THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH

DIVIDE IN MALI: THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE

TARGI AND BAMAKO IN A POST-COLONIAL

CONTEXT

SONIA JAGTIANI INTL 4003-02

DR. WILLIAM ROWE

Sonia Jagtiani Intl 4003-02 Dr. William Rowe Abstract: The Changing Nature of the North-South Divide in Mali: the Divisions between the Targi and Bamako in a Post-Colonial Context Northern Mali is currently in crisis. The North consists of desert and semi-desert areas in the Sahara/Sahel area. The insurgency includes national and Islamist groups; the Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad is a group made up of Tuareg rebels fighting for independence of Azawad, the northern part of Mali, from the central government located in the south in Bamako. Mali faced a coup d’état in March of 2012, which resulted in Azawad being declared as an independent state. The situation escalated as Islamist groups joined the fight that once was a nationalistic fight for independence, as the Tuareg believe they have been marginalized by the central government. This paper will discuss the political situation of Mali in relation to modernization theory and dependency theory to properly illustrate how Mali developed as a modern state after independence from France. Thus core-periphery model as well as proponents of dependency theory and Gunnar Myrdal’s cumulative causation theory will also be used to illustrate Mali’s economic development and dependency to France. Furthermore, Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism will be used to illustrate how the Malian state failed in creating a harmonious sense of unity amongst the various identities present. Hence, the Tuareg group felt marginalized and the north is still underdeveloped. Additionally, how has a nationalistic rebel movement transitioned into a global security crisis that has required an intervention by France. Keywords: Mali, Dependency theory, Neocolonialism, France, Targi

The Changing Nature of the North-South Divide in Mali: the Divisions between the Targi and Bamako in a Post-Colonial Context

The war in Mali broke out for France on January 11, 2013 when they joined the

offensive against several disunited rebel groups (Geneste and Guibert 2013, 1) . The fighting

started by the Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad,1 an ethnically Targi based

military and political organization. They are fighting for independence and autonomy due to

claims of marginalization from the central government. The crisis, once nationalistic in tone,

has evolved into jihadist movements seeking to establish a harsh form of Sharia2. A military

coup resulted, expressing discontent over the central government’s role or rather lack of a

role in properly combatting northern uprisings, which then allowed MNLA and Islamic

groups to gain more territory, causing MNLA to declare the independence of the north from

the rest of Mali. This evolving crisis in Mali reflects “the fragility of governance in the

region, the lack of economic development—especially in northern Mali, the absence of

meaningful opportunities for people to engage with their governments and the widespread

desperation that exits in an unforgiving, arid region with chronic food insecurity” (Carson

2012, 1).

The March 2012 coup and subsequent loss of Northern Mali to Islamic extremists

clearly demonstrates “how terrorists prey upon fragile states. Poor governance, weak

democratic institutions and a lack of development and economic opportunity create fertile

ground for terrorism and instability” (Carson 2012, 1).

The Malian military, unable to combat the growing strength of the various rebel

groups, requested French military support. Hence, this paper will discuss the reasons of

France’s intervention in relation to its colonial past in Mali. The Tuareg ethnic communities

1 National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) 2 Islamic Law 3 The Northern portion of Mali 2 Islamic Law

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have a long history of political, economic and social marginalization, which will be discussed

in relation to various frameworks in order to understand the context of the Mali conflict.

Current Context

On April 6, 2012, the MNLA declared independence from Mali for the territories it

had gained in its insurgency against the central government’s army. Neither Mali nor the

international community recognized the political sovereignty of Azawad3 (“Mali Timeline”

2013, 23). About a week before, the military leader, Captain Amadou Sanogo, seized control

of the capital of Mali, Bamako, and cited the main reason for his coup d’état as the “Malian

government’s inability to defend against the Tuareg rebellion” (“Rebels Take Control of

Northern Mali” 2012, 62).

This resulted in the Economic Community of West African States4 to call for a return

to constitutional order and threatened sanctions. This took place from March 29 to April 2,

which gave the insurgency groups an opportunity to take advantage of the power vacuum in

Bamako and declare independence. The coup was in response to the growing strength of the

renewed Tuareg insurgency; they claim that the central government has not done enough in

countering this insurgency and has “failed to address troops’ grievances” (“Mali’s Unfolding

Coup” 2012, 40).

The MNLA along with Islamist groups including Ansar ud-Din5, a militant Islamist

group and offshoot of MNLA; Jamāʿat at-tawḥīd wal-jihād fī gharb ʾafrīqqīyā6; and Tanẓīm

al-Qā‘idah fī Bilād al-Maghrib al-Islāmī7 joined forces to fight against the Malian military.

Nevertheless, tensions arose; the MNLA demanded independence from the central Malian

government for nationalistic reasons, whereas the other Islamist groups, including Ansar ud-

3 The Northern portion of Mali 4 ECOWAS5The spelling, Ansar Dine, is also commonly used. 6 Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJAO) or Movement for Divine Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) 7 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

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Din and AQIM sought to establish Sharia. There is no unity among the various national and

Islamist based groups. They have aligned and separated from one another several times

throughout the insurgency. MNLA, in fact, is comprised of members from the Tuareg ethnic

group and have faced a history of struggle from the central government since Mali gained

independence from France in 1960 (Keenan 2013, 15-16).

Ansar ud-Din split from MNLA and is primarily composed of Targi, as well, but they

are more than a nationalistic group—they want to establish Sharia. Similarly the MUJAO and

AQIM are akin to MNLA, though all the Islamist groups are not always unified either. The

clear divisions between the Islamist groups and the more secular, MNLA, were demonstrated

when the Islamist militants ascended over the secular groups in controlling Timbuktu,

destroying Sufi tombs in a fifteenth century mosque (Mark 2012, 1; Roy 2013, 1).

As the northern situation escalated, the central government lost more and more land to

the national and Islamist groups. This resulted in Mali’s interim government calling upon

France for military aid against the northern conflict (Roche 2013, 1). The geography of the

land is desert or semi-desert areas where knowledge of the terrain is key. The Malian

government is aware of its limitations, which are both military and geographic (“Mali:

Tuareg Rebel Group Seizes Border Town” 2012, 30). This influx in terrorist activity poses an

increased global security threat since this area is in danger of becoming a breeding ground for

terrorist and black market-type activities such as trans-Saharan smuggling, drug

transportation, and spread of jihadist terrorism (Heisbourg 2013, 9). This crisis is at risk of

having a spillover effect as the Tuareg population exceeds Malian borders into areas

including the south of Algeria, Niger, and north of Burkina Faso where sizeable amount of

Targi reside (Ferhavi 2013, 1; “In Niger, Intervention Likely in Potential Tuareg Rebellion”

2012, 55). This is a destabilizing factor for the rest of West Africa, including Niger where

France’s main source of uranium for its nuclear industry comes from. Furthermore, Nigeria

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already faces a growing Islamist threat, Boko Haram. The president, Goodluck Jonathan, has

said, “‘We can no longer surrender any part of the globe to extremism” (“Tran 2013, 1).

France’s motives for the Mali intervention may be dubious. Though it seems that

“Malians seem happy” with France’s current role in Mali and do not view the French as

neocolonialist (“Jihad in the Sahara: The Crisis in Mali and Algeria” 2013, 49). Moreover,

Andre Lewin claims that France’s thinking has always been “universally orientated and its

international action undertaken accordingly” (Lewin 2006, 398). Nevertheless, the sub-

Saharan and Sahel regions have vast mineral wealth and oil, which can significantly

influence the type of role France plays for its national and commercial interests in its prior

colonies. This all demonstrates the geopolitical significance Mali has on the international

community as it serves as a link among Africa’s critical regions of the Maghreb, Sahel,

Sahara, and the Gulf of Guinea (Ferhavi 2013, 1).

Political Context

Background

Mali is a West African landlocked country with a population consisting of various

sub-Saharan ethnic groups sharing similar historical, cultural and religious traditions.

Historically, Mali has held good interethnic relations because of increased mobility on the

Niger River and across the vast savannahs. It must be noted that exceptions exist within the

Tuareg and Maur8 ethnic groups who are desert nomads related to the North African Berber

populations. Approximately sixty-five percent of Mali’s land area is considered to be desert

or semi-desert, except the fertile Niger River basin in the south and east (Benjaminsen 2008,

826; “Mali Profile” 2013, 1). The northern portion of Mali is a part of the vast Saharan

desert, which is characterized by “extreme temperatures, rough terrain, and long distances

between towns and cities;” because of this, the north has experienced “minimum government

8Also known as Moors or Arabs

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presence or formal control” (“Mali: Tuareg Rebel Group Seizes Border Town” 2012, 30). By

contrast, most of the country’s government facilities, population centers, and economic hubs

are focused in the south, a region known as the Sahel. These striking disparities between the

two regions are incredibly important in the current Malian crisis; they are the reasons for the

MNLA’s nationalistic cause.

Theoretical context

Theorists of the modernization theory study political and economic development in

the developing world. Despite their differences, they share a number of underlying

assumptions and perspectives. They believe that developing nations’ development would

follow a progression of political and economic modernization parallel to the path already

traveled by developed countries. So, developing nations have to develop modern cultural

values and create modern political and economic institutions—essentially transforming their

systems from a traditional society to mass-consumption. Sociologists like Max Weber and

Talcott Parsons saw these traditional values as being irrational, outdated, and unscientific and

preferred humans to evaluate each other based on universalistic standards than their caste,

class, or ethnic origins. The transition to modernization was to be accomplished primarily

through education, urbanization, and spread of mass media while also creating more

specialized and complex political and economic institutions to complement these cultural

changes. It was argued as these cultural and institutional changes progressed, a modernizing

society would be able to establish the basis for a more stable, effective, and responsive

political system. The theory’s proponents generally anticipated achieving simultaneous

progress through economic growth, greater equality, democracy, political stability, and

greater national autonomy relatively smoothly, but economic growth has proved that it would

neither guarantee democracy, stability, equality, nor autonomy (Mokeba 2012, 7-9).

Nevertheless, it is clear that

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economic development substantially improves a nation’s democratic prospects; however, the full magnitude of the effect depends on the location of the nation in the world system. As the nation moves from the core, to the semiperphery, to the periphery, the effect diminishes. Even in the periphery, however, the effect remains statistically and substantively significant. Thus, around the world, economic development works to foster democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, 907).

The very process of political, social, and economic modernization has frequently

brought about political instability and violence; it has caused hostile class conflicts, ethnic

conflicts, military coups, and political repressions resulting in the fall of democratic

institutions, which will be demonstrated through the case study of Mali.

Additionally, this theory recognized the complicated processes involved in

development and was considered advanced for its time, but it demonstrated ethnocentrism

and the belief that western values were always superior. It also coined modernization as a

linear process; therefore, there was no chance of reverting back. This is false, as it has been

shown in the past and shows the risks Mali faces in its future, in particular with its current

conflict (Mokeba 2012, 7-9). These components of the theory are applicable in relation to the

way development has been pursued and the situation that has materialized in Mali since its

independence.

State building in Mali

The Malian territory has been divided into political formations of various sizes,

ranging from independent villages to kingdoms. Political power traditionally rested with

aristocratic dynasties; nevertheless, this did not entail the aristocratic class held a monopoly

on power since multiple instances existed in which people of lower social status achieved

positions with various degrees of prominence. Moreover, the traditional social structure

“favoured collective leadership and decision-making in the political sphere,” which has

played a strong role in the history of Malian politics (Martin 1976, 27). Mali has been home

to three ancient African empires—the Ghana, Malinke and Sonhai—that occupied the West

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African savanna at separate times. These empires controlled Saharan trade and were in

contact with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern centers of civilization (Kolstee 2006, 3;

“Mali Profile” 2013, 1-2).

French military penetration of this region began around 1880, which became known

as Soudan Français9 and was formally established as a colony in 1895 (Coleman 2012, 8;

Benjaminsen 2008, 828). French dominance was strenuously resisted until 1898 when the

Malinke warrior, Samory Toure, was defeated after seven years of war; however, this does

not mean resistance altogether dissipated. The French tried to rule indirectly; nevertheless,

they primarily undermined traditional authorities and governed through appointed chiefs, and

it was rather highly centralized.

As the old aristocracy attempted to retain its power in rural areas, economic and social

development was focused in cities and thus neglected in rural areas (Martin 1976, 28). This

urban development was concentrated in the south and included the expansion of a monetary

economy and the development of transportation and urbanization, favoring the merchant and

developing bureaucratic class. Trade was also able to substantially develop, which allowed

merchants who had been traditionally marginalized, to have a stronger voice in the political

struggle for independence (Martin 1976, 28). Most aristocratic families, the traditional elites,

were reluctant to send their children to French schools, resulting in people from lower social

statuses to attend these schools and therefore came to be the only educated ones and

“acquired a near-monopoly of administrative and teaching skills,” which resulted in an

emergent bureaucratic class that was critical in the struggle for independence (Martin 1976,

28). This dichotomy would continue to play a major role in Malian politics.

9French Sudan

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The aristocracy, bureaucracy, and merchants were pivotal in the political quest for

independence. The aristocracy joined the Parti soudanais progressiste,10 which was led by

traditional chiefs; the PSP was primarily a conservative and traditionalist party that garnered

the support of the French colonial administration since the party sought a slow transition to

independence in order to preserve the influence of traditional elites. The new bureaucratic

class that was literate, urbanized and westernized led the more radical Union Soudanaise-

Rassemblement Démocratique Africain,11 which was joined, although reluctantly, by the

merchants who were “islamized, traditionalist and illiterate” (Martin 1976, 28). However

reluctant, they “naturally identified with the bureaucrats as people of comparable social

origins;” furthermore, they hoped this would get rid of French business competition (Martin

1976, 28). Similarly the peasants supported the US-RDA since they were progressively

becoming exploited by the French bourgeoisie by policies such as forced labor, forced

conscription and forced taxation. This led the peasants to view the US-RDA “as liberator[s]

of the oppressed class from the colonial yoke” (Martin 1976, 45). Hence Martin makes the

conclusion that:

this social basis helps explain two of the most characteristic features of the US-RDA: its equalitarian outlook and constant opposition to traditional forces; and its early plea for immediate self-government, which, of course the bureaucratic class alone could assure (Martin 1976, 29).

This is a prominent feature that characterizes political parties of Mali even today—a constant

apprehension to the traditional classes.

In 1958, Soudan Français became a member of the French community12 and

possessed complete internal autonomy (Coleman 2012, 8). In January 1959, Soudan

Français joined Senegal to form the Mali federation, which became fully independent within

the French community on June 20, 1960. However, the federation collapsed two months

10Progressive Sudanese Party (PSP) 11Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally (US-RDA) 12Also known as the Franc Zone

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after, and on September 22, 1960, the republic of Mali was proclaimed, leading to the

subsequent withdrawal from the French community in 1962 (Coleman 2012, 8; “Mali

Profile” 2013, 2). It is incredibly important to note that in sub-Saharan Africa, there is “no

memory of widespread pre-colonial unity” (Good 1964, 634).

Pre-colonial political life was decentralized. Hence, the political communities created

during the colonial era were suspect for illegitimacy since a unified Mali had never existed

prior to colonialism (Good 1964, 635). Therefore, the road to developing and modernizing

the political, economic, and social sectors of Mali would be an arduous one.

Post-colonial Political Society

After independence, Mali’s first president, Modibo Keïta of the US-RDA,

immediately severed ties with France and developed a strong military and economic

relationship with the USSR—he “moved quickly after independence to declare a single-party

state and to pursue a socialist policy based on extensive nationalization,” which also included

policies of industrialization and agricultural modernization (Kolstee 2006, 4; Coleman 2012,

8; Benjaminsen 2008, 828). These socialist policies, Martin argues, were an apparent failure

in Mali and have a two-prong reasoning. First, being the economic difficulties “inherent in

the natural, geographical conditions of Mali and compounded by the additional stresses of

socialist austerity loom large in the explanation of the failure of socialism in Mali;” however,

he expands upon this claim and explains it through a class analysis of which he depicts

Mali’s socialist experiment as “an attempt by the bureaucratic class to build an economic

basis for itself, in economic opposition to the merchant class and in political opposition to the

traditional aristocracy using socialism as a convenient ideological smoke-screen” (Martin

1976, 26).

Mali’s policies were at no point “genuinely socialist” at either the economic, political

or social levels, and rather it was the “aborted attempt of a segment of the bureaucratic class

Jagtiani 10

to monopolize the political and economic powers for its exclusive benefit” (Martin 1976, 46).

The government “never seriously encouraged any active popular participation that would

have been conducive to an elaborate political consciousness on the part of the peasantry,”

which resulted in the fundamental interests of the peasantry to be ignored (Martin 1976, 45).

Thus Keita’s regime gradually managed to alienate important sectors of the population,

including the already mentioned peasants, army, and merchants. Despite the failures of these

policies on multiple levels, economic and social achievements were made, including the

creation of an independent economy, the formation of African cadres, and the development of

a national culture; however, the overall success of these policies are arguable, which will be

further explained throughout this analysis (Martin 1976, 45; De Jorio 2003, 830).

Political unrest and economic inflation that developed because of ties to communist

Russia resulted in the decision to rejoin the French Community in 1967 and modify some

economic programs. Though the economy did not recover and a bloodless military coup

d’état of Keïta’s regime was staged on November 19, 1968, which received cautiously broad

popular support, even if it meant military rule (Coleman 2012, 8; Kolstee 2006, 4; De Jorio

2003, 830). Lieutenant Moussa Traoré led the coup and then became head of state. He led the

fourteen-member Comité militaire de libération nationale party13 that was in charge of the

country’s politics (“Mali Timeline” 2013, 9). The military leaders renounced socialism and

attempted to pursue economic reforms but “for several years faced debilitating internal

political struggles and the disastrous Sahelian drought” (Coleman 2012, 9). Soon after,

Traoré established a new constitution—approved in 1974—that created Mali’s second one-

party state with the creation of the Union démocratique du peuple malien14 party, which was

designed to eventually transition Mali to civilian rule (“Mali Profile” 2013, 9; De Jorio 2003,

830). This government did not address basic issues facing northerners, such as frustration

13Military Committee for National Liberation party (CMLN)14UDPM

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over traditional land and water use rights. Traoré had installed a highly centralized and

repressive military regime that “appeared more interested in maintaining its control than

promoting development,” which significantly contributed to the Tuareg rebellion of the

1990s since any concession to the Tuareg would result in weakening Traoré’s one party

system (Fay 1995, 27; Lode 2003, 57).

Transitioning to a Multi-party Democracy

Demands for multiparty democracy was increasing in Mali, as in other African

countries. In early 1991, intense student-led antigovernment rioting broke out, which

received wide support from the population including government workers, civil unions, and

others (“Mali Profile” 2013, 2). When the army was ordered to fire directly on the people, a

number of soldiers sided with the opposition forces. With the government losing control even

more, a military coup under the leadership of Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré resulted,

which put an end to Traoré’s era. Touré helped convene competitive elections and in May of

1992, the Alliance pour la démocratie en Mali-parti pan-Africain pour la liberté, la solidarité

et la justice’s15 candidate Alpha Omar Konaré was voted into the national presidency with a

mandate for political and economic change (De Jorio 2003, 830; Bratton, Coulibaly and

Machado 2002, 198). This government had achieved a mixed record over its policies. Its

major political achievement was a peace agreement with guerrilla forces of the semi-nomadic

Touareg peoples of Mali’s northern zone that was not even effective, proven by the current

crisis (Bratton, Coulibaly and Machado 2002, 198). Konaré served his second and final term

in office on June 2002. During his time in office, important steps were taken to establish

democracy in local constituencies through decentralization (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 113).

Because of the ADEMA party, Mali now enjoys opportunities to express their political

opinions and are able to create political groups of their liking. Myriad newspapers and radio

15Alliance for Democracy in Mali-Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice (ADEMA)

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stations have emerged since 1991 (De Jorio 2003, 831). It was argued that ADEMA is

hegemonic over all other political parties; opposition forces have accused “ADEMA of

having transformed itself into a party state” (De Jorio 2003, 831). Furthermore, they claim

that

ADEMA’s rule has led to a reemergence of a generalized state of confusion between state and party infrastructures, fostered large-scale corruption, and hampered the development of viable political alternatives. In other words, it would appear that although different parties can freely voice their dissenting opinions, their proposals are often not given sufficient consideration in the government’s decision-making process (De Jorio 2003, 831).

After Konoré’s last term, Touré returned to office as Mali’s newly elected president and

defeated the candidate of the ADEMA party.

Touré’s time in office was marked by “‘an exceptional consensual political

environment’ in which all parties were asked to take part in ‘the management of state

affairs’” (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 114). Moreover, the politics of consensus was made

possible because of Touré’s personality and reputation and was legitimized through

references to Malian history. Nonetheless, this resulted in a “‘total absence of opposition on

the national political scene’” (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 114).

This kind of government began to show the imperfections of a consensus government

in the 2007 elections. Two loosely constituted alliances stood against one another, which

resulted in Touré’s victory. Voter turnout was incredibly low, with only about thirty-six

percent of registered voters actually voting (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 115).

Hence, despite Mali being presented as a successful democratic example, it can be

argued that “political debate in Mali has been constrained by the lack of both political

alternatives and opposition politics,” which suggests that “the government lacked

accountability due to ‘abuses of power’ that undermined support for the democratic order and

led to widespread dissatisfaction” (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 115). Therefore, public

opinion seemed more in favor of democracy but not of its recent performance in Mali, which

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has been described as “a combination of kleptocracy and fecklessness in the face of

deteriorating regional security” (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 115; Heisbourg 2013, 9).

Mali’s weak political and economic institutions have been significant impediments to

Mali’s developmental woes. These institutions have been unable to transform society

effectively through education, urbanization, spread of mass media and other cultural changes,

which are all needed to achieve modernization in the political, economic, and social spheres.

The attempts that have been made in development has resulted in political and social

instability in Mali, demonstrated by the declared annexation of Azawad and the subsequent

2012 coup d’état, resulting in a power vacuum in the capital, Bamako. Moreover, as the

critiques of modernization theory have claimed, this theory is often demonstrated through the

belief that western values are superior—through the monetary aid of France and other

western actors in a post-colonial context, western ideals of modernization have been

purported to be the only way to reach development. Nevertheless, as this paper has and will

continue to demonstrate, a one-size-fits-all model cannot be effective in reaching an equitable

level of development in political, economic, and social sectors.

Dependency to the Developed World

Dependency theory posits that development of any political system is largely related to

the way that system is tied to the international economy. Dependency theorists view Western

colonialism and economic imperialism as sustaining the unequal disadvantageous

relationship developing countries have with developed countries. In other words, developing

countries are deeply tied to western countries, so their chances of political development are

deeply hampered since developed countries will continue to exploit raw materials and other

services offered by the developing world (Mokeba 2012, 24-26).

Dependency theory is tied to the World Systems theory that describes the world in

three different structures: the Core, Semi-Periphery, and Periphery. Thus, economic

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dependence of developing countries (semi-periphery and periphery) has brought about

political dependence on the core (Kim 2013, 13-15). Developed nations tend to maintain

political systems that benefit the powerful few at the expense of the many. Two contradictory

views are taken on dependency theory: Andre Gunder Frank suggests that developing

countries are stuck in underdevelopment because of this; nonetheless, another dependency

theorist, F.H. Cardosa, believes that it is possible to develop with dependency on the outside

world (Mokeba 2012, 25-30).

Dependency theory is also associated with neocolonialism. The anticolonial leader

and first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkruma defined neocolonialism as “modern attempts to

perpetuate colonialism while at the same time talking about ‘freedom’’’ (qtd. in Watts 2009,

360). He formulated it as the ‘last stage’ of imperialism since it emerged in the context of the

Cold War and the deepening militancy of ex-colonial territories. The typical form of

colonialism had evolved to neocolonialism in which exploitation was perpetuated through

“invisible modalities,” economically, ideologically, politically and culturally (Watts 2009,

360). For Nkrumah, neocolonialism was achieved through new forms of corporate and

especially financial forms of capital, by a psychological dependency among Third World

elites” to the hegemonic forces of the former colonial states (Watts 2009, 360).

Context

Mali is among the poorest nations of the world in terms of income and human

development indicators. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s16

Human Development Index17 in 2002, Mali was considered to be the fourth most

disadvantaged country. In 2011, it ranked one hundred seventy-fifth out of one hundred

eighty-seven countries (Heisbourg 2013, 7; Simonsson 2005, 2). Mali is framed by artificial

colonial-era boundaries that has increased instability among various ethnic groups—most

16 UNDP 17 HDI

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notably the Tuareg. Additionally, the country is lacking in everything but agriculture and

pastoral resources. Two-thirds of Mali is desert and dry in the north and the rest is savannah

and riverine wetland in the south; the Niger River separates the two areas and forms the hub

of Mali with most of its economic activity being concentrated there. Their main exports are

cotton, gold and, livestock; however, these exports are significantly vulnerable to the market

and climatic fluctuations, which has left sixty-four percent of the country living in penury

(Heisbourg 2013, 7; Kolstee 2006, 3; Martin et al. 2002, 1).

Mali has high-income inequality—the richest ten percent of residents have about

fifty-six percent of income and wealth (Martin et al. 2002, 88). About seventy-five percent of

Malians live in rural areas and seventy-five of Mali’s four million economically active

workers are subsistence farmers. Eighty percent of Mali’s economy comes from agriculture

and fishing – leaving Mali dependent on foreign aid, which it has received in particularly

substantial amounts since its transition to multi-party democracy (Kolstee 2006, 3).

Prior to the 2012 coup, Mali had widely been regarded as a “stable and successful

low-income democracy” to the international community since the coup of 1991 that

established a peaceful transition to multiparty democracy from the one-party system since its

independence (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 113; “Mali Profile” 2013, 2). A 2007 Country

Strategy paper by the World Bank argued the strength of Malian democracy and referred to it

as “‘one of the most politically and socially stable countries in Africa’” though it mentioned

once of a “‘recurring crisis in the northern region of Kidal’” but downplayed its importance

and did not even mention the word ‘Tuareg’ throughout the entire report (van de Walle 2012,

2).

The Context of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid consists of any kind of voluntary assistance done in terms of economic or

financial terms; it is arguably given for various reasons including economic development,

Jagtiani 16

political development, or ideological motives (Handelman 2011, 287). Critiques are often

made about the effectiveness of foreign aid, and according to a World Bank report in 2006, it

stated that an “estimated half of the funds donated towards health programs in sub-Saharan

Africa did not reach the clinics and hospitals” and the drugs were often sold on the black

market (Garrett 2012, 1).

Mali has consistently received aid levels amounting to about twelve to fifteen percent

of its GNI,18 which accounts for more than fifty percent of the government’s annual budget.

Donors view Mali as a “test case” for aid reform (van de Walle 2012, 1). On paper, Mali’s

government has been a willing partner to most of the donor initiatives to make aid more

effective. This has caused aid dependency, which consequently results in a state being nearly

incapable of designing and implementing successful development policies. Furthermore, van

de Walle claims that aid dependence is due to the “plethora of poorly co-ordinated donor

driven decisions and policy-making mechanisms [that] dominate and in some cases have

largely replaced domestic government institutions” (van de Walle 2012, 2). Economically,

Mali has seen steady annual growth at a rate of five point eight percent between 1995-2000,

which is an improvement from the one point seven percent from 1985-94. It must be noted

though that this growth is probably due to the rise of gold exports, the devaluation of the

CFA franc in 1991, and increase in remittance from abroad (van de Walle 2012, 2, 4).

Remittances and foreign direct investments have been increasing rapidly; nevertheless, this

healthy economic growth rate must be balanced by the continued rapid population growth

rate that maintains the country’s impoverished conditions. Denise Youngblood Coleman

claims that despite there being economic growth, “this growth has not led to development”

but rather “Bamako’s elite prospered” (Coleman 2012, 13, 15).

18 Gross National Income

Jagtiani 17

Mali has long been dependent on aid especially in comparison to other sub-Saharan

African countries that have not had the same environmental issues such as neighboring Cote

D’Ivoire. Mali has tended to receive more aid, both in per capita terms and also as a share of

its economy. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

from 2010-2011,19 Mali received two point four percent of all Official Development

Assistance20 dispersed in Africa compared to other sub-Saharan countries: Niger received one

point four percent, Somalia received one point six percent but Nigeria received three point

nine percent (though Nigeria has a significantly higher population than Mali) (“Development

Aid at a Glance” 2013, 8; van de Walle 2012, 3-4).

During the droughts of the Sahel in the 1970s, the amount of aid increased

significantly due to the acute difficulties of the Sahel. In the 1980s, aid increased drastically

as donors sought to combat the growing economic crisis and influence some policy change.

The largest donors have been the World Bank, France, the European Union, and United

States (van de Walle 2012, 4-5). However foreign aid has too often than not been

mismanaged by the central government, which Coleman claims is marked by “relatively high

levels of systemic abuse and corruption,” resulting in high-levels of disparity (Coleman 2012,

15). The Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s were reactions “against embezzlement by

government officials of international relief aid destined for drought stricken people of the

northern Sahel” (Benjaminsen 2004, 829). Foreign aid has done little to solve and

arguably has sometimes aggravated some of the largest existing constrains on democratic consolidation, including the democratic consolidation, including the excessive dominance of the executive branch—and in particular the presidency—over the other branches of government, as well as the growing socio-cultural cleavage between urban elites and the rest of the population. (van de Walle 2012, 3).

19 OECD 20 ODA- a term coined for the OECD to measure aid

Jagtiani 18

Seventy-four percent of Malians “agree with the statement that ‘the government’s economic

policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few” (qtd. in van de Walle 2012, 12).

Malians often complain about the government’s corruption in regards to aid management and

distribution; in the spring coup of 2012, the junta “sought to legitimate its coup, not without

success, with reference to the ripe corruption in the Touré regime and popular unhappiness

about it” (van de Walle 2012, 12-13).

Foreign aid has done little to shorten the striking disparities between the French

educated elites and the masses; furthermore, the north of Mali has remained incredibly less

developed in relation to the rest of Mali, in particular the cities of the south, which has

decreased opportunities for northern inhabitants.

The fundamental aspect of this socio-political disconnect between the elite and the

masses is linguistic and educational. The educational system is modeled off the French

educational system in both content and language, and only a small minority of the population

has mastered French. Mali is among the very few democracies that have a majority

population that is unable to speak the language of government and public administration.

However, the government and donors, specifically from Muslim countries, have encouraged

schooling in vernacular languages and Arabic (van de Walle 2012, 13; Clark 1999, 163).

Moreover, this has created a dichotomy between the educated elites in Arabic and French and

furthered marginalization and discontinuities occurred within the Malian population. These

factors underlie the current Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali as well as past rebellions.

Co-development with France

The French policy of co-development aims to link migration and development

policies. Mali and France have established the Mali-France Consultation on Migration, an

annual bi-national consultation on migration between the two countries. Malian minister

Soumailia Cisse defined “cooperative development” as policy in “which industrial nations

Jagtiani 19

allow migrants to circulate between their home countries and abroad” (Martin et al 2002, 90).

The principle focus is co-management of migration and cooperative development. French

policy, traditionally, has been centered on economic needs while creating a diverse society;

France’s colonial relationships have laid the groundwork for “a steady movement of people

between France and its former colonies” (Kolstee 2006, 4). Immigrant workers were

encouraged to migrate to France especially following World War II, as it needed workers to

rebuild France. France declared itself officially open to immigrants and their families in

1945, but more recently, France has been increasingly reforming its immigration laws to

restrict immigration, which did not start until 1980. The most dramatic reforms were made in

1993 when Charles Pasqua set the goal of “zero illegal immigration;” this became known as

the Pasqua Laws (Kolstee 2006, 5). These intense laws significantly restricted immigration

flows and increased the power to deport with special consideration for skilled workers and

highly educated immigrants.

Divergent views exist on migration in relation to developmental levels. Neo-classical

and developmentalist approaches purport that migration decreased spatial (inter-region and

international) disparities. However Gunnar Myrdal’s Cumulative causation theory argues

that capitalist development is inevitably marked by deepening spatial welfare inequalities. Once differential growth has occurred, internal and external economies of scale (agglomeration and multiplier effects) perpetuate and deepen the bipolar pattern characterized by the vicious cycle of poverty in the periphery and the accelerated growth of the core region. So, economic activities in areas and countries with an initial advantage drain investment and the out-migration of the most talented populations from peripheral area and countries (de Haas 2010, 7). Though there are some “positive ‘spread effects’ such as increased demand for

agricultural products and raw materials trade from the periphery (or remittances)—those do

not match the negative ‘backwash effects”’ (de Haas 2010, 7). Nonetheless, these ‘positive

effects’ create a dependency on remittances and exporting raw materials that are highly

Jagtiani 20

vulnerable to market and environmental fluctuations and perpetuates the disproportionate

relationship between the core and periphery.

Hence Hein de Haas argues that migration “undermines regional and local economies

by depriving communities of their most valuable labor force, increasing dependence on core

countries (of which remittances are but one manifestation) and stimulating out-migration” (de

Haas 2010, 8). It is estimated that about 1.5 to 2 million Malians live abroad, which causes

Mali to suffer from a “brain drain,” which is the uncontrolled depletion of “an already

meager” skilled and highly educated workforce in a periphery and more importantly, “the

most healthy, dynamic, and productive members of their population” (de Haas 2010, 7).

Because of the high population living abroad and the poor economic conditions for most

Malians, a major source of income in Mali is remittances. Remittances create an increased

dependence on core countries, which results in asymmetric growth of regional and local

economies of developing countries. In correlation to aid and remittances, France provides

about $50 million per year in aid to Mali and estimated remittances for France-Mali are

estimated to be at least $50 million (de Haas 2010, 9; Martin et al. 2002, 92). This suggests

that migration increases inequality in Mali.

Most of the migrants come from rural areas that were dramatically affected during the

droughts of the early 1970s and mid-1980s, creating important financial ties between

migrants and their home communities. The majority of families depended “on migration to

get them through the drought” (Findley 1994, 549). Moreover, Malian migrant populations in

France influence domestic policies in relation to France (Ticktin 2006, 34). As long as the

economic conditions and opportunities for individuals do not improve in Mali, migration will

continue to be an issue and perpetuate political and economic dependency that Malians have

on core powers. One can see these effects in Mali’s request for French intervention in relation

to its current destabilizing crisis in the North.

Jagtiani 21

The Case of the Targi

Mali’s 16 million inhabitants are overwhelmingly diverse in terms of linguistic and

ethnic divisions (Heisbourg 2013, 7-8). The Tuareg or Berber populations lie in the northern

part of Mali in the deserts. Deep historical and cultural divisions exist between the people of

the south and the north. The Targi are characterized as having “a history of struggle since

Mali’s independence” in 1960, which has resulted in a series of rebellions fighting for vaster

autonomy as the Targi view the Malian government infringing upon their traditional way of

life and disproportionately allocating the benefits of a modernizing Malian state (“Mali

Profile” 2013, 1). Development in Mali has been focused in the south, in particular the cities,

which has resulted in striking disparities in socio-economic development in the north.

Context to the Tuareg Rebellion

The Tuareg are a pastoral nomad people inhabiting the Sahara in the northern part of

Mali21. Arab nomads, merchants and the Songhoy sedentarists of the Niger River basin

inhabit this area as well; these communities altogether comprise about ten percent of the

Malian population. The majority of the north is rooted in traditional society, but there is a

small section of modern professional elites that exist in the capital and provincial towns.

There are important divides within the civil society of the north that include the various

characteristics within the ethic, social and occupational roles between the nomads and

sedentarists (Lecocq 2003, 89; Lode 2003, 56). Therefore tensions between these

communities exist, but this does not pose an imminent threat because of their complementary

economic activities. Lode states:

Throughout the north there is a strong sense of inter-dependence based on mutual belonging to each other and the land that underpins relations across ethnicity and other social divides. Awareness of this inter-dependence underpins the community approach to adopting collective decisions (Lode 2003, 56-57).

21Northern Mali is often also called Azaouad or Azawad

Jagtiani 22

During colonial rule, the French attempted to set the two complementary economies in

opposition with each other to make their rule easier; nonetheless, strong conflicts never

developed between the nomads and sedentary population (Lode 1997, 411).

Background

In the beginning of colonial conquest, the Tuareg held political control over a vast

stretch of the Sahara that included parts of present day Libya, Algeria and Niger, They had a

military upper hand over neighboring peoples to the south (Lecocq 2003, 89). The Targi

resisted French occupation fiercely in numerous bloody battles until they finally surrendered

in 1917. The colonial administration lacked economic interest in the area, so they “largely

left them to their own deceives as long as they did not disturb la paix francaise”22 (Lecocq

2003, 89; Benjaminsen 2008, 828). Though the French sought to maintain military order

while taxing the people living in the Sahara, though very few investments were made in

education and economic development.

After independence, this system of marginalization in the North was perpetuated by

Keita’s socialist ideas of industrialization and agricultural modernization, which was

“basically to sedentarize and educate the nomads” (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 115). Their

ties to the nomadic ways of life were “looked upon as an obstacle to modernization and

development in general” (Benjaminsen 2008. 828). Furthermore Keita argued that:

sedentarization of nomads was important in order to develop the new nation and to convert nomads into ‘productive’ citizens by having them take up farming. Hence, the nomadic way of life was considered backward, unproductive and undesirable. This led Mali to be labeled le mali inutile,23 and the modernization policy that followed was perceived by Tuareg as a form of colonization; this time from southern Mali (Benjaminsen 2008, 828).

This marginalization, in addition to the taxes nomads had to pay without receiving any

benefits, precipitated a small-scale rebellion in 1963 that was brutally suppressed by the

22French peace 23 the useless Mali

Jagtiani 23

government and military forces with the use of aerial bombardment and of poisoning wells

among other tactics that led many Targi to migrate to Algeria and Libya (Benjaminsen 2008,

828; Lode 2003, 57; Benjaminsen 2008, 828). Thus Ag Baye claimed, “The new Malian

government was even more hostile to the Tuareg than the French administration had been”

(Benjaminsen 2008, 828).

This political, social, and economic marginalization of the north was perpetuated

throughout Traoré’s military government; the military regime was highly centralized and

repressive despite UDPM promising local representation and democracy when the party was

established in 1979 (Benjaminsen 2008, 828-829). Northerners, especially nomads, were

excluded in the political system, as they held virtually no positions at any level in the

government, administration, and army. Moreover, southern officials rarely understood or

appreciated northern cultures; hence northerners were unable to manage their local affairs

according to their tradition and needs. Very few development programs targeted the north

and even less infrastructure for education, health and communication was developed (Lode

2003, 57).

Droughts of the mid-1970s and 1980s

The north was particularly hit hard by the droughts of 1972-73 and 1983-85 in the

Sahel; the droughts “annihilated Tuareg herds, which still formed the economic basis of

society” (Lecocq 2003, 89). The victims of these droughts were confronted with insufficiency

of relief aid and state corruption in its distribution, as it was diverted and sold and was rather

used for development in the southern part of Mali in Bamako (Lecocq 2003, 89; Benjaminsen

2004, 829). The insufficient relief effort was often perceived as deliberate neglect and

resulted in many to migrate to neighboring countries, including Algeria and Libya in search

of employment. Many of the northern migrant men became soldiers of Libya’s “‘Islamic

Region”’ and received sophisticated military training and experience fighting in Chad and

Jagtiani 24

Lebanon; these experiences aroused beliefs that it was “acceptable and possible to solve

important problems through the use of force” (Lode 1997, 411; Lode 2003, 57). Hence some

of them aspired to use this experience to address the problems of marginalization and of the

unjust system in northern Mali. Furthermore, this aspiration “was compounded by the

widespread feeling of hopelessness for their future among the north’s younger generations”

(Lode 2003, 57). Then the Malian Targi were expelled from Libya and Algeria due to

deteriorating economic conditions in the host countries. As Lecocq explained:

A generation of Tuareg, born in the 1950s, grew up with forced sedentarization and education, social economic destruction by droughts and state agents and social economic marginality in the nation-states ruling their land. This led to strong resentment. As one of my informants put it ‘I grew up seeing all this, and in my youthfulness I took a really, really strong hatred. In those years an incredibly grave obligation fell upon us. It was they who owned us, like hostages. All young people my age in that period had the same hatred, the same sentiment of being re-colonized, and that caused a great feeling of hate in us’ (Lecocq 2003, 89-90).

These events and feelings precipitated the Tuareg rebellions of 1990 that was initiated by the

Mouvement populaire pour la libération de l’Azaouad.24 These attacks killed many people,

which resulted in President Traoré declaring a state of emergency in the north. The rebel

movement, Front islamique arabe de l’Azaouad,25 was encouraged to form by the

government; they hoped the two groups, Arabs and Tuaregs, would oppose one another.

Contrary to the government’s aspirations, the two rebel groups aligned against the

government (Lode 1997, 413). The army responded with brutal violence against both Tuareg

and Arab civilians; indiscriminate killings of local people and rebels alike, led to further

violence and civil unrest until a formal peace agreement was signed in 1996 (Hagberg and

Körling 2012,116; Lode 2003, 58). The 1990-1995 “Tuareg problem” was not an isolated

24People’s Movement for the Liberation of Azaouad (MPLA) 25 Arabic Islamic Front of Azaouad (FIAA)

Jagtiani 25

incident; its root causes stem from its history of general economic and political neglect,

compounded by drought and a heavy military hand on Mali’s northern regions.

Promises of the peace agreement were not fulfilled, which resulted in another

rebellion in 2007 that lasted until 2009. Consequently the state initiated development

programs; however, the few programs in which the government actually invested were

mainly devoted to the co-operation of northern elites. Moreover, the Programme special pour

la paix, la sécurité et le développement du Nord Mali26 following the rebellion was widely

criticized for its vertical approach and its failure to involve communities at the grassroots

level in the North. Security was prioritized over development, while “in practice the former

was reduced to an unwanted and unpopular increased military presence in the North”

(Hagberg and Körling 2012, 116). The Targi have felt “marginalized and mistreated” by the

centralized Malian state, which has led to several rebellions in the quest for more autonomy

or annexation (Hagberg and Körling 2012, 115; Poulton and ag Youssouf 1998, 70).

Nationalist discourse

The current boundary lines of Mali did not exist until French colonization and

subsequent decolonization, thus various ethnic groups were now cohabiting in one nation-

state. Benedict Anderson viewed nationality or nation-ness or nationalism as “cultural

artefacts of a particular kind” (Anderson 1983, 4). These artifacts were created as a

spontaneous reaction of a complex ‘crossing,’ which include the merging of various political

and ideological patterns, creating deep attachments (Anderson 1983, 5). He defines the nation

as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and

sovereign” (Anderson 1983, 4, 6). Communities are to be distinguished in the style that they

are imagined. They are imagined as being limited, sovereign and a community (Anderson

1983, 6-7). Furthermore, Moghadam makes the point that:

26 Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN)

Jagtiani 26

Ideology is neither self-contained nor immutable. It is, rather, linked with class experiences and class interests; ideologies have ‘social roots’ and ‘do not come from the beyond.’ Ideology develops and spreads within a societal framework, is linked to ongoing social change and can only be understood in terms of social evolution and in the context of socio-political change. Culture, too, cannot be reduced to religion and in any case must be analyzed in connection with other societal structures (Moghadam 1990, 190).

French colonization led to the development and spread of Islam at a significantly faster rate

than it had during the preceding nine centuries. Because of colonization, trade and security

increased, and Islam and Islamic ideas flourished and extended to areas that had previously

been impenetrable (Clark 1999, 155-156; Martin 1976, 28). Despite Islam having a “central

place in the social and historical imagination in Mali,” there is “no uniform way of being

Muslim” (Soares 2005, 79). Indeed Mali is overwhelmingly Muslim, but a national identity

cannot be reduced to religion as Moghadam argues.

At independence, Mali’s political administration continued colonial policies in

relation to Islam, consequently it embarked upon a path of secular, African socialism with

religious tolerance for all (Clark 1999, 160). The political power pursued the colonial

endeavor of constructing a specific national identity “limited and exclusive to a territory

originally conceived and designed to serve the needs of the colonizer” (Sy 2013, 1). In Mali,

like everywhere else in Africa, the first two republics envisaged the construction of a single

and homogenous nationality in a territory occupied by communities characterized by their

great human and linguistic diversity. In the formation of the first two republics’ institutions,

communities and their diversity were “ignored for the benefit of exclusively emphasizing the

identity of the individual and his/her nationality” (Sy 2013, 1). The actual diversity is thus

ignored in the local and regional territories for the benefit of the cult of a national territory

defined by borders that break up the dynamics of enduring communities.

The government subsequent to the third coup was meant to be more inclusive and

pluralistic, as it laid out the foundations for a pluralistic democracy committed to building a

Jagtiani 27

legally constituted state, which not only takes into account diversity but also recognizes it.

The choice to promote pluralism in the political sphere should extend to the cultural,

economic, and social spheres. Despite the new government being ‘decentralized,’ people in

the local governments especially “in rural areas were still considered and treated as

administered subjects who only have duties, and not as citizens who have rights and

responsibilities” (Sy 2013, 1). Public management denied everything traditional and adopted

the French model and language. Cohesiveness among the Malians has not existed, as there

are major class disparities in development and roadblocks to a ‘united nation’ as the

government continues the marginalization of certain portions of the population (Sy 2013, 1).

This has led to the current context of the Tuareg rebellion; marginalization of nomads in the

policies of the government subsequent to independence caused many Targi to “not develop a

feeling of being Malian” (Benjaminsen 2008, 828). During the Northern rebellion of the

1990s, two Moor-based rebel groups joined efforts and received “support of all ethnic groups

in the north for at least the first year” (Lode 2003, 58). During this time, the main issue was

between the north and the central government. “Northern solidarity transcended any local

inter-ethnic tensions over social resources or social differences” (Lode 2003, 58). After the

third coup, a sentiment of radical individualism took hold, which further alienated the

communities of the north (Skinner 2012, 322). The ethnic dissimilarities have created deep,

enduring divisions, which makes it difficult to reach a common sense of unity throughout the

country or sense of nationhood, as people tend to identify with their ethnicity rather than their

national identity (Meshal 2012, 8). Thus Mali has failed in effectively building a nation-state.

Conclusion

The Targi protests are due to the striking developmental disparities from the south to

north in Mali. These inequalities between the two regions have been perpetuated since French

colonization; the French and then the succeeding governments in Mali have done little to

Jagtiani 28

shorten the perceived gap, despite promises made to the Targi in the aftermath of their

rebellions. Bamako has more-or-less maintained the developmental inequalities in the north,

as they perceive the traditional to being antithetical to their modernization objectives. By

using proponents of the modernization theory, this analysis illustrates how in trying to

modernize the political, social, and economic spheres, the central government created

stronger divisions between the traditional Targi and the elites of Bamako. This extreme

discontent manifested itself in several rebellions that progressively worsened as each

government failed to address properly the grievances of the Targi. Mali failed in state

building since weak institutions have prevailed as shown through Mali’s coup d’états and

civil unrest.

Economic development has been strained due to the dependency Mali has on Core

countries (specifically France). Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world and has a

weak economy. Foreign aid and remittances have been pivotal to the Malian government’s

budget. Economic dependency can translate into a political dependency, and as Nkruma

argued, neocolonialism is achieved through psychological dependency to the former colonial

powers. Mali’s interim president asking for France’s help demonstrates the political and

psychological dependency that Malians have formed since colonialism.

Moreover, because of French colonization, new frontier lines for Mali were created

that never existed prior. Multiple culturally and linguistically heterogeneous groups were

now living within the confines of one supposed ‘nation-state.’ Mali modeled its nation and

state building off of the France’s, though efforts to create national unity among the various

ethnic groups proved difficult. By using a multi-disciplinary approach, this analysis was able

to demonstrate the underlying factors to the Targi claims of general political and economic

neglect, which its importance has been underlined because of Mali’s current conflict

involving France that is of geopolitical importance to the international community.

Jagtiani 29

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