State of Human Security in Africa High-Level Symposium on the Humanitarian Crises and Response in Africa

African Union Hall, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 14:30-17:30 Hours, June 01, 2009

State fragility, Human Security, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Humanity and the Right to Assistance

(R2A) in Greater Horn of Africa Costantinos BT Costantinos, PhD

African Centre for Humanitarian Action Africa Humanitarian Action

costy@costantinos.net

Summary Issues: The complex political, economic, social, and cultural phenomena of state failure are little understood with

failing states plagued by rampant corruption, predatory elites who have long monopolised power, an absence of the rule of law, and severe ethnic or religious divisions. Cases in the paper underpin the cruel consequences and reality of Afri-can failed states: Case (1) VAW - rape as a savage instrument of humiliation in Darfur; Case (2) Rise of vigilantes in IDP Camps; Case (3) Cultural and anthropological considerations in VAW; Case (4) Banditry; Case (5) Con-flicts and HIV/AIDS; Case (6) RH needs of women; Case (7) Somalia: state collapse – Chronology of events.

Actions: The ability of states to strip people of their rights to livelihoods security, behind the thin veneer 'non-interference in each other's internal affairs' is increasingly being challenged. Nevertheless, while the AU‘s political evo-lution may allow such novelties, how do the responsibility to protect projects in Africa pursue their goals consistently in varying contexts, but do so without resorting to a self - defeating, overly scripted and stage- managed political "play"?. Strategies should focus on the different stages of conflict - conflict prevention, containment and peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction in the social, political, and economic spheres. Strategies need to be simultaneously `objective', dealing with sub-stantive issues and the institutional mechanisms for response, and `subjective', in developing the awareness, understanding, and expectations at all levels.

Conclusion: Notwithstanding the need to move beyond military definitions of security to a more comprehensive and strategic human security visions; the central hypothesis augurs on the strategic necessity for the relative strength of politi-cal organisations determines the rules of the political game that are installed; requiring a plural set of political organisa-tions which promote and protect rules of peaceful political participation and competition. In this light, state hood build-ing in Africa can be understood as a dynamic two-way operation, of generic forms on particular contents and particular contents on generic forms, in which the deployment of the conceptual and institutional machinery of democracy is at the same time the representation of specific needs, interests, motivations, claims, rights, and obligations by individuals and groups. Going beyond structuring or rearranging African political actors and institutional activities in their spontane-ous, often turbid reality, this operation should result in their transformation into forms of transparent agency and prac-tice within an effective political system.

1. Backgrounder

1.1. Introduction

Notwithstanding the slavery and colonial legacy, that is still taxing the continent, new faces and forces of vulnerability and poverty haunt the Africa region. Conflicts, corruption, disasters, poverty, and pandemics now threaten the region with a calamity unforeseen even during the Great African Fam-ine of the 1980s, so much so that the G8 has made this a basket case for international action. While many proposals for remedial action have been formulated, real commitment to positive and collaborative processes at continental and inter-organisational level has always been limited. Mobilising the action re-quired has also remained a daunting challenge, as many practical and structural constraints militate against commitment by individual groups to inter-organisational initiatives nationally and regionally. Furthermore, the tragedy taking such a heavy toll of life has highlighted the fundamental weakness of the peace, secu-rity, and development strategies. Many conventional and preconceived notions have been questioned and new ideas proposed. Efforts have also been made to improve understanding of human insecurity, to estimate the risks resulting there from more accurately and to make adequate preventive measures ahead of time. In this sense, the traditional role of development, human security, and humanitarian or-ganisations has been tested harshly, even cruelly.

Because there is always a tendency to find a solution that is smart, simple, and immoral to every human problem in Africa, states and their international backers tend to have a linear way of thinking that is inadequate to unravel the many complex inter-relationships underlying people‘s insecurity. It is neither popular nor scientific.

The need for the fundamental change on how the global community deals with the internecine cri-ses and human insecurity must change since places such as Darfur, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Nigeria, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Northern Uganda and Kenya and metropolises such as Johannes-burg, Lagos, Nairobi, to name a few, have become a new insignia of human ‗bestiality‘. Hence, the issue is about the need for collective learning about responses, and the responsibility to those whose suffer-ing provided the basis for that learning which will never be more urgent than it is now. Unfortunately, such lessons, which may be learned through the shocks administered by an uncompromising reality, are rarely translated quickly into personal or organisational memories and the inherent will to change. The reasons for this are sometimes rooted in human inertia, weakness, and self-interest. They are equally often the products of a genuine confusion about how to act most effectively in an environment that seems to be growing more complex.

In response to this dilemma, states must encourage and take, within the premises of Human Securi-ty framework, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Right to Assistance (R2A), appropriate action for promoting and managing an enabling environment for human development, mainstreaming peace, security a developmental response in the drive for popular participation; such is a process within which people, acting as citizens of a political society, can reinforce their ownership of security and ensure live-lihood continuity. Indeed, AU member states have put in motion constitutional and policy instruments that ensure human security, nonetheless, real commitment to national and regional action that must fos-ter processes by which nations, communities and individuals grow stronger, are able to enjoy fuller and more productive lives, and become less vulnerable to the scourges of insecurity action is yet to come. The lecture will deliberate on these issued on operationalising the principles laid down in the AU Constitu-tive Act and many other international human security instruments.

The AU has made peace and security one of its primary objectives since its establishment. Among its aims and objectives is the determination to ―promote peace and stability in the region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management, and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue. The objective of the strategy will be to position Member States and the Commission to contribute actively to the peaceful economic development of the region, and to en-hance the regional capacity to prevent, manage, and resolve violent conflicts through the establishment of effective and viable regional mechanisms, as defined by various UN, AU/NEPAD and civil society decision, declarations and action plans to address human insecurity…

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1.2. Objectives

The objectives and themes of the high-level symposium are augured on exploring the humanitar-ian crises landscape in Africa and key challenges to implementation of human security declarations, identity and orientation of regional bodies, and the extent to which members identify with and commit to it, and how this commitment is affected by overlapping membership in other organisa-tions. It is further to reviewing its role in the area of conflict management and resolution and the consensus among members about approaches to peace and security issues and the challenges to Af-rican NGOs in addressing human security.

It focuses on a human security approach which en-sures that the security of states should not conflict with the security of its citizens, and examining ways of contin-uing and public citizenship involvement in monitoring regional security agenda both within states and on the interstate level. It enables looking at the issues of poverty and diseases of poverty and their impact on regional se-curity and governance. It is also about discussing the question of terrorism and the proliferation of militias, militarised societies, flow of arms and organised crime and impact on security. Moreover it is about lessons on existing peace and development initiative that worked; undertaking a comprehensive assessment of the present situation in the region, including an analysis of the causes or potential causes of conflict, and ways of dealing with them; reflecting on the lessons of regional successes and how to learn from them and to build on them; and exploring ways for engaging the power and security elites in the region in open discussion with relevant stakeholders on the security agenda‖.

2. Fragile states, international law, and human security:

Failing States are perpetually the product of a ―collapse of the power structures providing politi-cal support for law and order‖, a process generally triggered and accompanied by ―anarchic‖ forms of internal violence. Hence the theme will delve into

analysis of international legal norms addressing human security: the problem of the ―failed State‖ from the combined perspective of international law and of constitutional law in general;

cases of international law addressing human insecurity and resulting measures by the UN Security Council – Rwanda, Liberia, Former Yugoslavia, etc., a general analysis based on positive law, in which special emphasis is given to the reactions of the international commu-nity (in particular the Security Council);

relevance of AU instruments in international law and protection strategies: current state of international law and the prospects for its future development and

the Right to Protect and the Right to Assistance: the problem of the effectiveness of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as issues of State and individual re-sponsibility under international law

3. Methodology and tasks

The presentation primarily depends on findings and secondary review the following documents for its identification of gaps and related recommendations: The Constitutive Act of the African Union, Protocol on the Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council, African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights, The statue of AU/NGO forum, REC‘s Charter, Protocols and programmes climate change, trans-boundary resources for the control of HIV/AIDS, in cross border mobile communities in RECs, the progress to establishing an African inter-parliamentary union and topics covered so far by the AU peace and security strategy.

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The deliverables should address what mechanism can be effective in promoting peace and stabil-ity in the region and what should be the parameters to measure the success of this cooperation? What mechanisms should be in place to maximise the participation of citizens in the peace and sta-bility of the region and what should be the parameters to measure this effectiveness? Can this have a sort of peer review mechanism to monitor the human security development of the member states in the objective of promoting the cross fertilisation of best practices and creating a healthy competition among the member states? If yes what makes it different to the African peer review mechanism to which most of the member states are signatories? What can AU do in preventing election related violence in the member states? To what extent could election monitoring help in preventing vio-lence?

4. Paradigmatic development of the notion of human security:

4.1. Human security,

Human Security, a post-Cold War concept, is a multi-disciplinary understanding of security in-volving a number of research fields, including development studies, international relations, strategic studies, and human rights. The 1994 HDR, a milestone publication in the field of human security, introduces a new concept of human security. It equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms. It ensures ‗freedom from want‘ and ‗freedom from fear‘ for all persons. It is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity. It refers to an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather. It exam-ines both the national and the global concerns of human security and seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of SHD, capturing the potential peace dividend, a new form of development co-operation and a restructured system of global institutions. Increasing human security entails: investing in human development, not in arms; engaging policy makers to address the emerging peace dividend; giving the UN a clear mandate to promote and sustain develop-ment; enlarging the concept of development co-operation so that it includes all flows, not just aid; agreeing that 20% of national budgets and 20% of aid be used for SHD and establishing an Economic Security Council (UNDP, 1994) Human security holds that a people-centred view of security is necessary for global stability; and is now frequently re-ferred to in a wide variety of global policy discussions. In the 2005 World Summit outcome document, the UN GA committed itself "to discussing and defining the notion of security (UNCHS, 2003).

4.2. Freedom from fear vs. freedom from want:

While the ―HDR originally argued that human security requires attention to both freedoms from fear and from want; divisions have gradually emerged over the proper scope of that protection and over the appropriate mechanisms for responding to these threats. The Freedom from Fear School seeks to limit the practice of human security to protecting individuals from violent conflicts. This approach argues that limiting the focus to violence is a realistic and manageable approach towards human security. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention, and resolution, peace building are the main concerns of this approach. On the other hand, according to UNDP 1994, "Freedom from Want" school focuses on the basic idea that violence, poverty, inequality, diseases, and environmen-tal degradation are inseparable concepts in addressing the root of human insecurity. Different from "Freedom from Fear", it expands the focus beyond violence with emphasis on development and security goals.i In reality both should serve as an important impetus to global action,ii nevertheless, attempts to implement this human security agenda have led to the emergence of these two major schools of thought. The UNDP‘s Human Development Report of 1994 pioneered exploration of these questions. The UNDP's definition of human security argues that the scope of global security should be ex-panded to include threats in economic, food, health, environmental, personal and community securities. Since then, hu-man security has been receiving more attention from the key global development institutions.

4.3. Human and State Security:

State security is about a state's ability to defend itself against external aggression and threats. It underlies using deterrence strategies under the rubrics of the values of international security predom-inance and the ascension of the nation-state. While political theory asserts variants of state security,

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the fundamental trait of security focus is on the primacy of the state: shielding boundaries, people, institutions, and values. Human security shifts the focus to protecting well-being of individuals and responding to ordinary people's needs in dealing with sources of threats, expanding the scope of protection to inter alia environmental pollution, infectious diseases, and economic deprivation. It not only protects, but also empowers people and societies; hence its realisation, involves a broader participation of all stake-holders, including people who could contribute by identifying and realising solutions to insecurity (Liu Institute for Global Issues, 2010). Hence, human security and national security are not mutually exclusive concepts; neither can be attained independently (UNCHS, 2003: 2-6)

4.4. Governmentality:

―In recent years, scholars in the Foucauldian tradition have become increasingly interested in is-sues related to state security. Until recently in Foucauldian scholarship, ―broader preoccupations with the state (the modern omnipotent Leviathan) [had] given way to attention to plural sites of power‖ and allegedly more sophisticated techniques of social control, viewed as apart from the pur-view of state security. These would hold security laws and measures as ―residual pre-modern forms of state power…akin to the resort to state-inflicted violence to the body in punishment‖ (Wright, 1998). Recent years, however, have witnessed a shift towards a greater recognition of the continuing presence and significance of security measures in ―modern‖ states, a movement towards ―bringing the security state back in‖ to the Foucauldian analyses.

It has been argued that securitisation, rather than decreasing in importance over time, has in fact expanded and adopted new forms and new rationalities (Agamben, 2004; Johnson, 2002 & Turner, 2002). It is the relation of securitisation to regimes of discipline and governmentality, and the histor-ical role of security laws and measures in the constitution of the modern state and state power (Wright, 1998). In this context, scholars have argued for re-readings of Foucault with attention to the continuing intersection between sovereignty and governmentality… manifested around national security (Wright, 1998).

The renewed attention to security has brought attention to numerous concepts developed in Foucault‘s work and used for some time in fields such as criminology, which are potentially relevant to the analysis of securitisation (Foucault, 2003a) as a notion of the defence of society or the social-legal-political order as the overriding political value and primary obligation of the state (or political authority more broadly) and secondly, it is the identification of specific elements (individuals, groups, or forms of political action) as dangerous security threats warranting preventive measures. Several scholars, most notably Giorgio Agamben, have drawn upon Foucault‘s work on bio politics and governance in understanding developments in modern security techniques. Building upon these ideas, several have explored the basis of securitisation in positive scientific knowledge and tech-niques of normalisation. Scholars working in the Foucauldian tradition have drawn upon the notions of governance, bio politics, and police in trying to reveal the complex, profound relationship be-tween liberalism and securitisation - the ―liberal problematic of security‖ (Dean, 2002) -positing the existence of a ―liberal authoritarian‖ (Foucault, 2003b) form of governance centred around security (Risley, 2006).iii

The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Ghali, described this situation in the following way: States in which institutions and law and order have totally or partially collapsed under the pres-sure and amidst the confusion of erupting violence, yet which subsist as a ghostly presence on the world map, are now commonly referred to as ―failed States‖ or ―Etats sans gouvernement‖. However, neither expression is sufficiently pre-cise. ―Failed‖ is too broad a term, for, going to the opposite extreme, the aggressive, arbitrary, tyrannical or totalitarian State would equally be regarded as having ―failed‖ -- at least according to the norms and standards of modern-day international law. On the other hand, ―State without government‖ is too narrow, since, in the type of State discussed in this article, it is not only the central government but also all the other functions of the State, which have collapsed. For this reason, the term ―failed State‖ as used in the following text should be understood to mean ―disintegrated‖ or ―col-lapsed‖ state (Thürer, 1999).

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4.5. Delivering public and political goods

―Failed states serve as a catalyst to non-state terrorist networks. They provide locations for criti-cal face-to-face meetings/training that create the lifelong bonds of trust necessary for the smooth operation of covert networks. They are also excellent conduits for trans-national crime (drug and human trafficking primarily) that fund ongoing operations. However, an exact definition of what a failed state is and how they become failed states is fussy. ―Nation-state success can be measured by its ability to deliver public and political goods in the following hierarchy. These are security and law and order are the state's primary function as it provides a framework through which all other politi-cal goods can be delivered through a system of codes and procedures, which regulate the interac-tions of the population and sets the standards for conduct. In addition, states must provide human development services, critical infrastructure, banking system, an enabling business environment, a forum for civil society, and a method of regulating environmental commons‖ (Rotberg, 2003).

―Based on their ability to deliver these political goods, the health of states can be defined as fol-lows. Strong States are in full control of their territories and provide high quality political goods to their citizens. They perform well in growth GDP per capita, the Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and Global Integrity‘s Index. Weak States contain ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other tensions that limit or decrease its ability to deliver political goods. These conflicts are on the edge of exploding into open conflict. GDP per capita has fallen or falling. Interestingly, the privatisation of education and health care is a sign of state weak-ness. Corruption is common. The rule of law is weakly applied. Failed States provide very little polit-ical goods. They forfeit the distribution of political goods to warlords or non-state actors. Security is non-existant in all but the major cities (if that). The economic infrastructure has failed, the health care system is in decline, and the educational system is in shambles. GDP per capita is in a precipi-tous decline, inflation soars, corruption flourishes, and food shortages are frequent (FP, 2008).

Failed states often have a very rich minority that takes advantage of the failed system.

Collapsed States are failed states with a complete vacuum of authority (rare). They are black holes in regards to all indicators of health. Collapsed states can become failed states with in-tervention.

Daniel Thürer argues ―the term ―failed‖ State ―does not denote a precisely defined and classifia-ble situation but serves rather as a broad label for a phenomenon which can be interpreted in vari-ous ways. We will now consider the concepts associated with this term from a legal, developmental, and sociological perspective. Three elements can be said to characterise the phenomenon of the ―failed State‖ from the political and legal point of view.

Firstly, there is the geographical and territorial aspect, namely the fact that ―failed States‖ are essentially as-sociated with internal and endogenous problems, even though these may incidentally have cross-border impacts. The situation confronting us then is one of an implosion rather than an explosion of the structures of power and authority, the disintegration and de-structuring of States rather than their dismemberment.

Secondly, there is the political aspect, namely the internal collapse of law and order. The emphasis here is on the total or near total breakdown of structures guaranteeing law and order rather than the kind of fragmenta-tion of State authority seen in civil wars, where clearly identified military or paramilitary rebels fight either to strengthen their own position within the State or to break away from it.iv

Thirdly, there is the functional aspect, namely the absence of bodies capable, on the one hand, of representing the State at the international level and, on the other, of being influenced by the outside world. Either no insti-tution exists which has the authority to negotiate, represent and enforce or, if one does, it is wholly unreliable, typically acting as ―statesman by day and bandit by night‖ (Ibid, Thürer: 3-6).

Foreign Policy states ―this year, Somalia claims the unenviable distinction of being the state most at risk of failure. In many ways, Somalia has failed already, as the unpopular transitional government lacks control of the streets of Mogadishu—much less the rest of the country.v In 2007, several coun-

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tries that have long served as the poster children for failed states managed to achieve some unlikely gains. The Ivory Coast, which unravelled in 2002 after a flawed election divided north and south, experienced a year of relative calm thanks to a new peace agreement. Liberia, the most improved country in last year‘s index, continued to make gains due to a renewed anticorruption effort and the resettlement of nearly 100,000 refugees. The Fund for Peace Failed States Index (2008) provides a useful group of indicators

―mounting demographic pressures,

―massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitar-ian emergencies,

―legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia, and

―chronic and sustained human flight,

In addition, elements that aggravate state collapse are ―uneven economic development along group lines, severe economic decline, criminalisation, and/or de-legitimisation of the state‖. The progressive deterioration of public services, suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights, security apparatus operates as a "state within a state", rise of factionalised elites, and intervention of other states or external politi-cal actors‖ also account as formidable indicators for state failure‖.

The most enlightened in society must step forward to play the role required of them as harbingers of truth, freedom, modernity, and social change. There must be courage and an unravelled motivation to spearhead the process towards change in a society where for some time now; there has been the temptation to downgrade the value of education and professional development. A social psychology that puts so much trust in the machine gun and other paraphernalia of war must now be replaced by a social psychology that gives due respect to the highest ethical and professional standards in social life. State failure teaches us is that any society, which is not based on strong institutional pillars and a robust meritocracy in its distribution of social and economic benefits, is bound to fail. Thus, the merit system is consequential as a tried and tested route to success in constitutional self-governance. The mystique of presidential power in Africa is closely linked to the lack of institution building and the distortion of the role and influence of existing ones, such as the courts, traditional societies, public associations and other pillars of civil society.

The pathology of personal and individual power must be replaced by an ideology of institutional power and the fos-tering of communicative competence at all levels of the social system. In the experiences of the great nations, institutional power has always been legitimated by dialogic and democratic voices including all sections of society. The critical observ-er would note that the structure of national failure could be principally located within the vortex of this pathology, and the psychosocial assumptions and web of psychic delusions, which substantiate and give it its lifeblood. What this pre-supposes is that the analysis of political and structural failure should be predicated upon bringing into conscious aware-ness the role of subjective and phenomenological factors. The merits of this approach, for example, primarily lie in the analytical achievement of Fanon's subjectivism. By shifting the analysis of colonialism away from economic and political factors, Fanon succeeded where many structuralist theorists of decolonisation had failed (Johnson, 2003:2).

Table 1 – Fund for Peace state failure in selected countries in Africa

Fund for Peace Failed States Index

Global Rank and Country

(Greater Horn of Africa countries highlighted)

1.

dem

ogr

aph

ic p

ress

ure

2.

Ref

uge

es a

nd

ID

Ps

3.

ven

gean

ce-s

eekin

g

4.

hum

an f

ligh

t

5.

un

even

dev

elo

pm

ent

6.

sever

e ec

on

om

ic d

eclin

e

7.

stat

e d

e-le

giti

mis

atio

n

8.

serv

ices

det

erio

rati

on

9.

hum

an r

igh

ts v

iola

tio

n

10.

stat

e w

ith

in a

sta

te

11.

fact

ion

alis

ed e

lites

ris

e

12.

exte

rnal

po

litic

al a

cto

rs

To

tal

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1 - Somalia 2 - Sudan

3 - Zimbabwe 4 - Chad

6 - D. R. Congo 8 - Côte d‘Ivoire

10 - CAR 11 - Guinea

16 - Ethiopia 16 - Uganda 18 - Nigeria

22 - Niger 24 - Burundi

26 - Kenya 26 - Congo 29 - Malawi

31 - Sierra Leone 32 - Guinea Bissau

33 - Cameroon 34 - Liberia

36 - Burkina Faso 40 - Egypt

42 – Equatorial Guinea 42 - Rwanda

44 - Eritrea 71 - Djibouti

120 - Botswana 122 - Tunisia 123 - Ghana

125 - South Africa 148 - Mauritius

9.8 9.0 9.7 9.1 9.6 8.4 9.0 7.9 8.9 8.7 8.2 9.5 9.1 8.7 8.7 9.0 8.6 8.0 7.4 8.1 8.6 7.5 7.8 9.1 8.6 6.2 9.2 5.6 6.8 8.4 3.6

9.8 9.6 9.0 9.2 9.2 8.3 8.8 7.4 7.5 9.3 5.1 6.0 8.2 8.5 7.7 6.2 7.4 6.5 7.1 8.4 5.6 6.3 2.0 7.0 7.1 6.4 6.0 3.4 5.0 7.0 1.1

9.5 10.0 9.5 9.7 8.8 9.5 8.9 8.5 7.8 8.3 9.4 9.2 6.7 7.6 6.8 6.0 6.9 5.4 7.1 6.0 6.4 7.7 7.0 8.5 5.6 5.5 3.4 5.1 5.1 4.9 3.5

8.3 8.8 10.0 7.8 7.9 8.4 5.5 8.3 7.5 6.0 8.2 6.0 6.5 8.0 6.1 8.2 8.4 7.0 7.9 6.5 6.6 6.2 7.4 7.5 6.0 5.2 6.0 5.1 8.0 4.0 2.1

7.5 9.3 9.6 9.1 9.0 8.0 8.8 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.2 7.2 8.8 8.1 8.1 8.8 8.2 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.9 7.8 9.2 7.4 5.9 6.2 6.9 7.2 6.8 8.5 5.9

9.4 7.3 10.0 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.6 8.2 7.6 5.9 9.2 8.0 6.9 8.0 9.1 8.7 8.2 6.1 8.3 8.1 6.9 3.9 7.3 8.5 7.1 5.3 4.3 5.0 4.2 3.8

10.0 10.0 9.5 9.7 8.3 8.9 9.2 9.7 7.9 8.3 8.9 8.4 7.1 8.2 8.8 8.0 7.7 7.9 8.7 7.0 7.6 9.0 9.4 8.2 8.4 7.4 5.4 6.6 5.5 5.0 5.1

10.0 9.5 9.6 9.4 9.1 7.8 8.6 9.0 7.5 7.9 8.7 9.1 9.0 7.4 8.8 9.0 8.2 8.5 7.6 8.5 8.9 6.3 8.3 6.8 7.9 7.3 6.2 5.9 6.9 5.7 4.1

9.9 9.9 9.8 9.5 8.9 9.0 8.7 8.9 8.5 7.9 7.5 7.9 7.5 7.2 7.9 7.8 7.0 8.0 7.4 6.7 6.6 8.5 9.5 7.3 7.4 8.1 4.8 7.3 4.5 4.2 3.9

10.0 9.8 9.5 9.8 9.6 9.2 9.4 8.4 7.5 8.1 9.2 7.5 6.8 7.1 7.9 5.4 6.4 8.4 7.8 6.7 7.6 6.1 9.0 4.6 7.5 5.6 3.9 5.9 2.4 3.9 3.5

10.0 9.9 9.3 9.8 8.6 8.9 9.4 8.6 8.9 7.8 9.3 6.7 7.8 8.4 7.2 7.6 7.5 7.1 8.2 7.9 7.7 8.4 8.5 7.8 7.2 7.0 2.8 6.2 3.9 4.4 3.0

10.0 9.9 7.0 9.5 9.4 9.7 9.0 7.9 7.3 7.7 6.1 7.8 8.6 7.3 7.4 7.8 7.3 7.7 7.2 8.6 7.3 8.0 6.0 6.5 7.3 5.0 6.0 3.0 4.7 2.5 2.8

114.2 113.0 112.5 110.9 106.7 104.6 103.7 101.8 96.1 96.1 95.7 94.5 94.1 93.4 93.4 92.9 92.3 91.3 91.2 91.0 89.9 88.7 88.0 88.0 87.4 70.0 65.9 65.6 64.6 62.7 42.4

5. Unanswered questions on Community Engagement in R2A and R2P

5.1. Unanswered questions

Does R2P and R2A process enter local processes as an external ideology, constructing and de-ploying its concepts in sterile abstraction from the immediacies of indigenous traditions, beliefs, and values? Do R2P & R2A constructs add value to traditional ―development‖ programmes and how does the R2A construct base its assumptions on historically rooted community knowledge and expe-rience? Demographic, socio-economic, and political responses (adaptive strategies) Differential re-sponses between men and women – What informs these responses? Could these responses lead to sustainable livelihoods? What kinds of interventions are needed to enhance these responses? How do communities and external change agents integrate knowledge? What are the economic, social, cultural, political indicators used to measure progress? Two intellectual traditions provide the theo-retical framework within which the discus-sion is going on: Marxist perspective (internal class relations) and Political interactive framework (state vs. society = agency, poli-tics, ethnicity, war lordism, terrorism, suicide bombers).

5.2. Humanitarian Aid:

Growing external involvement in aid pro-jects has resulted in increasingly challenging problems of conceptualising and understand-ing the role and function of international agencies. Insofar as the activities of external agencies are not understood and engaged in partly as indigenous societal potentialities developing gradually into actual structures, functions and characteristics of states and societies, their developmental impact may diminish with their proliferation. This can mean little more than a weakly coordinated multipli-

Food for thought

“Grand aid designs of the Quarter-trillion Dollar aid chest have failed to alleviate human suffering, but the industry behind these has be-come a monster which is hard to restructure let alone get rid of - partly because of the money

and interest involved and partly because of col-lective ignorance about the motives of global

welfare-ism”. BBC

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cation of projects which have immediately recognisable or measurable effects in limited areas, but which seem to suspend rather than serve the ultimate goals of self-reliant development and democ-ratisation of African political systems. Agency refers to the full range of participants and their activi-ties to R2P policy formulation and management. Participants include state actors, non-state actors, the international community, businesses, and individuals. Stakeholders in Government constantly create undercurrents that determine the scope and nature of agency with their specific needs, imper-atives, and causes for interaction in a R2P exercise. People's organisations face many limitations. Various recommendations and declarations aimed at addressing institutional problems have been made in recent years. However, mobilising the action required has remained a daunting challenge, as structural constraints militate against it.

0

Fail

ed

sta

tes

ind

ex s

co

re

Less

ris

k

10

Norway Norway

Ireland 20 Finland

Portugal

30 Austria

Belgium

Germany

Lithonia 50

Mongolia Brazil

Iran

Russia 80 Djibouti

Cuba

Mo

re r

isk

Syria Yemen Uganda Rwanda

DRC Chad Rwanda Eritrea Eritrea Kenya

Ethiopia 100 Haiti Pakistan DRC

Zimbabwe 110 Nigeria Ethiopia

Sudan Sudan

Somalia 120 Somalia

20% 10% 10% 20% 0 .1, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6, .7, .8, .9 1

Inflation Parliamentary Power Index Fig. 2- Inflationary and parliamentary power index (Comparative countries shown) (Fund for Peace, 2008)

5.3. When has the State Failed? Consequences of state failure and PCR (Inder Sud, 2005)

A state has failed when the basic functions of the State are no longer performed. The consequences of wide-spread internal conflict, revolutionary and ethnic wars, adverse regime change, genocide and politi-cides and De facto or de jure loss of government legitimacy are ‗domestic effects‘ – ―conflict trap‖, neighbour-hood effects – conflict spill over; arms spending; economic consequences, and Global Effects – havens for terrorists. In Post-Conflict Reconstruction, one observes massive inflow of foreign aid to im-prove services and create jobs, show quick and tangible results to cement the peace, use of contractors and NGOs to deliver services, significant technical assistance to build government functions – democra-cy focus, bold economic and political reforms: window of opportunity and coordinated multi-donor efforts

5.4. Determinants of potential state failure (Ibid)

These involve the quality of life: material well-being of citizens: unfulfilled expectations, diffi-culty of delivering quick results, urban/capital bias and security constraints; international influ-ences: openness to trade, conflicts in neighbouring countries, large influx of money, waste and cor-ruption, large foreign aid footprint, local elites; regime type: partial democracies more vulnerable than full democracies and autocracies and no distinction between autocracies and democracies; and re-building country vs. the state: alternative delivery mechanisms de-legitimise government, Institu-

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tion building a slow process, unrealistic reform agenda, focus on democracy promotion appropriate? Multiple and varied donor agendas

5.5. R2P R2A Operatives - Ideology in civic engagement in R2P and R2A:

Ideological elements and constructs might be seen as the very constitutive structure of process openness and closure. These are concepts and rules of governance, national and cultural values, tra-ditions of political discourse and arguments, and modes of representation of specific interests and needs. These elements, or complexes of elements, will tend to assume varying forms and to enter into shifting relations of competition, co-operation, and hegemony during political reform to R2P &R2A. A determinate order of institutions, powers, interests and activities operate through com-plexes of transition ideas and values, filling out, specifying, anchoring and, often short-cutting their formal content or meaning.

5.6. Governance issues in GHA:

Governments recognise that weak Public administration capacity is a major problem at all tiers of government. The strength state public administration capacity will have major knock-on effects for all other areas of development and poverty reduction agenda. Capacity building is integral to overall poverty reduction strategy. Governance is the conscious management of regimes with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of political authority initiated as: state-led transitions, civil society initiated and led transitions and combinations of state led and society led transitions. Three main strategic and processual issues are usually considered in the study and analysis of democratic transi-tions. These are objective conditions for political transition in the socio-economic structures, contingent politi-cal dynamics and depends upon the emergence of supportive set of rules and political, social, and economic institutions

6. Recommendations and Strategic Approaches to Civic Engagement in R2P & R2A

6.1. Mechanisms, institution building and support instruments for civic engagement

Improving capacity for, and coordination of, early action including the development of peace support operations capabilities for civic engagement; improving early warning capacity through strategic analysis and support and prioritising strategic security issues as follows: promoting an African definition of DDRR efforts in post-conflict situations

Ensuring efficient and consolidated action for prevention, combating and eradicating the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons; and improving the security sector and the capacity for good governance as related to peace and security and generating minimum standards for application in the exploitation and management of Africa's resources in conflict areas,

Trafficking, protecting children, and women: The underlying premises for ensuring human security is empowerment as it answers the human security imperative by directing corrective policy and action to those whose security is most severely threatened. Here, gender plays an important role since gender inequality gives rise to skewed distribution of resources or neglect in areas vital to secu-rity. State and non-state actors can implement monitor, report and investigate systems to track and correct conditions of children in armed conflicts; putting in place accessible complaint mechanisms for reporting and reversing breaches of international convention on women and children, reinforc-ing protections against violence and exploitation. Here, the pursuit of human security begins on a point of princi-ple: that every person has a right to know their rights—and to know how to claim the protection of those rights.vi

6.2. Principles for Policy Determination

Popular Participation - While popular participation through civil defence organisation is rec-ognised by many African countries, the percept of popular participation is not put within the context of a process of self-empowerment

Right to assistance-people needs continuum - The lessons learned so far have enabled us to break fresh grounds in the new conceptualisation of the right to assistance and meeting people needs - devel-

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opment - sustainability continuum. Urgency of different measures is not carefully assessed and resources are not deployed for the more urgent measures and precedence is not given to areas where lives and livelihoods are more threatened

Right to assistance focal Points - Many countries have policies that clearly define focal points of action for different tasks at different levels nonetheless the transfer of legal, administrative, and political authority to make decisions and manage public functions from the central government to field organisations: subordi-nate units of government, semiautonomous public corporations, area-wide development authorities, functional authori-ties, autonomous local governments, or non-governmental organisations is inadequate.

Integration: an integrated approach in the formulation and implementation of the right to assis-tance and meeting people needs programmes in the right to assistance and meeting people needs. Programmes, touching on different aspects of economic life, shall sub-serve the goals of develop-ment and build up assets of the community,

Public Announcement of Disasters: this shall be declared when convincing and complete so-cio-economic reports from regional councils and the National Early Warning System are provided. National level declaration for disaster is made by some committees such as the National Disaster Preparedness Committee. The commencement of humanitarian assistance measures shall automatically fol-low the declaration of disaster in an area. However, it is not always necessary to await such formal declaration on measures to be taken. Having regard to the general policies of the Government, hu-manitarian assistance operation may commence with available resources before a formal declaration.

6.3. Governance Rules and institutions:

Democratic transitions can be explained with reference to two: political organisations and politi-cal rules. The central hypothesis is that the relative strength of political organisations determines the rules of the political game that are installed. Democratisation requires a plural set of Political Organi-sations and Rules, which promote and protect rules of peaceful political participation and competi-tion. These rules are Constitutional Rules, Legislated Rules, and Administrative Rules. In taking an institutional perspective, we assume that actors in the political system express preferences through organisations and that these organisations vary in strength according to their resource base. The ge-neric characteristics of institutions that apply to state and non-state organisations are autonomy, ca-pacity, complexity, and cohesion.

6.4. International legal provisions and instruments and codes of practice:

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the OAU, the MNAC and the United Nations and the provisions common to the Geneva Conventions: these include field of application, duration of application, general principles of law, prohibition of reprisals, non-renunciation of rights, supervision by protecting powers and ICRC sanctions and dissemination… The Sphere Project – Codes of Practice — Hu-manitarian Charter and Minimum Standards is the result of cooperation between various independent agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance. (See Annex)

6.5. National policies should address on three areas of rights:

Basic operational modalities in disaster management, structure for management and duties and responsibilities of functionaries at different levels. The objectives of the policies augur on the fact that

No human being shall be denied access to food, shelter and perish for want of assis-tance in time of disaster. sustainable subsistence shall be ensured to disaster affected households through livelihood security in affected areas shall be protected from deterio-ration urgently;

The RBA effort shall reinforce human capabilities of affected population while promoting self-reliance, eliminating the root causes of vulnerability and contribution to

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sustainable economic growth and development; the provision shall protect and safeguard human dignity and reinforce the social determination for development while the best use of natural resource endowment shall be promoted.

Mechanisms such as specific parliamentary oversight committees, especially in the area of public accounts, open parliamentary debates, parliamentary-mandated commissions of inquiry, and publication of parliamentary records can all help increase transparency

Creating a metric civil service is a basic requirement for limiting corrupt practices and rebuilding public confidence in the bureaucracy and reducing government involvement in the economy, streamlining government functions, and limiting the discretionary deci-sion-making of authority of officials will reduce opportunity for corruption, while eco-nomic reforms can eliminate the government monopolies and economic distortions which facilitate it

Reviewing the quality of training and education and founding an independent hu-man quality development think tanks would be the single most powerful tool - in-vestment in human qualities to stopping the brain drain, turning it to brain gain

Working in fourteen African countries, Africa Humanitarian Action is African in spirit, concept, and composition. Its mission is to restore Africa‘s self-esteem – to change its image from that of a global backwater to a continent capable of dealing with crisis through a credible, African designed agenda. Alleviating crisis and poverty in Africa is, first and foremost, the responsibility of Africans. It has acceded and adopted the Sphere guide on accountability and effectiveness and applying the Minimum Standards. AHA has also signed on to the principles of Partnership: The Global Humani-tarian Platform created to bring all humanitarian actors has adopted the following principles of part-nership: Equality, Transparency, Results-oriented Approach, Responsibility, and Complementarity.

7. Conclusion:

The Constitutive Act of the African Union‘s objective augur on promoting peace, security, and stability on the continent; promoting democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance. Notwithstanding the will to capture this uncommon opportunity, its perspec-tives on political reform neglect to pose the problem of articulation of democracy as a relatively au-tonomous mode of analysis (in which democracy projects impose ideology upon polities and social-ites from the outside) -- democratisation would consist of a set of activities in which universal, main-ly Western, concepts and standards of governance are neatly ―applied to‖, as distinct from produced or re-produced in, African contexts and conditions.

Even at the level of application alone, it is largely overlooked that international models may en-ter states and societies in Africa through a proliferation of mechanisms that hinder the growth of open and effective democratic processes, that they may retard the development of indigenous dem-ocratic-system experience and capacity. Whether democratisation is defined in terms of individual freedom or collective rights, government policy or citizen action, private value or public norm, the upshot of the relative inattention to problems of articulation of open democratic systems and pro-cesses in itself makes democracy at once the most concrete of idea systems. Within current projects of political reform, democracy is either conventionalised or sterilised on terrain of theory and often vacuously formalised on the ground of practice. It enters African politics and society in relatively abstract and plain form, yet is expected to land itself to immediate and vital African polity's socio-political experience.

It suggests itself, and seems within reach, only to elude and appears readily practicable only to resist realisation. The above analysis underscores the need to carve new mechanisms based on Africa problems and solutions through closer co-operation and understanding between states that must accept that the rights of people as spelt out in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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References & endnotes

Agamben, Giorgio. Estado de excepción. Homo sacer II, 1. (Valencia: Pre-textos. 2004) Armitage, John. State of Emergency: An Introduction. (Theory, Culture & Society 19 (4):27-38, 2002) Dean, Mitchell. Liberal government and authoritarianism (Economy and Society 31 (1):37-61. 2002) Dillon, Michael. Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the ‗New World Order‘ to the Ethi-

cal Problematic of the World Order (Alternatives 20: 323-368. 1995) Foucault, M. 'Governmentality', trans. Rosi Braidotti and revised by Colin Gordon, in Graham

Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller eds The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality Chi-cago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991) pp. 87–104

FP, The 2008 Failed State Index, (Washington DC., The Fund for Peace, in Foreign Policy, 2008 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140)

IFRC, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief, (reprinted in IRRC, No. 310, January-February 1996, p. 119)

IFRC, The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter & Minimum Standards (IFRC, 2010, http://www.ifrc.org) Inder Sud (2005) Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and Failed States, (The George Washing-

ton University Conference on The Challenge of Globalization: Reinventing Good Global Governance, GW Center for Study of Globalization November 4, 2005)

Johnson T, Liberia in Crisis The Structure and Underlying Causes of a National Failure, (Perspective. 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/liberia/2003/0626underlying.htm)

Johnson, Richard. 2002. ―Defending Ways of Life: The (Anti-) Terrorist Rhetorics of Bush and Blair.‖ Theory, Culture & Society 19 (4): 211-231.;

Lemke, Thomas. Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique, (Rethinking Marxism Conference, University of Amherst (MA), September 21-24, 2000)

Liu Institute for Global Issues, The Human Security Report, (University of British Columbia, 2010) Nyers, Peter. Introduction: What‘s Left of Citizenship? (Citizenship Studies 8 (3): 203-215.; 2004. Risley, Suzanne. The Sociology of Security: Sociological Approaches to Contemporary and Historical Securitization

(American Sociological Association, Montreal Convention Center, Montreal, 2006, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p105192_index.html

Rotberg RI. Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Problem, (National Intelligence Council's 2020 project, Nov 6, 2003).

Thürer, D., (1999), The Failed State and International Law, ICRC, Geneva. (The article is based partly on ―Der Wegfall effektiver Staatsgewalt: der 'Failed State'‖, published in Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, Vol. 34, Heidelberg, 1995, pp. 9-47. -- ICRC trans-lation of the original German text )

Turner, Bryan S. Sovereignty and Emergency: Political Theology, Islam and American Conservatism. (Theory, Cul-ture & Society 19 (4): 103-119. 2002)

UNCHS, human security Now, Final Report of the Commission on human security (Chapter 1: UNCHS, New York, 2003, p.2-6)

UNDP, HDR, New dimensions of human security (New York, UNDP, 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/,

Walker, Peter. Victims of natural disaster and the right to humanitarian assistance: a practitioner‘s view. (Inter-national Committee of the Red Cross Review, Geneva, 2000)

Walters, William. Deportation, Expulsion, and the International Police of Aliens (Citizenship Studies 6 (3): 265-292, 2002)

Wright, Barry. Quiescent Leviathan? Citizenship and National Security Measures in Late Modernity. (Journal of Law and Society 25 (2): 213-236. 1998)

i Japan, for example, has adopted the broader "Freedom from Want" perspective in its own for-

eign policy and in 1999 established a UN trust fund for the promotion of human security. Canada,

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for example, was a critical player in the efforts to ban landmines. It has incorporated the "Freedom from Fear" agenda as a primary component in its own foreign policy.

ii The 1994 Human Development Report first drew global attention to the concept of human security and sought to influence the UN's 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen. Since then, human security has been receiving more attention from the key global development institutions, and asserts that the scope of security should be expanded to include threats in seven areas: economic security that requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work or, as a last resort, from a publicly financed safety net; food security that requires that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food; health security that aims to guarantee a minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles; environmental security that aims to protect people from the short- and long-term ravages of nature, man-made threats in nature, and deterioration of the natural environment; personal security that aims to protect people from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse or from predatory adults - crime, particularly violent crime; community security aims to protect people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and from sectarian and ethnic violence; and political security is concerned with whether people live in a society that honours rights.

iii Foucault, for example, emphasises the shift to a logic in which the delinquent individual was to be considered by society ―in terms of his virtualities rather than his acts; not for effective infractions of an equally effective law, but for the behavioural virtualities that these represent.

iv 3. Examples include Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia and Kosovo. v The loose coalition of Islamic clerics and militia leaders that captured the capital in 2006 was routed in the early

weeks of 2007, who have since stayed on to battle the remnants of the Islamist insurgency. The fighting has yet to pro-duce anything resembling a victor; if anything, the country‘s clan chaos continues unabated in the unruly streets, while pirates stalk the waters offshore. What the fighting has successfully produced is a refugee nightmare, with some 700,000 people fleeing Mogadishu last year. Somalia‘s disorder is generally eclipsed by the humanitarian disaster in Darfur, a situation notable for its remarkable lack of progress. The spill over effects of this troubled region continue to pull Sudan and its neighbours closer to the brink, with worsening refugee crises around the region and escalating skir-mishes between rebels backed by the governments in Chad and Sudan. ―All told, sub-Saharan Africa is home to seven of this year‘s 10 most vulnerable states, with four of them in the top five. Zimbabwe‘s slide in this year‘s index reflects the country‘s out-of-control inflation, 80 percent unemployment, and the fact that thousands flee to neighbouring Bot-swana and South Africa every week. The country‘s fortunes, further spoiled by this year‘s election dispute, are likely to continue to suffer before Zimbabweans can expect a respite (FP, 2008).

vi It is also a political fact in that the powerless lack the means to make that claim, in part because they lack a voice in the decisions that govern their lives. Hence, it demands of state and non-state actors to advance women‘s equality and economic empowerment to end the specific injustices and measures to strengthen the capacity and accountability of states for enforceable protection and pre-vention. Compulsory action in human trafficking demands that all states should ratify the UN Pro-tocol against human trafficking, incorporate this in communal laws to classify it as a national and domestic felony; and addressing political economy of powerlessness, where human trafficking should be treated chiefly as a crime against the individual injured party and not just the state.

Annex One

Conventions, Instruments Legal Provisions and Codes of Conduct

(Besides the Universal Declaration on Human and People‘s Rights)

1. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights:

The charter underpins that the African States members of the Organisation of African Unity, parties to the present Convention entitled "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition which should inspire and characterise their reflection on the concept of human and peoples' rights; and convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights; reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the OAU, the MNAC and the United Nations. Hence

1.1. The Member States of the OAU, parties to the present Charter shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them. This further underpins that every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the pre-sent Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, lan-guage, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any status.

1.2. Every individual shall be equal before the law and shall be entitled to equal protection of the law. Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right. Every indi-vidual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, and treatment shall be prohibited.

1.3. Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained and shall have the right to have his cause heard. Freedom of conscience, the profession, and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms.

1.4. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law. Every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law. Subject to the obligation of sol-idarity provided for in Article 29, no one may be compelled to join an association.

1.5. Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law, in particular those enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others.

1.6. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development and the right to national and international peace and security with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development. For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly relations, State Parties to the pre-

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sent Charter shall ensure that: any individual enjoying the right of asylum under Article 12 of the present Charter shall not engage in subversive activities against his country of origin or any other State Party to the present Charter; their territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people of any other State Party to the present Charter.

1.7. State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education, and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding ob-ligations and duties are understood.

1.8. State Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institu-tions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter.

2. Provisions common to the Geneva Conventions (Extract from "Basic rules of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols" (ICRC))

2.1. Field of application, duration of application, general principles of law:

The Conventions and the Protocol are applicable in case of declared war or of any other armed conflict arising between two or more of the Parties to the Conventions and Protocol I from the be-ginning of such a situation, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them.vii

2.2. Prohibition of reprisals:

Reprisals, violations of the law in response to other violations of the law and to make them cease, are prohibited against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, medical services and personnel, civil defence services and personnel, prisoners of war, civilians, civilian and cultural property, the environment and works and installations containing dangerous forces, admitted only in the conduct of the hostilities. [I, 46; II, 47; III, 13; IV, 33; P. I, 20, 51-56]

2.3. Non-renunciation of rights:

The Geneva Conventions having as their aim the protection of war victims, these persons must be placed, as far as is possible, out of the reach of any pressures to make them renounce their rights. This is why these persons may in no circumstances renounce, in part or totally, the rights ensured them by the Conventions and the Protocol. The people mainly concerned are military and civilian medical personnel and the wounded, military, and civilian sick and shipwrecked persons, as well as prisoners of war, civilian internees, inhabitants of occupied territories and foreigners on the territory of a Party to the conflict. The principle of non-renunciation applies to all the rights which protect war victims. [I, 7; II, 7; III, 7; IV, 8; P. I, 1]

2.4. Supervision

2.4.1. Protecting Powers:

To ensure that the Geneva Conventions are respected, Parties to the conflict should secure the cooperation and admit the supervision of Protecting Powers, in other words neutral States appoint-ed to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict in enemy countries. If such appointments have not been made, the ICRC will offer the Parties to the conflict its help in the designation of Protecting Powers. [I, 8; II, 8; III, 8; IV, 9; P. I, 5]

2.4.2. International Committee of the Red Cross:

The presence of the Protecting Powers does not stand in the way of humanitarian activities which the ICRC or any other impartial humanitarian organisation undertakes for the protection of war victims.[I, 9; II, 9; III, 9; IV, 10] This is an application of the provision that governments may at any time agree to entrust to an organisation offering every guarantee of impartiality and efficiency the humanitarian duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers by virtue of the Conventions.[I, 10; II,

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10; III, 10; IV, 11] ICRC delegates are, in particular, authorised to go to all places where there are protected persons, prisoners of war or civil internees and to talk to them without witnesses. The ICRC will be granted all the necessary facilities to carry out its humanitarian work. [III, 126; IV, 143; P. I, 81]

2.5. Sanctions:

These articles have particular significance. They relate both to offences which are subject only to administrative or disciplinary sanctions as well as to grave breaches, against which they constitute an embryonic international penal law by elevating them to the rank of international crimes and desig-nating them as "war crimes". These articles lay before the conscience of the world the list of espe-cially grave violations of the Conventions and the Protocol which, were they to remain unpunished, would signify the degradation of human values and the regression of the entire concept of humanity. The Conventions and the Protocol require governments to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or ordering the commission of any of the grave breaches; they will search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered the commission of such breaches, including those resulting from a failure to act when under a duty to do so. Military commanders must be watchful to prevent breaches of the Conventions and the Protocol, will sup-press them and, if necessary, report them to the competent authorities.[I, 49; II, 50; III, 129; IV, 146]

2.6. Dissemination:

In time of peace as in time of war, the Parties are obliged to include the study of the Conven-tions and the Protocol in their programmes of military instruction and to encourage the civilian population to study them. Military and civil authorities must be fully acquainted with these texts and military commanders must ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and the Protocol. [I, 47; II, 48; III, 127; IV, 144; P. I, 83, and 87] In addition, Parties to a conflict are obliged to ensure that legal advisers are available to advise military commanders on the application of the Conventions and the Protocol and on ap-propriate instructions to the armed forces on this subject. [P. I, 82]

3. Codes of Practice:

Any discussion on strengthening the right of organisations to provide assistance must at some point address the issue of those organisations‘ legitimacy and competence. Before pursuing this question, however, there is a more fundamental issue which both individuals and agencies involved in humanitarian assistance need to recognise. The business of humanitarian assistance is driven by two ethics, that of the priest and that of the prophet. In many ways humanitarianism is a moral code: the priests among the humanitarian community tend to want to codify it, to define the business, set standards, and specify who can and who cannot provide assistance. The prophets, in contrast, believe that providing humanitarian assistance is the responsibility of all people. They seek to spread this message and stimulate humanitarian action at the grass roots levelviii (Walker, 2000).

International mechanisms to ensure quality: Any system of rights intended to legitimise the role of non-State providers of assistance must devise a way of ensuring that they are legitimate and com-petent, and work in the interests of disaster victims. No such mechanism yet exists. The code of conduct [2] drawn up in 1994 and widely recognised by both NGOs and States goes a short way in this direction but not nearly far enough. However, a recent initiative, emerging from an extensive coalition of humanitarian agencies, promises to bring us much closer to the goal of objective quality assurance in humanitarian work.

The Sphere Project

Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards is the result of cooperation between various in-dependent agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance, including most major NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Its aim is to define basic practical standards that should govern humanitari-

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an assistance, specifically that immediately relevant to saving lives, such as water and sanitation, food, health care and shelter. Such minimum standards already exist for many areas of humanitarian work. The problem is that there are often different standards competing with each other, or that the existing standards are out-of-date or incomplete. The Sphere Project is the first initiative to provide a coherent and complete set of standards to which a wide range of agencies are prepared to agree and against which their performance can be measured. Using basic human rights as its foundation, the Sphere Project seeks to erect an edifice consisting of clearly defined levels of assistance and the competence required to deliver it. This is intended to serve as a yardstick for humanitarian agencies in planning and assessment. Meeting critical human needs and restoring people dignity are core prin-ciples for all humanitarian action. The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards of the Sphere Project establish an explicit link between fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles on the one hand and clearly defined standards in terms of water supply, sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site selection, and health care on the other (IFRC, 2010).

vii These agreements also cover armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial

domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination. [I, 2; II, 2; III, 2; IV, 2; P. I, 1] The application ceases at the general close of military operations and, in occupied territories, at the end of the occupation except for those categories of people whose final release, repatriation or settlement takes place at a later date. These people shall continue to benefit from the relevant provisions of the Conventions and the Protocol until their fi-nal release, repatriation or settlement. [I, 5; III, 5; IV, 6; P. I, 3] In cases not covered by the Conven-tions, the Protocol or other international agreements, or in the case of denunciation of these agree-ments, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law de-rived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.[P. I, 1 ; I, 63; II, 62; III, 142; IV, 158]

viii Of course, both approaches are needed. The creed of the priests can survive only if a certain degree of commitment is generated by the prophets. Moreover, one could legitimately argue that while all individuals have a duty to render impromptu assistance to the best of their ability when they see suffering, once that assistance takes the shape of an organised, professional programme, codes, rules and standards are needed to safeguard the rights of the individual.