Task performance under deceptive conditions: Using military scenarios in deception detection...

Task Performance Under Deceptive Conditions: Using Military Scenarios in

Deception Detection Research

David P. Biros

[email protected]

Michael C. Hass

Air Force Institute of Technology

Karl Wiers, Douglas Twitchell, Mark

Adkins, Judee K. Burgoon, Jay F.

Nunamaker Jr.

University of Arizona

Abstract

The goal of this research was to

investigate how changes in modality

(communication type) and external conditioning

(warnings of player deception) relate to perceptions of deception and task difficulty and, in

turn, how these perceptions relate to the final

group game scores in a cooperative effort with

conflicting goals. One hundred and eight

participants were grouped into teams of three,

given similar instructions but different goals, and asked to play a cooperative game called

StrikeCOM that simulates the intelligence

gathering needed to develop an air tasking order

and subsequent air strike on three military targets.

The analysis of the post-game surveys showed

support for participants in games using a face-to-face communication method to have lower

perceptions of deception and task difficulty when

compared to games using real-time plain text chat.

1.0 Introduction

Deception is part of everyday life [8, 21].

Examples of this range from the frivolous, such as

agreeing that a style of hair is beautiful when you

feel that it is not, to the serious, such as courtroom

testimony, to the life-critical, which can occur

during military conflict. Despite this inundation, it

has been found that people are typically poor

detectors of deception- commonly only able to

detect it at a level slightly better than chance [9,

18]. Why people are typically so poor at detecting

deception communication is apparent when one

considers the nature of communication and of

people.

The basic nature of communication is to

convey information from sender to receiver

through some active means. This means that when

there is communication, the receiver is attempting

to comprehend what the sender is saying and there is a basic assumption made that the message is

comprehensive and truthful [12]. The problem

with this is that research has shown that such a

mindset can lead to truth bias; a predisposition to

assume that all others’ communication is truthful or

trustworthy [13, 17].

In a military environment, it is imperative

for members to be able to trust each other when

making critical decisions in support of mission

accomplishment. For complex tasks, multiple team

members are often ;brought together to analyze

data, gain situational awareness, and develop

optimal courses of action to complete a mission.

An example of this is the Air Operations Center

(AOC). It is the mission of the AOC to determine

the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Multiple team

members from various military disciplines

determine the operation mission (flying mission)

for the war-fighters. Information integrity is

critical. The introduction of deception into such an

environment could be detrimental thus, it is

imperative that AOC crew members remain

vigilance to the possibility of deception.

This study develops deception and

deception detection models by examining group

performance and perceptions of deception and task

difficulty under two different media types or

modalities commonly employed in military

campaigns and two different levels of awareness

using a military-based scenario. The two media

types considered are face-to-face communication

and real-time text chat. The two levels of

awareness are manipulated through the

introduction of additional information to selected

participants which may make them more

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Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2005

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suspicious of the other group members. The

scenario developed was one created using a

software package called StrikeCOM, developed by

the Center for the Management of Information at

the University of Arizona to evaluate group

performance in a task requiring a coordinated effort

among players.

2.0 Background

There has been a significant amount of

attention paid to the field of deception research,

and several theories and models have been

presented. One of the more significant of these is

Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) [4] The

theory was developed to identify the characteristics

of deceptive communication between a deceiver

and one or more receivers [4]. It takes into account

the dynamic nature of communication, where

participants may modify their style of

communication based on the feedback they receive.

The IDT relies on a two-part definition of

interpersonal communication and deceptive

communication to establish the theory scope.

Interpersonal communication is defined as the

“dynamic exchange of messages between two (or

more) people” [4: 205]. This dynamic exchange

requires that the sender and receiver are active

participants in the communication and that

individual roles will change over time, as

communicators become listeners and vice versa.

Another reason why people have

difficulty detecting deception has to do with their

preconceptions of what are accurate cues to

deception. So which cues do people associate with

deception? Surveys have shown that most people

link gaze aversion and fidgeting with deception [1,

14, 24]. In one survey, 75 percent of police

officers believed that liars look away. One

possible reason for this is that the police manuals

on interrogation promote this idea even though

there is little evidence to back this up [11]. These

inaccurate preconceptions make detecting

deception more difficult. Two recent studies that

examine the relation between what people think are

associated with deception and their ability to detect

it have shown this apparent conflict. Police

officers that believe that liars avert their gaze and

fidget were shown to be among the worst at

detecting deception [15, 23]. Only when the police

officers were asked to review the video tapes for

specific cues did the detection success rates

increase.

Another facet to this issue is that changes

in technology has made face-to-face and telephone

conversations to be used less often when compared

to e-mail, video conferencing, and chat rooms [2,

10]. Given this increasing emphasis on

technologically-based communication, the

probability for deceit within this media increases

[25]. Thus, it is appropriate to consider the

influence of deception under different modalities.

2.1 Modality

Modality refers to the different

communication media or modes that can be employed (face-to-face, e-mail, telephone, etc)

when sending information to one or more

recipients. These media have different

characteristics that affect how they convey

information, how much information each can

convey, and how many different people can they

convey information to in a set amount of time [4, 6,

7, 20]. Varying modalities allows the examination

of different sets of deceptive indicators and as well

as the influence of media richness on the ability to

detect deception. Along with varying modalities,

decision making behaviors of individuals and, in

turn, of groups may be influenced by the presences

of external conditioning. This may be in the form

of increased awareness of a potential deceptive act

taking place or it may be in some other form.

2.2 External Conditioning

External conditioning is the presence of

information provided from an outside source to

certain individuals or group members about the

possibility of deception The goal of providing this

information is to raise the non-specific suspicion

levels of certain group members by providing an

external stimulus to observe individual changes in

perception of deception and task difficulty [19]. A

previous study has determined that external

stimulation or warnings are positively associated

with deception detection success [3] and the

purpose of including this condition is to expand

these results to consider its interaction with

modality.

3.0 Research Model

In order to capture the influences on

medial type and external conditioning on deception

detection ability we offer the following conceptual

model (Figure 1). Varying media types or

modalities should influence ones perceptions of

deception and task difficulty. Similarly, the

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presence of external conditioning may also

influence in human perception in a similar manner.

These perceptions, in turn, will affect task success

(i.e. deception detection success).

Figure 1: Media Type and External Conditioning Model

The concept of media richness [6]

suggests that as communications media increases

in capability, the quality of the interaction between

two the sender and receiver improves. When

performing decision-making tasks, varying the

modality of the communication in a deceptive

environment should influence the perception of

deception of the decision-maker. Further, this

change in modality should also influences and

individuals perception of difficulty in a decision-

making task. That is, the less rich communication

modes are likely to make a decision-making task

seem more difficult that those that are richer. In

turn, higher levels of media richness should then

result in greater level of task performance. As such

we posit the following hypotheses:

H1a: Tasks performed using a text-only

communication method will have a higher

perception of deception when compared to tasks

performed using a face-to-face communication

method.

H1b: Task performed using a face-to-face

communication method will be perceived as

easier to perform when compared to tasks

performed using a text-only communication

method.

H1c: Task scores will be higher on average for

those employing the face-to-face communication

method when compared to those using the face-

to-face communication method.

However, modality alone may not be

enough. Understanding the role of situational

awareness is also necessary. Individual who have a

higher awareness of the presence of deceptive in

formation may react differently under varying

modalities. In fact, O’Hair and Cody [19] suggest

that external stimuli such as a warning of the

presence of deception may result in greater levels

of success at deception detection tasks. However,

that same warning may result in higher levels of

perceived task difficulty.

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H2a: The presence of external conditioning is

associated with a higher perception of

deception.

H2b: The presence of external conditioning is

associated with a higher perception of task

difficulty.

The perception of deception should have

an influence on deception detection task

performance. Those who believe there is deception

present should be more vigilant and thus look

harder for the deceptive information resulting in

better task performance. This was demonstrated by

in an earlier study [3], but the influence of its

interaction with modality is yet unknown.

Additionally, those who feel the task is difficult are

likely to performance less well [3]. As such, once

modality and external conditioning influence

perceptions of task difficulty and the presence of

deception, the will ultimate influence task success

[26]

H3: A higher perception of deception is

associated with higher average task

performance.

H4: A higher perception of task difficulty is

associated with lower average task

performance.

In summary, varying media types and

external conditioning should influence an

individual’s perception of deception and perception

of task difficulty. When these two perceptions are

affected, this, in turn, can influence individual and

group task success. In the next section we

introduce a novel method for testing our

hypotheses.

4.0 Experiment

In order to test these hypotheses and study

the influence of media type and external

conditioning, we developed an experiment

whereby three individuals were teamed to solve of

problem. A common problem for Air Force

officers to solve is to determine which targets

aircraft should be direction to in order to achieve

military objectives on the battlefield. In the real

world, this activity in performed in an Air

Operations Center (AOC) and a group of military

personnel including coalition forces, team to

determine the target priorities for the their

aerospace resources. Members of the AOC

provide information and subject matter expertise to

help the group decide on an optimal list of target

priorities. This prioritized list is referred to as an

Air Tasking Order (ATO). Thus, in order to test

our hypotheses, we developed a simulated AOC

environment and required our decision-makers to

devise an ATO. We did this using an AOC

simulator called StrikeCOM.

4.1 StrikeCOM

StrikeCOM is a game where teams of two

or more players cooperate to determine three

targets that are hidden over a 6x6 grid map (See

Figure 4). Each player is given assets that they

could use once per turn. For this study, we used

three player teams with each player providing

information about two information assets (e.g. air,

space, human intelligence, etc).

The two assets had different search

coverage abilities; asset one could search three grid

squares per turn and asset two could search one

grid square per turn. Search efforts encompassed

five rounds where each person used their assets to

search different portions of the map for possible

targets. Results of each search yielded information

about the grids searched. Each grid searched

showed that it either had no target, possibly had a

target, or probably had a target. Conducting

another search on a grid that possibly had a target

would have shown if there was either no target or

probably a target there.

Due to the number of grids on the map, it

was impossible for any one of the players to search

the entire map by themselves. Only the individual

players knew the results of their search. They

needed to communicate their search results to the

other players in order to develop a game-winning

or optimal strategy. In order to have the greatest

chance of finding targets, players had to plan and

coordinate their searches using the communication

mode they were provided. On the sixth and final

round, each player selected a set of three or more

grids to attack in the hopes of destroying the three

targets (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2. View of StrikeCOM

The number of group strike selections that

correctly chose the correct target locations

determined the final game score. A perfect score

was achieved when all group members selected the

same three correct targets for attack. This game is

made more difficult in this experiment by the fact

that one of the three players does not want targets

to be found or destroyed and will likely provide

misleading information to the other two players.

In short, one player was told insert deceptive

information into the decision making task.

4.2 Experimental Design

To conduct the experiment, we recruited

cadets from a Air Force Reserve Officer Training

Corps (ROTC) detachment located at a university

in the southwestern United States. In their ROTC

curriculum, cadets learn about AOCs and ATOs.

The detachment commander believed that our

experiment would be a great opportunity for the

cadets. In all, we recruited 108 cadets. The cadets

were randomly assigned in groups of three (36

groups) and given positions and information assets

for the AOC simulator, StikeCOM.

One of the advantages of StrikeCOM is

that it is an easy game to learn. It was even easier

for the cadets as they had a familiarity with the

AOC environment. After a short introduction and

practice period, the cadets were ready to begin the

task of determining the ATO. Each group of

cadets was expected to complete their session

within 2 hours and the room for the experiment

allowed for up to two simultaneous groups. Each

participant was videotaped for the duration of the

session. All audio and text inputs were recorded

and transcribed for future analysis.

4.3 Independent Variables: Role,

Deception, and External Suspicion

Induction

Each player was selected to play the role

of one of three component commanders: Air, Intel,

and Space. Each component had a different role

within the game and participants were randomly

selected for each role at the beginning of the game.

The Air component commander was given

the basic set of instructions. They were told how to

play the game and their goal is to play the game as

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best they can and help to achieve the highest

overall group score. They were not made aware

that any other player might have had a different

goal. For classification purposes, the Air

component commander was considered the naïve

player.

The Intel component commanders were

also given the same basic set of instructions but

half of them were also given one additional set of

instructions They were provided with an external

source of suspicion by being informed that one of

the other two players may provide deceptive

information. The Intel component commander did

not know which of the other players was the

deceiver and may have tried to find out whom

though their goal remained to help achieve the

highest overall group score in the game.

The Space component commanders were

given a similar set of instructions, however, unlike

the other two, the space commanders were told to

correct location of the targets. They were also told

to lead the other two players away from the correct

targets using any means necessary.

5.0 Measurement

In order to successfully test the

hypotheses posited for perception of deception and

perception of task difficulty, the groups were

divided into two modality types: face-to-face and

text-chat. In accordance with Daft and Lengal,

[6] we consider face-to-face a richer modality that

text-chat. We also divided the groups by level of

external conditioning (Air had no external

conditioning, Intel received external conditioning).

Because the participants that played the role of

Space component commander had direct

knowledge of the locations of the enemy camps

and were instructed to deceive the other members,

their perceptions of deception and task difficulty

would be different from the other team members

and are excluded from the analysis of post-game

survey data.

Measurements of the perception of

deception were obtained by having the participant

answer a questionnaire that was directly related to

evaluating the level of suspicion the individual

participant had of their team members and their

belief that their team members may have been

deceitful. This questionnaire was administered at

the end of play so as not to influence the

participants. Measurements of the perception of

task difficulty were obtained though analysis of the

questions from a “task difficulty’ measure. Both

measurements were found to be reliable in a

previous study. [28] All questions used in directly

answering the hypotheses used the same scale

ratings of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly

agree)..

A factor analysis was performed to ensure

the questions loaded on the deception and task

difficulty constructs. The results of the factor

analysis show that some of the variables in both the

deception and task difficulty measures are similar.

A rotated component matrix depicted that the

questions were appropriately similar to be

combined into a composite score to evaluate the

perception of deception. An additional factor

analysis was accomplished for the perception of

task difficulty questions. Four out of the five

questions in the group loaded together under the

task difficulty construct. The one question that did

not load had to do with functions of the game

instead of issues concerning the task. The

measurement for task success was calculated by the

game as described earlier.

6.0 Analysis

Once the data collection was complete, we

performed a pair of factorial ANOVAs to test for

hypothesis support while taking into account the

possibility of an interaction effect between

modality (face-to-face) and external conditioning

(Intel and Air) while examining the perceptions of

deception and task difficulty. The results of the

factorial ANOVAs ( = 0.05) using a one-tailed

analysis show that there is no significant

interaction between modality and external

conditioning for either perception of deception (F-

ratio = 1.664, observed significance = 0.203) or

perception of task difficulty (F-ratio = 1.541,

observed significance = 0.22). This enabled us to

consider modality and external conditioning as not

having a joint , yet be able to analyze their

interactive affects.

6.1 Analysis of Hypotheses

Hypothesis H1a stated that tasked

performed using a text-only communication

method will have a higher perception of deception

when compared to games performed using a face-

to-face communication method. An ANOVA (all

ANOVAs performed at = 0.05 using a one-tailed

analysis) indicated that the perception of deception

scores were higher for text-only games when

compared to face-to-face games (mean = 3.85 TXT

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and 3.05 FTF) and that the difference is significant

(F-ratio = 4.44, observed significance = 0.04).

Participant playing StrikeCOM under the text-only

communication method perceived the presence of

deception to a greater extent than the games where

participants communicate face-to-face.

Hypothesis H1b posited that the tasked

performed using a face-to-face communication

method will be perceived as easier to perform

when compared to games performed using a text-

only communication method. The results show

that the perception of task difficulty was higher for

text only games when compared to face-to-face

games (mean = 3.96 TXT and 2.87 FTF) and that

the difference is also significant (F-ratio = 8.97,

observed significance = 0.004). Participants using

the StrikeCOM games felt that the face-to-face

tasks were much easier to accomplish when

compared to the text-only games.

Hypothesis H1c stated that the final group

game scores will be higher on average for those

employing the face-to-face communication method

when compared to those using the text-only

communication method. One would expect a

higher level of media richness to enable them to

perform the task better. However, even with the

external conditioning considered, the average game

scores for text-only and face-to-face games are

almost identical (mean = 0.203 TXT and 0.200

FTF) and there is no significant difference between

them (F-ratio = 0.005, observed significance =

0.944). The face-to-face and text-chat task

performance measures were quite close in

comparison.

Hypothesis H2a maintains that the

presence of external conditioning is associated with

a higher perception of deception. The factorial

ANOVA results (performed at = 0.05 using a

one-tailed analysis) show that participants who

received an external warning of the possibility of

player deception (Intel participants) had higher

perception of deception than those who did not

receive any warning (Air participants) (mean =

3.81 Intel and 3.08 Air) regardless of what type of

StrikeCOM game was played. While the

difference is not significant (F-ratio = 3.68,

observed significance = 0.06), the results are strong

enough to suggest continued study of the

hypothesis. This result is not overly surprising.

Past studies have demonstrated that users will

continue to rely on information technology output

even when its veracity was in question [26, 27]

Hypothesis H2b posited that the presence

of external conditioning is associated with a higher

perception of task difficulty. One would expect the

introduction of the idea that some information is

deceptive would increase the cognitive task load of

the player. The results indicated that the

perception of task difficulty is slightly higher on

average in Intel participants when compared to Air

participants (mean = 3.47 Intel and 3.35 Air) but

this difference is not significant (F-ratio = 0.100,

observed significance = 0.753). The Intel

participants (those with external conditioning) may

have found the task more difficult but that the

difference is too small to say that for certain.

6.2 Analysis of Effects of Perceptions on

Task Scores

The analysis of the effect of perceptions

of deception and task difficulty on the final group

game scores was performed using linear regression

( = 0.05). Hypothesis H3 stated that a higher

perception of deception is associated with higher

average game scores. Those groups with Intel

commanders who received the external

conditioning would likely counter the planted

deception. The regression results show a strong

negative relationship (bivariate fit: Game Score =

0.276248 - 0.0215227 Perception of Deception)

between perception of deception and group game

score (F-ratio = 8.26, observed significance =

0.0046). This means that the alternate of H3, that a

higher perception of deception is associated with

lower game scores, is supported rather than the

original hypothesis and means that, in general, as

the individual perception of deception increased,

the final StrikeCOM group game score decreases.

This result will be discussed later on.

Hypothesis H4 maintain that a higher

perception of task difficulty is associated with

lower average game scores. The regression results

show a weak negative relationship (bivariate fit:

Game Score = 0.2076717 - 0.0017208 Task

Difficulty) between the perception of task

difficulty and the final group game score. This

weak relationship is not significant (F-ratio =

0.078, observed significance = 0.78) and H4 cannot

be supported. Thus, increasing individual

perception of task difficulty had no significant

effect on the final StrikeCOM group game score.

The level of perceived difficult apparently had no

affect on task performance in this case.

7.0 Discussion

Collectively, hypotheses H1a, H1b, and

H1c proposed that changes in modality would have

a significant effect on the on the perceptions of

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deception and task difficulty and on the final group

game scores. The statistical tests support the

changes in modality affecting individual

perceptions but not affecting the task performance.

An attempt to explain why there was no difference

in mean game score between modalities requires a

reexamination of the key differences in media

characteristics as illustrated by Carlson [5] in

Chapter 2 between the face-to-face and text-only

games.

The two media types would be similar in

terms of symbol variety and tailorability. The

media would also be similar in terms of

reprocessability due to the presence of scratch

paper (which all players used) in all games

providing the ability to make written logs of results

and suggestions. Face-to-face games would

provide a slightly higher synchronicity (by a few

seconds) and conversely text-only games would

provide a slightly higher level of rehearsability.

The biggest difference between the two media

types is in the area of cue multiplicity where face-

to-face games would be able to provide visual,

verbal, and nonverbal cue channels while text-only

games provide a verbal (plain text) cue channel

only.

Additionally, we observed that the text-

only games took significantly longer to complete

compared to face-to-face games (on the order of

twice as long). This is understandable because it

can be expected to take longer to communicate a

complex idea using typed plain text compared to a

face-to-face conversation. It can be noted however

that while the text-only games took longer to

complete, the research team allowed the

participants uninterrupted time to complete the

games even when their games ran over into the

next study time slot. This could mean that, given

enough time to communicate ideas within a group,

the difference in channel cues, in verbal and

nonverbal communication, may not have enough of

an effect to change the final outcome. If, however,

we held the text only group to the time allotted,

their overall scores may have been different. We

believe this to be a limitation in the study.

7.1 External Conditioning

Collectively, hypotheses H2a and H2b

proposed that the presence or absence of external

conditioning would have an effect on the individual

perceptions of deception and task difficulty.

Analyses of these hypotheses provided limited

support at best but did show the potential for

support if this presence of external conditioning is

coupled with a media type with low cue

multiplicity such as text-chat or voice. The results

of studying external conditioning versus perception

of deception provide a limited reinforcement to a

previous study that found support to the idea “that

warnings about possible deception in computer-

based data will be positively associated with

detection success” [3: 14]. Future studies could

examine the interactions between modality,

external conditioning, and training in order to

expand on the work performed here and in other

studies [2].

7.3 Individual Perceptions and Task

Performance

Hypotheses H3 and H4 were developed to

examine what effect individual perceptions of

deception and task difficulty had on game score.

The analyses of these hypotheses show that a

greater individual perception of deception can be

associated with a lower average group game score,

however, there is no correlation between

perceptions of individual task difficulty and group

game score. Results from this study reinforce the idea

that media characteristics and external conditioning

can affect deception detection accuracy. These

results are beneficial to the understanding of

interactive deception and deception detection

processes from the view of the academic and the

practitioner. The lessons learned and consequences

stemming from the discoveries and limitations

identified in this and the preceding chapter can be

applied to future studies in the hope of further

increasing the pool of knowledge on interactive

deception processes.

8.0 Conclusions

The influence of modality and external

conditioning on task performance under deceptive

conditions is indeed and interesting phenomenon.

Varying the modality changes individual

perception about the difficulty of the task, but

seems to have little effect on task performance.

The affect of external conditioning or warning

seemed to be minimal at best. External warnings

to some group members regarding the potential for

deception did little improve task performance when

deception was present. This underscores the

significant of the truth bias construct.

The use of the StrikeCOM game provided a

unique and interesting why to examine the

influence of modality and external conditioning on

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task performance. It provided the respondents with

a simulated environment that not only helped them

to understanding the function of an AOC, but also

helped to increase respondent motivation to

succeed at the task. Continue studies using this

tool under varying conditions are indeed warranted.

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