Taiwan and Tibet: Dealing with China’s Diplomatic Pressures in

Latin America.

China’s internal divisions have always been a source of

conflict since the country’s government decided to unify

everything under the same scope. History has shown that sometimes

internal diversity can play against if not managed correctly.

China has been condemned many times by the international community

for using authoritarian means towards uprisings and movements for

autonomy in Tibet and Xinjiang. These authoritarian means are

oppressive and imply human rights violations. The same means have

been applied to Taiwan but in a different way: blockades,

complains, pressures, threats and even nuclear tests near the

island. Countries that have recognized Taiwan have faced some

problems while dealing with China mainly in politics and

sometimes, in business.

China has been lately building stronger relations with Latin

American countries. The relevance each country gives to China

varies, however some Latin American countries recognize Taiwan as

a sovereign state but others just have economic relations with the

island. The fact of China forging relations with Latin America

could affect in the sense of China taking away markets and

competing for strategic sectors such as technology manufactures,

in which Taiwan has a remarkable strength.

Inside this essay, on the first section there will be a brief

background and a general analysis of the consequences and

implications from China’s recent involvement in Latin America.

Since the focus of the essay relies on Taiwan and Tibet, there

will be two case studies in the second section: Mexico and El

Salvador. These two countries were chosen because the former does

not recognize Taiwan as a state but, it does have a strong

economic relationship with it. The latter does recognize Taiwan

and has some political clashes with China for this reason. Since

China´s influence does not limit to the economic sphere, the case

of Tibet will be analyzed with both countries at the same time

because both always receive the Dalai Lama and allow him to host

private events. Inside his visits even government officials have

received him, something that makes China complain.

The third section will consist on an analysis of China’s hard

line on Tibet and Taiwan as determinant points of conduction for

relations towards other countries that support either one of them,

or both. Inside this section, there will be an emphasis on how

some countries defend themselves from external pressure in the

sense of echoing self determination or, just obeying self

interest.

The essay will conclude by saying that China has some

negative aspects that could lead it to future failure. In the case

of Tibet, the fact of many countries receiving the Dalai Lama in

good terms makes China be condemned constantly by the

international community for human rights’ violations. Latin

America is not the exception because the Dalai Lama has always

been gladly received in the region in spite of China’s constant

complains.

Relations between Latin America and China have their roots in

1870 when Chinese government established diplomatic relations with

Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Panama and Peru in order to promote trade

and also to protect Chinese workers’ rights inside these countries

(Shixue, 2005, p64). When People’s Republic of China was founded

in 1949, Cuba was the first country to recognize it in 1960. Later

on the same year, the foundation of the Friendship Association

between Latin America and China was given.

This association serves as a communication bridge between

Latin American countries and China, through cultural envoys and

also through invitations directed to Heads of State for visiting

China (Shixue, 2005, p63). A very relevant task this office is

performing is focusing on those countries that have diplomatic

relations with Taiwan. They seek to promote opportunities in trade

and business offered by China.

The fact of having the United States of America as a natural

neighbour and also as the most influential and prominent actor in

the continent made hard for Latin America to recognize China in

the beginning. Since the US took its role against Communism very

seriously, many countries from the region like Ecuador took a step

back due to Washington’s influence in the decade of the 1960s, as

Shixue (2005) explains: ‘In the 1960s, China and many Latin

American countries showed interest in normalizing their relations.

However, due to the pressure exercised by the United States, it

was not possible to go forward even though contacts from country

to country were developing with fluidity’(p64).

This tendency of Latin America being reluctant to have

diplomatic relations with China was broken in 1970 when Chile,

under Salvador Allende established diplomatic relations with

China, turning it into the first country of the region (Shixue,

2005a, p66). The next years from the seventies decade were better

for China inside Latin America, because thanks to President

Nixon’s visit and China’s reentry to the United Nations, countries

from the region felt confident enough to establish diplomatic

relations with China (Shixue, 2005b, p66). This last fact shows

how relevant is for Latin America to be in good terms with the

United States, because having a strong neighbour influencing the

region does affect when other potential power wants to expand its

influence beyond its continental borders.

The Cold War was a determinant factor for Latin America while

building its relations with China, especially in the internal

aspect. There were some Communist roots starting to develop inside

the region through political parties. The Communist Party in China

had a good relationship with these parties mainly because of the

sympathy towards Mao Zedong’s ideals. However, these relations

with Communist parties in Latin America did not last for long due

to China’s tensions with the Soviet Union and also due to internal

problems while the Cultural Revolution was held between 1966 and

1976. (Shixue, 2005, p68).

It was until 1978 when relations started to work better and

exchange became constant between China and Latin America thanks to

Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. In general terms, economies from the

region started to have an increasing trade activity with China.

Latin America’s product diversity has been favourably used by

China in order to satisfy the majority of its needs, especially

for raw materials.

Since China’s entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001,

economic activity with Latin America has increased remarkably in

general terms however, most of the countries inside the region

were aware of China’s low labour and production costs so, many of

them enacted many anti doping measures in order to protect their

national industry. When China’s entry to the WTO was confirmed and

consolidated, many Latin American countries were forced to take

these measures out of their policies and, this caused many

countries to build commercial deficit on the long run.

Exportations from Latin America arose steadily since 1990

with 32.2% and achieved around 26.1% in 2009 (ECLAC, 2009). Since

Latin America has some structural problems such as slow economic

growth, poverty deepening, unequal wealth distribution, corruption

inside political spheres and army intromission, plus US constant

intervention, some Chinese experts have identified the region as

sensible to world economy fluctuations (Pérez Le-Fort, 2005, p97).

Economic relations between China and Latin America can be

described as ‘complimentary,’ because of high regional

expectations about Chinese demand, consistency and increasing

market transparency (Pérez Le-Fort, 2005, p98a). Product range

along with commodities increased with the inclusion of new

sectors, such as agro industrials and manufactures. China

therefore has increasing importance as a trade partner for

Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, followed by Costa Rica, Mexico

and Venezuela. Interest from the region for increasing exchange

can be seen through free trade agreements like the one signed by

Chile and China in 2005 (Pérez Le-Fort, 2005, p98b).

Today, most of the countries inside the region have a

commercial deficit due to China’s comparative advantage in the

sense of low labor costs, currency exchange mechanisms and also

because of the policies inside countries. Heterogeneity is the

best word to describe countries inside Latin America, according to

León-Manríquez (2005), ‘It is clear that China’s growth affects

differently each country of the region. Therefore in this aspect,

it is inappropriate referring to Latin America as a geographic

entity subject to a homogenous analysis. Trajectories’

heterogeneity in relation to China is expressed on different

situations’ (p46).

It is necessary to understand the context and economic

indicators of each country in order to determine whether China’s

relation has been beneficial or detrimental. For example: In the

case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, there have been

commercial gains along with investment due to their comparative

advantage in raw materials and food but, others such as Mexico and

Central America are under a tough commercial deficit and, their

exportations are being displaced inside the United States’ market

(León-Manríquez, 2005, p.29).

In general terms, China’s relations with Latin America are

mainly focused on strategic bilateral relations promotion, in

order to strengthen political cooperation as well as economic and

trade necessities complementation (Pérez Le-Fort, 2005, p98c). In

the regional aspect, China seeks to associate with powers and to

cooperate or have a say inside Latin American affairs and, also

seeks to get involved not only inside commercial and political

spheres but also in local spheres if possible. Pérez Le-Fort

(2005) explains that ‘Chinese strategy, then, bases itself upon

economic interest (as a consequence of its necessity to strengthen

external links and obtain agricultural, energetic and mineral

resources) political interest (oriented to promote multipolarity

and international relations democratization) and finally, a

diplomatic interest (oriented towards Taiwan’s attempts to gain

independence)’ (p99).

In the previous section, as it can be seen, China’s

involvement in Latin America is very complex and seeks to be

overreaching. China’s idea of ‘Third World Policy’ has been taken

seriously in matters of contributions especially in the case of

Cuba, where Chinese investment has been growing to help the island

develop its health and transportation infrastructure. China

justifies this help through the argument of ‘adopting developing

countries’ agenda under the premise of multilateralism as the

central key of diplomacy. According to León-Manríquez (2005),

multilateral organizations would allow Beijing to move forward

towards a peaceful environment suitable for development, economic

opening-up and China’s insertion to the world on egalitarian terms

(p44).

However, most countries inside the region have sought to

defend themselves from China’s economic pressures (through

attempts for national industry protectionism like anti doping

measures) and also from diplomatic ones. Latin America, as

mentioned in the previous section, is heterogeneous and this

characteristic is more noticeable inside each country’s foreign

policy. Every country has a different way of directing its

relations with China, and inside the region few have diplomatic

relations with Taiwan for the same reason of China’s commercial

presence in the whole continent.

China’s position on Taiwan is monolithic and determinant

inside its foreign policy. The fact of some countries recognizing

Taiwan as a sovereign state is regarded as a problem by China,

because they seek to consolidate the ‘One China’ policy. Taiwan

has struggled since its secession from China since the 1950s

because it has faced China’s veto from all attempts for entering

to international organizations and also for establishing

diplomatic relations with more countries. In the case of Latin

American recognition it has varied because, inside the region only

eleven countries recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.

The most common argument found in the region for not

recognizing Taiwan is precisely the perceived priority of

relations with China by some countries. In the next section, this

will be shown through two case studies, the first one will be

about El Salvador, which recognizes Taiwan as a sovereign state

and faces clashes when dealing with China. The second one will be

about Mexico, who does not recognize Taiwan but does have a

substantial economic relationship with the island, which has

implications for China-Mexico relations in what refers to markets.

El Salvador is located in Central America and it has the

largest population concentration per square meter inside the

continent. In 1922, when China was still in the middle of

political consolidation, they established a general Consulate in

El Salvador, which after Taiwan’s secession turned into the

Embassy of the Republic of China in 1961 (Republic of China

Embassy in El Salvador, 2011). There are different perceptions

about Taiwan’s recognition inside the region. The first one can be

explained through the pressure exercised by the United States

during the tough decade of the 1960s, in which Latin American

countries were facing the stark decision of either aligning with

the United States during the Cold War or facing criticism.

The second one, which is strongly supported by the Ministry

for Foreign Affairs of El Salvador is that ‘The Republic of China

and El Salvador have maintained diplomatic and friendship

relations for many years that have always been stable and that are

getting intensified (…)’ (Chang de Tsien, 2011). Since the

establishment of the Republic of China’s Embassy in El Salvador,

there have been a large number of agreements in agriculture,

culture, trade, academic exchange and investment.

China’s recent approach to Latin America has put some

challenge to El Salvador, because since China declared at the

beginning that it would not establish diplomatic relations with

any country that recognizes Taiwan, most countries inside Central

America have lately been facing diplomatic difficulties. China’s

offers for trade are very convenient in many aspects but the

monetary investments given to developing countries are even more

tempting. The former President of El Salvador, Elías Antonio Saca

did open the possibility for having relations with China due to

some pressures from business sector. The actual President,

Mauricio Funes declared that it would be done only if is

convenient for the country but, he has not made any definitive

statement yet.

The biggest concern for Taiwan inside Central America is

precisely losing its allies after what happened in 2007, when

Costa Rica all of a sudden, without previous notice broke

relations with Taiwan: ‘Costa Rica was the first country of

Central America to break up diplomatic relations with Taiwan for

establishing relations with China in June 2007, [that] was

traduced in a huge avalanche of non refundable monetary aid and

credits along with Free Trade Agreement negotiations between

Beijing and San Jose’ (HOY, 2009).

Lately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from El Salvador has

declared that there seems to be some new agreements between Taipei

and Beijing in what refers to allow commercial relations with

countries that recognize Taiwan. El Salvador is still firm on its

position of not breaking with Taiwan because their relations with

the island have always been good since the beginning.

There are other places inside Latin America in which

relations with China have caused more problems than benefits. This

is the case of Mexico, where commercial relations with China have

brought deficit and also a decrease on its exports to the United

States. Mexico’s relations with Taiwan were broken in 1972 when

People’s Republic of China was officially recognized by the

Mexican government. Mexico is one of the countries inside Latin

America that has relations with China since a long time ago:

Mexico´s relations with China are almost 250 years old (Taiwan

Hoy, 2011). In 1991, the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs in

accordance with national laws, established an office in Taipei

which serves as a link for Mexico and Taiwan in absence of

diplomatic relations.

Mexican approaches to Taiwan have been mainly directed

towards trade and investment. Taiwan has been altruistic with

Mexico in many senses, according to Taipei Office in Mexico City

(2011): ‘In what respects to economy, we have turned into Mexico’s

9th commercial partner and its 7th provider with a sum of almost 6000

million USD in bilateral trade. This represents near 1% of foreign

trade, which leaves a big space for strengthening mutual

activities that will help both sides’.

The most relevant sectors with Taiwanese participation inside

Mexican economy definitely are technological and industrial ones.

Most of the economic relations are with private businesses inside

the country that are related to sophisticate technology

production, information technologies and production of raw

materials for goods’ manufacturing. The Taipei Office is

associated with the office in Mexico City dedicated to Taiwan

economic activity and business promotion in the country: Taiwan

External Trade Development Council, which organizes all events and

meetings related to business.

Taiwanese government has also invested in many different

areas of the country such as culture and education. In what refers

to culture, Taiwan has hosted many different events to promote

itself inside Mexican main cities and, this has helped the country

to stand out. In what respects to education, Taiwan is one of the

few countries that offer attractive scholarship programmes for

students. The Taipei Office in Mexico City constantly highlights

students’ success in their studies and also the impressions they

get from Taiwan. Relations between Mexico and Taiwan are more

focused and given inside the private business sphere, which in the

case of Mexico is the most relevant sector for the country’s

economic growth. Something that plays in favour of Taiwan is that

the Mexican business sector’s perception about Taiwan’s business

culture is very positive.

The previous sections have highlighted differences in how

countries manage their interaction with Taiwan. The common point

is China pressuring towards closer relations, which can result

either in breaking relations with Taiwan due to China’s potential

to ‘buy’ relations (like in the case of Costa Rica) or like in

most cases, cede under China’s influence on the region through

market concessions.

China’s attractive commercial and cost policies can

potentially drive Taiwan out of the continent. However, many Latin

American countries have been harmed by China’s intervention

through deficit and also, many entrepreneurs have declared that

China is not an honest country in the sense of complying with what

it promises, something that has not happened with Taiwan.

China has also intended to exercise pressure to the inside of

the region in the sense of trying to impose the Communist Party’s

views on certain issues, sometimes openly but others discreetly.

Inside Latin America, there are different opinions towards China’s

way of directing to its own people, and most importantly to its

own minority groups.

The Western discourse of respect towards human rights is also

common inside Latin American region and it is present inside most

countries’ principles of foreign policy. Sometimes these claims

for ‘respect towards human rights’ in Latin America fall into

contradictory ground due to the nature of some events happening to

the inside of the countries in the region. However, Latin American

countries are still known for being welcoming with most countries

and personalities of the world. The most uncomfortable situation

with which China deals with on the international arena is

definitely for human rights’ violations, particularly inside

Tibet.

Surprisingly, in spite of the geographic distance, there are

many nongovernmental organizations and groups inside Latin America

that support the cause of Tibet. Their reasons to do so are varied

but, most of them are directed towards admiration of the Dalai

Lama and compassion for Tibetans. In the words of Aloma Sellanes,

one of the founders of Tibet Patria Libre in Uruguay, ‘(…) All

Tibetans, from inside and outside want their homeland to be free,

and us, [who are] millions of kilometers away, before than

anything, respect that dream that implies all rights, therefore we

do what we can to contribute to turn [that dream] into a necessary

reality, because a group of oppressed people makes the rest of

the groups worldwide [be] oppressed to the same extent’.

The Dalai Lama is seen more as a symbol of spirituality

rather than a political dissident or rebel in the region and, the

influence from these pro Tibet groups has also helped to the

expansion of Buddhist principles, support for the Tibetan autonomy

cause and they are always present when the Dalai Lama comes to

visit. The largest groups can be found in Brazil, Chile, Costa

Rica, Mexico and Uruguay. They support the cause through different

activities, most of them cultural but also through online and

print publications where they explain the current situation inside

Tibet. They also have a Tibetan Buddhism school in which people

learn principles and practice through regular seminars.

There are many aspects inside Mexico and El Salvador that

serve to people as bases for supporting the Dalai Lama either as a

spiritual leader or as a revolutionary. In the case of Mexico, the

Dalai Lama is regarded as a spiritual leader. He came to the

country in 1989 for the first time and was received by former

President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. This first visit to the

country was symbolic because as Tsewang Phuntso (2011) explains,

‘this promising visit marked the first of many important visits

His Holiness would do to Central and South America for the

following 22 years and, it also marked the beginning of a close

relation between His Holiness and people from Latin America’.

In Mexico, he emphasized harmony and diversity and, from 1989

on he has continued visiting the country. The visit from the

previous year, 2011 was also very relevant because it was on very

particular grounds. To begin with, he came under the status of

Cult Minister due to his resignation as a Tibet’s political leader

on May 30, 2011 and also because, according to Antonio Karam

(2011) Founder and President of Casa Tibet Mexico, ‘He is coming

in a moment in which there is a huge moral and collective crisis’

This is due to the difficult situation Mexico has been facing

since 2007 because of the Drug War. Mexicans like the Dalai Lama

because of his messages calling for compassion, peace and

disarmament inside the country.

However, the government has been taking care of China-Mexico

relations so, since China’s entrance to WTO along with many signed

trade agreements since 2001, Mexican Heads of State have preferred

to be distant from the Dalai Lama but, in spite of this distance,

the Chinese Embassy’s memorandums of ‘Dalai Lama visit

condemnation’ are still present.

The perspective from El Salvador is rather particular and at

the same time, not very surprising for those who know about the

country’s recent history. The Dalai Lama is seen as a

revolutionary because his struggle for a free Tibet is seen as

similar to the Salvadorian’s struggle during the civil war in the

1980s. There are varied opinions about this similarity: some say

that since the Dalai Lama has been resisting Chinese occupation

for years and seen the horrors of violence, he advocates the basic

Buddhist principles of respecting the other and not using

violence. Others, such as Carlos Rivas, Major of San Salvador, see

him as a very brave leader: ‘This opportunity of having him here

is very valuable because very few people on this world have the

nerve to act and do the things he does in favour of humanity’ (ABC

Digital, 2004). In what refers to the perception of the Dalai Lama

as a revolutionary, this is mainly due to the historical legacy of

imperialism and US interventionism in El Salvador.

The same Major of San Salvador declared in the Dalai Lama’s

visit that ‘My country for ages has lived under the historical

aegis marked by the United States of America. Our country also

needs a moral resistance against many things that Americans try to

impose on us’ (ABC Digital, 2004)It is important to consider that

today’s government is held by Frente Farabundo Martí, a left wing

party. The central fact about this declaration is Tibetan

resistance against an ‘imperialist China’: an idea that could be

embraced as an opinion by many inside (the same Tibetans and

Uyghur) and outside China (Africa or some countries that have been

negatively impacted by China’s action and growth).

It is clear that managing relations with a big country such

as China is not an easy task, moreover when its ascension is

starting to be felt by the world. Latin American countries are

also in the way of measuring China’s capabilities through the

impact of their own foreign policy decisions. It depends on how

they view the consequences of having relations with China: some

will have to take measures to protect their economy, others might

have to choose between China and Taiwan (like El Salvador), or

invoke national foreign policy principles when receiving the Dalai

Lama in order to counter China’s complaints (such as Mexico with

the Estrada Doctrine of self determination).

China’s current behavior is indeed showing their confidence

about their new position on the world. They believe they will soon

turn into a super power. However, as it could be seen on the

previous case studies, many of its policies of conducting

businesses, trade, foreign and national policies are questionable.

If entrepreneurs and foreigners do not trust them on the long

term, then how will China be able to continue its growth? Will

entrepreneurs pressure their own governments to have relations

with Taiwan for better opportunities and fairer trade conditions?

Will Chinese citizens, Tibetans and Taiwan be able to stand

internal pressure for long? This remains to be seen.

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