SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGYA Theological argument for a Simple view of Persons

Joshua R. FarrisUniversity of Brisol

AbstractPresently, there remains an aversion for substance dualism inboth philosophical and theological literature. However, there hasbeen a renewed interest in substance dualism within philosophicalliterature. In the present article, I advance substance dualismas a viable position that persuasively accounts for theScriptural and theological data within Christian thought. I makea specific argument in favor of a metaphysically simplesubstance. Along the way, I note the overlap between thephilosophical and theological literature and suggest that asimple soul as substance is a metaphysical presuppositiongrounding the data.

But that which is intelligible and without dimension is neither contracted nor dispersed, she said. Contraction and dispersal are proper to bodies. The soul, however, is equally present according to its own invisible and incorporeal nature at the aggregation of the elements into the body and at their segregation. (Gregory of Nyssa, On TheSoul and the Resurrection, chapter 2, 47)

Introduction

In the contemporary literature on theological anthropology there

is an aversion for both substance ontology and substance dualism

1

on the grounds that the Christian Scriptures presume a relational

and monistic ontology.1 I seek to respond to this general

aversion by offering some persuasive lines of reasoning that

provide the foundations for Scripture and theological

construction. In this way, I show that we have good philosophical

reasons for a simple view of persons (which I suggest is likely a

soul) that shape and form both our reading of Scripture and basic

theological development. Assuming we do not have good defeaters

for a simple substance view, I argue we have good reasons to

affirm it as a theological position within Christian theology.

I address some of the philosophical evidence corresponding

to the Scriptural and theological desiderata. I do this for two

reasons. First, coming from the epistemic standpoint of

phenomenal conservatism, I take it that we have prima facie

evidence for human beings being a particular kind of thing.

Second, I take it that a natural reading of Scripture’s teachings

on the self (assuming God has revealed truth that corresponds to

naturally revealed truth) will either yield the same conclusions

or be made sense of in light of this foundational material. I

1 Most notable is Joel Green in Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature ofHumanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008).

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work through the literature on personal identity arguing in favor

of a ‘simple‘ view, which probably entails a soul view (however,

one could affirm an absolutely simple material particle). Third,

I work through the theological literature on human persons and

argue in favor of a simple substance view as satisfying the

theological data. In this way, relational and functional views,

arguably, presuppose simple substance.2 I suggest that there is a

good deal of overlap between the theological and philosophical

literature.

Why Accept Substance Dualism as a Theological Position?

I offer three reasons for accepting substance dualism and

specifically the idea that I am a simple thing. I give a reason

from my knowledge by acquaintance and two arguments. The first

argument is from the simplicity of the self; the second is an

argument for my being simple and not identifiable with the

material aggregate I call my body.

2 Notice, I am not making an explicit argument for the ‘image’ nor am I specifying its nature.

3

I suggest that I have a basic and direct experience of

myself.3 I am simple and absolute because I cannot be broken down

into parts. I cannot be reduced to my essential constituents or

properties. I am the kind of thing that exists in and through my

thinking and the stages of my bodily existence. I am fully

present at each stage of my existence. I know this through

introspection. I know when something is crawling on my arm as I

am thinking about myself. I know that if I were to lose one limb

I would still be me. Even if I lose part of my brain it seems

that plausibly, I still exist. If I were to lose my memory of

past events this would in no way nullify my existence. I know

that I would still exist because distinct memories are not

essential to my being who I am. I know that I am not as an

inference of my thinking, but as a precondition of my thinking.

When I think upon anything, it presupposes a thing thinking. f I

am thinking about eating a burrito or a pizza, then I have

knowledge by acquaintance—with myself and my thinking. According

to my phenomenal seemings, I exist at every point through change 3 See Roderick Chisholm, “The Problem of The Criterion,” The Foundations ofKnowing (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982), 61-75. Chisholm develops this notionof ‘seeming’ more fully. Also see Chris Tucker, “Phenomenal Conservatism andEvidentialism in Religious Epistemology” in Evidence and Religious Belief Ed.By Kelly James Clark and Raymond J. VanArragon (Oxford: OUP, 2011), chapter 4.

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and there is a property of self-presentation that bears itself at

every moment of my conscious existence. The point is that I have

a kind of existence that is absolute and simple. The nature I

have undergirds thinking and bodily existence. 4

Stewart Goetz and E.J. Lowe have put forth an argument, in

keeping with the intuitions above, in favor of a simple self not

dependent on the material body or non-essential properties. This

is an argument from intuition. Goetz has argued elsewhere that

one’s consciousness of actual states of affairs grounds the

intuitive logic of possibility.5 His argument is essentially

this: 1) I am essentially a simple entity (having no parts that

can be separated. 2) A physical body is essentially complex, and,

thus, has parts able to be separated. 3) The Principle of the

Indiscernibility of Identicals. This principle says that for

identity to take place x must have every property had by y, and

4 Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (Lasalle, IL:Open Court Publishing Company, 1979), chapter 1. Chisholm offers a veryconvincing argument in favor of our being directly acquainted with our selfthrough having an individual proposition that uniquely identifies the person.From this basis we are able to individuate. I am able to individuate myselfand others. What I have done here is asserted that I have direct acquaintancewith my self, which seems to be a natural perception. Furthermore, it seemsthis is the common sense view of self. 5 Stewart Goetz, ‘Modal Dualism: A Critique’, in Soul, Body and Survival(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 89-104.

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the same goes that y must have every property had by y. 4)

Therefore, on the basis of these premises, I am not identical

with my (or any) physical body. It is still possible I am a

proper part of my body or depend on some minimal bodily

composition or something of the sort.6 This is possible from this

argument, but if there is a distinct kind of thing thinking and

thinking is not material it is more likely I am a non-material

thing over and against a proper physical part of my body.7

A more modest argument, which might be accepted as promising

by a wider audience, is an argument from replacement. To indicate

that I am a distinct kind of thing that has a simple nature not

dependent on the material body I refer to the argument called the

replacement argument given by Alvin Plantinga. 8 Plantinga argues

6 E.J. Lowe, “Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self” in Soul,Body and Survival (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 139-158. Lowegives an argument for my being a simple self that leaves open the possibilitythat I am minimally dependent on part of my body. The problem with Lowe’sontology of human persons is that it leaves no place for Near DeathExperiences or the intermediate state wherein the self can exist apart fromthe body. This is problematic. I will take this issue up later in thedissertation. 7 Goetz, 102. Goetz in discussing the possible conclusions of the argumentmentions this possibility that I could be a physical proper part. Being awareof one’s simplicity is a strong intuition. It is not my intention to look atall that has gone into this discussion or the whole of the discussion in thisone essay. 8 Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism” in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology volII: Providence, Scripture, and Resurrection ed. by Michael Rea (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2009). Originally published in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 23 (2006).

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along these lines: I am a substance, but if I am a physical

substance I would be a proper part of my physical body, composed

of my body or collocated with my body. I am not my body or a

proper physical part of my body. I am not composed of my body or

collocated with my body. Therefore, I must be an immaterial kind

of thing. Plantinga offers some thought experiments to bring out

this argument. He begins by asking the question, if I am a

physical thing what kind of physical thing am I? The argument

begins with an intuition conceiving possibility; that I have the

property possibly to exist when B (my body) does not.9 We know

from experience that surgeons can replace organs with new organs.

We know from the present state of medicine that this is possible.

We know of people who have had liver, heart, knee, hip, ankle,

and lung replacements. What about my brain? Can I exist apart

from my brain? It seems at least conceivable that I am distinct

from my brain, and possibly could exist apart from my brain. 10 It

seems possible that I could exist with all my bodily parts

9 Ibid, 388. 10 Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, chapter 8 and New Appendix C.This is one version of the argument for substance dualism from modality. Itfits very well with the argument from replacement with respect toconceivability and modality.

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destroyed and I still exist. 11 If this is possible, I cannot be

identical with the whole of my body that I presently have or the

composition of my body. Then Plantinga asks the question of

speeding of the process of replacing each part of my body down to

the cellular level at a rapid pace. Would the rate change my

being modally distinct from my body and all the body’s parts? It

seems not. If these are possibilities at a much slower pace, why

should it matter if the rate is much faster? Plantinga’s point is

that it is likely that we are not identical with our bodies, nor

do parts of bodies compose or collocate with our bodies.12 At the

end of the day this seems plausible. If these arguments work, we

have reason to reject various forms of materialism, in favor of

the view that human persons are a soul with a body.13 These

arguments listed above give some grounds for thinking that

persons are not material things, identified with a physical part,

or composed of material things, but is a different kind of thing.

This kind of thing has different persistence conditions than do

material kinds of things and are distinct from the other. It is 11 Alvin Plantinga, “Against Materialism,” 388-389. 12 Ibid, 390-391. 13 For a useful cataloguing of these arguments and others like these seeMoreland in The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism(London, UK: SCM Press, 2009).

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important for my purposes to establish a prima facie case in

favor of substance dualism. Any philosophical or theological

anthropology ought to accept the notion that the human substance

or soul as substance is a simple immaterial thing.14 I believe

this is not only philosophically true but also assumed in the

Scriptural portrayal of man. Hence, this provides a basis for

approaching the Scriptures. Additionally, if my basic experiences

interface with that of the text of Scripture and accords with the

traditional understanding, then we have additional justification

for affirming a theological notion of persons as simple souls.

PHILOSOPHICAL, BIBLICAL, and THEOLOGICAL DESIDERATA

Personal Identity

I begin the approach to theological anthropology by

considering some of the philosophical foundations. It seems to me

that a particular conception of personal identity undergirds and

grounds a Scriptural and theological understanding of persons. In14 Again, this is the most common view throughout history and Ecclesiasticalhistory. The notion that the person or soul is a simple immaterial thing isnot foreign to Ecclesiastical history. In fact it is very common among thePatristics and the Medeivals. For one very thoughtful example see Gregory ofNyssa in Soul and the Resurrection, trans. Catharine P. Roth (Crestwood, NY:St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002), 40-44.

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the following, I address the philosophical literature on personal

identity and I argue in favor of the simple view.

It is common within the literature to read of four views on

personal identity, namely the body view, brain view, the memory

or character view, and the simple view. 15 16 The views other than

the simple view are not sufficient for personal identity, but

have their place in both philosophical and theological

developments of persons. Later in the discussion, I suggest that

each view helpfully relates to the simple view in two ways, but

that a simple/soul view (as I describe it) provides the pre-

conditions for theological anthropology. First, each view helps

fill out a more comprehensive picture of persons. Second, each

view provides evidential support for identifying one soul over

another soul. I will look at each view in turn and offer reasons

why I do not accept it as sufficient for personal identity.

15 Consider a few resources in the literature on personal identity. JohnPerry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. (Indianapolis,Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company; 1978). James Baillie, Problems inPersonal Identity. (New York, NY: Paragon Publishing; 1993). John Perry, ed.,Personal Identity (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press;2008). David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics (Toronto, Ontario:Broadview; 2009). 16 Apart from the simple view the others seem to presuppose a relationalontology, generally speaking.

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The first position is known as the ‘body view’, which is

often associated with Aristotle.17 The bodily criterion for

personal identity is the view that persons are identified with

their bodies or with a bodily constitutional relation. Broadly

speaking, the view does not say that I identify with one aspect

of my body or one physical part connected with my body. In fact

the ‘I’ is a linguistic reference for the body or biological

organism. Alternatively and related to this, one could say that

the body constitutes and makes me—me.18 Thus, I am my body. This

is one popular view held by philosophical and theological

physicalists, respectively.19

A helpful illustration of the intuitive problems found with

the body view or some similar view is seen in the Harry Potter

books. In book two, The Chamber of Secrets and book seven Deathly

Hallows J.K. Rowling introduces the reader to the polyjuice 17 A similar view is called Animalism. See Eric T. Olson, The Human Animal:Personal Identity without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press,1997). Trenton Merricks, Objects and Persons (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2001). 18 See David Shoemaker’s Personal Identity and Ethics (Ontario, Canada:Broadview Press, 2009), chapter 2. Also see David DeGrazia, Human Identity andBioethics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 19 A monist of a sort that is not a materialist could hold this if he heldthat there is something more fundamental to matter and non matter. The bodymight be of this sort of thing. This is beyond what we normally think of as abody, though. On this kind of view, physical matter would be more than gunk,physical-stuff and chemicals.

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potion. This potion can turn one’s body into the body of another

by simply dropping the hair of the organism into which the person

attempts to transform. Added to this, I could conceive of a

similar state of affairs. Lets say my wife of 5 years had massive

cosmetic surgery in order to take on the tone of voice, the face,

and the body of Giselle Bundchen. Would this then make my wife

Giselle Bundchen? Not at all. You might press the conceivability

of the state of affairs further wherein scientists could change

the DNA of a person - in this case my wife’s DNA. Would she then

cease to be the person I once married? I do not believe so. We

know from the intuitive reasons given above, and the arguments

from the previous section, that a person is not strictly

identical with her body, bodily constitution or her own

biological organism.

I wish to mention one problem, which is the problem of the

persistence of identity. It is difficult to see how persistence

in and through time works on a bodily/bodily constitution view.

The body changes every day and takes on new cells; it seems that

it is in fact not the same body after a phase of time. The idea

of personal identity with the body rubs against some basic

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intuitions about personal identity. Intuitively, from our basic

experience of the self, I am something distinct from my body in

virtue of the persistence conditions of the self. I realize that

materialists affirming something like a body view have responses

to this sort of problem, but it appears that the materialist must

trade in what is an obvious given for what is a confused and

complex notion of personhood. Why should one be inclined to

reject what is given for what is confused and complex? There is

no pre-philosophical or intuitive reason for doing so even if

materialists can offer a coherent explanation for the above-

mentioned intuitions.20

A second common materialist view of personal identity is the

view often termed the ‘brain view’. The brain view is similar to

the bodily criterion view because persons are identical to a

material object. It seems very natural indeed for proponents of

materialism to link the self or the linguistic ‘I’ with the brain

on the basis that the brain is responsible for much of the

“goings on” in the biological organism, e.g. body.21 The ‘brain 20 This is not a sufficient refutation for denouncing these versions of thebodily view, but they are reasons I am putting forth here. It is not myintention to offer a full-proof case against these positions here. 21 Peter Van Inwagen in Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1990), chapter 15.

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view’ is the view that the person identifies with the brain in a

holistic sense or identifies with some aspect of the brain, say,

the cerebral cortex, wherein the brain controls the functioning

of the rest of the body—call this the ‘control center’. Here

again philosophers seem to assume a linguistic reference ‘I’ as

identical with the brain controlling the body. This, as well,

seems to have problems. Let me ask a couple of questions and

explicitly draw out the implicit answers of those questions. Am I

a brain? Do brains think? At first glance these two questions

seem very odd. The question “Am I a brain?” seems to immediately

imply a response of “no;” but I do have a brain. The second

question seems very odd as well, “Do brains think?” This is

unusual in itself. It seems that a brain does not seem to think.

Usually, when speaking of thinking we refer to a person doing the

thinking. We could say it this way, “I use my brain to think.”

This seems much more natural. I can hardly imagine what it means

for a brain to think. It is similar to someone saying, “Hand

picks up the cup.” A hand may pick up a cup, but it is someone’s

hand picking up the cup. I use my hand to pick up the cup. As a

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result, the brain view will not work as a satisfactory view of

personal identity, either. 22

The memory or character theory of personal identity is a

third and prominent view. Historically, the memory and/or

character continuity theory is associated with John Locke.23

Ultimately, I think these two views are one view but could be

distinguished one from the other. I will take each in turn and

critique both the memory and character views as one set.

Proponents of this theory might come from the camp of

materialism/physicalism or from the position that persons are

immaterial kinds of things. A noticeable difference between this

view and the previous two views is that personal identity,

according to the memory-character theory, is not, and cannot be

reducible to some physical thing. This requires a materialism of

a non-reductive sort. The memory or character view of personal

identity associates the person with his memories or character.

The idea is that the person cannot be strictly identified with a

physical thing or a physical part, but personhood itself must be

22 See John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defence of a Cartesian Conceptionof the Mind (New York: Routledge Publishing, 1991). 23 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by. RogerWoolhouse (London: Penguin Publishers, 1997).

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more than a physical kind of thing. Personhood must be something

of a non-physical kind, namely, thoughts and memories. Arguably,

then, mental items comprise personhood, and these are continuous

with one another. 24

It is not unusual for philosophers to associate the

character theory with the memory theory. Similar to the memory

view it states that personal identity is found in the connection

between the mental states/properties that make up the character

in question with present mental states/properties. The similarity

is that there is a continuous link of memory states or character

states that comprise the person. On the character continuity

theory of personal identity a person identifies with his or her

character states. These are states of being the person has. For

example, Johnny exists as a person with the state of being

irresponsible because by not paying his bills Johnny conditions

habits of irresponsibility. Another example, Sammy has the

character state of developing a weak will with respect to

24 It seems that this almost assumes a kind of event-ontology preceding asubstantial ontology, possibly. This view requires a causal/relational linkbetween memories. It is also, arguable, that this view really is a materialistview of persons at all. There is no relation made to the body/brain, but tomental items.

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alcohol. This is so because Sammy has in times past given in one

too many times to having an excess of drinks.

One can see this in a thought experiment. Consider person A,

who lives a long life full with memories of himself in family, in

school, and at work. Person A is fully aware of his past life and

experiences day after day. He believes he exists day after day

somehow connected to the past events that he recalls in his

memory. Consider Person B, Person B wakes up one day after having

surgery on his brain. When he awakens he has the exact thoughts

and memories of Person A. This is verifiable because the memories

and thoughts of both Persons A and B are identical in historical

recall. Person B has no recollection of having thoughts or

memories of a pervious person or historical accounting of another

person he just thinks as if he has been Person A. Hence a problem

with the memory view because we know that Person A is not Person

B. The manner of one’s thinking does not necessitate the reality

of the situation. My belief that I have climbed Mount Everest

does not mean that I have done so. My memory is not sufficient

for personhood, although, it might be helpful for evidentiary

reasons. Memory plays a large role in the formation of personhood

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and as such it offers a great deal of evidential support for the

reality this person is this person and not that other person. 25

The character view does not, at least immediately, run into

the same problems as the memory view. The character view avoids

the subjective criterion found in the memory view by requiring

states of affairs to comprise personhood. Character states

comprise the person, and cannot be as easily altered or

manipulated as seen with memories.26 Having said this, both seem

to run into the problem of fully satisfying our common-sense

ideas and intuitions about human persons. Intuitively, it is

wrong to identify persons as a bundle of memories. Instead when

we think and speak of human persons owning memory and developing

character states we speak as if there is a person or a thing

owning the memories and having the character states, thus it

seems that both views are unsatisfying. 27 25 Recall the classic example of Thomas Reid’s Whipping Boy. See Thomas Reid’s“Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Our Personal Identity in Personal Identity ed. byJohn Perry (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2008),chapter 7. 26 Consider Personal Identity ed. by John Perry, (Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 2008). Perry, John. A Dialogue on Personal Identity andImmortality. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978). Baillie,James. Problems in Personal Identity. (New York: Paragon, 1993). 27 Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul: Revised Ed. (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1997), chapter 8 and 9. Also, a useful argument is found inSwinburne’s essay entitled “Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory” inMetaphysics: The Big Questions ed. by Peter Van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman

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Although these views are insufficient for personal identity

they still have a place in the discussion on personal identity.

For example, the bodily-continuity view might count as empirical

evidence for the reality of the same person/soul. Also

theologically, it has a role in accounting for the resurrected

body.

Next the memory-character continuity view has a place in

theological discussion. Like bodily-continuity it has a place of

supporting the belief in a person as a particular person.28 It

also has a role in the development of souls/persons. The memories

we have from our past shape and form the quality of life we have.

Character states have a positive role in human flourishing. If an

individual substance is obeying God he will have a more enjoyable

and flourishing life, as promised in Scripture in contrast to

those who continue in patterns of unrighteousness.29

(Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press, 1998). 28 The Evolution of the Soul, chapter 9. See Swinburne develop a similarargument. 29 Jerry L. Walls, Heaven (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 111.Walls makes this argument when speaking of personal identity in the afterlifewithin the context of Trinitarian identity and relational ontology.

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Fourth, the defender of the simple or ‘soul’ view identifies

persons with souls.30 The simple view is distinguishable from

various materialist constructions of human persons and the

memory-character view of human persons. On the variation of the

simple view I advance for theological purposes, I take it that

persons are identical with a soul or an immaterial mental

thing.31 In this case, I am distinct from my body, my brain, and

the memory-character view. In keeping with the arguments given

earlier, I take it that I as a person must exist for mental items

to exist, memories, and states of character. The simple view, I

offer, of persons says that persons are not reducible to a

material object and are not a bundle of properties (as on the

memory-character view). Persons are irreducibly simple, as argued

above from phenomenology, introspection (the simple argument) and

30 A person may hold to a proper physical part or something of the sort anddoes not have to hold to the soul view as synonymous with the simple view.Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul: Revised Ed. (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1997), chapter 8 and 9. See also Swinburne, Personal Identity: TheDualist Theory. Also E.J. Lowe’s essay entitled “Identity, Composition and theSimplicity of the Self” in Soul, Body and Survival (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 2001). 31 A materialist could develop a simple view by saying that ‘I’ existsomewhere in my brain as a simple self that is not divisible. For reasons Ihave already mentioned I do not accept a materialist view of persons becauseit requires rejecting what is most apparent or what is an experiential given.

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conceivability and replacement (the replacement argument).32 Some

of the benefits that follow from the simple view include the

feature of independence, endurance, and absolute identity. The

philosophical benefits overlap with and parallel what we find in

theological literature on persons. To this we turn.33

The distinct features of the simple view of personhood

include independence and the endurance of the substantial soul.

The soul is independent with respect to non-dependence for the

soul’s identity on anything else. The soul has a kind of identity

not dependent on or reducible to other properties or substances.

The soul precedes its properties in some sense, thus having a

kind of independence from them. Next the soul is an enduring kind

of thing. It endures through time. If the soul were a bundle of

properties that fluctuates, then identity would fluctuate, or so

it seems. On a simple view, predicating properties, and identity

of the thing is possible. It has a stable kind of identity that

does not fluctuate according to the various sortal-phases it

32 This can be brought out be distinguishing intrinsic properties andrelational properties. Intrinsic properties are those properties that areessential to the substance and are constituents of its essence. Relationalproperties are non-essential properties. 33 With the simple view one is able to say that persons can be numericallyidentical through change, yet can change qualitatively.

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encounters. Sortal-phases are non-essential properties wherein a

substance exists in and through various moments of existence.34

Theologically this is important in accounting for human persons

in general as well as individual persons in particular. A simple

substance exists in and through the various stages of time as

substantially the same thing. On this view the person is still

the same person even when going through various phases of

existence. Predicating properties of a person at two different

phases of existence is possible. For example, John may exist with

a full head of hair at one phase, yet persist as the same person

while losing his hair. As a metaphysical simple, John is able to

exist at differing phases.

When persons encounter the Scriptures for theological

development, the simple view seems to make sense of one’s reading

of Scripture. It is not my brain or even eyes that read the

Scriptures, but it is I that persists absolutely through the

stages of my reading various aspects of Scripture. This, then, is

34 I have written a similar section surveying personal identity with some distinctions in application as a part of a completely different argument in a purely philosophical context elsewhere. See Joshua Farris, “The Soul-Concept: Meaningfully Embrace or Meaningfully Disregard,” Annales Philosophici 5 (2012), 64-67.

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presupposed in our reading of Scripture and provides other

theological benefits. Turning to the feature of independence, we

find one theological benefit following the assumption of a simple

view.

The criterion of independence has theological significance.

If there is an absolute self that has independence there is the

possibility of predicating properties of the substance/person.

Theologically, one can predicate properties of goodness or

badness of the individual substance in question. When Paul says

in Romans 6:17: “But thanks be to God that, though you used to be

slaves to sin, you wholeheartedly obeyed the form of teaching to

which you were entrusted. You have been set free from sin and

become slaves to righteousness.”35 Paul in effect is ascribing

two properties to the person. Once the person was a slave to sin,

wrongdoing or badness, and presently the person is a slave to

righteousness. One is a property of badness, and the other is a

property of righteousness. Other properties, for instance, having

wisdom and the freedom to actualize one’s latent capacities

naturally presuppose the distinction of an independent substance

35 NIV, emphasis mine.

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and its properties. It seems to me that a person is still the

same person even if there is some significant accidental change.

On this view the person is substantially the same person, yet

accidentally different.

The criterion of endurance (namely, where an entity persists

substantially the same through change; an entity wholly persists

through change) has theological significance, as well. I will

give an example here. Substances, at least on this construal,

have the theological advantage of identifying a substance/person

in and through the stages of time. Persons, again, are not

reducible to properties, events, or relations. In fact we can

make sense of the reality that persons in redemptive history

exist through sortal-phases.36 This means that in and through the

experience of time and change human persons identify with persons

at differing stages of time by enduring. So, Chris is a thief and

swindler, but upon hearing the gospel of Jesus Christ through his

friend Jerry comes to know Jesus and is no longer a thief and a

swindler. There is a real and important sense in which this

36 Swinburne, Richard. The Christian God. (Oxford: Oxford University Press;1995), 13-14.

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person Chris is the same person, yet there is an important sense

in which Chris is different.37

This is a view commensurate with most forms of substance

dualism and the simple/soul view naturally entails substance

dualism. It naturally entails substance dualism because it posits

a simple substantial ‘I’ that has a body. My intent here is to

demonstrate the philosophical truthfulness of the simple soul

view as the metaphysical substance accounting for personal

identity. Additionally, the philosophical literature, here, seems

to find many parallels with the theological literature. I believe

this view coheres with the nature of the theological literature

on personhood and the imago Dei.

Theological Literature and Dualism

I put forward that a soul as substance that bears the

features of being simple, independent, absolute, and enduring

accounts for the theological data. In fact, I suggest that than

overlap is present in both the philosophical literature and

37 I do not think the other views of personal identity ground this importantdistinction allowing for change and sameness.

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theological literature that buttresses one’s prima facie beliefs

about herself being a simple soul as substance.

a. Substantive Views

On substance views of persons and the imago Dei, persons just

are substances that bear properties. In the theological

literature on substance, persons are the kinds of entities that

persist across time and undergird changes through the Fall,

Redemption, and Glorification. In this way, there is a fact of

the matter that is presumed in and through the Scriptural

delineation on persons. Having said this, the best accounting for

these changes is not just any substance but a soul as substance

as I argued above. Next, I argue that souls (i.e. simple

immaterial substances) undergird and account for functional and

relational views of persons.

b. Functional Views

Functionality has also taken the center stage having a

venerable tradition of support in Ecclesiastical history.38 38 J. Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1(Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), 25-29. Gerhard von Rad is usuallyassociated with this interpretation. See Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: ACommentary, rev. ed., trans. John H. Marks (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972),60 ff.; and Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, s.v.“eikon,” byGerhard von Rad, et al., ed. Gerhard Kittel, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 2:381-397.

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According to this view, persons and the imago Dei are identical

to functions or pragmatic purposings and doings. The passage

often cited in favor of this view is Genesis 1:28, “Be fruitful

and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it, Rule over

the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every

living creature that moves on the ground.” Notably, this is known

as the Creation Mandate. This is God’s command to man. The

argument is something like the following. In the Genesis

narrative immediately after God creates man in the image and

likeness of God, he gave man a special work. Work in the Creation

Mandate includes procreation, subduing, and caring for the earth.

Proponents of a functional view argue that Colossians 1:15-20

support their view. This text has two parallels with the Creation

Mandate. First, it speaks of Christ being in the “image of the

invisible God.” Second, immediately following it describes Christ

as being head over all creation having subdued all things—in the

sphere of redemption. Therefore, functionalist proponents argue

that Genesis 1:26-28 and Colossians 1:15-20 teach a functional

view of the imago Dei because the image is in man’s functioning

most fully actualized in Christ’s functioning as head over his

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Church and ruler over the world.39 The problem for this view is

that it merely captures what man was created to do, and seems to

miss what underlies functionality and other aspects of the

Scriptural narrative.

Whether or not one assumes that the Scriptures teach a

functional view of persons and the image does not mitigate

against the fact that functionality presupposes substantiality.

In order to make sense of human beings as functional entities our

phenomenological experience of the self is such that it is a

substance of a particular kind. Philosophically, one must make a

distinction between what a thing is and what a thing does. A

metaphysically simple substance accounts for the person’s

capacity to act at differing times and in differing ways.

c. Relational Views

Relational Views of the imago Dei abound these days. The

most notable proponent in history is Karl Barth.40 Trinitarian

39 There is another function worth noting often seen in connection withChrist’s functional position in the Trinity. Christ is fulfilling hissubordinate role of functioning under the Father in completing this work. 40 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: III/I translated by G.W. Bromiley and T.F.Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936-69),183ff. Also consider Barth’s TheHumanity of God. Translated by J.N. Thomas. (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press,1960). Also see Shults, F. LeRon. Reforming Theological Anthropology: Afterthe Philosophical Turn To Relationality. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: EerdmansPublishing Co., 2003), see especially chapter 6. Also see Robert W. Jenson’s

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language normally follows as the chief example of the relational

view. The image of God is a relational reality and presupposes a

relational ontology. On this view, there is a strong connection

between the Trinity and man’s relational nature. Some suggest

that the Trinity serves as a foundation for and an analogy for

human relations. Thus, human persons are reflective of the

Trinitarian nature by their relations. One specific example

includes relationships one has with a spouse. Human persons

exemplify relational oneness and unity in a spousal relationship.

Arguably, humans are a finite representation of the Trinity. Man

and wife are in relationship. They are in a deep and intimate

relationship. There is a kind of diversity and oneness manifest.

Additionally, the procreative act of bearing fruit and

multiplying reflects this creative action. It is natural then to

see this as a manifest imaging of the Trinitarian God because

both the Trinity and a marital relationship reflect oneness and

diversity.

Functional and relational views are similar to the memory-

continuity view and bodily view found in the discussion over

Systematic Theology: The Works of God vol.2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), ch. 18, “The Image of God”.

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personal identity. Both have a place in the discussion but are

insufficient in accounting for personal identity. Functional and

relational views are similar in that they provide evidence for

the individual substance as the memory-continuity and bodily view

provide evidence for the simple view of human personhood. The two

views offer important data that fleshes out a fuller and more

holist picture of human persons, but in themselves require and

presuppose something substantial that is able to persist through

change, namely a metaphysical simple.41 Relations and functions

presuppose relata.42 Relational properties require and depend on

substances and cannot stand on their own.43 Relations are also

causally conditional and depend upon an individual’s entering the

real world within a social-communal context of existing. In this

sense, relations are causally necessary for the substance. Thus,

41 In fact, one might argue, this logic is borne out in Genesis 1:27-28wherein the functions and relations that occur, whether they be causalnecessities or conditional realities, do so as distinct from the createdentity that God created. There is certainly a distinction made in text between“product” or object created and the processes that that object might beinvolved in. In this passage there is a clear chiasm common to the HebrewCanon wherein the image of God as God created humans is connected to theirbeing responsible for taking dominion over the earth and their being male andfemale is connected to being fruitful. 42 A term used in ontology in reference to a thing in relation. The thing inrelation that is presupposed as logically necessary and ontologically prior.43 See a defense of this in Reinhardt Grossmann. The Existence of the World(London: Routledge, 1992), 51-57.

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relations are significant in the world and in an overarching

theological framework.44 I as an individualized substance

necessarily enter into relationships in virtue of my being a

person, but this is not the same as saying relations are

foundational to what and who I am.45 Additionally, functions are

helpful for filling and fleshing out a theological understanding

of man’s purpose, but this is the subject of another article.46

In the discussion concerning persons and the imago Dei these

views have another place in philosophical and theological

development.

In recent philosophical-theological literature Jerry L.

Walls has argued for a relational ontology that seems to fit in

line with what I argue here. That is, his view is commensurate

with a substantive view of the imago Dei having both stative and

dynamic realities or teleological properties when discussing 44 This is often referred to as a traditional view of general ontology. See R.Harre and E.H. Madden, Causal Powers (Basil: Blackwell publishing, 1975).Brian Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2001). Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, and Free Will (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2013),chapter 1. Also see E.J. Lowe, Personal Agency (Oxford, UK: OUP, 2008), seeespecially the introduction and chapter 1.45 It does not seem to me that this undermines the notion that relations are not important or significant. I am also not saying that there are not essential and internal relations that are part of the substance in question. 46 Human beings, in Scripture, have a telos and according to the ontology hereI suggest an internal teleology.

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personal identity in his recent work Heaven: The Logic of Eternal

Joy. What is difficult in Walls treatment of personal identity in

theology is his initial defense of substance ontology, he later

moves to defending a relational ontology. Walls argues for

substance dualism at the beginning of his work.47 Then he argues

in favor of a relational ontology regarding personal identity and

the imago Dei in the context of speaking about the Trinity.

Substance ontology focuses on what a thing is internally, while

relational ontology puts emphasis on external and accidental

relations. Thus, the two ontological descriptions are distinct.

In the context of further elaborating on personal identity Walls

moves to a relational ontology because of the perceived

connection between the imago Dei and the Trinity. Walls

explicitly affirms this saying, “The discussion of this section

reveals that our individual identity is finally a relational

matter. Who we are is defined by our relationships with

47 Walls, Jerry L. Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: OxfordUniversity Press; 2002), 92-102. He draws from Colin Guntin in The One, theThree, and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). This iscommon parlance in more dynamic views of God, namely Process Theology and OpenTheism. It seems to be prevalent and growing in evangelical theologicalcircles as well. A recent treatment is found in Kevin Vanhoozer.Remythologizing Theology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 2010),see especially chapters 3, 4, and 6.

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others.”48 After affirming this Walls later states, “only

substances with certain given powers and potentialities can

relate to each other in the ways we have been considering. Thus,

the relational account of identity complements and provides depth

and texture to the ontological account of identity I discussed

earlier in this chapter.”49 What is difficult to determine is

whether Walls is holding to a substantive ontology and a

substantive view of the imago Dei or a relational ontology and a

relational view of the imago Dei. Either way, there is something

insightful about his move. As I stated above, both functional,

and relational views have a place in fleshing out our

understanding of the self. Both views reveal more about the

substance/person and his potentiality, all the while giving

ontological priority to the substance. The reality of the matter

is that we can have relationships with God and other human

persons in virtue of who we are, and a metaphysically simple

substance seems to make sense of the various relationships we

enter into.

48 Ibid, 108. 49 Ibid, 109.

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A similar view to the Wall’s view is a view developed by

Richard Mouw. Richard Mouw in a recent article has argued for a

particular philosophical anthropology in relationship to the

image of God. What is insightful about his article is his

emphasis upon the essentials of a Christian philosophical

anthropology and what is needed for the imago Dei or what is

required for our covenant partnership with God (construed as a

grid for understanding human composition). Richard Mouw comments

that it is not so much the properties that are identical with the

image of God, but the appropriate properties that actualize the

image. He states this: “I argued earlier that it would not do

simply to equate the image with the possession of such things as

a soul or free will or rationality. Instead, we need to ask what

properties of that order are necessary in a human being if that

being is to actualize the functional-relational roles and actions

associated with the divine call to engage in covenant

parternerships.”50 Mouw does not come down on a particular view

concerning the image for the purpose of his essay is to develop

the relationship between philosophical anthropology and the imago

50 See Richard Mouw, “The Imago Dei and Philosophical Anthropology,” 264. In Christian Scholar’s Review Spring 2012; XLI:3.

34

Dei. What he does is lay the framework for moving in a particular

direction that establishes the appropriate conditions for the

imago Dei along relational and functional lines whereby the image

is a representation tied to covenant partnership in doing actions

we were called to do. I believe this move is significant in that

it recognizes the substantial nature that is necessarily

presupposed in relational and functional views. The view I put

forth is able to give a metaphysical accounting of the imago Dei

that is essentialist in nature that is grounded in an immaterial

human soul as substance. By extension, this satisfies the

holistic nature of the imago Dei that is portrayed in Scripture

affirming its immutable nature. Again, the significance of the

Wall’s and Mouw move is that the ‘image’ has certain metaphysical

pre-requisites.51 What is significant about the Wall’s and Mouw

views is that substance is required for making sense of

relational and functional views. Here I have made the argument

that a soul as a simple substance underlies the Scriptural

teaching on human beings and the theological data on human

persons.

51 This is not to say that there are not substantive variations awaiting the eschaton, as we see in Eschatological or Christological views.

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Conclusion

In the present article, I have argued that we have a pre-

philosophical conception of the self that seems to undergird and

metaphysically account for both the Scriptural portrayal of human

beings and the theological literature on humans. In this way, I

suggest that we come to the Scriptures with this pre-

philosophical intuition and that there is an interface between

the direct knowledge we have of self and Scriptural teaching. I

have also argued that the authors of Scripture assume this about

themselves and others resulting in a basic hermeneutical control

on our readings of Scripture.

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