychiatry, medicine, or urban planning (Schmitz, Müllan, & Slaby, 2011; Grant, 2013). The

articles from Langewitz (2007, 2009) and Grant are examples of scientific applications in

medicine and urban planning. Since only one of Schmitz’s articles is available in English

(i. e. Schmitz, Müllan, & Slaby, 2011), the majority of this chapter refers to publications that are

only available in German.

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Felt-body, Atmosphere, Situation and Constellation

Before Schmitz’s definition of intelligence is explained, some fundamental concepts have

to be introduced first. These are the concepts felt body, atmosphere, situation and constellation.

In some cases, Schmitz has devoted several books to these concepts, but we hope that we will be

able to describe them briefly.

According to Schmitz (1965, 2009, 2011), the felt body is what people feel of their own

bodies. In contrast to the objectively measurable body, the felt body is always the subjectively

sensed felt body. The felt body is what someone can feel of himself in the area (but not always

within the limits) of his body, as belonging to him, without making use of the five senses,

namely seeing and feeling, and of the perceptive corporeal schema acquired from experience (the

habitual idea of one’s own body). Schmitz illustrated the difference between felt body and

physical body using the example of someone ill with fever who feels physically that his forehead

is hot (“I am hot”), but this feels cool when it is actually touched (“that is cold”). Phenomena of

what is directly felt (corporeal stirrings), which can be assigned neither to a person’s physical

body nor to his psyche, can be objectively described with the concept of the felt body. These

include, for example, tiredness, freshness or hunger. This means by implication that the felt body

does not find a place conceptually within a dualist paradigm, which is why most works by

Schmitz start by criticizing this (e.g., Schmitz, Müllan, & Slaby, 2011).

Closely linked with the concept of the felt body is the concept of the atmosphere, because

atmospheres as spatially poured out emotions in the domain of what is experienced as present,

are felt holistically on the own felt body. On the one hand, atmospheres are objectively present in

the space, but on the other hand impinge on the subjective corporeal condition via so-called

bridging qualities. There are two types of bridging quality: suggestions of motion and synesthetic

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characters. Suggestions of motion are omens of motions, which can emanate from latent as well

as from executed motions. They depict the suggestion of a motion that can be felt on the own felt

body. Examples of suggestions of motion are a glare, the branches of a weeping willow, a

pointed finger that stabs the person pointed at like a dagger, an eye-stinging smell, or the rhythm

of a piece of music. Synesthetic characters are qualities of perception that go beyond that

allocation to individual genres of perception (e.g., colors, temperatures, noise or light). A color is

perceived as bright or dark (light), as cold or warm (temperature). Sounds can be heavy, dense or

hard (mass). Generally, synesthetic characters stand out due to plus and minus qualities (and a

neutral zone between them). For example, plus qualities are bright, warm, fast, loud. Minus

qualities are then correspondingly dark, cold, calm, quiet (Schmitz, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1978,

1994, 2009, 2011).

For Schmitz (1980, 2005a, 2009, 2010b), people are always embedded in situations.

Along with an individual’s personal situation, there are many shared situations (e.g., the common

situation at work, at a party, or when shopping) through which the personal situation acquires a

social background. Schmitz defined situations through three attributes. Firstly, situations are

uniform, that is, they are characterized by coherence in themselves and by external detachment.

Secondly, situations cohere through a meaningfulness that consists of significances.

Significances are state of affairs, programs or problems. A state of affairs indicates that

something is; a program means that something should be or is desired; a problem refers to the

question of whether something is. Thirdly, the meaningfulness of a situation is internally diffuse.

This means that individual significances have to be neither individually countable nor separable

from each other. Through peoples linguistic abilities it is possible for them to explicate and

combine individual state of affairs, programs and problems from the internally diffuse, holistic

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meaningfulness of situations. However, such a combination or interlinking of individual

significances no longer satisfies the definition of a situation, which is why Schmitz referred

instead to a constellation. Situations can be more or less reconstructed and processed through

constellations. Objectification can only take place with the successful explication of individual

significances in constellations. The difference between situations and constellations is similar to

what Snow (1959) referred to as the two cultures or Kauffman (2010) called the schism between

practical life and pure reason.

Situations are mostly permeated with atmospheres that lend them a specific character,

although situations cannot be identified via atmospheres. Constellations cannot be permeated by

atmospheres because they lack the holistic character that is essential for atmospheres (Schmitz,

2005b, 2013).

Intelligence and Creativity

Schmitz (2010a, 2013) defined intelligence as the ability to lead programs to success in

such a way that this success is achieved not through the mere application of given schemata, but

through a new identification adapted to the circumstances. He differentiated three types of

intelligence in the broader sense: corporeal, hermeneutic and analytical intelligence.

Corporeal intelligence is the ability to deal with situations holistically without explicating

individual significances. One example of corporeal intelligence is the driver who has to

recognize the danger of a threatening accident at a glance and to react to the external

circumstances (asphalt, rain, trees, cars) without recognizing them individually. In contrast to

hermeneutic and analytical intelligence, corporeal intelligence operates without speech.

Intelligence in the narrower sense refers to dealing with individual significances and is

divided into hermeneutic and analytical intelligence. Hermeneutic intelligence explicates


individual significances from situations so sparingly that the wholeness of the situation can still

be detectable. There are two types of hermeneutic intelligence: as the adaptation to situations or

as the arrangement of situations. Adapting to situations is characterized by the cadence that

respects situations in their wholeness. This type of hermeneutic intelligence is important in

generally dealing with people, for example in politics or the family. It makes it possible to grasp

which acts and words are suitable in a situation, or where the limits of what is achievable lie. The

arrangement of situations is poetry, which is understood as the skillful economy of speech.

Individual states of affairs, programs or problems are retrieved to carefully form the internally

diffuse meaningfulness of the situation that the wholeness of the situation can shimmer through.

With analytical intelligence, individual significances are explicated and combined from

situations as valid facts. Accordingly, analytical intelligence is the ability to extract individual

significances from situations (explication) and to link them (combination). Whereas hermeneutic

thought is bound to the situation, analytical thought is emancipated from the situation. An

objectifying motion starts that, on the one hand, opens up possibilities of manipulation, but, on

the other hand, is exposed to the danger of the loss of (human) reality.

For Schmitz (2013), intelligence represents a necessary, but not sufficient precondition

for creativity, which represents a common view in research (e.g., Sternberg, 1988; Kaufman,

2002, 2012). This can already be seen in the outlined understanding of intelligence as a new

identification adapted to the circumstances. Because this is constitutive for creativity as well, this

implies that a creative performance is always intelligent. However, an intelligent performance is

not creative until something is understood and can be processed as a whole — because only if we

have the feeling of penetrating something as a whole can we deal with it as if we had found the

decisive word, as if we had somehow discovered the secret and could make what it was about as


a whole visible. An insight of this type is an essential component of the creative process (Wallas,

1926; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995) and productive thought in Gestalt psychology (Wertheimer,

1945).

In the following it will be shown what characterizes corporeal, hermeneutic and

analytical creativity.

Corporeal Creativity

Schmitz (1966, 2013) argued that it is integral to art (i.e. music, architecture, painting,

graphics, sculpture and dance) to embody something that can be felt on one’s own felt body —

similar to what MacKinnon (1962) calls “expressions of the creator's inner states” (p. 485). This

type of creativity is corporeal. It is the result of an encounter of corporeal feeling with

atmospheres. It is the artists felt corporeality that guides and inspires creativity. The work of art

does not acquire its specific character from an intellectual act in the form of an idea, but from the

artist’s specific condition that he feels in his own felt body. While an artist can be guided by an

idea, this does not lend the work of art its artistic quality. Artistic creativity consists of

transferring a stimulus felt in one’s own felt body into the objective form. This stimulus can have

its origin in the felt body itself (which is frequently the case in modern art in particular) or in an

atmosphere that intervenes in the artist’s corporeal feeling via suggestions of motion and

synesthetic characters. The artists drive is a corporeally felt impulse that guides the artist as a

suggestion of motion. While a dancer reveals this impulse directly on his or her body, with the

visual artist the impulse is disclosed in the work. Correspondingly, a work of art also has an

atmospheric effect through suggestions of motion and synesthetic characters (e.g., the

atmosphere of a painting, a sculpture, a piece of music, a church, a dance performance). In sum,

it is the task of art to present atmospheres, and the ability of the artist is his corporeal creativity.


Works of art represent atmospheres without situations. Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata

may be a fitting atmosphere for a moonlight situation, but it cannot be said that the sonata

represented primarily a situation of moonlight, even if Rellstab, who gave the sonata its name,

was possibly of this opinion (Schmitz, 2013). Because works of art do not represent situations,

they can be integrated very well atmospherically into existing situations, for example as a

painting in the personal living situation or as an atmospheric accompaniment to a situation

shown in a film.

Hermeneutic Creativity

According to Schmitz (2010a, 2013), hermeneutic creativity is possible in the two forms

referred to as adapting to and as arranging situations. Creativity in adapting to situations is

revealed in the ability to grasp a situation in its entirety and to adapt to it. Hermeneutic creativity

permits skilful dealing in a negotiation situation, if the negotiator knows exactly when the right

time has come to put forward demands, when it is better for him to concede, when a change

occurs, or what silence means. This includes dealing skillfully with the atmospheres of a

situation.

Schmitz (2010a) illustrated the sparing arrangement of situations in poetry by means of

Goethe’s lines “Above all summits/Is rest”, in which it is exactly the sparing word “is” that lets

the meaningfulness of the situation shine through and makes it become alive (a comprehensive

discussion of the word “is” in this poem can be found in Heidegger, 1981/1998). A hermeneutic

sparingness of this kind is also represented by the principle of the Japanese haiku, but it can also

be found in epic and dramatic poetry. Whereas the artist presents atmospheres (without speech),

it is the task of poetry to represent situations by carefully explicating them (via speech) so that

they are made accessible in their entirety.


Naturally, atmospheres also play an important part in adapting to situations and for the

poet, because situations are not only permeated by atmospheres, but the atmospheres lend the

situations a specific character, similar to what Standley (2008) called “the emotional context of

the situation” (p. 443). In the outlined negotiation situation, the intonation, facial expressions or

gesticulations both of the negotiation partners and one’s own are important for grasping and

dealing with the situation. For the poet, suggestions of motion and synesthetic characters are a

favorite stylistic device for accentuating a described situation atmospherically. For example, in

his novel Hannibal Harris (1999) wrote:

Starling felt pierced and lonesome in this goat-smelling surveillance van crowded with

men. Chaps, Brut, Old Spice, sweat and leather. She felt some fear, and it tasted like a

penny under her tongue. (p. 8)

An atmosphere (or an emotion) can trigger in the poet an impulse to write, but in the end

the inspiration comes from language and its implications (Piirto, 2005), which is why poets are

not corporeally creative.

Analytical Creativity

Analytical creativity means on the one hand seeing through the entirety of a situation so

that the situation is reduced to its essence by means of explication of individual significances

and, on the other hand, combining the individual significances so skillfully with one another into

constellations that the situation can be brought under control in this way. It is analytical

creativity that enables people to plan something, or to conjure up constellations of possibilities

according to which situations can be reshaped in certain circumstances. Analytical creativity

enables objective correlations to be gained from subjective situations. While the subjective


situation has a living character through its totality and internally diffuse structure, objective

constellations are lifeless (Schmitz, 2005a, 2010a). This becomes clear for example with the

physical sciences, about which Feist (2005) wrote:

Physical knowledge concerns the inanimate world of physical objects (including tools);

their movement, positioning, and causal relations in space; and their inner workings

(machines). (p. 124)

Because there are many ways for explicating and combining individual significances

from situations, it is possible analogously that the significances that are explicated independently

of each other from different points of view are contradictory (e. g, Euclidian geometry and Non-

Euclidian geometry). This can be understood as the philosophical equivalent to Gödel's (1931)

incompleteness theorems in mathematics, according to which it is impossible to find a complete

and consistent constellation of axioms that can be applied to the whole of mathematics. With

regard to these theorems, a creative mathematician is characterized by finding a new

constellation of axioms that have the greatest possible impact within mathematics.

A mathematician or scientist can also become hermeneutically creative, for example by

trying to represent a whole area of science (i.e. a network of constellations) as a situation. One

famous example is Sherrington’s (1942) description of the functioning of the brain:

The brain is an enchanted loom where millions of flashing shuttles weave a dissolving

pattern. (p. 178)

With Torrance (1988) and his artistic definitions of creativity, approaches can be found to

define the concept of creativity not analytically but hermeneutically (e.g., “creativity is wanting

to know”, p. 49, “creativity is looking twice” or “creativity is listening for smells”, both p. 50).

Torrance remarked that these are particularly suitable for generating hypotheses, or acquiring


theories. The reason for this is that these artistic definitions represent internally diffuse situations

(in contrast perhaps to the constellations of the definition on which this paper is based), from

which individual significances can be explicated and combined in different ways.

Phenomenological Outcome

In summary it can be stated that corporeal creativity deals with atmospheres, hermeneutic

creativity with situations and analytical creativity with constellations. These findings support a

domain-specific point of view, whereby the three types of creativity differ primarily in the

underlying structure of the creative processes (i.e. corporeal, hermeneutic, analytic processes)

and not — as in most studies — with regard to the domains to which the creative products can be

assigned (e.g., music, poetry, math). In spite of this, on an abstract level the three types of

creativity can (in most cases) also be applied to the description of creative products and creative

persons. With creative products, for example, a piece of music can be spoken of as atmosphere, a

poem as a situation and Euclidian geometry as a constellation of axioms. With regard to persons,

we can speak of corporeal, hermeneutic and analytical abilities. These can also be interpreted as

different cognitive styles, understood as a person’s stable and preferred cognitive strategy for

acquiring, applying and maintaining knowledge and experiences for the solution of a problem

(Miron-Spektor, Erez, & Naveh, 2011). Some people prefer to orient themselves to individual

facts and their combination, others rely preferably on the holistic impression that they have of a

situation.

Discussion

In the first place, the theoretical foundation of creativity reveals that creativity is not

(exclusively) domain-general and that three domains have to be differentiated on the uppermost

level: corporeal, hermeneutic and analytical creativity. These three domains are characterized by


a fundamental difference between creative processes and underlying abilities. Starting from this,

and in descending hierarchical order, further sub-domains can be differentiated. This idea of a

hierarchy is consistent with the work of Ludwig (1998), Baer and Kaufman (2005), Simonton

(2009), and others. It is also consistent with the empirical findings of Kaufman and Baer (2004),

and Rawlings and Locarnini (2007), whose explorative factor analyses resulted in three

superordinate factors: Creativity in empathy/communication (interpersonal relationships, solving

personal problems, writing), “hands on” creativity (art, crafts, bodily/physical), and math/science

creativity (math, science). The identified domain-specificity of creativity does not rule out that

there are domain-general factors that are necessary for creativity (e.g., intelligence, motivation,

environment). However, it rules out that there are domain-general factors that are equally

sufficient for corporeal, hermeneutic and analytical creativity.

Importantly, the theory of domains shown here provides a vocabulary for discussing

ascertained differences in creativity research. For example, it can be explained why there are

cases in science in which two or more scientists are able to make the same discoveries

independently of each other (so-called multiples, e.g., the invention of the telephone by Gray and

Bell), but two musicians will never compose the same symphony (Simonton, 1988, 1999).

Scientists work in more or less the same network of constellations and thus in principle can also

deduce in the same way in this network. In contrast, a musician always expresses his own unique

corporeal impulses. In addition, the theory permits differentiation within a domain. Writing,

understanding and analyzing poetry are three abilities of one domain: the linguistic domain

(Sternberg, 2005). However, they differ in that the author of a poem arranges situations, whereas

the experienced reader is able to adapt to these, and the critic explicates individual significances

as valid facts analytically.


The theory provided also allows for the rejection of certain empirical findings which are

in conflict with the presented scheme. This is the case, for example, with culinary art being

assigned to the scientific factor in the study of Carson, Peterson, and Higgins (2005). According

to the phenomenological findings, culinary creativity is about the presentation of atmospheres (as

anyone can visualize with a good wine, whose quality is measured both with synesthetic

characters such as soft or heavy taste and also with suggestions of motion, such as the tingling or

biting aroma) and is to be assigned to corporeal creativity. In contrast, with architecture it is

plausible that it could not be assigned unambiguously to any factor in the same study, because in

architecture presenting atmospheres is just as relevant as knowledge of the constellations of

engineering sciences (MacKinnon, 1962).

Naturally, certain limitations arise with regard to the three identified domains. To begin

with, they cannot always be discretely separated from each other, but flow into each other. In this

spectrum, the domain writing, for example, cannot be located clearly: while Japanese haikus or

short poems come closest to the ideal of hermeneutic creativity, texts from the nonfiction domain

are oriented more strongly to individual facts and constellations of facts, which is why they have

to be assigned in part to the domain of analytical creativity. Besides, it is not clear how far

adapting to and arranging situations involve two different abilities. Accordingly, many poets can

focus just on their work and compose own situations, if they withdraw from the situations in

which they are personally involved and shut themselves off from them (Perry, 2005). This retreat

from situations can be (although need not be) understood as the opposite of adapting to them, so

that along with the described commonality a certain diversity of abilities appears plausible. The


difference between turning inward to write fiction and turning outward to write about reality

made by Kohányi (2005) may also be considered in this context.

In general, limitations apply that can be found in other works as well (e.g., Baer, 2010).

Accordingly, domain-specificity does not imply that people are, or can only be, creative in one

domain. It is naturally possible that a person can be both corporeally and analytically (or

hermeneutically) creative. In addition, corporeal creativity does not mean that a high level of

creativity in the domain of painting automatically accompanies a level of creativity in other

corporeal domains (e.g., music). The reason for this is that, among other things, creativity usually

requires a substantial knowledge base, but only a few people have such a base in different

domains, or have the time to acquire one (Hayes, 1989; Amabile, 1996; Sternberg, 2005; Baer,

2010).

We believe that the strength of the presented model lies in its integrative nature. It is, for

example, not contradictory to Gardner’s (1983, 1993, 1999) approach. Instead, Gardner’s

domains of intelligence can be assigned to corporeal creativity (i. e. musical, bodily-kinesthetic,

and visual-spatial domains), hermeneutic creativity (i. e. verbal-linguistic, interpersonal, and

intrapersonal domains), and analytical creativity (i. e. logical-mathematical and naturalistic

domains). But, while the list of domains considered by Gardner may be extended or changed

over time, the structure presented here reflects basal characteristics of human subjective

experience. This does not mean, however, that the structure demonstrated has to coincide with

people’s belief about creativity or be experienced consciously. Kaufman and Baer’s statement

(2004) applies here as well:

Peoples beliefs about creativity may be (and probably are) different than the underlying

structure of creativity. (p. 151)


The structure of subjective experience is not identical with the subjectively experienced

structure. Instead, the structure of subjective experience is, in the phenomenological sense, what

proves to be immutable in any variation of all possible subjectively experienced structures.


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