The Association of Ideas in Locke, Hobbes, and Turnbull

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The Association of Ideas in Hobbes, Locke, and Turnbull

Abstract: Arguably, the theory of association explained in Locke’s Essay had a remarkable influence on most thinkers of the Scottish enlightenment. Martin Kallich argues that Locke was not the first thinker in the early modern period to come up with this theory, since Hobbes had already proposed a similar doctrine in Leviathan. Kallich also offers an interpretation of both versions of the theory that I find problematic. In particular, under Kallich‘s interpretation George Turnbull‘s description of the theory of association stands as a difficult case. I examine the theory of association in Hobbes, Locke and Turnbull, and argue for two claims: 1) Kallich‘s interpretation is not quite accurate, since Hobbes‘ version of the theory of association is not as closely related to Locke‘s version as he thinks; in fact, it can‘t even be regarded as a proper theory of association 2) Turnbull‘s commitment to the experimental method led him to construct a particular version of the association of ideas that differs from Locke’s and Hobbes’. I will support my claims by showing the similarities and differences in the three versions of the theory, focusing on the difference between natural association, associated ideas, and trains of thought.

Keywords: Turnbull, association of ideas, Locke, Hobbes.

Introduction

The theory of the association of ideas was one of the salient aspects of eighteenth-

century British thought. It was fundamental for the development of psychology and

aesthetics. Its origin is usually assigned to John Locke’s famous last chapter of book II

of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Besides its applications in psychology

and aesthetics, it played an important role in the theories of a number of British

philosophers, among them Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull, David Hume,

Alexander Gerard, James Beattie, Lord Kames and David Hartley, just to name a few.

These authors refer to Locke as their main source of the theory of association, but

common scholars have argued that its origin is found before Locke's time; they have

pointed out that the theory of association is in Aristotle's and Plato's work in some

degree, and Martin Kallich refers to both Hobbes and Locke as the initial exponents of

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the theory.1 Kallich’s treatment of the topic is an outstanding overview of the relation

between the theory of association and criticism, but his interpretation of Hobbes’ third

chapter of Leviathan on trains of thought as a theory of association is not quite accurate.

If we consider Locke’s version as the ‘standard’ theory in the eighteenth century and its

subsequent development by the philosophers already mentioned, we can see that

Kallich’s interpretation runs into trouble. If we want to trace the development of the

theory of association of ideas in the eighteenth century, we need to look at it from a

different perspective.

In this paper my aim is twofold: I want to shed light on George Turnbull's adoption of

the theory of association within its context, but in order to achieve this I must argue

against Kallich's account. In particular, I will argue that Hobbes’ theory of trains of

thought does not fit with what eighteenth century philosophers considered to be the

theory of association. I begin by analyzing the chapters in Leviathan and the Essay

concerning Human Understanding that are concerned with ‘trains of thought’ and

‘associated ideas’ respectively. Next I give an examination of Turnbull’s thought on the

‘law of association.’ With these concepts in mind, I will present Kallich’s interpretation

of Hobbes’ and Locke’s theory. If we follow Kallich’s reading, Turnbull´s chapter on

the law of association stands as a difficult case and we cannot make proper sense of it.

On the other hand, if we clearly define the terms ‘trains of thought’, ‘associated ideas’,

and ´natural associations’, we can see where Kallich goes wrong, and we can come up

with an interpretation of Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories that fit better within their Early

1 Martin Kallich, The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth-century England. (The

Hague: Mouton, 1970) p. 15. See also Barbara Bowen Oberg, 'David Hartley and the Association of

Ideas', Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (1976) No. 3: 441.

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Modern context. Under this alternate framework I give an account Turnbull’s version of

the law of association. This account provides a better understanding of Turnbull’s

thought by offering an interpretation of his theory of association that fits in properly

within the early modern context.

Hobbes and ‘trains of thought’

The title of chapter three of the first book of Leviathan is ‘Of the Consequence or Train

of Imaginations.’ This is the chapter where scholars claim we find the concept of

association of ideas. Hobbes never uses this phrase, but nevertheless some believe that

the Hobbes is referring to that concept with his term trains of thought.2

Hobbes begins by explaining what he understands by this term:

By Consequence or TRAIN of thoughts, I understand that succession of one

thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from discourse in words,

mental discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after, is not

altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought

succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not

formerly had sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no transition from one

imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses.3

2 For such interpretations of Hobbes see Kallich, Op cit., 17-31; and David Rappaport. The History of the

concept of Association of Ideas. (New York, 1974) 35-47. Both authors quote from other works by

Hobbes, but those quotes are included or mentioned in the Leviathan chapter.

3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Vol. III. (London, 1839) 11.

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There are two relevant aspects of this passage: the emphasis on the origin of ideas of

imagination in the senses (which Locke and Turnbull also emphasize, as we will see

later), and the definition of trains of thought as any succession of thoughts. Hobbes

explains the details of this concept and begins by identifying two different kinds of

trains of thought, unguided and regulated:

The first is unguided, without design, and inconstant; wherein there is no

passionate thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to itself, as the end of

scope of some desire, or other passion: in which case the thoughts are said to

wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a dream…The second is

more constant; as being regulated by some desire and design. For the impression

made by such things as we desire, or fear, is strong, and permanent, or if it cease

for a time, of quick return.4

The first type is not considered in detail; it is only mentioned that even in such 'wild

ranging of the mind'5 we can sometimes discover how the succession of thoughts is

connected. Hobbes focuses on the second type, regulated train of thoughts; through an

explanation of the different operations that stem from this type of succession of

thoughts he highlights their importance and necessity for the human mind. He tells us

that regulated train of thoughts can be further divided into two kinds:

One, when of an effect imagined we seek the causes, or means to produce it: and

this is common to man and beast. The other is, when imagining any thing

whatsoever, we seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to

4 Hobbes, Leviathan, 12-13. (All page numbers in the footnotes correspond to the page number of the

Leviathan included as volume III of The English Works of Thomas Hobbes)

5 Ibid.

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say, we imagine what we can do with it, when we have it. Of which I have not at

any time seen any sign, but in man only; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to

the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensual, such as

are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger.6

Hobbes labels this regulated, guided type of train of thoughts 'seeking, or the faculty of

invention, which the Latins called sagacitas, and solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of

some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause.'7 Following

this restatement of his definition, Hobbes mentions two different instances of the

seeking he has in mind: ‘remembrance’ and ‘prudence.’ To explain the first instance he

gives an example of a man that loses something, and so his mind goes 'from place to

place, and time to time' until he finds when and where he last had that something, and

from that point starts seeking for it to find out where he lost it: 'This we call

remembrance, or calling to the mind: the Latins call it reminiscentia, as it were a re-

conning of our former actions.'8

To explain what he means by prudence he gives another example, one where a man, in

order to know which consequence a future action might have, he looks for a similar

action in the past, 'supposing like events will follow like actions.' This enables him to

foresee that committing a crime will be followed by prison, then the judge, and then the

gallows, 'which kind of thoughts, is called foresight, and prudence, or providence;'

6 Hobbes, Leviathan, 13-14.

7 Hobbes, Leviathan, 14.

8 Ibid.

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Hobbes is aware that foresight might be fallacious and uncertain, but it still helps

creatures be more prudent.9

At this point Hobbes goes on to mention the importance of the train of thoughts for the

constitution of the mind. He tells us that:

There is no other act of man’s mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in

him, so as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and

live with the use of his five senses… For besides sense, and thoughts, and the

train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion;10

He concludes the chapter with a somewhat unrelated comment on the concept of

‘infinite’, which is irrelevant for our present discussion. We now examine Locke’s

version of the theory of association.

Locke and ‘associated ideas’

Locke’s chapter ‘Of the Association of Ideas’ was included in the fourth (1700) and

fifth (1706) editions of the essay, leading to the common assertion that it was just an

afterthought. However, eighteenth-century philosophers considered his theory of

association seriously. Locke was the first to use the term ‘association of ideas’, and we

shall now see what he meant by this term.

Locke begins the chapter by noticing how we can observe ‘unreasonableness’ in other

persons, and he will briefly mention a few common causes for it. It might arise from



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self-love, but not entirely; 'education and prejudice' might be its cause in most

situations, but it is not the root for this unreasonableness which Locke is now describing

as 'Madness.' Locke apologizes for calling it such a name, especially since 'there is

scarce a Man so free from it.'11 This is exactly why we need to discuss it and try to

control this ‘madness’:

And if this be a Weakness to which all Men are so liable; if this be a Taint which

so universally infects Mankind, the greater care should be taken to lay it open

under its due Name, thereby to excite the greater care in its Prevention and

Cure.12

The next section introduces the cause for this madness, namely associated ideas. He

contrasts them with naturally connected ideas:

Some of our Ideas have a natural Correspondence and Connexion with another:

It is the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace these, and hold them

together in that Union and Correspondence which is founded on their peculiar

Beings. Besides this there is another Connexion of Ideas wholly owing to

Chance or Custom; Ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so

united in some Mens Minds, that ‘tis very hard to separate them, they always

keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the

Understanding but its Associate appears with it;13

11 John Locke. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter Nidditch. (Oxford, 1975)

(Book II, Chap. 33, §4) 395.

12 Ibid.

13 Locke, Essay (Book II, Chap. 33, §5), 395.

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It is clear that Locke is separating those ideas that are ‘naturally’ associated from those

that are not. He will be concerned in this chapter with the latter kind, which can be

labeled ‘associated ideas’; the first kind can be called ‘natural associations’. It is

important to be aware of this distinction since it will be relevant for the analysis of

Kallich’s interpretation and the examination of Turnbull’s version of association.

Locke discusses briefly the possible origin of this 'strong combination of Ideas, not

ally’d by nature.'14 He tells us that they vary from one individual to another, depending

on their education, inclinations and interests,

all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set

a going continue on in the same steps they have been used to, which by often

treading are worn into a smooth path, and the Motion in it becomes easy and as

it were Natural.15

He uses the example of a musician to illustrate his definition: once she gets used to

playing a tune, the ideas of the successive notes follow in her head the same way her

fingers move through the piano to play the tune. Even though it is very likely that

associated ideas might have its origin in the motion of the animal spirits,16 Locke does

not discuss this since he is more concerned with the effects of associated ideas.

14 Locke, Essay (Book II, Chap. 33, §6), 396.

15 Ibid.

16 It is worth mentioning here that both Hobbes and Locke talk about the origin of connected ideas in

terms of ‘motions’ from sense experience. Turnbull appears to share this view, not the description in

terms of ‘motion’, but he agrees that the origin of this kind of ideas is sense experience. See Hobbes,

Leviathan, 11-12; George Turnbull, The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy, vol. I. Ed.

Alexander Broadie. (Indianapolis, 2005) 119.

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Regardless of their natural cause, it is undeniable that associated ideas are present in

most individuals. Locke goes on to consider these ideas as the cause for most of our

sympathies and aversions. He reminds us that even though through constant repetition

such sympathies and antipathies might appear to be natural, their origin is 'the

accidental Connexion of two Ideas.''17 These connected ideas keep showing up together

due to 'either the strength of the first Impression, or future Indulgence so united.'18

Locke leaves room for some truly natural sympathies and antipathies, but he is not

concerned with them at the moment; his interest lies in those ‘acquired antipathies’ that

might end up being regarded as natural. He gives the example of a person who has an

aversion to honey, and every time she hears or thinks about it, the idea of honey is

connected with sickness and vomiting. It might be the case that the cause of this

aversion was a honey overdose when she was young, but since no one can confirm this,

and she can’t either, the acquired antipathy is mistakenly considered a natural one.19

The whole point of this discussion is to warn us of this weakness so that we can prevent

it if we provide due attention to it, especially in the education of children. Since the

impressions experienced during our infancy are the ones that impact us the most, we

need to be aware of and prevent the unnatural connection of ideas. Locke warns us that

this 'wrong connection of ideas' has a strong influence in all aspects of our lives and

deserves to be examined with extreme care. Locke spends the rest of the chapter

mentioning a number of instances where this association of ideas takes place. He gives

the following examples: associating goblins and spirits to darkness by a child due to the

17 Locke, Essay (Book II, Chap. 33, §7) 396.

18 Ibid.


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influence of a 'foolish maid'; hatred arising from associating one small instance of pain

to a particular individual and never separating the two ideas; having an aversion to a

particular place (a room) because a friend died in it; a man who can only dance in a

room where there is a trunk in a particular location because the room where he learnt to

dance was configured in such way; and so on.20

In the midst of all these instances Locke includes a section where he gives us a very

good reason to prevent the wrong connections from ever happening: 'When this

combination is settled and whilst it lasts, it is not in the power of Reason to help us, and

relieve us from the effects of it.'21 Since not even reason can break the link between

ideas that have been wrongly associated, it is of extreme importance to prevent it and

dissolve the connection before it settles in our mind. The only thing that might help (and

not always) dissolve the link is time. Locke believes that disuse is the only way to

eventually separate the wrongly associated ideas, and he gives an example of a mother

who lost a child and consequently lost all joy because it was associated with the idea of

her child. Only time can dissolve the link between enjoyment and the child, though in

some cases the link can never be dissolved.

Locke concludes the chapter by claiming that wrongly associated ideas are also the

source of absurd reasoning when they affect our intellectual habits and when they are

imposed by a sect. In the first case, Locke gives the example of associating the ideas of

figure and shape to the idea of God, and he tells us that this leads to absurdities. In the

second case, the unnatural association of ideas leads to irreconcilable differences

between sects (philosophical and religious). Just like it was the case with intellectual

20 Locke, Essay (Book II, Chap. 33, §10-12, §14-16) 397-399.


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habits, the wrong association leads individuals to maintain absurdities and 'fills their

Heads with false Views, and their Reasonings with false Consequences.'22

Turnbull and the law of association

George Turnbull is one of the underrated figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. When

he is mentioned, if he is mentioned at all, is just to identify him as Thomas Reid's

teacher in Aberdeen. However, there is a lot that we can learn about the period and the

development of moral philosophy in the eighteenth century by looking at his work.23 In

this paper I am only focusing on one of the features of his construction of the human

mind.

In part I of The Principles of Moral Philosophy Turnbull is concerned with identifying

the general laws of human nature. He believes that once this task is done, all

appearances of human behaviour can be reduced to these laws, in the same way all

bodies are subject to the law of gravity. The first two laws of human nature he identifies

are ‘the law of power’, and the ‘law of our connection to the material world’. The third

law is going to be the ‘law of association of ideas’.

Turnbull begins by pointing out two 'remarkable' features of human nature: the

association of ideas and the formation of habits. Both stem from the one and same

22 Locke. Essay (Book II, Chap. 33, §18) 400-401.

23 In recent years some scholars have recognized Turnbull's relevance and reseve for him a special place

within the history of the Scottish Enlightenment. See for example Thomas Ahnert, 'The ‘Science of Man’

in the Moral and Political Philosophy of George Turnbull, 1698-1748.' In Human nature as the basis of

morality and society in early modern philosophy. Acta Philosophica Fennica 83 (2007): 89-104;

Alexander Broadie, A history of Scottish philosophy (Edinburgh, 2009); and Paul wood, The Aberdeen

enlightenment: the arts curriculum in the eighteenth century. (Aberdeen, 1993)

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principle, and they have a reciprocal effect on each other. I quote Turnbull’s explanation

in full:

They [association of ideas and habits] both include in their nature a certain kind

of cohesion with the mind, formed by reiterated conjunction or co-existence

between objects really separate and distinct from one another; i.e. that do not

necessarily co-exist, or are not naturally parts of one whole. And as they are like

to one another, so they must go together; or neither of them can take place in a

mind without the other. If habits are contracted by repeated acts, ideas will be

joined or mixed by repeated occurrence: and reciprocally, if ideas contract a sort

of coherence by being often joined, habits must be formed by frequent repetition

of acts.24

I will focus first on the caution included in Turnbull’s description that restricts the

association of ideas to an ‘unnatural’ connection, where the two ideas that are later

joined in the mind are 'really separate and distinct from one another.' A couple of

paragraphs after the above description Turnbull again emphasizes on the restriction

when he tells us that complex ideas are not associated ideas:

Sensible ideas or qualities, which by their co-existence make the same object,

(as, for instance, it is a particular shape, size, colour, taste, and other combined

qualities in the same subject that make a peach) are not said to be associated,

because they naturally and really co-exist, or naturally and really make the same

object.25

24 Turnbull, Principles, 119.


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At this point he adds a footnote referring the reader to Locke’s chapter on the

association of ideas in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. This appears to be

the source for the restriction, as well as for his thoughts on association of ideas in

general. Turnbull explains that almost all of our ideas have some sort of association in

them, including complex ideas. The difference between the ‘natural’ connection and the

‘unnatural’ connection is that in the former the ideas belong to the object, and in the

latter they are added by the mind. And we will only consider the unnatural ones as

‘associated ideas.’ He uses a peach as an example to illustrate this point: when we see a

peach, and in our mind we desire it when we imagine the taste of it, we are making a

natural connection (the taste belongs to the peach); when we see the peach, but in our

mind we desire it because we associate it with previous situations where we were happy

and were eating a peach, we are making an unnatural connection (the happy situation is

not constitutive of the peach).26

Turnbull considers the association of ideas a necessary process of the human mind. It is

also an advantageous process, but we need to be very careful with it and learn to control

and separate certain associations:

But, what is the whole frame and course of nature, or what else indeed can it be

but a constant occasion to us of association, i.e. of mixture or coherence of

ideas? It cannot but be so, because no idea can be presented to the mind singly,

that is, without preceeding, concomitant and succeeding circumstances; and in a

world governed by uniform laws, and filled with beings of analogous natures


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and employments, no idea can fail of being often presented to the mind in the

same or like circumstances.27

The association of ideas is necessary for Turnbull because nature is a mixture of ideas.

He also thinks it is advantageous because it allows us to improve our knowledge:

For, what can be more evident, than that were we not so constituted, we could

not attain to perfection in any science, art, or virtue? It would not be in our

power to join and unite ideas at our pleasure, to recal past ones, or to lay up a

stock of knowledge in our minds to which we could have recourse upon any

occasion, and bring forth, as it were, ready money for present use. Nor would it

be in our power by all our reiterated acts to become more ready, alert, and

expeditious in performing any operation than at our first attempt; but, in every

thing, and on every emergence, after ever so much past labour, all our work

would constantly be to begin again.28

He does not just think that the association of ideas allows us to improve our knowledge;

he believes it is actually a requirement for the progress of knowledge, and he thinks that

this is enough to prove it is a good law:

Now that the law of association is an excellent law, has already been proved: it is

The law of improvement to perfection. But its fitness and goodness will yet more

fully appear from the following considerations.29

27 Turnbull, Principles,123.

28 Turnbull, Principes, 121.


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Turnbull then shows ‘several good effects of this law.’ The first effect he describes

regards our knowledge of nature. He has already mentioned that nature is nothing but a

mixture of ideas, so it is due to the law of association that we acquire knowledge of it:

It is, indeed, in consequence of the law of association, that we learn any of the

connexions of nature; or that any appearance with its effects, is not as new to us

at all times as at first; that is, as unfamiliar to our mind. It is owing to it that any

appearance immediately suggests its concomitants and subsequents to us; and

that we thus become acquainted with nature, in proportion to the attention we

give to the course of things in it;… But what could we do, how miserable, how

ignorant would we be, without this faculty? without it we would plainly continue

to be in old age, as great novices to the world as we are in our infancy; as

incapable to foresee, and consequently as incapable to direct our conduct.30

Besides being necessary for our knowledge of nature, the association of ideas and

especially the ‘unraveling’ of associated ideas is a very pleasant enterprise, thus being

the reason for the pleasure we experience when studying nature. Turnbull supposes

here that the pleasure we acquire is a necessary characteristic of the study of nature;

since such enterprise consists mainly in 'separating our ideas received from experience'

he can conclude that the association of ideas must be pleasant as well.31

Another good effect of the law of association is that it allows us to 'strengthen or

diminish our desires; and to encrease our pleasures, or diminish our pains.'32 Turnbull

believes that our affections and desires are always excited by our ideas, and therefore

30 Ibid.


32 Turnbull, Principles, 127-128.

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we can increase the quantity of agreeableness/disagreeableness that arises from a

particular idea by associating it with other pleasures/pains.33 He lists a number of

affections that can be described as the result of a basic desire associated

(excited/moderated) with another idea:

For what, on the one hand, are luxurious fancies, excessive love of splendor,

voluptuousness, romantic love, and the immoderate lust of power, but

extravagant desires, excited by ideas of grandeur and happiness, somehow

blended with natural pleasures, and the desires these excite? Or what, on the

other hand, are patience, magnanimity, a contented mind, and other such vertues,

but affections towards certain natural objects, duly moderated by the

consideration of their intrinsic values, and of the strength of desire proportioned

to them; by separating from them all ideas that tend to encrease desire beyond

that due proportion; and by associating to them all the ideas, opinions and

judgments, that tend to maintain and preserve desire in a just tone and ballance,

with relation to true happiness?34

Turnbull concludes this section by telling us that it is Hutcheson who has extensively

covered this topic in his Essay on the Conduct of the Passions, and Turnbull’s passage

indeed closely resembles Hutcheson’s fourth chapter of the mentioned essay.35 They

both mention the same affections (luxury, extravagant love, lust of power) to illustrate


34 Ibid.

35 Hutcheson, Francis. An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with

Illustrations on the Moral Sense. (London, 1728) , 59-83.

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their argument, but Hutcheson gives a more detailed explanation of them while Turnbull

only mentions them assuming the certainty of the former’s claims.

Hutcheson considers in his Essay on the Conduct of the Passions how malicious

tempers arise, and Turnbull follows the same path by examining how the association of

ideas produces different tempers:

as associations of various sorts must necessarily be formed in the mind, by the

natural course of things, absolutely independent of us; so various associations

must produce various tempers and dispositions of mind; since every idea, as

often as it is repeated, must move the affection it naturally tends to excite; and

ideas, with their correspondent affections, often returning, must naturally form

inclinations, propensions, or tempers; for temper means nothing else.36

Turnbull focuses on the likeness of ideas and our ability to associate them to explain the

concepts of wit and judgment, and how they give rise to different characters. Likeness is

not a necessary requirement for the association of ideas, but Turnbull points out that

association is more easily engendered between ideas that have some affinity or

likeness, than between those which have no kindred, no resemblance; as we may

feel in a thousand instances.37

Turnbull gives his definition of ‘wit’ and ‘judgment’ following this comment,

identifying them as the sources for the different geniuses, as well as of different moral

characters, among individuals:


37 Ibid.

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Wit is justly defined to consist in the quick and ready assemblage of such ideas

as have any analogy, likeness, or resemblance, especially in those circumstances

which are not commonly attended to, so that the resemblance, when it is pointed

out, at once strikes by its evidence, and surprizes by its uncommonness.

Judgment, on the other hand, is rightly said to lie in nicely distinguishing the

disagreements and variances or differences of ideas; those especially which lie

more remote from common observation, and are not generally adverted to.38

Turnbull mentions that he is not interested here in the origin of wit and judgement in

human beings, but rather in establishing that they make a difference in genius. Since wit

and judgment are grounded on the rapid association of ideas, and the aptitude to discern

them, respectively, Turnbull concludes that the difference of geniuses among

individuals is due to the law of association. This conclusion also applies to the

difference in moral character. Melancholic, cheerful, cowardly, adventurous, etc., all

rise from joint ideas of different kinds.39 He does not go into the details of the relation

between moral tempers and the ideas that give rise to them (by association), since he

thinks that no further explanation is needed; arguing by analogy, if the differences

among the genius of individuals can be related to the propensity to associate/dissociate

ideas, then the same can be done with the moral character. Turnbull finishes the section

with a caution, reminding us that even though the difference of tempers depends on the

association of ideas, it also depends on ourselves; since the association/dissociation of

ideas can be taken too far by overindulging in them, we need to be careful with our

propensity to do so.

38 Ibid.

39 Turnbull, Principles, 130

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From his law of association Turnbull draws two conclusions, the first one regarding the

purpose of practical philosophy, and the second a caution on the way to break

associated ideas. In his first conclusion he tells us that,

true practical philosophy consists in what it was placed by the ancients: in the

assiduous examination of our fancies, ideas or opinions. For by these our desires

are guided or influenced…Now if this be true, our great interest and concern lies

in taking care of our opinions, that they be true and just. This ought to be the

whole business of our life; our continual, our daily employment: otherwise we

cannot be masters of our desires, or keep them in just and proportionate order.40

As he has mentioned before, the law of association is fundamental for human

knowledge because it allows us to improve our knowledge as well as separate the

unnatural associations that might be mistaken.

But the association of ideas is not easily broken, and cannot be broken by 'the

confutation of false opinions.'41 In his second conclusion Turnbull tells us that the only

way to break the link between associated ideas is by contrary practice. He illustrates this

with the following example:

Thus we may observe, that persons who by reasoning have laid aside all opinion

of spirits being in the dark more than in the light, are still uneasy to be alone in

the dark. And it is so in general, with respect to all associations: we must first,

indeed, correct the false opinion, from which the unreasonable desire or aversion

proceeds: but this is not enough: the association cannot be broken in any case,



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but, as in that instance just mentioned; by accustoming ourselves to walk in the

dark, with the absurdity of the opinion upon which our aversion or fear was

formerly founded present to our mind.42

The first sentence of this passage is found in Hutcheson’s Essay43, and Locke also

mentions the spirits-dark association in his Essay. The example is actually from

Lucretius' De rerum Natura, as explained in a footnote in Hutcheson’s text. This just

illustrates how heavily Turnbull borrowed from Hutcheson in his Principles.

The focus now shifts from association of ideas to 'active habits,' though Turnbull

reminds us that they are really the same thing, the latter being when association ends in

action. He mentions some of the good effects that arise from habits and considers

consequences of the law of association:

1. It allows us to have memory and learn.

2. It allows us to render things agreeable that we used to find disagreeable.

3. It allows us to strengthen our practical habits.

4. It allows us to form temper and character, ultimately rendering us capable of

liberty.

It is thanks to the law of association, when it terminates in action (law of habits), that

we are able to learn languages, to dance, to appreciate art, etc. We can do this thanks to

memory, which is defined as 'the power of recalling with facility and quickness ideas


43 Hutcheson, Essay, 63.

21

and truths we had formerly discovered or perceived.'44 It is because of memory that we

can improve and exercise all our faculties:

Without memory there can be no invention, judgment, nor wit, because without

memory ideas cannot be readily and quickly laid together, in order to be

compared, that their agreements and resemblances, or disagreements and

differences, may be discerned. And what is taste, but the power of judging truly

with quickness acquired by frequent consideration and practice: that is,

confirmed into habit by repeated acts?45

All of the powers of the mind are perfected habits, which we are able to develop

through our memory. Turnbull recalls Cicero to show us the method for improving our

memory. It consists in two main processes: repeated exercise (practice) and

comparison.46 The way to retain ideas and judgements is to attend to things properly,

which is the essence of repeated exercise. In order to help memory, we must consider

the analogies, relations and oppositions to other objects (comparison).47

The second consequence of the law of habits is divided in three parts. The first part is a

brief comment where Turnbull tells us that it is due to the law of habits that we can put

to good use our natural disposition to imitate, by turning our imitations into habits.


45 Ibid.

46 Hume recalls the same two processes for the improvement and development of the delicacy of taste in

his essay on taste. See David Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste', in Essays, Political, moral and Literary.

Ed. by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1987) 237-238.


22

However, we have to be extremely careful with what we choose to imitate, in order to

prevent the creation of bad habits.

The second part of the consequenc regards the ability of finding things agreeable that

we first thought of as disagreeable. Turnbull considers this a good effect of the law of

habits because it allows us to persevere in business, by getting to like what we might at

first find aversion to. He quotes Plutarch to illustrate: 'To chuse that which is likeliest to

be most advantageous to them, provided they have abilities for it, even though they

should have preconceived some prejudice against it, or aversion to it, because custom

will make it agreeable.'48

The third part explains how habits help balance our desire of novelty. Without habit, our

desire for novelty would prevent us from paying due attention to objects, since we

would be constantly switching objects looking for the new one, thus being incapable of

acquire the full knowledge of any object. Habit balances this desire for novelty by

making the repeated engagement with an object pleasant.49

It might seem that Turnbull is just speculating, and probably going too far, about the

good effects of the law of association of habits. But let’s remember that Turnbull

believes he has established the certainty of the law of association. Following the

experimental method, when he lists the good effects of his law all he is doing is

showing the phenomena that can be reduced to the law already established by

observation.



23

The third good effect where the law of habit is reflected is in strengthening our practical

habits. This is something he borrows from Joseph Butler: 'As practical habits are formed

and strengthened by repeated acts; so passive impressions are found to grow weaker by

being repeated on us.'50 This is confirmed by experience as Turnbull tells through Dr.

Butler: 'Thus perception of danger is a natural excitement of a passive fear, and active

caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the

same time that the former gradually lessens.'51

The fourth and final consequence of the law of habits is the formation of temper, which

leads Turnbull to comment on the one topic he mentioned in the introduction of his

Principles he would not discuss: liberty.52 He begins by affirming that,

All the affections of mankind be, and must be originally from nature; and art, or

exercise, cannot create, but can only make some change to the better or worse

upon what nature hath implanted in our breasts;53

However, we are able to form our temper through repeated acts, and in fact we do so,

since convincing our minds of the correct way to act is not enough to form our

character. This being the case, it is in our power to change our temper and form the

desired one. Turnbull thinks this is the most relevant consequence of the law of habits,

since it allows us to develop a ‘deliberative habit’ before we act:

50 Ibid. See also Joseph Butler, The analogy of religion, natural and revealed, to the constitution and

course of nature. To which are added, two brief dissertations: ... (Dublin,1736), 81-85.

51 Turnbull, Principles, 138; Butler, Analogy, 84.



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Whatever metaphysical janglings there have been about the freedom of our will;

our moral dominion, liberty, and mastership of ourselves certainly consist in the

established habit of thinking well before we act.54

Forming this deliberative habit should be the main focus of the education of the young,

and the daily task of adult individuals to maintain. This is the foundation of a good

temper, established and strengthened by habit, hence allowing us to gain control over

ourselves. This control is what Turnbull defines as liberty:

command over ourselves is liberty,as that being soenthralled by any appetite, as

not to be able so much as to examine its pretensions before we yield to it; or

being so habituated to desultoriness and thoughtlessness, and blind rash choice,

as not to have it in our power to think or judge before we act, is vile slavery and

impotence.55

Liberty then is also a consequence of the law of association, and with this Turnbull can

conclude his discussion and confirm that the law of association is a good general law of

mankind. He adds a corolary to his law, which is the caution we have already

mentioned:

That even in an absolutely perfect constitution of things, where the law of habit

and association takes place, if knowledge be progressive, and gradually

acquireable in proportion to application to improve in it, and consequently minds

must be in an infant state at their entrance upon the world; some associations and

habits must be early formed by minds in such a state of things, which ought to be



25

broken, and yet which cannot be broken or dissolved by reason without

difficulty and struggling. For it is impossible, but some ideas, by being

frequently presented to the mind conjointly must associate, which ought not to

be associated; or the association of which is contrary to happiness and reason.56

Kallich’s Interpretation

In my assessment of Kallich's interpretation I first focus on his exposition of Hobbes

and Locke, since his brief comments on Turnbull rely on his interpretation of the

former. It is this interpretation of Hobbes and Locke that I find problematic.

I have presented Hobbes’ and Locke’s thought on trains of thought and association of

ideas, respectively. Both of them give an entirely different version of what seems to be,

and what Martin Kallich takes to be, the same concept. Kallich places the origin of the

concept of association of ideas in both Hobbes and Locke, while recognizing that there

are laws of association in Aristotle. However, he claims eighteenth-century thinkers

were not aware of the latter as a source of the theory of association, so he begins with

Hobbes and Locke (in spite of his acknowledgement of the fact that eighteenth-century

writers do not refer to Hobbes either).57

Kallich mentions the emphasis Hobbes makes on ‘motions’ as the origin of all ideas,

and he refers the reader to the chapter of Leviathan we have examined:

But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in

whole, or in parts; so we have no transition from one imagination to another,


57 Kallich, Association, 15.

26

whereof we never had the like before in our senses. The reason whereof is this.

All fancies are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense.58

Kallich identifies this as ‘the law of contiguity', and mentions Hobbes’ two types of

trains of thought: unguided and guided. He refers the reader to the quotes we have

already examined here, and continues to interpret Hobbes' exposition of the kinds of

guided train of thoughts. Kallich thinks that these two kinds are what Hobbes labels

‘invention’ and ‘remembrance’:

Now as Hobbes continues making his categories, there are two types of

regulated trains of thought: remembrance and invention, each corresponding to a

principle of association.59

There is no mention of where ‘prudence’ falls under this interpretation. Kallich moves

on to examine how what he identifies as Hobbes’ theory of association affects the

imagination, criticism, and our appraisal of art. However it is doubtful if what Kallich

has identified as Hobbes’ theory of association is actually coherent with what

eighteenth-century thinkers understood the theory to be. Kallich certainly thinks his

interpretation is accurate:

Up to this point in our analysis of Hobbes’s use and explanation of the theory of

association, we notice that the laws of association are clearly defined. The

terminology is not always the same, but obviously the meaning is in agreement

with the usage of later writers.60

58 Hobbes, Leviathan. 11.



27

Furthermore, he claims that Hobbes was 'the first important writer to apply the

association psychology to English critical theory,' and that it is fundamental to

understand Hobbes’ theory of association for a proper interpretation of his theory of the

imagination.61 We will consider objections to Kallich’s interpretation of both Hobbes

and Locke later. Before examining his interpretation of Locke, it is important to

mention that Kallich thinks that Hobbes version of the association of ideas is necessary

for the proper functioning of wit and the faculty of invention.

Kallich dedicates only three pages to Locke’s theory of association, compared to the 13

he dedicated to Hobbes. He recognizes that Locke’s theory was very influential until

Hume’s treatise, and a modified version of it persisted through some Scottish thinkers.

Kallich thinks that both Hobbes and Locke are talking about the same concept of

association of ideas, but they differ on their assessment:

In this chapter, association is analyzed as an unusual activity of the mind

prejudicial to the understanding and akin to madness. Locke seems to have been

ignorant of Hobbes’s favorable analysis…But Locke may be considered original,

for perhaps no one from Aristotle to Hobbes had examined association only as a

weakness of the mind and as a hindrance to right thinking.62

This passage is followed by a brief summary of Locke’s chapter, where Kallich

mentions how Locke considers the association of ideas as a source of error, and how all

his examples illustrate this. Kallich also tells us that Locke did recognize a type of 'valid

connections,' but that he focuses instead on the 'irrational, unnatural train of ideas.' In a

61 Kallich, Association, 30-31.


28

footnote he clarifies that Locke does write (in other parts of the Essay) about these valid

connections, but that he does not 'consider them as the subjective mental phenomenon

known as the ‘association of ideas.'63 Kallich concludes his study on Hobbes and Locke

with the following comparison:

While Hobbes regarded the association of ideas as a natural phenomenon of the

mind and as a requisite for coherent expression, invention, and imagining,

Locke, on the other hand, regarded it as an irrational source of error.64

This confirms the claim that Kallich thinks Hobbes and Locke are referring to the same

concept of association of ideas, but draw completely opposite conclusions from their

analysis. Regarding Turnbull’s version of association, Kallich only gives a very brief

overview of it. He points out that Turnbull is 'an indiscriminate borrower,' especially

from Hutcheson and Locke, and that 'His treatment of the law of association derives

largely from the last two.'65 This might be true, but it does not entail that there is nothing

of worth or originality in Turnbull's version of association of ideas.

According to Kallich, we have a ‘negative’ version (Locke), and a ‘positive’ version

(Hobbes) of the theory of association. If we take a look at the analysis on Turnbull’s

chapter on association, we can see that he offers a positive reading of the theory, but

recognizes as his main sources and Locke and Hutcheson, which are both identified by

Kallich as giving a ‘negative’ approach to the theory of association. Turnbull does not

mention Hobbes at all. So how can we explain Turnbull’s theory, (and those of other

eighteenth-century philosophers, like Hartley’s) under Kallich’s interpretation? I claim

63 Kallich, Association, 31-32.



29

that we cannot, and the reason for this is that Kallich interprets Locke and Hobbes as if

they are talking about the same concept, when they really are not.

‘Associated ideas’ and ‘Train of thoughts’

There are a couple of (what I consider to be) mistakes in Kallich’s interpretation of both

Locke’s and Hobbes’ on associated ideas and trains of thought. In particular, his

interpretation might be driven by his aim of connecting the theory of association to

criticism. In any case, his interpretation is not accurate, and I will be focusing only on

just one of those mistakes, the one relevant for our present purpose. Once we sort the

terminology out, we can see where Kallich goes wrong, and we can come up with an

interpretation of Locke’s, Hobbes’, and Turnbull’s thought on association that is more

consistent with their texts and with the development of the concept in the eighteenth

century.

When analyzing the relevant chapters from Hobbes and Locke, we came across the

concepts of train of thoughts and associated ideas. Kallich interprets them as referring to

the same concept, but this is incorrect. In Locke, besides associated ideas we also have

natural associations. These three terms help us develop a better understanding of the

theory of association, its development and origins. The meaning assigned to each one of

the three terms can be found directly in the texts of Hobbes and Locke:

‘Train of thoughts’: By Consequence or TRAIN of thoughts, I understand that

succession of one thought to another, which is called, to distinguish it from

discourse in words, mental discourse.66


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‘Associated ideas’: Besides this there is another Connexion of Ideas wholly

owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin, come

to be so united in some Mens Minds, that ‘tis very hard to separate them, they

always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the

Understanding but its Associate appears with it;67

‘Natural associations’: Some of our Ideas have a natural Correspondence and

Connexion with another: It is the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace

these, and hold them together in that Union and Correspondence which is

founded on their peculiar Beings.68

It is tempting to say that both of Locke’s definitions (associated ideas and natural

associations) are train of thoughts and are equivalent to Hobbes’ two kinds (unguided

and guided). However, a closer look at Hobbes’ definitions of unguided and guided

train of thoughts show that this is not the case. The difference between Hobbes’ kinds

relies on the fact that the guided ones are regulated by some desire or design, while the

unguided ones are not. In Locke’s distinction, the difference is given by the

correspondence and connection of the united ideas, characteristic of natural

associations. Furthermore, the examples Hobbes uses make it clear that he is talking

about a relation of cause and effect, and not about Locke’s associated ideas or natural

associations. Both guided and unguided train of thoughts fall under a relation of cause

and effect, while in Locke’s distinction this is not the case. The example Hobbes gives

to illustrate the kind of unguided train of thoughts can help us see the difference. He is

67 Locke, Essay, (Book II, Chap. 33, §5) 395.

68 Ibid.

31

trying to show that even in unguided train of thoughts we can often see how the

thoughts are connected:

For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent,

than to ask, what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was

manifest enough. For the thought of the war, introduced the thought of the

delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought

of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of the thirty pence,

which was the price of that treason; and thence easily followed that malicious

question, and all this in a moment of time;69

This kind of connection is not what Locke has in mind when he is talking about

associated ideas. Locke’s definition is pretty clear and it is unnecessary to repeat it. We

can illustrate by pointing out at the examples he uses. The association between goblins

and darkness, example also used by Hutcheson and Turnbull, shows what Locke has in

mind when he talks of associated ideas. There is no correspondence between these two

ideas; even though the cause of this union might be traced (in a similar way to Hobbes’

penny example) to ‘a foolish maid,’ there is still no connection between the two ideas.

In Hobbes’ example, all the thoughts involved in the succession have some connection.

It seems then that Locke and Hobbes are not referring to the same concept.

The other of Locke’s definitions, natural associations, is not considered in his chapter

on the association of ideas, but the brief definition he gives is clear enough to distance

the two concepts. When talking about the association of ideas in Locke, we need to

focus only on associated ideas and leave natural associations aside. As we have seen,


32

Kallich assumes that they are both part of the same theory of association. This is not

accurate: by leaving natural associations out of his chapter Locke is restricting his

theory only to associated ideas. The correspondence and co-existence of ideas is a

completely different topic.

Kallich’s main mistake is to interpret all three terms under the same concept. If we look

at the definitions giving by the authors we can see that they are not really talking about

the same concept. Hobbes’ theory of train of thoughts is not a version of the theory of

association, especially if we take in to account the fact that eighteenth-century

philosophers never mention him in relation to the topic. This provides us with an

interpretation of the development of the theory of association that is more consistent

with the evidence from eighteenth-century texts in which the origin of the theory is

placed in Locke’s chapter of the Essay.

But we still have the problem of interpreting Turnbull’s chapter on association, since he

seems to turn Locke’s warning of the danger of associated ideas into something

necessary and useful for human beings. Turnbull follows Locke’s version of

association, and is aware of the danger of associated ideas. However, due to his

commitment to the application of the experimental method of natural philosophy to the

study of the human mind he is forced to come up with a law of association that can

account for Locke’s theory, but that can also prove it to be necessary and useful for

human beings (a good general law), and reduce all phenomena to it, since such is his

definition of law of nature. Turnbull is able to justify this by saying that the process of

dissociating the associated ideas is a pleasant enterprise, and since nature is a mixture of

ideas, the process of ‘unraveling’ them is necessary for the study of nature.

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Still, Turnbull ends up claiming the opposite of Locke. If the latter thought that the

association of ideas is very dangerous and something we should try to prevent, the

former think it is necessary for the progress and advancement of learning! This can be

explained by referring to Turnbull’s commitment to the experimental method. He takes

Locke’s danger of associated ideas into account, but this is just one part of the law of

association; Turnbull focuses on the other part of the law, the ability of the mind to

associate and dissociate ideas in general. This is what will eventually enable him to

claim that there is such thing as a ‘law of association,’ and that it is a good general law

due to all the good effects it produces. Turnbull’s law of association covers Locke’s

take on the association of ideas as a madness, but it goes beyond it to explain how the

progress of knowledge and the study of nature is possible, the formation of moral

characters is carried out, and how we are capable of liberty. We must remember that the

turn on Locke’s madness thought on association is driven by Turnbull’s general agenda,

which is

To vindicate human nature, and the ways of GOD to man, by reducing the more

remarkable appearances in the human system to excellent general laws: i.e. to

powers and laws of powers, admirably adapted to produce a very noble species

of being in the rising scale of life and perfection.70

The association of ideas cannot be considered a law of human nature if it is the cause of

madness, so Turnbull must reduce this to a caution, and show the good effects that the

law of association produces. This interpretation is consistent with the evidence from the

texts and the development of the theory of association. It maintains Locke as the source

of the theory of association for eighteenth-century philosophers while explaining the


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positive take of Turnbull. It also accounts for the fact that there is no mention of Hobbes

in relation to the topic in the eighteenth century, since his theory was not understood as

a theory of association of ideas.

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References:

- Ahnert, T. 'The ‘Science of Man’ in the Moral and Political Philosophy of George Turnbull, 1698-

1748.' In Human nature as the basis of morality and society in early modern philosophy. Acta

Philosophica Fennica 83 (2007): 89-104

- Broadie, A. A history of Scottish philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinbutgh University Press, 2009)

- Butler, Joseph. The analogy of religion, natural and revealed, to the constitution and course of nature.

To which are added, two brief dissertations: ... By Joseph Butler, ... (Dublin: J. Jones, 1736.)

http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupName=otago&tab

ID=T001&docId=CW121666346&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel=

FASCIMILE

- Hobbes, T. Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. Edited by Sir William Molesworth,

Vol. III. (London: John Bohn, 1839)

- Hume, D. 'Of the Standard of Taste', in Essays, Political, moral and Literary. Edited by Eugene F.

Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987)

- Hutcheson, F. An Essay On The Nature And Conduct Of The Passions And Affections, With Illustrations

On The Moral Sense. Edited by Aaron Garrett. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003.

http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/885

- Kallich, M. The association of ideas and critical theory in eighteenth-century England: a history of a

psychological method in English criticism. (The Hague: Mouton, 1970)

- Locke, J. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Peter Nidditch. (Oxford: Clarendon,

1975).

- Oberg, B. 'David Hartley and the Association of Ideas', Journal of the History of Ideas, 37 (1976) No.

3: 441-453

- Rappaport, D. The History of the concept of Association of Ideas. (New York: International

Universities Press, 1974)

- George Turnbull, The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy, vol. I. Edited by Alexander

Broadie. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005)

- Paul Wood, The Aberdeen enlightenment: the arts curriculum in the eighteenth century. (Aberdeen:

Aberdeen University Press, 1993)

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