- DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HISTORY - GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

“The Boatless People”: The UNHCR and Afghan Refugees, 1978-1989 by Jaci Eisenberg

WORKING PAPERS in INTERNATIONAL HISTORY No. 14 / December 2013

2

© Jaci Eisenberg No part of this paper may be reproduced without the permission of the author. Working Papers in International History Editor: Jesse Sargent ©Department of International History Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2 – 1202 Geneve, Suisse http://www.graduateinstitute.ch/international-history

3

“THE BOATLESS PEOPLE”: THE UNHCR AND AFGHAN REFUGEES, 1978-1989

Jaci Eisenberg*

Abstract: This work examines how the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR) attempted to carry out its mandate in regards to the

Afghan refugee populations created as a result of the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in 1979. It focuses on the experience of Afghan refugees in the

three chief countries of first asylum: Pakistan, Iran, and India. In exploring

how this refugee crisis was handled, this work follows three lines of inquiry

reflecting the major concerns of the UNHCR. The first line, UNHCR

involvement, encompasses the recognition of refugee status for Afghans and

UNHCR presence on the ground in refugee-receiving countries. The second

line, international considerations, moves beyond the UNHCR and explores

accession to relevant international refugee instruments, as well as problems

with the concept of first asylum. The third line, donor financing of the

Afghan refugee relief effort, is an entirely new approach in academic

literature on the Afghan refugee crisis. These three lines of inquiry were

pursued to determine how such factors facilitated or hindered the action of

the UNHCR on Afghan refugees.

* Jaci Eisenberg is a PhD Candidate in International History at the Graduate Institute (IHEID), Geneva, Switzerland. Her dissertation on American women involved in the League of Nations entities will be completed in late 2013. This paper came out of the project The UNHCR and the Globalization of Refugee Issues, 1951-1989, underwritten by the Swiss National Science Foundation. The author would like to thank the project’s director, Jussi Hanhimäki, and its research coordinator, Jérôme B. Elie, for their invaluable support in guiding this work. The author would also like to thank interviewee Gerald Walzer for his time, and Gareth Austin, Alessandro Monsutti, and Jesse Sargent for their invaluable comments on drafts of this work.

4

Introduction

This paper examines how the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) attempted to fulfill its mandate in regards to the Afghan refugee

populations created as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It

focuses on the experience of Afghan refugees in the three chief countries of first

asylum for Afghan refugees:1 Pakistan, frequently covered in academic literature

and a main recipient of Afghan refugees;2 Iran, which housed almost as many

refugees as Pakistan but is less often studied;3 and India, a host country for

comparatively fewer Afghan refugees, but which nevertheless felt the strain of this

additional population just as keenly as Pakistan and Iran. In exploring how this

refugee crisis was handled in these countries of first asylum, this work follows three

lines of inquiry which reflect the major concerns of the UNHCR. The first line,

UNHCR involvement, encompasses the recognition of refugee status for Afghans

and UNHCR presence on the ground in refugee-receiving countries. The second

line, international considerations, moves beyond the UNHCR and explores accession

to relevant international refugee instruments,4 as well as problems with the concept

of first asylum. The third line, donor financing of the Afghan refugee relief effort, is

an entirely new approach in academic literature on the Afghan refugee crisis. The

1 This three-county study approach builds on that conducted by J.B. Elie, The UNHCR and the Cold War: a Documented Reflection on the UN Refugee Agency’s Activities in the Bipolar Context, Working paper of The UNHCR and the Global Cold War, 1971-1984, a joint UNHCR/GIIS/GCSP project with funding from the GIAN, Geneva, June 2007, available at: http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/globalmigration/shared/_communIntersites/UNHCR_and_CW_Work-P.pdf (last visited 13 Apr. 2013).

2 Pakistan as host country for Afghan refugees is the theme of countless articles, including: H.-A. Razvi, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications”, Pakistan Horizon 37(1), 1984, 40-61; I. Hussain, “Pakistan’s International Law Practice on Afghan Refugees”, Pakistan Horizon 38(1), 1985, 85-98; T. Rogers, “Afghan refugees and the stablility of Pakistan”, Survival 29(5), 1987, 416-429; P. Centlivres & M. Centlivres-Demont, “The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan: An Ambiguous Identity”, Journal of Refugee Studies 1(2), 1988, 141-152; M.G. Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship”, Asian Survey 31(6), 1991, 496-511.

3 Many of the available studies on Afghan refugees in Iran deal with integration or repatriation long after the initial crisis, including: T. Garakani, “Place-making in the margins: a case study of Afghan refugees in Iran”, Ph.D. Diss., Teachers College – Columbia University, 2009.

4 The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. For the development and scope of these instruments, see S.E. Davies, “Redundant or Essential? How Politics Shaped the Outcome of the 1967 Protocol”, International Journal of Refugee Law 19(4), 2007, 703-728.

5

examination of these three lines illuminates the main factors which facilitated or

hindered the action of the UNHCR on Afghan refugees.

This examination is based on the UNHCR archives and the Jimmy Carter

Presidential Library and Archives. Such a narrowly-based story cannot be the

definitive account of the Afghan refugee crisis. The national archives of India, Iran,

and Pakistan, as well as the countries and organizations which donated to the

Afghan refugee relief effort, will certainly add more depth to our understanding of

the subject in future. Nevertheless such a partial picture is already valuable as an

initial attempt to identify constructive trends to be encouraged in future practice,

part of the duty of historians of international relations.5

Afghan refugees are here labeled “the boatless people”6 because this phrase

succinctly contextualizes the difficulties faced by the UNHCR at the onset of the

Afghan refugee crisis: the attention and resources of the international community

had already been focused, for several years, on the Orderly Departure Programme

(ODP).7 Western resettlement countries were fatigued from their contributions to

that crisis,8 meaning UNHCR appeals for aid for other refugee populations were

increasingly unwelcome to the international community. The title holds more

contemporary relevance as well. Recent important contributions on the international

refugee regime ignore the complexity and lack of resolution in the Afghan refugee

experience, choosing instead to focus on refugee situations demonstrative of

successful international cooperation, such as the ODP.9 This work seeks to

illuminate one complex situation of refugee resettlement.

5 K. Salomon, “What is the Use of International History?”, Journal of Peace Research 30(4), 1993, 387. 6 UNHCR Archives, Geneva, Switzerland [hereafter, UNCHRA], “The Boatless People – Pakistan Times”, 1 October 1979, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.PAK.AFG [Vol. 4] 1979.

7 For a recent analysis of humanitarian fatigue, see R. Brauman, “Emotion et action humanitaire”, Etudes 410, 2009, 9-19.

8 R. Schöch, “UNHCR and the Afghan Refugees in the early 1980s: Between Humanitarian Action and Cold War Politics”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27(1), 2008, 50-51.

9 G. Loescher, A. Betts & J. Milner, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The politics and practice of refugee protection in the twenty-first century, New York, Routledge, 2008; A. Betts, Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2009.

6

UNHCR involvement

The Afghan refugee problem first appeared on the UNHCR’s radar in 1975. United

Nations (UN) Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had contacted the Pakistan

government to account for the mass exodus of Pakistani Bengalis into Afghanistan

which had been reported by the president of Afghanistan. In his reply, Pakistani

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto turned the tables and replied to Waldheim with a

letter drawing attention to the trickle of Afghans entering Pakistan.10 This was a

diversionary tactic in a continuing battle of note verbales.11 Afghan refugee flows into

neighboring countries began in earnest with Nur Mohammad Taraki’s coup in April

1978, which sought to make Afghanistan a Communist state. These refugee flows

accelerated with the Soviet invasion in December 1979.

As could be expected, the Afghan government did not wish to view their

rapidly expatriating citizens as refugees. It immediately sought to reverse the flow.

A note in the UNHCR archives recounting a 17 December 1979 meeting between the

then president of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, and a UNHCR official showed

Afghanistan urging the UNHCR to help extraterritorial Afghans by encouraging

their return to Afghanistan. The government offered full amnesty and land grants

for these refugees. Amin posited that, by aiding Afghan refugees through

cooperation with the Afghan government, the UNHCR would be doing its part to

“safeguard the good reputation of the unations [sic].”12 After investigation, this

solution was dismissed by the UNHCR because acceptance would have impaired the

UNHCR’s ability to impartially aid Afghan refugees.13

10 UNHCRA, Folio 1: “United Nations NV/409 of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, to UN

Secretary-General (SG) Kurt Waldheim,” 23 January 1979, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.AFG.PAK [Vol. 1] 1975-77.

11 Ibid. mentions a flurry of communication between the Pakistani and Afghan Governments. 12 “[U]nations” meaning United Nations. UNHCRA, Folio 229: “Note of Evlogui Bonev, United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative in Kabul, to SG Waldhiem, High Commissioner for Refugees (HC) Poul Hartling, and others”, 18 December 1979, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.PAK.AFG [Vol. 6] 1979-82, p. 2.

13 Unfortunately, no direct follow-up to Bonev’s note exists, but later in the same file revelatory correspondence appears. UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar requested that HC Hartling, at the suggestion of the Afghan Government, circulate the text of the proposed amnesty upon return for Afghan refugees. Hartling responded negatively to this request, noting that Afghan refugees were not ready to return voluntarily, and that circulating the text would draw the HC into an untenable political situation. UNHCRA, Folio 447:

7

According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR was charged with

determining the status of asylum-seekers through individual interview, in order to

separate bona fide refugees from economic opportunists. However, the sheer number

of Afghan refugees spilling into neighboring countries meant that individual status

determination was impractical and a strain on UNHCR resources.14 A cable from the

UNHCR headquarters in Geneva to the field in early 1981 deemed that all Afghans

outside Afghanistan claiming refugee status were “considered, prima facie, refugees

under UNHCR mandate unless upon individual interview found otherwise.”15

Being an Afghan abroad at the time afforded immediate access to the UNHCR

protection mandate,16 an automatic luxury not afforded to several contemporary

refugee groups.17 Blanket determination of refugee status for expatriate Afghans

made it easier for the UNHCR to help them. Instead of being inundated with

innumerable interviews for refugee status, the UNHCR could focus on liaising with

host states and voluntary agencies to bring aid to populations in need.

The preceding could be considered one example of UNHCR flexibility

benefitting refugees – when individual interview was not possible, blanket

determination could efficiently protect a population at risk. In at least one instance,

however, this flexibility opened up the agency to criticism. Best practices for refugee

villages called for locations a good distance away from the border, for protection.18

In the Afghan case, however, a few such refugee villages were located within 1-2

miles of the border, and were known by UNHCR staff to be rest stops and weapons

“Letter of HC Hartling to SG Perez de Cuellar, 30 March 1982”, 30 March 1982, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.PAK.AFG [Vol. 7] 1982, p. 1.

14 For more on the vicissitudes of refugee determination, see I.C. Jackson, The Refugee Concept in Group Situations, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1999.

15 UNHCRA, “Cable from UNHCR Geneva to MM/MS Bari, Carpenter, Jackson, Jahn, Meijer, Krens, Makhouly, Sampatkumar, Willday”, 2 January 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.INS 1974-84.

16 With the exception of India, where Afghan asylum seekers were interviewed individually. See UNHCRA, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IND [Vol. 1] 1983-84.

17 Prima facie recognition of refugee status did, however, have some degree of precedent in the UNHCR: Hungarians fleeing the revolution in 1956, and, contemporarily, Iranians fleeing the Islamic Republic of Iran.

18 Protection from events including cross-border helicopter raids. Notes of UNHCR policy to move refugee villages away from the border include: UNHCRA, Folio 257: “Memo of Gerald Walzer, Chief of Mission for the UNHCR in Islamabad, to the UNHCR in Geneva, entitled “Protection of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan”, 16 May 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.PAK [Vol. 5] 1984; UNHCRA, Folio 278: “Confidential note of Michel Moussalli, Director of International Protection, to the Representative of the UNHCR Office in Islamabad (J. Amunategui)”, 3 July 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.PAK [Vol. 6] 1984.

8

storehouses for mujahideen.19 This left the agency20 (and Pakistan as a host

country21) open to accusations that they were actively facilitating the efforts of the

mujahideen.22

Blanket determination of refugee status for Afghans by the UNHCR had the

secondary effect of enabling migrants, as well as refugees, to benefit from first

asylum and UNHCR aid. The 1985 protection report highlighted the trend of non-

refugee Afghans traveling to India solely for medical treatment – a longstanding

practice – but then attempting to register with the UNHCR in order to have their

medical expenses covered, and then furthermore illegally – as per the international

refugee protection regime, which dealt with refugees in their countries of first

asylum only - departing for third countries.23 Still, while not perfect, the UNHCR’s

blanket determination of refugee status for Afghans created a foundation for action.

Highlighting a population of concern allowed the issue of protection to be raised

with the eventual host countries, whether signatories or not of the relevant refugee

instruments.

Returning to the origin of the Afghan refugee crisis, in April 1979, Pakistan

informed the UNHCR that some 80,000 Afghans fleeing the Communist regime had

taken up residence in Pakistan. By late 1979, that figure ballooned to almost 400,000

19 UNHCRA, “Report on Protection Activities in Baluchistan, 1986”, undated, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.PAK

[Binder A] paras. 2.12, 5.19, 5.25. On mujahideen versus refugees, Schöch concluded that the “UNHCR simply did not have the capacities to separate combatants from refugees, as its mandate was shaped for the protection of individuals in quite different circumstances.” R. Schöch, Afghan Refugees in Pakistan during the 1980s: Cold War Politics and Registration Practice, New Issues in Refugee Research Research Paper No. 157, UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland, June 2008, 12, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4868daad2.html (last visited 13 Apr. 2013).

20 “The Afghan refugees have provided the basis of the Afghan resistance movement, and an international humanitarian assistance program to the refugees has had the additional consequence of making the continued resistance possible.” L.P. Goodson, “Refugee-Based Insurgency: The Afghan Case”, Ph.D Diss., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1990, 324.

21 One example of many: Pakistan Mission to the UN in New York, Press release no. 12/79, “Refuge to 35,000 Afghans on Humanitarian Grounds”, which refuted allegations appearing in Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia that Afghan refugees in Pakistan were using the country as a staging ground for hostile activities.

22 While mujahideen were certainly a challenge to UNHCR protection of Afghan refugees, they are not the sole challenge, or even the defining point, of the Afghan refugee crisis. Strangely enough, some works insist on reducing the Afghan refugee crisis to this element. To wit: G. Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 216ff.

23 UNHCRA, Folio 8: “1985 Report on UNHCR Protection Activities for India,” ca. 3 March 1986, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.IND [Binder A], p. 6 of report.

9

Afghan refugees in Pakistan alone.24 As a refugee host country, Pakistan was

somewhat problematic: it had not acceded to the Refugee Convention and Protocol.25

In the absence of such ratification, Pakistan had not officially accepted the UNHCR

definition of refugee established by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Because

of these facts, Pakistan had no statutory obligations to help refugees seeking asylum

on its territory, nor any regularized contact with the UNHCR. The resulting

situation was such that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),

rather than the UNHCR, was the first responder for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Already active on the ground, the UNDP Resident Representative ad interim26

Hans-Cristof von Sponeck proved to be an adept contact person for the UNHCR. In

the early months of the Afghan refugee crisis (mid-to-late 1978), von Sponeck kept

UNHCR’s best interests at the forefront of his recommendations. On 6 December, he

counseled the UNHCR against setting up a large-scale assistance program, believing

instead that the UNDP could effectively take care of the Afghan refugee inflow to

Pakistan at its current rate.27 Yet it was more than just a desire to use existing on-site

resources which kept the UNHCR out of Pakistan in the early months of the Afghan

refugee crisis. As F.L. Pijnacker Hordijk, the Chief of the UNHCR Asia Regional

Section in Geneva, noted in a letter to von Sponeck, it was also a matter of which

resources could best serve the refugees. For example, the International Committee

of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the sole organization active in Pakistan authorized by

the Pakistani Government to issue recognized travel documents to refugees. Hence

UNHCR headquarters in Geneva believed it made sense to leave this aspect of

refugee assistance to the ICRC, given that neither the UNHCR nor the UNDP were

24 UNHCRA, A/AC.96/577 – 14 August 1980, 31st Session Executive Committee, Report on UNHCR

Assistance Activities in 1979-1980 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programmes and Budget for 1981, para. 602, p. 175.

25 Pakistan has not acceded to these instruments to date. 26 Title valid for part of 1978; by late 1978 he became the Deputy Resident Representative of the UNDP in

Islamabad. 27 UNHCRA, Folio 22: “Letter of Hans-Cristof von Sponeck, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in

Islamabad, to F.L. Pijnacker Hordijk, Chief of the UNHCR Asia Regional Section in Geneva”, 7 December 1978, Fonds 11 Series 2, 640.PAK 1974-84.

10

able to do so.28 However, this initial deference to organizations on the ground did

not last long. Pakistan requested UNHCR expertise and resources on 10 April

1979.29 This query was answered with an emergency allocation (non-regular budget)

by the UNHCR of $200,000 in August 1979.30 On 18 October 1979, UNHCR opened

an office for its Chief of Mission for Pakistan in Islamabad,31 with subsequent sub-

office opening in 1980 in Peshawar and Quetta for regional monitoring of the

assistance program.32

On paper, Iran appeared to be a more eager partner for the UNHCR than

Pakistan. On 28 July 1976, after much prodding from the US State Department,33 the

Shah signed the Refugee Convention and Protocol,34 meaning that official contact

with the UNHCR was therefore established prior to the Afghan refugee crisis. Yet,

signature did not ensure adherence: prior to the Taraki coup, in February 1978, a

report of a UNHCR mission to Iran noted that despite accession, Iran had yet to

implement the measures required under the Refugee Convention and Protocol.35

Nevertheless, UNHCR kept a presence in Iran until the Iranian revolution, at which

time it was ousted from the country.36

28 UNHCRA, Folio 60: “Letter of F.L. Pijnacker-Hordijk, Chief of the UNHCR Asia Regional Section in

Geneva, to Hans-Cristof von Sponeck, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in Islamabad”, 12 March 1979, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.PAK.AFG [Vol. 1] 1975-79, pp. 1-2.

29 UNHCRA, Folio 69: “Note for the file recounting the visit of Jamsheed K.A. Marker, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN Office at Geneva, to the UNHCR on 6 April 1979”, 10 April 1979, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.PAK.AFG [Vol. 2] 1979, p. 1.

30 UNHCRA, Folio 121: “Memo of UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Dale de Haan to Gerald Walzer, Chief of the UNHCR Finance and Control Section”, 23 August 1979, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.PAK.AFG [Vol. 3] 1979, p. 1.

31 UNHCRA, Folio 1: “Unattributed draft memo on the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, initialed “MJ” or “HJ,” 25 March 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 110.PAK [Vol. 1] 1979-81, p. 2.

32 UNHCRA, A/AC.96/577, 14 August 1980, para. 605, p. 175. 33 UNHCRA, Folio 3: “Letter of Frank L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugee and Migration

Affairs (USA), to HC Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan”, 2 January 1975, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 IRN 1971-78. 34 UNHCRA, Folio 13: “Cable of UNHCR in Geneva to several recipients”, 5 August 1976, Fonds 11 Series 2,

671.1 IRN 1971-78. 35 UNHCRA, “Confidential Mission Report of Kamel Morjane, trip to Teheran 8-29 January 1978”, 10 February

1978, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 IRN 1971-78, p. 4. 36 UNHCRA, Folio 44: “Mission Report of Juan Amunategui, UNHCR Regional Representative for the Middle

East in Beirut, trip to Iran 8-12 August 1979”, report date 14 August 1979, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IRN [Vol. 2] 1979-82, introduction page.

11

Afghan refugees show up in UNHCR files pertaining to Iran in 1979.37

Initially Iran took pride in its ability to handle the relatively small influx of

refugees,38 but by late summer 1980, word had reached the UNHCR that the Iranians

were seeking help in an “[I]slamic context.”39 However by early December 1980, the

Iran-Iraq War (ongoing since late September of the same year) began to take its toll,

and the Iranian Government officially requested aid from the UNHCR.40 Replying

in the new year, High Commissioner (HC) Poul Hartling requested permission for

an assessment mission of UNHCR staff to survey the needs of the Afghan refugees

in Iran.41 A two-part assessment mission took place in August and October 1981,42

and a programming mission took place in April 1982,43 but in general the provision

of aid was slow.

A draft agreement on UNHCR operations in Iran, a key outcome of the 1982

programming mission, went without reaction from the Iranian Government for over

a year, and the UNHCR understood such inaction as a signal to stop providing aid

for Afghan refugees in Iran: without government permission, the UNHCR could not

act in Iranian territory. Yet Krishan Singh, the UNDP Resident Representative in

Iran as of 1983, had a different explanation: the draft agreement on UNHCR

operations in Iran was a legal document requiring parliamentary approval,

something unlikely to be achieved at the time due to the “current atmosphere in

Parliament.” As a legal stop-gap measure, Singh suggested arrangement of the

37 UNHCRA, Folio 42: “Cable from the UNHCR in New York to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 22 February 1979,

Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IRN [Vol. 1] 1971-79. 38 UNHCRA, Folio 18: “Memorandum of Leslie A. Goodyear, Acting Deputy Director of Assistance, to R.

Yazgi, of the Regional Section for North Africa and the Middle East”, 28 January 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 1] 1978-82.

39 “Treated it in Islamic context and said they discussing it bilaterally with Pakistan.” UNHCRA, Folio 29: “Cable of the UNHCR in New York to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 1 August 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 1] 1978-82.

40 UNHCRA, Folio 37: “Cable of Karim Khoda Panahi, Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, relayed by Mr Yammin, UNDP Resident Representative in Teheran, to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 9 December 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 1] 1978-82.

41 UNHCRA, “Letter of HC Hartling to Karim Kohoda Panahi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teheran”, 15 January 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 1] 1978-82.

42 UNHCRA, Folio 84: “Cable of the UNHCR in Geneva to the UNHCR in New York”, 3 March 1982, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 1] 1978-82.

43 UNHCRA, Folio 90: “Cable of Morse of the UNHCR in New York to HC Hartling”, 4 April 1982, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 1] 1978-82.

12

UNHCR emergency assistance programme under the 1961 UNDP Accord de Siège

with Iran.44 The Iranians soon elaborated on this point directly with the UNHCR.

Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Iran to the UN Office at Geneva,

Nasrollah Kazemi Kamyab, visited the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva and “raised

the question whether an Agreement needs to be signed before UNHCR can start

implementing projects. Apparently, the ICRC operated in Iran without a formal

Agreement.”45

A circuitous solution was found for this difficult situation. On 15 June 1983,

HC Hartling authorized $1 million from the Emergency Fund to provide 5,000 tents

for Afghan refugees in Iran,46 perhaps a carrot to encourage Iran to sign the draft

agreement on UNHCR operations in Iran. Yet the tent-furnishing operation, carried

out in summer 1983, was a bust: while the UNHCR began tent delivery, the relief

operation had to be “suspended midway due to inadequate arrangements for receipt

and distribution” of tents.47 Because the relief for Afghan refugees in Iran was

interrupted, Iranian representation in Geneva repeatedly contacted the UNHCR to

request that the remaining tents be distributed, ultimately to no avail.48 Finally, in a

last-ditch effort to secure help for Afghan refugees, a cooperation agreement was

reached between the Iranian Government and the UNHCR on 25 July 1984.49

44 UNHCRA, Folio 138: “Memo of Ghassan Arnaout, Head of the Regional Bureau for the Middle East and

South West Asia, to HC Hartling, on assistance to Afghan refugees in Iran”, 30 May 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 2] 1982-84, p. 2.

45 UNHCRA, Folio 140: “Note for the file, on a 3 June 1983 meeting of Nasrollah Kazemi Kamyab with the UNHCR, by René van Rooyen”, 7 June 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 2] 1982-84, p. 2 (point 9).

46 UNHCRA, Folio 141: “Memo: Allocation of the UNHCR to purchase and transport 5,000 tents for Afghan refugees in Iran, from HC Hartling to the Finance and Control and Administration and Management Sections of the UNHCR in Geneva”, 15 June 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 2] 1982-84.

47 UNHCRA, Folio 148: “Cable of the UNHCR in Geneva to the UNHCR in New York”, 19 August 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 2] 1982-84, pp. 1-2.

48 Letters of 22 February, 5 March, and 13 March 1984 requesting the distribution of the remaining tents all referred to in UNHCRA, Folio 153: “Letter of Nasrollah Kazemi Kamyab to HC Hartling”, 13 March 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 2] 1982-84.

49 UNHCRA, Folio 166: “Letter of W.R. Smyser, Deputy High Commissioner, to Hossein Kazempour Ardebili, Deputy Foreign Minister for International and Economic Affairs of Iran”, 30 July 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 2] 1982-84.

13

The UNHCR was keen to cooperate with Iran the best way it knew how:

opening an office on the ground in order to be able to respond more effectively.50 To

the UNHCR, a local office was part and parcel of a proper country operation

agreement drafted with the needs of the local population in mind. Iran was

skeptical about a new UNHCR office: as in Pakistan, the UNDP had already an

established presence in Iran.51 As the author of a 1983 note recounted, for the Iranian

authorities, “UNHCR’s insistence on opening a separate office seems more a sign of

competition between UN agencies than a genuine operational requirement.”52

Nevertheless, the UNDP expressed a need for assistance in refugee matters due to a

lack of personnel and proper training:53 specialized UNHCR expertise was required.

However, it was not just the considerations of operation agreements or

duplicate UN offices which complicated UNHCR relations with Iran: primarily it

was the issue of monetary aid earmarked for Afghan refugees. Table 1 shows a

difference of 700,000 Afghan refugees between government-reported figures of

Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran for the end of 1984 (2.5 million versus 1.8

million).

50 UNHCRA, “Cable of the UNDP in Iran to UNHCR in Geneva”, 17 April 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 010.IRN

1984, p. 2; UNHCRA, “Letter of Krishan G. Singh, Resident Representative of UNDP in Teheran, to Mr (Hossein?) Kazempour-Ardebili, Under-Secretary for International and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran”, 17 April 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 010.IRN 1984; UNHCRA, “Cable of the UNDP in Iran to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 19 April 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 010.IRN 1984, p. 2.

51 Soudabeh Amiri, a former employee of the UNDP in Teheran, recounted that after the Islamic Revolution, the “UNDP, as the one international agency that remained in Teheran, became the intermediary between Iran and the rest of the UN system.” C.N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 192.

52 UNHCRA, “Cable of the UNDP in Iran to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 19 April 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 010.IRN 1984, p. 2

53 UNHCRA, Folio 65: “Confidential Mission Report of Hassan Utkan, trip to Iran, 16 November-24 December 1983 [report title is wrong, should be 1982]”, report date 19 January 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IRN [Vol. 4] 1982-83, p. 18.

14

Table 1: Afghan refugees by host country, 1979-199054

Year Pakistan Iran India

1979 402,000 100,000

1980 1,428,000 300,000

1981 2,375,000 1,500,000 2,700

1982 2,877,000 1,500,000 3,400

1983 2,873,000 1,700,000 5,300

1984 2,500,000 1,800,000 5,900

1985 2,730,000 1,880,000 5,700

1986 2,878,000 2,190,000 5,500

1987 3,156,000 2,350,000 5,200

1988 3,255,000 2,350,000 4,900

1989 3,272,000 2,350,000 8,500

1990 3,253,000 3,061,000 11,900

Yet, Table 2 shows that the UNHCR’s total obligations (General and Special

Programmes combined) from voluntary funds for 1984 favored Pakistan more than

eleven-fold (approximately $87.1 million versus $7.8 million).

54 Excerpted from “Figure 5.2: Afghan refugee population by country of asylum, 1979-1999,” in the UNHCR,

The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty years of humanitarian action, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, 119. Figures at 31 December of each year. On the reliability of refugee figures, see J. Crisp, “‘Who has counted the refugees?’ UNHCR and the politics of numbers,” New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No. 12, UNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland, June 1999, available at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ED9302CE174AB751C1256DAD0037FB44-hcr-count-jun99.pdf (last visited 13 Apr. 2013).

15

Table 2: UNHCR total obligations (in USD) from voluntary funds in Pakistan and

Iran, 1979-199055

Year Pakistan Iran

1979 4,476,400 n/a

1980 69,331,000 n/a

1981 109,482,500 0

1982 93,978,300 0

1983 85,539,900 3,561,700

1984 87,144,600 7,804,300

1985 67,650,500 12,168,800

1986 78,835,300 8,550,800

1987 81,261,200 16,572,900

1988 59,869,200 23,029,100

1989 55,217,200 17,018,300

1990 55,885,200 14,116,800

55 Sources for figures from Pakistan, all from UNHCRA: A/AC.96/577 (14 August 1980), p. 180; A/AC.96/594

(10 August 1981), p. 178; A/AC.96/606 (23 August 1982), p. 415; A/AC.96/620 (1 August 1983), p. 472; A/AC.96/639 (1 August 1984), p. 390; A/AC.96/657 (5 August 1985), p. 434; A/AC.96/677 (Part VI) (22 July 1986), p. 25; A/AC.96/693 (Part V) (16 July 1987), p. 28; A/AC.96/708 (Part V) (1 August 1988), p. 30; A/AC.96/724 (Part V) (15 August 1989), p. 28; A/AC.96/751 (Part V) (15 August 1990), p. 32; A/AC.96/774 (Part V) (28 August 1991), p. 34. Sources for figures from Iran, all from UNHCRA: A/AC.96/606 (23 August 1982), p. 397; A/AC.96/620 (1 August 1983), p. 453; A/AC.96/639 (1 August 1984), p. 372; A/AC.96/657 (5 August 1985), p. 416; A/AC.96/677 (Part VI) (22 July 1986), p. 13; A/AC.96/693 (Part V) (16 July 1987), p. 16; A/AC.96/708 (Part V) (1 August 1988), p. 19; A/AC.96/724 (Part V) (15 August 1989), p. 18; A/AC.96/751 (Part V) (15 August 1990), p. 18; A/AC.96/774 (Part V) (28 August 1991), p. 22. The reports of a given year record the obligations of the previous year. Figures included are those allocated from voluntary funds (regional appeals excluded) for general and special programmes. UNHCR reporting did not consistently distinguish whether budget lines were earmarked for Afghan refugees alone, or in combination with other refugee populations; I have therefore left their total figures by country intact. This means that the figures presented here likely overestimate the aid provided for Afghan refugees. Aid to Pakistan in this period was predominantly earmarked for Afghan refugees; aid to Iran, particularly in the mid-to-late 1980s, showed several budget lines for non-Afghan refugees. This means that the disparity of aid per refugee in the two countries presented is likely underrepresented in this table. India is unfortunately not included because entries for India in the same sources were usually amalgamated under a listing for “other countries and areas in Asia,” with each line item sometimes appearing at irregular intervals.

16

Iran sought only what it believed was just: funding on par with the aid given

to Pakistan per Afghan refugee. Failure to meet this condition led Iran to believe the

UNHCR was neglecting the Afghan refugees on its soil.56 This belief contributed to

Iran’s stonewalling of the UNHCR’s request for an operational presence. This

sticking point came across in other UNHCR-Iran encounters: an appeal for funds in

favor of Ugandan refugees in mid-1984 was rejected by the Iranian Ambassador to

the UN on the basis that Afghan refugees in Iran were its priority.57 However, this

impasse did not last for long: Iran acquiesced to the UNHCR’s desire for an

operational presence, eventually allowing two UNHCR staff on the ground in mid-

1984,58 and the establishment of a full office in Teheran in October 1984.59

India felt the spillover effects of the Afghan refugee crisis beginning in April

1978, and in earnest after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.60 The majority of

Afghan refugees in India travelled from Afghanistan to Pakistan, their country of

first asylum, and then moved on to India because of rumors in refugee villages

alleging more favorable treatment from the UNHCR office in India.61 Indeed, some

of the wealthier Afghan refugees flew directly from Kabul to New Delhi, bypassing

Pakistan altogether.62 The Indian Government was reluctant to view Afghan

refugees as bona fide refugees. In the first instance, amicable relations between India

and the USSR, solidified by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of

1971, made recognition of refugees from a Communist state a sensitive matter. This

was more than just a passing feeling – the Sixth Emergency Special Session of the 56 UNHCRA, “Cable of the UNDP in Iran to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 19 April 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2,

010.IRN 1984, p. 1. 57 UNHCRA, Folio 238: “Letter of Nasrollah Kazemi Kamyab, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of

Iran to the UN and other IOs in Geneva, to Ole Volfing, UNHCR Director of External Affairs”, 13 July 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 010.IRN 1984.

58 UNHCRA, Folio 239: “Confidential memo of Ghassan Arnaout, Head of the Regional Bureau of the Middle East and South West Asia, to HC Hartling, on his mission to Teheran, 2-6 July 1984”, report date 16 July 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 010.IRN 1984, p. 2.

59 UNHCRA, A/AC.96/657 – 5 August 1985, 36th Session Executive Committee, report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1984-1985 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programmes and Budget for 1986, para. 1219, p. 412.

60 UNHCRA, Folio 60a: “Mission report of S. Bari to New Delhi, 27 October – 1 November 1980”, report date 26 November 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81, pp. 1-2.

61 UNHCRA, Folio 86: “Cable of the UNHCR in New Delhi to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 16 January 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81, p. 1.

62 UNHCRA, Folio 90: “Cable of Candida Toscani, of the UNHCR in New Delhi (through UNDP New Delhi), to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 21 January 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81.

17

UN General Assembly (UNGA) (10-14 January 1980)63 was called specifically to deal

with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During this session, the Indian

Government representative aligned with the USSR and Afghanistan in abstaining

from the vote on an ultimately successful resolution which requested the withdrawal

of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The representative of the Indian Government,

B.C. Mishra, was quoted as saying that the Soviet Union would withdraw from

Afghanistan when requested to do so by the Afghanistan Government.64

Moreover, dealing with Afghan refugees, or refugees of any sort in the region,

meant discussing the quagmire of Kashmir. Mr Gharekhan, Joint Secretary of the

UN Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, insisted on his government’s

belief that Pakistan was setting up refugee camps in “Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.”65

Finally, acceptance of Afghan refugees was seen as a challenge to national

sovereignty. De facto partner agency the ICRC constantly queried the status of

Afghans detained in Ferozepur jail, “and was warned in no uncertain terms that if

ICRC even touched this matter it would mean end of its presence in India.”66

Certain issues, it appeared, were too sensitive for international supervision or

involvement.67 However, diplomatic rationales were perceived as obstructionism to

refugees in need of UNHCR aid. Leaders of Afghan refugee groups continually

threatened to demonstrate in front of the UN complex in New Delhi until their 63 Emergency Special Sessions of the UNGA are provided for in resolution 377A(V), “Uniting for Peace” (3

Nov. 1950). Such sessions are to be convened within the twenty-four hours of calling for such a session. As of April 2013, only ten such sessions have ever been called.

64 Cited in P. Olkhovsky, India and the U.S., Heritage Foundation, 27 July 1982, available at: http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/9030.pdf (last visited 13 April 2013).

65 UNHCRA, Folio 60a: “Mission report of S. Bari to New Delhi, 27 October – 1 November 1980”, report date 26 November 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81, p. 5 (bullet point 23).

66 UNHCRA, Folio 429: “Cable of F. Karim, UNHCR Chargé de Mission in New Delhi (via Mangun of UNDP in New Delhi), to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 10 August 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 8] 1984.

67 The same issue arose in Pakistan: the UNHCR and the ICRC were initially barred from visiting Afghan asylum-seekers in Pakistani jails, detained for charges running the gamut from minor offenses to issues of national security. However, unlike in India, the Pakistani Government eventually acquiesced and gave the UNHCR full access to this population by autumn 1981. UNHCRA, Folio 26: “Cable of Roman Kohaut, UNHCR Chief of Mission, Islamabad, to UNHCR in Geneva”, 28 October 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 PAK 1974-84. See also UNHCRA, Folio 57: “Letter of S.S. Wijeratne, Assistant Chief of Mission – Legal Section, to Zahid Saeed, Director-General (Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan) in the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on general permission to visit jails to interview asylum seekers”, 28 October 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 640.PAK 1974-84; UNHCRA, Folio 155: “Memo on Afghans detained in Manzai Jail”, 2 March 1982, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.PAK [Vol. 3] 1982-83; UNHCRA, “Amnesty International Report”, 2 November 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 630.1 AFG 1982-84.

18

treatment was improved to be at least on par with that given to Afghan refugees in

Pakistan.68

Given its established presence in India, as in Pakistan and Iran, the UNDP

proved to be a first responder.69 While the UNHCR undertook several missions to

India to observe the refugee situation brewing in 1979, a new, separate office was not

in the cards early on.70 The first breakthrough was small: in March 1981, a UNHCR

official was assigned to work in the UNDP office in New Delhi.71 Four months later,

a UNHCR chargé de mission was sent to New Delhi to deal with arrangements for

Afghan, Indochinese, African, and Iranian refugees,72 without consultation with the

Indian Government.73 The UNHCR chargé de mission in New Delhi remained linked

with the UNDP.74 Despite UNHCR involvement in aiding Afghan asylum-seekers,

the Government of India officially avoided recognizing the population as bona fide

refugees.75

The impracticability of UNHCR as first responder in this crisis, combined

with a lack of host country engagement, did not mean Afghan refugees lacked

support. As demonstrated by this case, the initial UNHCR mandate could be carried

out rather successfully through aid agencies already on the ground, like the UNDP

68 UNHCRA, Folio 60a: “Mission report of S. Bari to New Delhi, 27 October – 1 November 1980”, report date

26 November 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81, p. 2. For example: UNHCRA, Folio 70a: “Confidential note relaying the occupation of the UNDP New Delhi office over the alleged deportation of six Afghan nationals, from Jan P. Huyser, UNDP Resident Representative in New Delhi, to R. Sampatkumar, Chief, Regional Bureau for Asia and South East Asia, UNHCR in Geneva”, 11 December 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81; UNHCRA, Folio 165: “Cable from UNHCR New Delhi to UNHCR Geneva relaying the situation of several Afghans (ex-Pakistan) seeking refugee status”, 31 July 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 3] 1981.

69 UNHCRA, “Mission report of Candida Toscani in New Delhi 5 January – 27 February 1981”, report date 12 March 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81.

70 The UNHCR had established an office in New Delhi in 1969 to aid Tibetan refugees, but it was closed in 1975. S. Sen, “Paradoxes of the international regime of care: the role of the UNHCR in India”, in R. Samaddar, Refugees and the state: practices of asylum and care in India, 1947-2000, London, SAGE Publications, 2003, 399; UNHCRA, Folio 60a: “Mission report of S. Bari to New Delhi, 27 October – 1 November 1980,” report date 26 November 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81.

71 UNHCRA, A/AC.96/594 – 10 August 1981, 32nd Session Executive Committee, report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1980-1981 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programmes and Budget for 1982, para. 705, p. 197.

72 UNHCRA, A/AC.96/594, 10 August 1981, para. 706, p. 197. 73 Sen, in Samaddar, Refugees and the state, 401. 74 UNHCRA, Folio 14: “1986 Report on UNHCR Protection Activities for India”, ca. 10 February 1986, Fonds

11 Series 3, 600.IND [Binder A], p. 1 of report. 75 Elie, The UNHCR and the Cold War, 25-26.

19

and the ICRC, or through the detachment of UNHCR officials to such offices.76 To

be sure, UNHCR presence went hand-in-hand with advocacy for broader

compliance with international refugee norms. Nevertheless, first response measures

could be successfully handled by UNHCR proxies.77 In certain instances – like Iran -

connections with external agencies had the advantage of facilitating UNHCR action

which had otherwise stagnated.

The UNHCR’s heavy reliance on external actors to carry out its mandate

underscores the political nature of the Afghan refugee crisis and the extreme

difficulty of working in such situations. Nevertheless the eventual solicitation of the

UNHCR – once conditions were auspicious - emphasizes the centrality of the

UNHCR and its mission in the broader international community. “From its

inception, the UNHCR developed its capacity to work with others and through

others.”78 Through collaboration with other UN and even non-UN actors, the

UNHCR was able to carry out its protection mandate in spaces where the possibility

for action appeared out of reach. Such active collaboration in favor of refugees by

entities not primarily concerned with such a population (like the ICRC and the Red

Crescent)79 attests to the validity of inter-agency cooperation as a means to fulfill

mandates,80 particularly when possibilities for UNHCR-directed action are limited.

76 This directly challenges Frederick Cuny’s assertion that, in order for the UNHCR to be effective, it had to

“arrive early and promptly” in refugee relief operations. F.C. Cuny, “The UNHCR and Relief Operations: A Changing Role”, International Migration Review 15 (1/2), 1981, 17.

77 Some UNDP offices were poorly equipped to manage refugee issues, and required UNHCR help from the start, notably the United Arab Emirates. UNHCRA, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.UAE.AFG 1980-84, passim.

78 Gerald Walzer (former UNHCR official active in Pakistan 1982-1984), interview by author, 2 November 2010.

79 For more on UNHCR-voluntary organization cooperation, see E.G. Ferris, “The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the International Refugee Regime”, in N. Steinder, M. Gibney & G. Loescher (eds.), Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights, New York, Routledge, 2003, 119.

80 An example: Walzer attested that the World Food Programme’s distribution of food aid to Afghan refugees in connection with UNHCR activities was indispensable to the success of UNHCR efforts in favor of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Gerald Walzer, interview by author, 2 November 2010.

20

International considerations

Moving beyond the immediate protection-related concerns of the UNHCR, it is

necessary to examine some larger questions of refugee protection in order to

continue to complete the picture of how the UNHCR discharged its mandate as

regards Afghan refugees. Most significantly profiled here is the continuing UNHCR

campaign to promote accession to the Refugee Convention and Protocol; its

prominence is derived from the amount of archival material on this topic. An

addendum to this issue is the difficulty of aiding refugees in countries other than

their country of first asylum. This can be summarized as a disconnect between the

well-intentioned terms of the Refugee Convention and Protocol and the reality of

refugee situations on the ground. As regards Afghan refugees, the UNHCR ended

up having to adapt to unforeseen situations.

Pakistan, the primary country of first asylum for Afghan refugees, gained

power and respect from the UNHCR through its handling of the refugee crisis.

Rather than continuing to circulate accusatory note verbales regarding the causes of

the mass exodus of Afghans from Afghanistan among UN members, as was the case

between Afghanistan and Pakistan early on, Pakistan began a humanitarian charm

offensive.81 During the debate on the Afghan refugee crisis in the UNGA Emergency

Special Session held from 10-14 January 1980, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Aga Shahi

gave an eloquent discourse:

The problem of Afghan refugees is not of our making. Our concern for them is entirely humanitarian. They have been given shelter by Pakistan in accordance with the universally accepted principles and practices, the 1951 UN Convention relating to refugees supplemented by the Protocol of 1967 as well as the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration for Human Rights.

81 According to Walzer, who met Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq several times while working for

the UNHCR in Pakistan, the President expressed his commitment to assisting Afghan refugees on a number of occasions, stating that “as a Muslim and as a human being, there was no question of not helping.” Gerald Walzer, interview by author, 2 November 2010.

21

To show that Pakistan was not only being magnanimous towards Afghan refugees,

but was also complying with international norms, Shahi mentioned that the Afghan

refugee villages set up by Pakistan were inspected by the UNHCR.82 Other Pakistani

government pronouncements spoke in terms of a religious duty to aid Muslims in

need of assistance,83 in line with the tradition of zakat. Some focused on the kinship

created by the overwhelmingly Pashtun heritage of the Afghans seeking refuge in

Pakistan, and prospects for their eventual resettlement in the province of Baluchistan

(encompassing parts of Iran and Afghanistan).84

The UNHCR had actively courted Pakistani accession to the Refugee

Convention and Protocol for several years, certainly pre-dating the Afghan refugee

crisis.85 However, Pakistan’s willingness to accept Afghan refugees without a proper

mandate led the UNHCR to relaunch their efforts. UNHCR approached the

Pakistani Government both in-country and through the Pakistani representation to

the UN Office at Geneva in order to push for accession to the Refugee Convention

and Protocol. For a while it seemed that Pakistan was seriously considering such a

move: an official of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs even requested a

bespoke memorandum on the benefits of Pakistan’s hypothetical accession for

Pakistan (and the UNHCR) in March 1980.86 Yet accession was not to be. As a

UNHCR official in Pakistan remarked in April 1980, “[t]he Afghan Refugee problem

is treated as a special problem with favorable political and religious overtones.”87

Pakistani accession would open up international supervision of areas and

82 Text as reported in the Islamabad press. As it was presented in UNHCR files in telegraphic cable format, it

was largely without punctuation and included some misspellings; these have been cleaned up for readability. UNHCRA, Folio 9: “Cable of the UNHCR in Pakistan to the UNHCR in Geneva,” 16 January 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 PAK 1974-84.

83 J.K. Jesse, “Policy Networks and Resource Dependencies: Third World Governments, International Organizations and Refugee Policy Making”, Ph.D Diss., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1998, 185-186.

84 Ibid., 193. 85 UNHCRA, Folio 1: “Letter of HC Aga Khan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan”, 25 June 1974,

Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 PAK 1974-84; UNHCRA, Folio 4: “Letter of HC Hartling to Pakistani Foreign Minister Aga Shahi”, 3 March 1978, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 PAK 1974-84.

86 UNHCRA, Folio 12: “Note for the file of S.S. Wijeratne, Legal Officer for the UNCHR in Islamabad”, 31 March 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 PAK 1974-84, p. 1.

87 UNHCRA, Folio 19: “Protection of Refugees in Pakistan, by S.S. Wijeratne, Assistant Representative”, 20 April 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 PAK 1974-84, p. 1

22

populations deemed to be of national, not international, importance: notably

Kashmir, and the question of the Bihari people. Accession would mean protection

could no longer be selective. While this rationale was unfavorable for Pakistan’s

public image, Pakistan was unconcerned: they had a convincing rebuttal prepared.

To Pakistan, lack of accession did not preclude protection. Pakistan was helping

Afghan refugees without acceding to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, and

UNHCR was then operating in several countries - Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Thailand – which had yet to accede to the Refugee Convention and Protocol.88 It

would appear that Pakistan attempted to deflect its non-adhesion by recalling the

UNHCR back to its mission: protection, not politics. The UNHCR remained

unconvinced by this line of argument, and continued to make accession-related

overtures to Pakistan throughout the Afghan refugee crisis, though all failed.

The UNHCR’s point of contact in the Pakistani administration for practical

issues of refugee protection was the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions

(SAFRON). While the correspondence between the UNHCR staff in Pakistan and

SAFRON remaining in the UNHCR archives is sparse, their relationship appears to

have been amicable and fruitful. When the UNHCR Chief of Mission in Pakistan

forwarded a complaint about Pakistani corruption in administering aid to Afghan

refugees in Pakistan, the Joint Secretary of SAFRON confirmed the accusations and

referred to an on-going investigation into the matter.89 When Afghan air raids began

affecting refugee camps closer to the border, officials from SAFRON began,

seemingly without prodding, to work on moving the camps to sites further inland.90

SAFRON even undertook re-numeration [census] exercises of the refugee population

88 Ibid.; UNHCRA, Folio 18a “Accession to the Convention and Protocol by S.S. Wijeratne, Legal Officer”, 21

April 1980, Fonds 11 Series 2, 671.1 PAK. NB: Wijeratne’s title appears to have changed in a one-day span, likely indicative of a bureaucratic error.

89 UNHCRA, Folio 102: “Memo of Kohaut to Sampatkumar, forwarding the response of Colonel Babar, Joint Secretary of SAFRON, regarding accusations levied by Sungar Islami Toulana that refugee affairs in Pakistan are corrupt”, 16 July 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.PAK [Vol. 2] 1981-82.

90 UNHCRA, Folio 186: “Memo of F. Cappelli, Deputy Chief of Mission in Islamabad, to the UNHCR in Geneva, forwarding detailed information from Colonel Babar”, 18 January 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.PAK [Vol. 3] 1982-83.

23

in order to more accurately assess the need for UNCHR aid.91 The active

participation of SAFRON in refugee protection serves as a reminder that successful

refugee protection can be just as much of an internal (state) development as an

external (international) one, a point often forgotten when focusing on international

refugee protection. While the UNHCR and its standards certainly have established

an international benchmark, this example proves one should not be quick to

discredit states which, by virtue of non-ratification of the Refugee Convention and

Protocol, are considered outside of the international refugee protection regime.

Indeed, states subscribing to the main international refugee instruments are

not necessarily models of refugee protection. Iran had technically, under the Shah,

acceded to the Refugee Convention and Protocol: it was a fait accompli at the time of

the Afghan refugee crisis.92 However, as seen the previous section, Iran held a very

ambivalent attitude about concluding a cooperative contract with the UNHCR, both

under the Shah93 and after. This situation was not helped by the view of the

UNHCR as a Western puppet, and the UNHCR’s insistence on having cooperation

carried out strictly as per regulations and signed agreements. Only after four years

of back-and-forth negotiations (by 1984), was cooperation along the lines desired by

the UNHCR established in Iran. The insistence for state sovereignty remained high

in Iran. A 1986 UNHCR protection report recounted that:

our capacity to influence government policy in protection matters is extremely limited at this stage. Our activities in this field are further hampered by the fact that CAR and local government staff, at least in Khurasan province, seem to have little notion of UNHCR’s protection mandate. We are seen as a source of assistance goods only and our protection related questions are looked upon as an unwarranted intrusion.94

91 UNHCRA, Folio 443: “Memo of Roman C. Kohaut, Chief of Mission, UNHCR, to the Chief of the South

West Asia Section, forwarding a letter from Colonel Babar (SAFRON) about renumeration of refugees”, 9 March 1982, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.PAK.AFG [Vol. 7] 1982, p. 2.

92 The UNHCR did not consider the shift from the Shah’s Iran to the Islamic Republic of Iran to terminate the legal effects of the conventions. As the chargé de mission of the UNHCR in Teheran reported to Geneva in 1986, “Iran is a party to the Convention and the Protocol,” though he went on to explain procedures for determination of refugee status in Iran were nonexistent. UNHCRA, Folio 6: “Reporting on UNHCR Protection Activities in 1985,” 4 March 1986, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.IRN [Binder A], p. 2, para. 1 of report.

93 See above footnote 35. 94 UNHCRA, “Protection report of Mission to Iran (30 June – 18 July 1986), by Stefan Sperl, Head of Desk for

Iran and the Middle East”, 30 July 1986, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.IRN [Binder A], p. 4. NB: CAR is the

24

After years of wrangling for an operational agreement, it appeared that the UNHCR

would be solicited for aid, but decision-making regarding Afghan refugees largely

remained the province of the Government, as in Pakistan and most countries where

the UNHCR operated. Iran wanted the UNHCR to help Afghan refugees on its

territory, but on Iran’s terms. Unfortunately discussion of the protection of Afghan

refugees in Iran was, by the mid-1980s, largely overshadowed by the case of Kurdish

Iraqis and Iranian refugees.95

India, like Pakistan, had not acceded to the 1951 Convention and 1967

Protocol at the onset of the Afghan refugee crisis. However, there is little in the

archival evidence surveyed to suggest the UNHCR ever mounted as aggressive a

campaign to encourage India to ratify these instruments as they did for Pakistan.

One reason for this could be that UNHCR action in India to date had been fairly

limited: the UNHCR had established an office in India 1969 to help resettle Tibetan

refugees (closed by 1975),96 one which remained active throughout the East Pakistani

Crisis of 1971-1973. Such a campaign was not necessary because the UNHCR was

permitted to carry out protection activities for Afghan refugees despite non-

ratification of the pertinent instruments.

India’s public attitude towards Afghan refugees was quite different from its

private attitude. Publicly, for reasons of alliances and internal difficulties, Afghan

asylum-seekers were not identified as refugees. Privately, India permitted leeway

for the UNHCR to act. Afghan (and Iranian) asylum-seekers recognized by the

UNHCR were able to obtain one-year residence permits (without work

authorizations) and to attend educational institutions, even if their entry into the

country had been illegal. The Indian Government indicated to the UNHCR that it

Council for Afghan Refugees, the office in the Iranian Ministry of the Interior which functioned as UNHCR’s partner in refugee matters.

95 Based on observations in UNHCRA, Fonds 13 Sub-fonds 2, Mission (of Poul Hartling) to New York (18-21/6/1985); Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IRN.AFG [Vol. 1] 1978-82, and 671.1 IRN 1971-78.

96 UNHCRA, Folio 314: “Memo of Dennis MacNamara, Chief of the South and South East Asia Section, to the UNHCR chargé de mission in New Delhi (F. Karim), on a meeting with the Indian Permanent Mission”, 16 February 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IND [Vol. 2] 1984, p. 1 of “UNHCR’s activities in India.”

25

preferred high profile Afghan asylum cases to not be recognized by the UNHCR,

and instead be processed quietly and quickly for resettlement in a third country.97

This tenuous, unofficial engagement seemingly occurred only where India was

comfortable with such action; indeed, the UNHCR was barred from aiding the Sri

Lankan Tamils and the Bangladeshi Chakmas.98

Government nonchalance regarding accession to the Refugee Convention and

Protocol frustrated the UNHCR. Humanitarian exceptions, while providing a basis

for action, had the effect of severely limiting UNHCR ability to protect all refugee

populations. Nevertheless, accepting such selective action was necessary for an

agency focused on refugee protection: without such pragmatic concessions, action

would have been severely curtailed. Though the UNHCR could not help all

refugees, it would do its best to help those with which it was permitted to engage.99

Such discerning engagement highlights two important points: first, states often

sought to help only those refugee populations which were not perceived as threats

to their sovereignty, or for which aid had favorable political overtones. Second, in

certain crises, host states themselves were not completely devoid of refugee

problems – for instance, in this case study, Iran was both a refugee hosting and

refugee-generating state.100 In order to carry out its protection mission under such

complicated circumstances, the UNHCR was challenged by competing objectives in

achieving refugee protection: working with the host state in favor of one refugee

population, while discreetly protecting refugees fleeing this very same state.

One facet of refugee protection has not yet been broached: the effect of the

refugees themselves. In regards to the Afghan refugee crisis, the issue of asylum in

India is instructive. India functioned as both a country of both first and second

asylum for Afghan refugees. Those seeking first asylum in India were typically 97 UNHCRA, Folio 8: “1985 Report on UNHCR Protection Activities for India”, ca. 3 March 1986, Fonds 11

Series 3, 600.IND [Binder A], p. 5. 98 UNHCRA, “Report on UNHCR Protection Activities in India in 1987 – Part I”, ca. 12 February 1988, Fonds

11 Series 3, 600.IND [Binder B], p. 2. 99 J.B. Elie, “‘Protection is the Art of the Possible’: Relations between the UNHCR and the United States in the

early 1980s – the Case of Displaced Salvadorans,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 27(1), 2007, 89-103. 100 See UNHCRA, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.IRN [Binder A], and 600.IRQ 1975-84.

26

wealthy: such refugees had the financial means to head directly for India by air,

rather than traversing Pakistan by ground. This paradox was not lost on UNHCR -

well-to-do refugees were entitled to UNHCR help in India, whereas those less well-

off who had made the land crossing from Afghanistan via Pakistan to India were not

entitled to UNHCR help in India because of their classification as seekers of second

asylum.101 UNHCR guidelines asserted that protection would be afforded to

refugees in their country of first asylum only.102 The desire of Afghan refugees to

leave first asylum in Pakistan and seek out what was rumoured to be better aid from

the UNHCR in New Delhi was not entirely unfounded: the UNHCR found some

credence in accusations of poor conditions for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.103

The social station of Afghan refugees in India, estimated to be 95 per cent

intellectual workers,104 combined with Indian official non-recognition of Afghan

refugees, combined into a perfect storm. Afghan refugees seeking second asylum in

India, once rejected by the UNHCR, protested outside the UNDP office in New

Delhi.105 They even conducted a hunger strike in the lobby of the aforementioned

office,106 and threatened the personal security of UNHCR employees.107 The

UNHCR’s standard principle of encouraging such refugees to return to their country

101 UNHCRA, Folio 90: “Cable of Candida Toscani, UNHCR in New Delhi (through UNDP New Delhi), to

UNHCR in Geneva”, 21 January 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81. 102 Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits refoulement of asylum-seekers back to their country of

origin (obligation to give asylum), and Article 31 does not consider asylum-seekers refugees if they do not arrive directly from their country of origin. For more see Morten Kjaerum, “The Concept of Country of First Asylum,” International Journal of Refugee Law 4(4), 1992, particularly 514-515.

103 UNHCRA, Folio 261: “Note for the File of F. Karim on Policy Committee Decision of 4th July regarding screening of and assistance to Afghans in India”, 12 July 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IND [Vol. 1] 1983-84, p. 1.

104 UNHCRA, “Mission report of Candida Toscani in New Delhi 5 January – 27 February 1981”, report date 12 March 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 2] 1980-81.

105 UNHCRA, Folio 165: “Cable from UNHCR New Delhi to UNHCR Geneva relaying the situation of several Afghans (ex-Pakistan) seeking refugee status”, 31 July 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 3] 1981. The UNHCR office in Islamabad was also subject to such protests. However, the efforts focused on the UNCHR in New Delhi were longer and more violent. For the occurrences in Islamabad, see UNHCRA, Folio 6: “Cable of UNHCR Islamabad to UNHCR Geneva,” 13 January 1986, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.PAK [Binder A].

106 UNHCRA, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 6] 1983, passim. 107 UNHCRA, Folio 347: “Note for the file on the Security Situation OCM New Delhi, by Geldolph A. Everts”,

30 May 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IND [Vol. 3] 1984, p. 1.

27

of first asylum108 was stymied when the Pakistani Government decided to refuse

returns of such refugees.109

The UNHCR sought to devise a solution which would aid genuine refugees

rather than encouraging ordinary migration, but unlike the member states in which

UNHCR operated, the agency did not have the luxury of picking and choosing when

it came to operations: a uniform rule had to be formulated. Hence, if UNHCR

recognized Afghans ex-Pakistan in India, it would have to recognize Iranians ex-

Pakistan in India as well.110 A sudden solution pre-empted the UNHCR from having

to come up with a durable work-around: by mid-January 1984, the Indian

Government had agreed to issue residence permits to Afghans ex-Pakistan and ex-

Iran recognized as refugees by the UNHCR.111 This change of heart, while helping

those refugees legitimately in need, had the effect of increasing the number of

Afghans ex-Pakistan in India.112

The crisis of second asylum of Afghans ex-Pakistan in India was often

attributed by refugees to a lack of publicity on the importance of the country of first

asylum in the UNHCR mandate. Yet, the UNHCR did not believe this explanation,

placing more credence in a poor standard of living in Pakistan’s refugee camps, and

special exceptions made in favor of some Iranians ex-Pakistan.113 Though the first

asylum rule afforded some degree of protection against accusations of favoritism, it

did not account for the vicissitudes of reality. Real refugee crises cannot always be

108 By and large with Pakistan as country of first asylum, until halfway through 1982, when Afghans with first

asylum in Iran began moving to India as well. UNHCRA, Folio 247: “Note for the File: Arrival in India of Afghan refugees who have transited through Iran, by Geldoph A. Everts, South and South East Asia Section”, 31 August 1982, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 5] 1982.

109 UNHCRA, Folio 177: “Cable of the UNHCR in New Delhi to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 10 November 1981, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 3] 1981.

110 UNHCRA, Folio 301: “Memo from F. Karim of the UNHCR in New Delhi to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 14 June 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 6] 1983, p. 1.

111 UNHCRA, Folio 372: “Cable from the UNHCR in New Delhi to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 18 January 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 7] 1983-84, p. 1.

112 UNHCRA, Folio 386: “Memo of F. Karim, Chargé de Mission of the UNHCR India (New Delhi), to the UNHCR in Geneva, "Influx of Afghans from Pakistan””, 2 March 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 100.IND.AFG [Vol. 7] 1983-84.

113 UNHCRA, Folio 208: “Copy of cable from UNHCR New Delhi on arguments being advanced by Afghans ex-Pakistan in India as to why they should be protected”, 14 June 1983, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.PAK [Vol. 3] 1982-83.

28

solved by the neat boxes of local integration into countries of first asylum,

resettlement, or repatriation to countries of origin.

Donor financing

At the time of the Afghan refugee crisis, the UNHCR was a temporary agency of the

UN. Its mandate was renewed periodically until 2003, when it became a permanent

agency of the UN.114 Until then, its budgetary position was complicated by its

inability to plan on a long-term scale – appropriations were typically made on a

yearly basis.115 The UNHCR had full control over its General Programmes budget.

These funds, largely donated by nation states, were solicited and allocated on

regional and need-based determinations. In contrast, the UNHCR administered, but

had less control over, its Special Programmes budget. The Special Programmes

denomination, established on the authority of the UNGA, gave donors (mostly

nation states but sometimes multilateral entities like the European Community) an

opening to wield great influence over specific operations, namely through

supplements to General Programme actions and in earmarks for extra-mandate

interventions.116

Funds for the Afghan refugee crisis came out of both the General and Special

Programmes budgets. At certain times more was sourced from the General

Programmes funds than those of the Special Programmes, and vice versa. Given this

balancing it is interesting to note that in the case of Afghan refugees, aid was more

forthcoming for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, a non-signatory of the Refugee

Convention and Protocol, than in Iran, on paper a signatory in good standing.117 The

United States played the key role in generating this enormous funding imbalance

between the two countries, both of whom housed relatively comparable numbers of

114 UNGA, A/RES/58/153 (2003), Implementing Actions Proposed by the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees to Strengthen the Capacity of His Office to Carry Out Its Mandate: Resolution. 115 For comparison, the International Labour Organization has, since the 1970s, drawn up its programme and

budget in two-year increments. 116 Jesse, “Policy Networks and Resource Dependencies”, 154-157. 117 An imbalance noted in ibid., 222, among others.

29

Afghan refugees at times.118 There are several factors which could explain this

disparity.

In the first instance, Pakistan was the first country of the three mentioned here

to welcome Afghan refugees and to ask for UNHCR help in managing their refugee

populations: it is therefore fitting that initial funding would be targeted at Pakistan.

The UNHCR made its first comprehensive (special, not general) appeal of $55

million USD for refugee Afghans (estimated to number 500,000) in January 1980.

The US responded on the last day of the month with $5 million in emergency relief

for the Afghan refugee relief program of the UNHCR, and an additional $300,000 for

voluntary agencies,119 over 9 per cent of the total amount sought. This was in line

with the Jimmy Carter administration’s goal of supporting “a comprehensive

response to the Afghan refugee problem, rather than dribbling out piecemeal bits

which will never get added together and will put us on the earlier Cambodian

treadmill.”120

In the second instance, the US sought an accepting and accommodating venue

in which to carry out its Cold War-era foreign policy. The US contribution to the

UNHCR emergency appeal of January 1980 should be seen in that light. Records

show the US believed the UN agency was an efficient partner who could also be

exploited for propaganda: “everyone agrees that the best bilateral actions will be

visible U.S. contributions in kind coordinated with UNHCR, in the form of direct

contributions of commodities that carry U.S. logos…”121 Additionally, Pakistan, an

extremely desirable US ally in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan122

118 Tables 1 and 2. 119 “Assistance for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, Announcement of U.S. Measures, 31 January 1980.” Public

Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81. Book I - January 1 to May 23, 1980, Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1981, 256-257.

120 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Archives, Atlanta, Georgia, USA [hereafter, JCL], memo of Lincoln Bloomfield (in charge of global issues at the National Security Agency) to Zbignew Brzezinski (National Security Adviser), 28 January 1980, National Security Affairs Collection [hereafter, NSA] #6 – Brzezinski Material – Country File, “Afghanistan-1/9-31/80,” Box 1.

121 JCL, memo of Lincoln Bloomfield to Zbignew Brzezinski, 28 January 1980, NSA #6 – Brzezinski Material – Country File, “Afghanistan-1/9-31/80,” Box 1.

122 The US government cut all funding to Pakistan in 1979 amidst suspicions that Pakistan was building a nuclear bomb. P.I. Cheema, “Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan”, Pakistan Horizon 41(1), 1988, 42. On the newfound importance of Pakistan to the U.S. in Southern Asia, see F. Grare, “The Geopolitics of

30

and training ground for mujahideen123 was noted to have preferred aid funneled

through the UNHCR rather than Islamic organizations.124

While this evidence seems to highlight US confidence in the UNHCR, heading

in to the Afghan refugee crisis, in reality the US harbored serious doubts about the

agency’s abilities. UNHCR Deputy HC Dale de Haan was singled out for his

“games with the Viets threatening to undermine our understandings re moratorium

and family reunification.”125 Members of the Carter administration, though working

on “revving up UNHCR,” remained skeptical about the functioning of the

organization.126 Nevertheless, some reforms in 1980 – notably the choice of Roman

C. Kohaut as UNHCR Head of Mission in Pakistan, with his reputation as a

competent “program manager,” inspired US confidence in the agency.127

This context is important as the US considered the UNHCR a valuable partner

in the Cold War context. The US Secretary of State dispatched a cable to the US

Mission in Geneva stating:

In view of the possibility that the GOP [Government of Pakistan] may be hoping that the UNCHR will make its own protest in Kabul or Moscow (…), please consult with UNHCR Commissioner Hartling. You are authorized to urge Hartling to protest the raid to the Soviet Mission in Geneva or otherwise express grave concern over the military attack on civilian refugees. You should mention the concern of the US, as a major supporter of and contributor to the refugee effort, over this serious incident.128

The US government attempted to wield the power of the dollar over the UNHCR for

the privilege of being able to deploy the UNHCR as an agent of its policy objectives.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan”, in S.J. Stedman & F. Tanner (eds.), Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2003, 67.

123 The Pakistan-Afghan refugee-mujahideen connection is covered in detail in Grare, “The Geopolitics of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” 57-94.

124 JCL, memo of Zbignew Brzezinski to President Jimmy Carter, 9 January 1980, NSA #6, “Afghanistan – 1/9-31/80,” Box 1.

125 JCL, NSA Evening Report memo from Global Issues (Lincoln Bloomfield et al) to Zbignew Brzezinski, 3 August 1979, NLC-28-37-2-16-2.

126 JCL, NSA Evening Report memo from Global Issues to Zbignew Brzezinski, 8 February 1980, NLC-28-37-4-6-1.

127 Digital National Security Archive [hereafter, DNSA], confidential cable of Mr Helman (US Mission in Geneva) to Mr Hummel (American Embassy in Islamabad), 10 January 1980, ref. AF00785.

128 The raid referenced was that of helicopter gunships terrorizing refugee camps in Pakistan (24 October 1980). DNSA, confidential cable of Deputy US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to several US foreign policy outlets (including the US Mission in Geneva), 27 October 1980, ref. AF01068.

31

This was a tactic the US government employed with many international

organizations: the ICRC, the World Food Programme (WFP), and numerous

voluntary organizations in Pakistan.129 For the US, this multiplicity of partners was a

search for the best method to help Afghan refugees as well as an instrument of its

political agenda.130 The US was not the only country diversifying its activities,

however. Pakistan sought the aid and expertise of several organizations to manage

the Afghan refugees in its borders. The UNHCR was one of several.131

As seen in Table 2, UNHCR aid to Iran to help with Afghan refugees lagged

far behind that allocated to Pakistan for the same purpose. Ever since both of these

countries began receiving aid in 1983, Iran’s funding ranged from 4 per cent (in 1983)

to 38 per cent (in 1988) of UNHCR voluntary obligations allocated to Pakistan. Yet

Iran hosted 59 per cent of the number of refugees registered by Pakistan in 1983, and

72 per cent in 1988.132 The reasonable explanation would be that, in as much as the

US was a major donor to the UNHCR Afghan refugee relief effort, US favoritism of

Pakistan in the Cold War context trumped humanitarian considerations.133 The US

non-relationship with Iran given the Embassy hostage crisis in Teheran certainly

impacted any aid which would have been allocated to Iran for Afghan refugees.

India’s position as a Communist-friendly government - an ally of the USSR134 and

129 UNHCRA, Folio 1543: “Remarks by Mr James N. Purcell, Jr., Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs, U.S.

Department of State, to the Center for Migration Studies Conference, Washington, D.C., 30 March 1984, relayed in an interoffice memorandum from J. Henkel, Acting Representative, Washington Branch Office of the UNHCR, to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 2 April 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 010.USA [Vol. 1] 1984, p. 4 of speech.

130 Prior to the aid announcement of 31 January 1980, Brzezinski had wondered whether “[m]ultilateral assistance provided outside the UNHCR context (perhaps through Islamic organizations) could allow us to further the resistance effort more effectively.” JCL, memo of Zbignew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser, to President Jimmy Carter, 9 January 1980, NSA #6, “Afghanistan – 1/9-31/80,” Box 1.

131 Jesse, “Policy Networks and Resource Dependencies”, 189. Razvi mentioned the following as such organizations: the ICRC, the Saudi Red Crescent, the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children (U.K.), the Australian Relief Committee for Afghan Refugees, and the Church World Service; they should be supplemented by the UNDP and the WFP. Razvi, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications”, 47.

132 Tables 1 and 2. 133 While some Governments saw the UNHCR as an arena for Cold War strategizing, the UNHCR believed

itself completely removed from Cold War vicissitudes, deriving strength from its position outside the fray. Gerald Walzer, interview by author, 2 November 2010.

134 1971 Friendship Treaty, previously cited.

32

Afghanistan135 - made it privy to much less aid than that distributed to those

countries more aligned with the US during the Cold War. This supports the findings

of Jolene Kay Jesse, who singled out Marxist-Leninist tendencies and US interests as

two key variables in UNHCR funding allocations.136

While it is impossible to draw an overarching conclusion about financing of

the Afghan refugee crisis in the absence of separate funding figures for Afghan relief

in India, certain observations can be made. Regarding Iran versus Pakistan, the

funding imbalance was one of several initial barriers to action - albeit a somewhat

minor one, given the allocation of funding for tents in Iran from the Emergency

Fund. Pakistan reaped much from its double role as host for Afghan refugees and as

a prospective US ally: seemingly this combination played a large role facilitating

funding to Pakistan.137 The amalgamation of India’s funding for Afghan refugees

with all refugee funding for that country indicates the perceived unimportance of

the Afghan refugee community in India.138 One general conclusion is that donors

appear to have had great influence in directing funding for the Afghan refugee relief

efforts, which, in turn, shaped the UNHCR’s ability to act.

Conclusions

The crisis of “the boatless people” never had a discernible ending. For the UNHCR,

other, more pressing, refugee crises took precedence The action sheet for a 1986

mission report on the situation of refugees in Iran noted that the arrangements for

Afghan refugees were “satisfactory” and that Iraqi refugees were now the pressing

concern for the UNHCR in that country.139 Externally, diplomatic signposts such as

135 India was the sole South Asian country to recognize the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. 136 Jesse, “Policy Networks and Resource Dependencies”, 165. 137 Conclusion echoed in R. Schöch, “UNHCR and the Global Cold War. National Interest vs. Humanitarian

Mandate: Assistance to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan during the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan”, DEA thesis, IUHEI Geneva, 2007, 34-35.

138 Footnote to Table 2. 139 UNHCRA, Folio 4: “UNHCR action sheet attached to the Strictly Confidential: Mission to Iran report - some

observations on the present situation in Iran as a country of origin and of asylum, by M. Sultan, Senior Legal Adviser in the Division of International Protection”, 12 February 1986, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.IRN [Binder A].

33

the US-USSR talks of April 1988, the 28 April 1988 agreement between UNHCR and

Afghanistan on the repatriation of Afghan refugees, and the Soviet withdrawal from

Afghanistan in 1989 lulled the international community into believing that a solution

had been found for the Afghan refugee crisis. And yet, certain countries noticed an

uptick in refugees after these conciliatory events,140 at least in part due to previously

suppressed antagonisms between exiled Afghan political factions,141 antagonisms

which manifested themselves for several years to come.142

However unfinished the situation, valuable information about UNHCR action

can still be obtained from this analysis. First, UNHCR’s action towards Afghan

refugees was helped or hampered in proportion to the state’s degree of willingness

to engage with it. The UNHCR was barred from acting in Afghanistan, the refugee-

generating country, and could only assist Afghans in Afghanistan if other aid

entities on the ground gave notice to UNHCR.143 While Afghans in Afghanistan

cannot, under UNHCR’s own definition, be considered refugees (they remain in

their country of origin), this inability of the UNHCR to help Afghans in Afghanistan

stands in sharp contrast to the Orderly Departure Programme. There the UNHCR,

with government approval, facilitated migration of would-be refugee Vietnamese,

stemming a crisis at the origin.144 This example underscores the fact that state

engagement with UNHCR is a precondition for any intervention, and that expansive

state engagement can lead to creative solutions.145

140 UNHCRA, “Cable of the UNHCR in New Delhi to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 9 March 1989, Fonds 11 Series

3, 600.IND [Binder C], p. 1, and following documents. 141 UNHCRA, Folio 123: “Memo of Janvier de Riedmatten, Assistant Chief of Mission (Legal), UNHCR

Islamabad, to UNHCR Geneva, on Assistance to Afghan Refugees with Security Problems”, 19 October 1989, Fonds 11 Series 3, 600.PAK [Binder D], p. 1.

142 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000, 121. 143 UNHCRA, “Letter of W. Clarance, Chief of the Advisory Services Unit of the Division of International

Protection, to Lord Bethell”, 1 November 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.AFG 1984. 144 Lisa Komar, “Le Programme des départs ordonnés pour la réinstallation des Vietnamiens (1979-1996): un

exemple de division du travail”, Relations Internationales, 152, 2012, 63-76. 145 Even with creative solutions, the UNHCR can only do so much. Nicholas Morris citied Freda Hawkins to

note the fundamental difficulty of the UNHCR’s work: “UNHCR, responding to an unending series of refugee crises, moves in like an ambulance, picks up the victims, provides immediate protection and assistance. But it never asks what caused the accident. Thus the same sequence of events can take place over and over again without any serious enquiry as to the “root causes” of these occurrences.” N. Morris, “The Evolution of Humanitarian Action”, Refugee Survey Quarterly 27(1), 2008, 27.

34

States often chose not to fully engage with the UNHCR. The states in

question here mostly rejected UNHCR requests to accede to relevant refugee

instruments, or failed to comply with the requirements therein. Though UNHCR

protection for Afghan refugees was eventually permitted in Pakistan, Iran, and

India, it was done so on an exceptional basis. The UNHCR was not permitted to

intervene on behalf of all refugee populations in these three states, instead they were

confined mostly to the Afghan refugee population. Blanket permission for refugee

protection was denied for considerations of national security or interest. The

UNHCR accepted these limitations in order to be able to act in favor of as many

populations as possible, all the while actively working to overcome these limitations

when possible. For example, while collaborating with the Iranian Government on

behalf of Afghan refugees, the UNHCR led protection efforts for Iranian asylum-

seekers in India and Pakistan.

The degree to which host states utilized the UNHCR influenced the eventual

outcome on the refugee populations. Pakistan’s early engagement with the UNHCR

in favor of Afghan refugees on its soil meant that large amounts of aid for said

population was located and funneled relatively quickly (emergency allocation in

August 1979). On the other hand, Iran’s standoffish attitude towards the UNHCR

culminated in a relatively late engagement (mid-1983) for Afghan refugees. India’s

policy of permitting aid – albeit unofficially – to Afghan refugees on its soil led to an

evolving, and sometimes difficult, partnership. Nevertheless, even in the most

active country described here, Pakistan, the ability of the UNHCR to act was

complicated by more routine obstacles, such as coordination between national and

local actors.146

Just as state abstinence from UNHCR membership did not preclude action in

favor of refugee populations, UNHCR absence from the scene was not always

catastrophic for refugees. The UNHCR, through a network of amicable relations 146 UNHCRA, Folio 355a: “Memo of F. Karim, chargé de mission in India, to the Representative of the UNHCR

branch office in Washington, on illegal entries of refugees to the USA from India”, 20 June 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IND [Vol. 3] 1984, p. 2.

35

with actors on the ground, such as the UNDP, the ICRC, and others, was able to

ensure that Afghan refugees were benefitting from some measures of protection

without the UNHCR present. On a broader level, continued support of refugee

protection had familiarized the broader international community with refugee

protection as a principle of customary international law. The UNCHR’s activity was

at the heart of this development.

Jesse has posited that the UNHCR held a modicum of control regarding the

design of refugee relief programmes.147 In regards to the main action in favor of

Afghan refugees, this is simply untrue. Preconditions for UNHCR action in Pakistan

specified by the Pakistani Government put the government in charge of all relief

efforts. Iran sought to cooperate with the UNHCR on its own terms, and the

UNHCR attempted to operate under these terms until inadequate coordination

make it impossible to do so. India sought to force the UNHCR into a game of

deception so as not to anger its allies. The UNHCR’s independence was challenged

by refugee host states at every turn, in every way possible.

A clear example of this is that blanket determination of refugee status for

expatriate Afghans by the UNHCR did not necessarily make it so: host countries still

had to accept this status. The Indian Government, in consideration of political

alliances, was reluctant to bestow such a label upon the Afghan asylum-seekers

resident in its country. However, it was more than just simple reluctance. An

editorial in the Patriot, a newspaper with pro-Indian National Congress leanings,

placed blame for three high-level Afghan defections from the national Ariana

airlines squarely on the UNHCR. The UN family, it reasoned, had overstepped its

authority in according refugee status to these seekers: “under circumstances, then,

action of local undp officials [noted to be acting for the UNHCR] in arrogating to

themselves supra-national authority and thereby violating indian sovereignty is

147 Jesse, “Policy Networks and Resource Dependencies”, 204.

36

more matter for investigation than mere expression of concern.”148 States were wary

of letting their sovereignty pass to an international agency whose donors, and thus

motives, were not necessarily neutral.

In regards to independent efforts, the UNHCR held some sway. Helga

Baitenmann remarked that the UNHCR, once established on the ground in Pakistan,

began to contact non-governmental orgaizations and place them in charge of certain

aspects of the Afghan refugee relief effort.149 As a coordinating body, the UNHCR

became the focal point for independent efforts in favor of Afghan refugees. While it

is unclear from the archives whether these were one-sided projects or truly

collaborative efforts, in regards to the welfare of Afghan refugees, the UNHCR

liaised with organizations representing most of the UN family, as well as numerous

voluntary organizations. The organizations contracted by the UNHCR were bound

to abide by the same rules as the UNHCR, which proved to be a point of contention

for some. For example, the UNHCR mandated Doctors Without Borders (MSF)150 to

help them with Afghan refugee relief efforts in Pakistan in 1980. MSF however

envisioned helping the Afghans directly in Afghanistan, and to this end, the

UNHCR put this specific proposal in front of the Pakistani Government. When this

proposal was rejected by the Pakistani Government, MSF split from UNHCR efforts

and started efforts of its own in Afghanistan.151 The restrictions on UNHCR’s

margin of action proved too much for a group that was anxious to deliver aid

immediately.

Taking into account the limited margin of action that states such as Pakistan,

India, and Iran gave the UNHCR with regards to Afghan refugees, the UNHCR

attempted to provide a modicum of protection, even when they were specifically

barred from such action, through proxy agencies like the UNDP. In negotiations on

148 UNHCRA, Folio 397: “Cable of F. Karim of the UNHCR in New Delhi, to the UNHCR in Geneva”, 24

September 1984, Fonds 11 Series 2, 600.IND [Vol. 4] 1984, p. 1. 149 Helga Baitenmann, “NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicization of Humanitarian Aid,” Third World

Quarterly 12(1), 1990, 67. 150 The abbreviation is derived from its French name: Médecins sans frontières. 151 Anne Vallaeys, Médecins sans frontiers: la biographie, Paris, Libraire Arthème Fayard, 2004, 415.

37

protection with host states, the UNCHR sought a baseline of good working practices

through operating agreements. When these were unobtainable, they acted within

the imposed parameters. The UNHCR was not, however, able to tackle the aid

disparity stemming from donor preferences. The quiet strength of the UNHCR in

the Afghan refugee relief effort was derived from the fact that the UNHCR knew

when to pick its battles, in order to fulfill its protection mandate in a politicized

reality.