Sout-East European Journal of Political Science, no. 1, vol. 1, 2013

CONTENTS

Open Letter Leonardo MORLINO ……………………………………………………………………… 3 Editorial Andreea ZAMFIRA, Does Political Europeanness Exist? Democracy and Civil Society after 1989 ……………….. 5 Articles Michele PROSPERO, Hegel e il Concetto di Società Civile, ………………………………. 13 Gheorghe Lencan STOICA, Civil Society in Romania and Central and Eastern Europe …... 52 Daniel BARBU, Public Sphere, Citizens’ Participation and the Legacy of Communism …… 74 Florin-Ciprian MITREA, Intellectuals and Civil Society. The Polish Case ………………… 96 Gelu SABĂU, Democracy against Nationalism. The A.C. Popovici Case ……………….... 111 Cătălin-Valentin RAIU, Civil Society as Its Own Enemy: The First Romanian Christian-Democratic Attempt ……………………………………………………………………... 130 Salvatore CINGARI, Per un’ Analisi Critica del Concetto di «Meritocrazia» come «Ideologia» Neo-liberista ……………………………………………………………………………... 159 Victoria SPAU, Social Movements through Music and Culture. An overview ………….…. 177 Essays Selami Ahmet SALGÜR, Need Of Intercultural Dialogue between Black Sea Countries … 189 Book Reviews Sorin BOCANCEA, Daniel ȘANDRU (coord.), Totalitarismul. De la origini la Totalitarianism. From origins to consequences (Adrian-Marius TOMPEA) ……………………………………... 201 Tom GALLAGHER, Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong, (Lucian JORA) …………………………………………………………………………… 204 Jonathan POWELL, The New Machiavelli. How to Wield Power in the Modern World (Aurelia PERU-BĂLAN) ………………………………………………………………… 210 Alexandru RADU, Politica între proporționalism și majoritarism. Alegeri și sistem electoral în România postcomunistă (Florin GRECU) …………………………………………………………….. 214 Event Filip STANCIU ………………………………………………………………………….. 218 Signals Florin-Ciprian MITREA …………………………………………………………………. 222 Notes On Contributors ………………………………………………………………… 227

South-East European Journal Of Political Science, Vol. I, No. I, 2013

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OPEN LETTER


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Dear colleagues,

founders of South East-European Journal of Political Science,

The birth of a journal is a tangible and strong sign indicating both the development of a community of specialists in the field and the existence of future plans and expectations. Therefore, this initiative must be warmly and admiratively saluted for the courage and effort of its founders. A journal of political science like this one creates opportunities for all of us, scientists, political elites and citizens, to think about, analyse and initiate debates regarding the difficult aspects that have characterized our democracies in the recent years. Maybe this journal aims to improve our life together. Hence, I congratulate you for this, as well and send you my best wishes.

Leonardo MORLINO

Past President of the International Political Science Association

Leonardo MORLINO Professor of Political Science and director of Research Centre on Democracies and Democratizations at LUISS, Rome. In the 2009-12 term, he served as President of International Political Science Association (IPSA). His most recent books include Changes for Democracy, OUP, 2011; Democracias y Democratizaciones, CIS, 2008; International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy?, Routledge, 2008 (with Amichai MAGEN); Democratization and the European Union. Comparing Central and Eastern European post-communist countries, Routledge, 2010 (with Wojciech SADURSKI).


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EDITORIAL

Does Political Europeanness Exist? (Post)Democracy and Civil Society after 1989

Andreea ZAMFIRA

University of South-East Europe Lumina

Abstract: Starting from the question regarding natural Europeanness and political Europeanness, the present paper aims to open an ample discussion about the role of intellectual traditions and political mentalities in the creation of a common European methaphorical identity space. As it is shown by the contributors of this volume, mainly reflected in the way that democracy, liberal State, citizens’ participation, modernity are understood by European societies, the post’ 89 differences between East and West are to be explained in relation to the legacy of previous regimes and local traditions of political thought. Moving the focus to some new issues in the literature on political science, i.e. the postdemocracy and new forms of participation, the present paper implicitly invites us to reflect to the future of European democratic regimes, “Europe of values” and political Europeanness. Keywords: political Europeanness, (post)democracy, postcommunism, intellectuals, civil society. 1. INTRODUCTION After the dissolution of the communist regimes, Central and South-Eastern

Europe had to imagine long-term sustainable solutions for the passage from dictatorship to democracy. During the first two decades after 1989, the ex-communist countries experimented several “provisional patterns”, some of them local or endogenous and others exogenous (of Western origin)1. Soon after the first steps towards liberalization, the European adhesion became an ideal coveted by all these societies. They all realized their common need for institutions guaranteeing the democratic order, the rule of law, the respect of human rights and liberties. These are the very EU core-values that brought closer 27 Western, Central and South-Eastern countries during the last more than sixty years. The 27 member States of the EU are far from being equally and fully attached to the European norms and institutions, far

1 Guy HERMET, Les désenchantements de la liberté. La sortie des dictatures dans les années ’90, Fayard, Paris, 1993; Jean-Michel De waele (ed.), Partis politiques et démocratie en Europe centrale et orientale, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2002.


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from similarly defining the “common good” or having comparable senses of public responsibility – which are some of the reasons sustaining the already popular discourse about a “Europe with multiple speeds”. Nonetheless, through their Union, the European societies illustrates that the (political) will of constructing a common destiny surpasses the differences in political culture. In the new era of postnationalism and transnationalism, the old theses of Occidentalism and Orientalism1 are permanently reconsidered. Nowadays, the press, civil society and citizens ask themselves who really is better characterized by old ethno-stereotypes and centrist labels like “Europe of the butter”, “Europe of the spirit” (Constantin Noica). Therefore, the question now and here is: “Does political Europeanness really exist?”

2. EUROPE, AS AN IMAGINARY POLITICAL ENTITY The history of the European imaginary political entity is maybe as old as

Europe itself. The most frequent references today do not go before the 18th-19th centuries. Probably the most cited in this matter are philosopher Immanuel Kant – for his concept of ewigen Frieden (en., perpetual peace) – and the French poet and writer Victor Hugo – for his expression États-Unis d’Europe (en., United States of Europe).

The contemporary European political and institutional entity is nothing else than the embodiment of imaginary representations (myths, images and symbols) which were built along centuries through philosophy, literature, etc. – through erudite knowledge, common knowledge and everyday living. But is this mental-cultural frame coherent or cohesive? All societies are based on general worldviews common to their members; institutions and political regimes (democracies, theocracies, etc.) correspond straight to particular conceptions about life, origins of the world, the role of humans on earth, etc. Could Europeans’ traditional and modern beliefs sustain the construction of a veritable society, of a veritable political society and a veritable civil society? Or, is this a mere illusion and natural Europeanness does not really suffice? If so, could political Europeanness be acquired through the process of European integration?

In the academic literature, modern European representative democracies are severely criticized for diluting citizens’ sovereignty at the very moment after elections. People rarely consider that their representatives follow their electoral agenda. In reality, the separation of powers is nothing else than a “constitutional illusion”; the

1 About this process of stereotypization: Jenó SZÚCS, Les trois Europes, trans. Véronique Charaire, Gábon Klahiczay & Philippe Thureau-Dangin, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1985; Alain MONNIER, “L’Europe de l’Est: différente et diverse”, Population (French Edition), No. 3, 1991, pp. 443-461; Guy HERMET, Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en Europe, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1996; Maria TODOROVA, Balcanii şi balcanismul, Humanitas, București, 2000.


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majoritarian parties always concentrate more executive, legislative and judicial power than the other political actors. And “Parties are not what they were once”1:

“Nevertheless, one of the major reasons that I am convinced of the weakness of parties in these neodemocracies is that virtually all the difficulties that they have been experiencing are also being experienced by contemporary parties in archaeodemocracies. The crisis of representation and intermediation through partisan channels seems to be generic, not specific to those countries that have recently changed their mode of political domination” (original emphasis)”.2

Not only the democracy and Constitution are discussed in terms of

postdemocratic illusions. In the literature of political science, Europe was also called “a grand illusion”3. What is the European project?, seems to ask himself Tony Judt. We all know that this political project was officially based on three principal objectives: peace, welfare and the idea of Europe4. But where are we now? The treatment of a part of European citizens as citizens of second order, the economic gap between the West and the East, the deceptions of ex-communist countries, the EU exclusivist politics are some of those elements Judt brings into question. Maybe Judt is right: the “national State” did not complete its historical project and Europe was formed too early. Or maybe this euroskeptical position could be undermined by solid postnationalist arguments. How were the former imaginary political entities created? Differently?

Let us now imagine Europe as a new developing social and political structure, oriented towards a limited set of principles and objectives (peace, welfare and Europeanness), an European society with differences of interests and culture, institutionalized old conflicts and rationalised old violence, a developing (though divided) transnation having thus surpassed the risk of stagnation and decadence5. If we accept that there is certain continuity between the different forms of political organization conceived over time6, then the European government would be just another stage of rationalised domination. Consequently, the values promoted within the plural European Union are nothing more than the core emotive and cognitive

1 Philippe C. SCHMITTER, “Parties Are Not What They Were Once”, in Stefano BARTOLINI, Peter MAIR, Identity, competition and electoral availability. The Stabilization of European electorates: 1885-1985, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 67-89. 2 Ibidem, p. 84. 3 Tony JUDT, Europa iluziilor, trans. Daciana Branea & Ioana Copil-Popovici, Polirom, Iași, 2000. 4 Olivier COSTA, Nathalie BRACK, Le fonctionnement de l’Union Européenne, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2011. 5 Charles TAYLOR, “Neutrality in Political Science”, in Peter LASLETT, W.G. RUNCIMAN, Philosophy, Politics and Society, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969, pp. 25-46. 6 Michel FOUCAULT, Dits et écrits, 1980-1988, Vol. IV, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, pp.134-161 (“Omnes et singulatim – vers une critique de la raison politique”).


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content of new social and political ties between old national societies1 and, at the same time, a proof that the European elites’ interest is not limited to a precise set of principles and objectives but they also strive to develop political Europeanness. The question here is whether this political Europeanness represents a value in itself or it is just a simple vehicle in the process of European imaginary construction.

“[…] declaration of principle on ‘values’ had been incorporated into European treaty. No mention was made of this concept either in the Treaty of Rome or in the Treaty of Maastricht which only referred to ‘principles’. For the majority of political analysts, the introduction of the reference to a ‘Europe of values’ in the treaty was meant to symbolize the use of a more emotional, less ‘curt’ type of rhetoric than the previous references to the ‘rights’ and ‘principles’. This would hopefully arouse popular adhesion, or even enthusiasm. [...] it would be interesting to analyse whether such a discourse on ‘values’ might contribute to legitimizing the European project. Before addressing the ritual question of ‘what values for Europe’, should we not seriously wonder if Europe really needs to invoke these so-called ‘common values’? In other terms, should Europe’s political union be buttressed by shared values or by the recognition of a small set of principles of justice?”.2

3. DEMOCRACY, POSTDEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN EUROPE The concepts of “democracy”, “rule of law”, “fundamental rights and liberties”

are integrant part of the European conception on good governance. In transition from the “best regime” to the “good governance”, the European Union tries out new doctrinarian and political formulas which are presumed to surpass important tensions that modernity brought in civitate. In this sense, the democracy and the rule of law are permanently revisited and negotiated. Modern democracy can no longer be separated from civil society which is now considered an important prerequisite for good governance. The importance of civil society directly results from the modern tension between norms and political reality; its role is now seen as being essential for establishing strong democratic regimes3.

The origins of the concept of civil society are deeply anchored in the history of political ideas, a reason for which a lot of scholars in the field choose to begin their debates with Locke, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, etc. Michele

1 Tzvetan TODOROV, «Construire une mémoire commune», in Bronislaw GEREMEK, Robert PICHT, Visions d’Europe, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2007, pp. 335-345; Anne-Marie THIESSE, « Une mémoire commune pour quelle vision de l’Europe ? », in Bronislaw GEREMEK, Robert PICHT, Visions d’Europe, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2007, pp. 345-359. 2 Justine LACROIX, “Does Europe Need Common Values?: Habermas vs. Habermas”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 8, No. 141, 2009, pp. 141-156. 3 Bent FLYVBJERG, “Habermas and Foucault: thinkers for civil society?”, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1998, pp. 210-233.


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Prospero, in the article included in the present volume, “Hegel e il Concetto di Società Civile”, presents civil society through Hegel’s lens. Accordingly to Prospero, Hegel was the author who introduced the autonomous concept of civil society, analysing it in relation with major others concepts of the political, social and juridical sciences. It is important to mention that Hegel, among other important scholars, considered that “the creation of the civil society belongs to the modern world”.1 In the article entitled “Civil Society in Romania and Central and Eastern Europe”, Gheorghe Lencan Stoica continues to explore the historical roots of this concept, adding other philosophers’ interesting ideas (Marx, Gramsci) to Prospero’s outline. Through Gramsci, Stoica offers us a first operational definition of the civil society: “a complex network of cultural, moral and ideological conditionings”2 preventing from statism and dictatorship.

Maybe one of the most comprehensive definitions of civil society is the one given by Habermas (reproduced bellow). We retain the idea that civil society is composed by all the formal and informal representation instances struggling for democratic principles, instances that, at a certain moment, citizens could court for taking over the representative function of political parties in crisis3.

“Most writers on civil society agree […] that civil society has an institutional core constituted by voluntary associations outside the sphere of the state and the economy. Such associations range from, for example, churches, cultural associations, sport clubs and debating societies to independent media, academies, groups of concerned citizens, grass-roots initiatives and organizations of gender, race and sexuality, all the way to occupational associations, political parties and labour unions”.4 In his article cited above, relying on the theory of modern civil society, Stoica

tries to emphasize the salient distinctions between the Romanian situation and the ones from the neighbouring countries (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.) before and after ’89. A significant number of explaining factors are to be found in particular moments in the history of these countries and the author reminds us of them. He openly manifests his adhesion to Stephen Gill’s opinion that the role of intellectuals is fundamental in creating an alternative “collective conscience”. Daniel Barbu reopens the Romanian case, in the article about “Public Sphere, Citizens’ Participation, and the Legacy of Communism”. Convinced that passivity and non-participative attitudes after ’89 are mainly inherited from the previous political period, the author attentively examines the communist enrolling of the society during Ceaușescu’s regime. He also examines the so called “resistance through culture”, an interesting phenomenon that, despite its noble resonance, is found to be nothing more than a fiction or, citing the

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001. 2 Antonio GRAMSCI, Quaderni del carcere, Einaudi, Torino, 1975. 3 Philippe C. SCHMITTER, “Parties Are Not…cit.” 4 Craig CALHOUN (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, p. 453.


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author, “an almost pathological form of ethical autism when visibility was a political burden, if not, at times, a life risk”, “a formula lacking any political and moral sense as long as the entire culture of the five decades of Romanian totalitarianism was the product of the ideology, and of the variable, but implacable mechanisms of censorship”. Barbu’s final conclusion is that the “resistance through culture” was, in fact, an “assent through culture”. In his article on “Intellectuals and Civil Society. The Polish Case”, Florin-Ciprian Mitrea returns to intellectuals (to politically engaged intellectuals but also to independent ones) and their situation during totalitarianism, opting for an extraordinary case study – Poland. Mitrea’s study follows two different conflicts and their principal stages: the conflict between the humanist intellectuals and the communist elites, on the one hand, and, the one between left-wing intellectuals and the Catholic writers, on the other hand. In the author’s opinion, the contours of contemporary Polish civil society are to be decoded through the formation and evolution of public intellectuals after ‘45.

But today’s political culture cannot be entirely understood only through the study of the communist period. Two of our authors, Gelu Sabău and Cătălin-Valentin Raiu, suggest we should look back in time, at some older writings on democracy that could give us important clues about the intellectual context within which democracy conceptually evolved. In his article, “Democracy Against Nationalism. The A.C. Popovici Case”, Sabău draws the image of democracy viewed by the Romanian political thinker Aurel Popovici, an important critic of democracy, modern society and Western liberalism, who was mainly influenced by and devoted to Mihai Eminescu’s conservative vision about politics. In the following article, “Civil Society as Its Own Enemy: the First Romanian Christian-Democratic Attempt”, Raiu portrays “the first artisan of Christian-democracy in the Romanian space”, namely Bartolomeu Stănescu (the bishop of Râmnic). Considering Christianity and democracy as quasi-synonymous, Bartolomeu Stănescu initiated a project of evangelic democracy in interwar Romania, but this project was destined to fail: its initiator does not prove to be consistent with its political ideas and he migrates from evangelic democracy to organic statist authoritarianism.

From the critique of democracy and modern society of the interwar period, Salvatore Cingari invites us to pass to a critique of neo-liberal ideology accompanying the postdemocratic process. His article, “Per un’ Analisi Critica del Concetto di «Meritocrazia» come «Ideologia» Neo-liberista”, focuses on a particular aspect of this ideology, namely the use of the term of ‘meritocracy’. In his attempt to deconstruct this concept, Cingari revisits several classical writings on democracy, postdemocracy and liberalism, (i.e. Colin Crouch’s and Anthony Giddens’), then analysing the contemporaneous Italian debate on meritocracy. In the last section of the article, Roger Abravanel’s Meritocrazia occupies an important space. In Cingari’s opinion, hegemonic neo-liberal ideology of our times is actually using the term of “meritocracy” as a mask of inequality. The discussion about postdemocracy, a term referring to the evolution democracy has known during the 21st century (formal democratic institutions, non-representative elections, aristocratic tendencies, the takeover of the public initiative by exclusivist political-economic groups, etc.), is


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strongly related to the discussion about civil society and its enemies. Through her article entitled “Social Movements through Music and Culture – An overview”, Victoria Spau offers an analysis of the latest theories of social movements, an extremely interesting phenomenon gradually flourishing all over the world. This phenomenon makes political scientists question the future role of the new forms of democratic participation in transforming the existing models of governance. Specialists on civil society, collective identities or collective action are particularly interested in the issue of social movements. The creation of social networks and movements through communication channels, cultural and artistic affinities constitutes an ultramodern theme of reflection for social scientists. So does the issue of interculturality, introduced in our volume through Selami Ahmet Salgür’ essay “The Need For Intercultural Dialogue Between Black Sea Countries”.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS Historians and political scientists consider “South-Eastern Europe”, a concept

conceived for the first time by the Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga, as a culturally and politically coherent region. Among the most salient elements configuring “South-Eastern Europe” and differentiating it from Central and Western Europe, Paschalis Michael Kitromilides includes: the weight of the dominant religion (Orthodox Christianity) in the formation of identity, the role of the Eastern Roman Empire in the formation of law, institutional and political traditions, the cultural heritage left by the Ottoman Empire, etc.1 Nevertheless, it is important to stress that among an important number of scholars, Kitromilides approaches the West and the East as two complementary parts of Europe, of one and the same civilization. Therefore, the conservative and nationalist traditions, the appetite for paternalism and patriarchalism, the submissive cultures, the sense of guilt and inutility, and other particular traits of South-Eastern peoples are considered to be evident notes of distinctiveness in relation to Central and Western Europeans but, at the same time, inherent sources of particularism or localism. Several postdemocratic evolutions in Europe today reveal salient shared legacies of the past, diluting old arguments in favor of occidentalist or orientalist thesis. In this register of ideas, is it adequate to inquire whether political Europeanness exists?

1 Paschalis Michael KITROMILIDES, An Orthodox Commonwealth. Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe, Variorum Collected Studies Series, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007; Idem, “Orthodox Culture and Collective Identity in the Ottoman Balkans during the Eighteenth Century”, Δελτίο Κέντρου Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών, Vol. XII, 1997-1998, pp. 81-95; Idem, “Modernization as an Ideological Dilemma in Southeastern Europe: from National Revival to Liberal Reconstruction”, Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes, Vol. XXX, No. 1-2, 1992, pp. 183-189; Idem, “The Enlightenment East and West: A Comparative Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions”, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring 1983, pp. 51-70.


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Bibliography CALHOUN, Craig (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,

1992. FLYVBJERG, Bent, “Habermas and Foucault: thinkers for civil society?”, The British

Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1998, pp. 210-233. HERMET, Guy, Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en Europe, Éditions du Seuil, Paris,

1996. HERMET, Guy, Les désenchantements de la liberté. La sortie des dictatures dans les années ’90,

Fayard, Paris, 1993. JUDT, Tony, Europa iluziilor, trans. Daciana Branea & Ioana Copil-Popovici, Polirom,

Iași, 2000. KITROMILIDES, Paschalis Michael, An Orthodox Commonwealth. Symbolic Legacies and

Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe, Variorum Collected Studies Series, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007.

KITROMILIDES, Paschalis Michael, “Modernization as an Ideological Dilemma in Southeastern Europe: from National Revival to Liberal Reconstruction”, Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes, Vol. XXX, No. 1-2, 1992, pp. 183-189.

KITROMILIDES, Paschalis Michael, “The Enlightenment East and West: A Comparative Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions”, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, Vol. X, No. 1, Spring 1983, pp. 51-70.

LACROIX, Justine, “Does Europe Need Common Values?: Habermas vs Habermas”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 8, No. 141, 2009, pp. 141-156.

MONNIER, Alain, “L’Europe de l’Est: différente et diverse”, Population (French Edition), No. 3, 1991, pp. 443-461.


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ARTICLES

Hegel e il Concetto di Società Civile

Michele PROSPERO

“La Sapienza” Università di Roma

Abstract: Civil society is one of the most relevant concepts defined by Hegel’s philosophy of law. Analysing the material and symbolic layers that create the “system of needs”, Hegel enters a dialogue with political economics and foregrounds the constitutive features of the modern bourgeois society embodied as a distinct existential sphere by the representative political state. The concepts of market, contract, machine, abstract labour, the circulation of goods, ownership, land and possession are investigated as essential elements of the social experience of modernity. They consolidate the original tension between the public and the private, the general and the particular, the abstract and the concrete, the form and the content. Keywords: Hegel, civil society, State, philosophy of law. 1. TERRA E MARE Con la rivoluzione industriale, la proprietà non è più identificata con un bene

statico come la terra sulla quale maturano pertinenze, obblighi, potestà. Oggetti di proprietà diventano sempre più gli strumenti, le invenzioni, i macchinari, le industrie, le energie. Questa nuova fisionomia astratta assunta dalla questione proprietaria in un'economia di mercato viene registrata soprattutto da Hegel. Egli nota che il primato dell'astratto, della minuziosa distribuzione delle funzioni, conferisce una diversa struttura allo stesso mondo agricolo: «nella nostra epoca l'economia agricola viene esercitata anche in modo riflettente, come una fabbrica»1. La logica organizzativa della fabbrica penetra anche nel ristretto mondo della terra e lo piega a una esigenza di mobilità, alienabilità cui tutto obbedisce. Entro questo scenario, che prevede un diritto di proprietà dai connotati assoluti ed esclusivi per ciascuna tipologia dei beni, niente è più assurdo che il rimpianto di una mitica natura incontaminata o della terra come fondamento di onore e prestigio (ideologia cui pure Hegel cede talvolta innalzando il 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001, agg. par. 203. Per Hegel l'agricoltura è una «manifestazione esteriore», è il «comportamento pratico dell'uomo rispetto alla natura e alla soddisfazione dei suoi bisogni finiti». In essa appare una «relazione di dipendenza dalla natura» che svela il carattere particolare, limitato del soggetto (Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia, La Nuova Italia Ed., Firenze, 1981, I, p. 134).


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ceto agricolo a emblema di una eticità sostanziale). Hegel non condivide l'esaltazione della campagna e l'invocazione della sua eticità naturale presente anche in Rousseau. A suo giudizio, «i tentativi di sottrarre l'uomo alla vita generale del presente e di educarlo in campagna (Rousseau nell'Emile) sono stati inutili, perché non può riuscire di estraniare l'uomo dalle leggi del mondo»1. Contrariamente a una ideologia pastorale specificamente tedesca che sopravviverà fino ad Heidegger, per Hegel (quello dei Lineamenti) la campagna è un elemento passatistico e nostalgico, la città è invece il moderno, il centro dello sviluppo delle libertà del soggetto. Occorre pertanto «esser cittadino». Peraltro solo nella città è possibile coltivare il sentimento moderno della libertà («il senso per la libertà e ordine è sorto principalmente nelle città»). Le tendenze del moderno vengono descritte da Hegel come un intreccio di produzione astratta di cose e libertà dei soggetti di agire e determinare le interconnessioni sociali sulla base di volontarie transazioni. Hegel (anche se rimarca la diversità di terra con perpetuità delle situazioni domenicali e beni mobili e la peculiarità delle discipline giuridiche dei diritti afferenti) è in questo senso un filosofo della produttività borghese, esalta e riconosce la funzione del lavoro di fabbrica che ha una componente alienante e ripetitiva ma che allo stesso tempo stimola la crescita e la qualificazione. L’operaio non è solo una macchina passiva abbandonata sulla via dell'ottusità, ma grazie alle attività coordinate sviluppa anche attitudine alla disciplina. Ciò perché «il lavoro non è un istinto, bensì un atto razionale»2.

In un mondo di cose astratte, come quello dell'industria, è impensabile un diritto statico come quello esaltato dalla scuola storica e occorre procedere verso la costruzione di una nozione omogenea di proprietà in grado di ricomprendere ogni forma di appropriazione e utilizzazione delle risorse e dei beni. Il codice coerente e concluso rientra tra le funzioni essenziali del moderno che reclama prevedibilità e calcolo per il suo regolare funzionamento. Solo in un universo statico, nel quale il bene primario è la terra, è possibile ricostruire i fondamenti lontani dei diritti e rifarsi al valore normativo della consuetudine e reclamare una qualche compressione della condizione di appartenenza piena del bene. I diritti consuetudinari (che rispecchiano sovente la presenza di interessi frazionati sulla terra) presentano però l'inconveniente di esser «saputi in un modo soggettivo e accidentale». Occorre un codice, garante di

1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., agg. par. 153. Hegel non pensa che la solitudine della campagna possa sottrarsi al mondo spirituale che ha la forza sufficiente per raggiungere anche «queste remote regioni» (ivi). Nell'Estetica, Einaudi, Torino, 1976, p. 60 egli scrive: «certo è possibile sentir ripetere molto spesso che l'uomo deve rimanere in immediata unità con la natura; ma tale unità, nella sua astrazione, è esclusivamente rozzezza e ferinità». 2 Idem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese, Laterza, Bari, 1971, p. 95. Per Hegel «tanto più meccanico diventa il lavoro, tanto meno ha valore». Il lavoro perde qualità, attitudini, competenze e «diviene un lavoro formale, astrattamente universale». Con la divisione del lavoro si accresce il dominio sulla natura e aumenta la comodità. «Il lavoro diventa sempre più assolutamente morto, esso diventa lavoro di macchina, l'abilità del singolo diventa sempre più infinitamente limitata e la coscienza degli operai della fabbrica viene degradata fino all'estrema ottusità» (ivi, p. 99). Da questi brani emerge la parzialità di un rilievo peraltro acuto di Karl MARX (Opere filosofiche giovanili, Editore Riunti, Roma, 1977, p. 264): «Hegel resta al punto di vista dell'economia politica moderna. Vede soltanto l'aspetto positivo del lavoro, non quello negativo. Il lavoro che Hegel soltanto conosce e riconosce è il lavoro spirituale astratto».


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certezza e prevedibilità, che tuttavia Hegel assume in forme piuttosto limitative come mera «raccolta» delle consuetudini1. Anche se incompleto («pretendere in un codice la compiutezza è una pretesa che è segnatamente una malattia tedesca»2), il codice introduce indispensabili parametri formali per regolare i tempi moderni che pretendono l’assolutezza del dominio proprietario. La società civile richiede ben altra dinamicità che quella consentita dal diritto consuetudinario esaltato perché «si adduce che esso sia vivente». Per Hegel la vitalità del diritto «in nazioni civili» non consiste nel suo legame con le vetuste consuetudini disperse nei vari luoghi ma nella sua attitudine a «essere un sistema entro se stesso». E' proprio il moderno («infinito impeto del tempo») a richiedere per il diritto «il sistematizzare», a amplificare «la vocazione per la legislazione», ad affinare l'attitudine a pensare universi normativi validi e coerenti3. Il disordine normativo, proprio delle irriflessive consuetudini, introduce parametri di assoluta incertezza in un mondo che ha la vocazione alla prevedibilità, alla sistematicità dei suoi movimenti quotidiani. Il carattere vivente del diritto non può risiedere allora nella passiva registrazione di consuetudini accidentali ma nella costruzione pensata di un ordine normativo poggiante sullo schema unitario della proprietà come forma della appropriazione. Un oltrepassamento dei limiti dell'intelletto giuridico non può certo essere rinvenuto nella consuetudine ma soltanto in un recupero di ethos capace di congiungere sistema e vita, ragione e contenuto, dover essere astratto e essere concreto, norma e bisogno.

L'introduzione di parametri etici rischia però di rompere l'esigenza di un sistema giuridico in sé coerente che affranca la terra da usi civici, da ogni vincolo angusto e anacronismo feudale e pensa a norme valide come conseguenza dei connotati astratti dei tempi moderni. Lo sforzo hegeliano è di recepire i tratti formali e razionali del diritto senza però accodarsi al modello giusnaturalistico che esalta una proprietà senza ethos o ontologia sociale. Secondo Hegel,

«[…] l'ambito giuridico e l'ambito morale non possono esistere per sé, ed essi devono avere l'ethos per loro sostegno e loro base, giacché al diritto manca il momento della soggettività, che la moralità d'altro lato ha per sé ma da solo, e così entrambi i momenti non hanno realtà per sé. Soltanto l'infinito, l'idea è

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 211. «Negare a una nazione civile la capacità di fare un codice sarebbe uno dei più grandi affronti che potrebbe esser fatto a una nazione» (ivi). Contro la scuola storica, legata alle consuetudini, e il diritto naturale, connesso alla vuota astrazione astorica, Hegel tiene fermo il carattere positivo del diritto: «se vogliamo sapere che cosa è diritto, siamo rinviati anzitutto alle leggi» (Scritti storici e politici, Laterza, Bari, 1997, p. 287). 2 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 216. «Un codice penale appartiene precipuamente al suo tempo e alla situazione della società civile in quel tempo» (par. 218). 3 Ibidem, par. 211. Come è stato osservato, «il termine diritto in Hegel copre praticamente tutta la sfera della pratica» ossia l'economia, la morale, la politica (Mauro BARBERIS, Filosofia del diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000, p. 74). Si può dire che «la vera filosofia del diritto hegeliana è quella contenuta nelle pagine dedicate all'eticità» (Guido FASSÒ, Storia della filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001, p. 80). Per un quadro d’insieme Paolo BECCHI, Le filosofie del diritto di Hegel, Angeli, Milano, 1990.


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reale: il diritto esiste soltanto come ramo di un intero, come pianta che si avviticchia ad un albero»1. L'ethos in fondo è quella garanzia di stabilità, di fondamento che il moderno con

la sua astratta produzione di cose ha smarrito nei rivoli dell'atomismo individualistico e nella generalizzante configurazione di una norma positiva. Il paradigma di Hegel prevede, accanto all'accettazione dell'individualismo come contrassegno del moderno potere di utilizzazione del bene, anche la precisazione dei surrogati etici in grado di arginare la deriva relativistica e l'indifferentismo morale di soggetti isolati. La «consuetudine dell'ethos» è il rimedio al fragile individualismo senza argini protettivi e proteso verso la cosa con il solo intesse di natura economico produttivo. Secondo Hegel «il diritto degli individui alla loro particolarità è parimenti contenuto nella sostanzialità etica, giacché la particolarità è la guisa esteriormente apparente nella quale l'ethos esiste»2. Non la campagna, non la vita primordiale espressa nella consuetudine giuridica e da arcaici regimi di gestione dei beni, ma l'ethos come «spirito reale di una famiglia e di un popolo» è il rimedio alle incertezze dell'individualismo. Quella di Hegel appare come una adesione trattenuta ai caratteri distintivi del moderno e delle tecniche di appropriazione in chiave esclusiva dei beni. Egli ambisce a recuperare quei capisaldi etici che proprio la società astratta, con i suoi rapporti giuridici di signoria sul bene, contribuisce a demolire per insediarsi stabilmente nell’economia e nel resto della vita. Per Hegel il moderno garantisce al soggetto uno «sprofondamento entro di sé», una «profondissima solitudine interiore con sé», un «completo starsene ritirato entro di sé»3. L'inconveniente di questa conquista di una coscienza morale individuale è che

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., agg. par 141. Con l'ethos Hegel introduce «una specie di teodicea» che comporta «il grave pericolo di ottundere il sentimento morale» del singolo rispetto all'intero (Friedrich MEINECKE, L'idea della ragion di Stato nella storia moderna, Sansoni, Firenze, 1977, p. 376). Un sottofondo mistico si scorge nella filosofia di Hegel al punto che «per l'intelligenza dei principi hegeliani, la filosofia della religione è ancora più importante della filosofia dello Stato» (Karl LOEWITH, Da Hegel a Nietzsche, Einaudi, Torino, 1981, p. 82). Quella di Hegel è una filosofia a impianto teologico perché «è al tempo stesso saggezza del mondo e conoscenza di Dio, poiché il suo sapere giustifica la fede» (ivi, p. 83). Ciò vuol dire che «la logica di Hegel è onto - logia e questa è parimenti teo - logia: essa è dunque onto-te-logica» (Karl LOEWITH, Hegel e il cristianesimo, Laterza, Bari, 1976, p. 7). Loewith parla di una «conciliazione hegeliana di tradizione cristiana e greca in una sorta di cristologia gnostica» (ivi, p. 9). Sul rapporto tra la logica mistica (unità originaria degli opposti che annulla la accidentale molteplicità delle cose) e la logica hegeliana cfr. Galvano Della VOLPE, Eckhart o della filosofia mistica, in "Opere", I, Riuniti, Roma, 1972. Nella logica hegeliana «l'idea divina si compie logicamente, cioè nel puro pensiero, anteriormente ad ogni realtà, ad ogni natura e ad ogni tempo» (Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph SCHELLING, Lezioni monachesi sulla storia della filosofia moderna, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 1996, p. 116). Comunque già «dal cristianesimo e dal catechismo ognuno certamente impara non solo a concepir Dio come spirito, ma anche a volerlo e a crederlo tale; nessuno, quindi, potrà pretendere come una sua scoperta che Dio è spirito» (ivi, p. 123). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit. par. 154. Nel dovere Hegel rintraccia la comparsa della «libertà sostanziale». Il dovere è per l'individuo «la sua liberazione» giacché lo sottrae al «mero impulso naturale», e alla «soggettività indeterminata o libertà astratta» che non perviene mai alla «determinatezza oggettiva» (par. 149). 3 Ibidem, agg. Par. 136. La nostalgia di unità affiora spesso in Hegel: «l'idea del fondamento o della totalità, che implica il problema (molto spinoziano) della scomparsa delle entità dipendenti, finite, in


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essa non si limita ad affrancare la volontà soltanto da ciò che è esteriore, per cui il soggetto «non è più incatenato dai fini della particolarità». Ad essere irreparabilmente rotti sono anche i contenitori di una eticità sostanziale che lega i soggetti, conferisce loro un senso del generale altrimenti smarrito. «L'io è nel tempo e il tempo è l'essere del soggetto stesso»1, scrive Hegel. Il soggetto è anche accidentalità, corpo che ha interessi, bisogni. La sfera della finitezza, delle passioni, cioè della temporalità, rimanda alla mondanità di un soggetto finito che non ha più alcuna immediata unità con il sostanziale dello spirito.

Anche l'Hegel romantico che aspira a qualcosa di più solido e di assoluto cui aggrapparsi, al sostanziale che assorbe e invera la libertà meramente astratta o l’impulso irriflessivo, non può fare a meno di osservare il passaggio di consegne altamente simbolico tra la terra (onore, status, prestigio) e il mare (commercio, incertezza, concorrenza). «Come per il principio della vita familiare è condizione la terra, possessi stabili, così per l'industria l'elemento naturale che la anima verso l'esterno è il mare»2. Non più la solida terra, come spazio insicuro da presidiare da vicini aggressivi e comunque valore di alta rilevanza sociale, ma il liquido mare, che è affrancato dall'ossessione del confine e mette in comunicazione soggetti lontani, è la dimensione che meglio incarna i tempi presenti con il loto individualismo proprietario. Famiglia e possesso sono legati alla terra come a un che di valido e sostanziale, ma la crescita delle potenze legate al mare si rivolge minacciosa all'universo disgregato degli antichi valori. La «brama di guadagno», che accompagna il commercio, sfida il pericolo e «tramuta il radicarsi nella terra e nelle cerchie limitate della vita civile, i suoi godimenti e desideri, con l'elemento della fluidità, del pericolo e del naufragio»3. La terra evoca orizzonti limitati di esistenza, valori rigidi e angusti momenti di godimento. Il mare esprime il massimo di incertezza e tende a ricomprendere ogni nuova forma di

un'unità che è loro alla base» (Eugène FLEISCHMANN, La logica di Hegel, Einaudi, Torino, 1975 p. 153). Sul rapporto tra finito e infinito cfr. Lucio COLLETTI, Il marxismo e Hegel, Laterza, Bari, 1976. Sulla logica di Hegel cfr. Nicolao MERKER, Alle origini della logica hegeliana, Fetrinelli, Milano, 1961. 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Estetica...cit., p. 1013. La finitezza del soggetto rimanda al «vuoto dei giochi dell'immaginazione e del narcisismo», alle passioni (p. 797). 2 Ibidem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 247. Su Hegel e il moderno cfr., da punti di vista diversi, Biagio De GIOVANNI, Hegel e il tempo storico della società borghese, De Donato, Bari, 1976; Domenico LOSURDO, Hegel e la libertà dei moderni, Riuniti, Roma, 1999; Nicolao MERKER, Marxismo e storia delle idee, Riuniti, Roma, 1974. G. Luckàcs nega ogni passatismo di Hegel affermando che «la leggenda dei rapporti di Hegel col romanticismo si mostra in tutta la sua nullità ed inconsistenza» (Il giovane Hegel, Einaudi, Torino, 1975, p. 14). Anche per Della VOLPE, peraltro, il giovane Hegel antintellettualista che invoca il cuore, i sensi, non va confuso con l'entusiasmo estetico di Schiller e «il terreno su cui si muove è e resta illuministico, e del migliore illuminismo, lessinghiano e kantiano» (Galvano Della VOLPE, Hegel romantico e mistico, in, Opere, I, Riuniti, Roma, 1972, p. 57). Lo stesso concetto di Volksgeist, che per la scuola storica è «un oscuro principio unitario e creativo», per Hegel è invece un concetto illuministico, non romantico (ivi, p. 63). Solo più in là Hegel perverrà alla coscienza mistica della comunità, alla unità vivente di intuizione e riflessione, e alla nozione di destino che pone «lo Stato al di sopra dei singoli e dei loro diritti» (Della VOLPE, Hegel romantico…cit., p. 184). Comunque «lungi dall'esserci uno hiatus fra il periodo mistico, presistematico, e il periodo sistematico diremo che non è dato capire il secondo nella sua genesi intima e nel suo motivo più profondo senza il primo» (ivi, p. 199). 3 HEGEL, ivi. Hegel registra «il rapporto col mare presso le nazioni nelle quali è fiorita l'industria».


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ricchezza negli stampi della assolutezza del sistema proprietario. Ma proprio il mare «porta terre lontane nella relazione del traffico, di un rapporto giuridico introducente il contratto, nel quale traffico si trova in pari tempo il massimo mezzo di civiltà, e il commercio trova il massimo mezzo di civiltà, e il commercio trova il suo significato storico - mondiale»1.

I traffici economici diffondono ovunque, insieme alle merci a buon prezzo, anche figure giuridiche omogenee, contratti tipo indispensabili per affrontare con le forme più adeguate il mercato mondiale. Come è possibile dinanzi al «significato storico - mondiale» dei nuovi commerci via mare insediarsi nel ristretto spirito di un popolo legato alla terra? Dinanzi alla sconfinata liquidità del mare, occorre recuperare una più appartata dimensione territoriale che assicura «una ricchezza stabile e naturale nel suolo» ed esprime una eticità basata «sulla fede e la fiducia»2. Il mare è l'economia illimitata, la terra diventa uno spazio politico protetto e presidiato dalle sostanze etiche. Il contrasto è inevitabile.

La terra è in contatto con il mare, «con ciò che è sconfinato» e la disponibilità di mare «dà origine a uno specifico tipo di vita». I monti dividono, i confini naturali separano. Il mare invece comunica, «l'acqua è ciò che congiunge»3. Precisa Hegel: «la terra fissa l'uomo al suolo; la sua libertà è così ristretta da un immenso complesso di legami. Ma il mare lo conduce al di là di queste limitazioni»4.Il mare è una metafora della libertà che spezza argini e legami, dell'iniziativa che «risveglia il coraggio» e incrementa «il lavoro rivolto all'acquisto». Il pericolo, il rischio, il bisogno da soddisfare con azione intrepida sono legati al mare che così determina nell'individuo «la coscienza di una maggiore libertà ed autonomia». Il mare rende un impulso empirico, come la tendenza alla ricchezza, un qualcosa di nobile perché legato al coraggio, all'astuzia, alla volontà di affermazione del soggetto. Il pericolo viene affrontato con la nave «questo cigno del mare» che proietta oltre «ciò ch'è saldo». L'epos originario è per Hegel certo impensabile nel «nostro ordinamento industriale moderno con le sue officine e le sue fabbriche, insieme con i prodotti che da esso

1 HEGEL, ivi. In Hegel ciò che viene attribuito «agli spiriti dei popoli, come individualità collettive, è sottratto all'individualità, al singolo come essere umano» (Theodor ADORNO, Dialettica negativa, Torino, Einaudi, 1980, p. 308). In Hegel tuttavia è presente il principio illuministico in base al quale «la ragione, in quanto principio di leggi universalmente valide, si riconosce in ogni essere razionale» (Scritti teologici giovanili, Guida, Napoli, 1989, p. 73). Anche se l'illuminismo resta impigliato nelle «astrazioni delle morte gore razionalistiche dell'intelletto», rimane bloccato da un «formalismo del negativo» che lascia indifferente il contenuto, esso ha comunque colto «la categoria del diritto infinito dello spirito» (HEGEL, Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche in compendio, Utet, Torino, 1981, p. 113). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche, II, Laterza, Bari, 1980, p. 496. La camera alta è per Hegel destinata ai grandi proprietari terrieri perché solo il fondiario «è libero dalle tentazioni dell'esercizio di un mestiere» (Karl ROSENKRANZ, “Hegel”, in Claudio CESA (a cura di), Gli hegeliani liberali, Laterza, Bari, 1974, p. 36). 3 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 217. Su questo tema cfr. Ernst JUNGER, Carl SCHMITT, Il nodo di gordio, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987. 4 HEGEL, ivi. p. 218.


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provengono, così come in generale il modo di soddisfare i nostri bisogni vitali»1. Ma il mare, i commerci su sfera mondiale, hanno anch’essi qualcosa di epico, di eroico. Trovare un argine, offrire una sponda, questa è la preoccupazione che Hegel paventa dinanzi alla inarrestabile affermazione del principio dell'individualismo e alla diffusione di una nuova ricchezza industriale che sforna beni artificiali. Restare nel vecchio ordine della terra, rinsaldare il legame con un mondo che sviluppa bisogni infimi, non è possibile e tocca all’individualismo rompere i tradizionali argini ampliando gli schemi proprietari per ricomprendervi tipologie nuove di cose. La fuoriuscita dai legami d’un tempo stretti con la terra è sollecitata dai nuovi parametri di crescita che esigono il passaggio dalle proprietà molteplici su un unico bene alla proprietà che con schemi unitari ricopre la varietà dei modi di utilizzazione economica delle cose. Ciò impone per Hegel la necessità di ricostruire su basi inedite nuove legature, più avanzate unificazioni di particolarità e universalità, di astratto e concreto. Alla cosa salda che si identifica con la terra si affianca la cosa astratta prodotta da una struttura industriale fondata su una assegnazione esplicita di prevalenza giuridica ed economica ad un’unica situazione proprietaria rinvenibile sul bene patrimoniale.

2. IL RAPPORTO INDIVIDUO – COSA L'individuo singolo che utilizza i beni e li rende privati non è il presupposto,

come per i giusnaturalisti, è il risultato della vita moderna e la leva che disgrega antiche appartenenze e ricombatta in uno schema uniforme le frammentate situazioni proprietarie. Hegel ritiene che «la creazione della società civile appartiene al mondo moderno»2 e quindi solo moderno può essere l'individualismo possessivo come base di funzionalità ed efficienza economica della astratta situazione proprietaria. Alla sua base c'è la comparsa di una distinzione tra sfera pubblica e ambito privato sconosciuta nella bella eticità antica. La rottura della comunità coesa e la disgregazione dello status e della terra sono la condizione per la visibilità trasparente dell'individuo come dimensione privata, universo negoziale sottratto allo sguardo del pubblico. «Il diritto alla particolarità del soggetto, di trovarsi appagato, ovvero, il che è lo stesso, il diritto

1 Idem, Estetica...cit., p. 1177. Grazie all’attenzione alla vitra reale, con Hegel «si verifica la rottura definitiva col diritto naturale» (Alessandro Passerin d’ENTRÈVES, La dottrina del diritto naturale, Comunita, Milano, 1980, p. 83). 2 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., agg. par. 182. Solari rintraccia nella nozione di società civile di Hegel «l'elemento veramente vitale del suo pensiero giuridico e sociale» (Gioele SOLARI, La filosofia politica, Laterza, Bari, 1974, p. 211). Avverte Solari (p. 254) che «la scoperta della società civile come concetto autonomo fu il grande merito di Hegel, maggiore certamente di quello che solitamente gli si attribuisce di aver rinnovato il sentimento e la dignità dello Stato». Anche per altri interpreti quella di società «è la grande intuizione hegeliana che sarà il cardine di tutta la scienza sociale e politica dei nostri tempi» (Guido De RUGGIERO, Hegel, Laterza, Bari, 1972, p. 203). Nella esplorazione della società civile Hegel «coglie i legami profondi tra i vari istituti economici, sociali e giuridici» (Guido FASSÒ, Storia della filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001, III, p. 80). Sulla «duplicità» della nozione di società civile (come sistema dei bisogni, del particolare interesse ma anche come forma dell’universalità) cfr. Emanuele CAFAGNA, La libertà nel mondo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1998, p. 126.


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della libertà soggettiva, costituisce il punto di svolta e centrale nella differenza tra l'antichità e l'età moderna»1. Il diritto all’autolegislazione dei soggetti privati in merito ai particolari interessi è alla base della moderna economia di scambio che esige un diritto proprietario astratto e non più frantumato e diviso. Hegel però non tratta dell'individuo e della sua astratta capacità giuridica come una conseguenza della società civile, fonda il soggetto in maniera atemporale anteponendo la titolarità astratta di diritti all'ingresso nel mondo conflittuale della società moderna. Nel campo del diritto privato o astratto Hegel condivide le stesse asserzioni volontaristiche e atomistiche dei giusnaturalisti per valicare le disfunzionali situazioni di convivenza di plurimi interessi su di un medesimo bene. Il particolare mondo delle relazioni civilistiche costruisce un ambito del tutto peculiare di utilizzazione piena del bene che è riparato dalle asfissianti determinazioni pubbliche o dalla moltiplicazione delle situazioni proprietarie. Non che Hegel accetti in toto il paradigma giusnaturalista, anzi ricorda spesso la sua avversione per «la riflessione astratta» che fissa il momento del particolare «nella sua distinzione e contrapposizione di contro all'universale»2. Ma la sua veduta postula la presenza di una sfera privata o civile in cui si esplica la signoria sui beni ed è ben distinta dal momento della statualità che, essa sì, non tollera alcun ricorso alle nozioni del contratto. Hegel cerca solo di integrare la condizione moderna della soggettività o particolarità con l'essenziale precisazione che l'individuo che si appropria di cose - merci secondo uno schema astratto di dominio è un prodotto storico accertabile, non il punto di partenza. E' solo tramite la storia del superamento delle proprietà frammentate che l'individuo si separa dalla comunità ed emerge come irriducibile diversità e come soggetto titolare dei beni secondo i parametri romanistica della assolutezza ed esclusività. E tuttavia,

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 124. Per questo Hegel si pone alla conclusione «del movimento moderno del diritto naturale», di questa «scienza laica» che parte «da premesse puramente laiche» per «rendere superflue le verità rivelate» (Franz ROSENZWEIG, Hegel e lo Stato, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1976, p. 360). In tal senso si esprime anche Norberto BOBBIO, Studi hegeliani, Einaudi, Torino, 1983. Per Bobbio tuttavia la ragione di Hegel non ha nulla a che spartire con quella dei giusnaturalisti (Norberto BOBBIO, Michelangelo BOVERO, Società e Stato nella filosofia politica moderna, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1979, p. 74). Hegel nega che un diritto naturale o razionale possa esistere senza essere reale, storico, positivo ma parte «dal singolo e cerca di conquistare il concetto di comunità da questa premessa». Il suo è uno sforzo di «costruire il divenire della comunità dai singoli svincolati gli uni dagli altri» (Rosenzweig, op. cit.). Un estremo individualismo convive con esigenze comunitarie, con istanze imponderabili come il concetto di destino. De Ruggiero (op. cit., p. 190) avverte il rischio per il soggetto di «un conformismo che modella l'individuo nello stampo della collettività». Questo rischio è incancellabile dal momento che lo sforzo di Hegel è quello di transitare dalla società civile «a una società integrata» (Jan ROHLS, Storia dell'etica, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995, p. 384). In generale l'intento di Hegel è «di sostituire al predominio del sociale quello del politico» (Claudio CESA, “Fichte, i romantici, Hegel”, in Luigi FIRPO (a cura di), Storia delle idee politiche, economiche e sociali, Unione tipografico - Editrice torinese, Torino, 1975, IV, p. 841). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., Scrive Hegel: «in passato si credeva di dover dedurre dalla natura dell'uomo i principi che andavano sotto il nome di diritto naturale; nello stesso tempo si credeva che il diritto statale non corrispondesse alla natura, fosse qualcosa di non più naturale» (Scritti storici e politici, Laterza, Bari, 1997, p. 287). Questa scissione tra ragione e istituzioni è inaccettabile: «c'è diritto solo là dove esiste uno Stato». Per Hegel addirittura «la storia ha inizio solo con la legge e con lo Stato» (p. 288). Niente autorizza a santificare il dato empirico giacché «non tutto ciò che esiste è reale» (ivi).


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malgrado questa acuta consapevolezza del carattere storicamente prodotto dell'individuo proprietario che si avvale di forme astratte per la circolazione della ricchezza, e quindi del suo connotato tutt'altro che originario, Hegel prende le mosse proprio dal diritto astratto e dall'individuo separato.

Prima ancora della società civile, con la sua trama dei bisogni che lega i differenti corpi in relazioni continue per l'appagamento, egli fonda la sfera del diritto astratto e della proprietà proiettandola in un mondo sconfinato di io irrelati che vogliono le cose in privatezza di possesso senza ancora disporre di una cornice sociale e istituzionale necessaria ad accordare diritti e a stabilire obblighi. In tal modo, le sfere del diritto astratto e della proprietà si rivelano delle costruzioni solo mentali e non delle storiche istituzioni sociali che soppiantano la medievale frammentazione degli interessi proprietari. Hegel prima definisce gli schemi astratti (persona, contratto) validi ab aeterno e solo dopo li applica alle concrete relazioni sociali che così hanno a disposizione forme già pronte prima di averle espresse nella concretezza dell'esperienza intersoggettiva. Prima vengono definite le forme astratte di dominio che sorreggono la privata autonomia e poi si introduce la vita di relazione di singoli atomi. Le forme unitarie del possesso esclusivo compaiono ancor prima delle operative necessità della vita in comune, esse sono storicamente inapprese in quanto precedono i modi di vivere della società civile. La relazione sociale che supera la scomposizione feudale della proprietà finisce così per essere l'inveramento di tipi giuridici predefiniti che esaltano la determinazione autonoma delle sfere particolari. La società frl libero mercato è una conseguenza del diritto e gli schemi astratti del diritto sono creazioni arbitrarie di un ordinamento aleatorio che esiste già prima che compaiano le relazioni sociali. Le relazioni che sorgono tra individui che scambiano reciproche prestazioni o beni sono già munite in Hegel delle astratte forme dei diritto dei privati. Le forme non sono un risultato dello stare insieme con gli altri, ma anticipano l'incontro dei soggetti che hanno una capacità giuridica originaria. Benché avverta con chiarezza che «soltanto dopo che gli uomini si sono scoperti molteplici bisogni e l'acquisizione dei medesimi si intreccia nell'appagamento, possono venir fatte delle leggi»1, Hegel fonda il diritto astratto o civile prima ancora dell'esplorazione del sistema dei bisogni e della entrata nella società civile. La trama genetica degli istituti sorti dalla dissoluzione degli antichi regimi giuridici sui beni non conta ed essa è persino fuorviante rispetto alla identificazione del nesso logico che pretende di costruire un universo giuridico vincolante innestandolo solo sulla volontà del soggetto come assoluto centro di decisione. Per questo sforzo di cogliere il rapporto logico e non il dato empirico, la proprietà è vista come «fine essenziale per sé» e non «come mezzo riguardo al bisogno» (Lineamenti, par. 45). A giudizio di Hegel, il bisogno può essere raffigurato non come il dato originario ma come un pungolo: «i bisogni sono in 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., agg. par. 210. Per Hegel «i bisogni uniscono gli uomini in maniera naturale, ma il vincolo dei rapporti giuridici è tutt'altra cosa» (Scritti storici e politici, cit.). Non si dà per Hegel una spiegazione economica - naturalistica (legata al bisogno, all’impulso naturale) della proprietà ma solo una fondazione filosofica (connessa alla determinazione spirituale). Sul superamento del bisogno e la fondazione ontologica della proprietà cfr. Francesco M. De SANCTIS, Dall’assolutismo alla democrazia, Giappichelli, Torino, 1993, p. 116.


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generale gl'incentivi all'attività degli uomini»1. I bisogni per lui sono anche delle costruzioni artificiali e «la razionalità della moda consiste nel fatto che essa esercita sul gusto dell'epoca il diritto di rinnovarlo continuamente»2. Ma il dato empirico quale sollecitazione immediata è irrilevante: la volontà crea una sfera esterna solo per esercitare la libertà infinita dell'attore.

Hegel precisa che la proprietà nei suoi risvolti di astratta signoria su qualsivoglia bene è una manifestazione dell'idea di libertà e non una risposta a un bisogno legato alla disponibilità di oggetti esterni. Una cosa è il bisogno che concerne corpi concreti e poteri dall’estensione solo temporanea, altra cosa è il diritto che riguarda astratte persone giuridiche. La priorità del bisogno lascerebbe la cosa come un che di positivo e di per sé sussistente, oggetto di interessi frammentati e priva di ogni giuridica determinazione in direzione della esclusività. Ma la natura non ha questa indipendenza ed ogni autonomia d’azione dei privati come singoli è priva della capacità di fondare diritti. Non è un caso che una delle figure più rilevanti nell'analisi hegeliana sia costituita dalla persona, cioè dalla espressione soggettiva della volontà libera capace di compiere atti giuridicamente rilevanti, al riparo da obblighi forzosi o rapporti di dominio ingiustificati. Come scrive Goethe «la nostra volontà vale la tua, calpestarla non è facile». La volontà libera è il tratto distintivo della nozione di persona provvista di autonoma capacità giuridica. Volontà e persona sono inseparabili e il contratto si afferma come criterio essenziale per il conferimento e il trasferimento di diritti reali entro una società dinamica e attraversata da una circolazione illimitata di beni. Nella libertà della persona, non del corpo naturale ma del «soggetto capace di diritto, di imputazione», Hegel scorge il momento caratteristico della modernità in cui la circolazione materiale dei beni è rivestita da forme giuridiche che tamponano l’antica scomposizione della proprietà e immettono ogni bene o interesse economico nel circuito della alienabilità. Nel mondo moderno, con la nascita, ciascun individuo è titolare di diritti inviolabili («sii persona e rispetta gli altri come persone»). Ogni individuo diventa un soggetto giuridico («la personalità contiene in generale la capacità giuridica») che può entrare in rapporti con gli altri seguendo comportamenti liberi e privi di violenza. L'affermazione del moderno coincide con la generalizzazione delle relazioni contrattuali e negoziali poste come fondamento della validità di ogni

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 225. In Hegel la proprietà sebbene implichi uno schema unitario racchiude beni assai diversi come la terra, le industrie, gli oggetti personali. «Se esiste una sfera esterna della libertà personale, della quale parla HEGEL, questa non si trova in qualsiasi oggetto del diritto di proprietà, ma nella proprietà personale, indipendentemente dal suo scopo produttivo o di consumo» (Helmut RITTSTIEG, La proprietà come problema fondamentale, ESI, Napoli, 2000, p. 247). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Estetica...cit., p. 838. Il moderno lavoro unilaterale e semplificato grazie all'invenzione delle macchine genera la moda che opera come straordinario impulso al nuovo consumo: «il taglio dei vestiti, lo stile dell'arredamento non sono niente di permanente. La loro variazione è essenziale e razionale, molto più razionale che il restar fermi ad una moda, il voler affermare qualcosa di fisso in certe singole forme» (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 168). La moda non ha a che fare con l'estetica («il bello non è sottoposto ad alcuna moda») ma con il consumo, con la creazione di un gusto mutevole attraverso «una bellezza eccitante che vuole eccitare l'impulso, il desiderio, la causalità» (ivi).


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rapporto giuridico e diritto reale (credito, scambio, lavoro). Hegel spiega che occorre rimuovere ogni naturalismo legato a corpi umani concreti poiché «il diritto è il rapporto fra gli uomini nella misura in cui sono persone astratte. È contraria al diritto quell'azione con cui l'uomo non viene rispettato come persona, o la quale invade la sfera della sua libertà»1. La fondazione della categoria giuridica della proprietà avviene a questo livello generico della persona che vuole la cosa esaltando la propria privata autonomia nel rincorrere qualsivoglia interesse economico. E' la volontà unilaterale e del tutto irrelata rivolta alla cosa, per Hegel, a fondare il diritto astratto o potere del soggetto di perseguire una efficace utilizzazione economica del bene. Trasferire la proprietà da istituzione sociale specifica a manifestazione di una volontà al di fuori del tempo significa obbedire alla non innocente supposizione che anche la proprietà sia forma vuota che, nella sua irriducibile indeterminatezza, risulta del tutto indifferente ai tipi storici di organizzazione della vita sociale. Quando la persona agisce con un pieno potere di gestione economica del bene suppone che la sua volontà illimitata non incontri più l’antica proprietà frantumata su cui gravitano molteplici interessi convergenti ma assuma i risvolti di un dominio eminente onnicomprensivo che può raggiungere qualsiasi cosa (con la conseguenza assurda che, poiché la cosa è sempre l’ombra del soggetto, qualsiasi diritto di servitù vien fatto gravare sulla cosa si trasferisce immediatamente anche sulla persona). In contatto entrano la volontà della persona giuridica e la cosa disponibile senza che gli altri siano in qualche misura coinvolti. Il rapporto con la natura avviene in completa assenza del nesso sociale: è una volontà sradicata e priva di contenuto sociale quella che si aggiudica la cosa come un legittimo coronamento della sua inesauribile brama di avere. Eppure anche Hegel si mostra consapevole che il punto cardine della proprietà risiede proprio nella relazionalità, ossia nel riferimento a una norma comune che conduce alla «esclusione di tutti gli altri»2. Fissando nel semplice rapporto con la cosa il titolo originario della proprietà egli decide di fermare lo sguardo solo sulla spontanea attività rivolta ai beni e di mettere fuori gioco gli altri e una istituzione pubblica garante degli scambi di volontà. Non occorrono dunque gli altri per fondare una relazione giuridica in quanto 1 Idem, Il dominio della politica, Riuniti, Roma, 1980 (“Propedeutica filosofica”). Il moderno riconosce a tutti personalità giuridica ma non una identica capacità d’agire. «Mentre la capacità giuridica è idoneità naturale (generica) della persona ad essere soggetto di rapporti giuridici, la capacità di agire è idoneità naturale (specifica) della persona ad essere soggetto del rapporto (di quel rapporto) che si svolge nell’atto (Francesco CARNELUTTI, Teoria generale del diritto, Foro italiano, Roma, 1951, p. 237). In Hegel la persona ovvero la astratta capacità di essere soggetto svolge rapporti giuridici ed entra nelle relazioni sociali. Ogni fondazione della proprietà sul nesso con la cosa è però generica e tautologica: «in quanto la proprietà è un diritto reale su di una cosa non si è ancora detto nulla sul potere concreto, ch’essa accorda a chi ne è investito. Noi sappiamo soltanto questo, ch’essa importa una potestà da esercitare direttamente sopra una cosa, e nient’altro» (Silvio PEROZZI, Scritti giuridici, Giuffrè, Milano, 1948, p. 445). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Scritti teologici giovanili, Guida, Napoli, 1989, p. 561. Il diritto non può fornire protezione a qualsivoglia volontà riferita a un oggetto ma solo a quella manifestazione del volere legata a funzioni reputate socialmente rilevanti. La volontà riguarda non solo oggetti ma precisa anche anche una sfera di interesse nelle relazioni intersoggettive. Nel «dogma della volontà e nel puro e semplice modo di essere del volere è escluso il rapporto con l’alterità. I vecchi pregiudizi individualistici, non hanno ancora afferrato il senso dell’autonomia privata come fatto sociale» (Emilio BETTI, Teoria generale del negozio giuridico, Cerveteri, Roma, 1951, p. 57).


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la volontà del singolo, con l'elemento di spiritualità che contiene, è per Hegel in grado di aggiungere qualcosa in più all'oggetto esterno che così perde la sua indifferenza e si presta ad essere preso in legittima proprietà. La volontà (un misto di fatto psichico interno e di volontà esterna nel senso del negozio giuridico) è davvero potenziata al di là di ogni limite e ciò consente di vedere il diritto anche dove si scorge soltanto una pretesa unilaterale di fare propria una cosa.

In questa costruzione hegeliana, che fa della proprietà il momento riassuntivo dell’appartenenza, riecheggia una concezione del soggetto come anima che sulla base della volontà razionale azzera la sfera del tutto negativa della corporeità sensibile. Anche il corpo è un che di esteriore su cui si esercita la volontà di possesso del soggetto persona. «Il corpo - scrive Hegel - in quanto è esistenza immediata, non è adeguato allo spirito; per essere organo volitivo e mezzo animato del medesimo, deve anzitutto esser preso in possesso da esso»1. Il soggetto è pura coscienza e volontà consapevole che vanta un potere eminente di utilizzazione economica dei beni. Il suo corpo è invece un puro involucro naturale che dev'essere controllato e guidato dallo spirito. Riaffiora, in questo modo, l'antico dualismo corpo - anima. Hegel scrive che nella religione cristiana «il soggetto ha in se un valore infinito, perché è oggetto della grazia divina. Ma l'uomo ha questo solo come spirito, e perciò è necessario che esso si separi dalla naturalità»2. Anche Hegel si incammina verso la tradizione spiritualistica che svaluta il corpo ritenendolo un elemento puramente sensibile privo di autentico valore. La caratteristica essenziale del soggetto risiede nella sua capacità di agire come volontà pura e cosciente al riparo da ogni determinazione sensibile. Il mondo esterno viene così piegato dalle manifestazioni spirituali del volere. Tutto ruota attorno al soggetto come centro di volontà che crea il diritto sulla base della semplice decisione di prendere la cosa e goderne secondo le forme di appartenenza che riguardano ogni categoria di beni. Hegel è ben consapevole che l'esistenza «è essenzialmente esser per un altro». Questo riconoscimento del carattere relazionale dell'esistenza non gli impedisce tuttavia di trattare il problema della proprietà sotto l'angolo di osservazione

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit. Osserva Marx: «la schiavitù legale della gleba non era forse una prova reale contro le ubbie razionali secondo le quali il corpo umano non dev'essere oggetto di mercato e di possesso?» (Opere, vol. I, Roma, 1976, p. 136). Sul nesso tra nascita di un privato come ambito distinto dal pubblico e cristianesimo insiste Roberto FINELLI, Mito e critica delle forme, Riuniti, Roma, 1996, p. 201. Quando i giuristi escludono dal novero dei beni il corpo umano registrano un movimento storico generale di avversione alla schiavitù. Essi però sono andati «oltre il segno negando diritti sul corpo diversi dalla proprietà: esiste infatti una folla di fenomeni di circolazione aventi il loro oggetto precisamente nel corpo umano: tale è, in modo tipico, lo scambio oneroso di lavoro, che assume una importanza addirittura imponente nella economia moderna» (Francesco CARNELUTTI, Teoria giuridica della circolazione, CEDAM, Padova, 1933, p. 4). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1973. Si rinviene «l'equazione hegeliana tra fondazione volontaristica del soggetto e riduzione privatistica del mondo delle cose» (Umberto CERRONI, Società civile e Stato politico in Hegel, De Donato, Bari, 1974, pp. 44 - 45). Peraltro la concezione individualistica, con il dogma della volontà, si avvale di un concetto indeterminato poiché «la parola volontà è polisensa che si presta a equivoci concettuali (Emilio BETTI, Teoria generale del negozio…cit., p. 60). L’espressione volontà è solo » un riempitivo incolore e inutile, generica, che sta a tener luogo di designazioni specifiche più appropriate, come dichiarazione di accettazione, di adesione, di rinunzia, di offerta, di revoca, di recesso, di impugnazione (ivi, p. 59).


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del nesso che si stabilisce tra la volontà del soggetto («soltanto la volontà è l'infinito. Quindi appropriarsi significa soltanto manifestare l'elevatezza della mia volontà di fronte alla cosa») e la cosa esteriore (che non è mai «in sé e per sé, non è fine autonomo»). Scompare così, in questa concezione della proprietà intesa come istituto unitario, la relazione sociale tra gli individui e la proprietà come lecita appropriazione di oggetti esterni viene fondata da Hegel già prima di aver problematizzato la società civile, il sistema dei bisogni e l'ordinamento dello Stato. Restano perciò in campo solo la volontà (costruita in modo del tutto indipendente dal rapporto con gli altri) e la cosa (presentata come un pezzo di natura, un che di «non libero, senza diritto»). Oltre la volontà singola che vuole la cosa tutta per sé non ci sono elementi di condizionamento (gli altri, le istituzioni) che possano turbare l'epifania del soggetto isolato che, nello schema d’impronta romanistica, stabilisce un rapporto diretto e immediato con il bene. La vuota persona giuridica si rigonfia di cose empiriche e le rende, con i suoi atti unilaterali di volontà, proprietà privata con l’attribuzione di una assoluta appartenenza in capo al soggetto titolare.

In fondo Hegel attribuendo una massima estensione dei poteri al soggetto «ha interpolato surrettiziamente la pienezza dei contenuti della volontà nell'astratta vuotezza formale della persona»1. La categoria del tutto formale, e quindi vuota di contenuto, di persona intesa come soggetto che vuole secondo la capacità giuridica contiene ben impressi i contenuti materiali esterni alla sfera della interiorità e appartenenti al mondo delle cose sociali. Non il corpo con i suoi bisogni, ma la persona astratta dell’universo giuridico per Hegel entra in relazione organica con le cose o natura secondo l’unitarietà della figura proprietaria. Nel suo disegno, la società rappresenta un sistema consapevole di convivenza che compare solo dopo il diritto astratto e le vuote determinazioni delle persone giuridiche. Il soggetto per natura è solo un corpo, è solo con le qualificazioni giuridiche che la società costruisce, che diventa persona. In Hegel invece il corpo è già persona giuridica che, senza alcun ordinamento oggettivo che la definisca, entra in rapporto con la natura. Tra forma astratta e natura particolare non esiste alcun ponte di collegamento. E perciò la forma vuota (la persona) non può fare sua la cosa (la natura), e la cosa (natura) non può esser fatta propria (diritto). La persona, che è solo un ambito giuridico - formale, per Hegel ha anche una volontà ossia è in sintonia con un centro di decisione o corpo che è nel mondo. La volontà, piena dei contenuti oggettivi che è riuscita a desumere dai reali rapporti esteriori, incontra e vitalizza la persona dapprima costruita come vuoto ambito formale, come astratta capacità giuridica, come generica libertà di agire sugli oggetti. Il mondo esterno è solo un'appendice del volere e la volontà ha gli empirici

1 Mario ROSSI, Il sistema hegeliano dello Stato, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976. Infatti «se di fronte alla natura si trova la volontà libera in quanto tale, coi suoi bisogni, desideri ecc., la presa di possesso, il darsi un'esistenza sarà qualcosa di comprensibile, ma non di giuridico; se, a trovarsi di fronte alla natura è la persona, essa non potrà incidere sulla natura perché non ha altro contenuto che la possibilità astratta, e non potrà darsi nessuna esistenza». Anche nei codice si rinviene traccia della pretesa hegeliana di «trasformare il rapporto fra l’uomo e la cosa in un rapporto fra gli uomini, nella pretesa del singolo di servirsi delle cose con esclusione degli altri» (Francesco GALGANO, Istituzioni di diritto privato, Monduzzi, Bologna, 2006, p.76).


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contenuti desunti senza griglie critiche adeguate dal mondo reale. Per questa leggerezza della volontà capace di lambire ogni dimensione esterna, Hegel non si preoccupa di precisare un limite alla volontà. Qualsiasi cosa cada sotto il suo angolo di osservazione può quindi costituire oggetto di legittima appropriazione. Il volere può abbracciare qualsiasi cosa (che in quanto tale, e non in riferimento ai modi di utilizzazione, di gestione o di alienazione diventa proprietà illimitata) e farla propria nelle forme del godimento privato. Non si capisce come la volontà di prendere tutte le cose incontri dei limiti in questa fase che Hegel caratterizza solo per la vigenza di un diritto astratto concepito in assenza di società civile e Stato. Tra agguerrite volontà che rivendicano le stesse cose, solo un terzo elemento, quello pubblico, riuscirebbe però a stabilire obblighi e restrizioni nei modi di utilizzazione del bene. Non si può, restando solo nell'ambito del diritto astratto, e quindi di incontri privati di volontà al riparo della statualità, fondare limiti diversi da quelli che la volontà esclusiva del singolo è in grado di imporre. E’ insomma solo il rapporto di fatto a costituire un limite oggettivo alla espansione della volontà di appropriazione esternata dalle astratte persone che reclamano pienezza di signoria. Il diritto astratto senza Stato, con rapporti di obbligazione a matrice solo negoziale, non può essere definito diritto vincolante senza un riconoscimento dell’ordinamento e non conosce altre restrizioni che quelle provenienti dalla potenza di ciascuna volontà. Il limite che accompagna il diritto non può che corrispondere alla minaccia privata o alla volontaria astensione dal fare proprie cose che anche altri vogliono. Il quanto si possegga, che Hegel fa rientrare nell'ambito della pura accidentalità, è una questione che non può essere risolta con gli strumenti del diritto astratto o della volontà intersoggettiva fissata nella legge positiva. Non è la legge a stabilire la impossibilità di appropriarsi di una cosa già conferita ad altri bensì il nudo potere di fatto.

Spiega Hegel che in età moderna viene esclusa ogni pluralità di domini sulla cosa e viene superata la autonoma configurazione di distinti poteri reali sul bene:

«una cosa che è già di un altro non mi è lecito prenderla in possesso, e non già perché essa è una cosa, ma perché è cosa sua. Se infatti mi impossesso della cosa, io tolgo in lei il predicato di essere la cosa sua, e con ciò nego la di lui volontà. La volontà è qualcosa di assoluto che io non posso mutare in qualcosa di negativo».1

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit. Il possesso naturalistico viene potenziato a proprietà e «la cosa prodotta per soddisfare il bisogno non è soltanto una cosa lavorata, ma una cosa appropriata nelle specifiche forme della proprietà privata» (Umberto CERRONI, op. cit., p. 27). Molto penetrante è la valutazione di Marx (Grundrisse…cit., p. 26): «Hegel comincia correttamente la filosofia del diritto con il possesso come la più semplice relazione giuridica del soggetto. Ma non esiste possesso alcuno prima della famiglia o dei rapporti di dominio o di servitù, che sono rapporti molto più concreti. Sarebbe invece corretto affermare che esistono famiglie, unità tribali che ancora posseggono soltanto e non hanno proprietà. La categoria più semplice appare dunque come rapporto di semplici associazioni familiari o tribali in relazione con la proprietà. Nella società più progredita essa appare come il rapporto più semplice di un'organizzazione sviluppata. Il sostrato concreto, la cui relazione è il possesso, è però sempre presupposto. Si può immaginare un singolo selvaggio che sia possessore. Ma in tal caso il possesso non è un rapporto giuridico. Non è vero che il possesso si sviluppa storicamente in direzione della famiglia.


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La volontà di un individuo ben incorporata nella cosa, e non un obbligo

giuridico di astensione, è dunque il titolo che impedisce a chiunque altro di entrare in possesso del bene. E' sufficiente la volontà di un attore isolato a stabilire diritti e obblighi in merito alla cosa. Il rapporto generico della volontà con il mondo esterno avviene in Hegel già entro le peculiari figure giuridiche della proprietà privata. Egli suppone, tacitamente, molte altre «cose» che intervengono a strutturare un rapporto, tra la volontà individuale e la cosa, che sia anche giuridicamente protetto nel paradigma unitario del diritto di proprietà. Hegel postula l'esistenza dell'ordinamento giuridico di origine statale senza il quale l'appropriazione resta un mero fatto accidentale e non diventa mai un diritto consolidato che ruota attorno a un criterio assoluto di appartenenza. Lo stesso Hegel avverte che «il concetto di diritto come potenza fornita di autorità indipendente dagli impulsi della singolarità, ha realtà effettuale soltanto nella società statuale»1. Se questo è vero, il rapporto unilaterale della volontà con la cosa non può mai fondare un istituto giuridico che suppone sempre relazionalità, intersoggettività e un ordinamento giuridico oggettivo in grado di definire le varie situazioni soggettive. II paradosso della costruzione hegeliana risiede nel fatto che essa, da una parte, riconosce che il mio e il tuo esigono «la difesa della proprietà mediante l'amministrazione della giustizia», dall'altra postula che la proprietà rappresenti un «fine essenziale per sé» che può valere come «assoluto diritto di appropriazione su tutte le cose». La fretta di giustificare la proprietà nei suoi tratti di illimitatezza e perpetuità prima ancora di entrare nella società e nello Stato, sospinge Hegel persino a celebrarne l'assolutezza e il carattere illimitato, connotati che restano estranei però al diritto che in quanto relazione tra persone non può che configurarsi come ambito relativo e limitato. Dal mero rapporto con la cosa Hegel ricava inoltre acquisizioni ingiustificate: il carattere privato, nel senso di giuridicamente privato, della proprietà e la esclusione senza tentennamenti di ogni suggestione comunitaria che paventa qualcosa di demoniaco.

Il nesso che si stabilisce tra una volontà e la cosa però può designare solo un momento dell'appropriazione e non può certo essere, come Hegel pretende, già inquadrato nell'ambito di un compiuto diritto di proprietà. Il diritto soggettivo o astratto è impensabile al di fuori della cornice di un ordinamento che stabilisce limiti e vincoli e così conforma l’istituto della proprietà. Una volontà isolata, che proietta il suo desiderio sulla cosa, non può fondare alcun diritto, poiché il diritto è sempre una relazione tra soggetti. La volontà astratta di Hegel si rivela ben piena di contenuti empirici come quelli espressi dalle forme storiche della proprietà privata. La volontà astratta ingloba concrete articolazioni sociali e confida sulla protezione degli appositi istituti espressi dal moderno. Senza dirlo esplicitamente Hegel costruisce il momento dell'astratto e della pura forma sul calco costituito dal moderno istituto proprietario.

Piuttosto esso presuppone sempre questa categoria giuridica più concreta». Sul primato della comunità e sul risvolto politico della proprietà antica cfr. Pietro BONFANTE, Istituzioni di diritto romano, Giuffrè, Milano, 1987. 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Il dominio della politica…cit. (“Propedeutica filosofica”).


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L'appropriazione della cosa, un elemento generico che può esplicarsi in una molteplicità di modi, per Hegel deve avvenire nelle forme specifiche e, in modo del tutto surrettizio assolutizzate, della proprietà privata. Il generico (appropriazione) si appiattisce sulle forme specifiche (proprietà privata) e il congiunturale meccanismo acquisitivo del moderno (proprietà privata) sale a determinazione universale e metatemporale (appropriazione). Diventa così del tutto impensabile una manifestazione diversa del rapporto con la cosa che non sia quello insormontabile espresso nei calchi rigidi della proprietà privata. Il ragionamento di Hegel si avvolge in un circolo: poiché la comunità è inesistente sono presenti persone astratte e poiché si rintracciano solo persone non può esserci comunità di possesso. Le forme della libertà del soggetto sono così collegate con gli astratti schemi della proprietà, come accadeva in certe manifestazioni del giusnaturalismo da Hegel medesimo sbeffeggiate. Il nemico dell'astrazione, che specula in nome della ricomposizione di un nesso tra la ragione e la realtà storica, accetta in tal modo proprio i paradigmi della riflessione, le rigide divisioni dell'intelletto. Anche se non sfugge una accortezza analitica: Hegel svela una sfasatura temporale tra due diverse espressioni della libertà. La libertà della persona precede la libertà della proprietà. E quest'ultima mostra di avere maggior rilevanza ai suoi occhi. C'è stata una fase di libertà della persona che non esprimeva tuttavia le forme della proprietà. Segno evidente questo che occorre qualcos'altro rispetto al mero diritto astratto perché sia disponibile un regime proprietario ben strutturato. Questa ulteriore condizione è qualcosa di peculiare al moderno: la società civile, il sistema dei bisogni, lo Stato.

Le acquisizioni storico - sociali di Hegel si imbattono contro il suo assunto gratuito secondo cui la proprietà è legata alla volontà, alla forma e non al bisogno, all’astratta capacità giuridica e non all'impulso: «aver proprietà appare come mezzo riguardo al bisogno, se questo vien reso la cosa prima; ma la posizione verace è che dal punto di vista della libertà la proprietà, intesa come il primo esserci della medesima, è fine essenziale per sé»1. L'artificio hegeliano sgancia la proprietà dal bisogno, dalla accidentalità sensibile, per innalzarla al rango di una manifestazione spirituale della libertà del soggetto. Solo abbracciando la sfera della libertà la proprietà trova quella giustificazione assoluta e incondizionata che mai avrebbe potuto trovare finché restava ancorata all'angusto angolo dei bisogni. Precisa Hegel:

«[…] l'essenziale della forma è che, ciò che è diritto in sé, anche come tale sia posto. La mia volontà è razionale, ha valore, e questo aver valore deve esser riconosciuto dall'altro. Qui ora deve cader via la mia soggettività e quella degli altri, e la volontà deve ottenere una certezza, stabilità e oggettività, qual è quella che essa può conseguire soltanto ad opera della forma»2.

1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 45. 2 Ibidem, aggiunta al par. 217. Come rileva Emilio BETTI, Teoria generale…cit., p. 63, «il dogma della volontà non è in grado di spiegare se non con metafore di carattere mitologico e mistico certe configurazioni di negozi. In fondo la volontà interna, l’intenzione psicologica dei contraenti non hanno rilievo senza le reciprocità di interessi da regolare secondo schemi predisposti da forme e per questo» l’essenza normativa del negozio sfugge completamente alla qualifica evanescente di volontà (ivi, p. 64).


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Hegel avverte la insufficienza della pura volontà singola per fondare una forma

comune vincolante e vorrebbe raggiungere disperatamente l'alterità senza di cui esiste una pretesa unilaterale ma non già un diritto. La forma, che esprime l'insufficienza dell'intendersi sulla base di segni e parole scambiati tra soggetti privati, non può scaturire da un immediato rapporto della persona con la cosa. Essendo la forma un che di posto, di pubblico, non è possibile la sua scaturigine da un legame di per sé unilaterale tra la volontà del singolo e la cosa esterna. La forma evoca l'alterità, la costruzione impersonale di un significato pubblico, non può essere confinata - come Hegel invece pretende - nella unilaterale manifestazione di volontà che si esplica senza alcun atto esteriormente riconoscibile. La persona astratta che entra in relazione con la cosa non può essere confusa con l'individuo naturale che con la cosa soddisfa un bisogno: per questo allora di essa non è possibile parlare prima di aver posto un ordinamento giuridico che esprime le formalità attraverso le quali i negozi sono possibili, gli atti di autoregolazione degli interessi sono riconoscibili da parte di altri.

3. CONTRATTO E RICONOSCIMENTO La categoria del contratto quale momento giuridico provvisto di una tipica

funzione economico - sociale sospinge Hegel a fuoriuscire dalla fondazione volontaristica unilaterale della proprietà e a prendere in più adeguata considerazione il mondo dell'alterità esistenziale. La volontà che si esplica in un contratto però non è in alcun modo riconducibile alla mera volontà psichica soggettiva, essa è infatti una manifestazione dell’autonomia privata che suppone una forma giuridica che rende ogni estrinsecazione di volere riconoscibile socialmente perché veicolata da schemi tipici. La coesistenza delle persone che ricorrono a comportamenti volontari e si impegnano a sopportare le conseguenze di ogni atto impegnativo nel disegno di Hegel è la sommatoria di volontà singole che si riconoscono quali soggetti proprietari. Quella visione atomistica e unilaterale che egli respinge quale fondamento della rappresentanza qui ancora opera come funzione dello scambio e dell’autonomia privata e non appare come viziata da un pregiudizio soggettivistico. Hegel sa che il semplice possesso della cosa da parte di un io - voglio non è ancora proprietà perché le fa difetto una volontà comune condivisa con altri che stabilisce quali interessi svolgano funzioni sociali degni di tutela. Solo il riconoscimento degli altri e la mediazione di una forma giuridica determina il diritto di proprietà che, per conferire efficacia ultrapersonale al contratto, invoca una protezione sociale e giuridica e non può risolversi nel puro iter voluntatis e nell’elemento puramente soggettivo del negozio. Hegel chiarisce che «il diritto del possesso immediato concerne il rapporto verso le cose, non il rapporto verso terze persone. L'uomo ha il diritto di impossessarsi di ciò ch' egli può in quanto singolo. Egli ha il diritto; cioè risiede nel suo concetto di essere un Sé; e con ciò egli è il potere su tutte le cose. Ma la sua presa di possesso acquista anche il significato di escludere un terzo. Che cos'è, riguardo a questo significato, l'elemento vincolante per l'altro? Di che cosa mi è lecito impossessarmi senza fare


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torto al terzo? A tali domande, appunto, non è possibile rispondere. La presa di possesso è l'appropriazione sensibile che l'uomo deve, mediante il riconoscimento, trasformare in giuridica. Non è che l'appropriazione sia giuridica per il semplice fatto ch'essa c'è. A prendere possesso è, in sé, l'uomo immediato. V'è questa contraddizione per cui a costituire il contenuto è l'immediato, il soggetto, il cui predicato deve essere il diritto. Poiché una cosa è riconosciuta dagli altri, essa è mia proprietà. Ma che cosa gli altri riconoscono? Ciò che io ho, ciò di cui sono in possesso»1. Se nel rapporto individuo - cosa la proprietà viene fondata gratuitamente perché il titolo si presume attribuito a prescindere dalle volontà degli altri soggetti, nella fondazione contrattuale della proprietà diventa indispensabile considerare la volontà di un altro, il titolo legittimo di proprietà, la efficienza del diritto trasferito. Non più la immediatezza del prendere, la pura manifestazione del volere che imprime un segno sulla cosa, ma il riconoscimento e il contratto, cioè il carattere specificamente relazionale del diritto («il diritto è la relazione che la persona nel suo comportamento ha con un' altra persona») vengono posti alla base della proprietà e dell’essenza normativa di ogni negozio giuridico. Nel Sistema dell'eticità Hegel si serve ampiamente della nozione di riconoscimento per fondare il titolo di proprietà: «La proprietà compare nella realtà attraverso la pluralità delle persone che attuano lo scambio e vicendevolmente si riconoscono»2. In tal modo viene esaltato il carattere produttivo dell’autonomia negoziale del privato che attraverso il regime dei reciproci scambi costruisce momenti di intesa validi anche senza l’egida rassicurante della statualità.

La proprietà non è più il mero rapporto dell'individuo con la cosa, chiama ormai in causa la capacità creativa dello scambio, la produttività del riconoscimento che intercorre tra i soggetti delle transazioni e il requisito della sicurezza degli atti di scambio e circolazione dei beni. Se prima la proprietà è stata da Hegel esaurita nella volontà della singola persona che intercetta la cosa facendola sua, ora lo sforzo è quello di far scaturire la proprietà da un accordo reciproco. Ancora resta sullo sfondo l'ordinamento, lo Stato e lo sforzo profuso mira a contenere la proprietà nell'ambito di soggetti che riconoscono le pertinenze reciproche. Non si pone Hegel il problema di chi predispone gli schemi contrattuali, di chi sorveglia l'adempimento, di chi stabilisce le sanzioni. Il tentativo di fondare il diritto di proprietà è davvero disperato. Quando Hegel percepisce che non è possibile fondare la proprietà sul semplice possesso, sulla volontà depositata nella cosa, cerca di tratteggiare un'apertura alla socialità, alla relazionalità mediata dal diritto. Ma anche la nozione di riconoscimento possiede una struttura contraddittoria: ciascuno infatti riconosce all'altro ciò che già possiede. Perché si superi il possesso immediato, e si abbia la proprietà legittima di un bene,

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit. pp. 136 - 137. La relazionalità del diritto è tenuta presente da Hegel in contrasto con il diritto di natura. Egli scrive che «diritto è la relazione della persona nel suo comportarsi verso l'altra persona» (ivi, p. 135). Solo entro il puro stato naturale la proprietà si confonde con il possesso immediato e privo di diritti: «il diritto del possesso immediatamente porta sulle cose, non su di un terzo» (ivi, p. 136). L'obbligo verso l'altro costituisce la proprietà che scavalca così la presa di possesso immediata o appropriazione sensibile. All'immediato prendere subentrano le forme del contratto. 2 Ibidem.


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occorre il riconoscimento degli altri. Ma gli altri riconoscono a ciascuno solo il possesso che già vantava sulla cosa. Il diritto cioè, con questi espedienti, non si discosta molto dal fatto. Il rapporto uomo - cosa, che avviene in una situazione pregiuridica sprovvista di efficaci regolazioni formali, è dunque in Hegel il reale contenuto del reciproco riconoscimento attuato tra persone che operano - si suppone - dentro una società non ancora retta da un ordinamento giuridico consolidato. Il rapporto del tutto empirico - immediato che la volontà instaura con la cosa, è inadeguato a giustificare la proprietà. E tuttavia il diritto di proprietà, che Hegel fa sorgere dal reciproco riconoscimento, postula, quale sua base empirica reale, proprio l'appropriazione naturalistica avvenuta al riparo da ogni interferenza giuridica. La finzione del reciproco riconoscimento - argomenta Kelsen - «nasce dall'ideologia giuridica individualistico - borghese»1. In base ad essa, ciascuna individualità è disposta a trascendere la contingenza di quanto possiede solo perché il riconoscimento reciproco, che culmina nella creazione di una volontà collettiva giuridicamente rilevante, non fa che garantire i possessi già in precedenza acquisiti. Il reciproco riconoscimento delle parti serve solo a difendere quanto già la loro volontà di possesso è riuscita ad accaparrarsi. L'ordinamento giuridico in quanto tale non gioca un ruolo di particolare rilievo.

Neanche il riconoscimento apre dunque alla dimensione della socialità e dell’oggettivo ordinamento giuridico. Esso infatti non arriva a prospettare un ordinamento giuridico poggiante su più solide basi che non siano quelle dell'individualismo possessivo da proteggere. Per Hegel la cosa voluta diventa proprietà stabile solo «mediante la coscienza» che consiste nella assunzione della piena consapevolezza che riconoscendo il possesso singolo ciascuno ottiene la rassicurazione sul proprio. In tal modo «la sicurezza del mio possesso è la sicurezza del possesso di tutti; nella mia proprietà tutti hanno la loro proprietà»2. Dirottando la proprietà nella coscienza, non si perviene però a un solido e stabile fondamento. La coscienza del singolo, al riparo da strutture più ampie di regolazione, non può essere la fonte durevole, non occasionale di obblighi, di prestazioni, di sanzione dinanzi ad illeciti. La pratica del riconoscimento non può fondare la proprietà perché in essa non vige alcun diritto o dovere reciproco fissato da una norma generale dell'ordinamento. Solo il diritto formale esprime un ambito comune astratto. Proprio Hegel rifiuta di scorgere la genesi della norma nelle sfere del vivente: «la legge è l'esistere della volontà comune di diversi soggetti intorno ad una singola cosa»3. La legge esprime una volontà 1 Hans KELSEN, La teoria generale del diritto e il materialismo storico, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, 1979, p. 156. 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit. p. 100. Secondo Hegel la proprietà esige, oltre al singolo che vuole la cosa, anche «la coscienza universale» che dispone la esclusione degli altri dal mio e dal tuo. Così «nel possesso determinato tutti hanno altrettanto il loro possesso» (ivi). Invero la certezza della proprietà di essere protetta nella sua esclusività e pienezza è sempre legata all’esistenza di un’autorità che interviene con il codice penale (punizioni del furto, dell’indebita appropriazione, della violazione del domicilio) e con il codice civile (azioni peritorie, possessorie, azioni di nunciazione). 3 Ibidem, p. 161. Anche Hegel ricade negli errori delle teorie che attribuiscono alla volontà la fonte di un dominio completo sulla cosa corporale. Questo è un vizio teorico comune a molti autori che «credono


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comune che è ben diversa da quella empiricamente espressa da privati che si riconoscono come proprietari. Scrive Hegel: «la proprietà, della quale il lato dell'esistenza o dell'esteriorità non è più soltanto una cosa, ma contiene in sé il momento di una (e quindi di un'altra) volontà, viene a esistere mediante contratto». È soprattutto quando si accosta allo scambio delle volontà, al contratto (in base al quale «ogni cosa singola diviene un elemento sociale») che Hegel va oltre la riconduzione della proprietà al semplice rapporto della volontà con la cosa, o alla appropriazione immediata della cosa necessaria per soddisfare bisogni esistenziali (che avviene già sotto le forme del diritto di proprietà). La diffusione dei canoni contrattuali, nel funzionamento delle relazioni sociali fondamentali, è un prodotto specificamente moderno. L'industria produce uno spiccato senso della soggettività: «l'industria contiene in sé il principio dell'individualità, quella che nell'industria si sviluppa e predomina, è l'intelligenza individuale»1. Con la «libertà del possesso e la libertà della persona» - nota Hegel - insieme «ad ogni illibertà del vincolo feudale, decadono tutte le norme derivate da quel diritto, le decime e i canoni. Alla libertà reale appartengono inoltre la libertà dei mestieri, cioè il fatto che sia concesso all'uomo di usare delle sue forze come vuole, e il libero accesso a tutti gli uffici dello Stato».

Hegel coglie con chiarezza che, nelle condizioni moderne, il ricambio sociale è azionabile solo attraverso libere alienazioni. A termine di una ricognizione puntuale del lavoro astratto, della macchina, del denaro, egli afferma che «qui la casualità del prendere possesso è tolta: nell'esser riconosciuto, ho tutto mediante il lavoro e lo scambio. Fonte, origine della proprietà è qui il lavoro, il mio stesso fare»2. Hegel ha messo alle sue spalle il problema della giustificazione della proprietà sulla base della volontà impressa nella cosa e si concentra sull'analisi di un meccanismo sociale che con il lavoro coordinato produce grandi quantità di ricchezze, che scavalcano il puro bisogno legato alla sopravvivenza fisica. In questo meccanismo di creazione illimitata di merci, un ruolo centrale occupa il contratto. Rileva Hegel:

«[…] posso alienare la mia proprietà a un altro e posso acquistare proprietà estranea. Questo acquisto avviene solo mediante il contratto, cioè il reciproco consenso, da parte di due persone, di alienare una proprietà, di consegnarla all'altro, e il consenso di riceverla».

erroneamente che dal fatto che uno può far tutto su di una cosa discenda naturalmente anche quello che un altro non possa farne nulla» (Silvio PEROZZI, Scritti giuridici, Giuffrè, Milano, 1948, p. 446). La definizione di proprietà come disposizione sulla cosa è inadeguata a cogliere il potere connesso alla nozione di proprietà. La volontà che si orienta sulla cosa facendola propria non implica alcuna determinazione specifica poiché la volontà può ben essere «di una persona fisica, di uno Stato, di un comune, di una tribù» (ivi). 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 229. Il lavoro dell'industria non è legato solo al bisogno, è «lavoro astratto», «astratta attività» ma non ancora il «comprensivo, pieno-di-contenuto e lungimirante spirito» (Filosofia dello spirito jenese…cit., p. 147). Sul lavoro e la recezione dell’economia politica cfr. Manfred RIEDEL, Hegel fra tradizione e rivoluzione, Laterza, Roma - Bari, 1975. 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 149.


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Hegel va così molto oltre la raffigurazione del lavoro immediato quale titolo di proprietà sulla cosa e segnala una forma di produttività più legata alla divisione sociale delle funzioni e alla creazione di valori di scambio mediata dalla estensione del regime delle transazioni negoziali. Il problema che la pretesa soluzione contrattualista incontra è quello di fondare lo stesso contratto che non può essere posto sulla base di una transazione volontaria. La ricerca del contratto originario che ha conferito validità al contratto si impiglia in tautologie. Inoltre questo approccio sottovaluta che non è per contratto tra privati che sgorgano figure di valenza pubblicistica eteronome e fondanti le stesse nozioni di capacità giuridica e d’agire. Anche senza aderire alla formula di Hobbes, che vuole la proprietà una conseguenza dello Stato, Hegel deve evocare lo Stato per fondare gli istituti della proprietà che non possono certo esaurirsi nella capacità evocativa del contratto e del riconoscimento. «Lo Stato è l'esserci, la potenza del diritto, il sostegno del contratto e del permanere della sua proprietà stabile, l'unità esistente della parola, dell'esserci ideale e della realtà, così come l'unità immediata del possesso e del diritto, la proprietà in quanto sostanza universale»1. La proprietà come rapporto mediato dalle forme del contratto ha un rivestimento giuridico costoso che pone come non più sufficienti la fiducia data con semplici parole. Il ricorso a formalità, a ratifiche dell'autorità, simboleggia che tra i soggetti esiste qualche «segno di sfiducia» perché non bastano più relazioni informali o affidamenti su elementi piuttosto aleatori come la coscienza, la doverosità sociale spontanea.

Il contratto (che Hegel confina nell'ambito del diritto privato e del meccanismo economico e respinge con forza quale possibile fonte dell'obbligo politico - statuale) segnala l'avvento di una società nella quale tutte le prestazioni e le relazioni interindividuali avvengono per il tramite del consenso. «Il contratto - egli precisa - è la stessa cosa che lo scambio, ma scambio ideale. È uno scambio di dichiarazioni, non più di cose, ma vale quanto la cosa stessa. Per entrambi la volontà dell'altro vale in quanto tale»2. Con il contratto, quale fonte di obbligazione, si entra in un diritto immateriale che contempla non già l’empirico scambio delle cose fisiche ma lo scambio di volontà che trasferisce facoltà, delimita poteri, precisa prestazioni. Con il contratto, con i modi dell’acquisto ad essere trasferita non è la concreta cosa materiale, sulla quale converge l’appartenenza proprietaria, ma il potere astratto di esercitare facoltà piene di godimento economico sul bene patrimoniale. Il diritto non postula alcun transito di cose reali o materiali ma prevede dichiarazioni di volontà con effetti reali nel godimento dei beni, schemi formali che autorizzano transazioni, atti che definiscono negozi e alienazioni. L’assolutezza della proprietà non concerne più il dominio dell’empirica cosa da parte di un soggetto ma l’utilizzazione piena a fini patrimoniali di un astratto potere di godimento ascritto al titolare. La generalizzazione del contratto come attivazione di ogni potere di disposizione a contenuto patrimoniale attributivo postula un sistema sociale in cui il denaro diventa il veicolo principale della mediazione, come apprezzamento del valore economico negoziabile, che si afferma al di là di ogni sopravvivente barriera di status. Lo schema del contratto permette infatti

1 Ibidem, p. 170. 2 Ibidem, p. 151.


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di superare ogni vincolo giuridico legato a status particolari di appartenenza, e di fondare il funzionamento della vita economica sulla apparente dialettica del volere con la quale ogni bene giuridico è trasferibile, divisibile, ipotecabile secondo procedure. L’oggetto del trasferimento per via contrattuale non è la cosa, il bene materiale ma il diritto, il godimento di ogni bene fonte di appartenenza proprietaria nei limiti del negozio. Hegel precisa che il contratto come riferimento astratto che dà luogo alla successione nel diritto reale relativo alla cosa è la manifestazione essenziale della libertà dei moderni, in quanto la fondazione consensuale delle relazioni sociali e produttive esclude discriminazioni giuridiche. Il contratto fa convivere elasticità, relatività e assolutezza e pienezza della condizione di appartenenza. La proprietà persiste nel suo schema unitario capace di cogliere qualsiasi contenuto o condizione di appartenenza e al tempo stesso, grazie al contratto che rende trasferibile fasci di poteri, vanta una elasticità che la pone in grado di aprirsi alle varie posizioni di interesse. Tutto è cedibile attraverso il contratto, ma «inalienabile è la mia ragione, la mia libertà, la mia personalità e ciò che in genere contiene essenzialmente in sé l'intera mia libertà»1. Hegel scorge il carattere contrattuale delle relazioni sociali moderne che confidano sulla illimitata capacità autoproduttiva dei negozi giuridici posti alla base del diritto soggettivo.

Le principali manifestazioni dell'esistenza (compresa l'attività produttiva di beni privatamente appropriabili) avvengono attraverso le forme del contratto che, come entità giuridica, mostra come l’unità della proprietà non risieda tanto nella «cosa» da preservare nella sua materiale consistenza dalla frantumazione dei possessi quanto nella astratta potestà in capo al proprietario di far valere poteri e utilità. L’unità e assolutezza della nozione di proprietà è vista da Hegel nella qualificazione generale ed astratta dei poteri ritagliati dall’ordinamento per il soggetto posto nella condizione di godere dei beni senza bisogno di materialità immediata. L’unità del concetto di proprietà non è più nella condizione materiale - corporale di appartenenza della cosa ma nella conformazione di astratti poteri dispositivi. Quando Hegel sostiene che «il contratto presuppone che coloro i quali contraggono si riconoscano come persone e proprietari»2 esprime però la persistente, insuperabile antinomia della sua fondazione

1 Hegel precisa che «intorno al mio onore e alla mia vita non ha luogo alcun contratto» (ivi, p. 154). Il contratto, quale base delle relazioni economiche, può essere solo a tempo determinato e riguarda il corpo che lavora, non il corpo - dignità. Anche per Marx il contratto prevede un uso limitato nel tempo del corpo che lavora altrimenti «se fosse permesso all'uomo di vendere la sua forza lavoro per un tempo illimitato, la schiavitù sarebbe di colpo ristabilita. Una tale vendita, se fosse conclusa, per esempio, per tutta la vita, farebbe senz'altro dell'uomo lo schiavo a vita del suo imprenditore» (Opere, vol. XX, Roma, 1980, p. 128). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 135 - 136. Come chiarisce Solari, «il possesso, i rapporti di forza, tendono a legittimarsi, al riconoscimento universale mediante il diritto. La particolarità cerca nel diritto una norma universale, ma questa è solo formale. Il possesso universalmente riconosciuto diventa proprietà; i rapporti di forza cercano nel consenso la loro giustificazione» (SOLARI, op. cit., p. 214). La fondazione della proprietà come possesso esclusivo basato sul riconoscimento reciproco è presente anche in Fichte (Diritto naturale, Roma & Bari, 1994, p. 114) per il quale «ogni proprietà si fonda sull’unione della volontà di più persone in una volontà. Per Fichte, più che di esclusione dalla cosa altrui sanzionata dall’ordinamento, si deve parlare di una autoesclusione in virtù della


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della proprietà. Lo stesso tentativo di fondare la proprietà sul contratto si avvita in una antinomia irrisolta. Esso infatti postula pur sempre il concetto di proprietà delle cose o del corpo, che dovrebbe invece essere spiegato. Il libero consenso viene invocato quale essenziale titolo che conferisce legittimità alla appropriazione privata della ricchezza. Ma la libera volontà degli agenti dello scambio, che dovrebbe rappresentare il fondamento della attribuzione privata della proprietà, può davvero esplicarsi solo se di fronte al prestatore d'opera, che cede le sue energie per un tempo determinato, esiste già il proprietario degli strumenti necessari per la produzione di cose - merci. Qui risiede l'antinomia della fondazione della proprietà attraverso il contratto tra soggetti eguali: il libero incontro delle volontà (mercato), che dovrebbe legittimare il titolo di proprietà, è possibile solo se prima della relazione contrattuale tra gli agenti dello scambio, si sia già verificata una situazione non contrattuale (ossia l'attribuzione dei mezzi per produrre ai soggetti proprietari). Neanche Hegel sfugge a questa surrettizia attribuzione a uno dei soggetti contraenti di dotazioni di strumenti e di potere che appaiono di origine non contrattuale. Egli nota che:

«[…] delle mie possibilità dell'attività e attitudini (corporee e spirituali) particolari io posso alienare produzioni singole e un uso limitato nel tempo da parte d'un altro, poiché esse ottengono secondo questa limitazione un rapporto esteriore con la mia totalità e universalità. Attraverso l'alienazione del mio intero tempo, concreto grazie al lavoro, e della totalità della mia produzione io ne renderei proprietà d'un altro il sostanziale, la mia universale attività e realtà, la mia personalità»1. La prospettiva di Hegel è quella di un formale scambio di volontà che

intercorre però tra soggetti diseguali: uno cede energia, tempo e l'altro denaro. Al di fuori del libero contratto restano pur sempre la quantità di valore che dalla prestazione di lavoro si ricava e il potere di dirigere complessi di macchine a fini particolaristici.

quale il soggetto con un atto di libera volontà rinuncia alla proprietà dell’altro. Il riconoscimento reciproco postula che io non posso pensare nulla come mia proprietà senza pensare, allo stesso tempo, qualcosa come proprietà di un altro» (p. 115). Più che una fondazione si rintraccia in queste formula una vuota tautologia per cui il riconoscimento suppone la proprietà che dovrebbe istituire attraverso la legge giuridica. A sorvegliare sul quanto gli individui lecitamente possono riconoscersi interviene per Fichte lo Stato, garante di proprietà e sicurezza, che stabilisce quanto è legalmente concesso al singolo nella sua presa di possesso. Lo Stato delimita anche lo spazio dei produttori e «la generale liberalizzazione dei rami produttivi va direttamente contro il contratto di proprietà originario» (p. 204). 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 67. Secondo Hegel la schiavitù è basata sull'arbitrio e quindi essa contraddice i principi di uno Stato razionale. Egli non dubita del principio moderno che «la schiavitù è ingiustizia in sé e per sé, perché l'essenza dell'uomo è la libertà». Rifiuta però l'idea che si possa avere una «improvvisa abolizione della schiavitù» e non invece una «graduale eliminazione della schiavitù che è cosa più opportuna e giusta» (Idem, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1981, I, 253). Per Hegel dunque «non si può pretendere in modo assoluto che l'uomo, per il solo fatto che è un uomo, sia ritenuto essenzialmente libero». Occorre dare tempo al concetto perché l'assoluto ha una storia lenta da percorrere per ritornare in sé. Per questo concetto che sbanda, di un assoluto che entra nel tempo, di un infinito che è nel contingente, bisogna tener conto che «l'africano non è ancor giunto alla distinzione di sé», e che «il negro rappresenta l'uomo naturale nella sua totale barbarie e sfrenatezza» (op. cit., p. 209).


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4. TRA STATO E CONCORRENZA Rispetto alla ricognizione kantiana del contratto di lavoro, la trattazione di

Hegel raggiunge una maggiore aderenza alle forme astratte del moderno. La sua attenzione lambisce il problema dell'appropriazione privata delle nuove forme della ricchezza industriale, e si avvicina alle tematiche della distribuzione e della circolazione delle merci prodotte. La percezione di molti elementi specificamente moderni (carattere astratto assunto dal lavoro, mediazione contrattuale necessaria per l'attivazione dello stesso circuito produttivo) convive in lui assieme alla persistenza di alcuni aspetti più legati alla tradizionale visione di un rapporto tra la volontà e la cosa o alla simbiosi lockiana tra persona e soggetto proprietario. L'ambito dell'astratto per Hegel è quello della società civile, non certo quello dello Stato (a meno che non si coltivi dell'astratto una visione sovversiva di tipo francese che il filosofo tedesco rigetta però con sprezzo). E' la società civile a svelare un astratto sistema dei bisogni e una astratta nozione del lavoro inteso come tempo eguale applicabile a qualsiasi cosa - merce. Lo Stato incarna una logica diversa, concreta e nient'affatto astratta. La concretezza hegeliana non è certo quella del liberalismo empirico - economicistico alla Locke. Non è possibile scambiare la logica dello Stato (ragione, cultura) con quella della società civile (economia, concorrenza). Il contratto è la specifica grammatica della società civile che è attraversata dagli scambi e dalla concorrenza. Per questo va tenuto distante dalla sfera pubblica. La logica del contratto non attenua il peso delle differenze empiriche ed essa è la stessa che crea proprietà e plebe, ricchezza e precarietà. Non è contro il contratto o violando il diritto astratto che si creano le contraddizioni della società civile. La dipendenza moderna non è di tipo formale ma scaturisce silenziosamente da «un sistema di dipendenza onnilaterale»1. La sola connessione è per Hegel quella creata dal proprio interesse particolare che entra in relazione con altri portatori di interessi. Nel moderno tutto avviene attraverso il contratto e rispettando ovunque l'autodeterminazione dei soggetti individuali e la capacità creativa sprigionata dalle forme del contratto. Senza contravvenire alle esigenze dell'astratto (perché Hegel non condivide le demolizioni del regime proprietario e anzi intende proteggerlo con maggiore rigore), lo Stato deve introdurre una diversa logica che il privato da solo non riesce a prospettare. E' questa la base di un intervento pubblico che non è affatto in contraddizione con le esigenze dell'astratto sistema economico da Hegel così acutamente avvertite. Nella sfera della società civile e del contratto irrompono problemi acuti e disagi gravi che occorre lenire aprendo una logica diversa, quella dello Stato che accolla sulle sue spalle domande e oneri che non possono gravare su una economia di libera concorrenza.

1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 182. «In tal senso la società civile rimanda alla sfera dei rapporti di fatto. Anche se possiede alcune forme giuridiche, manca l'organicità capace di unificare le parti e quindi la società civilpossiede alcune caratteristiche dello Stato ma non è lo Stato» (Norberto BOBBIO, “Società civile”, in Norberto BOBBIO, Nicola MATTEUCCI, Dizionario di politica, Utet, Torino, 1983, p. 1085).


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Che si tratti di due differenti logiche Hegel lo ha ben chiaro. Da una parte il diritto astratto visto come condizione della proprietà che emerge sin dalla soddisfazione di un bisogno. Dall'altra il diritto pubblico, presentato come dimensione specifica dello Stato che è un ambito diverso dall'economia. La società civile è un mondo astratto che «strappa il legame», «estranea l'uno all'altro». La socialità dei tempi moderni è solo la mancanza di un affare comune, l'unico legame che si crea è quello non consapevole legato alla rincorsa individuale di prestigio e ricchezza. Per Hegel la sola comunità visibile è quella che scaturisce dalla «connessione degli uomini attraverso i loro bisogni» 1. Si tratta quindi di una falsa comunità, di un che di cieco, di non voluto, di una autentica necessità esterna non prevedibile che mette i soggetti in relazione solo per comperare e vendere. Nel moderno «la soddisfazione del bisogno necessario come del bisogno accidentale è accidentale. La società civile offre lo spettacolo in pari modo della dissolutezza. Della miseria e della corruzione fisica ed etica»2. Dalla concorrenza e dalla divisione del lavoro mediata dalle forme propulsive del contratto non emerge una spontanea armonia ma solo conflitto e lacerazione che fanno disperare della possibilità di un ritorno di etica. La società civile è un terreno di scontro tra molteplici interessi che cercano di prevalere. Hegel vi rintraccia «i diversi interessi dei produttori e consumatori»3, ma anche l'esplosione della questione sociale, ossia la divaricazione tra denaro e plebe, creata non da una deviazione del moderno bensì dalla sua stessa logica costitutiva: la specializzazione del lavoro, la macchina. Il sistema dei bisogni sollecita relazioni sociali tra uomini e un rapporto naturale tra uomo e cose. Attraverso la divisione e la specializzazione del lavoro, è possibile la soddisfazione di bisogni ma in un quadro di estrema polarizzazione tra ricchezza

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 243. In Hegel «la società non è una comunità; essa è in certo senso sconfinata, o comunque priva di capacità di porsi dei limiti da sola» (Franz ROSENZWEIG, Hegel e lo Stato…cit., p. 400). La società civile hegeliana «è sistema non solo economico, ma anche giuridico e amministrativo, ed è chiamata perciò tanto Gesellschaft quanto Staat » (Michelangelo BOVERO, “Il modello hegelo - marxiano”, in Norberto BOBBIO, Nicola MATTEUCCI, Dizionario di politica…cit., p. 175). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 185. Come è stato notato «l'interesse di Hegel per la negatività è di origine extralogica e costituisce il residuo del suo periodo romantico» (Eugène FLEISCHMANN, La logica di Hegel, Einaudi, Torino, 1975, p. 18). La «suggestione dei ricordi teologici» nella dialettica hegeliana è rintracciata anche da Guido De RUGGIERO, Hegel, Laterza, Bari 1972, p. 9. Nella descrizione del lavoro moderno non ci sono invece «lamentazioni romantiche» secondo Lukàcs (op. cit., p. 463). Il merito di Hegel è per lui quello di aver colto il capitalismo come «totalità oggettiva che si muove secondo le sue proprie leggi» (p. 465). I limiti hegeliani sono nella mancanza di una teoria del valore - lavoro e nella «sopravvalutazione dei principi giuridici della vita economica» (p. 538). 3 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lineamenti...cit., par. 236. In Hegel la proprietà fondiaria inalienabile appare come l'essenza della proprietà in quanto essa non è «una proprietà determinata dalla volontà sociale» (Karl MARX, Opere filosofiche giovanili...cit., p. 112). Hegel pone quale contenuto della costituzione politica «il maggiorasco, il superlativo della proprietà privata, la sovrana proprietà privata» (ivi, p. 113). La specificità della proprietà inalienabile è che si postula «che si abbia proprietà non in una volontà comune, bensì soltanto mediante una cosa e la mia volontà soggettiva» (p. 115). Il rapporto giuridico di proprietà, che in età moderna postula il contratto, una volontà comune, viene da Hegel dipinto in termini di eticità sostanziale con una autentica «religione della proprietà privata» che si esprime nella proprietà fondiaria inalienabile e sacra. Si capisce che «nei nostri tempi moderni, la religione è divenuta in genere una qualità inerente alla proprietà fondiaria» (p. 117).


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smisurata e povertà irriducibile. Il timore di Hegel è che il bisogno conduca a una sfera dinamica mai doma che sollecita sempre nuovi consumi e ripropone forme sempre aggiornate di diseguaglianze eccessive. Non c’è la soddisfazione ultima che arresta la differenza di status bensì si incontra il sempre rinnovato stimolo a consumare beni diversi e a contenere i costi del processo di produzione. Hegel avverte la stretta funzionalità tra economia e regolamento giuridico. Il benessere non può fare a meno della copertura giuridica, ed il diritto non può rinunciare all’appagamento dei bisogni.

Lo Stato ha a quale suo referente non la persona o diritto astratto e nemmeno il soggetto o morale ma la società civile, luogo nel quale per la prima volta si può parlare di uomo. Il ritorno di ethos serve per risolvere il conflitto tra particolare e universale, tra legge e inclinazione, tra diritto e esistenza sensibile. Come l'etica non annulla diritto astratto, ne svela però la insufficienza, così lo Stato non cancella la società, ne mostra la tendenza a dileguare le qualità sostanziali entro parametri solo quantitativi. La libertà astratta è limitata al soggetto della concorrenza, occorre una comunità etica per rendere la sfera privata organizzata dal sostanziale1. Oltre la soggettività vuota, emerge la persona concreta con bisogni complessi che travalicano quelli appena abbozzati collegati alla realtà della appropriazione. Al di là del benessere privato esiste una prospettiva di benessere collettivo che lo Stato deve recuperare imponendo in una pubblica sfera un quadro di riferimento sostanziale irriducibile ai canoni privatistici della concorrenza. Scrive Hegel: «la costituzione statale è la porta, per cui il momento astratto dello Stato entra nella vita e nella realtà; ma con essa interviene anche la distinzione fra chi comanda e chi obbedisce, tra governanti e governati»2. La vita non può restare al di fuori dell'universale, non può esistere una forma senza penetrazione nei contenuti. Altrimenti, da una parte la forma indica una vuota determinazione intellettualistica, uno sterile dover essere che è sintomo di incompiutezza, e dall'altra la vita esplica una preoccupante situazione di endemica limitatezza e naturalità. Una vita che non viene mediata dalla forma genera insicurezza e odio, risentimento. Precisa Hegel che «la povertà in sé non rende plebe: questa viene determinata soltanto dalla disposizione d'animo che alla povertà si congiunge, dall'indignazione interiore contro i ricchi, contro la società, il governo»3. Sintomo di grave miopia sarebbe lasciare questi settori marginali in una condizione di accidentalità, di mancanza: occorre un sistema pubblico accanto al sistema privato dei bisogni capace di imporre una logica sostanziale, una razionalità materiale sconosciuta all’economia di mercato. Sin dal periodo giovanile Hegel si è mostrato sensibile verso

1 Insieme alla capacità del singolo, occorre postulare la presenza del pubblico. Oltre al «diritto negativo» il singolo deve esigere un «diritto positivo» (cfr. Pietro COSTA, Civitas. Storia della cittadinanza in Europa, Laterza, Bari, 2000, II, p. 437). La prospettiva di integrare i soggetti è quella di un «patriottismo istituzionale» (Pietro COSTA, op. cit., p. 442). Secondo Esnst CASSIRER (Simbolo, mito e cultura, Roma - Bari, Laterza, 1985, p. 121), «la filosofia di Hegel è in larghissima misura responsabile delle nostre moderne teorie dello Stato onnipresente». Tuttavia la sua critica al liberalismo non ricorre agli argomenti del romanticismo politico e «nel sistema di Hegel non può darsi separazione alcuna tra il concetto di Machtstaat e quello di Kulturstaat » (p. 125). 2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit., p. 138. 3 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., agg. par. 244.


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queste tematiche: «dei nostri rapporti politici e civili, la disuguaglianza nel tenore di vita e nei beni di fortuna hanno aumentato non solo ogni genere di miseria, ma anche la suscettibilità e la sensibilità ad essa»1. Lo Stato non può atteggiarsi a cattiva universalità che costruisce la forma come la soppressione del finito mondo dei bisogni. I bisogni e gli interessi che la forma crede di aver scacciato dalla vita concreta in realtà sono allontanati solo dalla visibilità del puro calcolo economico ma continuano a operare in profondità e trovano il modo per alimentarsi continuamente. Lo Stato senza gli interessi è una pura forma che supera il sistema dei bisogni solo in astratto, nel senso che non riesce davvero a rendere il privato come una sua determinazione. Lo Stato per Hegel deve ospitare presso di sé anche ciò che è altro rispetto alla forma, deve giungere alla sua idealità solo attraverso il proprio altro che in tal modo non resta accidentalità esterna accanto alla idea. Il baratro tra lo Stato e i bisogni è la spia del fallimento del concetto di Stato che lascia sussistere fuori di sé come realtà indipendente la finitezza, la divisione. L'unità di Stato e società civile è l'autentico superamento delle tensioni che sorgono invece lasciando al suo posto il bisogno contrapposto alle vuote forme dello Stato di diritto. Il problema di Hegel non è quello di aver compreso come un’economia incentrata su parametri quantitativi e competitivi risulti strutturalmente refrattaria alle questioni di senso, alle domande di qualità sociale (che vanno perciò indirizzate a un ambito funzionale diverso, quello della amministrazione pubblica). Il suo problema è piuttosto di aver creduto possibile rintracciare una logica del concreto, del valore pubblico del disagio individuale già dentro le sfere della società civile, che in quanto civile dovrebbe invece restare indifferente a sollecitazioni di pubblica pertinenza. Quando saluta nel ceto agricolo un che di sostanziale e di etico Hegel approda a una soluzione ibrida tra modernità e passatismo.

Per Hegel la sfera particolare non può organizzare una propria autonomia politica, deve essere invece inserita entro le coordinate generali dello Stato che assegna una funzione specifica alle parti attraverso una rappresentanza non atomistica (alla francese2) ma di cerchie rilevanti della società. Il suo sforzo è quello di recuperare con i ceti una dimensione etica (comunità coesa) senza smarrire il connotato della modernità, e cioè l’emersione dell’individuo che con il contratto dispone di uno strumento giuridico di autoregolazione. La questione sociale in Hegel è conseguenza della modernità che accanto al denaro produce plebe e frantuma ogni coesione. Affrontare il disagio con la morale, con la carità privata, significa non cogliere la radice del problema. La disoccupazione è indotta proprio dal macchinario che l'economia concorrenziale deve necessariamente introdurre lasciando senza lavoro, per contenere

1 Idem, Scritti teologici giovanili...cit., p. 111. Hegel si scaglia in più luoghi contro l'eguaglianza astratta di atomi: «l'universale, dirotto negli atomi degli individui assolutamente molti, questo spirito morto, è una eguaglianza nella quale tutti valgono come ciascheduno, come persone» (Fenomenologia dello spirito, La Nuova Italia, Firenze, 1976, II, p. 36). Sul tema cfr. Vladimiro GIACCHÉ, Finalità e soggettività, Pantograf, Genova, 1990. 2 Per avviare all'universale occorrono le corporazioni «ma bisogna guardarsi dal ritenere che lo Stato possa configurarsi come un aggregato di corporazioni, o che l'etica statale sia una semplice sublimazione dell'etica corporativa» (Claudio CESA, op. cit., p. 857).


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i costi, i vecchi occupati. Lo Stato deve salvaguardare le persone in carne ed ossa e non rivolgersi alla tutela astratta dell’individuo che dispone delle libere forme del contratto e dell’autonomia negoziale. La tutela della proprietà non può portare al sacrificio della vita reale delle persone. L'interesse particolare va in Hegel subordinato alla generalità organizzata dallo Stato. Per questo lo Stato abbraccia una dimensione diversa dalla società civile che è luogo del conflitto, della particolarità, delle molteplici vedute empiriche1. Oltre alla capacità astratta della persona giuridica esiste la concreta esperienza del corpo vivente con particolari bisogni. Gli interessi non possono sussistere senza la forma ed atteggiarsi ad alterità irriducibile che pretende di permanere nella sua irrimediabile particolarità e immediatezza. La realtà positiva degli interessi si avverte solo nella statualità che supera ogni estrinsecità con la sua tipica organizzazione razionale. La ragione statale assicura l'unità della forma e dell'oggettivo mondo degli interessi cui pure viene riconosciuta l’autonormatività tramite contratti privati. La forma, nel vero Stato, corrisponde al concreto nel senso che essa non è più un astratto dover essere che non si avvede che la dispersione del particolare deve cessare. Lo Stato, che è un estremo rispetto alle sfere del particolare interesse, in Hegel diventa anche il mediatore, l'unità realizzata di generale e particolare. L'interesse si toglie di mezzo, rinuncia alla sua ostinata particolarità e lo Stato senza ostacoli si espande nel finito per sussumerlo alle ragioni della generalità. La potenza straordinaria del medio rende lo Stato sia unità che differenza. Lo Stato integra in forme astratte una società differenziata e supera pertanto l'atomizzazione della società civile, ma è anche una funzione delle sfere della particolarità2. La curiosità dello Stato per il mondo dei bisogni è solo in funzione del ritorno nella fortezza delle pubbliche istituzioni. La società è solo una tappa per approdare in un'altra sfera, è un limite esteriore che ha per destino il dileguare dinanzi alla potenza onnicomprensiva del generale.

I bisogni del sistema (che invoca unità, conciliazione) piegano il sistema dei bisogni (che esprime scissione, accidentalità). Per Hegel esistono impulsi, inclinazioni ossia un «sistema di bisogni sensibili». Questi bisogni sono ineliminabili e tuttavia «in quest'ambito naturale dell'esistenza umana il contenuto del soddisfacimento è di specie finita e limitata; il soddisfacimento non è assoluto e procede quindi senza posa a sempre nuovi bisogni»3. I bisogni sono la inesauribile finitezza sempre inappagata e

1 In Hegel «l'opinione pubblica del pubblico dei privati perde la base della sua unità e verità, ritorna al livello di una credenza soggettiva dei molti» (Jürgen HABERMAS, Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica, Laterza, Bari, 1984, p. 144). In tal senso «Hegel disattiva l'idea della sfera pubblica borghese». Egli da una parte fa delle istituzioni «una dimensione pubblica degradata a mezzo di educazione» e dall'altra postula «un principio di integrazione dei cittadini dall'alto» (p. 146). Con i vincoli corporativi e i compiti educativi in Hegel «la dimensione pubblica non può essere più quella liberale» (p. 145). Anche per Rossi (op. cit., p. 288) «lo Stato hegeliano non è affatto lo Stato liberale». In Hegel i cittadini non possono rivendicare garanzie contro il potere che assegna diritti civili ma è lo Stato che esige garanzie «contro l'animus privatistico e le usurpazioni dei corpi rappresentativi» (Claudio CESA, op. cit., p. 856). 2 Cfr. Umberto CERRONI, op. cit. 3 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Estetica...cit., p. 114. Una svalutazione del bisogno è presente anche in Hegel per il quale «la comunanza di religione costituisce una comunità più profonda, mentre più volgare è quella dei bisogni fisici» (HEGEL, Scritti politici, Einaudi, Torino, 1974, p. 68). Nondimeno in


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«dove vi è finitezza, ivi irrompono sempre l'opposizione e la contraddizione e il soddisfacimento non va oltre il relativo». Occorre andare oltre, ma non certo contrapponendo ai bisogni la legge astratta, il diritto formale. La forma deve avere più corposi contenuti e non può affatto esaurirsi negli astratti schemi del diritto privato che vede i singoli autoregolatori dei rispettivi interessi economici. Di per sé la pura forma e il diritto astratto dei privati sono insufficienti: libertà e diritto «riguardano pur sempre singoli lati relativi e i loro singoli oggetti: questa casa, questa somma di denaro, questo determinato diritto, questa legge, questa singola azione, questa singola realtà». Occorre, secondo Hegel, altro rispetto alla sfera del diritto privato affidato ai singoli che negoziano con il medium del denaro, ossia si deve raggiungere il totale, il sistema, la ragione, la verità. Ciò implica la necessità di trasformare gli impulsi empirici in «impulsi al sapere» e salire dall’economia retta dal contratto e dal denaro alla statualità governata dalla concreta ragione. Così viene superata la contraddizione, l'opposizione di libertà e necessità, di impulso e legge. Nel pensiero scompaiono interessi e desideri. Precisa Hegel: «l'elemento più importante non è il bisogno fisico, non il diritto formale, ma il pensiero»1. La società civile, appena posta come ambito della finitezza, subito viene annullata come sfera in sé positiva e dotata di irriducibili cadenze. Hegel decreta di negare la realtà finita che essa incarna per far risplendere il vero essere dello Stato che esprime l'idealità. Tocca allo Stato riconoscere nella società un qualcosa di provvisorio, caduco. Il non - essere della società viene posto dallo Stato che risplende come ragione oggettiva. La separatezza di Stato e società va rimossa come lascito della cattiva costruzione della riflessione, dell'intelletto, dell'opinare. L'unità postula il non essere del sociale come mondo dei particolari bisogni. Il benessere non va negato unilateralmente però, ma superato con un passaggio graduale e ricco di determinazioni. La ricetta di Hegel è di non lasciare il sociale come realtà indipendente senza però credere di sbarazzarsene con il semplice negarlo. La negazione del sociale deve essere mediata, pensata, attraverso la definitiva affermazione della verità del sociale che è lo Stato, l'idea. La società ha come fondamento l'altro, lo Stato e pertanto deve essere disponibile a diventare idea o Stato. La società assume realtà grazie allo Stato e non in quanto esteriore mondo. Così la società diventa idea e gli interessi assumono una proiezione etica. L'interesse deve sopprimere se stesso come mera accidentalità. E nella società c'è già il principio che conduce oltre, all'idea dello Stato che ha al suo vertice il corpo di un monarca che decide2.

Hegel appare la consapevolezza che «il rapporto tra uomo e natura è anche rapporto tra un soggetto e un altro soggetto» (Enzo PACI, Relazioni e significati, Lampugnani Nigri, Milano, 1966, p. 266). 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Lezioni sulla filosofia della storia...cit. p. 132. 2 Proprio con Hegel «inizia la dissoluzione del diritto come norma nel diritto come attività» (Guido FASSÒ, op. cit., p. 91).


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5. IL SISTEMA DELLE IMPOSTE Hegel è quasi spaventato dall'empirico rinvenimento delle radici dello Stato

nei bisogni. La ragione ha una genesi contigua all’irrazionale. Preferisce perciò una più rassicurante passeggiata tra le altitudini del pensiero. Come sfera del concetto, lo Stato non ha una origine nella vita empirica, nei bisogni, nella sicurezza, nella libertà di movimento economico. Solo il caso americano per Hegel mostra «una comunità procedente dagl'individui nella loro atomicità, tale che lo Stato era solo qualcosa di esteriore, ai fine della tutela della proprietà»1. Lo Stato solo embrionale dei coloni americani assicura «la protezione universale della proprietà e la quasi totale assenza d'imposte». Lo Stato in queste circostanze peculiari opera in un quadro ancora immaturo che esalta il privato, l'acquisto, l'interesse particolare «che si volge all'universale solo in servigio del proprio godimento»2. In tale contesto, l'organizzazione giuridica è del tutto aleatoria e inefficace e lo Stato «non è ancora fissato nella sua salda autonomia». Quello delle ampie distese americane è «uno Stato tuttora in divenire». Uno Stato autentico per Hegel sorge solo quando si riscontra una società civile moderna e articolata che esige un momento razionale di stabilità e di coesione pubblica. Osserva pertanto che «un vero Stato e un vero governo sorgono solo quando vi è già una differenza di classi, quando ricchezza e povertà divengono molto grandi, e ne nasce uno stato di cose per cui un gran numero di persone non può più soddisfare i suoi bisogni nel modo che gli era consueto»3. L'America è risparmiata dalle tensioni sociali europee perché non ha confini e ha molta terra vergine da conquistare:

«[…] l'America non va ancora incontro a questa tensione, perché le è aperto ininterrottamente e in larga misura l'espediente della colonizzazione, e un gran numero di persone affluisce di continuo nelle pianure del Mississippi. Con questo mezzo vien meno la fonte principale di scontento, ed è garantita la persistenza dell'odierna organizzazione civile»4. Un non Stato (quelli federativi «sono gli Stati peggiori») consente all'America di

fondarsi sul commercio e di assorbire le conflittualità grazie alla generosa disponibilità di spazi. Ancora non c'è «il credito, la sicurezza dei capitali» come si incontrano nel più solido commercio inglese. E poi la vita economica americana «continua ad aver per oggetto solo prodotti del suolo, e non ancora prodotti di manifattura o d'industrie»5. La concorrenza è incentivata in America da vantaggi grazie ai quali «si acquistano campi con facilità e a buon mercato, non si pagano imposte dirette», ma «grandi difficoltà controbilanciano questi vantaggi». I grandi spazi, che salvano dai conflitti intensi, impediscono però la maturazione di una «società civile concentrata e

1 Ibidem, pp. 228-229. 2 Ibidem, p. 229. 3 Ibidem, p. 230. 4 Ibidem, pp. 230-231. 5 Ibidem, p. 232.


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agglomerata in sé». Manca un «saldo ordinamento di cose» e il suolo è così libero da non esprimere esigenze di controllo statale rigido. A giudizio di Hegel senza «un sistema compatto di società civile» non può prendere quota «uno Stato organizzato». L'America è un progetto incompiuto nella società e nella politica e nondimeno fortemente evocativo di tendenze possibili. «L'America è il paese dell'avvenire, quello a cui, in tempi futuri, forse nella lotta fra il Nord e il Sud, si rivolgerà l'interesse della storia universale. Essa è un paese di nostalgia per tutti coloro che sono stufi dell'armamentario storico della vecchia Europa»1. Solo in un non -Stato come quello americano è possibile trascurare il sistema della tassazione. In uno Stato ben organizzato il fisco è invece centrale perché evoca la potenza del pubblico e il carattere nient'affatto assoluto o intangibile della proprietà. Dinanzi alle ragioni dell'interesse particolare che vuole affrancarsi dai costi della comunità, Hegel afferma le ragioni dell'universale che ha bisogno del prelievo per svolgere i suoi compiti di regolazione. «Già le tasse, che lo Stato non può fare a meno di esigere, sono un togliere il diritto di proprietà»2. Al cospetto del prelievo fiscale cede l'artificio di un bene privato potenziato come sfera del godimento illimitato e assoluto. In quanto assorbe un elemento di eticità la politica non può permettere che «il sistema del diritto civile, che attiene al possesso ed alla proprietà, di tanto si approfondisca in sé da prendere, nell'ampiezza in cui si perde se stesso per una totalità in sé incondizionata ed assoluta»3. Il diritto civile, e il regime proprietario da esso prospettato, non possono rivendicare assolutezza e incondizionatezza ed aspirare a «esser presi come qualcosa di assoluto». Il sistema dell'acquisto e del possesso è sempre una costruzione del diritto e non può pretendere di oscurare tale dipendenza da una norma per prendere arbitrariamente le ingannevoli sembianze di un incondizionato affidato ai negozi di sfere private. Hegel reagisce con asprezza alla tendenza di esaltare il contratto a principio ordinatore generale della società civile e respinge che «quell'infinitezza formale che costituisce il principio del diritto civile, si è conquistata una speciale supremazia sul diritto statuale»4. La rivendicazione di un primato del politico (come ambito del generale cui dipendono anche le tipologie dei contratti e gli schemi negoziali) non sospinge Hegel verso i lidi dello statalismo autoritario ma lo induce a rivestire anche la sfera della privata autonomia negoziale con diritti pubblici aperti alle istanze della personalità concreta. L'esaltazione del diritto statale comporta una essenziale cautela per evitare che esso «penetrando l'essere dei singoli come loro 1 Ibidem, p. 233. 2 Idem, Scritti politici...cit., p. 88. Hegel attribuisce alle leggi civili (al diritto privato) «la sicurezza della persona e della proprietà di ogni cittadino» (ivi, p. 293). Ma ciò non toglie che lo Stato abbia compiti superiori rispetto all’autonomia dei privati giacché nel moderno «le finanze sono divenute una parte essenziale della potenza che deve trovarsi direttamente nelle mani del supremo potere dello Stato» (ivi, p. 87 Per Hegel «un ordinamento delle finanze», un efficace regime delle imposte sono il fondamento di una politica pubblica e richiedono «l'impiego dei più grandi talenti». Egli trova insostenibili le «frequenti lamentele» contro le tasse che sono invece il fulcro del moderno Stato (ivi). 3 Idem, Scritti di filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 1971, p. 143. E' il diritto che organizza la produzione e la «singola potenza qual è l'agricoltura oppure quali sono le manifatture e le fabbriche o qual è il commercio» (ivi). 4 Ibidem, p. 144.


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perfetta polizia, finirebbe col negare la libertà civile e in ciò consisterebbe il più duro dispotismo»1. Lo sforzo di Hegel parrebbe rivolto a scomporre l’accoppiata persona - proprietà e ad ampliare il ventaglio degli interessi meritevoli di tutela nel diritto civile proiettandolo oltre il registro patrimoniale. La libertà civile è ben più ampia della libertà del proprietario di cose. Il rimprovero che egli avanza a Fichte è proprio quello di volere «che ogni azione ed essere del singolo sia in quanto tale sorvegliata, conosciuta e determinata dall'universale»2. Se la prevalenza del diritto civile determina l'oscuramento dell'universale, il dominio del pubblico, postulato nella maniera di Fiche, comporta il rischio concreto dell'azzeramento dell'autonomia delle sfere del privato. Ogni ambito giuridico, che viene posto nella sua autonomia, deve nel contempo avvertire la sua parzialità e mostrare così un senso del limite. Tutto ciò è indispensabile, secondo Hegel, per rispettare il campo esclusivo dell'altro «poiché il principio morale come quello del diritto civile esistono soltanto nella finitezza e nella singolarità»3. La morale al parti del diritto civile non può avere altri pilastri che gli individui singoli che reclamano indipendenza e libertà d’agire. Assicurata la pertinenza individuale delle scelte morali e della attitudine negoziale, resta da appurare il divario reale che i patrimoni determinano tra i soggetti astratti. Il diritto, come astratta costruzione di una forma generale insensibile alle differenze, è posto di fronte alla «diseguaglianza della forza della vita» e quindi incrocia «il rapporto di signoria e servitù» che vede soggetti con pari diritti vantare una potenza sociale diversa4. Gli individui che stanno di fronte nel rapporto sociale sono equiparati nella forma, ma sono differenziati nella vita per il grado di potenza sociale.

Hegel avverte che l'eguaglianza esteriore della forma astratta non cancella la disuguaglianza reale della vita. Nel rapporto sociale l'individuo non costruisce un legame, incontra piuttosto «una forza straniera, su cui egli non può nulla, quella da cui dipende». Il soggetto è così schiacciato da «un perpetuo ondeggiare» delle situazioni oggettive di vita che rende inafferrabile il sistema del bisogno che gli offre il sostentamento a condizioni competitive. L'equilibrio sociale è per Hegel un prodotto, non è solo un dato spontaneo affidato alle transazioni del mercato. Il governo deve anche «opporsi alla natura», controllare gli equilibri mutevoli e le empiriche accidentalità (concorrenza, prezzi). Hegel non mostra al riguardo esitazioni: «il governo deve, poiché la natura ha soppresso la calma medietà, sostenere questa stessa e l'equilibrio»5. La politica non può sottrarsi alla produzione continua di ordine, alla

1 Ibidem, p. 145. 2 Ibidem, p. 145. 3 Ibidem, p. 145. 4 Ibidem, p. 210. Hegel non è certo un pensatore dell'eguaglianza. Egli scrive che «con lo Stato si ha l'ineguaglianza, la differenza di governanti e governati. Il principio conseguente dell'eguaglianza rifiuta tutte le distinzioni, e, per tal modo, non lascia sussistere nessuna sorta di Stato» (Enciclopedia…cit., p. 505). Il principio di eguaglianza può valere solo come eguaglianza astratta (e non naturale, poiché «per natura gli uomini sono soltanto ineguali») di persone giuridiche capaci di proprietà. Negli Stati moderni all'eguaglianza formale stabilita dalla legge fa riscontro «la massima ineguaglianza concreta nella realtà» (ivi, p. 507). 5 Ibidem, p. 287.


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ricostruzione di nuove soglie formali dopo che le precedenti sono state infrante, perché

«[…] il governo è la totalità reale avente potere, che è indifferente riguardo alle parti, non però un astratto, ed è quindi indifferente nei confronti della singola maniera della sovrabbondanza, alla quale una parte vincola la sua realtà, però non può essere indifferente per quanto riguarda l'esistenza di questa stessa parte»1. Vigilare sui «tentennamenti empirici», che talvolta portano «alla distruzione

dell'equilibrio», non comporta per Hegel un attacco al regime proprietario ma un suo controllo secondo parametri pubblici. «La disuguaglianza della ricchezza è in sé e per sé necessaria» egli avverte. Dinanzi alla «grande ricchezza» che si contrappone alla «profonda povertà» la sfera pubblica però non può restare in una condizione di sovrana indifferenza perché il disagio diffuso rende vulnerabile la società nel suo complesso. Ribadisce Hegel che «il governo deve operare contro questa disuguaglianza e contro la propria e l'universale distruzione. Esso può fare ciò immediatamente in maniera esteriore con l'aggravare l'alto profitto». Lo strumento fiscale che stana le rendite, grava i profitti è la leva principale per la mano pubblica di limare le grandi differenze di fortuna e affermare la centralità di una funzione redistributiva. Hegel esaltando la politica fiscale respinge ogni concezione minima dello Stato dinanzi al preteso ruolo esaustivo dell'operatore economico provvisto di diritti patrimoniali primordiali. Non esiste pertanto un assoluto diritto proprietario inteso come zona intransitabile e lo Stato non compare come strumento tecnico subordinato alle sovrane scelte degli agenti di mercato. La tassazione in Hegel non è una funzione residuale posta dinanzi all'imbarazzo di non scalfire il godimento dei proprietari inteso come massima espressione di libertà soggettiva. Essa piuttosto appare come uno strumento chiave per la precisazione di politiche pubbliche solidali orientate all’equilibrio sociale.

Il problema del tributo, quale risorsa per affermare un interesse pubblico, risiede nell'incerta conoscenza del reddito dal momento che solo la terra ha un valore stabile, mentre in altre fonti di ricchezza il fisco si imbatte «contro l'infinito vacillare del valore delle cose». Mentre i «beni immobili vengono smisuratamente gravati d'imposte» per reggere il bilancio dello Stato, i beni mobili sono un che di «incalcolabile». Osserva Hegel che «il sistema delle imposte cade immediatamente nella contraddizione che è assolutamente giusto che ciascuno debba contribuire in rapporto alla consistenza del proprio possesso; ma questo possesso non è nulla di stabile, di consistente, bensì nella sollecitudine del guadagno esso è un infinito vivente, alcunché di incalcolabile. Che il capitale sia tassato e calcolato secondo i redditi, è possibile, considerando formalmente la cosa, ma i redditi sono alcunché di affatto particolare, non -come dei beni immobili - alcunché di oggettivo, di cui è possibile sapere e conoscenza. A questo modo non si può quindi gravare il singolo possesso con

1 Ibidem, p. 287.


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giustizia, poiché esso, proprio in quanto singolo possesso, non ha la forma dell'oggettivo»1. Malgrado questa base difficilmente eliminabile di incertezza riguardo ai capitali, il sistema fiscale non può essere scalfito nelle sue esigenze funzionali se alla politica si affida un compito costruttivo e non quello di neutrale guardiano degli equilibri precari del mercato. La sfida, secondo Hegel, è quella di mettere al riparo lo Stato dalle fluttuazioni della produzione per non diminuire il gettito su cui costruire politiche sociali il cui presupposto è che il libero operare delle forze economiche è strutturalmente inadeguato a svolgere compiti di giustizia sociale. «La produzione dovrebbe essere gravata in progressione crescente», osserva Hegel che in mente ha politiche fiscali redistributive e allocative. A suo avviso, proprio «nelle imposte il governo ha un mezzo per influenzare questa limitazione e questo sviluppo di singole parti». Revocando l'idea di un originario diritto di proprietà, Hegel escogita una funzione attiva dello Stato impositore che va oltre la fornitura dei beni pubblici classici (ordine, polizia, difesa). Lo Stato, per questo compito di costruttore di benessere, ha nel fisco una fonte per distribuire beni primari confidando nelle risorse provenienti dalla tassazione (su produzione, redditi, abilità, distribuzione, merce)2. Il mito della intangibilità della proprietà viene infranto per realizzare obiettivi non rinviabili di sicurezza sociale e di coesione economico - civile.

Hegel prospetta non solo un regime delle imposte indirette, come quello auspicato dai fisiocratici, ma anche sistemi di imposte sui beni immobili e con questa copertura che si estende nei vari campi della ricchezza anche per le casse dello Stato «il guadagno diventa un sistema multilaterale». Insomma, lungi dal custodire diritti di proprietà invalicabili, «il sistema fiscale deve radicarsi dappertutto; deve sembrare invisibile: poco di tutto, ma dappertutto»3. I diritti di proprietà non sono l'ombra della persona, ma sono contingenti e si raccordano sempre con regole di origine pubblica. La capacità contributiva è fissata dalle norme e a giudizio di Hegel in un sistema efficace di tassazione «la ricchezza dello Stato deve fondarsi il meno possibile sui beni demaniali, bensì sulle imposte. Quelli sono possesso privato e sono casuali, esposti al deprezzamento; invece ognuno sente le imposte e vuole sapere che sono ben impiegate»4. La tassazione non è quindi un mero fardello dal quale guardarsi con timore e furbizia, ma un prelievo indispensabile per la vita associata di individui che non sono atomi incomunicanti, ma soggetti sociali inseriti entro contesti pubblici e reticoli istituzionali. Proprio l’incombenza delle tasse sollecita nei cittadini una superiore esigenza di controllo della macchina amministrativa. Anche per Hegel la sfera giuridica è astratta e non vivente e pertanto «la legge in quanto tale può soltanto proibire, non concedere»5. E tuttavia, anche se allo Stato spettano in prevalenza leggi

1 Ibidem, p. 293. 2 Ibidem, p. 294. 3 Idem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 169. 4 Ibidem, p. 170. 5 Ibidem, p. 161. La vita per Hegel nei casi estremi (come per il divorzio) prevale sulla astrazione legale: «l'astratta legge entra in conflitto con la vitalità, e la vuota, pura volontà è in contraddizione con il volere naturale. Essa deve riconoscere la sua astrattezza e cedere di fronte alla volontà concreta» (ivi, p. 163).


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negative e non positive, non è il mercato la mano invisibile che regge l'equilibrio del sistema sociale. E' piuttosto lo Stato il garante di un ordine difficile entro società polarizzate per via della «ineguaglianza della ricchezza e della povertà». La ricchezza per Hegel «diventa forza» e quindi ad essa vengono associate prestazioni, poteri. L'opposizione sociale rende problematico l'ordine di un meccanismo economico spinto alla perenne innovazione tecnica:

«[…] i rami dell'industria che davano da vivere ad una grande classe di uomini si disseccano di colpo a causa della moda o della diminuzione di prezzo per invenzioni fatte in altri paesi; e tutta questa quantità di gente è abbandonata alla miseria, che non può far niente per aiutarsi»1. L'industria moderna, immersa in una concorrenza globale che mostra «la

completa casualità dell'esserci singolo», produce scissione e quindi «ribellione e odio» non per capricci, disfunzioni estrinseche, ma per la intrinseca logica orientata al contenimento dei costi di produzione delle merci e al continuo risparmio di tempo per la realizzazione dei beni. Non solo i diritti proprietari hanno un costo per il pubblico, ma è interesse dello stesso sviluppo economico l'apertura di una sfera pubblica che promuova obiettivi sociali e un minimo di giustizia distributiva. Dinanzi alle inadempienze del mercato, osserva Hegel, «subentra il potere dello Stato e deve procurare che ciascuna sfera venga conservata, ovvero deve intervenire, cercare sbocchi, nuovi canali di vendita in altri paesi, limitare un'attività, in quanto essa si estende troppo a svantaggio delle altre»2. Hegel reclama un intervento pubblico che non è in alternativa al mercato, ma va a sostegno di un mercato che genera, per una sua stessa organica tendenza all'innovazione senza posa, squilibrio, incertezza, esclusione.

«La libertà dell'industria resta necessaria; l'intervento deve essere quanto più possibile invisibile - giacché questo è il campo dell'arbitrio; la comparsa della forza deve essere evitate e non si deve voler salvare niente, che non è da salvare, bensì dare diversamente lavoro alla classi misere»3. L'ottica non è quella di un meccanismo coattivo esterno, che con una sfera di

comando capillare, vigila minaccioso sulle transazioni affidate alle libere scelte degli agenti di mercato e impone logiche esterne a quelle dello schematismo proprietario. Per Hegel lo strumento direttivo della politica è legato alle tasse, al sistema delle imposte necessarie per correggere le ricadute sociali di industrie che innovano ma «col sacrificio di questa generazione e l'accrescimento della povertà». L'interferenza dello Stato, alla lunga, si rivela conveniente anche per coloro che esaltano l'autonomia dei

La sua definizione di diritto però non lascia dubbi: «il diritto come tale è il diritto formale ed astratto» (Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche, II, Laterza, Bari, 1980, p. 478). 1 Ibidem, p. 168. 2 Ibidem, p. 169. 3 Ibidem, p. 169.


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diritti proprietari e l’arbitrio degli attori economici. Hegel non contesta il mercato, egli ritiene anzi che «tutti gli scopi della società e dello Stato sono quelli propri dei privati»1. Pensa però che i meccanismi dello scambio, della mediazione, dei diritti civili esigano un coordinamento tra la sfera d'azione dei singoli che operano entro la sovranità del contratto e l'ambito pubblico chiamato a ridurre le diseguaglianze e favorire i meccanismi della integrazione. Il moderno produce, senza violare il principio cardine della libertà della persona e della formalità del diritto dei privati, «la dipendenza incondizionata dal complesso sociale»2. La libertà di Hegel non è rivolta alla mera protezione del proprietario dallo Stato, ma guarda anche alla tutela dei singoli dalle inquietudini del mercato. L'autonomia privata, da questo punto di vista, deve accettare i parametri della disciplina pubblica che richiede prestazioni patrimoniali per sostenere politiche di pari opportunità, per fornire beni pubblici, per acquisire beni comuni. Non è la difesa della proprietà dell'homo oeconomicus il criterio per giustificare la tassazione, ma i compiti generali che lo Stato deve svolgere per la vita collettiva. Hegel si dichiara contrario sia alla «fatua ciarla» della sovranità popolare con le sue estreme conseguenze egualitarie sia all'empirismo proprietario con la sua celebrazione della piena sovranità dei rapporti di contratto e di scambio. Dinanzi alle insidie del sistema economico sottoposto a crampi periodici, per Hegel «lo Stato deve intervenire, cercare sbocchi, nuovi canali di vendita in altri paesi»3. La mano pubblica è anche una valvola di sicurezza dinanzi agli impacci in cui si imbatte il mercato competitivo sottoposto a congiunture sfavorevoli. Stato e mercato non si pongono in una rigida alternativa. Per Hegel «ci vuole l'una e l'altra cosa insieme: il potere dello Stato nell'esserci e il lasciar esistere, lasciar fare»4. Concorrenza e politiche macroeconomiche non si escludono tra loro. E' un mercato vestito con precise determinazioni giuridiche e istituzionali quello che si viene prospettando con nitidezza. La crescita affidata all’intraprendenza dei privati convive con la mano visibile dello Stato che governa il sistema sociale complessivo.

I diritti non sono una conseguenza della mera espansione della laissez -faire, che svolge sicuramente un ruolo produttivo e appare uno stimolo continuo alla innovazione. Essi sono collegati allo Stato che è «un che di etico» e pertanto non può assumere quale suo fine «soltanto la garanzia della vita e della proprietà degli

1 Idem, Enciclopedia...cit., p. 477. 2 Ibidem, p. 495. 3 Idem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit., p. 169. In Hegel si rintraccia un primato della politica che «dissolve l'autonomia del discorso morale individuale e di ogni procedura contrattualistica di verifica e controllo dei conflitti» (Bruno GRAVAGNUOLO, Dialettica come destino, Liguori, Napoli, 1983, p. 111). Hegel riflette la condizione tedesca per la quale la proprietà esprime un legame politico e «le stesse funzioni generali appaiono come proprietà privata, ora di una corporazione, ora di uno stato» (Karl MARX, Opere filosofiche giovanili...cit., p. 123). Dal punto di vista storico «la borghesia, fino alla seconda metà del XVIII secolo, è al pari della nobiltà una formazione corporativa caratterizzata e sostenuta da diritti particolari» (Norbert ELIAS, Potere e civiltà, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1983, p. 235). 4 Ibidem, Filosofia dello spirito jenese...cit. p. 174. In Hegel affiorano tre distinti concetti di Stato: lo Stato politico con le istituzioni di governo, lo Stato civile con le tipiche istituzioni contrattuali della società, lo Stato etico che incarna valori condivisi (John M. KELLY, Storia del pensiero giuridico occidentale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1996, p. 383)


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individui»1. Il controllo politico per Hegel è essenziale per una modernizzazione che esprima crescita quantitativa ma anche sicurezza nei diritti di cittadinanza. Lo Stato è ragione per Hegel, come per Kant. Ma mentre in Kant la ragione è un punto di partenza, un dover essere che sacrifica il sensibile, in Hegel la ragione è un processo che vede lo Stato transitare entro il tortuoso mondo della insocievolezza, lungo la sfera insicura e bellicosa della società civile con i suoi bisogni inesauribili. Dal punto di vista dell’empirico, la concorrenza non viene sacrificata, trova però una giusta collocazione entro un parametro normativo fissato dallo Stato. Dal punto di vista della ragione, lo Stato non indica un astratto dover essere ma agisce come effettualità concreta. Nel processo che sale verso la ragione, secondo Hegel, i bisogni e gli interessi vengono depurati, dapprima nella società civile e poi finalmente nello Stato, dove perdono ogni empirica determinatezza. L'individualismo abbandona così il suo estremo anelito particolaristico e si rende disponibile verso i parametri pubblici. La società senza Stato è perfetta anarchia, insicurezza estrema, solo il controllo pubblico dà ordine e razionalità allo stesso sistema economico. Non si rinviene in questo alcun autoritarismo politico. Come osserva Sabine, «benché il potere regolatore dello Stato sia assoluto, questo non si estende all'abolizione delle istituzioni o dei diritti dai quali dipende il compimento delle funzioni economiche»2. La proprietà, infatti, secondo Hegel non è creata dallo Stato e neanche risulta dalla società essendo piuttosto una astratta determinazione della persona. Né il puro cittadino, alla giacobina, né il puro proprietario, alla Locke, viene assunto da Hegel come base del sistema sociale. Per un verso, egli registra la presenza di una pluralità di attori sociali che entrano in concorrenza e assume come referente «l'uomo reale di Hobbes, che è portato a stringere rapporti coi suoi simili dagli istinti della sua natura sensibile, da cui è dominato come da forze cieche, inconsce, esteriori»3. Per un altro, al di là della vita naturale che è competizione, lotta, istinto, Hegel fissa un momento di comunità e in tal modo «all'uomo naturale degli economisti e dei giusnaturalisti, Hegel contrappone l'uomo sociale»4. L'incertezza del mercato è coperta da un momento di universalità reale capace di costruire la ragione a partire dalle differenze empiriche. Lo Stato, non il diritto astratto con le sue fattispecie normative e clausole contrattuali che esaltano la piena autonomia dei privati, è il rimedio alla concorrenza dissolutrice. Per emendare alla società imperfetta degli agenti di mercato, che fanno tutto con i negozi previsti dal diritto astratto, Hegel pensa allo Stato che prospetta beni pubblici e alla sua base pone un riferimento alla «socialitas» non alla «charitas»5. Ma in nome di una «socialitas» diversa è già matura la critica dei rapporti di proprietà.

1 Idem, Lineamenti...cit., par. 325. 2 George SABINE, Storia delle dottrine politiche, Etas Libri, Milano, 1978, p. 506. Sul tema cfr. Giorgio BUONGIOVANNI, Antonio ROTOLO, “Hegel e lo spirito del dispotismo”, in Domenico FELICE (a cura di), Dispotismo, Liguori, Napoli, 2002. 3 Gioele SOLARI, La filosofia politica…cit., p. 212. Nota Solari che «esula dal sistema dei bisogni ogni esigenza ideale, universale». Gli individui sono uniti «da vincoli esteriori che operano con la necessità delle cause naturali» (p. 213). 4 Ibidem, p. 235. La classe cui si accede per volontà è un concetto «essenzialmente ed esclusivamente economico» (ivi, p. 237). Però lo stesso Solari non può fare a meno di precisare che «la società civile, nel pensiero di Hegel, non è solo un sistema di bisogni, di rapporti economici, ma è anche necessariamente una comunità giuridica e politica» (p. 239). 5 Ibidem, p. 250.


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Bibliography ADORNO, Theodor, Dialettica negativa, Torino, Einaudi, 1980. BARBERIS, Mauro, Filosofia del diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000. BECCHI, Paolo, Le filosofie del diritto di Hegel, Angeli, Milano, 1990. BETTI, Emilio, Teoria generale del negozio giuridico, Cerveteri, Roma, 1951. BOBBIO, Norberto, Studi hegeliani, Einaudi, Torino, 1983. BOBBIO, Norberto, Michelangelo BOVERO, Società e Stato nella filosofia politica

moderna, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1979. BONFANTE, Pietro, Istituzioni di diritto romano, Giuffrè, Milano, 1987. CAFAGNA, Emanuele, La libertà nel mondo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1998. CARNELUTTI, Francesco, Teoria generale del diritto, Foro italiano, Roma, 1951. CERRONI, Umberto, Società civile e Stato politico in Hegel, De Donato, Bari, 1974. CESA, Claudio (a cura di), Gli hegeliani liberali, Laterza, Bari, 1974. COLLETTI, Lucio, Il marxismo e Hegel, Laterza, Bari, 1976. D’ENTRÈVES, Alessandro Passerin, La dottrina del diritto naturale, Comunita, Milano,

1980. DE RUGGIERO, Guido, Hegel, Laterza, Bari, 1972. ELIAS, Norbert, Potere e civiltà, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1983. FASSÒ, Guido, Storia della filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001. FINELLI, Roberto, Mito e critica delle forme, Riuniti, Roma, 1996. FIRPO, Luigi (a cura di), Storia delle idee politiche, economiche e sociali, Unione tipografico -

Editrice torinese, Torino, 1975. FLEISCHMANN, Eugène, La logica di Hegel, Einaudi, Torino, 1975. GALGANO, Francesco, Istituzioni di diritto privato, Monduzzi, Bologna, 2006. GIACCHÉ, Vladimiro, Finalità e soggettività, Pantograf, Genova, 1990. GRAVAGNUOLO, Bruno, Dialettica come destino, Liguori, Napoli, 1983. HABERMAS, Jürgen, Storia e critica dell'opinione pubblica, Laterza, Bari, 1984. HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Lineamenti di filosofia del diritto, Laterza, Bari, 2001. HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Scritti teologici giovanili, Guida, Napoli, 1989. HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche in compendio, Utet, Torino, 1981. HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche, II, Laterza, Bari,

1980. HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Scritti politici, Einaudi, Torino, 1974. JUNGER, Ernst, Carl SCHMITT, Il nodo di gordio, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987. KELSEN, Hans, La teoria generale del diritto e il materialismo storico, Istituto della

Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, 1979. KELLY, John M., Storia del pensiero giuridico occidentale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1996. LOEWITH, Karl, Da Hegel a Nietzsche, Einaudi, Torino, 1981. LOEWITH, Karl, Hegel e il cristianesimo, Laterza, Bari, 1976. MARX, Karl, Opere filosofiche giovanili, Editore Riunti, Roma, 1977. MEINECKE, Friedrich, L'idea della ragion di Stato nella storia moderna, Sansoni, Firenze,

1977.


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MERKER, Nicolao, Marxismo e storia delle idee, Riuniti, Roma, 1974. MERKER, Nicolao, Alle origini della logica hegeliana, Fetrinelli, Milano, 1961. PACI, Enzo, Relazioni e significati, Lampugnani Nigri, Milano, 1966. PEROZZI, Silvio, Scritti giuridici, Giuffrè, Milano, 1948. RIEDEL, Manfred, Hegel fra tradizione e rivoluzione, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 1975. RITTSTIEG, Helmut, La proprietà come problema fondamentale, ESI, Napoli, 2000. ROHLS, Jan, Storia dell'etica, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995. ROSENZWEIG, Franz, Hegel e lo Stato, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1976. ROSSI, Mario, Il sistema hegeliano dello Stato, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1976. SCHELLING, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, Lezioni monachesi sulla storia della filosofia

moderna, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 1996. SOLARI, Gioele, La filosofia politica, Laterza, Bari, 1974.


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Civil Society in Romania and Central and Eastern Europe

Gheorghe Lencan STOICA University of Bucharest

Abstract: The concept of civil society has a long and rich tradition in the political thought and activity of the Western world, the identification of its first forms of manifestation often intersecting both human rights issues and the first aspects of democracy in the modern world. Moreover, the essence of the last decades’ changes in Central and Eastern Europe followed naturally the democratic evolution, as well as the state of justice. Therefore, the concept of civil society has a special significance, and in order to understand its deep meaning a more through investigation, a comparative analysis and its compulsory historical survey should be taken into account. Keywords: Civil society, Western world, Central and East European societies, democracy. 1. THE ORIGINS OF THE NOTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY The notion of civil society has its origins in the writings of some major

philosophers as John Locke, Montesquieu, Spinoza, Kant, Alexis de Tocqueville, K. Marx, A. Gramsci, etc.

In the era of the bourgeoisie’s ascension and of the promotion of individualism, the agenda was dominated by the fundamental rights of man and of the citizen, by the freedom of speech and the freedom of expression and association. We deal herein with a “complex systematization of the fundamental principles”, entailing a whole series of subsequent aspects; such problems characterised the classical debate which transformed itself ultimately into what we call civil society. Thus, the eternal problem of how to interweave individual interests with the social arena and, vice versa, the social welfare with private or individual life became once more the object of public reflection of the entire political spectrum. In other words, what is at stake is the best way to build society itself, both in terms of private individuals and of a public common sphere.

Indeed, the concept of civil society (civilis) is mentioned for the first time by the English philosopher Hobbes, who points out especially in De civis, but also in The Leviathan that the “union is called civitas or civil society, therefore society is no longer conceived merely as natural, but as the consequence of a pact (contract), as representative person. In Hobbes’ vision, the state of nature is that type of state in which men fight one another fiercely (homo hominis lupus est).1

1 Adam SELIGMAN, L’idea di società civile, Garzanti Editore, Milano, 1993, p. 7.


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But only with John Locke does civil society acquire a larger scope, though synonymous with political society, therefore synonymous with the state. Locke used both terms without discrimination. But in another very famous work, Locke discovered and investigated other aspects without which the concept of civil society could not have been conceived.1 We have in mind especially The Second Treatise of Civil Government and Letter concerning Toleration. In this respect, the idea of tolerance understood as a moral right seems to be particularly significant. At the same time, Locke would theorise the primacy of the individual in the state, primacy founded on contractual bases in order to “secure the person and the goods” of the individual. He also speaks about the guarantees that should be given to minorities and about their right to equal dignity, Locke stating that these should be immediately annulled if they violate the laws or if they bring about a violent overthrow of the state. Spinoza goes further, and formulates in an original way his vision on society:

“Society is very useful and even absolutely necessary, not only because it defends us against our enemies, but also because it operates the union of multiple activities. In fact, if people had not helped one another, they would have lacked both time and the capacity to do as much as they can do in order to survive and preserve themselves”.2

Spinoza too speaks clearly about fundamental rights and liberties especially in

his famous work A Theological-political Treatise. For instance, by civil right he means each person’s liberty to maintain himself in his civil state; thus, Spinoza rises firmly against any encroachment or limitation of the rights the individuals have in a state. Particularly in his Political Treatise Spinoza also analyses the role of the crowd’s action, even with its internal contradictions and limits, i.e. democracy itself. This is the essential structure of any political association, leaving aside the historically speaking form of government.

Asserting the importance of civil society, Montesquieu is another building block in Western political thought. The author claims that political liberty is to be found only in moderate governments and rejects many commonplaces that identify liberty either with the faculty of choosing a leader or of deposing a tyrant, or of doing whatever one desires, or with the possibility of living under a certain political regime. In Montesquieu’s opinion, liberty is “the right to do whatever the law allows you to do”. Even more explicitly, Montesquieu declares that “we are free to live under the authority of civil laws”.3 He considers that liberty consists in the existence of laws and in the certainty of their enforcement and efficiency; liberty is not the power of the people, but the power of the laws. Experience shows us constantly that any man invested with an authority is tempted to commit abuses and to take advantage of his power. To prevent such abuses which are in the very nature of things, power ought to be limited also by power. In Montesquieu’s vision, that is how the principle of the 1 Ibidem, p. 31. 2 Baruch SPINOZA, Tratat teologico-politic, Editura Științifică, București, 1960, p. 86. 3 Charles-Louis MONTESQUIEU, Despre spiritul legilor, Vol. II, Ed. Științifică, București, 1970, p. 228.


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separation of powers in a state is reached. In a civil society it is not the state that is preeminent, but the citizen or the real human being. Hence, as other philosophers have argued, all this entails the primordiality of the law as source of justice. Consequently, the fundamental values that underlie any government are law, equality, security and freedom.

J. J. Rousseau identifies the concept of civil society with the state, which he names civil state, the other powers being particular manifestations of the one and unique “supreme power”: people’s sovereignty. Legislative power belongs to the people and can belong only to the people.

It is quite obvious that the contraposition between the state of nature and civil society was a constant element till Hegel.

In Kant’s work, for instance, the unitary situation of a people that keeps mutual relationships is called civil (status civilis) and on the whole, related to its members, it is called state (civitas). In this respect, it is interesting to notice that Kant identifies the state of law with the state of reason, in which the “universal” will that is given a priori (to a people or in connection with other peoples) is “the only one that determines what is just among men”.1 Trying to picture society, Kant sees it as a wood, where each tree “tries to take the air and the sun of the other trees”, until they are all “mutually compelled to rise higher and higher and that is the reason why they grow beautifully and straightly, whereas if we leave them in liberty and separated from each other, they grow with their branches deformed, twisted and crooked”.2

It is important to specify in this context that in the eighteenth century Europe witnessed the constitution process of modern civil society in parallel with the dissolution of old political relations that placed the individuals in privileged or discriminated groups. It was this very dissolution that generated the separation of the two distinct spheres, i.e. a depoliticised and atomised society – civil society – and the state, as a manifestation of the political will (the political state) of the main groups of civil society.3

From a conceptual perspective this phenomenon was best captured by Hegel. In his Philosophy of Right (published in 1821), by using the term of civil society Hegel dissociates from his predecessors who saw it as a political society or the state. When he uses the term of civil society, Hegel refers both to the sphere of economic relations and to the whole body of juridical regulations set up by the liberal (bourgeois) state.4

Hegel’s civil society includes the totality of concrete, real social states. Starting from such concrete relations, Hegel understands the participation of politics in state affairs as an expression of the plurality of relationships in which civil society is articulated.

So we may see that in Hegel’s vision civil society includes not only the sphere of economic relations and class formation, but also the administration, justice and

1 Immanuel KANT, Scritti politici e di filosofia della storia del diritto, Utet, Torino, 1956, p. 294. 2 Ibidem, p. 294. 3 Adam SELIGMAN, L’idea di società civile…cit., p. 61. 4 Gheorghe L. STOICA, Concepte, idei și analize politice, Ed. Diogene, București, 1999, p. 106


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police or corporative order. In essence, according to Hegel, civil society “is the difference that interposes between family and state, although its completion is subsequent to that of the state, for being the difference it assumes beforehand the state, and, in order to subsist, civil society must regard the state as an independent entity”.1

Continuing Locke’s, Spinoza’s, Rousseau’s and above all Hegel’s ideas, Marx too deals with the problems connected with civil society. From the beginning, says he, civil society designates “the totality of the individuals’ material relationships within a given stage of development of the productive forces. In fact, according to Marx, society is defined as “the real home, the theatre of any history, and we can see how absurd is the heretofore view on history”, which limits it to the deeds of statesmen and states, and ignores real relationships. In Marx’s opinion, civil society includes the entire economic and commercial life of a certain period of time and is therefore broader than the state and the nation; on the other hand, it must assert itself externally as nationality, and internally as state.

In his work On the Jewish Question, Marx describes brilliantly the role of the state, as well as of civil society, in their interconnection:

“Only when the real, individual man will have summarised in himself the abstract citizen, as an individual man in his empirical life, in his individual work, in his individual relationships, only then will he become a member of the human species, and not until man will have recognised and organised ‘his own capacities’, as social capacities, consequently not separating social force from himself, and the social force is no longer divided by the political power, not until then will human emancipation be achieved”.2

The classical view on civil society reaches now a stage from which it will continue to develop till the twentieth century taking the form of liberal as well as socialist political theories.

2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY In the last century, continuing and developing these ideas, Antonio Gramsci

offered an interesting point of view on civil society. Formulating his conception on civil society in Quaderni del carcere (Prison Notebook), he resumed and studied thoroughly the multiple aspects of this concept. That is why we witness today a real “re-discovery” of this idea with a large audience in many countries of Eastern Europe, South America and North Africa. So is it an accident that Gramsci’s works are so widespread in the whole world? By civil society he means “a complex network of

1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL, Principiile filosofiei dreptului, Editura Academiei, București, 1969, pp. 222-223. 2 Karl MARX, La questione ebraica e altri scritti giovanili, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1969, pp. 78-79 (“Sulla questione ebraica”).


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cultural, moral and ideological conditionings” (higher education institutions, cultural and broadcasting establishments), but he has also in view certain “private” forms such as trade unions, the Church, parties, the Parliament, etc., all these being evident obstacles in the way of statism and dictatorship tendencies.

In his book published during the last decade under the title of The Idea of Civil Society, treating the question of civil society, Adam Seligman declares the following: “The present re-discovery of civil society calls to mind the works of various thinkers, as Ferguson, Marx, Hegel, Adam Smith, Tocqueville or Antonio Gramsci. Thereafter, the confusion (A/N) was strangely increased by the asymptotic development of the term in the twentieth century”.1 Ignored for many decades by the main stream of Western European and North American writings on social philosophy and political theory, the idea of civil society continued (and is still continuing) to make the object of wide-spreading debates between intellectuals of the left and their critics from both ex-socialist countries and post-industrialised Western societies.2

The importance of Gramsci’s reflections results from the moment or rather from the context in which he treated this problem. He refers to Croce’s ample contribution to the development of Italian philosophy, in the great tradition of neo-Hegelian philosophy. The context we have in mind is the third decade of the last century, when Stalinism was consolidating itself in Russia and the Western world was consumed by the famous “crisis”. In this epoch Gramsci re-discusses the question of civil society and operates a distinction between East and West. “In Russia the state was everywhere” and there was no room for civil society. Intelligentsia’s culture and civil society’s culture despise each other in Russia, while in the Western world even the smallest state possesses a high cultural level and a civil society. That is why when dealing with civil society Gramsci reveals the positive aspects resulting from the analysis of this concept, as well as civil society’s real importance in the functioning conditions of certain developed and democratic countries. In the mid-20th century, Gramsci was almost the only thinker that re-evaluated this concept and gave it an adequate theoretical form. Hence his frequent negative references to the tendencies to amplify and exaggerate the force moment and the dictatorship “in Stalin’s Russia” and his openly critical opinions regarding the on-going process in the Soviet regime. “My starting point, says Gramsci, is that we shall have to distinguish between the meaning of civil society as it was understood by Hegel, meaning that is often used in these notes (i.e. political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the entire society, as ethical contents of the state) and the meaning given by Catholics, for whom civil society identifies itself with political society or with the state, versus familial society and the Church”.3

We may easily conclude that in Gramsci’s work the term of civil society is not explicitly defined; therefore it confronts itself with unilateralist but very rich in “cultural values” directions, like Croce’s (of which Gramsci intensely profited), or with

1 Adam SELIGMAN, L’idea di società civile…cit., p. 14. 2 Ibidem, p. 70. 3 Antonio GRAMSCI, Quaderni del carcere, Einaudi, Torino, 1975, p. 703.


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directions of Hegelian or Marxist filiation, to which they are subsumed, maintaining however certain methodological differences. Thus, in Gramsci’s conception, civil society constantly designates a certain level of the superstructure which includes the private political institutions of the social groups, including those of the ruling classes that are not directly part of the state’s power network. The deciphering of Gramsci’s idea of civil society “must be sought in the effort of grasping a typical component of the political power, namely the instruments meant to primarily secure the social consensus necessary to rule”.1 In fact, it is precisely the meaning of Gramsci’s specification, according to which “civil society” is the space of economic activity, breaking up with the liberal tradition and being a bridge and a contact with Marxist tradition. To found a new type of state means to transform the economic structure (the economic relationships), to reorganise and develop the means of production, to create a new specific market, to adjust homo economicus’ behaviour and needs to the new structure and to the necessity of developing the productive forces. By transforming civil society into a centre of private, economic or political initiative, Gramsci depicts such a combination in the chapter “Americanism and Fordism” of his Quaderni, where he literally declares:

“Americanization supposes a concrete frame, a given social structure or a will determined to create, as well as a certain type of state. That state is the liberal state, but not in the sense of custom free trading, or of real political liberty, but in the most fundamental sense of free initiative and economic individualism, reaching the regime of industrial concentration and of monopoly by its own means, as “civil society”, throughout its own historical evolution”.2 Finally, Gramsci’s contribution in grasping the notion of civil society was

brilliantly highlighted by Norberto Bobbio’s “Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society”, a study presented at the Gramscian congress of 1967. After this philosopher’s intervention, another remarkable allocution pointed out the active role of Gramscian subjectivity. The state is the integral state, i.e. political and civil society.

Although there are about 250 years since the term of civil society has appeared, there still are different interpretations of its meaning. We concentrated our attention mainly upon Gramsci’s point of view, but its roots can be found at the beginnings of modern world – a fact proved also by Ferguson’s writings. It knew a new life in the 1970s when the Polish workers’ movement reached a peak undermining the state itself. But in the 1990s, this concept played a major part in the political debates of Eastern and Western Europe, as well as in U.S.A.’s political life. However, the idea of civil society had also different meanings. At the level of the masses the term was perceived as a slogan, with different political significances. Yet many thinkers emphasised besides the multiple aspects different other sources and historical traditions.3 1 Gheorghe L. STOICA, Concepte, idei și analize…cit., p.109. 2 Antonio GRAMSCI, Quaderni…cit., p. 215. 3 Adam SELIGMAN, L’idea di società civile…cit., p. 13.


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The meaning and the significance of the term sometimes vary because of the specific particularities detectable in the ample movements of organisations such as Solidarity (Polish trade union), Charta 77 (Czechoslovakia) and the National Forum of Hungary. Still, the resemblances ensue from the universal character of these aspects of civil society: human rights, the need of democracy, of liberty, etc.

The people’s enthusiastic response to the first free elections after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe was due, as Adam Przeworski will say, to fierce and even long-lasting struggles.1 In that context (of the 1990s), the idea of civil society had a particular echo in Central and Eastern European countries. It took the form of conferences and articles and was sometimes used even by the ruling parties as a sort of political slogan.2

In his work The Idea of Civil Society, published in 1992, in U.S.A., Adam Seligman points out this fact with much rigor. He describes in detail the manifestations of civil society in different regions of the world and concludes that this concept was perceived in a certain way by the citizens of Bucharest, Vilnius, Budapest or Prague, and in a quite different way by the citizens of Chicago, Toronto, Oxford or Princeton.

That is why, besides the various theoretical significances and besides the sometimes fascinating political priorities, related to the idea of civil society, ultimately it is a synthesis of the public and the private welfare or of ideal and social aspirations. Therefore, for many theoreticians the idea of civil society embodies an ethic ideal of public and social order which, if it does not overcome the conflictive needs of individual interests and of social weal, at least it attempts to harmonise them.3 In order to shed more light upon the meaning of this concept we shall furthermore refer to a country from Northern Europe, namely Sweden, where civil society plays a very active part in the life of society as a whole, as well as in each individual’s specific political and social life. More precisely, we have in view the citizens’ trust in each other. Swedish society allows its citizens to benefit of a wholesale institutionalization (for instance in the case of public instruction) based on a deeply rooted common culture regarding solidarity and trust. It should also be mentioned that in Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Finland) public education is free of charges and constitutes the ideal frame of society’s education. Examining the same aspects this time in Eastern European countries, we notice a quite different situation. In this part of the world, especially in Poland, the Church played an extremely important role. In order to understand the quite active political role of the Polish Church, a real political actor, we should mention that it transformed itself in an essential pillar of civil society. Ethnical and religious divisions represent another particularity of Eastern civil societies, justifying the significance of the syntagm of Eastern and Western civil society. Likewise, an essential and distinctive feature of Eastern civil societies, from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union, was the existence of samizdat writings asserting a different vision on the individual as an autonomous social actor and as an ethical and

1 Ibidem, p. 119. 2 Ibidem, p. 223. 3 Ibidem, p. 7.


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moral entity, different from the political tradition of the respective countries. T. H Marshall, as well as Arend Lijphart or Robert Dahl also include in their views on democracy such aspects of the civil society. Adam Seligman identifies the following elements: 1) the liberty to create and to adhere to organisations; 2) freedom of speech; 3) franchise; 4) eligibility in public functions; 5) the right of political leaders to obtain support and votes; 6) alternative sources of information (liberty of expression); 7) free elections without any administrative interference; 8) the institutions resulting from elections depend on votes and on other preferences, etc.1 Mention should be made of the fact that in the Western world the sense of the idea of civil society and democracy cannot be understood without the close connection of the two concepts. In the Eastern world, however, where real democracy does not exist and where the afore-mentioned elements are thereby absent, we do not meet that civic spirit which creates a propitious climate for the active functioning of civil society. The constitution and the laws alone cannot safeguard liberty, which is kept alive only through the citizen’s conflictive participation in public affairs. There is no liberty without conflict; by nature, man is a partisan being and confliction is an un-removable dimension of politics. Especially in Central and Eastern European countries, the question of civil society takes sometimes unilaterally into consideration certain themes as justice or solidarity. Voluntary associations or interest-based groups and corporative groups constitute the essence, as well as the existence form of civil societies, argued Hegel in the nineteenth century, along with other philosophers, such as Charles Tayler or Michael Walzer, who speaks for instance about “the spheres of justice”. The difference between these groups and the type of identity and of group alliances characterizing the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe consists in the nature and the determination of the relationships existing among several groups and among the members of the same group.

In Western countries, civil society’s voluntary associations are interest-based groups organised in such a way as to defend their mutual interests at institutional levels (strategic action, as Habermas calls it). Their interaction with other groups (and with the state) is characterised as rational instrumental orientation.2

Taking into account the processes that took place in 1989 in Budapest, Berlin, Prague, Sophia and Bucharest, in his book Reflections on Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the political scientist Ralph Dahrendorf detects a common objective of all these “changes” or rather “revolutions”, i.e. their anti-dictatorship and anti-totalitarian character. Yet the phenomenon is much more complex and its aim was to build the new Eastern European societies on real democratic principles and on the principles of the state of justice. In this context, civil society knew a significant process of revitalisation. Auto-determination and the implication of individuals that think and act acquired in the whole world an ever greater importance. By their action they became everywhere in the world and especially in Western and Eastern countries major actors in the environmental protection movement and in the defence of human rights and

1 Ibidem, pp. 226-227. 2 Ibidem, p. 17.


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liberties. When the conflict between East and West ended, most of the states tended to consider themselves as more and more democratic, and, consequently, more civil and closer to the values of civil societies in terms of human rights, protection of the environment, defence of freedom, etc. Further on, we shall refer to civil society’s functioning and existence in inter-war and nowadays Romania, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe.

But can we still speak of a civil society in today’s Romania? The question seems rhetorical, yet we shall try to show how it functions.

3. THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN ROMANIA

Romania’s civil society developed more thoroughly only after the enforcement

of the Constitution of 1923 which stipulated the first plenary acknowledgment of the citizens’ freedom of association. However, till the first half of the nineteenth century, there were few significant activities organised at the level of the Romanian civil society. Nevertheless, all specialists agree that the existence and the assertion of civil society can be traced back only in Romania, whereas her neighbours, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, were subject to dictatorship or to a severe totalitarianism. Therefore, in the inter-war period Romania’s democratic regime was widened and even generalised by the introduction of the universal suffrage which led to the emergence of a rather fragile civil society.

The well-known Romanian political scientist Matei Dogan underlined brilliantly these aspects and in 1946 he put them down in his Statistical Analysis of Romania’s Parliamentary Democracy.

Did Romania really have in the inter-war decades a genuine parliamentary democracy? Matei Dogan’s answer leaves no doubt: “We cannot firmly state that during the inter-war period there was an authentically democratic regime in Romania”.1 Furthermore, referring to the same context, this political scientist of Romanian origin, living on the banks of the Seine, explained even more minutely the causes of this phenomenon:

“We must… admit that in any democracy there is a gap between theory and reality. We may however say that this gap was nowhere else deeper than in Romania, a country where real democracy never existed. People’s sovereignty was just a name and franchise had nothing in common with a representative regime [...]. Liberties were too feebly fought for to be properly understood. The people remained calm while at the surface a delicate revolution was going on. There was no political education at all. There were many principles, but no visible progress was made. With the rulers’ abuses and dishonesty, with the rulers’ indolence and weakness, the Romanian people did not understand the

1 Matei DOGAN, Analiza statistică a “democrației parlamentare” din România, Editura Partidului social-democrat, București, 1946, p. 109.


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value of the principles written in the Constitution and did not really assimilate the meaning of democratic virtues”.1

Thus, in the Romanian Parliament there was neither “a majority”, nor “a

minority”, but there was constantly an overwhelming governmental majority that reduced the opposition to helplessness. Such a governmental majority in the Parliament was made up of one of the two ruling parties which alternatively reached the power and organised parliamentary elections. Matei Dogan analysed and commented upon these aspects. After 1937, what happened in Romania ensued almost naturally – the installation of dictatorships. During World War II, democracy and “civil society” were crushed by the authoritarian regimes and afterwards by the communist regime.

Later on, towards the end of the communist regime, in the period 1970-1980, various clubs, cultural associations, etc. began to appear in Romania too, still the country was not shaken by dissident movements led by intellectuals, as it happened in Poland, the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia.

Starting with the last days of December 1989 and especially in 1990, Romania’s civil society developed impetuously. Several free trade unions were created at all the levels of the society: in economic organisations, institutions and universities. Freedom was displayed and hailed everywhere. However, “in the absence of a genuine associative culture, the emerging of a new civil society had to be approached from a new perspective and that is why international institutions, Western governments and illustrious foreign donors (George Soros, for instance – A/N) developed various programs in order to support the apparition of civil society in Romania”.2

Consequently, numerous civic organisations, cultural magazines, publishing houses, parties, associations and cultural societies sprang to life at every turn. In 1990, there were more than a hundred political parties. In those days, the Provisional Council of National Union (a system in which all the parties existing till February 1, 1990 were represented) as well as the National Salvation Front (a party in power till the elections of May the same year) witnessed very interesting but also controversial debates. The analysis of civil society’s evolution in the beginning of the 1990s reveals two different stages of development. Thus, in the early 1990s, “civil society had to free itself of the totalitarian regime heritage and to fight for an autonomous space of its own within the state’s sphere. In the second part of the 1990s, the political environment having improved, civil society gained a better defined profile and established certain roles”.3 Any measure with however small a totalitarian tendency was immediately contested and criticised. The authority of the state and of the institutions was scorned culminating with the greatest mass demonstration ever seen in Romania, known by the name of University Square. Moreover, the entire authority of the state was in

1 Ibidem, p. 110. 2 Dialogue for Civil Society, “Report on the state of civil society, in Romania”, 2005, p. 18. 3 Ibidem, p. 21.


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danger, phenomenon which had critical consequences on the evolution of the Romanian democratic process. Because of this profound crisis of the state’s authority, in Romania, more than in her neighbour countries, the construction and consolidation of the democratic regime was characterised by powerful social anarchy, and serious antisocial actions at the level of economic and civil life, prejudicing the national wealth and injuring the Romanian civil society.

“Civil society” became therefore very active and expressed itself heartily, the citizens’ participation was enthusiastic and was supported by extensive street protests. Nonetheless, in certain cases, many pre-existing and still necessary laws were infringed and even elementary cohabitation rules regulating social life as well as certain decisions of the new regime were sometimes violated.

Nevertheless, the gradual consolidation of a democratic state (a bicameral legislature), the drafting of the Constitution and its validation by referendum in December 1991 were but some of the compulsory conditions of a democratic society, which does not mean that the two processes identify themselves. There are a real non-synchrony and asymmetry between them, as the development of a democratic society represents a much more complex objective than the simple building up of the institutions of the state of justice. The construction of a democratic society also implies the stability and the progress of economy, without which an authentic social integration becomes unthinkable. Notwithstanding, a democratic society also supposes the creation and existence of a wide democratic tradition, of a civil society, of the social groups that constitute it, of a better social conduct and of social morals. All these are the complex aspects of civil society entailing not only the functioning of parliamentary institutions, the observance of man’s rights and the citizen’s liberties, but also the active penetration of democratic values and regulations in the individual and collective mind. In the following years (1991-1996), many NPOs (non-profit organisations) stemmed from and operated in the economic and social fields, but the relationship between NPOs and policy-makers improved rather slowly and in 1996 the coalition around the Democratic Convention was considerably supported by civil society’s quite active forces, mainly by the Civic Alliance. In this respect, many NPOs prominent leaders, as well as many distinguished intellectuals joined the new administration and received different functions, as presidential advisors, ambassadors or government officials. Civil society being at that time very dynamic, it determined a change of Romania’s political regime. The party which organised the elections lost them and it was unequivocally proven that the elections were correctly conducted and that in Romania freedom was sanctioned and guaranteed. In spite of certain difficult still persisting situations, it was obvious that in Romania society was functioning and was organised on solid democratic principles. However, those who expected and hoped that the changes would be reinforced were in the long run deceived. Despite all, during this period of time were laid the institutional bases for an adequate functioning of the parliamentary democratic regime. In Romania the standards and the rules that make the democratic game possible were by that time observed. We have in mind the rules of consensus, competition, majority, minority, alternation, institutional control and lawfulness. However, the rule of accountability functioned


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rather feebly in the democratic process of Romania. Although there exists a law regarding ministerial responsibility, neither in the recent past did it function, nor nowadays. And although everybody accepts the thesis according to which the Democratic Convention’s victory is to be credited to civil society’s support, democracy in Romania suffered considerably because of the vicissitudes encountered by civil society. After the elections of 2000, the relationship between civil society and the new social democratic government was a thorny one, and the government was often accused of trying to subdue both media and civil society.1

That is why the change of power of 2004 was perceived as positive, since the new government was considered to be cooperative with civil society.2 But things did not go on so smoothly and some of the many hardships civil society would have to cope with would have their roots in this kind of “cooperation”. Nowadays, civil society crosses a very difficult period. Because of the frequent attempts to limit civic rights by overbidding totalitarianism, freedom itself is queried in Romania. Needless to say, in civil society the safeguarding of liberty implies the existence of ethos and of the awareness that life is to be lived in a community. Liberty is always influenced by the good functioning of democratic forms so that the management of civic affairs might be entrusted to persons pertaining to all social classes according to their activity, merits and professional capacities. Therefore, the noncompliance of civic rights leads to the nonexistence of civil society. However, there are civic rights in Romania, still, by and large, they are only formally acknowledged. Consequently, modern democracy should imperatively prevent the transformation of the leaders into a dictatorial minority. The repeated attempts to use the procedure for government accountability and the disregard of the Parliament are all significant symptoms that impede the correct functioning of the democratic game.

That is why, the purpose of the frequent free elections organised on a large scale in other countries is to confront and test the democratic qualities of a society and to submit democratic institutions to a systematic survey so that the persons who have the power might be reconfirmed on or replaced from the political scene.

This is a first function secured by the elective mechanisms of democracy, which guarantees that the options of certain majorities will become dominant interests at local and political levels. Thus can be elaborated tendencies in defining regional and national strategies of collective administration acceptable to various socio-human entities. The second function is secured by more subtle mechanisms, the so called selective mechanisms of democracy meant to formulate and thereafter to implement this strategy. It goes without saying that in today’s Romania all these things do not exist. Lately, Romanian unions were not able to organise any large demonstration and there was a pensioners’ movement at which only one person was present. Yet “participation” and civic activism are the distinctive signs of a genuine civil society.



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“Civil society” has three levels of manifestation. The first level refers to the individual, to the way he relates to power (following his own interests), to his civic and social rights. The second level is the level of autonomous social groups. At this level individuals’ interests crystalise giving them the possibility to manifest themselves outside political institutions. Finally, the last level includes political parties, associations, clubs, etc. through which individuals’ interests and desires express themselves more efficiently with regard to political society (power). Having in mind Romania’s concrete social realities we may say that the major structural weakness of civil society is the citizens’ low level of participation in associative life, along with a feeble level of organization and limited relationships among civil society organizations, all these aspects hindering the development of a strong non-governmental sector. Despite the numerous attempts made by civil society organisations to mobilise the citizens around problems of both local and national public interest, people’s reaction remains shy. Although improved in 2005 and 2006, the organisation of Romania’s civil society is still fragile, marked by a limited cooperation and communication among civil society organisations. Thus, in a well-constituted civil society, if we may speak of “direct democracy”, then it stops at the first above mentioned level, i.e. at the role of bestowing confidence upon persons elected according to their capacity to be represented. This statute may also be acquired according to a sum of specific qualities which allow them to integrate into a superior political game, where the ordinary man’s diverse options (and more than once divergent) are interpreted and correlated in order to voice the fundamental interests of certain groups, communities, etc.

Another major aspect is that a community which identifies itself by certain values and assumes general responsibilities becomes a component of civil society. And as soon as the social group’s identity is affirmed and institutionalised, it becomes an active element in the sphere of social and political relationships. The uppermost level of civil society functionality is its relationship with state institutions. This ratio expresses the capacity of civil society organisms to interpret social reality according to a criterion of authentic adherence to the interests of social groups in whose name they speak without resorting to opportunism or fashions. Therefore civil society without which authentic democracy cannot be conceived implies a continuous formation of a political class, made up of a political party system. Consequently, the multiparty system is a sine qua non condition of the existence of a civil society worthy of this name and offering to social groups and classes the opportunity to militate for freedom, autonomy, identity, civilisation and human dignity. Partially that is why the institutionalisation of the single-party system existing in the former communist regime and claiming to hold the monopoly of power irreconcilably contradicts the ideal of liberty and of social group autonomy, as well as the groups’ possibility to manifest their specificity as actors of history.

But when civil society is too frail in a state, it gets isolated and its role in the democratic transformation of a country decreases significantly. It is precisely what we have witnessed in Romania until recently. The country’s resources diminish or are reduced and at the same time are directed towards other destinations, as governance or transparency. On that account, one of NPOs main role was to participate in the


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democratisation of the Romanian society. One of the most important tools they used to reach this objective were a democratic discourse, the introduction and promotion of good practices cultivated by foreign NPOs. Taking into account the salutary results obtained by Romanian NPOs, they were perceived as real promoters of democratic values in Romanian society. And they were accepted as indispensable partners of both the Romanian government and E.U. For this reason, they can be identified with such organisations as those whose objective is to consolidate a democratic society in Romania. For instance, the Pro-democracy Association is one of the most visible organisations, for it succeeds to mobilise large masses and due to the impact of its activity. In this respect, we should also mention as active promoters of high democratic values the Romanian Academic Society, the Institute for Public Policies or the Centre for Independent Journalism.1 In Romania, nowadays the state accepts the autonomy of civil society, still its organisations are sometimes the object of uncalled for interferences. If at national level autonomy is no longer a major problem, at local level public authorities still exert a quite visible influence on NPOs activities. In this respect, the case of the Pro-Europe League of Târgu Mureş constitutes an eloquent example. After having criticised the mayor of Târgu Mureş, civil society organisations were threatened that they would be evacuated from their headquarters situated in a building owned by the state. Such cases were investigated by researchers and their conclusion is that in many localities there is a relationship of dependency or even of clientelism between NPOs and political actors.2

However, both NPOs and the state struggle to find a way towards a genuine dialogue. The first efforts to reach an institutional relation can be traced back in 1994, but the situation took an evident turn for the better in 1996, when different structures were set up in order to secure the dialogue of the state with NPOs at local as well as national level. Within the government, each ministry possesses an office charged to supervise the relationship with civil society and to inform it on the cabinet’s programme and activity; needless to say, there are certain offices which do not perform their duties. At local level, despite a few exceptions, the interaction is satisfactory. At national level, NPOs are invited to state their opinion on legislative or political projects, as well as on public policies, but NPOs representatives pretend this attitude is purely formal, since the government seldom takes into consideration the suggestions made by civil society. As the access to legislation is rather limited, NPOs contributions to implement public policies are often obstructed. Still, as far as the implementation of the community acquis is concerned, the cabinet took counsel with NPOs on certain chapters and acknowledged their beneficent contribution.

It is worth mentioning that in Romania only a small number of NPOs benefits of the state’s support.3 As far as NPOs are concerned, we may conclude that their activity stimulates the development of civil society.



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The most stable democracies, namely those where all these mechanisms function well or almost well, succeed to reduce as much as possible discordant options at macro political level by defusing tense situations at “local political” level (simple administrative management). Thus, the complex network of civil society operates like an unobtrusive system of individual and social behaviour conditionings, as an integrative matrix of each individual in the universe of culture, traditions, morals, common sense, conformism, etc. that contribute to build and structure a nationwide moral and intellectual coherence, endorsed by a convergence of certain political and economic objectives nourished by different social groups.

By attentively feeling the social pulse, in democratic societies the political class does not oppose civil society, but rather follows its trail. The interaction of civil society with the state engenders a minimal social cohesion, wherein civil society elements represent a sort of self-control, self-regulation and self-improvement of the “social body”. Civil society is a structure specialised in reducing tensions or conflictive situations generated by their discordant interests in order to insert them in a “normal” dynamics recognised as such by the state. In Romania, in spite of a normal development of civil society, particularly in the last five years we notice a disregard especially of state authorities as far as civil society is concerned. In this respect, the vigorous revival of secret services stands as an outrageous example. Public opinion does not cease to warn that specialised agencies have the possibility to interfere in Romanian citizens’ private calls. Moreover, media is about to become more and more centralised, newspapers acting like propaganda tools favouring in power authorities. And to crown it all, the MPs of the former governing party struggled to pronounce media “a threat” and finally succeeded in doing so.

Until last year, at every step, Romanian authorities were infringing the principles of the state of justice and the separation of powers doctrine. The most revealing example to illustrate this statement is that Romanian judges (i.e. the judicial power) were “forced” to obey the former ruling party’s orders. The Supreme Council of Magistracy (S.C.M.) is the only institution that seems to ignore the Romanian president’s express command. For this reason, in his frequent apparitions on T.V. president Băsescu has declared that justice representatives “have compromised themselves”. Even the Senate was often rebuked because it did not embrace the order “established” by the former majority in Parliament. The upper chamber of the Romanian Parliament was permanently scolded. Instead of being voted in Parliament, laws were enforced directly by the government which as a general rule disdained parliamentary regulations. An event never seen before in democratic societies happened in 2009 – premier Boc’s government was deposed through a motion of censure initiated by the opposition. After the Romanian president’s refusal to appoint Mr Johannes as prime minister, Emil Boc became once more the leader of the cabinet. And after the presidential elections of 2009, it was the same Mr Boc who was nominated as Romania’s prime minister. A new majority in the Parliament was obtained through a clever expedient: some former MPs of the Social Democratic Party and of the National Liberal Party created a new party, friendly to the government. After countless abnormal stratagems and compromises, or after


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sometimes brutal interferences in the functioning of Romania’s Parliament, Romanian democracy itself seemed jeopardised. What about civil society?

On the eve of 2008 and 2009 parliamentary and Euro-parliamentary elections, the Romanian Academic Society (R.A.S.) played an important role in establishing a “clean” Parliament, in promoting the state of justice and in invigorating civil society. Mrs Alina Mungiu’s successful, still short-lived protests aimed to impede the president’s daughter candidature for the Euro-parliamentary elections. Finally Elena Băsescu did not candidate on behalf of the Democratic Liberal Party - however she became a Euro-deputy by presenting herself in the elections as independent, generously supported by the afore mentioned party. In this case did civil society function normally? Most of the (competent) specialists will by no means answer that it did not.

4. THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Nowadays, in Central and Eastern Europe civil society seems to function better

than in Romania. One of the causes might lie in a different historical background, for in countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary certain elements of civil society could manifest themselves even during the previous political regime. An even more profound explanation might be that in those regions liberties and rights have much deeper roots. “In Poland and Czechoslovakia intellectuals and workers tried to loosen the totalitarian screw-vice.” As far as civil society is concerned, Hungary too has an interesting history. Long before the changes of 1989, and long before Gorbachev’s ascension at the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, civil society’s functioning was the talk of all Budapest. More precisely, people then talked about a “School of Budapest”, as well as about certain names inspired initially by Lukacs’ ideas, who became great celebrities even on the other side of the Atlantic. Let’s name just Agnes Heller, Ferenc Fehler, Gyorgy Markus and Mihaly Vajda, and we shall have a general idea about Hungarian civil society.

The quite complex creation of the “School of Budapest” was essentially the work of Georg Lukacs, who founded it shortly before he passed away. His last book “The Ontology of Social Being” generated many debates, and some of his pupils criticised the master’s great unachieved work by expressing their skepticism about some of the Hungarian philosopher’s solutions. After 1971 this “school” was enriched by Agnes Heller’s contributions, but a decisive role was played by Istvan Herman, who co-opted an important number of industrious young men. By attacking their “master”, they brought again to light the “theory of reflection” formulated in the “Ontology”, denounced the ambiguity of the terms of “essence-phenomenon”, as well as the questionable definition of the relation between natural sciences and philosophy, etc. Such writings and contributions, the “novelties” they introduced and the “transgressing” of the ideological frame imposed by the “political instructors” of that time called for discussions and generated new opinions that undermined the Stalinist dogmatism. In the context of the 1980s Mihaly Vajda’s work seems


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particularly interesting. In his article “The Philosopher and Politics”, published in a German newspaper, Vajda breaks up with “friend Lukacs” and dissociates himself not only of his master’s work, but also of his master’s “behaviour”. Early in the 1990s, Budapest’s philosophical debates find another space of manifestation. The young doctoral candidates of the University of Debrecen create a new school, whose main concern is no longer to debate Lukacs’ work, but to study Wittgenstein, Heidegger, or postmodernism.

Agnes Heller and Vajda appear frequently in the media and discuss mainly topics related to socio-political realities.

The domestic as well as the international renown of the “School of Budapest” encouraged free debates and influenced the changes that took place shortly after 1987 and mainly after 1989. We must bear in mind that in such a climate the changes and the transformations were for the most part spurred by Gorbachev’s ascension in USSR. Certainly, it was not by accident that in this part of the East the frontiers were opened for East-German refugees on September 12, 1989. Throughout this period, debates and discussions represented the fundamental elements of an active civil society, quite influential in Hungary even in the last communist decades of the preceding century. The assertion of the freedom of speech and the stimulation of dialogue and political initiative are all essential aspects of Hungarian civil society.

Especially after 1987, the Hungarian (dissident) opposition maintained an ambivalent relationship with the power, the opposition’s suggestions being quite often taken into account. It was the case of Andrea Hegedüs’ ideas, a reformist sociologist and former prime minister of Hungary. Other openings were brought about by economic activities and aimed to increase the social control of “the producers’ democratic associations” over the state. Ianos Kis conceived a strategy regarding the relationship of a self-organised and self-limited civil society with the “communist” regime.1 The same year, many dissidents buttressed a programme meant to renew and reform Hungarian society, having a “precise message: Kadar must leave”. Their programme also encompassed the prohibition of censorship, social rights for employees, and new guarantees concerning the protection of individual rights.2 Hungarian civil society influenced hugely the political factor during the events of 1989 and 1990, the members of the ruling Communist Party and especially its leadership participating actively in the reformation of the socialist state. The Hungarian opposition could discuss freely and unlimitedly with Imre Pozgay and Karoly Grosz. At that time, the Hungarian people organised meetings and demonstrations partaking of a sort of enlightened reformism and transgressing the bounds of “perestroika”.

The analysis of the situation in Czechoslovakia, chiefly after 1977, when “Charta 77” was initiated, is quite interesting and provides relevant evidence for civil society’s existence and functioning in Central and Eastern Europe, especially after the “freezing” that followed the end of “the Prague Spring”. Threatened by president

1 Adrian POP, Originile și tipologia revoluțiilor est-europene, Ed. Enciclopedică, București, 2010. 2 Ibidem.


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Husek’s regime to return to Stalinism, Prague witnessed the blossoming of a protest inspired by the Declaration of Helsinki. The most important founders, Jan Patočka, Vaclav Havel, Jiri Majek, etc. created a “civic initiative” in order to implement in Czechoslovakian society a sense of civic responsibility,1 civil and political rights, etc. Besides Havel, who highlighted especially in “The Power of the Powerless” a fundamental aspect of “power”, or of “cultural” hegemony, indispensable for the correct understanding of the functioning of political power mechanisms, another great representative of “Charta 77” was Jan Patočka.

The famous Czechoslovakian philosopher, former student of Husserl, studied phenomenology and made a name for himself even before World War II. In 1968, during Dubcek’s government, Jan Patočka involves himself heartily in “the Prague Spring”. Among his most celebrated works we must cite “Plato and Europe” and especially “Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History”. After the end of “the Prague Spring”, he accepted to be the first signatory and spokesman of “Chart 77”, a democratic movement, founded in 1977, and hostile to the Czechoslovakian pro-soviet government. Due to this steadfast involvement with the movement, he was subject to long interrogations, had to be hospitalised, as he suffered from some form of heart disease, and shortly afterwards he died, on March 13, 1977.2 During his interrogation by pro-government agents, Patočka expressed his lifelong creed, namely that there must be something fundamentally non-technical and non-instrumental, there must be an obvious non-accidental ethic, an unconditioned morality… Morals do not exist to make society function; they exist so that man might be a man. It is not man who defines a moral order according to his needs, aspirations, tendencies or desires, on the contrary, it is morality that defines man.

After Patočka’s death, Vaclav Havel continued to defend and extend the principles of “Chart 77”. By mightily defending human rights, the chart became the core around which orbited the entire civil society of Czechoslovakia. All of Havel’s discourses and writings abound in references to totalitarianism:

“Totalitarian systems represent the absolute rule of an anonymous self-confident bureaucratic power, not yet wholly irresponsible, but already acting outside consciousness, a power based on omnipresent ideological fiction, able to rationalise everything and never having to confront itself with truth. It is a power [...] that transforms thought, morality and privacy into a state monopoly, achieving thereby the performance of totally des-humanizing them all. It is a power that has long since ceased to concern only a small group of arbitrary rulers, it is an all invading power, swallowing everybody, so that everything and everybody should merge into it, at least through their silence”.3 Further on, Havel declares that “a totalitarian power represents an alarm signal

for contemporary civilization”. In some other writings, Havel insists that we should

1 Jan PATOCIKA, Saggi eretici sulla filosofia della storia, Einaudi, Torino, 2008, p. 176. 2 Vaclav HAVEL, “Politica antipolitică”, Polis, No. 1, 1994, pp. 86-87. 3 Ibidem, p. 3.


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live in society “only in the name of truth”. This thesis was formulated as late as 1963 by the representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, such as Solzhenitsyn and Yevgeny Yevtushenko, the co-authors of the manifesto “Live not in lies”. In a similar way, in “The power of the Powerless”, the dissident Havel sympathises with those who still believe in a new kind of humanity, different from the small group of Western bourgeois.1 In Havel’s view, it is possible to establish a new type of humanitarian order, a sort of “new polis”, a parallel polis. This would be a kind of power established outside the already existing structure. He has in mind a structure able to generate ethical values, values that give life a meaning and contribute to the revival of an authentic democracy. Havel shared Potočka’s opinion, namely that “a solidarity of the beaten” is thus created. They both referred to “those who dared to face the impersonal power, countering it with the only thing they had at their disposal: their own humanity”.2 For more than ten years, “Charta 77” concurred to the awakening or rather to the revival of the Czechoslovakian society. The intellectual upholders of the chart tried to win to their cause “those who were not satisfied with how things went on in their country”. During the last years of the regime, more and more people joined the demonstrators and protesters. On the eve of 1989 changes, the workers joined the intellectuals and the students went to factories trying feverishly to convince the population to mobilise and act. The streets echoed with slogans such as “We are the people, but you, whom are you with?”

In 1988, twenty years after the suppression of “the Prague Spring” and due to the influence of “Chart 77”, Dubcek’s name was again on everybody’s lips. The general strike of November 27, 1989 paralysed the whole society. At the end of the same year, the Czechoslovakian communist regime fell. Civil society had made possible a “velvet revolution”.

Slovenia offers us another remarkable example. In this state, created in 1991, after having detached itself from the former Yugoslavia, civil society asserted itself as an alternative and not as an “opposition”, as a distinct sphere, independent and opponent to the action of the state. The distinction between state and civil society was the starting point for the critique and rejection of the self-governing system. As an alternative, civil society assumed the understanding of civil and social action as a positive activity, producing new open social spaces that created an alternative culture and independent public spheres.3 The magazine Punk hosted the first new social movement in Slovenia that introduced the concept of independent social life, proving that it was really possible and inventing the first elements of a new social and political language. Civil society is a sine qua non condition of democracy. And Slovenia was longing to have one too.

1 Richard RORTY, “Canteremo nuove canzone?”, in Giancarlo BOSETTI (a cura di), Sinistra punto zero, Donzelli Editori, Roma, 1993, p. 76. 2 Tomaz MASTNAK, Polis, No. 1, 1994, p. 102. 3 Ibidem, p. 103.


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If there is no democracy without civil society, it is not however impossible to imagine a civil society without democracy or even against it.1 Thus, when it finally reaches the power, civil society represents an unlimited power, yet the novelty added by the democratic opposition in comparison with the old regimes was the very idea of self-limitation.2 In Croatia, another member state of Yugoslavia, there existed, ever since the 1970s, an important theoretical magazine, Praxis, that drew the intellectual elite of the whole Yugoslavia, introduced themes of analysis which captivated the public’s attention at that time, was highly appreciated in the Western world and had an almost unprecedented liberty of expression in Eastern Europe. Thus, this magazine organised periodical debates that were attended by numerous personalities who discussed Lukacs’ ideas, a fact then impossible in neighbouring Hungary.3 The intellectual and even the political elite, as well as the Croatian public opinion frequently pinpointed the potentialities and the limitations, the issues and the uncertainties of their country’s trajectory delimited by the identifying homologation and specificity. A significant nucleus developed and contributed to the evolution and assertion of an active and projective civil society in relation to the intricate situation that was to come after 1990. Stefano Bianchini, a reputed specialist in this region, stated that the Eastern world “produced reforms and new political systems, specific ways of building modernity which brought about an evolution of history and a creation of particular politics anticipating sometimes themes, problems and anxieties that finally reached Western societies too”.4 In this respect, we should point out that when he began to implement his reforms, M. Gorbachev had much confidence in the historical “innovations” from this part of the world, yet innovations which were obstructed and experiences which in the last decade of the twentieth century turned into a catastrophe that made Europe shiver.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS Theoretically speaking, we may say that up to now the researchers have

continued to minutely investigate the concept of civil society. We have in mind researchers and scientists as Robert Cox, Jean L. Cohen, Stephen Gill, Anne Showstack Sasson, who, following N. Bobbio, interpreted Gramsci by using the concepts of “international hegemony” and “civil society” inserted in a reading of the present political frame connected to the economic globalisation issue.5 In this respect, let us also mention Robert Cox, who, starting from Bobbio’s lesson on civil society as conceived by Gramsci, underlined both Gramsci’s and Tocqueville’s pioneering ideas. Indeed, Cox agrees that the present reduction of the role played by the state is

1 Ibidem, p. 105. 2 Adrian POP, Originile și tipologia revoluțiilor…cit., p. 411. 3 Tibor SZABO, Gyorgy Lukacs, filosofo autonomo, Ed. La Città del Sole, Napoli, 2005, p. 240. 4 Stefano BIANCHINI, Le sfide della modernità, Rubbetino, Catanzara, 2009, pp. 319-320. 5 Guido LIGUORI, Sentieri gramsciani, Ed. Carocci, Roma, 2006, p. 37.


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achieved either by taking into account the fact that the stress laid on oppressed groups disappeared, or by opening “a new opportunity”, the revival of “the complex of autonomous collective action” concerning subordinate classes. It is a whole complex that might constitute civil society.

Robert Cox, for instance, includes in civil society the entire network of non-profit organisations that along with the voluntary system represent those interstitial forms which are not part of the market. We refer to that “framework where cultural transformations take place”, as Antonio Gramsci put it in Quaderni. On this basis, Cox speaks about a new participatory democracy and “a global civil society”, ground of a possible “alternative world order”. Jean L. Cohen too redefines civil society as an “aggregate of voluntary associations”. In 1992, together with Andrew Arato, Cohen wrote “Civil Society and Political Theory”. In their work, the authors underline the “relevance to modern political theory of the concept of civil society and the attempt of building at least the general framework of a theory of civil society, fit to the conditions existing in contemporary societies”.1 The specialists as well as the public pay again close attention to the concept of civil society, because of their confrontation with military and communist dictatorships in different parts of the world. It is easy for Cohen to place Gramsci in the centre of cultural storms, since the Sardinian thinker insisted heavily on the autonomy of society in its relation with the state, Gramsci being perceived in this case as one of the “noble parents” of the trend which opposes civil society to the state.

Stephen Gill too stresses the intellectuals’ importance in creating an alternative “collective conscience”. Classes and parties have no place in this frame. Very interesting and actual is also Giuseppe Vacca’s interpretation, according to which Gramsci is the “thinker of globalisation, of the crisis of the nation-state and of the creation of a global civil society”.2 Marcela Montomari argues that especially if we take into consideration the post-national democratic horizon, the centrality of civil society and the acknowledgment of the important role of the market these are the most important frameworks for the interpretation of democracy and of the issues of contemporary societies. In the context of contemporary debates on civil society Anne Showstack Sasson’s considerations are also very interesting. This author too refers to voluntarism, NPOs, the tertiary sector, all these being the substance of the new relationships linking the state and the individual. Civil society is the texture through which are reclassified the duties and the supporting roles of the “welfare state”, as well as the capitalist market economy, incapable otherwise to satisfy most of the individuals’ needs and requirements. Benedetto Fontana of USA stresses the frequent “utilisation in today’s cultural and political debates of the term of civil society as conceived either by Gramsci and Hegel or by the liberals”.



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Bibliography BIANCHINI, Stefano, Le sfide della modernità, Rubbetino Editore, Catanzara, 2009. DOGAN, Matei, Analiza statistică a “democrației parlamentare” din România, Editura

Partidului social-democrat, București, 1946. GRAMSCI, Antonio, Quaderni del carcere, Einaudi, Torino, 1975. HAVEL, Vaclav, “Politica antipolitică”, Polis, No. 1, 1994. HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Principiile filosofiei dreptului, Editura Academiei,

București, 1969. JAKOBSON, Roman, “Dal curriculum vitae di un filosofo ceca”, in Jan PATOCIKA,

Saggi eretici sulla filosofia della storia, Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi, Torino, 2008. KANT, Immanuel, – Scritti politici e di filosofia della storia del diritto, Utet, Torino, 1956. LIGUORI, Guido, Sentieri gramsciani, Ed. Carocci, Roma, 2006. MARX, Karl, La questione ebraica e altri scritti giovanili, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1969. MONTESQUIEU, Charles-Louis, Despre spiritul legilor, Vol. II, Ed. Științifică,

București, 1970. PATOCIKA, Jan, Saggi eretici sulla filosofia della storia, Ed. Einaudi, Torino, 2008. POP, Adrian, Originile și tipologia revoluțiilor est-europene, Ed. Enciclopedică, București,

2010. RORTY, Richard, “Canteremo nuove canzone?”, in Giancarlo BOSETTI (a cura di),

Sinistra punto zero, Donzelli Editori, Roma, 1993. SELIGMAN, Adam, L’idea di società civile, Garzanti Editore, Milano, 1993. SPINOZA, Baruch, Trattato teologico-politico (a cura di Emanuela Scribano), La nuova

Italia, Firenze, 1993. STOICA, Gheorghe L., Concepte, idei și analize politice, Ed. Diogene, București, 1999. SZABO, Tibor, Gyorgy Lukacs, filosofo autonomo, Ed. La Città del Sole, Napoli, 2005. *** Dialogue for Civil Society, “Report on the state of civil society in Romania”, 2005.


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Public Sphere, Citizens’ Participation

and the Legacy of Communism

Daniel BARBU University of Bucharest

Abstract: The author is trying to explain the communist strategy of taking over the Romanian society beginning with coming into power in 1944 and developing during a long period of more than forty years. The author tries to explain most people‘s lack of reaction by their previous experience with authoritarian practices used in the last decades on the Romanian political stage and later on, when repression has been more and more replaced by manipulation, by some strive for normalcy of most citizens. The author does not accept any exoneration of responsibility by the so called resistance “through culture” which is considered to be similar with an almost pathological form of ethical autism when visibility was a political burden, if not, at times, a life risk. All these traditions could explain why politics was and still remains for many Romanians such an intricate burden.

Keywords: lazy political monopoly, political participation, collaborationism, totalitarianism, political legitimation, resistance through culture. An anthropologist who had spent many years observing the people of socialist

Romania has concluded his research with a closing statement that all those partaking in the case could underwrite beyond any reasonable doubt:

“Most people to whom I talked – young and old, men and women, workers, peasants, and clerks – said that one of the best things about the revolution was that it allowed them to be left alone to live their lives as they saw fit. Some workers, in fact, were elated to be relieved of the obligation to belong to any party. Membership in the Communist Party was, after all, a burden: it infringed on their time, energy, and personal autonomy. Now that party affiliation is voluntary, Olt Landers are gleefully exercising their right ‘to have no business with anyone,’ as they say”.1

Indeed, from a somehow elementary economic perspective, totalitarianism could be, and actually has been described2, as the political monopoly of a single party burdening a society where people would have rather preferred to go about their own

1 David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism. Romanian Villagers to the Revolution and Beyond, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993, p. 226. 2 E.g. Michael WALLER, The End of Communist Monopoly, Manchester and New York, 1993.


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businesses than embark on a common project. This is to assume that the entire process of production, circulation and distribution of social goods in the public sphere was strictly controlled and centralized by the Communist Party. According to the Marxist model of monopoly, this domination of a single party was meant to yield a maximum and exclusive political payoff for the communist hierarchy. In order to accomplish this task, the single party had to prevent the people it ruled from abandoning their participation in the communist project of social engineering, as well as from engaging in different forms of reluctance, resilience, or even worse, of silent or vocal protests. There is no doubt that, under totalitarianism, the public sphere did not constitute and did not function as a space established by the citizens through a free act of political will, eventually translated in the explicit language of a covenant, but in a somehow Hobbesian manner, as a space created by the “sovereign”, namely the Communist Party, for its own advantage and usage.

It is equally obvious that any public square has to bear with the intent of its sovereign author. Which does not necessarily mean that such a space is the exclusive result of the choice or decision of a single political subject, be it a collective one. In fact, there may not be, at the center of the public space, a forbidden city where all the threads of power inevitably and ultimately lead. We should rather figure out any public space as a stratified network of commands, compunctions, contradictions, causes, compulsions and complicities that manage a given society. The public realm could then be defined as an anonymous strategy that coordinates individual tactics, personal initiatives, unequally distributed instructions, duties, and rights that are unremittingly transferred between social actors, and converted at the level of personal responsibility. In such a setting, the power of the sovereign “is not an institution, is not a structure, is not a certain authority with which some are equipped” and others are not, but “the name we give to a complex strategic situation in a given society”1.

The Romanian Communist Party found itself in a favourable strategic situation from 1944 to 1948. As of May-June 1944, the initiative in the Romanian public sphere, that is to say the monopoly of the restructuring of power relations, belonged entirely to the communists, as it was the case in all the countries of Eastern Europe2. Until August 30th, 1948, when by the decree No. 221 the General Direction of the Security of the People (Securitate) was set up, and the total and explicit elimination of any direct or potential opposition took on a public, systematic and violent aspect, the communist strategy of taking over the society has not been one of a prevailing and declared repression, but has rather espoused a legal and political character.

From 1944 to 1948 the Romanian Communist Party made use of the public law in order to abolish individual rights. The new power device was born and outlined within a well-thought dynamics of licit and illicit political operations, of interdiction

1 Michel FOUCAULT, La volonté de savoir, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 123. 2 François FEJTÖ, Histoire des democraties populaires, I. L’ere de Staline (1945-1952), Seuil, Paris, 1952, pp.117-124.


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and leniency, of popular support for reformists and exposure of reactionaries, of democratic proceedings and manipulation techniques, of free expression and censorship, of transgression and complicity, of pardon and punishment. The new regime purposely tried to present itself in this complex political-legal framework, which allowed it to legitimately prescribe the way power itself had to be construed, obeyed, or opposed by the citizens. Indeed, this political-legal frame offered the Party a splendid opportunity to exert violence and to administer an obvious political dissymmetry under the appearance of a general law, in a social environment characterized by the urgency of institutional and economical post-war reforms. Thus, Romanian communists not only acted in a legal manner in most cases, but they were in the privileged position to be the authors of the laws they had to use. The appropriation of the state was achieved through strictly legal proceedings, with the formal consent of the constitutional sovereign of that time until December 30th, 19471. Undoubtedly, there have been psychological pressures, demonstrations of force, violent actions, operations of intimidation and blackmail, threats and complicities, street movements, abusive institutional stand-offs, but revolutionary acts not only did entirely lack, but also have been deliberately avoided. The state as such has never been called into question.

Why is that Romania was the first East-European country in which a communist-inspired government succeeded in controlling the state, even if Romania, unlike Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Poland, seemingly had the historical advantage of relying upon constitutional, institutional, and political structures untouched by the war? The Soviet occupation, to which this success is so often credited, fails to provide us with a sufficient or a satisfactory explanation of this political development.

There is no doubt that, as anywhere else in Eastern Europe, the Soviet military occupation was the “necessary precondition” for the installation of the communist regime2. But it is not less true that the ways and means through which different parties backed by Moscow took over political power, and took under control the public space, as well as the degree of political and social resistance to that process depended in the first place on the type of society in which Soviet totalitarianism was to be reproduced. Therefore, in Yugoslavia and Albania, the conquest of the state took the form of guerrilla warfare, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria that of “parliamentarian infiltration”, and in Poland and Eastern Germany that of “baggage-train governments”3. The Romanian solution seems to have combined the last two methods: the institutional infiltration of a government pre-fabricated by the occupant.

If the Soviet military presence, together with the pressures and interferences of the occupation authorities, represented the main cause of the accession of communism in Romania, the secondary causes are, in turn, numerous and aggravating: 1 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă. Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă, Nemira, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 76-82. 2 Richard V. BURKS, “Eastern Europe”, in Cyril E. BLACK, Thomas R. THORNTON (eds.), Communism and Revolution. The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1964, p. 78. 3 Ibidem, pp. 86-88.


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the failure of the “historical” parties to coordinate a credible and coherent opposition; the precariousness of the political organization of social-democracy and labour unions; the great number of “bourgeois” politicians ready to accept to be “fellow travellers”; the massive support of prominent intellectuals (culminating in 1948); the incapacity (if not the indifference) of the society at large to understand the historic character of the political issues at stake1.

And again, how was such a complete and rapid infiltration of the communists in the fabric of the public space and in the bureaucratic structures of the Romanian state possible? How come that Romanian public space, organized around intact institutions (the army, the dominant Orthodox Church, the Royal Court, the established “historical” parties, an influential academia), has proven itself to be so unable to oppose any spontaneous resistance to the Soviet political input and its domestic operators?

The answer to these uneasy questions should probably be sought in the neighbourhood of the relations between the Romanian society and its traditional political class. Power relations, as they were practiced during the inter-war period, and, then, in the years of the dictatorship of king Carol II, and later throughout the World War II were obviously in crisis. The dual political system that strove between 1918 and 1938 to conciliate strong executives inclined to suppress political liberties with weak parliaments elected by male universal suffrage obviously had failed in convincing Romanians that democracy, as they were given the chance to know it, was worthwhile defending. What the survivors of the former constitutional organization were unwilling to accept and analyse was their very responsibility for the authoritarian drift of 1938.

Organized political opposition to communism was thus the deed of re-emerged political actors, tempted to draw on the same political language they used in the aftermath of World War I and that had already given public proofs of helplessness in the face of authoritarianism. In front of them, the Communist Party expropriated the democratic vocation of the “historical parties”2 and achieved a relative popular approval by promising a radical, national, and modern breakthrough. In addition, the affirmation of the “class” character of the communist program did not constitute an innovation in Romanian political culture, the public having been accustomed for a long time with revolutionary, ideologically-oriented formulations, of the kind used by the National Peasant Party.

In fact, neither the bureaucratic-technocratic vocation of the Communist Party, nor its ambition to control the personnel of the public administration system were absolute novelties. The civil servants compelled, by the alternate use of threats and recompenses, to leave their positions or to become members of the Party, had

1 Bela VAGO, “Romania”, in Martin McCANLEY (ed.), Communist Power in Europe, 1944-1949, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1977, pp. 126-127. 2 François FEJTÖ, Histoire des democraties populaires…cit. , pp. 120-121.


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been officially conscripted not so many years ago, in another bureaucratic party with mass vocation, the single party of king Carol’s dictatorship1.

However controversial the recourse to statistics may be, numbers have at least the merit of underlining the trends and of indicating with a certain amount of accuracy the sense of a given historical process. Let us compare the communist membership in Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria2, before the war and in 1947, in order to grasp the dynamics of popular support for the new regime:

Country Before the war 1947 Growth Romania 1,000 710,000 710 times Hungary 30,000 750,000 25 times

Czechoslovakia 80,000 1,300,000 16.2 times Poland 20,000 800,000 40 times

Yugoslavia 15,000 400,000 26.6 times Bulgaria 8,000 510,000 83.7 times

We should however consider that, in 1947, Communists represented 10.5%

of the total population in Czechoslovakia, 8.2% in Hungary, 7.2% in Bulgaria, 4.5% in Romania, 3.3% in Poland and 2.5% in Yugoslavia.

While Romania was not among the countries where communists amounted to an important percentage of the population, the outgrowth of the party has been by far the most spectacular. Thus, theoretically speaking, the Romanians’ predisposition to enrol in the Communist Party was 9 times greater than that of Bulgarians, 18 times greater than that of Poles, 26 times greater than that of Yugoslav citizens, 28 times greater than that of Hungarians, and 45 times greater than that of Czechs and Slovaks.

All these data may also help us observe the weak incidence of ideology in a strategy of power that was at the beginning of a legal and political order3, as well as the fact that the option for communism expressed by an important part of the Romanian society before 1948, was neither the manifestation of a natural leaning of Romanians towards collectivism, nor a triumph of Marxism-Leninism, but an unquestionable historical choice.

From the very start, the communists did not commit themselves to bringing about a political life based upon formal procedures, already morally discarded in Romania (electioneering, parliamentary debates and the like), but to procuring good governance, a better government than the one the traditional political class was able to offer. The force of the totalitarian message has been fuelled for five decades by this

1 Andrew C. JANOS, “The One-Party State and the Social Mobilization: East Europe between the Wars”, in Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, Clement H. MOORE (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. The Dynamics of Established One-Party System, Basic Books, New York and London, 1970, p. 216. 2 François FEJTÖ, Histoire des democraties populaires…cit. , p. 196. 3 The secondary role, if not the very decline of ideology in the process of communist recruitment and assimilation in an yet non-communist society was well documented by Gabriel A. Almond (with Herbert E. Krugman, Elisabeth Lewin, Howard Wriggins), The Appeals of Communism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954, p. 396.


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explicit refusal of formal, liberal-democratic politics. If between 1945 and 1948 the new power - as soon as it gained command of the state – resorted to interdiction and repression in a political and legal framework, after 1948 the Party employed itself to transforming the very nature of power relations in order to discipline and normalize social behaviours.

The communist method of government turns after 1948 into a disciplinary, or more exactly a self-disciplinary power that depends less on repression and interdiction, and more on the urge to action, on initiation, emulation, and mobilization. In other words, communism was partial to bio-power1, to a power that assumes the vital functions of the social body. In this setting, the individual can no longer be conceived as a mere inert biological element who is formed, given sense, or randomly hit by an exterior agent of power, but as a bearer of power, even as a co-author of power, regardless of the fact that he exercises this power institutionally, or on the contrary, he is just a victim of the institutions that host the power.

When looked from the post-communist common wisdom of the 1990s, Romanian communism seems to be an anonymous, impersonal cataclysm that fell unexpectedly upon a population forced to improvise its resistance: armed resistance in the mountains, political resistance in prisons, moral resistance in the households, resistance through culture, resistance through infiltration in the ranks of the party. Totalitarianism is very often depicted according to the rules of a siege, as a regime imposed through repression over a society that was in a permanent, though covert, state of denial.

The data available today indicates the fact that repression – however heinous and inexpiable its manifestations at the level of communities, families and persons – seems to have not played a central political role. After 1948, police procedures, legal proceedings, tortures, incarcerations, and capital executions did not constitute social practices capable of defining by themselves and in themselves the nature, the scope, and the objectives of power.

Therefore, even the obviously violent decade 1950-1960 was not centred on repression as a cardinal method of government. Despite its incontrovertible role as an instrument of social control and change2, repression was lodged at the periphery of the main social trends. From 1950 to 1967, according to a report of the Council of State Security3, 73,636 persons were convicted for “plotting against the social order” or related offences, another 25,740 were interned, and another approximately 60,000 were assigned to mandatory residence. Which means that some 160,000 Romanians suffered directly the penal rigors of the regime over its roughest 17 years. If we take into account their families, by using a 4.5 ratio, it would result that totalitarianism hit

1 Michel FOUCAULT, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Gallimard, Paris, 1975, pp. 137-196. 2 Alexander DALLIN, George W. BRESLAUER, Political Terror in Communist Systems, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1970, p. 6. 3 Lucian NASTASĂ, “Conduita conspirativă sub regimul comunist: mit şi realitate”, in Lucian BOIA (ed.) Miturile comunismului românesc, Nemira, Bucureşti, 1998, p.203.


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and destroyed the lives of around 700,000 people, i.e. 4% of Romania’s population of that time.

Let us add to these designated political victims and their households another 80,000 peasants (to whom we ought to apply again the 4.5 ratio) that the Party avowed to have prosecuted and convicted in relation with the collectivization process1. We attach hence another 360,000 citizens that were the immediate object of the repressive experiment. That would enlarge the “focus group” of repression – direct victims and their families – to a number that does not exceed 6% of the total population.

Assuming that, for whatever reason, the records of the confidential report of the Securitate were understated, and considering that they do not include the 1945-1949 period, it seems reasonable to multiply the numbers by two in order to approximate the maximum figure of the political victims implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by the repressive institutions of the Communist Party, a figure in which we include the families of these victims. Hence, 2,000,000 individuals, or a maximum of 12% of the total population, may fall in the category of people afflicted by “the great terror”.

These figures correspond to the estimations made by one of the most respected survivors of the communist prisons, who evaluated the number of those incarcerated to 282, 000, of which 190,000 are thought to have died in detention2. If we count up the 80,000 peasants that were the forced collectivization’s casualties to the 160,000 political prisoners averred by the report of the Securitate, we obtain a number close to Corneliu Coposu’s appraisal. The official sources and the most authorized unofficial accounts seem to confirm each other.

What is though the implication of these somehow cynical calculations, as long as an elementary ethic tells us that a political regime does not need to execute millions in order to be definitively discredited? In fact, the counting of victims could never be accomplished accurately, and does not provide as such neither moral reparation, nor penal mitigation, and is ultimately relevant only for the place that these figures take up in the post-communist memory. The repressive procedures, more than the actual number of those marginalized, discriminated against, persecuted, and executed represent sufficient evidence for the qualification of a political regime. It would be naïve to assert that Romanian totalitarianism is less guilty because we can register beyond any reasonable doubt 240,000 victims and not, for instance, 2,500,000. The execution of a single blameless person by the hands of the state should summon our conscience as forcibly as the extermination of thousands of innocent people. The political responsibility of Romanian society is not in direct proportion to the number of victims, just as the moral guilt and the penal accountability of those who participated in the repression, or were aware of it and kept silent, is not dependent on the computation of the victims.

1 The declaration of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej at the plenary session of November 30, 1961 in Ghiţă IONESCU, Communism in Romania 1944-1962, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p. 201. 2 Corneliu COPOSU, Dialoguri cu Vartan Arachelian, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 95.


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The question to which these figures can really answer is extremely simple and has no ethical connotations whatsoever, being mainly relevant for the realm of social science: those who suffered under totalitarianism were less or more numerous than those who improved their status under state socialism? To put it in other words, did the Romanian society perceive communism, at the personal or general level, as a repressive and abhorring strategy of power, or on the contrary, as a solution for national and individual development? Was there in the way the Romanians made it through the Alltagsgeschichte of totalitarianism1 a dominant social behaviour that can be uncovered by statistics? Has the average citizen been rather hostile than favourable to communism? Statistically speaking, did totalitarianism advantage or disadvantage the majority of the Romanians? Was the public space of state socialism leaning towards exclusion or, on the contrary, of a mind to inclusion?

Let us look at several economic and social data from the period 1950-1970, which overlaps the epoch unanimously considered to be the climax of repression.

First, between 1950 and 1970, the real income per capita increased with 250%2. This unprecedented rise benefited mostly the segment of society newly conquered by the civilization of the factory, i.e. 3,592,575 Romanians (20% of the total population) that migrated from village to town between 1948 and 19663. It is fair to say that industrialization, launched and conducted by state socialism, produced an irreversible transformation of the social fabric. Nevertheless, it should be clearly emphasized that this spectacular social change driven by industrialization did not solve, at least not in Romania, the classic Central and East European “agrarian problem” by simply replacing peasantry with a fresh working class, as some tend to believe4. The resurrection of this issue in post-communist Romania confirms the observation that the process of rapid and comprehensive industrialization was undertaken somehow at the expense of a real modernization of the Romanian public sphere5.

Yet, the weight of those relying exclusively on incomes paid from the public budget (wages and social funds) rose from 37.9% in 1950 to 71.5% in 19706. In absolute figures, for instance, the number of retired persons insured by the state system jumped from 251,400 in 1950 to 1,116,500 in 19707. As it would be expected, the number of university students for 10,000 inhabitants evolves steadily form 17 in 1938, to 31 in 1950, and to 75 in 19708; also the number of high-school students is

1 For the methodological debate of this topic, Detlev PEUKERT, Alltagsgeschichte der NS-Zeit: Neue Perspektive oder Trivialisierung?, Oldenbourg, München, 1984. 2 Anuarul statistic al României, Bucharest, 1990, p. 122; this figure is comparable with the threefold rise in real income in Western European societies. 3 Ibidem, p. 51. 4 George SCHÖPFLIN, “Culture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe”, in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), Developments in East-European Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1993, p. 21. 5 Kenneth JOWITT, Revolutionary Breakthrough and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971, p. 278. 6 Anuarul statistic al României…cit. p. 121. 7 Ibidem, p. 126. 8 Ibidem, p. 138.


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multiplied by ten from 1938 (49,287) to 1970 (505,891)1. Dependency with respect to the state – to the type of work culture it created, to the incomes and services it provided – registered thus a massive increase.

If we sum up these figures and compare them with those of the preceding series we can immediately notice that the proportion of those for whom the totalitarian regime represented a permanent and violent threat, an immediate or virtual menace lies between 6% and 12%, while those for whom state socialism meant a positive change in status and recognition, a stable and ever-increasing income, a broader access to higher education, a closer tie with a providing state represent at least 20% (with an overwhelming maximum of 70%).

In order to wind up this reconstructive (and tentative) exercise in social statistics, we still have to confront and ponder the probable average numbers of the two ranges of data. In so doing, we could conjecture that the long communist rule repressed, excluded and marginalized about 8% of Romania’s population, but was able to bring material and symbolic benefits to around 45% of the same population, through such means as the generalization of modern work methods, the massive migration from backward rural to more developed urban areas, the constitution of a dominant technical elite, the consolidation of a State welfare system. Moreover, as late as 1999, one out of three Romanian adults stated their belief that the condition of liberty under totalitarianism was the similar or even superior to that of the post-communist period2. Ten years after the downfall of state socialism, the political side of totalitarianism registered an approval rate of 30%.

The extreme mobility of these statistical data may suggest that, between 1948 and 1989, power relations did not function only with the aim of standardizing and normalizing social behaviours. Of course, state socialism was paying a meticulous attention to high numbers and strongly encouraged the collective expression of consent, as any other system of domination necessarily does. And yet, the power was especially interested in each citizen in particular, in the management of personal attitudes, in the supervision of individual behaviours, in the political administration of the living bodies3.

The civilization of the factory, as a product of the economic growth and of the migration from rural to urban areas, instituted the realm of productive labour, or, literarily, the “workfield” (câmpul muncii) as the sole legitimate path to social recognition that each and every individual had not only the right, but also the duty to follow. Interestingly enough, the requirement to conduct a socially useful work as a precondition for the dully recognition of citizenship was introduced into Romanian political culture, along with the notion of “workfield”, by an authoritarian right-wing

1 Ibidem, p. 136. 2 21% better, 9% the same, Metro Media Transilvania, Barometrul politic. Romania, Cluj, September 1999, p. 12. 3 Zoe PETRE, “Promovarea femeii sau despre destructurarea sexului feminin”, in Lucian BOIA (ed.), Miturile comunismului românesc, Nemira, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 255-271 and Gail KLIGMAN, The Politics of Duplicity. Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s Romania, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles and London, 1998.


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predecessor of state socialism. In 1941, the military dictatorship of Marshal Ion Antonecu ruled that all Romanians should carry out the “national duty” to be active in the “workfield” in order to enjoy the full extent of their civil rights1. Suffice it to say that the industrial work imposed, on large scale, a discipline of bodies and an inflexibility of individual time totally unknown to the traditional Romanian civilization2. Therefore, the inhabitants of state socialism will be mainly defined as “working people”, and not as citizens3. In other words, political status was conferred by people’s participation, on an individual basis, to “the edification of the socialist society”, and not by the assent given to a social contract. Work was the political covenant of state socialism.

In fact, the communist sovereign did not act by interdiction or limitation of citizenship, did not use the law to repress freedoms and produce political unanimity. The socialist positive law precisely denounced and renounced the formalism of “the bourgeois legal system”. To be honest, communist constitutional law could easily afford the luxury of including all standard democratic provisions, which it actually did. For communism did not represent itself in relation to a given law, but to its historical ends. Its objective was not to enforce the rule of law, regarded as a mere operating code, but the rule of work and of the working-class.

Even when, after 1964-1965, more subtle techniques of manipulation and persuasion came to replace exclusion and violence as instruments of domination, and a major shift occurred in the relations between power and society, this new course continued to privilege work over citizenship. The introduction of certain formal participative procedures (general and local elections with more than one candidate for selected constituencies in 1975)4 was not only short-lived, but also unable to stir the citizens’ interest for pluralism and more democratic political practices. Instead, certain professional groups, linked to the outgrowth of industrialization, were granted the opportunity to be represented, at the expert level, in the process of public policy elaboration5. Notwithstanding the fluctuation of the official language, which sometimes praised professional expertise, only to proclaim eventually the overall competence of the party apparatus, the managers of the “workfields” of industrialization kept their positions of influence until the end of the regime.

As of 1965, through the emphasis of national and empirical values, the Romanian Communist Party has gradually abandoned the repressive policies of 1 Lia BENJAMIN (ed.), Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944. Legislaţia antievreiască Vol. I, Doc. No. 41, Hasefer, Bucureşti, 1993, pp. 150-154. 2 Katherine VERDERY, What Was Socialism and What Comes Next?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, pp. 39-57 regards the “etatization” of time as a form of subjection proper to Ceauşescu’s Romania. 3 Mainly during the 1950s and the 1960s, the term “citizen” was used in the administrative language to designate those who, for political reasons or because of their social origin, were unworthy to be addressed as “comrade”. 4 Mary Ellen FISCHER, “Participatory Reforms and Political Development in Romania”, in Jan F. TRISKA, Paul M. COCKS (eds.), Political Development in Eastern Europe, Praeger, New York and London, 1977, pp. 220-221. 5 Robert A. KING, A History of The Romanian Communist Party, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1980, pp. 100-101.


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consolidation of its own power in favour of a set of policies of inclusion in its power of some social segments whose “functional autonomy” was politically recognized1. By so doing, and despite the official discourse about the “monolithic unity” of the society behind the party of the working class, the power of the single party ceased to be a unique and indivisible power. That is because the strategy of inclusion called for an operation of functional differentiation within each level of power, a power that was structurally expanding and typologically diversifying, being shared by various professional groups according to their degree of empirical expertise and to their strategic position in the process of economic growth and social development2.

The portrait of a totalitarian regime at the age of inclusion, as drawn by Kenneth Jowitt3, overlaps the figure of Romanian communism in Ceauşescu’s period: the party strives to demarcate itself institutionally from its repressive apparatus; the political manager tends to replace the political bureaucrat; the scope of power is enlarged by means of institutionalized consultations with the major social groups; the party expands its political influence as it seems to encourage its members not only to be disciplined and committed, but also to value their individual social-political identity; manipulation substitutes domination in the relationship between power and society; public policies are elaborated according to development stakes, and not any more on an ideological basis; the representative institutions of the state (the presidency of the Republic, the Great National Assembly, the local administration) gain a larger symbolic weight; the nation becomes an increasingly important social good; foreign policy is no longer an ideological confrontation, but is approached in terms of international cooperation. The only feature of an ideal-typical integration regime that was absent in Romania is the presumed evolution from a neo-patrimonial leadership to an oligarchic form of government. Nevertheless, after 1971-1972, some of these integration tendencies lost ground to the temptation to return to certain charismatic and mobilizing aspects of the first decade of communist history4.

Notwithstanding this a-typical reversal of political trends, Romanian society responded to mobilization as well as to the integration put into effect by the Communist Party. Indeed, when compared to all other countries from Central and Eastern Europe, Romania had the highest percentage of adhesion to the Communist Party, as these data from 1983 show5:

1 Kenneth JOWITT, “Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes”, in Jan F. TRISKA, Paul H. COCKS (eds.), Political Development in Eastern Europe, Praeger, New York and London, 1977, p. 101. 2 Ibidem, pp. 98-100. 3 Ibidem, pp. 96-109. 4 Ibidem, pp. 110-111. 5 Guy HERMET, Les désenchantements de la liberté. La sortie des dictatures dans les années ‘90, Fayard, Paris, 1993, p. 58.


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Party Membership Percentage of the total population

The Labor Party of Albania 122,000 4.3% The Bulgarian Communist Party 826,000 9.2%

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1,600,000 10.4% The East-German United Socialist Party 2,202,000 13.2% The League of Communist of Yugoslavia 2,200,000 9.6%

The Polish United Working Party 2,327,00 6.4% The Romanian Communist Party 3,300,000 14.6%

The Hungarian Socialist Working Party 852,000 8% The Communist Party of the USSR 18,331,000 8%

In 1989, 15% of Romanians were members of the Communist Party, which

included therefore a third of the active population and every fourth adult. If we take into account the family members, it would result that three thirds of the Romanian society was institutionally bound, directly or indirectly, to the communist regime.

One of the high-efficiency operations of Romanian communism, which may explain to a large extent this unparalleled amplitude of political inclusion, was the production of loyal, if not simply partisan, intellectual elites in a society in which the intelligentsia traditionally had a rather mediocre place, and only random ways of promotion. Thus, at the end of 1964, 42% of the academic personnel of all levels and 54% of teachers had joined the Communist Party, while, in 1969 the industrial workers represented only between 27-39% of the party members1.

It is only after 1989 that these elites, which had achieved social status and public reputation under totalitarianism, and were in the debt of the means of cultural production administrated by the Communist Party, tried (retrospectively) to relocate themselves in the public square.

The topic of the resistance through culture has become, since the very beginning of post-communism, a common place of strategic importance for the survival of the intellectual elites that were shaped and promoted by the totalitarian regime. Reduced to its most elementary expression, the theme is non-political, if not anti-political and for that matter it seems to be a perverse resurrection of the 19th Century motif of the autonomy of aesthetics set forth by the literary critic (ad not surprisingly prime minister) Titu Maiorescu. Those who contributed to creating true cultural works, or those who were competent scientists or researchers, could only have been, ipso facto, anti-communists. Every authentic work must have represented an implicit act of

1 Trond GILBERG, “Romania: in Quest of Development”, in Ivan VOLGYES (ed.), Political Socialization in Eastern Europe. A Comparative Framework, Praeger, New York and Washington and London, 1975, p. 155. For a comparison, in the mid 1960s, 50% of the Soviet academic personnel were members of the Soviet Union Communist Party. T.H. RIGBY, Communist Membership in the USSR, 1917-1967, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1968, p. 444. It should be noticed that the Romanian Communist Party managed in two decades to mobilize most of the intellectuals, while the brother Soviet party needed half a century to accomplish the same task.


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rebellion against the values the regime stood for. That is why all the important books written under communism should not be considered today as being mere cultural goods produced in keeping with the standards of state socialism and for its consumption, but as landmarks of a collective movement of a non-violent resistance to communism. Nor should their authors be looked at as well-to-do members of the communist establishment.

Karl Jaspers already noticed, shortly after the end of World War II, that many German intellectuals who did collaborate at first with the national-socialist state, seeking certain social and symbolic payoffs, came eventually to distance themselves from it on the assumption that they always expressed reservations in the private sphere; in due course, they even claimed to have been victims of the regime, and, as such, entitled to play an important role in the post-war period. According to Jaspers, the guiltiness of this category of intellectuals - researchers, artists, professors and the like - is in no way different of that of the members of the Nazi party. The exculpatory circumstances they presented in their own defence - they have created, each in his field, valuable spiritual goods and have preserved the authenticity of the German cultural tradition – does not exonerate them from the responsibility of having refused to undergo a self-clarification process1.

The language of Jasper’s analysis can be entirely applied to post-communism in general, and to Romanian post-communism in particular. Those who claim to have resisted through culture can be told, in Jaspers’ words, that they have only enjoyed the “freedom of a king’s fool” and have solely kept alive an “illusion convenient only for the leadership”2.

The resistance through culture seems a formula lacking any political and moral sense as long as the entire culture of the five decades of Romanian totalitarianism was the product of the ideology, and of the variable, but implacable mechanisms of censorship. Ultimately, “to create” did not constitute a form of resistance, but of participation, participation to the dynamics of the communist public space. On the contrary, it would be more appropriate to speak about assent through culture. Censorship was one of the instruments employed by the regime in order to fuel the “passion for unanimity”, as a characteristic of the totalitarian societies3.

Therefore, one can say that within the totalitarian public space, censorship fulfilled the function of the legitimate political observer. It ensured the visibility of each and every cultural actor: either on the list of forbidden authors, or on the list of edited authors. Not a single writer was left unnoticed. Censorship established who should become visible for society and who should remain visible only for the state employees who had the assignment to run the cultural operations on behalf of the 1 Karl JASPERS, Die Schuldfrage. Für Völkermord gibt es keine Verjährung, Piper, München, 1979, pp. 19-59. 2 In fact, Karl JASPERS’ book, originally published in 1946, should simply be “plagiarized” in order to fit the post-communist setting: if German were to be replaced with Romanian, war with gulag, nazism with communism, we could obtain an almost exact description of the moral landscape of the Romanian aftermath of totalitarianism. 3 Carl J. FRIEDERICH, Zbignew K. BRZEZINSKI, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p. 16.


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sovereign. Censorship – as a totalitarian institution of social control – represented one of the fundamental practices put into effect by state socialism in order to constitute a unified public space and a common political culture. From this perspective, the objective of censorship was not only to establish who should not publish and whom should not be read, but also to decide who should publish and what literature should Romanians read.

In practice, institutionalized censorship played, at the same time, two contending roles: a negative one (to forbid and purge), and a positive one, to create through ideological selection a “front of literature”, a “front of history”, a “front of science”, etc. Then, the major function of censorship was perhaps to produce new elites according to an ideological canon established by the sovereign. In historical terms, it is less important that certain authors were under interdiction or certain books were forbidden – though these actions should have been painful for those directly concerned – than the fact that other authors and books were promoted as exemplary models.

On this account, the elites fashioned and acknowledged under the regime of totalitarian censorship belong globally – notwithstanding their explicit will and the illusions that they might have had about their personal merits, or their ability to bypass the not always intelligent vigilance of the censorship – to the space administered by the communist sovereign.

That is because the presence in the public space – understood again in a Hobbesian perception, as the sovereign’s private space – was inevitably preceded by censorship. Nobody could have hoped to enter this space and indulge in its privileges, while remaining invisible in the eyes of censorship. In contrast with the modern and liberal public space, in which reputation can coexist with neglect, because the autonomy of every observer is granted, in the communist public space nobody passed unnoticed. An anecdote gathered from East-Germany1 attributes to a high-ranking party member the remark that writers should be happy they have the opportunity to live in a socialist country, where the literature is seriously taken into consideration and every single line is read with maximum attention.

We are dealing thus with a space of a pre-modern type in which not only everyone has a place of his own, but in which that place cannot be denied2. Modernity allows you to neglect someone, to pretend you do not notice him, to act as if that person were not there. In contrast, the Ancient Regime, as well as totalitarianism, did not admit the social and ethical invisibility of any of the members of society.

Consequently, it is easy to understand the intellectuals’ reluctance to overtly question a regime that bestowed upon them the benefits of public visibility. Moreover, any time before the gloomy 1980s, they could have asked themselves: “And what if the communist experience is after all a successful one?”; the question seems today

1 Klaus von BEYME, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe, Macmillan, London and New York, 1996, p. 35. 2 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Basic Books, New York, 1983, pp. 250-253.


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rather unenlightened, but it was formulated from 1917 to 1989 with good faith and enough good reasons by numerous prominent intellectuals1. Now things are somehow clear. Nevertheless for many decades it was not unambiguous whether communism was a criminal plan of exterminating bourgeoisie, liberty, and freethinking altogether, or, on the contrary, it was a generous project of transformation of the course of history.

If truth be told, Romania lacks the alternative visibility of the critical and civic individualism of the “dissidents”. Let alone the isolated acts of defiance of Gheorghe Calciu and Doina Cornea, the only project, unsuccessful as it has been, of a civic movement led by intellectuals was the one superficially articulated around the writer Paul Goma. Such forms of secluded intellectual dissent had actually no recruitment pool, as the beginning of “mini-cultural revolution” of 1971 coincides with a massive colonization of the instances of validation of intellectual careers and reputations by the Party: at the end of 1971, 60% of the academicians, doctors in science, professors, and researches were party members2. The numbers were as high among writers, artists, and journalists.

Be it as it may, the regime was spared until the last minute any critical review undertaken on a proper political basis. When the critique nevertheless manifested itself, among the older generations of the nomenklatura, or through the voice of some writers and intellectuals, it referred exclusively to the abuses committed by high-ranking officials. The sole exception to this rule – that remained largely anonymous and was not capitalized politically in the 1990s – is represented by several dissident religious groups of Evangelical persuasions that passed from the moral incrimination of the agents of repression to the political denunciation of the nature of the totalitarian regime. Only for these groups the affirmation of identity was invested both in a systematic refusal to collaborate in any way whatsoever with the regime or its representatives, and in an explicit rejection of the communist ideology3.

The invisibility of dissent could thus explain why the revolution of December 1989 was not preceded by an ideological disenchantment. The power of Marxism-Leninism was rather powerless outside the inner circle of historical militants of the Communist Party. And this is because Romanian communism did not succeed in authoring an intellectual history of the triumph and the decline of its own brand of scientific socialism4. Instead, Romanian communism was the narrator of the natural history of its power over life.

Anyway, Soviet type totalitarianism did not manifest itself, in the practice of government, as an ideology-oriented political regime: the proper political function of

1 Norberto BOBBIO, Il dubio e la scelta. Intellectuali e potere nella societa contemporanea, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, Roma, 1993, p. 223. 2 Robert A. KING, A History of the Romanian Communist Party, The Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1980, p. 104. 3 An account of the “Christian opposition” can be found in Dennis DELETANT, Ceauşescu şi Securitatea. Constrângere şi dizidenţă în Romania anilor 1965-1989, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1998, pp. 215-221. 4 Cf. Vladimir TISMANEANU, Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel, Free Press, New York, 1991.


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ideology was to mark a clear hierarchy between the “owners” of the system (vested with the authority to canonize and modify the ideological message) and its mere “tenants”, that were only required to adhere to this message without being mandatory or necessary to believe in it1. Notwithstanding their political theories, which they usually tend to consider as scientifically proven and therefore as able guides to the future, totalitarian regimes are characterized by their “disbelief” in ideas, not by a widespread and internalized ideological creed2. In Romania, the ideology of scientific socialism was no more than a routine of the official language used in public reunions, where citizens were required to profess the belief in the regime’s capability of governing, providing, and leading them to “the totalitarian happiness”3, that is to say to a certain level of normalcy in everyday life4. The pursuit of normalcy was perhaps the greatest moral misconduct under totalitarianism. The general disinterest for community life and the unconditional pursuit of personal interest help drawing the map of a geographical paradox: most Romanians lived in Romania without ever acknowledging to be present at, let alone part of the events that took place in their own country. The strive for normalcy of most citizens, the moral emigration in which the largest part of the Romanian society (following in the footsteps of the intelligentsia) had taken refuge for five decades was, in political terms, more damaging than the overt or confidential collaborationism of some citizens with a repressive and oppressive regime. The resistance “through culture”, the resistance within “your own self” is ultimately equivalent with an almost pathological form of ethical autism. More than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc, communist political mobilization seemed to have been morally demobilizing5. In socialist Romania, it was common wisdom that a lesser public visibility conveyed a greater personal safety6. Visibility was a political burden, if not, at times, a life risk.

Without being in itself the object of moral judgment, totalitarianism is the result of the accumulation and institutionalization of personal actions7, performed not only to those who have promoted the vast utopian experiment in human degradation that communism was all about8, but also by those, definitely more numerous, who declined or postponed to oppose this experiment. Totalitarianism as such cannot be

1 Guy HERMET, Les désenchantements de la liberté…cit., p. 20. 2 Ibidem, pp.158-163. The measure of this disbelief in ideology in Pietro GRILLI DI CORTONA, Le Crisi politiche nei regimi comunisti, Angeli, Milano, 1989, p. 360. 3 Guy HERMET, Les désenchantements de la liberté…cit., pp. 43-79. 4 Vladimir SHLAPENTOKH, “A Normal System? False and True Explanation for the Collapse of the USSR”, Times Literary Supplement, December 15, 2000, pp. 11-13. 5 Robert G. WESSON, Communism and Communist Systems, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978, p. 201. 6 David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism…cit., p. 99. 7 JOHN-PAUL II, “Reconciliatio et paenitentia 16”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 77, Roma, 1985, p. 217. 8 The qualification belongs to Daniel CHIROT, “What Was Communism All About?”, East European Politics and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1998, pp. 674-675.


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sued, cannot be presented before a judge, and cannot be inflicted a punishment1. That is why, responsibility is not incumbent on the “system”, “the regime”, “the party”, but on the people that have participated for forty-five years in the installation of the system, in the consolidation of the regime, and in the advancement of the communist party.

Of course, the Romanian Communist Party is to be held responsible for hundreds of thousands of victims, but it is only fair to admit that communists should be themselves counted among the casualties of the basic contradiction of Marxism-Leninism as a political theory turned into a state ideology. Indeed, scientific socialism had no vision of the distribution of sovereignty among the branches of the government and between the government and the citizens. Instead, it went on about the inevitable disappearance of state power. Indeed, the state and its coercive institutions are in a Marxian perspective warranted only by economic inequality, and a triumphant working class will waste them away in order to open the door to communism. The historical framers of the communist theory and strategy left the Party leaders with no philosophical guidance on how they could move along in extending power beyond their own relatively closed circle2. From repression to mobilization and inclusion, the Party failed in its attempts to share sovereignty, because it had no concept of how its administration of the socialist mode of production could become the self-rule of a socialist people.

The people itself had no real interest, and no experience, in self-government. Socialist citizens were typically more concerned in exploiting for their private benefit the state-owned means of production and in informally influence the management of things, than in participating in the government of society3. The serpent in the paradise paradise of state socialism was thus people’s inability of expressing any common political awareness or recognizing the value of general social goods4, regardless of the fact that such consideration for public stakes could have ratified or, on the contrary, undermined the communist project.

If the weight of evidence indicates that the Party was successful in its endeavours of nation building5 and political inclusion, the question remains why so many Romanians have chosen to take an active and institutional part in supporting a regime that, after its demise in 1989, could not find a single pro bono advocate.

To clarify this issue, we should look at the three main avenues of political participation in a soviet-type political regime that could be identified6. First, the 1 Nevertheless, the ethic strategy adopted by many victims is summed up by the following sentences: “the torturers are morally irresponsible” and “it is not important to blame people, but to indict ideas”, Corneliu COPOSU, Confesiuni, dialoguri cu Doina Alexandru, Anastasia, Bucureşti, 1996, pp. 118-119. 2 Carl A. LINDEN, The Soviet Party-State: The Politics of Ideocratic Despotism, Praeger, New York, 1983, pp. 159-160. 3 Wayne DIFRANCEISCO, Zvi GITELMAN, “Soviet Political Culture and ‘Covert Participation’ in Policy Implementation”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, 1984, pp. 618-619. 4 David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism…cit., pp. 162-163. 5 Kenneth JOWITT, Revolutionary Breakthroughs…cit., pp. 73-230. 6 The typology is based upon the empirical research undertaken by Wayne DiFRANCEISCO and Zvi GITELMAN, “Soviet Political Culture…cit.”, pp. 603-621.


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formal, if not ritual, participation-pledge of the Party members, but also of the citizens at large, mainly on election days intended to celebrate – through a regular 99% turn out – the social triumph of state socialism. To cast the ballot in favour of the Communist Party and its mass organization was not a political choice, but a pledge of allegiance. Second, the participation-plea, of the citizens going before state and Party authorities to solicit the enactment of a particular right, to request for services they deemed themselves entitled to, or simply to ask for undue favours. Third, the participation-persuasion of citizens taking the opportunity to informally negotiate with local officials (mayors, Party activists, chief executive officers of state companies and factories, heads of public institutions and the like) the way policies designed at high political level could and actually should be implemented in any particular, real-life setting1. Thus, the general public of state socialism was confident in its own ability to exert a factual influence on the micro-social interpretation and execution of any given decision of the state and Party hierarchy2.

When compared to the classical forms of political participation, well documented throughout Western societies, this three-fold “communist” version of political participation – where inducement towers over official commitment and bureaucratic petition – is dramatically overturned. And, in order to be faithful to the Leninist reading of Hegelian dialectics, it is doubly reversed. Primary, and contrasting to the Western logic, the hegemonic Party does not sum up, ponder, and translate into public policies a plurality of interests expressed by its different constituencies; quite the opposite, the interests of all organized social and economic groups are defined by the Party itself, through its unchallenged control over the institutional leadership of all recognized labour, professional, local, ethnic, or religious associations, as an empirical analysis of the Polish society has pointed out3. Secondly, and contrary to the most basic understanding of the rule of law, when it comes to enforcement, both legal norms and Party decisions are subject to a complex and sneaking process of negotiation. Social ruling and economic planning were rather literary endeavours, which meaning was almost always bargained by the affected citizens according to circumstantial, incidental, sometimes accidental, and always local interests4.

This model of political participation seems to confirm the Foucauldian perspective5 on political power, which should not be conceived as an autonomous symbolic good that can be forcibly or legally obtained, that can be transmitted, shared, 1 For this last type of participation as experienced in Romania, David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism…cit., pp. 104-105. 2 Wayne DiFRANCEISCO, Zvi GITELMAN, Soviet Political Culture…cit. pp. 618-619. 3 Jerzy J. WIATR, “Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland”, American Political Science Review, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, 1970, pp. 1242. 4 The challengers of the state and Party in this process of informal negotiations were rather local and unstable networks with unstructured and incidental interests, as Janine WEDEL has proven for the Polish case (The Private Poland: An Anthropologist’s Look at Everyday Life, Facts on File, New York, 1986), than proper official and/or unofficial corporate interests, as Valerie BUNCE believes (Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999). 5 Michel FOUCAULT, La volonté…cit, pp. 112-129.


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or distributed, as something that can be “reached”, or kept, something one can lay hands on, or risk to lose grip of. Of course, power relations are not exterior to other types of relations – economic processes, labour dynamics, social mobility – but manifest themselves, most of the time, as means of production, for they do not forbid or permit according to an established set of norms, but create and let themselves be created beyond the legal logic of permission and repression.

Then – and this may be perhaps the essential remark – power comes into being from bottom to top. It is less the outcome of an overall contention between the dominated and the dominators, or of a class struggle, or of the competition between parties, or of the poise of multiple relations that command the constitution of ownership, family, knowledge, or institutions. Power is rather the setting where the tensions that arise among all these factors come to a particular arrangement or, better, the place of redistribution and disciplining of conflicts that naturally stir up the social body. Where there is power, there is necessarily resistance to power. The latter cannot function without contending with a multitude of indispensable, probable, impossible, dubious, spontaneous, enraged, perfidious, calculated, suppressed, solitary, inefficient, violent, irreconcilable, interested, self-destructive, opportunist or ready-to-compromise bodies of opposition. Like power relations, resistance knots are irregularly distributed all across the social networks, and seldom amount to one great refusal, to a massive and global denial, or to a coherent centre of revolt with a specific address. Man as subject of liberty, and the state as agent of the law are present together in the recipe of power.

To be sure, the inhabitants of state socialism indulged themselves in an “ethos of dependency” with respect to the state1. But it would be only fair to add that they were also able to shape their relations to the state in conformity with an “ethic of socialist calculation”2. In the eyes of most citizens, the state was at the same time the ultimate provider figure and an aggressive intruder into their private life. Thus, the state and its agencies were simultaneously exploited and avoided by the ordinary citizen. It seems therefore appropriate to acknowledge that the “democratic centralism” supposed by the Leninist tradition to rule the Party and the socialist society might have been in fact replaced by a spontaneous authoritarian decentralization. The theory of “democratic centralism” holds that when the supreme leadership of the Party has to adopt a policy, it should do so after a free discussion, a comprehensive debate, and an organized agreement of the rank and file; but, once duly pronounced, this particular decision should remain unquestioned and should be carried on without any reservation and with the greatest of disciplines by all membership. In fact and in the realm of real socialism, the supreme leadership assumed the exclusive authority to decide on all matters without prior consultation of the Party members; instead, what was authoritatively determined at the top always ran the risk to be received at the bottom with compunction and put into effect in a manner contingent on local circumstances and incidental interests. As a rule, the agents of these informal, grass

1 George SCHÖPFLIN, Culture and Identity …cit., p. 26. 2 David KIDECKEL, The Solitude of Collectivism…cit., p. 166.


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roots transactions were the local Party bosses who tried to accommodate the official policies to the particular environment they directly knew and had the task to manage. Nowhere else in Central and Eastern Europe was this kind of informal influence more influential than in Romania, and at the expense of a “loosened state”, an observer noticed1. In this respect, the Communist Party should be construed not only in terms of an overwhelming monopoly of its supreme leadership over both state and society, but also, at its lower and larger levels, as a mediator between state and society, and, as such, as an organization not so different from any political party operating in a Western democracy.

Was this function of the Communist Party a late “corruption” of an initially strong breakthrough regime, which developed an increased vulnerability to the influence of its diverse constituencies, as Kenneth Jowitt argues2? The obvious weakness of the post-Leninist state, able perhaps to control, but not to determine either the social behaviour of individual actors, or the performance of public institutions3, could perhaps be the explained by the fact that, despite its claim to be the driving force of a classless and nationless future, the Communist Party was, after all, but a political party, that is an organization compelled to promote social interests, conflicts, and values that predate and command its very existence. An organization also designed to allow its individual members to exploit their political position for private interests4. State socialism lasted for five decades because the Communist Party could count on a genuine constituency able to outnumber any would-be opposition.

However incongruous it may seem today, communism ultimately became a legitimate political order in the eyes of a large majority. Legitimacy should be understood here in Max Weber’s terms5, that is to say less as a personally and rationally pledged allegiance, morally motivated, but as a voluntary disposition to leave out of question and out of the reach of personal interests an order that manifests itself as legitimate, and whose validity is guaranteed by a human instance able to use violence in order to sanction any infringement of the established order. Such an avoidance to call into question the state and its functions was observed in Romania

1 Robert G. WESSON, Communism and…cit., pp. 201-204. 2 Kenneth JOWITT, “Soviet Neotraditionalism: the Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime”, Soviet Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1983, pp. 275-297. 3 Arista Maria CIRTAUTAS, “The Post-Leninist State. A Conceptual and Empirical Examination”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1995, pp. 379-392, especially pp. 381-383. The Post-Communist state is a “castrated” one, as Venelin GANEV, “The Separation of Party and State as a Logistical Problem: A Glance at the Causes of State Weakness in Post-Communism”, East European Politics and Society, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1999, pp. 389-420 puts it, because its predecessor was already undergoing a diminution of its power. 4 Empirical evidence of this trend in the Soviet Union provided by Vladimir SHLAPENTOKH, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People. Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1989, pp. 227-229. 5 Max WEBER, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, edited by J. Winckelmann, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1972, p. 17 sq.


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long after the demise of communism1. Moreover, by uprooting the traditional hierarchies and by cultivating its own version of social opportunity and economic equality, state socialism levelled the social, economic, and cultural differences it inherited and essentially performed a democratic function. Indeed, totalitarianism, unlike authoritarian regimes, not only claimed to be democratic, but also theorized the democratic privilege of the “popular” majority to suppress the “decadent” and “bourgeois” freedoms of the liberal well-to-do minority2. From a contemporary and involved standpoint, state socialism could have easily been construed as a political monopoly of a popular majority promoted to welfare by the party of the working class.

In fact and in economic and political systems that are not based on competition, a monopoly is often relaxed, debonair, and inefficient, as Albert Hirschman has argued3. For the very purpose of preserving their inefficiency and negligence, lazy monopolies not only do not hinder peripheral expressions of abandon and protest, but tend to include them within certain limits in its space of sovereignty. The most active citizens were officially denied the right to speak up against the regime, or to leave it behind. Instead, they were offered some opportunity, in their own walk of life, to reapportion in their personal advantage the public space. If we admit that state socialism, at least in its terminal stage, could be considered a lazy political monopoly, we should infer that it had the astuteness to turn any latent sign of dissent into a specific, yet incidental form of political participation.

If Carl Schmitt was right4, and the ultimate power of the sovereign is to establish exceptions to the common rule, it would ensue that, under state socialism, people got in the end a clear share of sovereignty, that they were able to discriminate, in any particular setting of society, between what they could actually do to improve their status and what they could not do, and did not even need to bother about. Just like the “semi-sovereign people” of Western democracies, the socialist people were involved in public affairs by the logic of conflict5. The difference resides in the fact that the socialist people did not have the opportunity to choose among alternatives put forward by competing political organizations. Rather, the semi-sovereign people of state socialism had to introduce their own unorganized and incidental alternatives to the policies laid down beyond their jurisdiction by the Party as nominal sovereign of the public space. They did not respond to a competition, but were compelled to create it, at their own level and within their reach. That is perhaps why politics was for them such an intricate burden.

1 Gail KLIGMAN, “The Social Legacy of Communism: Women, Children and the Feminization of Poverty”, in James R. MILLAR, Sharon L. WOLCHIK (eds.), The Social Legacy of Communism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1994, p. 267 n. 43. 2 Juan LINZ, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO., and London, 2000, p. 20. 3 Albert O. HIRSCHMAN, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1970, pp. 173-202. 4 Carl SCHMITT, Verfassugslehre, Achte Auflage, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1993. 5 E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, The Semi-sovereign People. A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, The Dryden Press, Hinsdale, IL., 1975, pp. 126-139.


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Bibliography DiFRANCEISCO, Wayne, Zvi GITELMAN, “Soviet Political Culture and ‘Covert

Participation’ in Policy Implementation”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, 1984.

FEJTÖ, François Histoire des democraties populaires, I. L’ere de Staline (1945-1952), Seuil, Paris, 1952.

FOUCAULT, Michel, La volonté de savoir, Gallimard, Paris, 1976. HERMET, Guy, Les désenchantements de la liberté. La sortie des dictatures dans les années ‘90,

Fayard, Paris, 1993. JOWITT, Kenneth, “Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes”, in

Jan F. TRISKA, Paul H. COCKS (eds.), Political Development in Eastern Europe, Praeger, New York and London, 1977.

JOWITT, Kenneth, Revolutionary Breakthrough and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971.

KIDECKEL, David, The Solitude of Collectivism. Romanian Villagers to the Revolution and Beyond, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993.

LINZ, Juan, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO., and London, 2000.

SCHMITT, Carl, Verfassugslehre, Achte Auflage, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1993. SCHÖPFLIN, George, “Culture and Identity in Post-Communist Europe”, in

Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), Developments in East-European Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1993.

WESSON, Robert G., Communism and Communist Systems, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978.


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Intellectuals and Civil Society. The Polish Case1

Florin-Ciprian MITREA


Abstract: The notion of public intellectual is, undoubtedly, a product of modernity. Nonetheless, the roots of this concept should be traced back in the late Middle Ages themselves, when intellectuals, in a quite vague sense, begin to assert themselves socially as a distinct entity. After World War II, being an intellectual acquired new connotations in accordance with the new social and political context. In Eastern European countries, intellectuals were confronted with some major decisions, the stake being their independence as regards a totalitarian regime. That being said, the present article analyses the structural transformations applied in communist Poland to the class of intellectuals. Additionally, we are going to detail the stages of the conflict between the Polish humanist intellectual elite and the ideology of the party-state, as well as the evolution of the relationship between left-wing intellectuals and the Polish Catholic Church. The main aim of this study is to enhance the role played by Polish intellectuals, after 1945, in the configuration of a civil society able to successfully oppose the totalitarian regime.

Keywords: intellectuals, communist Poland, totalitarianism, civil society.

The radical changes produced at the level of Polish society after World War II

were most deeply visible in the case of intellectuals. Whereas the Catholic Church and the peasantry of Poland succeeded in passing over the post-war period by maintaining their structure and position in society relatively unchanged, intelligentsia suffered major transformations entailing even a possible redefinition of the fundamental elements of its status. At the same time, the transformations undergone by the class of Polish intellectuals served as litmus paper for the strategy adopted by the communist party in order to establish and consolidate its power. In this respect, it is extremely relevant that the notion of intellectuality came to designate, on the one hand, the category of diploma and academic degree holders, and, on the other hand, the so-called “white collars” (the category of all types of clerks).2 In fact, this double

1 Acknowledgment: This paper was financed by POSDRU/89/1.5/S / 62259 contract, for the strategic project “Socio-human and political applied sciences. Postdoctoral training program and postdoctoral research fellowships in socio-human and political sciences”, co-financed by the European Social Fund through the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013. 2 Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature. Poland 1945-1989, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1999, p. 34.


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significance characterised the notion of intellectual ever since this social category was invented.

With respect to this idea, J. Le Goff shows that medieval intellectuality was composed, on the one hand by the quasi socio-professional category of the people who “worked with words and their spirit”, who “did not earn their living from land rents and were not constrained to have physically demanding jobs”, working for instance in universities, and, on the other hand, there were also the intellectuals in a broader sense, represented by 13th and 14th century men of letters, who belonged neither to university nor to monastic environments, but who were connected to the urban milieu.1 Still, the main tension in that epoch was less the animosity between the university staff and independent men of letters, but the conflict between faith and reason. Thus, the representative profile of 13th and 14th century intellectuals was the Averroist philosopher, compelled, on the one hand, to find a balance formula in that context, and, on the other hand, to face the anti-Aristotelian attacks launched by Albert the Great and Thomas of Aquino, as well as by Augustinianism.2 Another significant aspect as to the model of medieval intellectual is the coagulation of a large part of the intellectuals in a university corporation that becomes progressively independent from both the ecclesiastic and the political power, asserting its own identity, and laying the basis of a specific tradition consisting of student debates, collective ceremonies and amusements.3 Consequently, comparing the medieval Western intellectual (described by specialists in this historical epoch) and the one in post-war Poland (depicted by Michnik) we can identify as a common trait the attempt of finding an intermediary space in between the two poles of power, represented by the Church and the State. And, to a certain extent, we can also speak of a reiteration of the medieval conflict (resumed with the beginning of modernity) between faith and reason, for in the year 1945 Poland witnessed a polarisation of society: in one camp we find those who remained faithful to the Christianity inherited from their forefathers, and in the second camp we can find those who adhered, more or less formally, to the secularising precepts of communism. That is why post-war Poland can be portrayed, from this point of view, by the Gombrowiczian metaphor which compares her with “a piece of dry bread that breaks crackling into tow smaller pieces: a devout one and another lacking faith”.4

As far as the polysemy of the notion we are referring to is concerned, the explanations of Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli are quite pertinent, according to whom we can speak of a restricted sense and of a broad sense of the concept of intellectual, encompassing two extremities in between which intellectual activities are carried on. Thus,

1 Jacques LE GOFF, Les Intellectuels au Moyen Age, apud Alain DE LIBERA, Gândirea Evului Mediu, trans. Mihaela and Ion ZGĂRDĂU, Amarcord, Timişoara, 2000, pp. 5-6. 2 Mihai MAGA, Redescoperirea experienţei intelectuale în idealul moral al filosofului averroist, commentary on Boetius of Dacia - Despre viaţa filosofului, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005, p. 115. 3 Ibidem, p. 115. 4 Witold GOMBROWICZ, Jurnal, selection, translation and notes by Olga ZAICIK, Univers, București, 1998, p. 48.


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“in the restricted sense, we say that a person is an intellectual if he/she is not only engaged in an intellectual activity, but is moreover engaged in conveying its capacity of searching with the specific tools of the intellectual activity, in conveying the development pathway, and the well-defined purposes of the activity: it is only natural that he/she be above all a teacher, therefore a magister at the school of time”.1

As regards the broad sense of the term of intellectual, it refers, according to

Fumagalli, to those “who make use of intelligence and words, but changing quite often the role and the context of the activity, in a way which frequently reveals a certain indifference concerning the aim of their work”.2

If in the interwar period sociologic instruments sized Polish intellectuals at 14% of the population of the country, after 1945 the percentage would increase up to 35%. Obviously, this modification is a consequence of the broadening of the very concept of intellectuality, ensuing from the strategy of the new power to enthral this important component of society. Hence, the policy of Popular Poland towards intellectuals proved to be, at least in the first stage, not one aiming to destroy the intelligentsia, but a protective policy, aiming to increase its number, but only in the sense desired by the regime.3 The concern of the communist Polish power for the intellectuality presents many similarities with the attention paid to intellectuals in Soviet Russia, after the 20th Congress of CPSU, in February 1956, corresponding to the beginning of the relative thaw engendered by Khrushchev’s secret report on Stalin. Replacing, at least for a while, the firing squad and the deportations in the Gulag with the ideological pressure exerted on literature and art in general, Khrushchev somehow showed that, although omnipotent in society, the Party counted on the creative intelligentsia’s services. Especially meaningful is, in this respect, Solzhenitsyn’s testimony (who, on the background of these changes, had succeeded in publishing his explosive short story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich”) about a meeting between the communist leaders and the intellectuality, in December 1962. In that context, in his closing speech, Khrushchev declared the following to the intellectuals present in the hall, “People’s minds are being fought for. Your minds are very precious to us, and you yourselves are a sort of field-marshals”.4

Confronted, as in fact all communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, with an acute crisis of legitimacy, the communist power of Poland grasped that, in order to strengthen itself, it did not suffice to annihilate or to neutralise political competitors, it was also necessary to win a difficult and symbolic war at the level of a

1 Beonio Brocchieri FUMAGALLI, “L’intellectuel”, in Jacques LE GOFF (coord.), L’Homme médieval , apud Alain De Libera, Gândirea Evului Mediu…cit., p. 281. 2 Ibidem. 3 Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature. Poland 1945-1989, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1999, pp. 34-35. 4 Aleksandr SOLZHENITSYN, Viţelul şi stejarul. Însemnări din viaţa literară, vol. I, trans. Maria and Ion Nastasia, Humanitas, București, 2002, p. 87.


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society thoroughly impregnated with conservative values. That being so, it was vital for the new regime to win the sympathy of that anticlerical and socialist-oriented ore of the Polish intelligentsia, which was well represented at the level of the entire society. It is relevant to highlight the significant difference, from this point of view, between Poland and Romania (where the dominant intellectual tradition pertained to the right-wing politics, therefore the regime passed to physical annihilation and to an atrocious attempt of re-education by torture).

So, in spite of the fact that the whole Polish society was deeply imbued with conservative values, based on the preservation of national identity and Catholicism, a large part of the intellectual elite on the banks of the Vistula adopted a left-wing political culture. However, what distinguishes essentially Polish socialist tradition is the fact that it cherished particularly the idea of nation, for which reason even a part of the Polish communists would have to endure Stalinist persecutions. Paradoxically, the nationalism of left-wing Polish intelligentsia co-existed with a particularly pronounced anticlerical dimension. That is why, when communism took control over Poland, there were a big distance and tension between the Church and left-wing intellectuals. That is the reason why Adam Michnik regarded the rapprochement of these two sources of Polish energy as the key for the formation of a vigorous anti-totalitarian resistance. To identify the possible bridges between the two pillars of Polish society, Michnik had first to x-ray, as one who knew from the inside the Polish socialist tradition, the nature and the formative trajectory of left-wing intelligentsia on the banks of the Vistula.

Michnik believed the Polish secular left could be best defined and analysed, by examining the changes produced throughout the years 1936, 1946, 1956 and 1966. At the beginning, in 1936, the secular left-wing was a little bit more conspicuous through its firm options in a few clear issues. These options had in view antifascism, the pleading for planned economy, the support of the agrarian reform and the defence of the principle of the separation of Church and state. Ten years later, in 1946, the official historiography identified the left in accordance with the support offered to the “new reality” and the new regime established by the Red Army. Despite the difficult context, the Polish Socialist Party (the interwar PSP), represented by personalities such as Puzak, Zaremba or Zulawski, stood unflinchingly against the “new reality”. A similar attitude was assumed by left-wing intellectuals as Maria Dabrowska, Maria şi Stanislaw Ossowski. Nonetheless, at the same time, other leaders of the PSP, as Julian Hochfeld, Oskar Lange, Adam Rapacki, expressed their readiness in cooperating with the communists. Additionally, the ideologists of the Polish Working Party (PWP) thought they were also entitled to speak on behalf of left-wing ideals.1

The challenge brought on by the recently established power led to what Michnik calls a split of the left. Thus, while the editor-in-chief of the journal Kuznica talked about the progressive-minded character of the social reforms undertaken by the PWP, other left wing intellectuals, such as Maria Dabrowska and Zygmunt Zulawski,

1 Adam MICHNIK, L’Eglise et la gauche. Le dialogue polonais, trans. Agnes Slonimski, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1979, p. 7.


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united in the group WRN (Liberty – Equality – Independence), were evincing the obscurantism and totalitarianism of the methods used to put into practice the respective reforms. In this context, the year 1956, when the famous Polish October took place, is another determining landmark for the identity of the left wing on the banks of the Vistula. From the standpoint of political struggle itself, October 1956 should be regarded as a consequence of the upheaval which started in Poznan, in June, the same year (resulting in the deaths of dozens of people), and which coincides with the moment the tough wing in the party, that pleaded for the repression by the army of the protests, was defeated (during the debates at the Central Committee ensuing with Gomulka’s appointment in the post of secretary of the Party) by the reformers supported by the revolted workers of Warsaw’s factories.1 Taking advantage of this wave of enthusiasm produced by this victory of Polish communists against Soviet communists, the revisionist current will emerge as an expression of the “hope in the evolution of the communist system”.2

Additionally, the fact that distinguishes in that particular historical moment the Polish left wing current is that it assumed a double negation. On the one hand, what is at issue is the assertion of the opposition toward the Stalinist faction inside the party, and, on the other hand, it is about a critical approach of the traditional right wing and the Catholic Church. In this respect, it is worthwhile mentioning the attitude of the gazette Po Prostu, one of the sharpest spears of the revisionist movement, which was attacking with equal virulence both Stalinist and catholic dogmatists. Another relevant example as to the 1956 position of the Polish left is the case of the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski. Accused by the communist regime of being an oppositionist and a revisionist, at that time Kolakowski had adopted an explicit Marxist position, contributed to the journal Argumenty edited by the Association of Atheists and Free Thinkers and was constantly polemicising with the Church. As regards revisionism in general, it was a current formed, on the one hand, of former Stalinist who criticised the policy of the party, and, on the other hand, of anti-Stalinist left-wing intellectuals (the most important and vocal of them being Maria Dabrowska, Maria and Stanislaw Ossowski). Consequently, in 1956, the secular left wing defined itself through an oppugnant relation with both the Central Committee of the Party and the Catholic Church. In Michnik’s opinion, the main error of the secular left resided in this manner of identifying its enemies, for it made the mistake of misinterpreting reality and of making too feeble an opposition to the regime, without any visible results.3 As a matter of fact, in all the countries which witnessed this phenomenon, revisionism, as critical attitude towards real communism and as anti-Stalinism (or at least as recantation of Stalinism), shared in making a breach in the system. Nonetheless, sooner or later it would exhibit its precariousness, as well as the limits of its vision.

1 Jean-Marie LE BRETON, Europa Centrală şi Orientală între 1917 şi 1990, trans. Micaela Slăvescu, Cavallioti, 1996, p. 195. 2 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare şi alte eseuri, Polirom, Iaşi, 1997, p. 127. 3 Idem, L’Eglise et la gauche…cit., p. 8.


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Similar to the Polish case is the cogent attitude of Russian intellectuals in the post-Stalinist period toward the case of Solzhenitsyn. Thus, after having enthusiastically received his short story “One day in the Life of Ivan Denisovici”, published in the magazine Novâi Mir, on the background of the liberalisation produced in the first part of Khrushchev’s mandate, USSR’s intellectuals began to feel certain reservations as regards Solzhenitsyn’s subsequent writings which no longer limited themselves to denounce Stalinism, but aimed at the very ideological basis of Marxism. In this case, the litmus paper was the open letter addressed to the Patriarch Pimen, which was vituperating against the atheism of the communist system, along with the historic novel August, which was criticising the Revolution of 1917.1 We can therefore identify a resemblance between Michnik and Solzhenitsyn, in the sense that both of them followed an ascending trajectory in their writings and attitudes, starting from the denouncement of the totalitarian effects of communism, without however attacking its ideological basis, and advancing toward the severe condemnation of the constitutive principles of the regime. The major difference between the two resides in the fact that, while in Michnik’s case, the change of approach corresponds to a change of his political thought, in Solzhenitsyn’s case (who, due to his camp experience, had realised the true nature of communism), it was just a matter of change of strategy in revealing the truth. As far as the merits of Polish revisionism are concerned, they consisted in the fact that they evinced the necessity “of a critical participation in the life of society” and that they disseminated on a large scale an “opposing attitude” towards the power.2 On the other hand, this attitude was based on the erroneous faith in the “identity between the aspirations and objectives of the liberal wing of the Party and those of the revisionist intelligentsia”. Consequently, the events of March 1968 would entail the collapse of the “heroic myth of the party leader” (which had substantially nurtured the illusions of the intelligentsia), as well as the breakdown of revisionism as a way of referring to totalitarian power3.

The negative effects of the strategy adopted by the secular left wing on the basis of a political thought inconsistent with the reality of Polish society would be brought to light, argues Michnik, in 1966, when the conflict between the PZPR (Polish Unified Workers' Party) and the Episcopate reached its peak. After the closure, in 1957, of the gazette Po Prostu, this open conflict between the totalitarian state and the Church represented the tensest moment in Polish public life. Despite all this, the most prominent left-wing Polish intellectuals (among whom Kolakowski, Wlodzimierz Brus, Maria Ossowska, Antoni Slonimski were the most important) did not understand the real stake of the events and, consequently, did not react against the defamatory campaign led against the bishops accused of having betrayed the interest of their country. That is the reason why the sermon uttered by cardinal Wyszynski, at the end of the year 1956, which cited approvingly Kolakowski’s essay entitled “Jesus Christ, prophete et reformateur”, received no answer from the Polish philosopher,

1 Aleksadr SOLZHENITSYN, Viţelul şi stejarul…cit., p. 409. 2 Adam MICHNIK , Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 129. 3 Ibidem, pp. 129-130.


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who, on the contrary, disavowed in a paper the interpretation of the clergyman. According to Michnik, this could have been the starting point of the rapprochement of the Church and intelligentsia, had the latter responded to the hand lent by the Episcopate. As a matter of fact, throughout the conflict between state and Church, Leszek Kolakowski, as leader of the revisionist current, remained silent. This silence would be broken in 1966, at the University of Warsaw, when the philosopher drew a bitter conclusion on the communist rule. After having delivered this speech, he was expelled from the party. However, not even in this courageous declaration did Kolakowski refer to the policy of the power as to the Church. Thereupon we may infer that in 1966 Poland’s left-wing intelligentsia was driven by the desire to fight for democratic liberties, yet it was still very far away from understanding the fact that the totalitarian regime could not be successfully opposed without making an alliance with the Church1.

With respect to the fact that Poland’s communist regime tried to win Polish intellectuals on its side, unquestionably this does not imply that it took a special interest in their weal, on the contrary, it shows an astute strategy of annihilating an uncomfortable social category. Thus, the party’s efforts to form a “red bourgeoisie” (czerwona burzuazja), went hand in hand with the measures taken to ensure that the intelligentsia would be totally deprived of all political power.2 An efficient instrument in that direction was, certainly, what Stanislaw Baranczak called “Big Brother’s red fountain pen”3, in other words the daily censorship exerted on everything that was meant to be a public discourse, “from wedding invitations, circus posters, to obscure publications concerning Mediterranean archaeology”4. Moreover, the social policies of the regime endeavoured to develop a sort of middle class composed of the industrial and technocratic proletariat, a class which was to replace the emblematic figure of the old Polish intellectual with that of a professional who would be active only in a mould strictly delimited by the division of labour. Consequently, Polish intelligentsia actually ceases to exist after World War II, the last relics of this social segment being noticeable at the linguistic level, in certain customs and life style or in the domestic atmosphere.5 Thus, one of the effects of the redefinition of the notion of intellectual in the Popular Republic of Poland consisted in the relativisation of the frontier within Polish cultural tradition, which irreconcilably separated the statute of inteligentny from that of supporter of the political power. That being so, the spread of higher education led to the apparition of a professional technical and scientific social stratum whose representatives were employed by the state and who were not engaged in political or moral conflicts as those experienced by writers, artists or teachers. The manoeuvre of moving the centre of gravity from humanist intellectuality to technical intellectuality,

1 Idem, L’Eglise et la gauche…cit., p. 9. 2 Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature…cit., p. 35. 3 Stanislaw BARANCZAK, Breathing under Water and Other East European Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1992, p. 61. 4 Ibidem, pp. 61-62. 5 Maria HIRSZOWICZ, “The Bureaucratic Leviathan“, apud Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature…cit., p. 35.


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in portraying the emblematic figure of the representative intellectual, was a strategy used in the majority of the countries under the Soviet bloc. An important reason in this respect was the fact that by its very nature the technical domain predisposes, in general, to strict specialisation and to a lower propensity for developing a critical spirit in social and political issues. Thus it is worthwhile noting that taking into account the special attention paid by the state to the control and organisation of each and every aspect related to cultural life, the prototype of the old fashion independent intellectual had but very few chances to survive. That is why, a large part of the educated Polish, who considered themselves the elite of the Polish intelligentsia, were compelled to work in the state system and to adhere to unions sponsored by the Party.1 The phenomenon of the apparition of a new intellectuality, as a sort of middle class, occurred in soviet Russia too (but in the more dramatic context of physical extermination of an important part of the traditional intelligentsia, during the Stalinist period). Solzhenitsyn speaks very eloquently about the quality of this new social stratum which he qualifies as a huge and “hateful class”, which includes the whole party apparatus, “which acquired a substandard culture”, a “cultivated tribe who claims the title of intellectuality”, given that “intellectuality can be but a genuine, creative, not at all numerous, and selfish from tips to toes elite”.2

Under the communist regime, a special category of the Polish intelligentsia was represented by catholic writers. Endeavouring to perpetuate the great tradition of Polish literature, deeply imbued with catholic themes and values, the writers who cherished the Church in post-war Poland differ however from their great predecessors pursuant to the different contexts in which they created. In the case of writers as Adam Mickiewicz or Henryk Sienkiewicz, the national ideal, catholic values and the theme of liberty combined harmoniously in a single whole, meant to inspire the Polish people with those moral resources which might help them resist and fight to gain the independence of their country. As far as the conservative writers who created in post-war Poland are concerned, the situation was much more complicated, since the totalitarian challenge was quite different from the challenge represented to the writers of the past centuries by the foreign occupation. While in the 18th and 19th centuries the writers who were faithful to the Catholic Church were the sharpest spears of the spiritual force that roused against the brutal force of the occupying powers, in the second half of the 20th century Polish writers were compelled to find a proper and creative answer for the tensions between conformism and non-conformism, between the preservation and the modification of the social, political and cultural status-quo. Thus, if for left-wing intellectuals, by virtue of their structural inclination for criticism, the source of their thinking and behavioural error was the tendency to criticise undiscriminatingly the two major expressions of the hierarchic principle in Poland’s society of that time (videlicet the Communist Party and the Catholic Church), for right-wing writers the risk of losing authenticity came from too great an expansion of

1 Norman DAVIES, Heart of Europe. The Past in Poland’s Present, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 347. 2 Aleksandr SOLZHENITSYN, Viţelul şi stejarul…cit., Vol. I, p. 305.


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the conservative principle up to the relativisation of the demarcation lines between opposite values. In other words, the great temptation of the post-war Polish intellectual was to waver between either the hypostasis of the critical and uprooted intellectual, or that of the organic intellectual, exclusively dedicated to the preservation of the stability of society (be it dominated by communism).

Another trait of catholic writers in communist Poland resided in the way they manifested themselves publicly. In fact, as Czeslaw Milosz puts it, the main criterion of labelling a writer as catholic writer is less the extent to which he assumes the creed and the dogma of the Church (for such an aspect is hardly measurable), but rather his collaboration with catholic publications and publishing houses. Another characteristic of these writers is their predilection for historical subjects, treated with traditional literary techniques, preferably in prose, and feeling a certain dependence on catholic literature and the model of French conservative and right-wing kind of attitude.1 Among the most important catholic writers we find the names of Hanna Malewska, Antoni Golubiew, Teodor Parnicki, Jerzy Zawieyski, Zofia Kossak, Jan Dobraczynski, Wladyslaw Grabski, Jerzy Piechowski, Andrzej Piotrowski, Stanislaw Stomma, Jerzy Turowicz, Stefan Kisielewski, Jacek Wozniakowski.2 The most representative publications of this category of intellectuals were Znak, Wiez and Tygodnik Powszechny. Those who published constantly in these papers accepted, implicitly, the power of the Party in society and allowed censorship to check their writings. Consequently, these writers were perceived as conformists by their peers who published underground or abroad.3

Actually, the attitude branded as conformist was an expression of neo-positivism which, argues Adam Michnik, “was taking into consideration the country’s geo-political parameters, as well as her Catholicism, an indispensable part and parcel of Polish public life”4. The most prominent representative of neo-positivism, Stanislaw Stomma, was referring to USSR, in the traditional way, naming it the great Russian power, and did not regard it as a country dominated by a regime which was propagating and promoting Marxist ideology. Stomma’s and his group’s purpose was to create the core of a political movement, able to take the power and, at a given time, govern the Polish nation. Such an opportunity could have been seized during the years 1956-1959, when the communist system had begun to show the first signs of disintegration.5 For this strategy, Stanislaw Stomma took as model Roman Dmowski, the leader and doctrinaire of national democracy, who understood to serve the Polish nation by respecting the institutional framework of the great Russian power. In this respect, in 1906, Dmowski entered the Duma of tsarist Russia, and in 1957, he became member of the Diet. For the leader of the National Democrat Party (Endecja),

1 Czeslaw MILOSZ, “History of Polish Literature”, Berkeley, 1983, apud Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature…cit., p. 48. 2 Carl TIGHE, The Politics of Literature…cit., pp. 48-49. 3 Ibidem, pp. 47-48. 4 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 128. 5 Ibidem, p. 128.


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World War II represented the best moment to win the independence of his country.1 As an embodiment of the Polish nationalism of early 20th century, Dmowski exerted a strong influence on the political culture of the banks of the Vistula long after his death. Thus, the book in which he developed his political philosophy, Thoughts of a Modern Pole, would become very popular not only in the days of its author, but also in the ’80s, as an incentive text of the Solidarity, as movement which strove to regain national independence.2 In this work, Dmowski states that “the primordial goal of the Popular National Union is the power of the Polish nation and state...”3 To achieve this goal, it was necessary to create a “material base for the Polish force” by developing the cities, the crafts, and the country’s industries and commerce, by strengthening the middle class, the numerous and prosperous households of the peasants and the thriving working class. This material dimension of the Polish power had to be accrued by the moral force of the nation which can be the fruit but of “the education of society in a religious and national spirit, instilling in the citizens the feeling they are all equal before the law and that they all have the same responsibilities in the state”. Dmowski’s quality of conservative and catholic intellectual is made conspicuous by the fact he declared that the pillars which support national education are the Church, school, family and the authority of the state. Moreover, the leader of Endecjiei states resolutely that the nation’s moral education rests on religion, the Church paying the role of guide of moral life. That is why, Dmowski argues that “all religious beliefs should enjoy a total freedom of confession and rite in Poland”, but, as “the overwhelming majority of the Polish nation is catholic”, everybody should acknowledge the leading role of the Catholic Church.4

Hence, Roman Dmowski and Stanislaw Stomma represent the central landmarks of the category of catholic Polish writers, both of them having as priority the relation with the Church and the nation’s moral, economic and political strengthening. As in the case of Polish intellectuals any approach of an issue related to national identity cannot ignore the moment this nation lost its sovereignty after the 18th century partitions, we should mention that the way Dmowski deals with this moment is one closer to the realist rather than to the romantic tradition in Polish political thought. Thus, in Dmowski’s opinion, the three partitions of Poland (in 1773, 1793 and 1795) among Russia, Prussia and Austria had as main cause not so much external, as internal factors (represented by the decay and corruption of the szlachtei, the ruling class of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). Denouncing the noble and proud experience of Poland as a “historical nation”, still bearing the seeds of her own destruction,5 Dmowski believes that the solution to regain sovereignty lies in a domestic moral and economic strengthening of Polish energies. By building a program

1 Ibidem, p. 128. 2 Peter F. SUGAR, Naţionalismul est-european în secolul al- XX- lea, trans. Radu Paraschivescu, Curtea Veche, București, 2002, pp. 221-222. 3 Roman DMOWSKI, “Mysli Novoczesnego Polaka” (Gândurile unui polonez modern), Sklad Glowny Gazeta Warszawska, Warszawa, 1933, apud Peter F. Sugar, op. cit., p. 205. 4 Ibidem, p. 207. 5 Ibidem, p. 219.


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based on the existing realities, in tune with positivist thinkers, Dmowski considers that the defence and consolidation of the nation had to be effected with the instruments of education. But unlike the positivists (who maintained themselves at an apolitical level), Dmowski pleads that the struggle had to be extended in the political plan too, through the respect and the enforcement of the existing legal framework. For the leader of Endecjiei, the solution to the Polish issue resided largely in a rapprochement to Russia, given that Prussia’s policy of Germanisation of Polish territories had become an increasingly great threat.1 Discarding the romantic philosophy of all or nothing, the realism promoted by Dmowski evinces the necessity to collaborate with Russia and with the other partitionist powers, with a view to obtaining political concessions leading progressively to autonomy, as a first step to a future independence. This strategy would be successfully applied also in October 1956, when, unlike the Hungarians who played the independence card, the Polish people limited themselves to fight for a leader of the Polish Communist Party chosen by themselves and not imposed by the Soviets.2 So the Polish conservative and catholic intellectuals’ political thinking more often than not tended to realistically evaluate the political situation, to distinguish between short term and long term objectives of the country, and especially to obtain and preserve an as large an autonomy as possible which might promote educational activities (with the help of the Church, family and school) meant to fortify the nation. Naturally, such a perspective excluded romantic revolutionary philosophy and the radical fight with the system. That is the reason why the members of this intellectual current were regarded, especially after 1945, as too inclined to compromise with the regime. Similarly, the adepts of the organic work philosophy of the 19th century were accused by those who did not agree with this perspective on resistance that their political passivity stemmed from the desire to protect their economic interests.

In fact, two categories of intellectuals asserted themselves within this current: those who, like Dmowski and Stomma, were anxious to create a basis for the nation’s resistance founded on conservative values, and others, as the writer Jerzy Andrzejewski (1909-1983) who, as Czeslaw Milosz pointed out,3 in the context generated by the totalitarian communist regime, turned from catholic moral to the moral of social conformism. Andrzejewski is portrayed by Milosz as a representative type of moralist intellectuals deprived of that inner substance that would have been proper for the public role he assumed. Because of this spiritual inconsistency, says Milosz, the number of catholic writers is extremely small in the 20th century, which confirms the fact that “usually the so-called conversions of intellectuals pertain to a rather dubious species and do not differ from the transient conversions to surrealism,

1 Stanislaus A. BLEJWAS, Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival in Nineteenth Century Poland, Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1984, pp. 195-197. 2 Ibidem, p. 199. 3 It is about the character Alfa through whom Czeslaw Milosz presents, in fact, not only a singular case, but a whole category of intellectuals attracted, in the beginning, by the values of Catholicism, but who did not take deep roots in this perspective, and yielded, later on, to the pressures and temptations of the totalitarian regime. Cf. chapter „Alfa or the moralist” in Czeslaw MILOSZ, Gândirea captivă. Eseu despre logocraţiile populare, trans. Constantin Geambaşu, Humanitas, București, 1999, pp. 90-115.


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expressionism, existentialism, etc.”1 Several times these conversions proved to be the mere effects of a cultural fashion (which had as main ingredient the interest in Thomism and J. Maritain’s philosophy). Thus, considering that “each one sought in Catholicism something else”, the assumption of its values was used by many 20th century intellectuals more like a mask ordained to cover their own nakedness.2 This distorted relation of intellectuals with the Church, fruit of a rather political than religious conversion, is labelled by Michnik as the second treason of intellectuals.3 The lack of authenticity as regards the relation with faith and the Church represents for the Polish critique of communism an as great, still much subtler a danger as the adherence to the communist ideology. The diagnosis made by Witold Gombrowicz to the intellectuals’ spiritual condition in post-war Poland is a relevant example in this respect. In Gombrowicz’s opinion, communism succeeds to enslave the minds not only through its persuasive force, but also through the negative fascination it exerts on certain intellectuals, in the sense they become so obsessed with the idea of fighting against the regime that they evaluate all the other aspects of life according to this landmark and not for its intrinsic value. Also in Gombrowicz’s opinion, “our mind is so chained to our situation and so enthralled by communism, that all our thoughts are directed only against it or for it – and we are avant la lettre attached to its waggon, it defeated us by binding us to it, though we enjoy an illusory liberty.” Consequently, “we are allowed today to think of Catholicism too as if it were but a force able to offer resistance, and God has become a gun with which we want to shoot Marx.”4 Seeing things this way, Gombrowicz does not hesitate to address the harshest of words to his fellow countrymen:

“Hypocrites! If you need Catholicism, then become more serious and try to get closer to it with sincerity. Let not the common front you are going to make be just a political one! I just think that no matter what might happen in our spiritual life, let it be as profound and honest as possible. It is high time atheists sought a new understanding with the Church”.5 Though interested in a rapprochement between intellectuals and the Church,

cardinal Wyszynski did not hesitate to stand firmly against turning faith into an instrument for social purposes. In fact, the primate of Poland was convinced that for a long period of time there was no catholic intellectuality in the purest sense of the word. The reason of this relevant absence of intellectuals, in the most critical moments, “from the battle field for the catholic ideal”, resided in the fact that “intellectual milieus remained always close to relativism in matters of thinking and morals”.6 According to Wyszynski, the intellectuals’ major problem is that although

1 Ibidem, p. 92. 2 Ibidem, p. 94. 3 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 196. 4 Witold GOMBROWICZ, Jurnal…cit., p. 49. 5 Ibidem, p. 49. 6 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 195.


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they cherish the conviction that Poland can be saved only through the Church, they do not adhere to it. Thus, explains the primate, “the intellectual approaches the Church because he is in search of political thrills, but he does not live a life filled with grace”, although “grace is the main force of the Church”.1

Another symptom of this intellectual category is, according to Milosz, the abuse of words, in the sense that the respective writers are not deeply convinced of the reality of the conflicts they create in their works. What characterises mainly the Alpha type of intellectual is the passage, according to the political context, from catholic ethics (fashionable during the inter-war period) to the ethics of loyalty, as a prolongation of Christian ethics, but opposed to social ethics (a theme widely spread in the political underground literature during the war) and then to the ethics of the New Creed (enacted by socialist realism).2 According to Milosz, the sole remedy for this sort of intellectual and moral stumbling is the passion for truth. Frequently this passion for truth finds its expression through “that inner voice which prevents us from uttering too many things”. We have in mind that restraint which should govern a writer when he feels he cannot say all the truth, but only a part of it.3 It is precisely in favour of this complete harmony between the author and his text that Witold Gombrowicz militates when confessing that: “I believe that all the things I endorse have a value inasmuch as an idea severed from a particular man does not fully exist. There are no other ideas but the embodied ones. There is no word which is not also a body”.4 We find this idea, differently formulated and in another context, in Adam Michnik’s work, where he plainly pointed out that “the motherland of intellectuals is the Truth” and that their duty is to say the Truth.5 The specific nuances which individualise the two Polish intellectuals reside in the fact that Milosz stresses artistic truth (in other words that the writer must not deal with the themes and concepts he works with as if they were some toys, he must treat them as realities which have to be experienced), and Michnik understands by the duty of telling the truth especially the protection of the civil rights of the members of the national community. Let us add to all these standpoints also Leszek Kolakowski’s, according to whom the most important responsibility of intellectuals is the “correct and as less as possible guileful utilisation of the word”.6 For Kolakowski,

“it is less the truth than the spirit of the truth which matters, since no one can swear never to be mistaken; but the spirit of the truth can be preserved, which means never to relinquish a vigilant suspicion related to one’s own words and

1 Ibidem, p. 195. 2 Czeslaw MILOSZ, Gândirea captivă…cit., pp. 95-111. 3 Ibidem, p. 115. 4 Witold GOMBROWICZ, Jurnal…cit., p. 118. 5 Adam MICHNIK, Scrisori din închisoare…cit., p. 259. 6 Lezek KOLAKOWSKI, Modernitatea sub un neobosit colimator, translated by Mihnea Gafiţa, ed. Curtea Veche, București, 2007, p. 62.


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identifications, and to know how to recant one’s own errors and be able to amend them alone.”1 In conclusion, the pivotal challenge which any attempt to x-ray a model of the

engaged Polish intellectual must assume has in view the possibility of identifying a category of intellectuals situated in between or outside the two poles of power. In this respect, the question that rises refers to the ways in which this sort of intellectual might preserve his independent statute, while keeping his statute of engaged intellectual too. The answer given to this query by the Polish pattern of anti-totalitarian resistance rested, it seems, in unceasingly fostering and assuming the fundamental tension between what Adam Michnik called the model of the priest, represented by cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, and the model of the buffoon, embodied by the rebel writer Witold Gombrowicz. The profile of Polish civil society, even in its current hypostasis, cannot be depicted in all its complexity without taking into account these two historical paradigms of the Polish intellectual, as well as the specificity of their dialogue.

1 Ibidem.


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Bibliography BARANCZAK, Stanislaw, Breathing Under Water And Other East European Essays,

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, 1992. BLEJWAS, Stanislaus A., Realism in Polish Politics: Warsaw Positivism and National Survival

in Nineteenth Century Poland, Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, New Haven, 1984.

BOETIUS (of Dacia), Despre viaţa filosofului, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005; DAVIES, Norman, Heart of Europe. The Past in Poland’s Present, Oxford University

Press, New York, 2001. De LIBERA, Alain Gândirea Evului Mediu, trans. Mihaela and Ion Zgărdău, Amarcord,

Timişoara, 2000. GOMBROWICZ, Witold, Jurnal, selection, translation and notes by Olga Zaicik,

Univers, București, 1998. KOLAKOWSKI, Lezek, Modernitatea sub un neobosit colimator, trans. Mihnea Gafiţa,

Curtea Veche, București, 2007. LE BRETON, Jean-Marie, Europa Centrală şi Orientală între 1917 şi 1990, trans. Micaela

Slăvescu, Cavallioti, 1996. MICHNIK, Adam, L’Eglise et la gauche. Le dialogue polonais, trans. Agnes Slonimski,

Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1979. MICHNIK, Adam, Scrisori din închisoare şi alte eseuri, Polirom, Iaşi, 1997. MILOSZ, Czeslaw Gândirea captivă. Eseu despre logocraţiile populare, trans. Constantin

Geambaşu, Humanitas, București, 1999. SOLJENIŢÂN, Aleksandr, Viţelul şi stejarul. Însemnări din viaţa literară, vol. I, trans.

Maria and Ion Nastasia, Humanitas, București, 2002. SUGAR, Peter F., Naţionalismul est-european în secolul al-XX-lea, trans. Radu

Paraschivescu, Curtea Veche, București, 2002. TIGHE, Carl, The Politics of Literature. Poland 1945-1989, University of Wales Press,

Cardiff, 1999.


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Democracy against Nationalism. The A.C. Popovici Case

Gelu SABĂU

Hyperion University of Bucharest

Abstract: This article seeks out to analyze the critique of democracy in Romania during the first half of the twentieth century. The starting point of this analysis is the opposition between nationalism and democracy theorized by the Romanian political scientist Aurel C. Popovici. We can find the origin of A. C. Popovici’s conception in Eminescu’s critical attitude towards modern society and French liberalism. A.C. Popovici emphasizes the irreducible opposition between democracy, which is global and universal, and nationalism, which has the capacity to underline the cultural specificity of every nation. I will try to compare the way in which Popovici refers to democracy and nationalism with the approach of this ratio in Western societies (England or France). Keywords: nationalism, democracy, conservatism, modernity, Eastern society.

1. FOREWORD Aurel Popovici is one of the most important political thinkers of the beginning

of the 20th century. Born in the then Austro-Hungarian administered Banat, he studies medicine and political sciences in Vienna and Graz. His intellectual path shall be decisively marked by his origins. Even since his time as a student he stands out through his protests against the abuses of the Magyarization policy, even being sentenced to serve prison because of Memoriul Studenților din România (The Romanian Students’ Report). In 1906 he compiles a project of federalization of Great Austria aiming to solve de problem of nationalities within the Empire and becomes close to the crown prince Franz Ferdinand, who was a sympathizer of this project. The assassination of the prince in Sarajevo in 1914 and the offset of the Second World War will cause the permanent termination of this project.

During his time in Bucharest he teaches German and manages the Sămănătorul (The Sower – archaic Romanian) magazine, after Nicolae Iorga quits. In 1910 he publishes a volume entitled Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne (Nationalism or Democracy. A critique of the modern civilization), gathering articles published within Sămănătorul during his management. This book and the one about The Great Austria are the most important works of A.C. Popovici.


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Although an extremely knowledgeable writer and a refined political thinker, A.C. Popovici is an author that has almost been forgotten in our day. Except for his volumes being edited by Constantin Schifirneț there is no monograph dedicated to the thinker from Banat, and the studies on his mind -set are extremely scarce1. A possible explanation is that A.C. Popovici is a firm nationalist, and today nationalism is no longer currency. But, on the other hand there are several other nationalist writers that are discussed and commented on even today (M. Eminescu, N. Iorga or Nae Ionescu). The reasons of A.C. Popovici’s strange oblivion, not being an influential writer even in the inter - war period, can be connected, as C. Schifirneț suggests, to his project of federalization of Austria:

“We consider that his paper Statele Unite ale Austriei Mari (The United States of Great Austria), suggesting the federalist solution, his attempts to convince Austrian authorities to put into action his federalist ideas, as well as his combatant attitude towards democracy were decisive for his future course by expressing ab initio reserves concerning his theses”.2 I have chosen to study here A.C. Popovici’s political vision because for me he

is an important fraction of the multitude of conservative and nationalist Romanian thinkers in the 20th century. Then, by the trenchant opposition that he sketches between democracy and nationalism, A.C. Popovici’s vision had an important contribution in the radical critique of the democratic regimes in the inter -war period. Furthermore, by the fact that his vision is in a certain degree the result of the historical circumstances, it can offer an important indication of the manner in which a certain culture and political mentality came into being in our country, a culture whose roots are in my opinion still alive.

2. A.C. POPOVICI’S CONSERVATISM In the present study I shall handle specifically the analysis of the ideas and

vision presented in Naționalism sau democrație. First and foremost A.C. Popovici describes himself as a conservative, explicitly relating to two masters of the conservative thinking: Edmund Burke, who was also considered the father of European conservatism and Mihai Eminescu, the man Popovici calls “our times’ signs

1 We would like to point out a few studies on Aurel C. POPOVICI: Virgil NEMOIANU, “A Jeffersonian Neoconservatorist in the End of the Century Vienna: Aurel C. POPOVICI”, România și liberalismele ei, Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, București, 2000 and Constantin SCHIFIRNEȚ, “Aurel C. Popovici: a conservative point of view on the nation”, and “Aurel C. Popovici on the federalist state organisation of the nations”, in Idem, Geneza modernă a ideii naționale, Albatros Publishing House, București, 2001. 2 Constantin SCHIFIRNEȚ, Geneza modernă...cit., p. 102. We consider that his reservations concerning the works of Aurel C. Popovici were likely determined by his ideas concerning a possible Austrian federative state, excluding the existence of a Great Romania, and not his critical attitude towards democracy, taking into account that in the interwar period there was a relatively strong anti-democratic current.


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prophet”1, the author that probably had the most influential political vision among the Romanian conservatives. Popovici makes several references to Edmund Burke, and he dedicates an entire encomiastic article to Eminescu. It is true that we can find all traits of conservative thought in Popovici.

Firstly, we notice the exposure of the “reasonable” vision according to which the state is the result of a social contract coming from the rational will of individuals. Like Eminescu, who almost obsessively repeats, Popovici also states that “the state […] is not an artificial, drifting product. Its origin and entire existence is a product of nature and not a simple logical abstraction, not an intellectual construct”2. As such, societies, nations and states are the result of an unlabored historic evolution, of a certain population on a given land. So, we are dealing with the organic vision of society development, with all that it implies: gradual evolution, where as that of a plant that grows in time, any intervention from the exterior is improper and having a detrimental effect. The growth of a society has to begin with its own resources, represented by traditions, customs and beliefs, and not from formal rules inferred from an a priori lucidity.

Even more so the respective rules do not necessarily match all societies. Popovici is here in full agreement with Maiorescu’s conservative critique of the forms without substance:

“The language, beliefs and manners sustain a people, and new laws allow it to naturally grow further. But again, only if they match its character. Because this is the only way laws can be accepted by the people. This way, the people get «perfect» laws in the law book, in pockets with gazettes and speeches, while their souls are in discontent, revolt! Because the entire being of the nation, its whole nature had been drained by absurd, disastrous laws and theories”.3 The French Revolution enunciates its modern political principles in “The

Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen” and it has, as such, through the abstract rationalism that it disseminates, a leveling effect on the way politics are made, irrespective of the development stage of a society. This “imperialistic” influence has a detrimental effect on many societies because it does not take into account their natural development rate and risks disturbing the social order in the name of some “imaginary” rights:

“I particularly advocate that natural evolution, that which is usually called development, advancement, is always disrupted artificially, especially for the past hundred years, by theories that have no grounding in what is natural, that is science, made by impulsive and hurried men, and which, for years, have been draining through their disciples the life of the European states under the pretext of

1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne, Albatros Publishing House, București, 1997, p. 92. 2 Ibidem, p. 195. 3 Ibidem, p. 135.


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bringing them in a «scientific manner» towards an I do not know what kind of uniform «world progress»” (original emphasis).1 Another common stance of conservative ideology that A.C. Popovici assumes

is that of the difference between the political “theory” or the politics deduced from abstract principles and the political “practice” or politics as an art. The goal of politics is to adopt, with a certain restraint, from the principles acclaimed by the politic sciences only what can be beneficial for the society at a certain point in its existence. To make social changes originating from premade doctrines and ideologies can be just as harmful, if not even more so, than if no reform was made in that society.

“Practical politics is not an exact science yet, but a sui -generis art. From the positive and certain results of sciences, even the so -called politic sciences, it can only take what it needs. It, not science! For political, not doctrinarian purposes. Because politics is neither an experiment laboratory nor a formula department, of «conceptions» of history or legal vocabulary, of theories about «historical law», of «natural rights», etc.” (original emphasis).2 Here we can certainly make a reference to Eminescu, who regards as

“charlatans” those ideologists of the Forty-Eighters movement who believe that evoking certain principles from The French Revolution is a solution for the problems of any society3.

In order to prevent a rupture from tradition and the radical reforms that the ideologues of the middle class are promoting, Popovici states, like Burke, that society is not the result of an agreement on which individuals settle upon at a certain time, but the result of an immaterial contract between the forefathers, the present and the next generations: “The sovereignty of the nation is not and cannot be the expression of our will, people nowadays. It does not contain only the ambition of the living. But also all the hopes of the dead. All their virtues and sacrifices for the country, for us, their descendants” (original emphasis).4

3. THE CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY AND DEMOCRACY Following Eminescu, A.C. Popovici is a radical critic both of the ideas of

political modernity and the principles enunciated by The French Revolution, as well as a critic of democracy. Nevertheless, the two authors have different reasons for their 1 Ibidem, p. 116. 2 Ibidem, p. 117. 3 For example, Mihail EMINESCU, “Icoane vechi și icoane nouă”, Timpul, 14 December 1877; Idem, Opere politice, Vol. II, Timpul Publishing House, Iași, 1997, p. 26. For a critique of political rationalism in Eminescu, see Ioan STANOMIR, Reacțiune și conservatorism. Eseu asupra imaginarului politic eminescian, Nemira Publishing House, București, 2000 (chapter “Secolul raționalist, tranziția și libera Engliteră”), pp. 140-195. 4 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 213. Also see Edmund BURKE, Reflecții asupra Revoluției din Franța, trans. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp, Nemira Publishing House, București, 2000, p. 138.


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critiques. Eminescu denies the ideas of political modernity starting from his critique of the way in which the modernization of the Romanian society took place. This modernization process, starting with 1829 with the entry of the Romanian provinces under the economical and ideological influence of the West, is accompanied by a paradoxical phenomenon: on the one hand we have the birth of a new structure, typical for a modern society (centralized administration, banks, bureaucracy, railway system, etc.), and on the other hand the demise of the small craftsmen (the ones that should have become the new bourgeoisie) under the pressure of the competition with foreign industrial goods.

Modern Western society is based on an industrialized economy with an added -value that enables the birth of a middle class. In relation to that, Romania has a double disadvantage: on the one hand it exports agricultural products (with low added value) and on the other hand it imports industrial products that carry a significant added value1 The only thing is that, a modern political regime, in order to be effective, needs a strong middle class. In our case, in return, the middle class is made out of social strata dependent on the state that is “superposed strata”, as Eminescu called it: clerks, bankers, intellectuals, attorneys, etc2. So, lacking a middle class leads to the inability of putting into practice the principles of a modern constitution3. To this, we can also add the deterioration of the fate of the peasants in the second half of the 19th century, the social class that is considered to be the highest in number in Romania in the respective period of time and, according to Eminescu, the only productive social strata4

In consequence, the modernization accomplished by the liberal Forty -Eighters in the name of the principles of political modernity leads, at least on a short term, to the deterioration of Romanian society. Eminescu draws the logical conclusion, through a line of argument that starts from the social contract, through The French Revolution and the Forty -Eighters Movement to the decadence of Romanian society. This is an explanation for his alternative point of view on the state, as a product of nature and not the result of a rational contract between individuals.

Unlike Eminescu, criticizing modernity first and foremost because of its social effects, the reasons for A.C. Popovici’s critiques pertain to the national problem, more precisely the situation of the Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That is because the Hungarian Forty -Eighters apply, in the name of the sovereignty of the people inspired by the French Revolution, a Magyarization policy, by people understanding mainly the Hungarian ethnics:

“Kossuth had foreseen the ideas of severance from Austria with the purpose of centralizing the power of Hungary in the hands of the Hungarians, that it may

1 Mihail EMINESCU, “Icoane vechi și icoane nouă”, Timpul, 13 December 1877. 2 Idem, Opere politice...cit., p. 21. 3 Mihail EMINESCU, “Influența austriacă asupra românilor din principate”, Convorbiri literare, 1 August, 1876; Idem, Opere politice...cit., p. 17. 4 Idem, “Influența austriacă asupra românilor din principate”, Convorbiri literare, 1 august, 1876; Idem, Opere politice...cit., p. 17.


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turn the multinational, historic and actual mosaic of Hungary into a homogenous nation. To this end, he started from the democratic concepts. He would only recognise in Hungary a single sovereignty: that of «the nation». Sure enough, the Hungarian one” (original emphasis).1 Therefore, this is how modern democracy, exercised in the name of the

sovereignty of the people, can lead, when we are talking about a multi -ethnic state, to a conflict between the cohabitant nationalities. In this case, the Hungarians have the political power, and the ethnical “minorities” (Romanians, Serbs, Ukrainians, etc.) shall abide. As such, we have a first conflict between the democratic principles of people’s sovereignty (as the product of rational deduction that implies a universally -applicable process of governing) and the principle of nationality, which entails the preservation of historical, cultural and political identity of each people, or in other words, each ethnicity. Trying to avoid such a leveling centralization, Popovici proposes the project of a Federal Austrian State, based on a broad autonomy of all cohabitant ethnicities.

On the other hand, Popovici considers democracy as based only on a formal and quantitative procedure that, as it is applied to all societies had the tendency to erase all differences between them.

“The politician draws from modern politics, and these politics from the democratic ideology. In Paris, Rome, Athens, and Belgrade – same stereotyped accusations to the politics, like in Bucharest. It seems like they are the same politicians, same «independents» and the same gazettes. The differences are only of a formal, exterior character. Because all but a few start from the same constitutional principles”.2 We are dealing with an avant la lettré globalization. This universalist leveling

platen that the democrat ideology and modern civilization have brought with themselves is opposed by the principle of nationality that is a qualitative principle.

“Nationality is specifically a pronounced individuality of the people. It is based on the existence of a common territory, on the conscience of a common origin, a common history and language and, partially, the realization of the existence of a common religion and mentality. Being national is living politically autonomous, so you can continue developing a particular culture”.3 This dichotomy qualitative nationality – quantitative democracy is assumed by A.C.

Popovici, arising from the romantic difference between culture and civilization4.

1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 16. 2 Ibidem, p. 142. 3 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Stat și națiune. Statele Unite ale Austriei-Mari: studii politice în vederea rezolvării problemei naționale și a crizelor constituționale din Austro-Ungaria, translated by Petre Pandrea, Editura Albatros, București, 1997, p. 206. 4 “Culture comes, as we already know, first of all from the cult a people has for the moral order of the world, its own order. Civilisation, in a narrow sense, is a technical development. It makes physical


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Through history, traditions and customs, culture is the holder of the spiritual identity of a people, while civilization, with its modern political and institutional forms, with the new technologies, has the tendency, through its leveling platen, to destroy authenticity and cultural differences. This is the source of A.C. Popovici’s rhetoric writings on Western culture, a “waiting staff” culture, just because it has lost its sense of tradition, while “superior culture” is based on the faith in God. From this point of view, a simple Romanian rural priest is for Popovici superior to a scholar from the civilized world that has lost faith1.

Another reason for A.C. Popovici to stand against democracy is this acceptation of the term. That is because for Popovici democracy is first of all direct democracy, on Rousseauist filiation. Or, direct democracy is generally unfeasible, with the exception of some small communities2 Then, the fact that democracy is based on the sovereignty of the people entails the involvement of all citizens in political problems. The problem arising here comes from the fact that generally people are so ignorant when it comes to highly complex political problems. Hence, as Popovici ironically remarks, a shoemaker is asked to have more cognizance than a citizen called upon to express his political opinion:

“[…] according to the enlightened idea of a democrat, making shoes is a «social» business that has far more importance than ‘making laws’ and their safeguard. Because for shoemaking he, the democrat, requires licensed skilled workers, but he always and serenely places the affairs of the state in the hand of all tinkers” (original emphasis)3. Because the sovereignty of the people that is so acclaimed in democracy, and

democracy itself implies the political equality of all individuals, where there is really no equality, A.C. Popovici foresees the danger that a democracy easily degenerates into a demagogical or even authoritarian regime:

“[…] us, who consider ourselves sovereign atoms, we greatly appreciate always being told about «democracy» and we think of ourselves as the «true» power in the state. A delusion, like many others in life. As for reality, both now and before, there is little else than demagogy. And that leads any country and any people to perdition” (original emphasis).4

survival possible, by offering us the conditions and facilitations belonging to the material life, clothes, communication”. (Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,…cit., p. 27). For the difference between culture and civilisation, Aurel C. POPOVICI, also see Geneza modernă...cit., pp. 109-111. 1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,…cit., p. 38. 2 Here is a relevant quote from this point of view: “Radical «true» democracy, is a simple mental abstraction that could never have existed and can never exist but in eternal promises and eternal deceptions, continuous reprimands and brotherly fighting. Democracy is a word. Because this is the nature of the peoples and in fact only one person or a group of people can govern them. Never, and for a thousand words, a people cannot govern itself“ (Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație…cit., p. 356). 3 Ibidem, p. 173. 4 Ibidem, p. 358.


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Thence, for Popovici, the danger of the democratic regimes is the fact that they

allow demagogues access to power, hereby destroying the elite of society, whose true role is that of safekeeping and passing on the values of a nation. The main risk is the nation itself dwindling.

In all verity, notwithstanding his great political knowledge, A.C. Popovici displays the limitations of his notion of democracy while debating it1 with Constantin Stere. Popovici’s entire perspective on modern democracy is questioned through the distinction Stere makes between the forms of state and the forms of government2. Therefore, Stere correctly points out that democracy is a form of state that has the tendency to assert itself everywhere in the modern age, from the simple reason that today there is no other form of legitimate sovereignty except the sovereignty of the people. Unlike the democratic state, that has the tendency to become universal, the forms of government define, through their constitutions, the way in which sovereignty is carried out. The forms of government are those that have to take into account the specific characteristics of each state.

4. LIBERALISM AND NATIONALISM 4.1. Liberalism versus Nationalism A.C. Popovici’s nationalist conception certainly reflects Eminescu’s influence.

However, while Eminescu is a critic of democracy and of the 1848 liberalism, A.C. Popovici is an opponent of democracy and an adept of liberalism. According to Popovici, democracy with its inherent tendency to freedom, is irreconcilably opposed to liberalism that always privileges freedom at the expense of equality: “Any democracy is essentially egalitarian. And liberalism is the most categorical denial of the equality inferred from abstractions, theories and fantasies. True liberalism, as the English one used to be, does not start from dreams, but from the practice of life”3 (original emphasis). The explicit reference to the English liberalism implicitly hints at E. Burke’s doctrine that promotes the freedom of those who hold the power at the expense of all citizens’ tendency to equality4. And for A.C. Popovici, freedom is an aristocratic and creative 1 The debate took place in 1908, through some articles between Aurel C. Popovici, the manager of Sămănătorul magazine and Constantin Stere, the manager of Viața Românească (Romanian Life) magazine. 2 The forms of state are characterised by the way in which sovereignty is attributed, while forms of governing are dependant of the way in which sovereignty is exercised. See Constantin STERE, “Democratismul and A. C. Popovici”, Scrieri (Writings), Minerva Publishing House, București, 1979, pp. 579-584. 3 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,...cit., p. 359. 4 According to Burke, democracy corrupts natural order, because the idea of equality between individuals is against nature. Society relies on order and on a hierarchy that imitates the hierarchy of the created world. Unlike Rousseau, who considers that the equality between individuals is given by their freedom to take part in the exercise of power, Burke considers that freedom is only for those who exercise power at


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principle, unlike the principle of equality that is homogenizing and plebean. The duty of any state is to defend the elites’ creative capacity from the cosmopolitan threat of democratic egalitarianism1.

A.C. Popovici’s conservative ideas thus gain a liberal nuance. And indeed, he finds the best conditions of any society’s development in the blending of the two political ideologies:

“[…] the normal life of a state, of a nation, needs only two parties: a conservative party, that needs to maintain, preserve the inheritance of the past, to defend historical continuity [...] and a liberal party that represents the necessary changes imposed by the times, but always with the intention to deepen, to strengthen the national character in the country and in the people” (original emphasis).2 Therefore, nationalist conservatism and liberalism are the factors that can

determine the healthy and natural development of a society. However, liberalism is a positive factor only if moderate, i.e. it does not lead to democracy3 But are nationalist conservatism and liberalism compatible from Popovici’s perspective?

If we refer to classical liberalism that is based on the inalienable rights that the individuals possess in a natural state, the civil society being a product of the contract between these individuals, then liberalism is incompatible with nationalism. Nationalism entails the individuals’ organic belonging to community and places community above the individual, while liberalism prioritizes the individual at the expense of community: “according to this (contractual, natural rights) conception, society is posterior to the individual and not the other way round, as organicism of all types claims; in the organicist vision, society is prior to individuals, or according to an Aristotelian formulation [...] the whole precedes the parts”4. One of the consequences of the liberal conception of the individuals’ inalienable natural rights is the minimal role of the state in society, the function of the state being to guarantee the protection of these rights.

Notwithstanding A.C. Popovici’s nationalist and organicist outlook, there are passages where he sounds like a classical liberal, speaking about the minimal role of the state in society:

the expense of the subordinated. Therefore, freedom is incompatible with citizens’ equality (Leo Strauss, Histoire de la philosophie politique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1999, p. 770 and Edmund Burke, Reflexions sur la Révolution de France, trans. Pierre Andler, Paris, 1989, pp. XLI-XLIII). 1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., pp. 362-363. 2 Ibidem, p. 351. 3 “National conservatism and moderate liberalism, these are the conditions for a healthy development. I deliberately say: moderate liberalism, because I myself am certain that it is only through moderation that liberalism becomes national. By no means through its evolution towards radical democracy”(Ibidem, p. 106). For the multiplicity of possible relations between liberalism and democracy, see Norberto BOBBIO, Liberalism și democrație, trans. Ana-Luana Stoicea, Editura Nemira, București, 1998, pp. 74-99. 4 Norberto BOBBIO, Liberalism și democrație...cit., p. 34.


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”But then, what does the state have to do not to create dissatisfaction for its people or peoples? To this I answer: the state should not be over -enthusiastic especially in matters that do not concern it. The main thing for it to do is: to grant its people or peoples the freedom they need to develop on their own, in their national and individual spirit, in accordance with their past and their specific nature”.1 One notices that in the above paragraph Popovici talks about the relationship

between the state and the people or the state and the peoples. The employment of the singular “people” may make us think he refers to the all citizens of a state, but when one talks about “peoples”, we understand that the phrase means the ethnicities within a certain state. Thus, Popovici implicitly refers to a multi -ethnic state. And it is at this point that liberalism and nationalism intersect. While according to classical liberalism, the individual is the possessor of inalienable natural rights, Popovici transfers these right onto a nation, therefore a population that shares one ethnicity, language and customs2.

4.2. The Spirit of 1848 in Ardeal From this perspective, A.C. Popovici is the follower of the 1848 tradition of

Ardeal, that defends the rights of the Romanian population in the Empire, especially through the character of Simion Bărnuțiu. In the 1842 protest he sends to the Magyar authorities in response to the decision of the Diet from Cluj to adopt the Magyar language as the official language in Transylvania, one finds the roots of a juridical philosophy that was very important to all the supporters of the national rights of the Romanians in the Habsburg Empire. Here is a passage from Barnutiu’s text:

“[...] each man or people (emphasis added), as a speaking creature has the right to live in this world and manifest their personality (jus subsistentiae personalis), to move their bodily force, their hands and feet, to earn their outer fortune, and the spiritual force [...] to earn their inner fortune: knowledge in various sciences, arts, foreign languages and native tongues (jus libertatis personalis); and these rights should be granted to all individuals and peoples equally (emphasis added), as all people and peoples are equal subl. n.), in this respect [...] (jus aequalitatis personalis) (emphasis added)”.3 As Petre Pandrea demonstrates in his study about Simion Bărnuțiu, the

Kantian philosopher Krug had a great influence over Bărnuțiu’s thinking in this text.

1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 157. 2 This is Aurel C. Popovici’s definition of the nation: “Nationality is defined as: a people, who lives in the same territory, speaks the same language and has reached a homogeneous national consciousness, yearns for a common cultural-political ideal. The main characteristic of nationalities, that also gives it a great political importance, is represented by the national consciousness [...]. This is the cogito, ergo sum of nationality: a moral unity based on a common thinking” (Aurel C. POPOVICI, Stat și națiune...cit., p. 199). 3 Simion BĂRNUȚIU, “Tocmeală de rușine...”, in Petre PANDREA, Filosofia politico-juridică a lui Simion Bărnuțiu, “King Charles II” Foundation for Literature and Art, București, 1935, p. 42.


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Here is a paragraph from the German philosopher from whom Bărnuțiu explicitly gets inspiration:

“[…] although there is only one primordial right directly based on the nature of the material -rational being - that is the right to validate oneself as a person in the phenomenal world - which may be called the right to personality, since every person can be considered from three perspectives, this right can be divided into the three rights - of personal subsistence, of personal freedom and of personal equality (emphasis added)”.1 Certainly, Krug is a rationalist philosopher, of Kantian origin, and in the above

paragraph he defines the individual fundamental rights: the right to existence, the right to freedom and the right to equality. These are the natural rights supported by the Enlightenment, which would be subsequently contrasted with the doctrine of historical law by the German authors. As we notice, as well as Krug, Bărnuțiu talks about the existence of the same fundamental rights, but unlike Krug, Barnutiu deals with a different topic of law: he does not mention only individuals, but people and peoples, too. This transfer of law from individuals to communities made by Bărnuțiu is made possible by the romantic concept of nation as an organism and by the ideas of Friedrich K. von Savigny’s Historical School of Law that have influenced Bărnuțiu.

P. Pandre claims that Bărnuțiu sustains “a synthesis between the doctrine of natural law and Savigny’s School of Organicist Historicism”2, doctrines which are normally antagonist. On the contrary, the French theoretician Cécile Folschweiller considers that one cannot talk about a synthesis between the two theories, but rather a confusion between the individuals’ natural rights and the peoples’ rights: “il faudrait plutôt parler de la Confusion (consciente ou non?), tant apparaît profonde la divergence entre la Conception de la liberté ici mobilisée [la Conception sur la liberté nationale] et celle, principielle et juridique, issue des Lumières françaises (et allemandes jusqu’à Kant)”.3 According to the French author this confusion is created by the Romanian language borrowing of the two concepts of “natural right” that Fr. von Savigny employs in his writings: naturliches Recht, the “natural” right that results from the living consciousness, practices and customs of a certain community, being a historical and particular right and Naturrecht, the Enlightenment “natural law” that is universal, springing from the rational and universal nature of all individuals4.

Without claiming to solve this debate5, we consider that the transfer of an individual’s natural rights to an ethnic community demanded by a Certain historical 1 Wilhelm T. KRUG, Rechtslehre, apud Petre PANDREA, Filosofia politico-juridică...cit., p. 61. 2 Petre PANDREA, Filosofia politico-juridică...cit., p. 75. 3 Cécile FOLSCHWEILLER, “Les ambiguités de la thèse de l’Etat naturel et du modèle organiciste à Junimea”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. X, No. 2, 2010, p. 253. 4 Ibidem, pp. 252-255. 5 In our opinion, Petre Pandrea does not really talk about “synthesis” in the technical sense of the word, that is the explicit presentation of opposed theses that eventually generates the synthesis. He explicitly demonstrates the influence of Krug’s thinking over Bărnuțiu and states that Bărnuțiu’s ideas result from adapting the German philosopher’s ideas to the historical context: “Krug’s philosophical foundation


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context, could not have been possible in the absence of an organic concept of the nation, itself based on the analogy between the individual and the society. It is the conception generated by Herder and the German Romanticism and which strongly influenced the ideas of the 1848’s spirit in Romania. Only in this way could the nation become a topic of law “the nation is considered an organic, natural structure, endowed with laws of development similar to the ones typical of living organisms. [...] Around 1848, the nation was not an arbitrary construction, neither fallible nor contingent. If it had been different, it could not have become the topic of claims based on the idea of natural right (emphasis added). In order to become socially and politically lucrative, nation had to be founded on natural criteria. [...] Nation [thus] becomes in -attackable, getting all the rights of a living organism”.1

4.3. National Liberalism In his turn, A.C. Popovici acknowledges the legitimacy of the transfer of these

rights from individuals to communities, spotting their origin in the French Revolution:

“The ideals of freedom and equality of the French Revolution initially referred to individuals. Soon, they were then taken over by social groups [...]. By the subsequent differentiation of these general ideas about freedom and equality, the principle of nationalities became foregrounded. If many peoples could replace the monarchic principle with their right to self -determination and their power, why would not other peoples have the right to set themselves free of the absolutism imposed by means of race to another privileged people?” (original emphasis).2

According to this text, individuals as well as peoples have the right to an autonomous existence, the free manifestation of their own identity and equality. Thus, as a consequence of the transfer of these natural rights from individuals to peoples, A.C. Popovici comes to talk about the existence of an ethnic or national right that he opposes to historical right:

“But in our case, the national fight was fought precisely between the historical -political and the national -political principles. Or, if you like, between constitutional rights founded on historical factors and national rights, claimed today. If, since then, since the beginning of these fights the national -constitutional

becomes the criticism of his own society with Bărnuțiu; applications are added and they are national; but the form remains far from Krug’s stylistics.” (op. cit., p. 65). There is no similar demonstration in Savigny’s case, and the Romanian commentator states that Bărnuțiu knows him via Krug, too. (op. cit., p. 57). He considers that Savigny’s influence is determined by the historical contexts and the similar roles held by Savigny and Bărnuțiu for their peoples (op. cit., p. 80). 1 Mona MAMULEA, “Toposuri romantice în fundamentarea filosofică a naționalismului românesc”, Revista de filosofie, Vol. LI, No. 1-2, 2004, p. 205. 2 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Stat și națiune...cit., p. 200.


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principle had been acknowledged and applied, the multiple minority issues as well as the dualist crisis would have disappeared”1 (original emphasis). In this paragraph that raises the issue of minorities in the Austro-Hungarian

Empire, Popovici highlights the opposition between minority rights or national rights and historical rights2. It certainly refers to the demands of the nations within the Empire, among which there were Romanians too. Those demands were justified by the transfer of the individuals’ natural rights to the ethnic communities, against the historical rights invoked by the Magyars over this nation, on account of their previous belonging to the Kingdom of Hungary.

5. THE CRITIQUE OF NATIONALISM Taking over a considerable part of ideas from the Enlightenment and the

German historicism, via the spirit of the 1848 in Ardeal, A.C. Popovici attempts a synthesis between liberal principles and a nationalist conception. The present study continues with a critical examination of Popovici’s nationalist conception. I will do this starting from the characteristics attributed to any nationalist thoughts and ideologies by Isaiah Berlin3, establishing the extent to which Popovici’s thinking meets the criteria of this ideology which involves:

1) the belief in the supreme need to belong to a nation; 2) the belief in the organic relation between all elements that make up a nation; 3) the belief in what is ours simply because it is ours; 4) when confronted with competitors for rivalry and authority, the belief in the

supremacy of your beliefs4. Let us consider each of them: 1) the belief in the supreme need to belong to a nation states that every

individual belongs to a particular community, whose way of living is different from that of other communities. This community is based on certain customs, traditions and values, that cannot be understood by individuals who are not its members. This means that people do not share certain universal values, such as good, truth or beauty, but rather that there is a plurality of values, irreducible to one other, that can even clash in certain situations.

This belief in the individuals’ inherent belonging to the national community is stated by Popovici several times when he claims that there is no “humankind”, only “nations”.

1 Ibidem, pp. 110-111. 2 For cases when the national law is opposed to historical law, see Romulus SEȘIANU, Principiul naționalităților. Originile, evoluția și elementele constitutive ale naționalității, Editura Albatros, București, 1996, p. 109. 3 Isaiah BERLIN, “Naționalismul”, în Adevăratul studiu al omenirii, trad. Radu Lupan, Editura Meridiane, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 557-578. 4 Ibidem, pp. 565-567.


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“The entire world civilization produces only nationalities. It cannot maintain and develop itself outside them. Humankind is an abstract concept, a word. It does not live and cannot live beyond the nationalities that compose it. No matter how strongly an individual wishes to plunge into «humankind», he can only fall into and merge with a nationality”.1 Therefore, no matter where an individual is born on the face of the Earth, he is

not primarily characterized by his humanity, i.e. being a rational being or a being with an articulate language, but he is defined by his language, religion and traditions of his local community. A.C. Popovici rejects rationalist universalism in the name of a type of “sensitive” empiricism: “Who has ever seen a ‘flower’? Who has seen a «tree»? We have seen and keep seeing violas, carnations, roses, but ‘flowers’ is only in our minds. We have seen and keep seeing pear trees, plum trees, apple trees, but «trees» does not exist. [...] Humankind is a similar abstraction. There is no «humankind», only peoples” (original emphasis).2

Given that one cannot find “flowers” or “trees”, i.e. one cannot perceive the idea of flower or the idea of tree, but only certain flowers or certain trees, in an analogous manner we cannot find the attributes of “humankind” anywhere. They are only in our mind that associates certain features with an entity that is already the result of abstract thinking.

A.C. Popovici does not acknowledge the existence of humankind or humanity, since he considers these abstract realities a result of the democratic ideology, whose aim is to “level”the existence of all people according to certain standard procedures: “What does democratic civilization do? It sees only «people» and «humankind». In the garden of «humankind», it always takes care of the ‘flowers’ and it pulls out the carnations, peonies and roses in order to replace them with ‘flowers’” (original emphasis).3 In his argument, A.C. Popovici certainly does not take into account the fact that nation, as well as humankind is also the result of an abstract thinking. One can perceive the presence of a certain nation or a certain individual nowhere. The language or the values of a nation are also the result of a cultural process that leads to abstract thinking, even if they have concrete forms of manifestation through speech or through the existence of certain customs or rituals. Therefore, the difference between nation and humankind is not the difference between concrete and abstract,but it is given by the difference between a lesser and a higher degree of abstract thinking. Of course, Popovici confers “concreteness” to the existence of a nation, probably relying on the metaphor of the organism that resembles a nation, therefore on the analogy between individuals and communities. However,one should not overlook the fact that this is only an analogy. And thus, we arrive at the second characteristic of nationalist thinking.

1 Aurel C. POPOVICI, Naționalism sau democrație,...cit., p. 72. 2 Ibidem, p. 72. 3 Ibidem, p. 73.


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2) As we have seen, the belief in the organic relation between all elements that make up a community, is a common feature of all conservative outlooks. Hence, it also emerges in A.C. Popovici’s case, where conservative organicism is combined with ethnicism and the romantic historicism.

3) the belief in what is ours simply because it is ours. In other words, we believe that something is good, right, beautiful or true because it belongs to us. This belief is to a certain extent a consequence of the conception presented in the first point. If one does not believe in the existence of some abstract realities and universal values, then the sole criterion for judging value is a local one, that belongs only to me and my community. The almost unavoidable consequence of this conception is a reversal of the value criterion: something is not good or beautiful because it matches general criteria valid for goodness or beauty, but it is good or beautiful because it is acknowledged as such by me and and by those who belong to my community. Taking this reasoning to its extremes, one can say that what belongs to us is good or beautiful. This is the manner of thinking typical of a person who evaluates the supreme criteria of value in relation to belonging to a certain community.

A.C. Popovici is a representative of such a belief, especially when he criticizes Western culture, claiming that it is a culture that has detached from faith and traditions becoming a culture of “waiters”. Hence, from Popovici’s perspective, a Romanian country priest is superior to a cultured Western person, only because the former represents the authentic national culture: “The other, His Holiness, our village priest from the hilltop, lost in Europe, leads a patriarchal, reactionary and miserable life, according to our civilized valet or waiter. Here, dear reader if your mind and heart are in their right places, I am asking you: which of these two people is a real factor of culture from a Romanian national perspective?” (original emphasis).1 Therefore, in the absence of a unique criterion of assessing different cultures, the sole available criterion becomes one’s belonging to a certain community, in the present case, one’s belonging to the Romanian nation. And Popovici fully confirms this aspect: “real culture cannot even be conceived unless in a national sense” (original emphasis).2 Hence nationality becomes a criterion of value for a certain culture.

This manner of thinking is reconfirmed when A.C. Popovici talks about religion. From a nationalist perspective, the Supreme Being itself is conceived within the grid of certain national particularities. Thus, every people has a particular manner of conceiving its God: “despite all the philosophical abstractions, the conception of the English, German and of every strong nation is typical of such a nation, however cosmic God may be conceived. Even the catholic faith, despite its very old, Roman -imperialist universality, is more or less differentiated according to nations” (original emphasis).3 Hence, God himself, which is the Good and the Truth, is filtered through the grid of national particularities by the nationalist A.C. Popovici. It is true that he



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does not suggest a complete identity between God or Church and the nation1, but he specifies that these national particularities are linked more with the significance acquired by certain rites and the way in which faith in God modifies a certain particular mentality2. But the manner in which nationalist thinking in general or A.C. Popovici’s in particular, conceives the relation between the existence of God and that of a nation lays the foundation for an equivalence between God and nation or between religion and nationalism, which eventually leads to the possibility to employ religion from an ideologic perspective.

4) With respect to the last feature of nationalist thinking, the belief in the supremacy of your beliefs when confronted with the beliefs of some rivals, it must be said that this is an “offensive” feature if nationalism. A.C. Popovici’s thinking does not contain such a feature, probably because the aim of his nationalist conception is primarily to obtain rights for the Romanians in the Austro -Hungarian Empire and not to impose the Romanians’ supremacy over other nationalities. However, the potential of this “offensive” perspective of the nationalist ideology will be fully remarked especially in the interwar period, which is also the period when nationalist and totalitarian thinking in Europe reaches its peak. And interwar Romania is not avoided by these historical realities. One of the famous examples that illustrates this fact is Nae Ionescu who presents several references of the legionary ideology in a series of informal conferences during his detention period in the detention camp at Miercurea Ciuc: “The character of the nation: offensive and imperialist par excellence, i.e. an organism that can only live in expansion, life, dynamism. Consequently, the one who wants to know God will only do it by conquering the outside, strangling someone, hence the nation is dynamic, it is life, it is offensive and imperialist”3. Of course, this paragraph contains all the ingredients of nationalist thinking, that Nae Ionescu takes to their extremes: first of all, there is the analogy between nation and organism. The nation is like an organism that has reached its full maturity this time (it does not need to fight for the acknowledgment of its own rights, which are granted to it as a consequence of a natural evolution) and it needs to conquer the vital space for manifesting itself. Like the organism that grows and comes to naturally attack the environment, nation becomes expansive and imperialist. Then, if God is identified as a national God, in the way it is conceived by each nation, it is normal that every nation should fight for the existence of its own “God”. Therefore, by means of a national God, religion can become a mere pretext for political fight between several nations. It is just that in this way, starting from the premises of nationalist thinking and pushing

1 Like the case of Nae Ionescu, who at some point became an exponent of the legionary ideology: “Chruch and nation overlap with us, the Orthodox.” (Nae IONESCU, Fenomenul legionar, Antet XX Press, București, 1993, p. 52); or “If the nation represents God on Earth, I am only interested in the God experienced by me, not by Hungarians, French, etc.” (Ibidem, p. 55). 2 “There is a certain difference between the one in Italy and the one in Belgium, between the Polish and the German one. Not with respect to dogmas, not in ritual, but in the mind of the peoples and in the life practice” (A. C. Popovici, Naționalism sau democrație...cit., p. 259). 3 Ibidem, p. 53.


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this thinking to its limits, religion becomes an instrument of political ideology and nationalism can be turned into a mere pretext for aggression.

6. CONCLUSIONS If we were to draw a conclusion to this brief examination of A. C Popovici’s

political ideas, we notice that in his case the ideas of the English liberal conservatism meet with the ethnic nationalist perspective, leading to an original political doctrine. Burke is acknowledged as the master of the conservative thinking, and Eminescu is praised by Popovici and acknowledged as the most influent Romanian political thinker. The original perspective identified in Popovici’s conception is given by the blending of conservatism and liberalism with nationalism. In this blending, the nationalist is prominent, probably because of the historical context that demanded the Romanians to claim certain national rights. We have seen that in this respect, too, Popovici is a successor of the 1848’s intellectuals in Ardeal, as their ideas helped him synthesize liberalism with nationalism. His historical positioning, as a citizen of the Austrian -Hungarian Empire, also made him see a radical opposition between nationalism and modern democracy.

Popovici’s political ideas are important for understanding the context in which they were formulated, but also for understanding a certain trend of nationalist thinking that would contest political modernity and democracy in interwar Romania. However, if examined from a critical distance, these ideas exhibit their limits. If, according to Pierre Manent, nation and democracy go hand in hand, nation being necessary for democracy as it represents the framework in which the rules of democracy are manifested1, still, nation has an ambiguous relation with democracy in the modern age. “Nation is both the condition for and the expression of democracy, as well as the reference point and the resource of the opponents of democracy. It is both the framework for self -government and the great principle opposed to self -government” (original emphasis)2.

In the West, democracy comes to manifest itself within the nation, an alien framework to democracy, a historical inheritance of a past that had nothing to do with democracy3. In Eastern Europe, the national states are founded inversely, as they

1 “Précisément la democratie, telle que nous la comprendons, vient à l’existence dans le cadre national” (Pierre MANENT, “La démocratie et la nation”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. I, No. 1, 2001, p. 10. 2 Pierre MANENT, O filozofie politică pentru cetățean, trans. Mona Antohi, Editura Humanitas, București, 2003, p. 95. 3 “La difficulté politique pratique de la démocratie peut être résumée ainsi: le principe démocratique ne définit pas le cadre dans lequel il s’exerce. Par exemple, le vote d’autodétermination d’un peuple, acte démocratique par excellence, s’exerce dans un cadre déterminé préalablement par des instruments sociaux et des principes étrangers à la démocratie, et même le plus souvent contradictoires de la démocratie généralement, par la tradition confirmée ou corigée par la force. Avant que les Français, se considérant désormais comme une nation, pussent prendre pour eux-mêmes la souveraineté, il fallait que quarante


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benefit from the formal framework of modern democracy. In other words, the West displays the evolution from a national background that at some point generates a democratic form, while the East presents a democratic form that generates a national background. But according to Manent, in this case the background and the form are alien or even opposed to each other. This aspect was theorized in Romania by Titu Maiorescu’s theory of forms without a background.

In the present case analyzed, not only does the author acknowledge the opposition between the democratic form and the national background, but he detects an irreconcilable opposition in this juxtaposition. Even if the democratic framework enables Popovici to claim national rights for the Romanians in the Empire, he still considers democratic formalism a strong enemy of the qualitative principle that he identifies with the nation. Popovici eventually chooses firmly: nation against democracy. This option is significant as to a certain extent it illustrates how political modernity was perceived in Romania.

rois – selon le slogan monarchiste – aient préalablement, par marriages et guerres, fait la France” (Pierre MANENT, “La démocratie et la nation...cit.”, p. 11).


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BOBBIO, Norberto, Liberalism și democrație, Editura Nemira, București, 1998. BURKE, Edmund, Reflecții asupra Revoluției din Franța, Nemira Publishing House,

București, 2000. EMINESCU, Mihail, “Icoane vechi și icoane nouă”, Timpul, 14.XII. 1877. EMINESCU, Mihail, “Influența austriacă asupra românilor din principate”, Convorbiri

literare, 1.08.1876. FOLSCHWEILLER, Cécile, “Les ambiguités de la thèse de l’Etat naturel et du

modèle organiciste à Junimea”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. X, No. 2, 2010.

IONESCU, Nae, Fenomenul legionar, Antet XX Press, București, 1993. MAMULEA, Mona, “Toposuri romantice în fundamentarea filosofică a

naționalismului românesc”, Revista de filosofie, Vol. LI, No. 1-2, 2004. MANENT, Pierre, O filozofie politică pentru cetățean, trans. Mona Antohi, Editura

Humanitas, București, 2003. MANENT, Pierre, “La démocratie et la nation”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science

Review, Vol. I, No. 1, 2001. NEMOIANU, Virgil, “A jeffersonian neoconservatorist in the end of the century

Vienna: Aurel C. Popovici”, România și liberalismele ei, Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, București, 2000.

PANDREA, Petre, Filosofia politico-juridică a lui Simion Bărnuțiu, “King Charles II” Foundation for Literature and Art, București, 1935.

POPOVICI, Aurel C., Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne, Albatros Publishing House, București, 1997.

POPOVICI, Aurel C., Stat și națiune. Statele Unite ale Austriei-Mari: studii politice în vederea rezolvării problemei naționale și a crizelor constituționale din Austro-Ungaria, Editura Albatros, București, 1997.

SCHIFIRNEȚ, Constantin, “Aurel C. Popovici: a conservative point of view on the nation”, Geneza modernă a ideii naționale, Albatros Publishing House, București 2001.

SCHIFIRNEȚ, Constantin, “Aurel C. Popovici on the federalist state organisation of the nations”, Geneza modernă a ideii naționale, Albatros Publishing House, București, 2001.

SEȘIANU, Romulus, Principiul naționalităților. Originile, evoluția și elementele constitutive ale naționalității, Editura Albatros, București, 1996.

STANOMIR, Ioan, Reacțiune și conservatorism. Eseu asupra imaginarului politic eminescian, Nemira Publishing House, București, 2000.

STERE, Constantin, “Democratismul and A.C. Popovici”, Scrieri (Writings), Minerva Publishing House, București, 1979.

STRAUSS, Leo, Histoire de la philosophie politique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1999.


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Civil Society as Its Own Enemy: The First Romanian Christian-Democratic Attempt1

Cătălin-Valentin RAIU

University of Bucharest Abstract: In this paper, by presenting few political ideas of the bishop of Râmnic Noul-Severin, Bartolomeu Stănescu (1875-1954), I am trying to portray how a social-Christian political vision has failed in the Romanian interwar period. In his case we are rather dealing with a transplantation of a doctrine named „Social Christianity” and defined as an eclectic body of counter-revolutionary ideas implemented with liberal tools and born out of socialist sensibilities. Although important figure in the Romanian Orthodox Church and Senate, moreover as a public promoter of Social Christianity, the failure of his political project gives us the clues to understand why Christian-democracy has never been born in Romania, as for instance in Italy, along with the principles of subsidiarity, anti-statism, democracy, personalism or anti-communism. On the contrary, the political reading of the interwar ecclesiastical debates and events is due to prove that the society was incomplete modernized, eager for paternalism and authoritarianism and mostly under the siege of an organic nationalism which has expelled both liberal and Christian-democratic approaches. Keywords: Bartolomeu Stănescu, subsidiarity, Social Christinity, nation, anti-statism, authoritarianism.

Called in that epoch the Social-Christian philosopher, the bishop of Râmnic Bartolomeu Stănescu of Râmnicul Noului Severin (1921-1938) was a genuine intellectual preoccupied by the confrontation between political modernity and Christianity, the first artisan of Christian-democracy in the Romanian space. Let us begin by giving some biographic details. He graduated the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of Bucharest (1898-1902), as well as the Faculties of Law and Sociology of the Sorbonne, Paris (1905-1911). Also in the capital of France he begins a doctorate in sociology, under the guidance of Emile Durkheim, but he will not obtain his Ph.D diploma, for he accepted to become a titular archpriest (arhiereu titular) in 1912. In his country he begins to teach theology at the university in 1914, and in 1921 he becomes the bishop of the eparchy of Râmnicul Noului Severin, where he will put into practice

1 This study is part of a vaster research entitled “When Social Christianity wears the Mitre: the Bishop of Râmnicul Noului Severin, Bartolomeu Stănescu (1875 -1954)”, presented as a Ph.D. thesis in September 2012 at the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Bucharest, under the guidance of professor Daniel Barbu, Ph.D.


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his totally innovative in the Romanian space social-Christian vision, till 1938 when he is dismissed by King Carol II. Harassed by all Romanian non-democratic political regimes, Bartolomeu Stănescu dies in abiding loneliness in 1954, in the monastery of Bistrița, in the county of Vâlcea. During his public activity and without actually having a programmatic scheme, the hierarch produced a political discourse that impresses with its modernity, authenticity and especially its capacity to detach itself from institutional rigours. Or to put it more overtly, Bartolomeu Stănescu distinguished himself constantly from the ecclesiastic and political mainstream of his times and, for a moment, he was the only Romanian that implemented in Romania Christian democratic ideas and principles.

Was Bartolomeu Stănescu a Christian-democrat at least in a certain period of his public activity? In this chapter we shall analyse this hypothesis considering several independent variables of the hierarch’s discourse, such as the nature of democracy, the human being’s centrality in the political architecture imagined by the bishop, the refusal of state assistentialism, the solidarity principle, social justice and the sense of private property and salary, and in the following chapters we shall analyse the subsidiarity principle in Bartolomeu Stănescu’s thinking, anti-statism and the importance given to the intermediary bodies of society.

1. ASSUMING DEMOCRACY

The Romanian Social Christians, in fact like the great majority of their European inspirers, do not consider that compatibility between democracy and Christianity can be possible1, in the sense that a democratic regime does not accommodate to the organisation of the Orthodox Church, an order specific rather to aristocracy than to democracy:

“Its constitution (A/N of the Church) is an oligarchic, aristocratic – according to Montesquieu’s words, -republican one, for it is directed by a body of bishops or by the holy synod which is the supreme authority in matters of faith”.2

Bartolomeu Stănescu does not keep aloof from Irineu Mihălcescu and does not

try to demonstrate the compatibility between the synodality of the Church and the people’s sovereignty identified with democracy, he is rather interested in the relationship between the state and society, the structure of rights and obligations and the attempt of rounding them off with a rationality inspired by Christian theology. To test the hypothesis according to which the bishop Bartolomeu Stănescu was a Christian-democrat, we have first to understand his viewpoint on the nature of democracy as political regime. Thus, democracy, in its modern form, is not possible in 1 Cătălin RAIU, Ortodoxie, postcomunism și neoliberalism. O critică teologico-politică, Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, 2012, pp. 129-138. 2 Ion MIHALCESCO, L'Eglise Orthodoxe Orientale et la vie spirituelle intérieure, Tipografia Cărţilor Bisericeşti, Bucureşti, 1932, p.14.


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the absence of the distinction between individual and society, and one of its main purposes was to free the human being from the patronage and tyranny of the state:

“Therefore now that thanks to social sciences the second human being, namely society, has finally been discovered, Christianity has to deal with it too, at least as much as it has dealt with the individual, when it had to emancipate the individual from the tyranny of the State”.1

In spite of all this, to remove the individual from the almightiness of

monarchies achieves but half of the virtual fruit of modernity, a reality “[…] imposed to people today also by the experiences their forerunners had long since used as ancient feudal authority, as bourgeois liberty and as proletarian Communism, which proved unable to satisfy to each individual all his bodily, intellectual and spiritual needs”2.

Consequently, besides being a mere political regime, pertaining actually to modernity, democracy has to be a social reality, a philosophical reflection, an equilibrium between, on the one hand, liberty and the rights of the citizens and, on the other hand, the authority and the duties of the institutions which enforce the order, and not just a simple translation of some forms without substance as the Romanian case stands:

“Today the work of emancipating the individual is already achieved and guaranteed by the Constitutions that defend his public, political and civil rights. Now it is high time the second work began, i.e. the consolidation of authority and the clarification of the services of society with the individual”.3

Additionally, democracy cannot appear overnight, as it is a political regime

which needs certain essential preconditions and several generations are necessary for it to bear fruit, a state of facts yet uncongenial to the great majority of European countries: “Both the attempts and the pretences to completely monopolise people’s lives, even the authority of the state, as in the West, and the total absenteeism from the public and secular life of peoples, as among the Orthodox, are likewise unsuited to the earthly mission of this Church”4, a Church whose final goal is to institute the Kingdom of Heaven in the hearts, minds and actions of people, seen both as private beings, and as communities. Consequently, liberal-like modernity as for instance the state of law, the assertion of the individual, aspiring politically towards democracy must be completed with the Gospel: “Reason must be complemented by the Gospel and teachings of the Cross, and natural right must complete divine right”5, which means that in the absence of Christianity and of the centrality of the Church in society 1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Curs de Exegeză a Noului Testament. 1913 -1914, 1914, p. 12. 2 Idem, Cursuri misionare cu preoții eparhii la Sfânta Mănăstire Arnota, Editura Sfintei Episcopii a Râmnicului Noul Severin, Râmnicul Vâlcea, 1939, p. 91. 3 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 12. 4 Idem, Produsuri sufletești și realități verificate, Tipografia “Cozia” a Sfintei Episcopii a Râmnicul Vâlcii, 1934, p. 13. 5 Idem, “Vom avea autonomia bisericească?”, Universul, Vol. 37, No. 132, 1919, p. 1.


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any form of modern democracy is impossible, with the exception of far-left ideologies that claim a democratic filiation:

“Gentlemen, unlike some of you, I am not willing to pretend these are democratic principles, as this word comprises meanings and a state of facts which can jeopardise humankind […] Today socialism and bolshevism call themselves democratic, nonetheless you know only too well that a social poison contains especially the latter of these two comrades”.1 At the same time, democracy means the centrality of Christianity in the life of

nations and not necessarily of Churches, though it is impossible that a society be imbued with Christianity in the absence of a strong Church, be it established as in Great Britain, or disestablished as in the United States of America. Bartolomeu Stănescu suggests however that it is not the Church-institution, endowed with a certain social and even political authority that builds democracy, it is her message which permeates the consciousness of communities of people:

“The brotherhood of people made by Christianity does not ensue from the law of the state, which does not create, but merely sanctions certain social principles and methods, and stems from the consciousness and the heart, which are the real creative and regulating powers among men”.2

Therefore, society is free as regards the establishment of social and political consensus, and the state only notes it: “Democratic laws should not be enforced through commandments; they should pervade more through the adhesion to them of the liberty and dignity pampered people”3. However, civil, social and political liberties which “[…] especially almost everywhere in Europe became the sacred attribute of civilised nations”4 should be rounded off with a soul:

“We, the religious men in the Senate, we occupy ourselves above all with the soul; and we believe it is natural and good to do it with you, for this time the evolution of life led us willy nilly to democracy, where we are first of all required to have a soul. Without a soul, the democracy we are asked to live has no foundation and is harmful, since it brands matter and instincts, dictates to the soul and kneels human nobility”.5

At the same time, modernity has to bring about a reform in religious life too,

especially if the divine-human institution wants to have a certain social relevance, assumed by Bartolomeu Stănescu through Social Christianity. In this respect, but chiefly because of the ontological quasi-synonymy between Christianity and

1 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 210. 2 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 103. 3 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 244. 4 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 63. 5 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 243.


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democracy, the Romanian Orthodox Church should open herself to democracy, not by changing its canons, but by carrying out an administrative reform, mainly as far as the hierarches’ behaviour towards their priests is concerned: “The sacerdotal autonomy, as discretionary power of the bishop, is not in tune with the democratic spirit, on the contrary, the two of them will always quarrel”1.

The quasi-synonymy between Christianity and democracy makes Bartolomeu Stănescu view the democratic regime as a reality encompassing not only the political domain, but also the social and economic zone. The only definition of democracy he formulated in the public space is destined to reduce democracy to the subsidiarity principle, equality of chances, the human person’s right to bring one’s personality to the fore, but also the obligation of the state to make this really happen. Simultaneously, democracy cannot be associated with Russian communism for it is characterised by a certain dose of elitism which the political body itself cannot secure. The definition of democracy given on the occasion of his intervention during the debates in the Senate on the Education Act is the more important as it is not part of the probably written text of his discourse, being a spontaneous retort addressed to a question asked by another senator:

“M.P. Dobrescu: What is democracy? His Grace the bishop of Râmnicul-Vâlcea: The right of each individual that is brought into the world of making the most of his/her forces, talents and aspirations of bettering one’s soul, not only through personal efforts, which, happening to be feeble, are entitled to benefit of the support and aid of one’s peers and of the entire human society, just as Jesus recommended. M.P. Dobrescu: But this is democracy, father. His Grace the bishop of Râmnicul-Vâlcea: Indeed, but bolshevism too seeks to pass for democracy. [...] M.P. Dobrescu: But yours is an extraordinary theory. Mr Paul Bujor: Are you not originally a commoner? After all you are the son of a peasant! His Grace the bishop of Râmnicul-Vâlcea: That is quite right, I am a commoner, but I worked hard and I acquired a certain competence. And in my duties I do not intend to make use mainly of number, but mainly of competence. [...] His Grace the bishop of Râmnicul-Vâlcea: This time competence is used in the broadest way; and the number of which misinterpreted democracy makes such a fuss is used in this law to enhance competence, as, gentlemen, solely with the power of number, on which misinterpreted democracy rests, we shall never accomplish anything”2. Consequently, in order to be viable, any form of democracy should exclude

those elements specific to 19th century French revolutionarism, which proved to be

1 Idem, “Vom avea autonomia...”, p. 1. 2 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., pp. 212-213.


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contrary to Christianity, such as the idea of liberty in whose name many crimes were committed, or the anonymisation of the human person among the huge masses of proletarians:

“Let us deprive democracy of its fraternity and let us leave it to the Church, for this virtue was never more terribly close than to the democracy of the French Revolution, when the revolutionaries killed not only thousands of compatriots, aristocrats and ecclesiasts, but they guillotined each other as no species of beast does on the face of the earth”.1

It was difficult to speak in that epoch of the complete and effective assumption

of democracy, just as it was hard to speak about the separation of the Church from the state, given that they were commonly associated with Russian bolshevism, which, as a neighbour of Romania, was considered by the contemporaries as a real threat of contamination. Thus, the bishop’s concern was to delimit ideal democracy from the failure of certain regimes pretending to stem from democracy, and also to find the decisive ingredient able to build democracy.

Bartolomeu Stănescu was not a philosopher to remain rooted in the traps of philosophy or to find himself in the embarrassing situation of not being able to express his ideas without giving examples. A proof in this respect is his manner of explaining his vision on genuine democracy which is applied in only two Western countries. Thus, in the United States of America and Great Britain democracy is more than a mere political ideology, it is a concrete reality that meets the requirements of the positive aspects brought about by modernity2, as well as the requirements of Christianity, given that both “[…] the English and the American peoples shine through their religiosity”3.

Although Bartolomeu Stănescu identifies the presence of an evangelical inspired democracy in both American and British nations, he seems inclined to admire more the American model, where Churches have always been disestablished:

“Luckily it is a country where life tends uninterruptedly to identify itself with the Gospel, where the very basis of life is the Gospel itself, and this country is America […]. The state and the federation itself are organised on Christian bases, but the clergy was almost all along the leading element of political achievements in America. Moreover, if we have a look at the Americans’ individual and chiefly social deeds we shall discover there unmistakably the spiritual man. Though divided in different dogmas and rites, faith is there strong and linked to Jesus, so that we see their dollars help their brothers in faith, with the intention that each and every cult conquer the world and turn it into a flock and a shepherd. And as for personal abstinence, the Americans are puritans;

1 Idem, O scurtă privire asupra unor stări de fapt de azi în legătură cu viitorul, Tipografia “Episcopul Vartolomeiu” a Sf. Episcopii a Râmnicului Noului Severin, 1935, p. 23. 2 Idem [Arhiereul V. BĂCĂOANUL], “Principii pe cari va avea să se întemeieze autonomia Bisericii Ortodoxe de Răsărit în Regatul Român”, Arhiva pentru drept şi politică, No. 1, iulie-septembrie 1919. 3 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 277.


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[…] To think that they prohibited alcohol by law shows clearly they have this propensity towards abstinence. But it is the social-based love they have for their fellow creatures, their self-denial, that best illustrates how inoculated they are with the Gospel of Jesus. […] with the principle of authority connected with the principle of liberty, constituting thereby the driving force in all the fields, be they social, political and cultural, etc. Why is this combination so good? Because if left alone, authority becomes tyranny, and liberty left alone become license. Just as God combined light with darkness to give us the day, likewise authority should intermingle with liberty in order to have a good social governance. Hence America has the organisation and the state of affairs that can form the spiritual man so that he might work with them”.1

The American political and social architecture is the result of puritanism,

which, through the covenant theology2, underlies America’s federalism, itself begotten by Christian minds:

“I cite herein some persons in whom this instinct appeared Christianly through the works produced by Him in their minds and souls. In North America between 1781 and 1789 two of these persons were George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, who put their lives at stake and supported each other like brothers to unite the 13 republics existing at that time. Washington was the inspirer, the guide and the soul conqueror in order to give these quarrelling republics a political unity. And Hamilton was their constructor or their social and political architect […] Before Carnegie North America had Washington and Hamilton as political energies, who gave these 13 republics the Constitution of the United States of America, in 1787, during a congress held in Philadelphia [...]. Seeing they would not agree, he kept the tension high all the way during his six hour speech which made them work for three months at the said convention. So however political this Convention might be, it was engrafted with Christian moral, not only because it put an end to the quarrels and brawls of these republics, but also through their federal support, which continued and continues even today to exert itself in the most peaceful and the most brotherly manner. They were followed by Mac Kinley, who opened the economic frontiers for the United States. The current President Roosevelt has proven to be very much like these three afore mentioned men”.3

If the key of the American democratic political formula, in which the Church

was disestablished by the Constitution, was, though not explicitly named, the covenant theology, in England’s case the success of democracy is given by local traditions, among which having an established Church seems to be the most important of all. Thus, Bartolomeu Stănescu admires the centrality of the Church in the public space,

1 Ibidem, p. 165. 2 Michael HORTON, Introducing Covenant Theology, Baker Books, n.p., 2006; A. Glen MOOTS, Politics Reformed: the Anglo-American legacy of covenant theology, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2010. 3 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Cursuri misionare cu preoții eparhii la Sfânta Mănăstire Arnota, Editura Sfintei Episcopii a Râmnicului Noul Severin, 1939, pp. 80-81.


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both in Great Britain’s and in the Jewish cases, which are in total antithesis with nations that put reason above faith:

“In London, for instance, on a Sunday, you will see that all industrial and commercial enterprises are closed, along with cinemas and theatres; and only the temples are opened; and their religious sermons too get out in the street, where the preachers speak to passers-by. Until the present day, England did not secularise almost anything of the social power of her Church, for even today weddings in the English rite are as valid in the English state as the marriage performed by the registrar. Even nowadays religious wedding produces in this civilised people the same civil effects as a civil wedding; and it is even more desirable than this one [...] Therefore you can see how deprived is the English people of the religion which has forged the virtues of its race, of the religion which has formed its compact social mass, of the religion which has created and is still creating the energies of life, and of the Church they moulded into organisation and dogma during the years; but without prejudicing the vigour of its religious element, but only to nationalise it even more [...] Behold what faith can do! It indents the soul with energies, competent people in all domains, in agriculture, in industry, in commerce can use to adapt the individual as soon as possible, as safely and as conscientiously as possible to this sort of occupations”.1 Accordingly, be it a laymen’s Christianity as it is the case in the United States of

America, where “the Christian moral2 [...] pertains not to the Clergy, divided by heresies, but to the lay Christians, who preserved the Christian moral untainted”3, or be it a protected by the state Church, as in Britain, the merging of Christianity with democracy can be seen in the associative spirit of the citizens, in national educational systems, or in the public servants’ liability before the laws:

“In British countries, says Valentin Brifant, a counsellor of law at the Court of Appeal in Brussels,[...] the liberty of association, to refer only to this one, has always been more flourishing than in continental Europe, where the ancient Roman right preserved its prominence almost exclusively [...] in England, the ancient adage «state in state» whose mystifying meaning always made our law makers shiver, engendered no fright in these countries. [...] On the contrary, in the United States freedom of association is complete, regardless of creed or goal; religious associations, scientific associations, recreation associations, educational, charity associations, etc. have all the liberty to organise, to make frequently quite substantial fortunes, to legislate and to govern within their respective attributions”.4

1 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., pp. 287-288. 2 Although the freedom of conscience is almost traditional in North America, the moral heredity of the Americans born by puritans engendered this application to human life of the Christianity of the first centuries, to which the American religious breaches are valueless (Bartolomeu Stănescu’s note). 3 Bartolomeu, STĂNESCU, Cursuri misionare...cit., p. 89. 4 Idem, “Principiile de bază ale reorganizării noastre sociale si ce însemnătate ar avea pentru reorganisarea Bisericii Ortodoxe de Răsărit din România întregită”, Solidaritatea. Revista social - creștină, anul I, No. 5-6, n.p., 1920, pp. 168-169.


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Hence, “the democratism of Christianity brought about the equality before the

law”1, which means that the exigencies of democracy should be the rule of law, in other words the lack of hazard and arbitrary, and the centrality of the human person, whose rights and liberties should prevail over the state:

“Two centuries ago, through Christianity and the American and the French revolutions humankind won and consolidated almost entirely all the rights of man and of the citizen. Afterwards modern civilisation adopted these rights regarding them as a sacred and inviolable patrimony of all humankind resting them on both human nature, to which these rights are naturally attached, and on the modern legal regime, which leads today all the cultivated peoples of the world”.2

According to the typology of the political scientist Daniel Barbu who

distinguishes two types of rule of law, Bartolomeu Stănescu is for the time being in keeping with a rather democratic option. Thus, the first type of rule of law makes theoretically use of the state conceived by Hobbes, which appears as a democratic option and is the result of the free and consensual union of individuals obeying a bottom-up structured political power, and enjoying the plenitude of natural law. A second type, fruit of Hegel’s thought, corresponds to an objective existence of the state, takes the “historic form of the spirit of a nation”3, is independent of the citizens, establishes the law which no longer precedes, but succeeds the state and which rests on the majority’s faith in the historic legitimacy of the state, and in which the power is organised from top to bottom.

Formulating the exigencies of democracy, the hierarch argues that the state precedes the individuals, is their subject and derives its rights and obligations from the will of the citizens. But as we shall see in the following chapters, the hierarch’s vision will suffer a radical change after 1930, when the state will be imagined as an embodiment of the monarch’s will, and as unique source of the law. Yet in both hypostases, although completely different and even opposite, Christianity continues to occupy a central place due to its specific reflection on the human being as sole sacred reality in the universe, with the exception of God: “Christianity [...] placed God, the family and human individuality above one’s motherland”4. But even if the Christian creed stipulated all this in its holly texts, it is modernity that actually opened the way and put the sacredness of the human person into practice through the assertion of the rights of man and of the citizen: “the sacralisation of human personality and of its close institutions. It is for this sacralisation, gentlemen, that our ancestors fought, to it

1 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 19. 2 Idem, “Cârmuirea sovietică nimicește în Rusia până și dreptul de închinare”, Renașterea. Revista de cultură religioasă, anul IX, No. 3, 1930, p. 81. 3 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă. Politică şi societate în România postcomunistă , 2nd ed., Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 139. 4 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 64.


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did they sacrifice their assets, and even their lives, until they succeeded to assert and secure it through the chart of the rights of man and of the citizen”1. Thus, the target of the democracy imagined by Bartolomeu Stănescu is a solidarity inspired once more by Christianity:

“From the principle on which Christian hierarchy is organised two things result: 1) justice or equality before the laws and 2) the commitment to charity, i.e. the strong shall help and shall sacrifice themselves for the weak. When combined, justice and charity give birth to solidarity, a new phrase in both legal and social sciences of today”.2

2. SOLIDARITY

Solidarity is the social and political formula which opposes to both socialist syndicalism and liberalism which did not count social justice among its major objectives. Accordingly, solidarity is “that establishment where people are not powerful or humble by predestination, but only due to the natural differences between their own forces, and in which evangelical fraternity is ensured through mercy, in other words through the love and sacrifices of the mighty for the feeble, and of the feeble for the mighty”3.

Solidarity being the major theme of the Group of Christian-Social Studies Solidaritatea, several of its members contributed with studies and articles. One of them, Șerban Ionescu, seems prone to view solidarity rather as the settlement of the conflict between social classes:

“The principle of human dignity introduced by Christianity was achieved in the family through the equality between spouses. The same principle transplanted in society accomplished in the political sphere the participation of the citizens of all social classes in the government and organisation of the state. In the economic field it dealt with labour productivity and the imbalance of the factors of production, as well as with the struggle against the exploitation of man [...]. In the social domain it aimed to level the tense situations and differences existing between social classes, and to further the equality before the laws, from the legal standpoint, by imposing the same rights and obligations to all citizens”.4

On the other hand, Bartolomeu Stănescu understands solidarity as a space

where individual rights and liberties are safeguarded, and especially as a social reality that opens anew to man the gate to the Kingdom of Heaven, since human solidarity and justice remain however imperfect forms for the human being as image of God: 1 Ibidem, p. 359. 2 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 21. 3 Ibidem, p. 11. 4 Șerban IONESCU, “Mișcarea social -creștină și reforma vieții sociale”, Solidaritatea. Revista social-creștină, Anul IV, No. 4-6, 1920, p. 79.


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“Therefore justice catches everybody in its framework as regulator of life, by defending his/her liberty, dignity and right, so that he/she might be, by wholly disposing of one’s self, the image of God on earth. By circumscribing man in this manner within his limits, justice unites with faith and the moral of life through that element of morality, which is called equity, and which justice comprises in its norms and tendencies, as a compass and a goal to be accomplished. The only frame of life that escapes to justice itself is the frame of faith, more precisely the divine relation between man and his soul”.1

But aside from theologically formulating solidarity, Bartolomeu Stănescu seizes

the opportunity of exposing it in the Senate also from the social, economic and political viewpoint. Thus, our bishop proposes an over taxation of inheritances2 and the introduction of progressive taxation, since inheritances have a bad influence on the person who makes a fortune without caring about the needs of the people around him/her, therefore without supporting the common weal, as well as on the offsprings, as heirs who are encouraged not to contribute to the common good, and who need not work, not even for themselves:

“The moral influence of inheritances in the manner we possess them is utterly disastrous, for, on the one hand, they accrue the selfishness of the person who gathers them and destroy his altruism, and, on the other hand, they deplete the work capacity and the mood for life of the person who inherits them”.3

Bartolomeu Stănescu’s views on the citizens’ forms of participation in the

common weal which finds its expression in solidarity commences from the Christian creed, according to which by its nature fortune is neither good nor bad4, but it acquires a moral sense in accordance with the way it is used. That is the reason why the bishop does not hesitate to delimit himself from socialism: “So you see I do not speak as a socialist, but from the viewpoint of moral and social realities which we have to take into account when legislating”.5

3. ANTI-ASSISTENTIALISM The bishop’s formula of Christian democracy contains a strong touch of anti-

assistentialism. Among other attributions, the state has to secure the happiness of its citizens, but it has not the obligation to procure the goods necessary for living, a fact that would violate the freedom of action of the citizens. Consequently, by turning 1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, “O cuvântare ținută la desvelirea busturilor foștilor Decani: Gh. Chițu și A. Betolian, ai baroului din Craiova”, Renașterea. Revista de cultură religioasă, Anul IV, No. 12, 1925, p. 397. 2 50% up to 500.000 lei and 75% more than 500.000 lei. 3 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 247. 4 Ibidem., p. 353. 5 Ibidem.


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their personality to good account, by enjoying the freedom of a market circumscribed to a clearly and strictly defined by the state zone, by benefiting of an impartial justice and by having the possibility to associate, the citizens need not resort to the assistentialism of the state:

“As instrument of order and support to all its citizens, the state is compelled to take care of their existence, as well as of the nation’s existence, and to re-establish in the economic field not the equality, but the possibility for all the people to live, work, and earn, by expropriating from where there is plenty in order to give where there is nothing. This legally legitimated conception of restoring the economic equilibrium means the right to exist, a right which belongs to anybody who comes into the world, and the public power has the obligation to secure it”.1

Although it is not a right holder but with the consent of the citizens, the state

must not assume the production of weal, it has just to facilitate the citizens’ access to prosperity. At the same time, when through its natural mechanisms (philanthropic associations, the Church, private charity, etc.), society cannot assure a decent life to all human beings, the state is compelled to intervene. However, in order to prevent people from being tempted to expect to get everything from the state, the bishop repeatedly solicited that the compulsoriness of work be introduced2 in the very text of the fundamental law:

“I see that the freedom to work has been guaranteed. Still this does not mean that the freedom to be idle is also guaranteed. The freedom to work is guaranteed by the public power, so that no one be hindered to choose any profession he/she prefers; so that no one be oppressed in his/her work engagement; and not to escape from work and proclaim our sloth sacred and inviolable. [...] the freedom to work is guaranteed to those who work, and everybody should join their ranks, and profit of the protection of the Romanian State; and who should not profit in the bosom of the Romanian people of the toil of those who work, and without whom they could not live. Along with the freedom and compulsoriness of work, I think the state should recognise itself under the obligation of the present Constitution of inoculating to its inhabitants a special competence for any kind of occupation, commencing with handicrafts, agriculture, etc., and ending as today with universities, in the case of intellectual occupations”.3 4. EVANGELIC DEMOCRACY Leaving aside for the time being the anti-statist dimension and that of the

intermediary bodies of society, the democracy of evangelic inspiration imagined by Bartolomeu Stănescu as the ideal political regime starts from the centrality of the



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needs of conservation and completion of the individual’s life, as incentive of the entire social body’s progress:

“Hence, our economic life shall have to develop in such a way so that each individual, be he valid or invalid, each institution, be it old or new, find their existence and their capacity to evolve through their own produce; and so that those entitled and responsible of social life find thanks to this produce of our economy the means to fully satisfy all our cultural needs, from whose capitalisation we expect the utmost and the paramount force of our nation”.1 Another transposition of the specifically Christian-democratic principle of

subsidiarity present in Bartolomeu Stănescu’s discourse resides in the description of school as an auxiliary of the family, a discourse that he pronounced in 1924, when the Education Act was discussed. On this occasion, the bishop took a public stand against compelling children to go to kindergarten arguing that it is a practice, which corresponds to the pedagogical theory of the German Friedrich Fröebel, stemming from socialism. He rested his innovations in matters of pedagogy on researches conducted in working class districts where parents used to send their children to the kindergarten because they spent most of their time at work2, a social situation that was not at all frequent in the Kingdom of Romania.

Consequently, for evangelic democracy to be functional it is necessary to have a highly respected by the society Church, but even more important than that it is necessary to have the tradition of exerting rights and liberties. But among the Romanian people, where not even the specific interior gist is stimulated, because “for some time now our nation’s creative energies are at rest”3, liberties seem to have never been born:

“We live in total falsehood, i.e. in a social life regime in which, according to inscriptions and doctrines, authority is limited and placed under the control of civil liberty, but where liberty, with the exception of the political vote, is deprived of any means of assertion and fulfilment of its duties as social, new and fundamental factor. Hence the satrapical authoritarianism of our public bureaus, left because of the disorganisation of liberty with no legal liability towards the citizens even when they are abused because of the clerks’ incompetence or sloth; [...] the assertion on any occasion of this rotten authoritarianism, dangerous to public education, through which our bureaus strive to repair the otherwise Platonic losses, caused by modern constitutions, to the escorting authority of Roman law; hence the rapid discredit of our public authority, which the spirit of liberty of the modern civilisation we live in can no longer tolerate, not even in Romania, under its antiquated forms; and hence too, the spread of anarchy under all its shapes, be they big or small, engendered by a

1 Ibidem, p. 354. 2 Ibidem. 3 Ibidem, p. 350.


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compromised authority and a disorganised liberty, such as we can find in our Romania”.1

Accordingly, evangelic democracy should rely on the few positive

characteristics specific to the Romanian people, which should be potentiated by the personal or collective exercise of liberty:

“Whereas we, the Romanians, who did not enhance our selfishness, long since superposed on our ancestral altruism, not even with competence in enterprises of personal interest, nor with the knowledge of physical and social environments, for the benefit of the affairs we attend to… but solely with an insatiable desire for wealth, we are the classical model of torment, which we inflict ourselves on our persons, as all sorts of social and individual squalidity, through the power and the certain fruit of our selfishness, unpolished by Western ways”.2 Bartolomeu Stănescu’s Christian democratic sensibilities resemble those of the

group of agrarian thinkers who distinguished themselves in the 1940s: “For the sake of social order the modern state sacrifices the person of the individual, gives the individual the universal suffrage, equality of rights, the freedom of speech, but throws away the insulated, emptied person, with no social reinforcement to support and defend it”3. The state plays the role of a protector, not of a tyrant, it guarantees, rather than suppresses the liberty of the person. The liberty of the person imposes itself due to its quality of innate, natural right, while the evangelic message is positively favourable to liberty. Equality pertains only to the moral field, it has no social counterpart, and people are not reducible to one another4. Still there are also Christian Social voices that interpret democracy in a strictly nationalist key5, a position that will be embraced by the bishop too, after 1930.

The democracy imagined by bishop Bartolomeu Stănescu differs from liberal democracy in the sense that the centrality of the regime is represented by the truth revealed by the Christian creed. According to Social Christian logic, the revelation expressed in policies is meant to keep the evangelic truth above the liberal public opinion, a path assumed by our bishop especially after 1930:

“Unlike liberal democracy, Christian democracy has a hierarchic dimension: to convey the gift of truth time and again, to preserve a non-democratic educational space preoccupied rather to find the truth than to decipher the opinion of the majority. But for this sphere democracy cannot discover the

1 Idem, “Principiile de bază...cit.”, p. 171. 2 Idem, Cum stăm cu progresul general la începutul anului 1928 sau Primejduirea omenirii, Tipografia Cozia, Râmnicul -Vâlcea, 1928, p. 53. 3 Ion MICLEA, Elemente de Politică Creştină, Tipografia Vremea, n.p., 1947, p. 25. 4 Alexandru MAMINA, Dimensiunea religioasă a gândirii contrarevoluţionare franceze, Corint, Bucureşti, 2002. 5 Nicolae T. BUZEA, Socialismul şi creştinismul social, Tipografia Eparhială “Viaţa Românească”, Chişinău, 1926.


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truth, nonetheless it will always be influenced by propaganda: mass representation will always represent itself and not the represented too. Thus, Christian democracy has to be also Christian socialism”.1

In his turn, the political scientist Marcel Gauchet observes the difference

between liberal democracies and those inspired by Christianity according to the trajectory assumed by both of them. Thus, whereas liberal democracy creates the conditions of an unprecedented expansion of the state, which becomes part and parcel of the social mechanism2, Social Christianity, as a source of Christian democracy, is rather interested in recomposing civil society which it wants entirely organised in all sorts of groups:

“Civil society manifests itself less and less under the form of organised segments acting precisely by virtue of their share as independent and self-consistent social blocks (as it was for a long time the case in France, for example, of the catholic confessional block). In a profound sense, the social movement becomes the individuals’ movement”.3

5. TYPOLOGIES OF DEMOCRACIES INSPIRED BY CHRISTIANITY Thus, the formula of the democracy imagined by the hierarch, called by himself

evangelic, due to the fact that its source professed by Bartolomeu Stănescu is the Gospel itself and especially in order to avoid its being mistaken for Christian democracy with which it does not superpose exactly, is characterised by the centrality of the human being, subsidiarity, solidarity, the concern for the natural communities of society and the primordiality of the human being over the state.

In spite of the numerous attempts of democratisation that populated the public space in the interwar period, the authoritarian political formulas dominated not only at the level of political projects, but also at intellectual and even academic levels. That being the case, Bartolomeu Stănescu may be included in both the afore-mentioned categories, just as his friend Mihail Manoilescu, who was one of the most cited and influential Romanians in the interwar international academic milieu. Mihail Manoilescu succeeded to create a sheer corporatist current which nurtured not only the European, but also the Romanian professors who sought to bring again to the attention of public opinion elements of the traditional Romanian corporatism4, iron-guardists and even the King Carol II. Thus, on the background of anti-democratism and of the royal anti-

1 John MILBANK, Simon OLIVER, The Radical Orthodoxy Reader, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London & New York, 2009, p. 352. 2 Marcel GAUCHET, Dezvrăjirea lumii: o istorie politică a religiei, trans. Vasile Tonoiu, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2006. 3 Ibidem, p. 304. 4 Eugen PAVELESCU, “Corporatismul Moldovei secolului al XVIII-lea”, Lumea Nouă, Anul V, 1936.


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parliamentarism, the second half of the interwar period is dominated by a complicity of several social, academic, political, economic and even religious groups, who view the guilds as genuine spaces of Romanians’ weal, especially through their anti-Semite dimension1. Mihail Manoilescu goes so far as to consider that the Church herself is the very prototype of corporation, as it is older than the state, equal with the state in the sense of functional, organisational and procedural self-sufficiency. In his opinion, the Church is the model corporation, for if demonstrated it has a life of its own, without having to borrow rules and institutions from outside its sphere2.

A similar complicity accompanies the reflection on democracy too, abandoned after the enthusiasm of the 1920s and transformed into an “oligarchy of the aristocracy”3 or into what Juan Linz calls organic democracy:

“The theoreticians of organic democracies stress the fact that people are naturally members of many groups of social relations, employment, professional associations, universities, districts, parishes, etc., in contrast with artificially created larger groups, such as political parties, which divide people […] why shouldn’t we organise political representation on the basis of primary unities?”.4

In his turn, Raymond Aron calls these regimes – in which the requirements of

democracy do not superpose over a tradition of parliamentarian practice – pluralist, constitutional, though oligarchic, regimes5. Therefore, although we find elements of corporatism, of representation and institutionalisation of interests, especially economic and occupational interests, in all political systems, democracies like the Romanian interwar democracy passed quite quickly to corporatism, the idea of ethical and ethnic state, of exacerbated nationalism, going back to tradition, yet gazing at the future. In this respect, the case of Bartolomeu Stănescu can offer us a few clues about the failure of the Romanian interwar democracy in general, and especially about the failure of the evangelic democracy formulated by our hierarch.

For the Oltenian bishop modernity is not merely the golden age of humankind, it is also his own golden age, the chance to put into practice genuine Christianity, uncorrupted by the political doctrines of the divine right, and in which the human being finds fulfilment in the earthly order through rights and duties. At the same time, modernity is that epoch in which natural right and the evangelic message become congruent, in which society as entity separated from the individual is born, and along with it the human person becomes not only a subject of the earthly world in general, but also a political subject.

1 Constantin C. BÂCA, “Românizarea prin bresle”, Lumea Nouă, Anul V, No. 10-11, 1936. 2 Mihail MANOILESCU, Preoții și profesorii în statul corporativ, Tipografia ziarului “Universul”, Bucureşti, 1934. 3 Nicolae T. BUZEA, Socialismul şi creştinismul social, Tipografia Eparhială “Viaţa Românească”, Chişinău, 1926, p. 275. 4 Juan J. LINZ, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2000, p. 211. 5 Raymond ARON, Democracy and Totalitarianism, trans. Valence Ionescu, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1968.


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Inspired by both social Christianity and Durkheimian sociology, Bartolomeu Stănescu presents a reflection meant to change the political subject of modernity1, refusing most firmly to identify it with the society which tends to proletarianise as in communism, and trying to put on the citizen as liberal political subject the armour of natural communities and professional corporations. That being so, his reflection includes the subsidiarity principle, anti-statism, noting that it turns into a professional and bureaucratic corporatism, the centrality of human being in social structures, the dignity of the person, the sacredness of life, as well as solidarity. Although the bishop assumes the democracy conceived by him as being an evangelic one, and therefore he never utters the Christian democratic phrase, we conjecture that he tried, not only at the level of the discourse, to initiate a project of Christian democracy in interwar Romania. In this respect, besides the activity of the Group of Studies and of the journal Solidaritatea, of the Priestly Society Renașterea, etc., we shall further the analysis of Bartolomeu Stănescu’s political discourse, but we shall also try to detect the causes why the hierarch’s Christian democratic project was not a success in the interwar period.

Bartolomeu Stănescu does not explicitly assume a project of Christian democracy, but he claims his thought to be inspired from and legitimates it through Social Christianity as a source of European Christian democracy, especially through Marc Sangnier in France and through the concern for democracy as the best possible political regime, not only in modern times, but of all times. Of the three protagonists of the Social Christian movement, to which the bishop claims to belong, Albert de Mun cannot be considered a Christian-democrat, Tour du Pin is a dogmatic corporatist, while the only one who approaches a democratic formula is Léon Harmel. Bartolomeu Stănescu cites Marc Sangnier as being a democrat, but does not present him explicitly as a source of his reflection. At the same time, the bishop places himself on the field of political philosophy and political theory, where he endeavours to demonstrate the consonance between democracy and Christianity and not on the field of public policies specific to Christian-democracy. Thus, with the help of Christian-democracy Bartlomeu Stănescu identifies the points Christianity shares in common with democracy, such as natural rights, Christian individualism, the separation of state and society, the concern for the natural communities of the human being, common good, etc., in an approach asserted also by one of the fathers of European Christian democracy, Jacques Maritain: “The more the political body is attached to the values of the Evangel, the more attached it is to the values of democracy, not because it is thus ordered by the state, but because it is only natural to be so”.2

1 Cătălin RAIU, “Social Christianity and The Constitution of A New Political Subject”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012, pp. 259-273. 2 Jacques MARITAIN, Omul şi statul, trans. Livia Iacob, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2008, p. 145.


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6. SUBSIDIARITY From one end to the other of his reflection, the bishop asserts some principles

specific to Christian democracy, which he never abandoned. We have in mind now the principle of subsidiarity1, a rare reflection in the Romanian intellectual space:

“The Church sanctifies and fights herself for the right of each and every individual that comes into the world to make the best of his/her forces and talents, advising however everybody not to infringe on someone else’s rights. This is the democracy I fight for. Democracy is the right of each individual that is brought into the world of making the most of his/her forces, talents and aspirations of bettering one’s soul, not only through personal efforts, which, happening to be feeble, are entitled to benefit of the support and aid of one’s peers and of the entire human society, just as Jesus recommended”.2

Subsidiarity turns then into a fear of the increasingly greater power of the state

and into an anti-statism meant to express the primordiality of civil society over the state in a given order of rights: “The state itself, with all its powers, debases itself if it is not counterbalanced, as is the case of the Church, for instance. The Church can likewise get corrupted if it is not counterbalanced by another institution, such as the state, for example”.3 One of Bartolomeu Stănescu’s major concerns is to ensure that the state will not be able to interfere on the field of the assertion of the citizens’ natural rights; therefore he focuses all his attention on the way citizenship is devised by the superposition of several layers consisting of social and political rights. His perspective is consonant with the long and difficult construction of Western democracy: “In Western democracies the citizen is the result of the accumulation of political and legal practices and guarantees. Positive political or social rights, whatever they might be, cannot be acquired unless beforehand negative liberties have already become a reality”4.

By contrast, his professor Émile Durkheim, who cannot be suspected of Christian democracy, argued that, on the contrary, the state is the one, which promotes the citizens’ natural rights and establishes their limits:

“The state is the that creates and organises and makes a reality these rights. And indeed, man is a man only because he lives in society. Take away from man all that has a social origin and nothing is left but an animal on a par with other animals. It is society that has raised him to this level above physical nature: it has

1 Chantal MILLON-DELSOL, Statul subsidiar. Ingerința și neingerința statului: principiul subsidiarității în fundamentele istoriei europene, trans. Margareta Petruț, Efes, Cluj-Napoca, 2000. 2 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Produsuri sufletești...cit., pp. 185 -186. 3 Idem, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 28. 4 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă...cit., p. 269.


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achived this result because association, by grouping individual physical forces, intensifies them”.1 Durkheim sheds light on democracy only at the level of its functioning, so that

democracy corresponds to the need of moralisation of society, for individuals accept laws less passively2 and because in democracy man takes directly part in decision making. Thus, in Durkheim’s view, democracy is that “[…] political system by which the society can achive a consciousness of itself in its purest form. The more that deliberation and reflection and the critical spirit play a considerable part in the course of public affairs, the more democratic is that nation”3. Nonetheless, democracy is helpless without secondary social staff and groups that free the state from citizens and the citizens from the state.

However, for Bartolomeu Stănescu's democracy is rather a zone of manifestation of early Christianity. Hence, even during his antidemocratic period, the bishop does not choose his examples from European corporatisms rooted in Catholicism; he seeks his examples in the two countries where evangelic democracy has triumphed:

“Carnegie’s and Rockefeller’s example who gave 730 billion of francs in order to build up foundations, among which we may quote the Pasteur institute, to which he contributed 55.000 francs, will be for Christian individuals models to follow. Of these five total inner and social states, and of all the public and private institutions of Christian peoples, the Christian clergy possesses the surest means to be used and the most powerful levers to sustain it in its pastoral mission in eparchies and parishes”.4

The bishop observes that democracy is in danger because it does not create

good leaders able to imbue the political body with a unitary creed5, in other words it lacks the elitism specific to conservatories and it relies on the fact that if left alone the people are unable to govern themselves. Moreover, democracy failed to produce morality in society, in the sense that if medieval man was a spiritual man, modernity created a homo oeconomicus, a man subject to the flesh, prone to lies, hatred, treason, theft, crime and tempted by sexual debauchery, aspects that precisely the authoritarian European regimes endeavour to better:

“The proof of these deficiencies is offered by the peoples of Europe, divided in the democratic ones, rooted in liberty, equality and fraternity, and authoritarian peoples rooted in force. The two Americas are part of the democratic peoples. The result of this division can be seen in the triumph of authoritarian peoples,

1 Émile DURKHEIM, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, 2nd edition, trans. Cornelia Brookfield, Routledge, London & New York, 1992, p. 60. 2 Ibidem, p. 60. 3 Ibidem, p. 89. 4 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Cursuri misionare...cit., pp. 78 -79. 5 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit.


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as well as in the stagnation of the democratic ones, where socialism, communism and anarchy are pullulating”.1

Consequently, though democracy should have triumphed, consensus and social

unit are much more visible in countries with authoritarian regimes, where work is elevate to the statute of mandatory social virtue. Thus, the necessity to create a moral man requires that work be the one which structures society and not the placement of rights in a social and political formula. Bartolomeu Stănescu has again in mind the old regime, which, relying on political and religious authority, succeeded to satisfy the commandments of Christian morality, which societies cannot attain spontaneously in democracy. Consequently, the great majority of European and Romanian social Christians have in common the predilection for social hierarchy, government exerted by those possessing this capacity, centrality of moral, etc.2

7. FROM CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY TO AUTHORITARIANISM For Bartolomeu Stănescu, from the “organised legal common effort [and] the

servant who gives orders”3, thus the state, becomes an “academy of tested competences”4, in other words, it becomes a dominant state, guarantor of the organic community, head of the economy, reflecting a sole undivided will, quite like a God5. After the national reunification of 1918, the Romanians no longer had any major objective to reach, fought for nothing more, which means that democracy did not succeed to inflame the energies of society:

“All these energies meant to strengthen our social body are now channelled into our individual personality, where, by bringing a surplus of forces, incite us toward a negative activity, that is to say they arouse in us various passions, the first of them being the strong desire for better living, greed, etc. [...] energies are not given by God to be mere means of human selfishness, they are also meant to be means of the social body, for the constitution of social beings in general, viz. of institutions and nations. That is why we have to give to our surplus of national energy a new superior objective, able to unify, invigorate and guide them towards good. Gentlemen, fortunately, in our earthly lives we still have two vast and powerful objectives that touch the energies of our nation, to wit we still have the economic objective and the cultural objective”.6

1 Idem, “Omul de astăzi”, Românizarea, Anul IV, No. 73, 1938, pp. 1-2. 2 Idem, “Principiile de bază ale reorganizării noastre sociale și Ce însemnătate ar avea pentru reorganisarea Bisericii Ortodoxe de Răsărit din România întregită(II)”, Solidaritatea. Revistă social-creștină, Anul I, No. 7-8, octombrie-noiembrie 1920. 3 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 361. 4 Ibidem, pp. 88 -91. 5 Peter J. WILLIAMSON, Varieties of Corporatism. A Conceptual Discussion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge & London & New York, 1985. 6 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 351.


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Although democracy is good in itself, but especially when a soul comes to

complete it, in the Oltenian bishop’s viewpoint democracy contains, at least latently, the mysticism of egalitarianism which was successfully exploited by the communist regime in Russia:

“Frequently, the subconscious of masses can be exploited for the happiness in this life, here, on earth, that is to say for political and social issues, created by speculators who endow them with a mystifying power, by promising that with their methods we are sure to wholly and in no time obtain earthly happiness. Didn’t the Bolsheviks act likewise?”.1

An extremely important reason for giving up the bishop’s democratic project is

the fear that too much liberty offered to the Romanians might facilitate their contamination with the political heresy of Russian communism. European Christian democracy assumed the completion of the political democracy begotten by the French Revolution with a social and economic democracy, in the sense that secondary communities help the people who are in need, and the state intervenes subsidiarily only when communities fail to do it properly2.

At the same time, Industrial Revolution created prosperity for a small category of people, while the majority was in a state of salaried slavery, which led to the apparition of socialism and Marxism, which do not mean peoples’ rule, but the replacement of capitalists’ tyranny with the dictatorship of the state. Thus, the way assumed by Christian democracy is situated between socialism and liberalism, between justice and liberty, which presumed the assumption of a community and Christian individualism, in the sense that the human being is more important than society as a whole, and the state should be permanently kept under observation, because it tends to insert itself in all the spheres of society. Democracy is by definition a political regime that lives only in the present and seeks neither “a bright future” as communism does3, nor the purity of the race as Nazism did:

“The democratic-bureaucratic state progresses gradually as it discards all prescriptive views on the future and as it enhances its representative openness to the dynamic multitude of aspirations and initiatives of its administered ones”4.

Hence, although democracy does not promise tomorrow’s good, but rather the

avoidance of today’s evil, Bartolomeu Stănescu has this quasi-eschatological

1 Idem, Cum stăm cu progresul...cit., p. 26. 2 Jacques MARITAIN, Omul şi statul…cit.. 3 Daniel BARBU, “Destinul colectiv, servitutea involuntară, nefericirea totalitară: trei mituri ale comunismului românesc”, in Lucian BOIA (coord.), Miturile comunismului românesc, Nemira, Bucureşti, 1998. 4 Marcel GAUCHET, Dezvrăjirea lumii...cit., p. 291.


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perspective on the creation of the moral man as a result of the superposition of several social and political practices, the most important of them all being the centrality of the Church, whose mission is, among others, to arouse individual consciousness and to unify the soul of the political body:

“Homogenisation of souls and therefore their unification in a sound and creative social body, or homogenisation and unification, where human sociability has its real conditions of existence. As we can see it is one of the most organic needs of human life; and no one but for the established Churches can best guarantee and meet these needs, because no one but the Churches can present to humankind a more common, more permanent and more above human powers ideal or way of implementation than these churches, and especially the Christian Church”.1

Regarded as a member of society, modern man is a creator of phenomena that

are harmful to life, such as suicides, divorces, legalisation of abortion, corruption, etc., a fact which leads the bishop to contemplate a new world in a pseudo-eschatological pattern, where “the non-completed and non-consolidated man”2 turns into a “completed man”3 and “moral, evangelic man”4. So, the role of democracy is not to create social solidarity and consensus, but rather to disseminate Christian teachings at the level of all the society, according to both Social Christianity and Durkheim’s sociology: “Durkheim, for instance, during the courses he gave at the Sorbonne, told us that of two people endowed with equal skills and capacities, the most powerful is the man who has the faith”.5 Still, in liberal democracies, man is by definition secular, and the task of political regimes is never to lead human beings to the Kingdom of Heavens, and not even to play the role of guardian of religious morality in society. Secular man obeys his impulses, finds his lot and even his raison d’être in getting richer and richer, in accumulating goods, and satisfying his needs and desires6; he is therefore oriented rather to the present than to the future.

1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Principiile de bază ale...cit., p. 240. 2 Idem, Cum stăm cu progresul...cit., p. 33. 3 Idem, Formarea omului întreg de către clerul eparhial și cel parohial al Sfintei noastre Biserici Ortodoxe Române, Tipografia “Episcopul Vartolomeiu”, Râmnicul -Vâlcea, 1936, p. 61. 4 Dumitru CRISTESCU, Viaţa şi înfăptuirile Prea Sfinţitului Episcop Vartolomeiu până la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani, Tipografia “Episcopul Vartolomeiu”, Râmnicul -Vâlcea, 1936, p. 91. 5 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, “Cuvântarea ținută de P. S. Episcop Vartolomeiu la deschiderea Adunării Eparhiale din 13 Maiu 1929”, Renașterea., Revista de cultură religioasă Anul VIII, No. 6, 1929, p. 202. 6 Clinton ROSSITER, James LARE, The Essential Lippmann. A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy, Vintage Books, New York, 1995.


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8. CORPORATISATION OF SOCIETY An essential point of the bishop’s democratic thinking is people’s sovereignty

as fulfilment of the democracy stemmed from the Gospel and as result of the social contract according to which “all powers emanate from the nation”1:

“In Antiquity and even in the Middle Ages the role of the state was to dominate the people. In the modern era, on the contrary, it plays a quite different role, to serve the people. It is so dictated by the nature of things, and it was so enacted by the French Revolution; and so says our Evangel too. […] European peoples took into account this new political direction of the state; and since the French Revolution, they put at its disposal for this purpose three instruments: a political one, a technical one, and a material one. The political instrument is national sovereignty; the technical one is duty and the capacity of the state to examine competently the people’s common and natural needs, and to organise public services in order to satisfy them; and the material instrument is taxation. The legitimisation of taxation ensues from the serving role of modern states; […] the legal instrument of national sovereignty is necessary because through national sovereignty the state exerts on the people its supreme and unique commandment that puts into practice the spiritual link that must exist between citizens. […] These considerations prove beyond any doubt the legitimisation of taxation, or its justification through natural law, which neither human law, nor divine law can infringe”.2

However, his 1934-1935 project for a political regime provides no more the

sovereignty of the political body, and stipulates only the King’s sovereignty, who embodies all the aspirations and needs of the people, organised in professional corporations. There is also a certain continuity, at least at the methodological level, between religious, political and social heresy, “which can be abnormal, that is to say prejudicial to human life, as it was the case for instance of the French Revolution, already cited in here, but also of all religious heresies and schisms in the world3, or of social upheavals, such as those that shake Russia nowadays”4. Consequently, in the absence of a national soul full of morality and especially in the absence of a faith in the people as source of power, the bishop fears that even “the Godless, soulless and lawless”5 communism could be considered democracy.

Additionally, the project of the Academy of Tested Competences to reduce state bureaucracy at only 25 technocrat members led by the King equals an anti-bureaucratic political regime generated by the bishop’s aversion for both the state’s

1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, Curs de Exegeză...cit., p. 66. 2 Idem, Produsuri sufletești...cit., p. 245. 3 As for instance the Inochentiștii, whose cult consists in such sexual debauchery that overshadows even brothels which are specialised in this kind of depravation (Bartolomeu Stănescu’s note). 4 Ibidem, p. 279. 5 Ibidem, p. 42.


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omnipotence and incapacity of producing social consensus, which means that the state should assume its role of pedagogue. Thus, Bartolomeu Stănescu positions himself against democratic liberal regimes, in which the claim of the state to broaden bureaucracy does not necessarily imply the need to submit individuals’ activity to a unifying plan imposed from above, it only means that the state should adapt to spontaneous social changes. So, as liberal democracies consolidate themselves, the state too grows, it does not diminish, trying to meet the expansive dynamics of society, which should be rendered to itself through self-determination and liberalisation in all domains:

“The need for a state corresponds to less and less out-dated authority and more and more representativeness. The democratic state no longer imposes the course, it creates a relationship of functional correspondence, of reflection when acting, wherein instead of making prevail an intrinsic necessity, the self-assumption of the social body, the actual self-possession should materialise under the form of effective rule”.1

In this way, the bishop falls into a trap similar to that neoliberalism which was

experimented in countries as Great Britain and the United States of America, in the 1980s, and eventually extended in all Europe, in other words the trap of freeing society from the state’s tutelage, but of putting it under the exclusive authority of one of its fundamental realities, namely free market. Therefore, just as the neoliberal state has to be a transparent one, with a discrete presence in economy, education, health, etc., the state imagined by the bishop too has a sole attribution, i.e. to organise society in professional corporations. Bartolomeu Stănescu’s state is peopled by a few technocrats who govern, not in the name of a politically assumed vision or on behalf of their liability towards citizens, but in the name of their scientific expertise.

Furthermore, the bishop stands against the democratic construction of Western countries from where he actually had borrowed his examples and where states were inserting themselves more and more deeply in society through public services precisely to liberate it:

“The fertile moment of crystallisation of the democratic system, as we know it since the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, offers it a crucial illustration: the development of the state under the form of various public services, the relinquishment of the royal, imperative character preserved by the exertion of political authority”.2

Consequently, the greater the role of the state in society, the more naturally

does it become present in the collective mechanism, without thereby engendering statism or assistentialism. Hence, Christian democrats plead for a certain degree of interventionism of the state, which would be totally inacceptable for classical

1 Marcel GAUCHET, Dezvrăjirea lumii...cit., p. 292. 2 Ibidem, p. 317.


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liberalism, yet at the same time they attack more severely Marxism than liberalism, which they associate to the state’s dictatorship and to the implicit negation of Christ’s fundamental teachings, viz. the infinite value of human being.

9. THE FAILURE OF BISHOP BARTOLOMEU’S PROJECT The failure of Bartolomeu Stănescu’s project of Christian democracy is above

all a personal failure. He migrates from evangelic democracy to organic statist authoritarianism, without even noticing the radical change of the proposed political regime. On the other hand, the bishop does not succeed to focus enough human energy to shape a social or political movement in order to give effect to some of his ideas. In this respect, during all its existence, the Social-Christian movement Solidaritatea was regarded not as a modern one, but as a modernist current, therefore it was kept at the periphery of both the Romanian Orthodox Church, and of the Romanian interwar society. As to the organisational aspect, in the bishop’s opinion, the Church herself did not possess enough resources to generate an at least intellectual movement, and much less a social one, since “today the Church is ossified contenting herself to prepare documents and indulging in administrative formalism”1.

On the other hand, the patriarch Miron Cristea himself never showed a real interest in the principles of Social Christianity, and the King Carol II, who forced bishop Bartolomeu Stănescu to withdraw, positioned himself ever since the royal Restoration of June 8, 1930 against political parties, Parliament and implicitly against democracy itself, attitude reconfirmed by the nomination of Miron Cristea as President of the Council of Ministers, a decision that had the role of consolidating the antiparty sensibility in society2.

Consequently, even if certain zones of the Romanian interwar civil society, such as Solidaritatea, sought to draw the attention on the need of a democratic construction, the major concern of the political class was to politically turn a vertical hierarchy into a horizontal arrangement of elites3; in other words, they paid less attention to civil equality which is specific to democracy, than to a sort of ultra-bureaucratisation which contradicts the bishop’s reflection, according to whom “it is man who makes the state in accordance with his needs, and not the other way around”4. Furthermore, the ruling parts of civil society exhibited no interest in associating themselves with the project or at least to imitate it at another level. In this respect, the priests I. Popescu-Mălăești

1 Bartolomeu STĂNESCU, “Cuvântare despre educaţia copiilor, rostită la conferinţa «Alianţei Universale» de la Stokholm, în luna august 1925”, Biserica Ortodoxă Română, Seria II, Anul 43, No. 12, 1925, p. 716. 2 Cristian PREDA, Rumânii fericiți. Vot și putere de la 1821 până în prezent, Polirom, Iași, 2011. 3 Daniel BARBU, Cristian PREDA, “Building the State from the Roof Down: Varieties of Romanian Liberal Nationalism”, in Iván Zoltán DÉNES (ed.), Liberty and the search for identity: liberal nationalism and the legacy of empires. Central European University Press, Budapest, 2006. 4 Stănescu BARTOLOMEU, “Datoriile economico -sociale ale statului din punct de vedere creştin”, Revista social -creștină Solidaritatea, Anul V, No. 1-3, 1924, p. 26.


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and Nicolae Dobrescu, both professors at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Bucharest, saw in Bartolomeu Stănescu’s Social Christianity but a political programme, inspired from Die christlich Partei and Le christianisme social, socio-political movements of Germany, and respectively of France1, which means that behind the association between modernity and Christianity there is no sheer scientific resource, but merely a political ideology, subject to transience and even contrary to the Romanian Orthodox Church. Thus, although we did not identify a cause-effect answer to the reasons which underlay the lack of influence of the Romanian social Christianity or to the reasons why the members of the movement gave up the project initiated by Bartolomeu Stănescu, the ecclesiastical and political elites’ silence betrays an utter lack of interest in the only formula of Christian democracy in interwar Romania.

10. CONCLUSIONS To top it all, Bartolomeu Stănescu’s democracy is the pray of the very novel

element it contained, namely the subsidiarity principle, which remains in both formulas of political regime conceived by the Oltenian bishop, or, in other words, subsidiarity in its democratic formula is very close to subsidiarity in the authoritarian formula. Bartolomeu Stănescu leaves the scene of the history as a character rejected by several political regimes (Carol’s dictatorship, the Iron Guard, Antonescu’s dictatorship, and the communist regime), but he enters the zone of historiography and history of political ideas as one of the few Romanians who sought to put into practice Christian democracy through an intellectual formula.

1 A.N.I.C., Fund of the Ministry of Cults and Public Instruction, File no. 2638/1913, sheet 38.


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Per un’ Analisi Critica del Concetto di «Meritocrazia» come «Ideologia» Neo-liberista

Salvatore CINGARI

University for Foreigners of Perugia Abstract: This article examines a particular aspect of the linguistic and cultural «neoliberal» hegemony, namely the use of the term «meritocracy», as a concept related to the idea of improving the degree of justice in society. The view expressed here is that in a more general process («post-democratic»), this term has an «ideological» nature, in the sense that it actually functions as a mask of inequality. Therefore, the debate in Italy is reconstructed, considering some mainstream texts, but also some interventions that deconstruct the ideology.

Keywords: meritocracy, post-democracy, neo-liberalism, hegemony, ideology.

1. POST-DEMOCRAZIA ED EGEMONIA NEO-LIBERISTA David Harvey, nel suo libro sulla storia del neo-liberismo1, insiste

«gramscianamente» sul ruolo dell’egemonia culturale conquistata dal neo-liberismo a partire dalla fine degli anni settanta. Tale egemonia corrisponde ai processi produttivi segnati dal passaggio al post-fordismo e alla finanziarizzazione dell’economia, agevolata dalle scelte politiche degli stati, in un quadro istituzionale che possiamo definire come «post-democratico».

Il termine «post-democrazia» è entrato nel linguaggio politico europeo con il libro di Colin Crouch del 20032. Esso intende enucleare la costituzione materiale dei paesi capitalistici, così come si è andata assestando fra anni ottanta e svolta del secolo. Una realtà politico-sociale, cioè, in cui, a causa di una progressiva deregolamentazione dei mercati e della finanza, le concentrazioni di capitale privato si sono particolarmente rafforzate sovrastando il potere degli stati sovrani e quindi della cittadinanza democratica. Non sono più le aziende che cercano di guadagnarsi il favore degli stati, ma viceversa. Di conseguenza sulle grandi decisioni che riguardano la vita delle persone, influiscono sempre più le grandi lobbies economico-finanziarie. I partiti non hanno più il ruolo di mettere in connessione i bisogni delle persone e dei corpi sociali con le istituzioni, ma di collegare queste, appunto, ai poteri forti dell'economia privata. In questo scenario le istituzioni pubbliche, e, in particolare, le istituzioni di welfare vengono progressivamente erose da processi di privatizzazione, giustificati con le retoriche dell'efficienza e della produttività, ma, in realtà, mosse

1 David HARVEY, Breve storia del neoliberismo, Il saggiatore, Milano, 2007. 2 Colin CROUCH, Postdemocrazia, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2003.


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dall'esigenza di mettere a disposizione dei guadagni privati e di borsa più ampie fette di beni comuni.

Il risultato di questi processi è quindi una riapertura drammatica della forbice delle diseguaglianze sociali e un arretramento dei diritti individuali e collettivi. Non solo il lavoro diventa sempre più precario e non tutelato, oltre che scarsamente disponibile, ma i salari e gli stipendi vengono sempre più compressi in favore di rendite, prevalentemente finanziarie, e profitti. L'economia basata su delocalizzazioni, investimenti in marketing e nella finanza, fa sì che la produttività o i guadagni non corrispondano più allo sviluppo collettivo. Non più denaro-merce-denaro, ma denaro-denaro. La capacità, quindi, del capitalismo, di generare ricchezza collettiva, sembra spenta e, così, anche rotta la relazione fra capitalismo e democrazia1.

La previsione è che in pochi anni sarà smantellata la sanità, l’istruzione e la previdenza pubblica, con una massa neo-servile assoggettata alla condizione precaria del lavoro e una minoranza oligarchica padrona delle risorse economiche. Un ritorno, perciò, all'antico regime, in cui pochi potranno istruirsi, spostarsi, curarsi etc. e molti avranno difficoltà a farlo. Si parla di «post-democrazia» perché tale situazione viene «dopo» alcuni decenni in cui la pressione esercitata sulle élites occidentali dai movimenti dei lavoratori e dell’Impero sovietico aveva generato un compromesso fra capitalismo e diritti sociali e, quindi, il ricordo di ciò dovrebbe consentire di misurare il presente col recente passato e con i suoi residui giuridico-istituzionali.

In questa temperie si diffondono saperi economici tutti schiacciati sull'economia neo-liberista ispirata dalla scuola di Chicago e discorsi etici e politici caratterizzati da una svalutazione dell'intervento dello stato e della gestione pubblica dei beni comuni, a vantaggio dell'idea che ognuno debba essere imprenditore di se stesso. L'uguaglianza economico-sociale viene svalutata, in quanto invece si ritiene che avvantaggiando i grandi patrimoni si determinino le condizioni per accumulare capitale da investire per una ricchezza comune che, come abbiamo visto, in realtà non si produce. La democrazia viene esaltata soltanto nel suo lato procedurale: essa è ritenuta in crescita sulla base dell'aumento dei paesi in cui si svolgono libere elezioni, ma senza che sia considerato il peso condizionante dei grandi poteri economici sulle dinamiche politiche e quello dei media e della microfisica «consumistica» del potere.

In questo ordine egemonico, un ruolo importante ha avuto in Italia, negli ultimi anni, il concetto di «meritocrazia». Tale idea è apparentemente connessa ad una critica democratica del sistema oligarchico. In un paese a scarsa mobilità sociale dove dominano le grandi famiglie, il nepotismo, il favoritismo, il clientelismo e talvolta la vera e propria corruzione, richiamare l'idea che l'assegnazione dei ruoli vada riportata al merito e alla competenza e non alle relazioni personali, sembrerebbe un assunto di semplice buon senso. E tuttavia tale discorso sta finendo per andare a costituire una vera e propria ideologia della diseguaglianza, in quanto va a giustificare le differenze di classe, configurandosi come una sorta di teodicea del neo-capitalismo. Il merito, quindi,

1 Cfr. Alberto BURGIO, Senza democrazia, Derive APPRODI, Roma, 2009; Luciano GALLINO, Finanzcapitalismo, Einaudi, Torino, 2011; Piero BEVILACQUA, Il grande saccheggio. L’età del capitalismo distruttivo, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2011.


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non come base della distribuzione di determinati ruoli, ma come giustificazione delle posizioni sociali esistenti e delle differenze di classe. Il concetto di meritocrazia, inoltre, è volto anche a sottolineare la necessità di selezionare i ruoli sulla base di un criterio di efficienza ed a valorizzare, a questo fine, quindi, la formazione di classi dirigenti e di leaders piuttosto che l’attenzione all’elevamento culturale e civile dell’intero corpo sociale, il cui benessere è visto solo in funzione, appunto, della possibilità di essere guidato da «eccellenze» (concetto peraltro non privo di mediate suggestioni nietzschiane). Si tratta insomma non solo della diffusione di massa delle teorie elitistiche, ma di un ritorno in grande stile dello stesso elitarismo aristocraticistico e irrazionalistico (non a caso venato di giovanilismo) del primo novecento, che accompagnava, non a caso, i processi di accelerazione imperialistica del capitalismo, come George Lukács ben comprese nella Distruzione della ragione. L’elitismo stesso tende ormai a lasciare il campo democratico guadagnato con Shumpeter per tendere ad un «modello Singapore» in cui meritarsi i diritti non rimanda tanto alla sfera dell’autonomia personale quanto a quella dell’obbedienza e della subordinazione gerarchica1, dal momento che non si tratta più, per i lavoratori, di organizzarsi ed unirsi per esprimere un conflitto al fine di rivendicare collettivamente diritti individuali, ma di «stare al proprio posto», cercando individualisticamente di ottenere premi e approvazione dai superiori; e in cui è quindi facile slittare dall’idea che chi merita deve assumere più responsabilità a quella che chi merita deve avere più diritti.

Non stupisce allora che il dato più ricorrente nella letteratura «meritocratica» è l'assenza di attenzione per i meccanismi produttivi e redistributivi utili affinché una società abbia quelle caratteristiche di giustizia tali da far emergere il «merito». La meritocrazia viene declinata come uguaglianza di opportunità (che sarebbe anche sinonimo di «socialismo»), ma tale uguaglianza viene vista come il frutto di particolari sistemi educativi, oppure proprio come frutto della distruzione dello stato sociale, nell'idea che mentre esso accresce rendite di posizione, la società privatizzata favorisce la mobilità, come se il liberismo sfrenato non menasse alle concentrazioni oligopolistiche e quindi all'immobilità.

Che l'idea del «merito» sia poi connessa alla cultura economico-aziendale egemone emerge dal proliferare delle pratiche di valutazione quantitativa nella scuola e nell'Università, con le connesse dinamiche etico-culturali ispirate alla competizione e all'enfasi elitaria sull'eccellenza al posto della cultura egualitaria che si era affermata negli anni sessanta e settanta. Allo stesso modo, in campo sociale, si assiste ad una diffusione di una cultura securitario-autoritaria, in cui si distinguono i cittadini «meritevoli» da quelli «immeritevoli», spesso razzizzati e criminalizzati, in modo parallelo a come, a livello di politica internazionale, vengono stigmatizzati gli «stati canaglia».

Nel seguito di questo saggio intendiamo dapprima ricostruire alcuni aspetti della genealogia del concetto di «meritocrazia», soffermandoci poi su alcuni momenti del dibattito italiano attuale. 1 Cfr. Bruno TRENTIN, “A proposito di merito”, L’Unità, 13 luglio 2006.


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2. PER UNO STUDIO GENEALOGICO DEL CONCETTO DI «MERITOCRAZIA»

La voce «meritocrazia» del dizionario di politica, a cura di L. Fisher1, sottolineava

come una società meritocratica (cioè dove il «kratos» è del merito) è una società in cui il successo educativo e sociale è il risultato 1) di doti naturali tipo l'intelligenza e 2) dello sforzo individuale. Si tratta di una prospettiva che critica il criterio «ascrittivo» basato sul privilegio di nascita e promuove quello «acquisitivo», basato cioè sul raggiungimento di posizioni acquisite grazie ai meriti individuali. Quest'ultima è una società meritocratica.

Un termine, questo, che oggi sembra indubitabilmente da declinare con quello di «democrazia». Ma basta guardarsi indietro di qualche decennio (a egemonia neo-liberista ancora da venire o da consolidare) per scoprire come invece esso possa anche classificarsi nello strumentario concettuale anti-democratico. Pensiamo che ancora nel 1998, Anthony Giddens, nel Manifesto della «Terza via», che a sua volta è oggi da ricordare più per i suoi cedimenti al neo-liberismo che per gli spunti di pensiero critico, arrivava a dire: «molti suggeriscono che oggi il solo modello di uguaglianza dovrebbe essere l’uguaglianza delle opportunità, o la meritocrazia – cioè a dire il modello neo-liberista». La meritocrazia, continuava Giddens, finisce per premiare oltre misura i più talentuosi che, poi, trasmetteranno i loro vantaggi per via ereditaria, trasformandoli in privilegi. Si impone, quindi, una mobilità verso il basso che mina la coesione sociale2.

Era questa, di fatto, la posizione di Michael Young, intellettuale laburista scomparso nel 2002, il padre del termine in questione, che lo introduceva, però, titolando una vera e propria distopia, un romanzo sociologico del 1958 in cui l’autore sembrava all’inizio esaltare una società meritocratica per poi dipingerla catastrofisticamente nei suoi esiti castuali3. Per Young ogni uomo doveva essere giudicato nella sua differenza, nei suoi specifici talenti, irriducibili alle quantificazioni dettate dal mainstream sociale. E’ veramente un capitolo curioso della storia culturale contemporanea, il fatto che alcuni fautori della meritocrazia, fra cui lo stesso Roger Abravanel, su cui torneremo fra breve, considerino Young l’ispiratore della cultura meritocratica, quando il suo intento era esattamente l’opposto4. Nella stessa edizione italiana di The rise of meritocracy, uscita per le Edizioni di Comunità nel 1962, Cesare

1 Dizionario di politica, UTET, Torino, 1976. 2 Anthony GIDDENS, La terza via. Manifesto per la rifondazione della socialdemocrazia, Il saggiatore, Milano, 1999, pp. 102-103. Per Giddens era illusorio pensare che l’istruzione potesse colmare le diseguaglianze in modo diretto, dato che il livello di essa rispecchia le diseguaglianze stesse (ivi, p. 110). Anche per Romano Prodi, autore della prefazione, non bisognava rincorrere «sconsideratamente le mitologie liberiste e meritocratiche» (ivi, p. 10). 3 Michael YOUNG, L’avvento della meritocrazia (1958), Edizioni di comunità, Milano, 1962. 4 Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento e rendere il ostro paese più ricco e più giusto, Garzanti, Milano, 2008.


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Mannucci, in sede di introduzione, parlava della meritocrazia come dell’ «esatta antitesi della democrazia».

Ma allora come è possibile che oggi il termine sia diventato parte dell’agenda politica dell’opinione pubblica, dei media e del personale politico di stampo «progressista»? In realtà, in effetti, il concetto, se non il termine, non è del tutto estraneo alla cultura di sinistra. Infatti è vero che esso si incarna nella cultura politica del dopo restaurazione, in sistemi elitistici come quello di Guizot, in cui non è più l’origine aristocratica, ma il merito personale cristallizzato nella ricchezza che attesta la capacità di attingere alla «ragione»1. Ma è vero anche che il problema di enucleare un’idea di società in cui il «merito» non è privilegio, è un tema che percorre la riflessione che, da Rousseau a Marx, cerca di andare oltre la democrazia liberale. E’ stato Galvano della Volpe2, nel saggio intitolato, appunto, Rousseau e Marx e quasi coevo all’opera di Young, che ha cercare di ritessere questo filo. In Rousseau, scriveva Della Volpe, un problema di fondo era proprio quello di far sì che le diseguaglianze fra gli individui legate alla dimensione politica e civile, non siano differenti da quelle determinate dalla capacità di lavoro e dal talento degli stessi. Notava Della Volpe che è però soltanto con Marx che si effettua una critica risolutiva alle radici di quella discrasia fra ineguaglianza civile e ineguaglianza naturale, instaurandosi una società in cui ognuno riceva a seconda del proprio lavoro e cioè del proprio merito. Della Volpe, che scriveva in epoca post-staliniana, riteneva di vedere realizzato tale modello nella società sovietica. Ecco perciò che in qualche misura possono essere comprese certe convergenze fra Gobetti e il giovane Gramsci nel segno del liberismo meritocratico, in cui certo emerge l’ascendenza in certo modo «borghese» del lavorismo marxista. E’ lo stesso Della Volpe che, però, accenna all’inizio del saggio a un tema che poi non sviluppa, e cioè quello del comunismo come società che non dà più a tutti secondo il merito, ma secondo il bisogno. E’ solo per questa via che in certo modo si può emendare il «naturalismo» insito nello stesso Rousseau: se si premiano i meriti naturali, infatti, non si determina una nuova aristocrazia? Cos’era l’aristocrazia alle origini, se non una borghesia primitiva, che però agiva in campo militare piuttosto che nel mercato, per acquisire potere?

Ecco quindi che da un lato la linea Rousseau-Marx sottopone fortemente a critica l’idea meritocratica contemporanea. Essa, infatti, è sempre declinata sul piano della moralità e legalità pubblica, senza mai andare a vedere quale sia la situazione economico-sociale, nel suo lato produttivo e redistributivo. D’altro lato la tradizione marxista, con l’idea della centralizzazione del bisogno, condivide con la stessa

1 Cfr. ad es. François GUIZOT, Della sovranità, Editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 1998; Della democrazia in Francia (1848), Centro editoriale toscano, Firenze, 2000. Su Guizot come teorico del merito cfr. Il bel saggio di Mario TESINI, “Meritocrazia, merito e storia del linguaggio politico”, Paradoxa, gennaio-marzo 2011, pp. 59-64. 2 Galvano DELLA VOLPE, Rousseau e Marx e altri saggi di critica materialistica (1957), Editori riuniti, Roma, 1962 (ed. accresc.).


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democrazia costituzionale del secondo dopoguerra1 l’idea che una serie di diritti sociali sono universali, a prescindere dal merito dei soggetti che ne sono titolari.

L’attuale discorso meritocratico, rimuovendo sia il problema dell’uguaglianza economico sociale per garantire pari opportunità, sia la questione di un livello di diritti riguardante la sfera del bisogno e non del merito, rischia così di diventare la giustificazione della diseguaglianza, mascherando i privilegi con il velo del «merito», come anche Fisher, negli anni settanta, sottolineava nella succitata voce del Dizionario di politica. Ma non c’è in gioco soltanto questa sorta di teodicea del capitalismo, ma anche la neutralizzazione del conflitto sociale. La società e le classi scompaiono di fronte all’individuo e alla sua responsabilità. In fondo si tratta della riproposizione di ciò che già si era affermato nella prima metà dell’Ottocento nei paesi anglosassoni, e nella seconda metà in Italia, e cioè l’ideologia del self-help2, che tendeva a giustificare una ridotta mobilità sociale dalle «classi pericolose» alle élites. Si trattava cioè di una vasta pubblicistica rivolta al «popolo», a cui si diceva di vincere le tentazioni conflittuali verso le classi più abbienti, ed evitare le spinte aggregative fra svantaggiati per sconfiggere i forti, investendo le energie, all’opposto, nel pensare che ognuno, individualmente, poteva riuscire ad essere fra quei pochi che avrebbero scalato la vetta del successo: «fai da te», «aiutati che Dio t'aiuta», «chi la dura la vince», «chi si ferma è perduto». Questi sono alcuni dei motti self-helpisti, che, non a caso, consigliavano a tutti di «stare al proprio posto», al di fuori dei ristrettissimi canali deputati alla mobilità sociale consentita. Oggi – come nell'Ottocento il self-help - l’ideologia del merito giustifica la nuova disuguaglianza del nuovo ordine neo-liberista, che riproduce le società pre-democratiche dell’Ottocento.

La criminalizzazione della povertà, assimilata alla devianza e contrapposta al «cittadino meritevole», è un risultato, ad esempio, di questa logica. La meritocrazia rivela inoltre una certa parentela con il razzismo stesso: nella misura in cui, cioè, essa naturalizza la posizione sociale e quindi la essenzializza gerarchizzando così la società3. Anche per Rousseau, del resto, il «merito» era una «dote naturale».

3. UN CASO STUDIO: IL DIBATTITO IN ITALIA 3.1. Il best seller di Roger Abravanel. Un’analisi critica di un testo

emblematico del futuro «senso comune» Nell’Italia di oggi il discorso meritocratico è diventato dominante, nell’agenda

politica e nel dibattito mediatico, per due ragioni. Da un lato per l’esigenza di criticare i favoritismi e il nepotismo tipici di una società a bassa mobilità, atavicamente fondata 1 Utilizziamo questo termine nel senso di Luigi FERRAJOLI, in Principia iuris, tomo II, Teoria della democrazia, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2007. 2 Su questi temi cfr. le indicaz. bibl. in Salvatore CINGARI, “L' "onda di fondo". Liberalismo e riforma del carattere negli epigoni italiani di Samuel Smiles”, Incontri mediterranei, No. 1, 2004, pp. 149-160. 3 Su ciò cfr. Alberto BURGIO, Nonostante Auschwitz. Il «ritorno» del razzismo in Europa, Derive Approdi, Roma, 2010.


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su privilegi oligarchico-familistici, che divengono particolarmente pesanti in epoca di crisi. Si pensa però che il rimedio sia migliorare il meccanismo dei concorsi o abbassare gli stipendi di chi li vince, non di agire sulla sfera produttiva-redistributiva e politico-partecipativa, elevando il livello etico e l’effettiva parità di opportunità. Dall’altro il discorso meritocratico è fondato sulla critica dell’egualitarismo post-sessantotto. In realtà è da considerare se il vero obiettivo del discorso meritocratico sia in realtà l’eguaglianza e lo stato sociale in quanto erogatore di servizi universali volti a soddisfare il bisogno e non a premiare il merito.

E’ in questa temperie che è fiorita, nell’ultimo decennio, una pubblicistica particolarmente significativa in questo senso. Citiamo qui solo alcuni esempi. Pensiamo a La guerra del talento di Giuliano da Empoli, del 2000, in cui l’allora enfant prodige scriveva che la società non doveva accollarsi il problema dei fallimenti individuali e che la flessibilità andava vissuta come una grande opportunità, dato che le fluttuazioni della finanza e le possibilità offerte dalla rete, consentivano alle persone intraprendenti e di talento di mettersi sul mercato e vincere la lotta per la vita, come avviene nella Silicon Valley1. Posizioni, queste, sostenute anche dagli interventi ospitati sul «Sole 24Ore» e sul «Corriere della sera» da Alberto Alesina e Francesco Giavazzi2. Ma pensiamo anche al libro di Adolfo Scotto di Luzio sulla storia della scuola italiana, in realtà estraneo agli accenti più volgari del neo-liberismo, al cui produttivismo anzi si contrappone, ma sulla base di un neo-gentilismo che ripristina, con eclatante sincerità, l’idea che soltanto chi se lo può permettere economicamente dovrebbe poter svolgere studi superiori, avendo cioè a disposizione il tempo e la tranquillità per farlo convenientemente3.

Ma un testo particolarmente fortunato come vendite e diffusione è stato il best seller di Roger Abravanel, Meritocrazia. L’autore è stato consulente del ministero dell’istruzione nell’ultimo governo presieduto da Berlusconi, è membro della Fondazione Montezemolo ed editorialista dei due giornali di punta della borghesia italiana: il «Corriere della sera» e il «Sole 24 ore». Una prima cosa da osservare è che contrariamente alle retoriche liberali anti-totalitarie volte a stigmatizzare l’ideologismo giacobino-progressista, incurante della formazione spontanea dei valori sociali, Abravanel4, più in linea con un approccio neo-cons, si fa esplicitamente fautore di un’ «ideologia» che debba «mobilitare migliaia di italiani eccellenti» per «trasformare la cultura e i sistemi di valori». C’è in gioco un «homo novus»: definire, cioè «nuovi valori morali per influenzare comportamenti diffusi fra milioni di persone». Insomma un vero e proprio progetto egemonico, che non esita ad auto-definirsi «ideologico». Il fine è produrre «leader eccellenti»5 nel settore pubblico e in quello privato, ma anche maggior «sviluppo ed eguaglianza sociale», sebbene su quest’ultimo punto la sua posizione sia ambivalente. Poco dopo, infatti, egli precisa che in Italia la cultura

1 Giuliano Da EMPOLI, La guerra del talento, Marsilio, Padova, 2000. 2 Alberto ALESINA, Francesco GIAVAZZI, Il liberismo è di sinistra, Saggiatore, Milano, 2007. 3 Adolfo Scotto DI LUZIO, La scuola degli italiani, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007. 4 Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento…cit., pp. 14-18. 5 Cfr. anche ivi, p. 241.


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meritocratica è stata in difficoltà perché c’è resistenza ad accettare la «piena responsabilizzazione degli individui e le pari opportunità orientate alla mobilità sociale», e inoltre è diffusa l’ indulgenza verso «chi sbaglia» e la critica della «disuguaglianza». Qual è allora l’uguaglianza che va assieme alla meritocrazia? E’ solo quella dei punti di partenza, mentre la diseguaglianza dei punti d’arrivo è un problema soltanto dell’antico regime, quando essa era basata su privilegi ascrittivi. Alla base di questo discorso c’è ovviamente l’idea che il merito sia all’origine delle diseguaglianze del sistema capitalistico e di quello neo-capitalistico in particolare, nell’epoca, cioè, di Bill Gates, in cui non ci sarebbe sfruttamento e il benessere finisce per favorire tutti1.

Molte sono le pagine che destano impressione in questo volume, in considerazione del suo successo. Ad esempio il succitato testo di Michael Young viene considerato come un’esaltazione delle meritocrazia attraversata da qualche spunto problematico2. E’ già stato da altri notato come il termine «meritocrazia», coniato da Young in un’accezione negativa, sia poi stato utilizzato con una carica valutativa opposta3. Prima di morire Young aveva scritto una lettera a Tony Blair (uno dei punti di riferimento positivi dello stesso Abravanel), sulle colonne del Guardian del 29 giugno del 2001, in cui esprimeva il suo disappunto per il fatto di essere chiamato in causa come padre della «meritocrazia». Addirittura, per Abravanel, Young sarebbe un fautore della quantificazione del merito4. Se Abravanel concedeva che l’education act varato nel ’44 dai conservatori a seguito delle battaglie laburiste criticate da Young e che prevedeva i test a undici anni per capire se il soggetto poteva fare le grammar schools o le secondary moderns, era troppo rigido perché a quell’età il condizionamento familiare è ancora tropo forte, egli propone a modello il sistema americano, che prevede il momento della valutazione a diciassette, con un sistema universitario privato che, nonostante le preoccupazioni del celebre presidente di Harvard fra anni trenta e cinquanta, A. James Bryant Conant, fautore del sistema pubblico, avrebbe saputo ben recepire la politica delle borse di studio5. Abravanel guarda al modello americano anche perché in esso università e scuole inferiori in media non sono di alto livello ma spiccano le punte di eccellenza6. Nel contesto italiano, non conviene a suo avviso investire più soldi in Università e ricerca, ma convertire i già tradizionalmente stanziati alla valorizzazione dell’eccellenza7. Le stesse preoccupazioni di Young sulla possibilità che l’utopia meritocratica (nella lettura di Abravanel) possa degenerare in un’aristocrazia genetica, sono facilmente fugabili, a suo avviso, con un monitoraggio

1 Ibidem, p. 20. 2 Ibidem, pp. 20, 37-41, 53-55, 109. 3 Su ciò Mauro BOARELLI, “L’inganno della meritocrazia”, Lo straniero. Arte-cultura-scienza-società, aprile 2010, No. 118 [www.lostraniero.net]; Mario TESINI, “Meritocrazia, merito e storia…cit.”, p. 66. 4 Cfr. Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento...cit., p. 68. 5 Ibidem, pp. 52-57. Pur ritenendo che studi non meglio precisati dimostrerebbero che il condizionamento familiare incida meno dell’intelligenza cognitiva e delle capacità caratteriali, Abravanel sostiene poi, contraddittoriamente, che lo stesso condizionamento sia fondamentale per determinare il livello di migliori opportunità educative. Ivi, p. 61. 6 Ibidem p. 81. 7 Ibidem, pp. 207-210.


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in età scolare, dato che «ricerche approfondite» (ma non precisate1) evidenzierebbero come a sette anni si possa prevedere il reddito del bambino a trentacinque2. Insomma Abravanel non comprende come il problema di Young non fosse l’errore possibile nel sistema di selezione genetico-aristocratico, ma il sistema stesso.

Per costruire una società meritocratica è necessario, per Abravanel, approntare sistemi di testing nelle università sul modello americano, rompendo con la diffidenza italiana per le classifiche e le misurazioni «obiettive e quantitative»3. Si tratta un po’, cioè, della filosofia che di recente cerca di improntare la valutazione universitaria italiana, i cui parametri quantitativi sono da tempo oggetto di accese critiche e dibattiti. Alla stessa filosofia attingono i test PISA, attraverso cui la scuola italiana è stata monitorata con il risultato di segnalare una forte discrepanza fra Nord e Sud.

Altra resistenza culturale alla meritocrazia, in Italia - paese, a suo avviso, dove domina una mentalità parassitario-assistenzialistica -, è secondo Abravanel la paura che essa porti al licenziamento dei nullafacenti e che inoltre, come temeva Young, si inauguri una «aristocrazia dello sperma». Egli fa invece notare come l’Italia abbia una delle società più diseguali del mondo, più di USA e Gran Bretagna4. Qui da un lato l’autore sembra non considerare come l’Italia abbia registrato nuovi coefficienti di accentuata diseguaglianza da quando le politiche neo-liberiste si sono gradualmente sostituite a quelle socialdemocratiche. Anche dove sostiene che le politiche per il mezzogiorno han dato risultati inaccettabili, sfornando dati dal 1995 al 2005, non considera come sia proprio in quel lasso di tempo che si inverte una tendenza invece positiva, in questo senso, nei decenni precedenti, in concomitanza con la fine dei provvedimenti redistributivi per il Sud5. D’altro lato va registrato come stranamente egli utilizzi USA e Gran Bretagna come esempi di società diseguali, dato che lamenta che l’Italia lo sia di più, quando poi in altri luoghi essi vengono rappresentati come modelli di società meritocratica e, quindi, secondo il suo discorso, di società egualitaria.

Il carattere «meritocratico» delle società anglosassoni è peraltro riportato da Abravanel alla cultura protestante e a quella laburista. Ciò secondo lui attesterebbe che anche in Italia il terreno può essere fertile ad una riscoperta, da parte della destra, del libero mercato e, da parte della sinistra, della mobilità sociale, in quanto l’incidenza della cultura cattolica e di quella comunista non dovrebbe quindi essere un ostacolo insuperabile6: ma in tal modo egli sovrappone in modo aproblematico protestantesimo protestantesimo e cattolicesimo, laburismo e comunismo. Tanto più che subito dopo viene fatto un rinvio al motto di uno dei modelli dell’autore e cioè la ditta McKinsey: «up or out»7. Nelle aziende, nota Abravanel, ormai lo stipendio non è più calibrato su

1 Anche Mauro BOARELLI, “L’inganno della meritocrazia…cit.” [www. lostraniero. net], fa notare la frequente mancanza di riferimento alle fonti da parte di Abravanel. 2 Cfr. Mario Tesini, “Meritocrazia, merito e storia…cit.”, p. 83. 3 Ibidem, pp. 21-22. 4 Ibidem, pp. 24-25, 159. 5 Ibidem, p. 192. 6 Ibidem, p. 25. 7 Ibidem, pp. 25-26.


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posizione e anzianità aziendale, ma sulla «performance»1. Le aziende devono classificare i dipendenti, valorizzando i migliori2. Secondo Abravanel il «testing non può essere assolutamente l’unica misura di merito, ad esempio, degli studenti: bisogna poter anche valutare la personalità, l’autodisciplina, i valori morali. Ma questo può avvenire solo in maniera qualitativa, e richiede particolari capacità di valutazione e formazione da parte degli insegnanti. Tuttavia è a suo avviso essenziale avere degli standard misurabili; altrimenti le valutazioni qualitative portano alla mancanza di oggettività».

Importante è inoltre la questione del giovanilismo. Abravanel sostiene che in Italia c’è troppo rispetto per gli anziani, perché non è vero che questi ultimi siano più adatti a prendersi delle responsabilità. In realtà, a suo avviso, dopo dieci anni va riscontrato in ogni lavoratore un inesorabile appiattimento di prestazioni. Secondo Abaravanel un laureato del 2005 è in media migliore di uno del 1995, che è migliore a sua volta di uno del 1985. Insomma una visione ascendente della storia, praticamente, che mescola il concetto storicamente relativo di gioventù con quello assoluto di chi incarna il tempo nuovo: una sorta, cioè, di seminconsapevole miscela di giovanilismo e nuovismo3.

Abravanel, peraltro, mostra di coltivare l’attenzione liberal-democratica per la valorizzazione dell’individuo a prescindere dall’appartenenza micro-comunitaria alla famiglia. Rileva opportunamente come il familismo in Italia sia anche il frutto del deficit di statualità4. Citando Napoleone, Hegel, Giddens e Young, egli sostiene l’idea di uno stato che ridimensiona il ruolo della famiglia nel senso di offrire agli individui «un’alternativa di appartenenza e di sviluppo»5. Ma non si avvede che le politiche neo-liberiste rilanciano le appartenenze naturali-tradizionali proprio nella misura in cui prevedono istituzioni che abbandonano socialmente l’individuo a se stesso.

E’ interessante che tale modello aziendalistico-produttivistico conviva con il riferimento ai metodi di selezione della RAF6 e poi dell’esercito israeliano7, fino a risalire alle pratiche di selezione spartana8 e, soprattutto, a Platone9, la cui utopia può anche essere pensata come una meritocrazia fondata su una metafisica delle idee. Tale idealismo, di fatto, converge tuttavia con le posizioni «naturalistiche», un po’ come i modelli cattolico e positivistico, nell’Ottocento, approdavano alle stesse posizioni sulla gerarchizzazione della società in sessi, razze e classi. Anche quando Abravanel si appoggia ad un riferimento venato di istanze democratiche, come Conant10, fautore di borse di studio per i meno abbienti e per la confisca dei beni ereditati, il riferimento è alla «aristocrazia naturale» basata su «virtù e talento» di cui nel 1813 discutevano

1 Ibidem, p. 130. 2 Ibidem, p. 133. 3 Ibidem, p. 175. 4 Ibidem, p. 186. 5 Ibidem, p. 184. 6 Ibidem, p. 131. 7 Ibidem, pp. 141-143. 8 Ibidem, p. 40. 9 Ibidem, p. 41, 143-144. 10 Ibidem, pp. 42-47.


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Thomas Jefferson e John Adams. Tale commistione di idealismo e positivismo è possibile rilevare anche nella pagina in cui Abravanel parla dei test SAT come di qualcosa di mistico, una sorta di degno sostituto «scientifico» della religione, che avrebbe portato gli intellettuali a capo della società come ai tempi della teocrazia. Possiamo pensare, per queste posizioni, al teorico del corporativismo fascista Ugo Spirito, passato da posizioni neo-idealistiche, nella prima metà del novecento, ad uno scientismo comtiano e spenceriano, che, nel secondo dopoguerra, rideclinava il capacitarismo corporativista nell’eugenetica1. Henry Chauncey, il padre dei test SAT – continuava Abravanel -, non a caso, parlava dell’ «equivalente morale della religione». Si tratta di utilizzare la «psicometria» per selezionare i leader delle masse, in un contesto in cui l’evoluzione dell’economia rende sempre più importante il manager e poi anche il «creativo» e il talentuoso, più che il tradizionale self made man di scarsa cultura2.

Il problema del sistema educativo italiano è a suo avviso, infatti, quello di voler dare la stessa istruzione a tutti. Paradossalmente, per Abravanel, ciò fa si che poi vadano a contare non le pari opportunità ma il condizionamento familiare: egli crede infatti, naturalisticamente (e quindi, in pratica, razzisticamente), che esistano i «migliori» e che quindi basti selezionarli estraendoli dai contesti e non che essi gli appaiano «migliori» per via del contesto3. Addirittura Abravanel, in uno dei suoi passaggi che sarebbe sbagliato definire «politicamente scorretti», perché caratterizzati da una sorta di inconsapevolezza naive, sembra ironizzare sul fatto che senza una selezione dei migliori con istruzione ed educazione differenziate, non resterebbe altro che accontentarsi della scuola italiana che aumenta l’alfabetizzazione e integra le diverse culture: «le scuole sono piene di figli di immigrati – scrive testualmente - e «tutti vanno a scuola»»4. Insomma a suo avviso, nell’istruzione pubblica bisogna passare dall’idea di «tutti allo stesso modo», a «educare secondo il potenziale di ciascuno», dall’«eguaglianza del livello di istruzione alle pari opportunità nel ricevere la migliore educazione»5. I meritevoli non abbienti saranno supportati da borse di studio6.

La nota autoritaria del neo-liberismo di Abravanel è evidente nel fatto ch’egli attribuisca un valore morale alla meritocrazia, radicato nella religione che punisce con l’inferno i peccatori. Il concetto di «merito» è alla base del modello di «legge ed

1 Cfr. su ciò, Salvatore CINGARI, “Ugo Spirito e la rivoluzione passiva. Note a margine”, Bollettino telematico di filosofia politica, 1 ottobre 2012. 2 Cfr. Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento…cit., pp. 49-51.

3 Ibidem, p. 256. 4 Ibidem, p. 257. Abravanel passa a criticare il sistema educativo italiano, sostenendo che i test Pisa pongono l’Italia agli ultimi posti (ivi, p. 246) e che addirittura un terzo delle lauree sarebbero valutate 110 e lode, aggiungendo che «secondo il rettore di un’importante università italiana, da noi il 110 e lode di una bella ragazza viene considerato quasi sicuramente immeritato» (ivi, p. 247). Segue la descrizione del sistema dei concorsi con il risultato predefinito, caratterizzati da minacce fisiche di tipo mafioso (ivi, p. 248). 5 Ibidem, p. 314. 6 Ibidem, p. 315.


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ordine», di una giustizia «rapida e senza compromessi», tanto che in America, società meritocratica per eccellenza, la maggioranza dei carcerati ritiene di «meritare» la propria condanna1. Anche questo assunto sembra collidere con la nostra civiltà costituzionale: l’ha fatto notare Francesco D’Agostino, sottolineando che la sanzione non mira a punire il condannato, ma a «reintegrarlo» nella società, riconoscendolo come soggetto di diritto2. E’ utile ricordare qua anche Shakespeare che, nell’Amleto, fa dire al protagonista che trattare ogni ospite come «merita» avrebbe voluto dire condannare ognuno alla «fustigazione», data la condizione umana3.

Secondo Abravanel, mentre nelle società feudali, schiaviste, castuali, la diseguaglianza giustifica privilegi ingiusti, nelle società meritocratiche la diseguaglianza è considerata «giusta» in quanto basata sulle «pari opportunità e la «mobilità sociale»4. Dal punto di vista specificamente politico, la nota più eclatante è l’enfasi positiva posta sul «sistema-Singapore», di cui esplicitamente si rimarca l’ordine ed efficienza come valori da apprezzare anche se non accompagnati da istituzioni democratiche. Singapore, per Abravanel, infatti, «non è una democrazia, ma i suoi cittadini non sembrano preoccuparsene più di tanto, visto che il livello di reddito pro capite è fra i più alti del mondo»5. Anche la Francia è peraltro considerata modello di meritocrazia nell’apparato pubblico, per l’eredità fortemente gerarchica di tipo napoleonico6. L’ordine discorsivo che stiamo analizzando, insomma, è emblematico della convergenza fra neo-liberismo e autoritarismo: della torsione anche culturale, insomma, verso la post-democrazia.

Abravanel non è per l’abolizione del Welfare, ma per la sua revisione in un sistema che incoraggi i «veri» deboli a prendere rischi7, citando il Giddens della Terza via, che, però, abbiamo visto prima come diffidasse del concetto di «meritocrazia». Con un tono quasi sprezzante Abravanel sostiene che non bisogna fornire sussidi a «disoccupate» e «ragazze madri» ma finanziare più asili nido8. Il welfare, insomma, non non deve essere una «rete di sicurezza dei barboni delle metropolitane»9. Questa immagine del «barbone» – che curiosamente sembra riprendere una tipica offesa rivolta dallo yuppie italiano degli anni ottanta a chi veniva ritenuto indietro nella scala sociale – ritorna a proposito del fatto che secondo l’autore in Italia c’è paura della meritocrazia perché si rifiuta l’idea dell’emarginazione a cui il modello americano sembra condannare fette significative della società10. E’ a suo avviso necessaria, del

1 Ibidem, pp. 60-61. 2 Francesco D’AGOSTINO, “Ben gli sta: che cosa merita un criminale”, Paradoxa, Vol. 1, 2011, pp. 18-23. 3 Cfr. Mario TESINI, Meritocrazia, merito e storia…cit., p. 59. 4 Roger ABRAVANEL, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento…cit., p. 62. 5 Ibidem, pp. 21, 145. Tipica dell’atmosfera del libro, la seguente frase supporto delle argomentazioni svolte: Lee Kuan Yew, considerato da Henry Kissinger «l’uomo più intelligente nel mondo orientale» (p. 146). 6 Ibidem, pp. 147-152. 7 Ibidem, p. 69. 8 Ibidem, pp. 85-86. 9 Ibidem, p. 95. 10 Ibidem, p. 108.


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resto, la massima flessibilità sul mercato del lavoro, compensata dagli ammortizzatori sociali, ma il salario minimo deve esser basso come in USA, per far respirare le imprese1. Il servizio pubblico, inoltre, per Abravanel non deve diventare un’occasione occupazionale, ma puntare sull’eccellenza2.

Coerentemente con le sue posizioni «platoniche», Abravanel è favorevole a pesanti tasse di successione (ma, in modo sintomatico, solo per ragioni «simboliche»), però non problematizza il nodo politico del loro attuale arretramento giuridico-politico nel mondo occidentale. Stesso discorso per il suo sostegno alla tassazione del capitale rispetto ai redditi da lavoro. Quanto ai cresciuti redditi dei super-ricchi, a suo avviso, essi sono da «lavoro» e non rendite da capitale, in un contesto economico idealizzato in cui le aziende sarebbero allergiche al nepotismo3. Arriviamo quindi ad un punto fondamentale del suo discorso: la forbice che si apre sempre più fra ricchi e poveri è, in realtà, un discrimine fra chi merita e chi no. L’importante è a suo avviso che, nonostante la diseguaglianza, il benessere collettivo aumenti, come (secondo la sua personale ricostruzione) insegnerebbe il modello inglese post-tatcheriano4. Probabilmente senza esserne consapevole, Abravanel torna ad usare toni di violenta intolleranza, affermando che con la globalizzazione, l’economia postindustriale e dei servizi (high tech), comincia a serpeggiare il credo che «i parassiti di oggi siano i poveri e non i ricchi»5. Le minoranze avrebbero oggi tutti i diritti di acceso all’educazione e per per questo, dato che alla fine nessuno dovrebbe poter lamentarsi, si sta affermando un rigetto dell’egualitarismo e un primato della responsabilizzazione a svantaggio della solidarietà6.

Il carattere ottimistico della visione abraveneliana emerge anche quando a quello ch’egli percepiva come uno sbandamento anti-meritocratico di Young, oppone che l’inglese «non poteva immaginare la società attuale, in cui i quotidiani abbondano di cronache e di storie che celebrano la gentilezza, il coraggio e la devozione di cittadini qualunque e la dignità di lavori umili»7. Per Abravanel il mondo di oggi è basato su una nuova economia dei servizi basata su un accesso ai beni dei redditi medio-bassi (discount, aerei low cost, telefonia, servizi finanziari). Quindi un miglioramento della qualità della vita dei cittadini8. La meritocrazia segnerebbe il futuro del mondo globale e sarebbe basata sulla «superiorità cognitiva»9.

1 Ibidem, pp. 88, 206. 2 Ibidem, pp. 85-86, 88. 3 Ibidem, p. 73, 161. 4 Ibidem, p. 74. 5 Ibidem, p. 115. 6 Ibidem, p. 116. 7 Ibidem, p. 94. 8 Ibidem, pp. 196, 199. 9 Ibidem, p. 97. Le pari opportunità nell’educazione a favore delle classi svantaggiate, alla fine vanno comunque a premiare una minoranza (ivi, pp. 100-101). Abravanel sembra ora dire che il contesto familiare è più importante dei fattori ereditari e critica anche The bell curve (ivi, p.106). Egli sottolinea come l’intelligenza cognitiva non sia la sola da considerare in prospettiva meritocratica, ma anche quella emotiva, caratteriale e comunicativa deve essere valutata per prevedere il reddito futuro (ivi, pp. 106-107, 157-158).


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Ovviamente il testo è stato scritto pochi mesi prima che esplodesse in modo conclamato la crisi economica tuttora in corso.

3.2. Il dibattito italiano sulla meritocrazia Il dibattito critico che si è cominciato a sollevare, in Francia ha prodotto il libro

di Pierre Rosanvallon La société des egaux1, in cui denuncia la rimozione contemporanea contemporanea del problema dell’uguaglianza sociale, frutto dell’enfatizzarsi di un individualismo consumistico, legato al neo-liberismo, che punta alla singolarità eccezionale – che sembra premiata dalla meritocrazia - più che all’uguaglianza fra i soggetti nel godere della libertà stessa.

In Italia, invece, negli ultimi anni, l’unico sforzo di ricerca di un qualche respiro, pieno di utili riferimenti bibliografici, è un numero del 2011 della rivista Paradoxa2, dedicato alla diade «merito-uguaglianza». I saggi della silloge (a cui abbiamo già fatto sopra riferimento), di ineguale impegno teorico, sono in realtà diversamente orientati. In alcuni il valore della meritocrazia viene sposato senza riserve, con un chiaro allineamento all’ideologia neo-liberale oggi dominante sui media. Luigi Cappugi, ad esempio, facendo riferimento ad Hayek3, sostiene che bisogna puntare ad una società che chieda meno tasse e cioè che faccia sì che gli «aiutati siano meno», in modo da incoraggiare le persone a fare di più. Contemporaneamente si associa a ciò la critica della «casta» dei politici che sprecano e si appropriano delle ricchezze pubbliche. Lo «Stato democratico – dice – è vissuto, a torto o a ragione, come un «distributore ingiusto e inefficiente di ricchezza altrui»». Anche Lucetta Scaraffia4 dà una valutazione positiva del concetto. L’Italia è un paese non meritocratico perché deriva da una società cetuale e basata su piccole corti magari dominate da dinastie straniere, in cui il potere finiva per contare più del merito (a eccezione della Chiesa, caratterizzata da una maggiore mobilità sociale). L’autrice sostiene che con le riforme della scuola del primo centrosinistra si è cercato finalmente di introdurre stimoli meritocratici nel senso di offrire pari opportunità con la scuola media unificata. E tuttavia subito dopo rimpiange la scuola ben strutturata e severa di «un tempo» (che non viene, però, precisato) e si denuncia l’egualitarismo post-sessantottino, finendo per elogiare Paola Mastrocola che, nel noto best seller Togliamo il disturbo, propone di disfarsi «degli studenti che non hanno alcun interesse per lo studio né alcuna disponibilità a imparare ma che son costretti a continuare in omaggio all’ideologia ugualitaria, per cui la scuola sarebbe un diritto per tutti, fino all’Università»5. La Mastrocola propone invece che a continuare gli studi siano solo gli alunni veramente disposti a faticare e a impegnarsi. Anziché perseguire l’uguaglianza, un’idea di trasgressività conformistica e una creatività che non può essere di tutti, generando 1 Pierre ROSANVALLON, La société des égaux, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 2011. 2 Paradoxa, Gennaio-Marzo 2011, No. 1, Anno V. 3 Luigi CAPPUGI, “Merito e uguaglianza: discorsi vecchi e attuali difficili e semplici”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, pp. 42-45. 4 Lucetta SCARAFFIA, “L’antimeritocrazia italiana”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, pp. 36-41. 5 Paola MASTROCOLA, Togliamo il disturbo. Saggio sulla libertà di non studiare, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2011.


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false aspettative, bisogna invece, per la Scaraffia, decretare la crisi «della scuola che deve accogliere tutti, che deve abbassarsi al livello dei meno dotati e dei più svogliati invece di selezionare i migliori».

Anche Pietro da Cortona ritiene che in Italia il merito sia stato sacrificato ai diritti «collettivi», ch’egli però non vede come tutela delle posizioni ingiustamente svantaggiate, che, in quanto tali, rinviano a diritti di carattere universale, ma a particolarismi corporativi. In modo sintomatico egli conclude: «so bene che il merito non è tutto e che non tutto può essere soggetto ad un tale criterio. Sono fermamente convinto però che quando il merito è applicato negli ambiti giusti abbiamo maggiori probabilità di vivere in una società più funzionale, più efficiente e, forse, addirittura più giusta ed egualitaria». Insomma («si noti il «forse, addirittura»): la giustizia e l’eguglianza sono un optional, mentre i valori sociali primari da perseguire sono la «funzionalità» e l’ «efficienza»1.

Laura Paoletti2 ritiene necessario trovare criteri oggettivi per valutare il «valore aggiunto culturale» e poter così selezionare i tagli alla cultura, che vengono dati come «naturali». Sebbene l’autrice sia consapevole che non si può fondare un criterio oggettivo, elevandolo a criterio assoluto, ella ritiene tuttavia che si possa prenderlo come criterio per «gestire e orientare certe dinamiche nella direzione desiderata». L’idea è che i beni culturali (musei, biblioteche, Archivi) si misurino con il numero dei visitatori o con il numero di volumi posseduti. Da un lato la Paoletti riconosce che non si può schiacciare l’identità di un istituto culturale sul marketing, ma dall’altro non può fare a meno di concedere che se un evento culturalmente significativo non richiama pubblico, allora il problema è, appunto, nel piano «marketing». Sembra quasi che la «ragione» combatta con le urgenze del pensiero unico astratto disseminato ormai nei saperi gestionali, pubblici e privati. In pratica una biblioteca settoriale (o archivio o museo) frequentata da pochi cultori o con pochi volumi, deve essere più facilmente tagliata di un’altra con coefficienti più alti che, però, nulla dicono del suo effettivo significato scientifico-culturale.

Gli ultimi tre saggi della silloge si discostano invece dalle posizioni appena riassunte. Mario Tesini mantiene un approccio molto sorvegliato e abbozza una ricostruzione genealogica del termine, da Young a Bourdieu, e, guardando al concetto dietro la parola, risalen anche ai classici della letteratura, oltre a soffermarsi in modo particolare su Guizot. A riscontro egli dedica alcune pagine critiche proprio ad Abravanel, enuncleando il dichiarato carattere «ideologico» del suo discorso3. Se per Tesini la meritocrazia può costituire un criterio «orientativo» utile, qualora esso invece voglia diventare un parametro di valutazione oggettivo fondativo di un nuovo ordine sociale, allora l’esito è la distopia di Young.

1 Pietro GRILLI di CORTONA, “Significato e ruolo sociale del merito: alcune riflessioni”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, p. 35. 2 Laura PAOLETTI, “Le molte facce del merito”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, pp. 8-12. 3 Cfr. Mario TESINI, Meritocrazia, merito e storia…cit., pp. 55-68.


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Anche Marcello Ostinelli1, riprendendo Rawls, problematizza il concetto di meritocrazia. Così come le diseguaglianze sono accettabili solo se vanno a vantaggio dei più deboli, così è necessario che la «giustizia» prevalga sull’idea di una società in cui i più forti abbiano il diritto di sopravanzare i più deboli. Nella scuola pubblica, ad esempio, la meritocrazia non può essere il criterio di base: infatti l’insegnante deve tenere conto non solo dei risultati ottenuti, ma degli sforzi compiuti, dato che lo scopo della scuola democratica non è solo premiare i più fortunati, ma aiutare i «meno fortunati ad avere un senso di fiducia nel proprio valore». Ma è Francesca Rigotti che effettua una vera e propria requisitoria del termine «meritocrazia» proprio dal punto di vista della categoria di «eguaglianza», sempre più espulsa – nota la studiosa - dal dibattito politico e teorico-politico. Senza l’ «eguaglianza», la libertà diventa un concetto vuoto e aperto ai contenuti discriminatori e particolaristici, come dimostra una realtà sociale in cui avanza ideologicamente la meritocrazia liberale e arretrano i diritti sociali e le opportunità della maggioranza dei cittadini. A Rawls, Dworkin e Sen vengono oggi contrapposte le teorie di Frankfurt, Walzer, Naussbaum, Anderson e Krebs, secondo cui alla natura relazionale dell’eguaglianza va preferita l’idea di una «vita buona in assoluto»2.

Su questa linea vanno registrati una serie di interventi critici, effettuati soprattutto su quotidiani e quindi di carattere spesso rapsodico ma non per questo meno utili. Ne citiamo qui alcuni. Nadia Urbinati ha opportunamente rilevato come l’errore della visione meritocratica stia nell’idea di fondare la società giusta sul «merito», quando è vero l’inverso: è il «merito» (come coincidenza di lavoro e capacità da un lato e ruolo dall’altro) che invece fiorisce sulla base della società «giusta»3. Bruno Accarino4, ha invece rilevato un altro aspetto fondamentale: e cioè la «teologicità» del concetto del «merito», sottolineata anche da Vittorio Mathieu nel succitato fascicolo di «Paradoxa», che ne ha segnalato la rideclinazione laica nel concetto kantiano della virtù5. Come si può fondare l’idea della società giusta sull’idea del «merito», se poi questo è qualcosa di assolutamente indefinibile in modo valido per tutti? Chi può dire se vale di più la capacità calcolatrice di un matematico oppure quella affettiva di un infermiere nell’accompagnare alla morte i malati terminali? Ecco come si spiega la furia quantificatrice dei fautori dell meritocrazia come Abravanel. In realtà, dietro l’impossibilità di riempire di un contenuto univoco il concetto, si apre il varco alla sua ideologizzazione in senso neo-liberista. E’ stato Giacomo Marramao, in un pezzo su «Liberazione», ha sottolineare come in realtà l’idea del «merito» coincida con le tre «I»: impresa, inglese, informatica. Avviene così uno schiacciamento del concetto sulle qualità funzionali all’attuale sistema produttivo. La ristrutturazione del sistema

1 Cfr. Marcello OSTINELLI, “Eguaglianza e merito nella scuola pubblica”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, pp. 69-81. 2 Cfr. Francesca RIGOTTI, “Contro il merito”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, pp. 82-93. 3 Nadia URBINATI, “Il merito e l’uguaglianza”, La repubblica, 27 Novembre 2008. 4 Bruno ACCARINO, “Meritocrazia come premio di obbedienza”, Il manifesto, 25.06.2008. 5 Cfr. Vittorio MATHIEU, “La meritocrazia come postulato”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011, p. 14.


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universitario in modo sempre più funzionale al mercato è connesso, ovviamente, a questa dinamica1.

Giuseppe Caliceti2 ha giustamente rilevato come la meritocrazia e la competizione, nella scuola pubblica, confliggano con la sua natura democratica. Infatti la scuola pubblica deve essere rivolta proprio a aiutare chi è in posizione di svantaggio, non tanto a valorizzare chi già mostra di essere migliore degli altri. Questo da un lato perché spesso le differenze di attitudini sono determinate dall’ambiente sociale, ma anche perché, pur se esse rimandino invece a una sfera «naturale», ciò non significa che la scuola non debba cercare di valorizzare anche soggetti non particolarmente talentuosi. C’è, insomma, una sfera del diritto e del bisogno che prescinde da quella del merito. Ed è su quella che soprattutto si misura il grado di democraticità di una società. Maurizio Ricciardi ed Enrica Rigo hanno denunciato come ormai negli scaffali degli intellettuali progressisti non ci sia più Pierre Bourdieu, che sottolineava come «la monopolizzazione del capitale culturale è funzionale alla costruzione di gerarchie invalicabili». Ecco perché è deficitaria l’idea che soltanto intervenendo sulle istituzioni scolastiche e universitarie, rendendole più meritocratiche, come vorrebbe Abaravanel, si riuscirebbe a sposare democrazia ed eccellenza. In realtà – sottolineavano sempre Ricciardi e Rigo – indebolendo scuola e università pubblica, come è stato fatto negli ultimi anni, non si fa che distruggere l’unico spazio in cui si era riusciti a ridurre le distanze fra le classi sociali3.

E’ possibile insomma decostruire il discorso meritocratico nella sua natura «ideologica» di falsa coscienza del ciclo neo-liberista e neo-autoritario, alla fine degli anni settanta sviluppatosi in contrapposizione ai valori democratici e sociali del secondo dopoguerra. Una reazione che, indebolendo a vista d’occhio l’inclusione sociale, è dubbio anche che possa generare una società dinamica e produttiva.

1 Giacomo MARRAMAO, “Montezemolo? Una retorica del merito grave e discriminatoria”, Liberazione, 2 giugno 2007. 2 Giuseppe CALICETI, “Appunti di scuola. Quanti scempi in nome della meritocrazia”, Il Manifesto, 9 novembre 2008; Giuseppe CALICETI, “Le aberrazioni di Abravanel”, Il Manifesto, 06-10-2012. 3 Enrica RIGO, Maurizio RICCIARDI, “Meriti senza debiti: quel diritto all’accesso negato dalla meritocrazia”, Il manifesto, 2 febbraio 2012.


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Bibliography ABRAVANEL, Roger, Meritocrazia. 4 proposte concrete per valorizzare il talento e rendere il

ostro paese più ricco e più giusto, Garzanti, Milano, 2008. ALESINA, Alberto, Francesco GIAVAZZI, Il liberismo è di sinistra, Saggiatore, Milano,

2007. BEVILACQUA, Piero, Il grande saccheggio. L’età del capitalismo distruttivo, Laterza, Roma

& Bari, 2011. BURGIO, Alberto, Nonostante Auschwitz. Il «ritorno» del razzismo in Europa, Derive

Approdi, Roma, 2010. CAPPUGI, Luigi, “Merito e uguaglianza: discorsi vecchi e attuali difficili e semplici”,

Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011. CINGARI, Salvatore, “Ugo Spirito e la rivoluzione passiva. Note a margine”,

Bollettino telematico di filosofia politica, 1 ottobre 2012. CROUCH, Colin, Postdemocrazia, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2003. DA EMPOLI, Giuliano, La guerra del talento, Marsilio, Padova, 2000. DI CORTONA, Pietro GRILLI, “Significato e ruolo sociale del merito: alcune

riflessioni”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011. DI LUZIO, Adolfo Scotto, La scuola degli italiani, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007. FERRAJOLI, Luigi, Principia iuris, tomo II. Teoria della democrazia, Laterza, Roma &

Bari, 2007. GALLINO, Luciano, Finanzcapitalismo, Einaudi, Torino, 2011. GIDDENS, Anthony, La terza via. Manifesto per la rifondazione della socialdemocrazia, Il

saggiatore, Milano, 1999. GUIZOT, François, Della sovranità, Editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 1998. HARVEY, David, Breve storia del neoliberismo, Il saggiatore, Milano, 2007. MASTROCOLA, Paola, Togliamo il disturbo. Saggio sulla libertà di non studiare, Feltrinelli,

Milano, 2011. OSTINELLI, Marcello, “Eguaglianza e merito nella scuola pubblica”, Paradoxa, No. 1,

Anno V, 2011. PAOLETTI, Laura, “Le molte facce del merito”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011. RIGOTTI, Francesca, “Contro il merito”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011. ROSANVALLON, Pierre, La société des égaux, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 2011. SCARAFFIA, Lucetta, “L’antimeritocrazia italiana”, Paradoxa, No. 1, Anno V, 2011. URBINATI, Nadia, “Il merito e l’uguaglianza”, La repubblica, 27 Novembre 2008. YOUNG, Michael, L’avvento della meritocrazia (1958), Edizioni di comunità, Milano,

1962.


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Social Movements through Music and Culture. An Overview

Victoria SPAU

University of Southampton Abstract: The author seeks out to offer an overview of the main theories of social movements in the last decade, emphasizing the importance of culture in producing collective action. In the past, Old Social Movements (OSM) theory defined movements through the lenses of political process, rational actor or resource mobilization theories. This paper centers more on New Social Movements (NSM) theories which focus rather on a cultural approach to social movements and stress the importance of collective identity, framing and networks in understanding the mobilization and participation of movements. The author shows that all these interrelated processes discussed by NSM theories are important for the achievement of collective action. Keywords: social movements, collective action, music, culture, networks, framing. 1. INTRODUCTION New Social Movements (NSM) theories shifted attention towards a cultural

approach of social movements emphasizing the importance of collective identity1, framing2 and networks3in understanding movements mobilization and participation (collective action). NSM oppose the rationalist approaches, such as resource

1 Alberto MELUCCI, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements”, Social Research, Vol. 52, 1985, pp. 781-816; Idem, “The Process of Collective Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL Press, London, 1995, pp. 41-63; Verta TAYLOR, Nancy WHITTIE, “Analytical Approaches to Social Movement Culture: The Culture of Women’s Movement”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 163-187; Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements: an Introduction, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999. 2 William A. GAMSON, “Constructing Social Process”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 85-106; David A. SNOW, E. Burke ROCHFORD, Steven K. WORDEN, Robert D. BENFORD, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 1986, pp. 456-481. 3 Rick FANTASIA, Eric HIRSCH, “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the Veil in the Algerian Revolution”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL Press, London, 1995, pp. 144-159; Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social Movements”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL Press, London, 1995, pp. 127-143.


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mobilization theory1 which consider collective movements as rational, with specific goals and organised action and political process theories2 which consider collective action as reliant on specific political opportunities. However, current studies on culture and social movements have emphasized the importance of music in the construction of collective identities which facilitates the mobilization of social movements3. The aim of this article is to offer an overview on the role of music and culture in social movements.

2. OVERVIEW In the last two decades, a developing interest has been noticed in the analysis of

culture as an important element in understanding the emergence of social movements4. In the past, movements were seen as a response to a destabilised system, whereas mobilization process theorists were mainly concerned with understanding “the structural shifts that gave collective actors the resources to act collectively on longstanding grievances” and considered the state as central to people’s concern with actions5. The rise of social movements such as “animal rights movements”, “gay and lesbian movements” or “the psychiatric movement” from the ‘60s raised new questions regarding the people’s motives to engage in a movement6.

However, before the rise of New Social Movements (NSM), movements were defined mainly through the lenses of political process, rational actor or resource mobilization theories7. The cultural approach to social movements emphasizes the importance of collective identity8, framing9, networks1 and collective action in understanding movements’ mobilization and participation. 1 Charles TILLY, From Mobilization to Revolution, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1984; John D. McCARTHY, Mayer N. ZALD, Social Movements in an Organizational Society, Transaction, New Brunswick, 1987. 2 Doug McADAM, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 1930-1970, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982; Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit., p. 9. 3 Aldon D. MORRIS, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change, The Free Press, New York, 1984; Simon FIRTH, “Music and Identity”, in Stuart HALL, Paul DU GAY (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity, Sage, London, 1995, pp. 108-125; Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions in Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 4 Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit. 5 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities and Social Movements”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 27, 2001, pp. 283-305. 6 Nick CROSSLEY, Making Sense of Social Movements, Open University Press, Buckingham, 2002. 7 John D. McCARTHY, Mayer N. ZALD, Social Movements...cit. 8 Alain TOURAINE, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements”, Social Research, Vol. 52, 1985, pp. 749-788; Alberto MELUCCI, “The Symbolic Challeng...cit.”; Idem, “The Process of Collective Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social...cit.; Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit. 9 William A. GAMSON, “Constructing Social Process”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit.; Erving GOFFMAN, Frame Analysis: an Essay on the Organization of Experience, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975.


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2.1. Collective Identity Mobilization and resource theories emphasize the structures which gave

resources to collective actors to mobilize over common grievances and stressed the importance of the rational and strategic components of action explaining how people mobilize, but failed to answer “why”. In turn, scholars of New Social Movements focused on collective identity to explain why people engage in social movements.

The development of communications facilitated a flow of information which increased the creation of symbols and cultural models necessary for the construction of individual and collective identities2. As Durkheim long ago suggested, the creation of symbols is essential in making the “life of a group palpable” for its members3. Furthermore, the post-industrial era gave birth to the “programmed society”, as Touraine called it, which oriented actors to the “production of symbolic goods which model or transform our representation of human nature and the external world”4. Touraine argues that in the industrial society the main conflict was one of social classes, whereas now, the control over information has generated new types of social conflicts between groups with contrasting ideas concerning the utilisation of cognitive and symbolic resources. Once with this “programmed society” we can talk about a shift in people’s goals from the materialistic perspective of “old movements” theory to that of solidarity, shared values, aspirations and common traits emphasized by NSM theorists.

In order to construct collective action, the set of common values needs to be transformed into a collective identity. Collective identity is shaped by culture as a “repertoire” or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills and styles from which actors construct “strategies of action”5. However, we have to mention that collective identity is not necessarily a “pre-existing” condition for action. It is argued that collective identity is “reinforced” or “weakened” through means for action6. Thus, collective identity shapes the means for action, but at the same time it is itself a subject of transformation during action, becoming an essential constituent of collective action, together forming an interrelated process. However, according to Klandermans, if a group fails to cultivate a collective identity, collective action cannot be achieved.

The next question that should be addressed is how actors construct a collective identity and the means for action. For Melucci, collective identity is developed through: cognitive definitions, by which “actors construct the ends, means and field of action […] incorporated in a given set of rituals, practices and cultural artifacts”; a

1 Rick FANTASIA, Eric HIRSCH, “Culture in Rebellion...cit.”; Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social Movements...cit.” 2 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements: an Introduction, Blackwell, Oxford, 1999. 3 Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., p. 76. 4 Alain TOURAINE, The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p. 61. 5 Ann SWIDLER, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 1986, p. 273. 6 Rick FANTASIA, Eric HIRSCH, “Culture in Rebellion...cit.”


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network where actors “interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate and make decisions”; and emotional investment “which enables individuals to feel like part of a common unity”1. For Melucci, “collective action is a producer of symbolic orientation and meanings that people are able to recognize”2. Thus, at the same time, collective action is also symbolic action.

Eyerman and Jamison3 add to Melucci’s symbolic action the concept of exemplary action of cognitive praxis (seen here as the process of identity formation) which is “more” than just symbolic. For them, art and music, as cultural representations, are more than symbolic producers because “music and art are lived as well as thought: they are cognitive, but they also draw on more emotive aspects of human consciousness”. As Eyerman and Jamison argue, ”as a cognitive praxis, music and other forms of cultural activity contribute to the ideas that movements offer and create in opposition to the existing social and cultural order”4. The role of these cultural practices, such as rituals or music, is seen here as an “apparatus” through which the collective actors express their emotions.

Rituals evoke emotions such as fear, passion, anger, love, hate, faith etc. (Mellucci), and are the “glue of solidarity” (Collins). Solidarity, as Touraine argues, sustains the conflict which is essential for the presence of a “we”. In order to motivate the “we” to take action, the symbolic elaboration is crucial5. Rituals have symbolic components such as song, testimonials, chants6. For example, as Eyerman and Jamison states, “music, in particular, embodies traditions through the ritual of performance. It can empower, help create collective identity and a sense of movement in an emotional and almost physical way”. In the context of rituals, songs reunite and remind participants of their scope within a movement and “locate them within a long-standing tradition of struggle and protest”7.

In his analysis of music and identity, Firth is concerned with how music constructs an experience from which identities are developed8. He argues that “music, “music, like identity, is both performance and stories, describes the social in the individual and the individual in the social, the mind in the body and the body in the mind; identity like music is a matter of both ethics and aesthetics”9. Cristiana Olcese argues that through art, social movements not only communicate within the larger society, but also internally10. She sees art as a master trope which “enables people to make up their own meanings and objectives” helping people to “achieve personal 1 Alberto MELUCCI, “The Process of Collective Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 44-45. 2 Ibidem, p. 46. 3 Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements...cit., p. 23. 4 Ibidem, p. 24. 5 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit., p. 73. 6 Verta TAYLOR, Nancy WHITTIE, “Analytical Approaches...cit.”. 7 Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements...cit., pp. 35-36. 8 Simon FIRTH, “Music and Identity...cit.”. 9 Ibidem, p. 109. 10 Cristiana OLCESE, “Contentious Master Tropes: Art vs. Politics in Protest” (unpublished), 5th ECPR General Conference), Postdam Universitat, 10-12 September 2009, p. 5.


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liberation and redemption”1. Through arts, the individuals who form the collective can express their emotions and feelings. Besides rituals, the symbolic expression of emotions is built through objects (identifiers, iconic persons, key artifacts, central events and symbolic places, stories, occasions, persona and roles2. Lofland divides the category of roles between creators or “knowledge creators” (intellectuals, artists and scholars) in charge with the production of culture and “disseminators of culture” such as culture retailers and artistic performers3.

Polleta and Jasper are talking about “institutional identities”, where the development of a “group pride” is another form of identity4. The goal of this practice is to construct a form of solidarity and loyalty of members towards the organisation they activate in. In this context, the symbols and strategies used resonate with those of prior members5. For example, when activists sing “We shall Overcome”, they recall and identify with the same tactics used in the civil rights movement6. Thus, collective identity secures the continuousness of collective action in time7.

In order to construct a collective identity one needs a conflict which forms a group (the “we”) with shared beliefs and values bond by solidarity and connected through a social network. Thus, people need this common “tool kit” to build the collective identity needed for action. The next question would be by whom and through what is this “tool kit” formed? As dellaPorta and Diani point out, “the symbolic construction permits us to attribute to the events and behaviours of individuals or groups a meaning which facilitates the activation of mobilization, but frame analysis allows us to capture the process of the attribution of meaning, which lies behind the explosion of any conflict”8.

In the context of conflict, collective identities need to be incorporated in frames of justice and injustice so that the collective actor can distinguish between “we” the group, and “them”, the conflict9 As Snow and his colleagues argue, identity construction is an ”inherent feature of the framing process”10. Thus, as well as identity, framing is an important feature that helps one understand movements’ mobilization and participation.

1 Ibidem, p. 33. 2 John LOFLAND, “Charting Degrees of Movement Culture: Tasks of the Cultural Cartographer”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 188-216. 3 Ibidem, pp. 205-207. 4 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities...cit.” 5 Ibidem, pp. 297-298. 6 Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements...cit. 7 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit. 8 Ibidem, p. 69. 9 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities...cit.”, p. 292. 10 David A. SNOW, E. Burke ROCHFORD, Steven K. WORDEN, Robert D. BENFORD, “Frame Alignment Processes...cit.”, pp. 631-632.


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2.2. Framing According to Ervin Goffman, frames are a “schemata of interpretation” that

enable individuals to “locate, perceive, identify and label” occurrences within their life space and the world at large1. Through frames, individuals are able to recognise the “world” and make sense of their reality2.

If Goffman regards frames as the “organisation of experience” or as a “belief system” from which actors construct reality, contemporary social psychologists regard frames as “mental models”, as well. These mental models are divided between cognitive elements that actors already perceive as real (for example, the concept of “restaurant”), cognitive beliefs (such as civil rights) and those non-cognitive beliefs such as norms, values, attitudes and goals from which they construct their own reality and beliefs about what is “just” and “unjust” in order to take action (OPP 2009).

Following Snow et al., Gamson3 suggests three components of collective action action frames: injustice, agency and identity and emphasize the importance of emotions and the media coverage of a movement in implementing these frames. For Gamson, injustice is constructed through emotions such as “compassion”, “cynicism”, “bemused irony”, and “resignation” which are used to sustain anger and take action. Through agency, consciousness is raised making actors aware of the social power of change they have as a collective. Media and the manipulation of symbolism are used in constructing or reconstructing “problems, enemies, crises, and leaders”, thus, “treats and reassurances”. The identity frame serves as a motor for collective action through which people distinguish between “we” the group, and “them”, the conflict.

On the other hand, Snow and Benford4 emphasize the importance of culture in in the framing process of a movement through elements such as norms, values, tradition, artefacts and of what social actors define as legitimate. It is argued that culture and collective action frames influence one another and that the framing processes “reflect wider cultural continuities and changes”. Snow et al. describe a set of discursive and strategic processes, through which collective action frames are diffused within movements, culture and time. The discursive process (speeches, talks, communication) is generated by frame articulation (alignment of events and experiences) and frame amplification involving issues, events or beliefs “bringing into sharp relief and symbolising the larger frame or movement”, for example, slogans such as “Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité” or “We Shall Overcome”. Within the strategic process, frames are constructed and organised to gain a specific purpose (in recruiting new members, in mobilization, in attaining resources). In order to achieve these

1 Erving GOFFMAN, Frame Analysis...cit., p. 464 2 Paolo R. DONATI, “Political Discourse Analysis”, in Mario DIANI, Ron EYERMAN (eds.), Studying Collective Action, Sage, London, 1992, pp. 141-142. 3 William A. GAMSON, “Constructing Social Process”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 85-106. 4 David A. SNOW, Robert D. BENFORD, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639.


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specific goals, Social Movement Organisations (SMOs) make use of what scholars called “frame alignment processes”.

Snow and Benford identified four alignment processes: “frame bridging”, “frame amplification”, “frame extension” and “frame transformation”. Through frame bridging, frames concerning particular problems are linked. Frame amplification, necessary for most movement mobilization, has the role to intensify existing beliefs and values. By frame extension, SMOs interests and frames are extended from their initial interests by including new issues of concern for new adherents. Finally, frame transformation is concerned with the change of “old understanding and meanings and/or generating new ones”1. Following Snow, Johnston analyses discourse on the influence of behaviour and argues that the goals of these frame alignment processes can be found in the social movement’s speech which is also influenced by culture. For Johnston, the “ ‘true location’ of a frame is in the mind of the social movement participant” and the “structure of mental frames can be reconstructed through the close analysis of the discourse of social movements” because “people do things with words”2.

At the same time, discourse involves creativity and repetition. As Billig states3, “an orator discourse that seeks to create new movements of opinion toward a minority position will often repeat, and claim to exemplify, the values of the minority”. By repeating signs, values, themes of an ideology etc., people develop a nature of “sensus communis” which provides the “resources for moral dilemmas to think and argue about”. On the contrary, social movements (the minority) provide arguments against the common sense (the majority) perception. Billig argues that no matter if the arguments of the minority oppose those of the “common”, the majority’s opinion is changed even by taking an offensive attitude. Hence, repeating a discourse affects people involved in a movement as well as those who are not.

Drawing from their research on women’s movement and the lesbian and gay movement, Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, illustrate discourse as embedded in ritual in order to construct collective action frames. By using the radical feminist movement, Taylor et al. describe how collective identity frame was constructed through “an extensive network of alternative institutions such as bookstores, music festivals, self-defence and martial arts schools, rape crisis canters, publishing houses, and travelling agencies”4. These alternative networks provided the solidarity incentive that facilitated movement participation. In order to understand how “mobilizing identities” are formed, scholars of social movements turned to network analysis5.

1 Ibidem, p. 625. 2 Hank JOHNSTON, “A methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements…cit., pp. 218- 227. 3 Michael BILLIG, “Rethorical Psychology, Ideological Thinking, and Imagination Nationhood”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL Press, London, 1995, pp. 64-81. 4 Verta TAYLOR, Nancy WHITTIE, “Analytical Approaches...cit.”, p. 165. 5 Francesca POLLETTA, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities...cit.”, pp. 288.


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2.3. Networks, resources and mobilization Melucci argues that collective identity as a process is formed through

“submerged networks”, where people construct an active relationship where they interact, communicate and influence each other, negotiate and make decisions. These networks are “forms of organization and models of leadership, communicative channels, and technologies of communication”. Social networks are the place in which the symbolic production is developed and where social relations are connected to mobilization. These networks “incorporate and enact the ways collective actor define ends, means and field of action”1.

Using their research on the nationalist movements in Spain, DellaPorta and Diani, identified three types of networks “those which link the various movement organizations”, “those which connect the same organisations by means of activists which they have in common” and “those which enable activists to be recruited”2. Activists “are the bearers of solid values and specific solidarities and are likely to involve in different social networks, hence, they can connect various movement organizations. Another important aspect of networks is their capacity to recruit members and to mobilize supporters. For example, Snow et al. found that more than 75 per cent of a movement’s members are recruited through networks. It seems that people are prone to adhere in a protest movement if they are connected with activists already involved in collective action. Within these links, potential activists collect information and construct their reality.

By activating in various organisations of a movement, members create new channels of communications among different organisations amplifying the promotion of their common goals. The organisation of a movement and the links created provide a specific form of subculture. It is argued that all groups, regardless of their size, develop a culture “a bounded set of images and traditions that come to characterize those individuals to themselves and often to outsiders”3. This “idioculture”, as Fine describes it, consists of “a system of knowledge, beliefs, behaviours, and customs shared by members of an interacting group to which members can refer and which they can employ as the basis of further interaction”. Thus, social movements are seen as a “space” where actors construct their own culture, interact, identify themselves as a subculture and perform cultural rituals (discourse, narratives, and stories).

Firth places music in a “metaphorical space” without frontiers because it ”is the cultural form best able both to cross borders- sounds carry across fences and walls and oceans, across classes, races, and nations- and to define places; in clubs, scenes, and raves, listening on headphones, radio and concert halls, we are only where the

1 Alberto MELUCCI, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements”, Social Research, Vol. 52, 1985, pp. 781-816; Idem, “The Process of Collective Identity”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture...cit., pp. 44-45, 49. 2 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit., p. 112. 3 Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social Movements”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements...cit., pp. 128 -129.


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music takes us”1. For example, in the civil rights movement, blues formed an “informal network” connecting migrant workers who were moving across the country2.

Considering art and music as both knowledge and action, Eyerman and Jamison, argue that art and music, as cultural expressions, influence the societal culture and become “functional devices for recruitment or resources to be mobilized”. Hence, culture is a “space” and a device for resource and moreover, of additional resources. For example, the radical feminist movement network mentioned above is not only a “space” of oppositional culture, where collective identity is formed, but is also a provider of material resources through the institutions formed by this network. However, the focus should be on resources as symbolic goods3. For Fine, “cultural expressions, slogans, and patterns of rhetoric are vital sources- manipulated consciously or emerging spontaneously- that symbolize the causes of discontent for movement actors and serve to energize and justify their actions” whereas the ideology (seen as culture) of a movement is the best resource for mobilization. The free rider problem is resolved by the set of nonmaterial resources and rewards provided by this idioculture4.

Further, as Fantasia and Hirsch point out, culture is not just a static field which provides opportunities and constrains for a movement. More than supplying the resources needed for a movement to survive over time, culture provides the resources for new practices and meanings. Social movements or “heavens” are networks in which “members of subordinated groups discover their common problems, construct a collective definition of the sources of their oppression, and note the limits of the routine means of redressing grievances, where collective identity and solidarity are cultivated in practices, values, and social relations”. These “heavens” provide the socio-organizational foundation for cultural transformations and collective action5. Thus, networks are important because they enable the organisation of action, cultural diffusion, and the framing and reframing of movement ideology and demand6.

1 Simon FIRTH, “Music and Identity”, in Stuart HALL, Paul DU GAY (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity, Sage, London, 1995, p. 125. 2 Jon David CRUZ, Politics of Popular Culture: Black Popular Movement as ‘Public Sphere’ (unpublished PhD dissertation), University of California, Berkeley, 1986; Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements…cit., p. 79. 3 Ron EYERMAN, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements…cit., p. 24. 4 Gary Alan FINE, “Discourse in Social Movements”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements…cit., pp. 132, 141. 5 Rick FANTASIA, Eric HIRSCH, “Culture in Rebellion: The Appropriation and Transformation of the Veil in the Algerian Revolution”, in Hank JOHNSTON, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements…cit., pp. 145-146, 159. 6 David A. SNOW, Robert D. BENFORD, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest”, in Aldon MORRIS, Carol MCCLURG MUELLER, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1992.


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3. CONCLUSIONS Focusing on collective identity, academics seek to explain how people construct

their interest in taking action. Collective identities are constructed through a set of shared values and beliefs and provide the foundation for action. The importance of culture in producing collective action comes from the values composing culture. In the first place, collective action arises from the identification of individuals with these values. As DellaPorta and Diani claim, the post-industrial values provide the motivation necessary to maintain the costs of action. Collective identity allows actors employed in a conflict to identify themselves with the movement by shared values, beliefs, interests and common traditions1. In order to become a “we”, these shared values and beliefs need to be transformed into collective ones. These are facilitated by cultural symbolic production and solidarity through different activities, such as rituals.

The symbolic production allows actors to give meaning to their beliefs and values, but in order to employ them in action, there is a need of a sense of what is just and what is not, and these feelings are integrated through frames of collective action. Action becomes possible through these “frames” which allow people to construct reality. Networks provide the space in which these social processes take place in order to create collective action. The network is the place where culture is diffused, framing is integrated and action is organised. Thus, collective identity, framing and networks are an interrelated process in the achievement of collective action. It is merely impossible to talk about action without considering these processes.

1 Donatella DellaPORTA, Mario DIANI, Social Movements...cit., pp. 62, 109.


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Bibliography BENFORD, Robert, “An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing

Perspective”, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 67, 1997, pp. 409-430. CROSSLEY, Nick, Making Sense of Social Movements, Open University Press,

Buckingham, 2002. CRUZ, Jon David, Politics of Popular Culture: Black Popular Movement as ‘Public Sphere’

(unpublished PhD dissertation), University of California, Berkeley, 1986. DellaPORTA, Donatella, Mario DIANI, Social Movements: an Introduction, Blackwell,

Oxford, 1999. DONATI, Paolo R., “Political Discourse Analysis”, in Mario DIANI, Ron

EYERMAN (eds.), Studying Collective Action, Sage, London, 1992, pp. 136-167. EYERMAN, Ron, Andrew JAMISON, Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions

in Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. FIRTH, Simon, “Music and Identity”, in Stuart HALL, Paul DU GAY (eds.), Questions

of Cultural Identity, Sage, London, 1995, pp. 108-125. GOFFMAN, Erving, Frame Analysis: an Essay on the Organization of Experience, Penguin,

Harmondsworth, 1975. JOHNSTON, Hank, Bert KLANDERMANS (eds.), Social Movements and Culture, UCL

Press, London, 1995. McADAM, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 1930-1970,

University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982. McCARTHY, John D., Mayer N. ZALD, Social Movements in an Organizational Society,

Transaction, New Brunswick, 1987. MELUCCI, Alberto, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements”, Social

Research, Vol. 52, 1985, pp. 781-816. MORRIS, Aldon D., The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing

for Change, The Free Press, New York, 1984. OLCESE, Cristiana, “Contentious Master Tropes: Art vs. Politics in Protest”

(unpublished), 5th ECPR General Conference), Postdam Universitat, 10-12 September 2009.

OPP, Karl Dieter, Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements, Routledge, London & New York, 2009.

POLLETTA, Francesca, James M. JASPER, “Collective Identities and Social Movements”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 27, 2001, pp. 283-305 [http://www.jamesmjasper.org/files/collective_identity_2001.pdf] – 15 Nov. 2010.

SNOW, David A., E. Burke ROCHFORD, Steven K. WORDEN, Robert D. BENFORD, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 1986, pp. 456-481.

SNOW, David A., Robert D. BENFORD, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639.


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SNOW, David A., Robert D. BENFORD, “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest”, in Aldon MORRIS, Carol MCCLURG MUELLER, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1992.

SWIDLER, Ann, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 51, 1986, pp. 273-286.

TILLY, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1984. TOURAINE, Alain, The Voice and the Eye. An Analysis of Social Movements, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, 1981. TOURAINE, Alain, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements”, Social

Research, Vol. 52, 1985, pp. 749-788. TOURAINE, Alain, The Workers’ Movement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge &

New York, 1987.


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ESSAY

Need Of Intercultural Dialogue Between Black Sea Countries Selami Ahmet SALGÜR


Abstract: In human history, living together in peace without violence and problem has been a challenge for all humanity. Sometimes it has achieved, but it has just as frequently failed. It means that human beings prefer living together with people who are like them rather than with people who are different in appearance, speaking, eating, dressing, behaviour and beliefs, i.e. people from different cultures. However, cultural diversity and difference is a standard characteristic of modern societies. In these societies, individuals have to live with the people from different nations, colors, religions, languages and cultures. Black Sea Region is one of the most diverse regions in the world in terms of all these differences. Ethnic and religious diversity is an historical reality in this part of the world. There are Christians, Muslims and Jewish populations living together over centuries in a peaceful atmosphere. The States in Black Sea Region should develop cultural, educational and social policies to maintain this coexistence for the future generations.

Keywords: Black Sea, intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity. 1. WHAT IS INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE? 1.1. Origin of the intercultural dialogue concept The Council of Europe used the term of “Intercultural Dialogue” at the

beginning of the 1980s in the social work area to encourage the citizens’ involvement into the political process. As a result of the collapse of the communist regime in Eastern Europe and the enlargement of the Council of Europe with new members, the concept of intercultural dialogue became one of the most important agendas in the new Europe at the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000s. This importance was the result of the increasingly pressing question of the “meeting of cultures”, caused both by the migration of people to Europe or in Europe and by the nature of national identities. People in Europe have to interact with different cultures because of travelling, technological improvements, or because of various economic reasons.

As a result of all these changes in social, economic and political situations in Europe, intercultural concept and policies related with intercultural dialogue have become more pivotal at the European policy level. The promotion of Intercultural


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Dialogue has been identified in the European Commission’s Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World as a tool contributing to the governance of cultural diversity within European societies, trans – nationally across European countries and internationally with other regions of the world. For this reason, the European Union has to create means by which to raise the awareness of and promote the cultural sphere, with a view to encouraging the European Union’s inhabitants to manage cultural diversity. Finally, the Commission proposed that 2008 be declared the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. This declaration was the result of this modern concept concerning the intercultural dialogue in Europe. The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue seeks to increase the visibility, efficiency and coherence of all European programs and actions that contribute to intercultural dialogue, such as the “Europe for Citizens 2007-2013” and the “Culture” program. This initiative also aims at integrating, as much as possible, intercultural dialogue in other European policies, actions and programs (European Union, 2008). The general objectives of the European Year were the following:

to promote intercultural dialogue as an instrument to assist European citizens, and all those living in the European Union, in acquiring the knowledge and aptitudes that enable them to deal with a more open and more complex environment; to raise the awareness of the European citizens, and of all those living in the European Union, about the importance of developing active European citizenship which is open to the world, respectful of cultural diversity and based on common values (European Commission, 2008).

1.2. Definition of intercultural dialogue

There is no accepted definition for Intercultural Dialogue. The term is an

adaptation of other terms, all of which remain current, such as multiculturalism, social cohesion and assimilation. Intercultural dialogue is a process that includes an open interaction between individuals from different cultural identities, with the aim of understanding each other’s opinions, ideas and values. This approach creates a chance to understand the origin of their differences, but also to appreciate the similarities that they share.

Intercultural dialogue is not a specific legal category that is regulated by international, European or national law in the strict sense. However, it is argued that the intercultural dialogue can only take place in an environment where a person is guaranteed safety and dignity, equality of opportunity and participation, where different views can be voiced openly without fear, where there are shared spaces for exchanges between different cultures to take place. From this point of view, there are indeed several international or European conventions, the European Union directives and national legal frameworks outlining basic human, civic, economic and social rights, upon which intercultural dialogue depends. As regards cultural rights, there are instruments, which recognize and enable the support for maintaining cultural


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difference, providing special rights to ethnic or linguistic minorities, such as promoting their cultures and the use of their languages in education or through media.

Intercultural dialogue is an important concept that contributes to overcome the boundaries that separate people and groups. However, dialogue is only the first part of the concept. It is necessary to go beyond dialogue and take concrete measures that reflect an understanding and appreciation of cultural diversity.

The best formulation at the moment is perhaps the terminology used by the Council of Europe in its White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue, which states: “Intercultural Dialogue is understood as an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage”.

1.3. Importance of intercultural dialogue

In human history, living together in peace without violence and animosity has been a challenge for all humanity. Sometimes this goal was achieved, but it has just as frequently failed. It means that human beings prefer living together with the people who are like them rather than with people who are different in appearance, speech, eating, dressing, behaviour and creed as compared to their own community, shortly, people from different cultures. However, cultural diversity and difference are a standard characteristic of modern societies. In fact, this standard character is not always something “desirable”. In these societies, individuals have to live together with people from different nations, colours, religions, languages and cultures. This situation can cause a feeling of alienation of individuals and distrust between them. Cultural diversity in a society should be a treasure to celebrate and to be proud of, rather than a problem to overcome. Intercultural dialogue gives an opportunity to a forward – looking model for managing cultural diversity (Council of Europe, 2008). To understand a situation like that, people from different cultures living in the same society need to interact with each other in their daily lives.

Moreover, most people in certain societies have to cope with several cultures in their daily lives. Individuals in such societies need to have a dialogue with all different cultures1. For this reason, intercultural dialogue is a long – lasting process that requires a worldwide participation at all the levels of the society. Intercultural dialogue must represent the first issue of all politicians and policy makers. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to establish a world in which people understand each other.

Intercultural dialogue shares in managing multiple cultural connections in a multicultural atmosphere. As a result of intercultural dialogue, individuals have a chance to achieve a new identity balance, to respond to new challenges and experiences and to add new understandings to their identity without relinquishing someone else’s origin. Intercultural dialogue also contributes to avoiding pitfalls of

1 Leonidas DONSKIS, Troubled Identity and the Modern World, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2009, p. 19.


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identity policies and to remain open to the challenges of modern societies. Intercultural dialogue is progressively understood as one of the most important alternatives for developing mutual understanding, better living together and an active sense of European citizenship and membership. Intercultural dialogue can only expand when certain requirements are met. The democratic governance of cultural diversity should be adopted in many aspects to develop intercultural dialogue. Democratic citizenship and participation should also be strengthened; intercultural competences should be taught and learned; spaces for intercultural dialogue should be provided and guaranteed at international level.

Intercultural dialogue gives a good opportunity to the community integration. In contrast with assimilation which charges exclusively immigrants with the burden of integration, and multiculturalism which was light – hearted with regard to integration, interculturalism presupposes efforts and compromises on the part of both migrants or newcomers and host communities.

2. BLACK SEA REGION

2.1. The geopolitical importance of the region The Black Sea region is geographically a foreordained area to be controversial.

The Black Sea has been a contested region for centuries because of its location between Europe and Asia. This fact has been confirmed so many times in human history. This area saw many political and economic transformations in history. In the past, the region belonged to and was claimed by several important powers. After World War II, it was the frontline between the democratic and liberal Western Europe and communist Eastern Europe. Turkey and Greece were guards of Western Europe as members of NATO along the south and south - east of Europe, and the Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria occupied the rest of the region and were members of the Warsaw Pact. This situation restricted the chance to economic and social relations between these countries and also affected the communication and cooperation between the nations of the region.

This situation continued until the 1990s, with the demise of communism. Its importance has completely changed after the end of the Cold War. We have witnessed the transformation of communist states into democratic states and we have also observed the deep impact of the globalization on most of the countries in the region. As a result of these quick changes in the region during the last several decades, some authorities have named the region the Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies1. The geopolitical position of this space has changed completely with the birth of six new states and some secessionist events. As a result of these changes, the number of the states in the Black Sea region has almost doubled. Additionally the region attracted

1 Vit STRITECKY, “Challenges for the Black Sea Region”, May 2012 [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/challenges - for - the - black - sea - region -.tr.mfa].


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several great global powers. The states started their economic and political cooperation and deeper integration with the rest of the world. These economic and political changes provided some profits to the peoples living in this region.

The geopolitical and economical importance of the region has increased at the beginning of 2000s. The region plays a key role in the transportation of oil and gas through Asia to Europe, and offers a new economic market for global powers such as Russia, USA and the EU. All these powers developed their own policies regarding this region. As a result of the increasing importance of the region, we can classify these powers or interests in the region into three groups:

1. The interests of Western countries: this group includes the US and the major European countries in the EU. They produce different strategies for the region. 2. The interests of Russia and Turkey: these two countries have an increasing power in the region countries and have also some important strategies about them. 3. The interests of the rest of the region countries: these countries are very diverse and are confronted with different problems and issues.

(Major Interests And Strategies For The Black Sea Region, p. 3) Within the new post-bipolar conditions of world order, regionalization has

been seen as a positive and promising response to contemporary problems and challenges. Regional cooperation has been suggested to be particularly valuable in the regions that undergo fundamental political and economic transformations, as well as in the areas, which might originally lack mutual trust and confidence. Several authors have expressed their doubts whether the Black Sea area actually constitutes a region, arguing that it makes little sense geographically, historically, or even culturally. However, directly facing the real challenges such ideas may appear rather as a distant intellectual exercise. Although accepting that the Black Sea states do not show any dominant common regional identity, the area shares a lot of economic and political incentives, which create appropriate opportunities, even needs, for regional cooperation1.

2.2. The economic situation of the region The economic situation of these countries in transition worsened sharply just

after 1989 until mid - 1990s. This happened so because of the sudden collapse of the communist system that affected the production and distribution of goods in these countries. The first phase continued until 1995, and constituted the initial economic transition in eight of the ten Black Sea countries. We can underline the reasons for this situation as follows:

The collapse of the old systems of production and distribution;

1 Mustafa AYDIN, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and Integration into Euro-Atlantic Structure”, Perceptions, Vol. X, 2005, pp. 29-30.


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The weak or non - existent legal frameworks; The non - functioning financial sector; The radial though often misunderstood and inconsistently implemented structural reforms; The macroeconomic instability characterized by high inflation (and sometimes hyperinflation) and a lack of fiscal control; The added challenge of establishing the structures and institutions of new sovereign states.

Even non - transitional countries such as Turkey and Greece were affected by these economic crises and saw relatively high inflation, fiscal imbalances and weak or uneven growth in the same period. This situation started to change at the end of the 1990s and the economic and political power of the region began to stabilise. The economic decline was arrested and in some cases reversed, the initial market - oriented structural reforms began to have a positive impact, and the macroeconomic situation stabilized. The living standards, the welfare of these countries, the integration of these societies in the wider world, investment and trade increased after this period.

This economic development continued until the end of 2008. This was a period of high and sustained growth based on a series of factors, which included:

adaptation to a market - oriented system and all that it entailed for the population in general, including improvements in the legal framework and its implementation; the fact that previous reforms, which had often been painful and expensive, began to pay dividends and have a positive impact, and that there was a robust response from industries which benefited from declining interest rates and earlier currency devaluations; vast improvements in macroeconomic stability, including the greater credibility of governments, declining inflation, smaller fiscal deficits, and reduced external debt and debt service coverage ratios; benign global economic conditions and enhanced trade and investment links with the wealthy markets of Western and Central Europe.

However, the global financial crisis that broke out in 2008 influenced the stability and economic situation of the region. This crisis almost led to the collapse of financial markets from all over the world. Its virulent impact on the Black Sea region resulted in a sharp halt of its growth. The economic crisis stressed the financial structure of the region and this affected the growth rate of these countries. In spite of these crises, the economic and political structure of the region is much better than it was in the 1990s, in terms of per capita incomes, goods and services.

2.3. The democratisation process The Black Sea region suffered important political changes starting from the

end of the 1980s. The democratic life and process of the region was influenced by the communist regime, with the exception of Turkey and Greece. 20 years after the


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collapse of the communist regime, the effects of this period on the democratic process are still topical in certain countries of this region. These effects still play important roles in overcoming the problems related to the democratisation process. While the democratisation process is completed in certain countries, the semi - authoritarian system is still valid in some others. Democratic institutions are still weak and people have no or have little experience related to democratic rights and political processes in these countries. Moreover, the party systems in most of the countries in the region are not yet stable.

2.4. Regional and international cooperation and organisations It is obvious that the countries of this area can get more benefits from

regional and international cooperation than from having independent relations with different countries, because of the geopolitical position of the region. International powers and organisations are also aware of this geographical importance. For this reason, international powers such as the EU, the US, Russia, China, NATO started to establish new relations and cooperation with this region.

As a result of this renewal of the relations, many organisations, structures and programs in the Black Sea region have been established since the collapse of the communist regime. Most of these organisations and programs are basically political, but economic relationships are also envisaged. Some of the main organisations are the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), Black Sea Euro-region (BSER), Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), Black Sea Cross Border Cooperation, the Black Sea Forum, Black Sea Organisation for Integration and Sustainable Development, the Transport Corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia (TRACECA), the Danube Black Sea Task Force (DABLAS), the Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE), Black Sea Security Program (BSSP).

Most the countries of this region became members of these organisations and programs, and also started to participate in the activities they organise.

2.5. The need of dialogue in the region In fact, the countries in the Black Sea region are very different in terms of

size, economic situation and social life of the people. On the one hand, there are European countries such as Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and on the other hand there are small countries like Moldova and Georgia. In addition to this diversity, there are some states in the Russian Federation such as Caucasus. This structure of the Black Sea countries attracted the global powers including the EU, the US, China to this region. Among these powers, the EU is the most critical power for financing, lending, investment, and other official assistance for the local countries. This concern of the EU affected the regional cooperation between the respective countries. Moreover, the region has become even more important as it effects the connection between East and West and North to South as a result of the increase of crude oil and


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natural gas transportation by pipelines and other economical movements. For this reason, promoting the regional cooperation and relationship between these countries is the main issue in the region.

Unfortunately, all economic, political and geopolitical changes and developments did not avail to the solution of the problems and conflicts persisting between the states of this region. The global powers mentioned above created a more fragile situation and affected the normalisation of these states. They caused secessionism, ethnic conflicts, economic and political crises in the region. Instead of finding solutions to the main issues of the region, the Black Sea states tend to vie each other for power and influence.

However, the economic, political and social development of the region needs a successful regional cooperation, which can only be obtained by promoting the dialogue between the local countries that includes debates about various issues - social, economic, cultural, environmental, energy sources, and transportation.

Moreover, the regional states and international policy makers can also act as follows to develop the stability and security of the region:

The states should not use the force in their relations with the other states and be respectful of international conventions in their relations. The developed countries should encourage the regional states politically and economically. The international policy makers should support the peace and efforts for peace.

2.6. The importance of intercultural dialogue

The Black Sea region is one of the most diverse regions in the world in terms

of cultural and religious differences. Ethnic and religious diversity is a historical reality in this part of the world. We find here Christians, Muslims and Jewish populations living together over centuries in the same atmosphere. The structure of the Black Sea countries is very different in terms of population, size, economic and financial situations, governance system, and social life. Because of this diversity, it is very hard to establish regional organisations or integrations that include all the local countries. However, if new approaches and ideas are developed by regional and international powers, the region can become a peaceful zone with a powerful economy and stable political systems. The states in Black Sea region should develop cultural, educational and social policies to preserve this coexistence for future generations.

For these reasons, there should be new understandings and relations between the countries and the societies of the region so that pending problems and priorities be discussed and solved with the help of new strategies. This can happen also by intercultural dialogue and relations between the Black Sea countries and other neighbourhood countries. This dialogue can aid the new approaches to solve the main problems of the region and also to give new chances to the local policy makers to create more secure, stable and welfare societies.


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It is clear that the intercultural dialogue between the Black Sea countries promotes the regional stability and cooperation. Moreover, the intercultural dialogue plays an extremely important role in advancing regional cooperation and finding the best solutions for the problems of the region. This dialogue should be established between all the components of society. Political leaders, religious leaders, non - governmental organisations, universities, schools all should involve themselves to develop the intercultural relation between the regional countries. Some through training should be organised to form this dialogue with these different social groups such as students, politicians, members of NGOs, public servants, etc. These activities are very important especially in conflict regions.

To establish the intercultural dialogue in the Black Sea region, international powers, organisations and policy makers have an important role to play along with the regional states. Among these international powers, the EU plays the main role, because three countries of this region, namely Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, are members of the European Union and Turkey is in the negotiating process to become a member state too. Moreover, the EU established very good economic relations and became the most important economic power in the region. Additionally, the Union plays an important role in implementing social and political changes in the region. Intercultural dialogue remains a political priority, which reflects, facilitates and fosters the core objectives of the Council of Europe and its member states to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Intercultural dialogue is not only an enhanced means of communication, which can build trust and mutual understanding, but it can also serve as a basis for peace and sustainable development in the Black Sea region and its neighbouring regions.

Intercultural dialogue should be a political priority for the region states and international policy makers. For this reason, the European Council started to support several international conferences and organisations for the development of intercultural dialogue. The Council published the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue described as a ‘key policy document’ for intercultural dialogue. The EU supported the “intercultural dialogue as a basis for peace and sustainable development in Europe and its neighbouring regions” conference that was organised in Baku, in 2008. Ministers of different countries responsible of culture participated in this conference. They adopted the following decisions made during the conference:

to acknowledge cultural diversity between and within countries as a common heritage of humankind; to agree to contribute to sustainable economic, social and personal development, favourable to cultural creativity; to promote a sustained process of intercultural dialogue, which is essential for international co - operation, with a view to promoting Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law; to reaffirm the important role of cultural policies at national, regional and local level and their contribution for promoting intercultural dialogue;


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to promote intercultural dialogue, including its religious dimension, as a process that requires a coherent interplay between different policy sectors and the full participation of the different stakeholders - including public authorities, the media and civil society.

The European Council is not the only intergovernmental organization that focuses on intercultural dialogue in the region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) has a consistent and positive role in the context of globalization and, in this sense, contributes to global governance1. Political stability and dialogue, and the strengthening of human rights, democracy and the rule of law were suggested by the BSEC2. The BSEC is also aware of the importance of dialogue among different cultures in establishing a good relation between the regional countries. The intercultural dialogue concept is necessary for understanding the differences and diversity of the region. This idea is enriching interaction and promotes the respectful sharing of different opinions and ideas. BSEC recognizes that tolerance is a basic value for all civilizations and that means respect for others, regardless of their diversity of religion, culture and language.

Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation recommends to the parliaments and governments of the BSEC member states:

to encourage the respect for differences and the tolerance of others in society, regardless of their sex, race, ethnic groups, religion or political affiliation, as well as the respect and tolerance for other cultures and civilizations; to recognize that dialogue among different cultures - within the member states as well as between the states - can contribute to making their common values, including universal human rights, more discernible; to welcome the contribution of the positive and mutually beneficial interaction among cultures throughout human history to the peaceful coexistence of nations and to the cultural enrichment of people; to take into account that education contributes to the better understanding of other cultures and civilizations; to encourage the fulfilment of all cultures present in the BSEC region by enacting laws providing for freedom of expression and creation; to guarantee equal access and participation in cultural life for every group of society, so that the cultural diversity is promoted in the spirit of democracy;

1 Roberto ALIBONI, “Globalization and the Wider Black Sea Area: Interaction with the European Union, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 166. 2 Sergiu CELAC, Panagiota MANOLI, “Towards a New Model of Comprehensive Regionalism in the Black Sea Area”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 201.


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to foster, while fully respecting human rights, and with a particular focus on the local and regional level, the development of tolerant and equitable relations between BSEC member states and between all culturally diverse groups in the BSEC region of each State; to involve the International Centre for the Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) in order to promote cooperation, exchange and scientific researches in the field of culture; to encourage at local and regional level participation in intercultural dialogue in the spirit of cultural citizenship and with a view to cultural democracy; to create a space for dialogue and cultural citizenship in which it is possible to express disagreement, which is not only part of the democratic process, but also its guarantor; to consider the development of knowledge of history, cultures, arts and religions from school age onwards to be of central importance; to contribute to the development of intercultural dialogue by encouraging, whenever possible, action intended to bring together different cultural groups through intercultural events and practices, aimed at all age groups and all socio - cultural groups, within programs implemented by cultural institutions responsible for the fine arts, theatre, literature, etc.; to counteract the conflict of civilizations with the dialogue of cultures in a way that none of the cultures have dominance over others providing a possibility for the nations to perceive cultural diversity provided that national identity is preserved (BSEC Assembly Report, 2006).


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Bibliography

ALIBONI, Roberto, “Globalization and the Wider Black Sea Area: Interaction with the European Union, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol. 6, 2006, p. 166.

AYDIN, Mustafa, “Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and Integration into Euro-Atlantic Structure”, Perceptions, Vol. X, 2005, pp. 29-30.

BSEC Assembly Report, Report on “Dialogue among cultures in order to build trust among nations”, Belgrade, 2006.

CELAC, Sergiu, Panagiota MANOLI, “Towards a New Model of Comprehensive Regionalism in the Black Sea Area”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, No. 2, Vol. 6, 2006.

DONSKIS, Leonidas, Troubled Identity and the Modern World, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2009.

STRITECKY, Vit, Challenges for the Black Sea Region, last accessed on May 2012, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/challenges - for - the - black - sea - region -.tr.mfa].

***European Commission, “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue”, 2008, last accessed on May 2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/culture/portal/action/dialogue/2008_dial_en.htm]

***European Union, “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue”, last accessed on May 2012, [http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/culture/l29017_en.htm].


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BOOK REVIEWS

Sorin BOCANCEA, Daniel ȘANDRU (coord.), Totalitarismul. De la origini la consecințe

[Totalitarianism. From origins to consequences], Institutul European, Iași, 2011, 451 pp.

The 19th and the 20th centuries

brought the fall of monarchies and hereditary descent. Therefore, the rule of dictators became one of the two most frequent forms of government next to constitutional democracy. From Latin America’s self - proclaimed leaders, born after the fall of central authority in the nations freed from the Spanish rule to the new states of Africa and Asia, where dictators quickly rose after World War II and the communist and fascist regimes from various technologically advanced countries, dictatorship took its toll on territories and populations all over the world.

Published in 2011, the present volume marks 120 years since the birth of the Romanian savant Petre Andrei who was among the first Romanian theoreticians to reject dictatorship publicly and in his writings. The papers published in this volume are grouped into four parts and the fifth one is dedicated to the national conference with the same title held by Petre Andrei University from Iași.

The first part of the book, entitled Hannah Arendt. The Critique of Totalitarianism reunites articles from authors who used Hannah Arendt’s writings as a starting point and offers new insights into her theories. In the first chapter of this part, entitled

Totalitarianism, Public Sphere and the Essence of the Political, George Bondor, for example, circulates the idea that dictatorship leads to people becoming isolated, therefore destroying the existing relations between them and their relationship with reality. By doing this, totalitarianism becomes the worst disease of the public sphere.

Caius Dobrescu uses Hannah Arendt’s volume, Men in Dark Times, as a departure point and correlates it with the ideas of sociologists Alfred Schultz and Peter Berger. Dobrescu takes a special interest in his material, the portrait of Hermann Broch, from Arendt’s Men in Dark Times.

In the third chapter of the first part, Florin Mitrea, leans over the more profound analysis of the roots of totalitarianism done by Hannah Arendt. Starting with the roots of the phenomenon (nihilism, the worship of history, truth and lie in politics), the author concludes with the solution given by Arendt to the evil of dictatorship: a revival of the truthful politics resulted from a public life based on solidarity, truth and liberty.

The last chapter of this part, written by Cristiana Arghire, contains a comparative study on Hannah Arendt's and Michel Foucault’s perspectives on the roots of totalitarianism with an


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emphasis on political historicism. The common denominator of the two thinkers' views, as highlighted by Cristiana Arghire, is represented by their common attitude towards the process of exclusion by which certain groups are pushed towards a social border, thus becoming nothing more than masses.

The second part, Theoretical Perspectives, gathers five contributions that analyse totalitarianism from the following perspectives: philosophical, political, legal and that of political marketing. In the first chapter Human Fallibility and the Totalitarian Phenomenon, Anton Carpinschi, strongly relates the aforementioned concept with the human condition, with our fascination with creating an infallible power and viewing it as the only efficient and universal political solution.

Using the concept of political crisis, in the next chapter, Vasile Boari considers that the totalitarian phenomenon is the expression of this crisis which manifests itself through a wide range of symptoms like: a decrease of trust in the public institutions, the weakening of political parties, the rupture between the civil society and the political class, corruption, etc. Trying to determine what must be done Boari thinks that the most viable solution is the birth of a new ethical and political paradigm, adapted to the present – day changes.

Constantin Ilaș deals with the relationship between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Nazism in his chapter entitled From the Great Politics to Nazism. The Ideological Exploitation of Nietzsche’s Philosophy. In his chapter, Cristian Bocancea underlines that like all societies, the totalitarian one has a set of laws too, based on exploiting the judicial

theme of the people’s sovereignty, but obsessively insisting on a so called law of Nature and History, the only one capable of giving legitimacy to justice.

In the last chapter of this part, Georgeta Condur presents the product that dictatorships brought to their societies, the so - called new man and its female partner, the new woman. But in the end, as the author concludes, this product is nothing but a failure, but the evil that its creation brought can still be seen in the behaviour and mentalities of the societies in which it “lived” even though they are free of totalitarianism now.

The third part of the volume, Totalitarianism and Religion, underlines the strong relationship between dictatorship and religious beliefs. Sabin Drăgulin, for example, analyses the relationship between dictatorship and Christianity and its role in the birth of the totalitarian regimes from 20th century Europe. The second chapter, written by Natalia Vlas, focuses on the totalitarian dimensions of a Neo - Calvinist form of Christian theology called the dominion theology best represented by a movement called Christian Reconstructionism, the most extreme component of the Christian Right from the United States, also connected to The Republican Party in the last few decades.

The fourth part of the book entitled Romania of Totalitarianisms. Case Studies reunites articles that show how this concept evolved in this particular space. Tudor Pitulac analyses, from a sociological point of view, the way in which totalitarian regimes managed to develop and implement their programs. In the next chapter, Sorin Bocancea writes about the conditions that made


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possible the submission of the Romanian Orthodox Church in just two years after the war. The methodological starting point of the author is represented not only by the classical conditions (political, economic or geostrategic) but also by the human factor. Being a state institution it was clear that the political views of its leaders would affect the political orientation of the whole Orthodox Church.

Lavinia Betea, tries to understand the mechanisms of the communist regime by resorting to interviews with exponential political figures of the regime in her chapter. The next chapter of this part is a film chronic of Ceaușescu’s Autobiography directed by Andrei Ujică. The author, Ovidiu Șimonca, suggestively adds the phrase the degradation of a leader, the dissolution of a world to the film title.

Mark Bucuci takes on the subject of cruelty, as it is institutionalized by the totalitarian regimes in the chapter entitled Totalitarianism and the Mechanisms of Cruelty: a Rortian interpretation.

The next chapter, written by Doru Tompea, is dedicated to the memory of the Romanian savant Petre Andrei who openly opposed fascism during a time in which this ideology was increasing in popularity, position that later cost him his life. In his chapter, Antonio Patraș honours the philosophy of another victim of a totalitarian regime, the

Romanian writer Ion D. Sârbu. This time it was the communist regime, although Ion D. Sârbu was a supporter of the left. The third victim is Maria Așembrener and her case is presented by Daniel Șandru. By describing her case the author states that, in a totalitarian regime, the instauration of terror inside the social space takes place at all the levels, from the public discourse to family life.

By directly participating in the search of the victims of communism, Marius Oprea tells the story of The Lost People, the story of the martyrs of communist violence, of bodies buried in graves, at the margins of cemeteries, but especially stories buried deep inside the memories of those who chose not to speak of what they had endured. The question of what is left of Romania after the fall of communist regimes is answered by Carmen Mușat in the final chapter: Redefining Politics: Evil and Fear in the Contemporary World.

What makes this book so interesting also makes it hard to read due to the gravity of the ideas it underlines. The whole analysis of the totalitarian phenomenon, culminating with the presentation of case studies that bring back unpleasant memories from Romania’s past, a legacy that, in the end, its people have to accept, can be a frightening image of the peril that the human being can be to itself.

Adrian-Marius TOMPEA

“Petre Andrei” University of Iași


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Tom GALLAGHER,

Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong,

Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2009, 304 pp.

Tom Gallagher has taught at the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University for many years. Among the books he wrote let us cite just some of them: Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789-1999, Routledge, 2001; The Balkans after the Cold War, Routledge, 2003; Theft of a Nation: Romania since Communism, Hurst & Co, 2005/ Modern Romania, New York University Press, 2005; The Balkans in the New Millennium: In the Shadow of War and Peace, Routledge, 2007; The Illusion of Freedom: Scotland under Nationalism, C. Hurst, 2009. Gallagher is a respected figure in the intellectual circles both in Romania and abroad, and one of the few non-Romanians capable to perform deep analyses of the Romanian political evolution. The architecture of this book includes ten chapters plus an introduction and conclusions: 1. “The EU discovers Romania”; 2. “Crafty natives lead the Eurocrats astray”; 3. “The futility of EU funding”; 4. “Labour of Sisyphus: administrative reform in Romania”; 5. Justice clings to its chains, 1989–2004”; 6. “NATO, the EU and Romania's strategy of duplicity”; 7. “The EU at its most incoherent: April–December 2004”; 8. “The EU regains and loses the initiative: 2005–07”; 9. “Corruption and anti-corruption”; 10. “The expiry of reform after 2007”.

In this appreciated and prize winning book published in 2009, two years after Romania’s accession to the European Union Gallagher’s main argument is that in 2007 (the year or Romania’s EU accession) this country was unprepared and unreformed (apart from surface cosmetic changes). In 2013 the book needs perhaps a new review in order to grasp from a four year perspective the accuracy of its sharp and often bitter observations. At the time when it was published the book was a great success, in my view, thanks not only to the accuracy of the investigation, but also to its direct and coloured language, as well as to its propose to unveil the Byzantinism of Romania’s political elites. A wide range of public would be interested in reading this academic investigation promising to show the way an unscrupulous oligarchy was working behind the scene to trick the EU rapporteurs masquerading the progresses toward the country’s Europeanization through promises, discourses, strategies, programs, …sometimes bribes (consisting not only in money, influence or fake privatizations of strategic companies, but also in prostitutes), but leaving meanwhile the core of pre-existent structures almost untouched.

Vasile Pușcaș, the former EU negotiator for Romania, is surprisingly tolerant with the many “facts and


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figures”, inconsistencies and speculation this essay is made up of (and perhaps to which it owes much of its success). He considers the book useful as an alternative to the Romania’s EU accession issue. On the general background of official enthusiasm and festivity which characterized both Romanian and EU official discourses during and after the accession, Vasile Pușcaș considers this book as a “cold but refreshing shower which is as troubling as it is enlightening”.1

Instead of a real, genuine European integration, the outcome was a process of “pseudo-Europeanization” or “Euro-Balkanism,” as Gallagher plastically calls it (without explicitly defining the “genuine European integration in a Central Eastern European context”). Most of the ideas we find in this book are founded on fresh arguments picked from the Romanian domestic political scene. More precisely, Romania’s membership in the select political club of clean corruption, free democratic and prosperous countries was the biggest battle won by Romania’s domestic “power-networks”.

The main ideas exposed in the 10 chapters of this book can be summarized as follows:

The European Commission’s well paid civil servants were incompetent, superficial and simply unaware of the real political and economical realities of this country, and if they were actually aware of the major inconsistencies they were either accepting several compromises, or turning a blind eye to evidences. The only real interest of the EC officials was

1 Apud Robert O. FREEDMAN, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, April 2012.

to see Bucharest complying with the economic conditions, whereas they paid much less attention to the country’s political conditions. I would say that this is not surprising as far as political conditionality is tricky, open to debate more difficult if not impossible to be measured. Hence, as there were no severe political troubles, it is unsurprising that EU officials were less rigorous on these aspects, just as they were in the case of other candidates accepted in 2004.

Even today the EU does not have a credible methodology to measure the level of the corruption in a certain candidate state, and on the other hand the accession procedures for a new member state are not adapted to the specificity of a particular country, as it was the case of Romania.

DG External Relations has its share of responsibility, as it is depicted by Gallagher as a bureaucratic body taking mechanical decisions based on stereotype formal reports, and not on front line, up to date in-depth information. The lack of communication and coordination between the delegations of Bucharest and Sofia is also blamed for the inconsistency of the reports and the entire monitoring system.

Then the book is systematically analysing (perhaps like no other political analysis of Romania) the domains of administrative reform, justice reform or agricultural reform or privatization, which, in Gallagher’s opinion were all as many failures. Even more surprisingly, Gallagher considers that politically Romania not only did not succeed to make any progress, but also in some areas it stepped back during the negotiation years (corresponding to the


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SDP’s and Adrian Năstase’s rule). In one of the most interesting chapters, “Crafty natives lead the Eurocrats astray,” Gallagher is particularly eager to expose his non dissimulated antipathy for the Social Democratic Party, PSD in Romanian (the largest party in Romania, with most of its rulers being former leading members of the Communist Party). The political reforms were again neglected thanks to the relative economic progresses and accelerated privatization which allowed the EC to grant Romania the so much needed status of “functional market economy”. In conclusion, Romania was allowed to enter the EU with more compromises than any other candidate state, even with a lower status than Bulgaria.

1. BOOK STRENGTHS As some critics have noticed one

of the major strengths and added value of this book is that it focuses on actual key political figures and their personalities rather than on institutions, which is normally the research feature in academic studies of EU policies. However this major strength is carrying one of its major weaknesses (which is anyway inherent to such an approach). The focus on personalities and individuals often drives the entire investigation into a disputable speculative field, many assertions looking like cheap scandal magazine gossip, not to say personal attacks.

Günter Verheugen, the commissioner in charge of enlargement during the negotiation with Romania and Bulgaria is characterized as being an arrogant top EU official who from the

altitude of his chair was too high to see the “details” on the “ground” related to corruption cases or administrative miss-management.

The book offers a unique list of documented failures of the state to meet its promises and obligations performed by the Romanian politicians at that time, and a unique of its kind and alarming radiography of European Commission practices, methodologies and civil servant professionalism.

Although many of the information revealed by Gallagher is quite well known and debated for years by specialized Romanian political analysts and intellectuals, the very fact that a prestigious British scholar succeeded to bring them together in a synthesis book about one of the list known and often neglected EU country (despite its size and economic weight) is salutary. Additionally, in my view, another major strong point of the book (confirmed by the “time test”) resides in the fact that the author is not only criticizing the EU performance, but he also offers credible solutions.

Here are some quotations from the book: What could the European Union have done? At least seven things:

“it could easily have asked the Romanian government for more powers of oversight and intervention in order to try to overcome the key blockages preventing Romania from becoming a law-based state, one where citizenship mattered and the state facilitated economic development”;

“it could have created task-forces to improve the capacity of key parts of ministries and regulatory agencies which needed to function in a competent way if the country were to


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have a chance of holding its own against competitors”;

“it could have created a different form of regional system in order to allow for the successful distribution of pre-accession funds”;

“it should have given education a prominent place in the accession strategy, in light of evidence that poor countries can recover quickly from underdevelopment when this is done”;

“it should have emphasised conditionality as much in political areas as economic ones. A longer period should have been allowed before particular areas of the national economy were opened to foreign competition”;

“it should have customised rules for the right to use pre-accession funds in a way that suited Romanian conditions (rules that were made far simpler, and funding access more resistant to interception by corrupt power-brokers)”.

In sum it’s a unique of its kind synthesis of explained and interpreted facts and figures from a little known corner of Europe useful for academics, practitioners or just for the public with professional, intellectual or business interests in Romania.

2. WEAKNESSES In my view, many of the carefully

documented corruption cases, state capture, hidden lobbyism and bribery of the Romanian political elite in this “typical Balkan” country are depicted out of their context, and are unidirectionally and selectively presented in order to demonstrate an initially assumed hypothesis (a procedure usually avoided by professional historians).

Many observations and analyses in terms of language and presentation style seem to be rather preloaded from the Romanian scandal press than from a moderate scholarly work based on facts and evidences, presented in a certain context and then compared to other CEE countries from the region and then with the similar problems encountered in the EU 15. The bombastic language and expressions used in this book correspond rather to apocalyptic scenarios than to a scientifically documented work. Forced parallelisms like the one with Mussolini’s Italy in 1922, expressions like “red counties”; “absolute control over the law and order”; “uncontrolled capitalism” etc, are alarmist, and exaggerated. One of the final “verdicts” labelling the EU accession of an essentially unreformed Romania as “one of the biggest setbacks for democracy seen in Europe since 1945”, is not only bombastic and easy to dismantle, but also again unexpected from the pen of a professional historian. As many reviewers have already noticed, Tom Gallagher's book is “a look back in anger at a decade-long story of deceit and betrayal. Anger is generally a bad counsel in writing the sort of book that gets published by university presses”.1

The lack of comparison with other EU countries is another major deficiency of the book. Devoting more space to the failings of other EU members might have produced a less apocalyptic view on Romania. There are indeed other EU member states renowned for their administrative inefficiency, where the

1 Toby VOGEL, “A look back in well-controlled anger”, European Voice, 10.09.2009 [www.europeanvoice.com] – 19.03.2013.


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justice system has many failings, where organized criminal networks are powerful, and where the relationships between politicians and major business interests are notorious, or where progressively fewer individuals or organizations control increasing shares of the mass media. And all this in spite of decades of old EU membership. Paradoxically, the streets of London or Belfast during the 70’s or early 80’s with sometimes more than 10 bomb attacks per day would not have looked more apocalyptic than Bucharest in 2009.

The general conclusion which depicts the Romanian political elites as specialised in venality and the Europeans as specialised in incompetence is a flashy, but inaccurate assertion. The venality is not the exclusive attribute of the Romanian ruling elite or administration, and the EU bureaucrats are not necessarily incompetent. Indeed, no one denied the need for continuous transformation and improvement of the European Commission, but the book as such does not seem to have done much research on the EU officials point of view, being almost entirely sourced from media debates.

Some assertions in the book will question the author’s familiarity with the EU basic procedures. Tariff barriers were lowered far more quickly than was the case with Spain and Portugal when they joined in the 1980s. According to the European Act (1993) there was a 10 years transition period which gave Romania in theory enough time to prepare its economy for the competitive pressures of EU market. Moreover, there is no connection between the EU membership and the removal of protective tariffs. Romania today is a low-wage, high-tax economy in which

purchasing power had fallen by nearly 50% since 1990. In 1989 the Romanians had been weighed down by shortages, but household costs such as rent and heating usually did not exceed 10% of an average income. Both the fallen purchasing power by 50% as compared with 1989 and the assumption that the household costs such as rent and heating did not exceed 10% of the average income are wrong because the author generalizes them. Gallagher forgot to mention that it might have been the case perhaps with the rents paid in nationalized houses (where the rent was rather symbolic) and not the case of real rents (after 1990 most of those houses were sold to their rent payers at symbolic prices).

Finally many of the assertions made in this book are contested by the evolutions occurred these last four years. More precisely, during the economic crisis it was not Romania (nor Bulgaria or other Eastern European new member states) who put the entire EU in trouble by destabilizing the euro as the Greed sovereign debt crisis did. The budgetary deficits of Romania as well as her public debt is smaller than those of other EU member states, the severe budgetary cuts and sacrifices were understood and largely accepted by civil society with no street turmoil, there were also no escalation of far right xenophobic discourses attitudes or actions (as it was the case in some well quoted EU western democracies). Withal, the predicted invasion of Western Europe by Romanian delinquents did not occur either. In fact, the statistics show that actually the level of criminality among the Romanian expats is within the average of other nations. Additionally, in Romania in the last two years more


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parliamentarians have been convicted of corruption than anywhere else in the EU.

The recent Cyprus financial crisis seems to confirm that if there is a serious thereat addressing the European Construction it will not come from Romania as professor Gallagher suggests in this book. With an unemployment level of around 8% (as compared to 27% in Spain, Greece or south Italy), with a hard working community of expats and a

political class and civil society too eager to keep in this part of Europe what it was so badly needed and looked for in the last two centuries Romania seems to be rather the docile sheep among the EU member states and in terms of size and strategic importance one of the greatest and most important investments the EU made for its own future.

Lucian JORA

Romanian Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations


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Jonathan POWELL,

Noul Machiavelli. Cum se gestionează puterea în lumea modernă [The New Machiavelli. How to Wield Power in the Modern

World],trans. Alexandru Șiclovan, Cartier, Chișinău, 2012, 504 pp.

The work of the great Florentine

thinker, written merely in a few months, between June 1513 and January 1514, has inspired many contemporary authors, who tried to fit the reality of the politics and principles of modern governance in the matrix of the governance pattern created by Machiavelli’s principles. Among these we mention The New Prince (1999), the work of Dick Morris, councillor of the American president Bill Clinton, and The New Machiavelli, Jonathan Powell’s book. Jonathan Powell was the chief of staff of the British prime -minister Tony Blair, starting with his coming into power in 1997. In November 2012 the work was published in Romanian by Cartier publishing company from Chisinau.

The New Machiavelli is made up of 12 chapters and the title of each of them starts with a quote by Nicolo Machiavelli in The Prince. Therefore, even at a first glance, one may retrieve from the Machiavelli’s thinking its impressive actuality for the current political context: flatterers must be avoided; while defamation is damaging for the republics, public accusations are useful; the arrogance of the one who reaches power in a republic etc.

What Machiavelli wanted to do in The Prince was to give advice to a leader as to how to get to a governing position and how to maintain power.

Furthermore, he depicted the mandatory qualities of a prince and gave advice in regard to exerting his power. Powell’s worth is his attempt to make a comparison, over a gap of centuries, between Machiavelli’s advice and Tony Blair’s way of acting while in power. This kind of awakening makes us conclude, almost with no doubt, that there are no undiscovered situations in politics and that which was an opportunity for Machiavelli’ Prince may be of great use for a modern Europe prince. Could we argue against the following thoughts of Machiavelli: the prince who obtains the power of a country by means of a favour from its inhabitants must weigh carefully the reasons for which they made this possible; and if it proves that they did not act due to a natural affection towards him and only because of discontent for the previous leadership, then it will be extremely difficult for him to keep them as friends if it will be impossible to appease them.

Jonathan Powell highlights Blair’s qualities that favoured the carrying out of his mandate. And this subject is treated through the grid of Machiavelli’s text that treasured more than two qualities that allow a man to assert himself: courage and intelligence, and these two qualities represent the core for leadership in any area. In politics the fact of having courage is seldom proven by the ability to make complex decisions


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and by the will to take risks when the result is uncertain. Powell shows this through Tony Blair’s working manner. Tony’s almost instantaneous decision to candidate for party leader, when John Smith died in 1994 proves his courage. A more fearful politician would have moved away from Gordon’s path, his older partner in development of the New Labourism, but he felt that Gordon missed his chance (p. 57). Through the vision shared by Powell a manifestation of courage is shown as well when one confronts the opposition. Tony did this in his election campaign in 2005, exploring the issue of immigration, a hot topic in the British politics, by which the labourists attempted to win votes of the traditional conservatives. Tony praised the remarkable advantages that immigration had brought to Britain in a public speech. This did not bring votes to them but blocked any arguments for conservatives for the rest of the campaign. Had this issue been ignored, there would have been a gradual decrease of the labourists’ votes (p. 60).

By analysing the qualities that a political leader must have, the author comes back to Machiavelli’s thinking, to later find its relevance for the modern era. Machiavelli considers that besides the ability to make decisions, a successful prince must be born with good political instincts. Some leaders choose the perfect tone, while others are tone dead. Powel states that Tony’s reaction to the news of Princess Diana’s death, on 31st of august 1997, was an example of perfect tone. He had an instinct concerning the public’s state of mind. The author reveals a quote from his diary: he definitely feels a real pain… Especially since the phrase People’s Princess

belongs to Blair. Besides courage and instinct, the leaders must acquire five qualities: competence, ability to communicate, charisma, perspective and charm. Just as Machiavelli said about new leaders, a prince must offer astonishing proofs of his abilities (p. 72). In a unique manner the author shares his thoughts about the third quality necessary for a political leader – charisma (p. 87). In Powell’s opinion, charisma may be obtained; it is not an inherited quality. Even people without inborn charisma, insists the author, such as Mikhail Gorbaciov and John Major, can make heads turn when entering a room, due to their dignified figure, because of what Max Weber called habitualness of charisma. An essential ingredient of the charisma is optimism. Powell comes with relevant arguments from electoral races: Blair versus Major, Bush Jr. versus Gore, Obama versus McCain, Clinton versus Bush Sr. etc. Tony had an optimistic spirit that appealed to people – writes his councillor.

Even if well-known, we can not neglect this allegoric comparison of Machiavelli, which recommends that a prince be at the same time lion and fox, because the lion can not dodge traps, neither the fox wolves. Therefore, one must be fox to avoid traps and lion to chase away the wolves. A leader must have the ferocity of lions and all the cunning of foxes. Tony was a master of constructive ambiguity. The most spectacular demonstration of his fox qualities was when Tony managed the northern-Ireland issues, states Powell (p. 209).

Is it better to be loved or feared? It is Machiavelli’s question full of meaning for the current political life.


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Machiavelli’s answer was this: since love and fear cannot coexist, if we must choose, it is safer to be feared than to be loved. The author states that when Tony became the leader of the Labourist Party, he was considered both by conservatives and press to be a Bambi, a weak and defenceless chess-piece, which may be easily overcome by the situation. It was extraordinary how fast Bambi changed into Stalin, a dictator stepping on the others’ wishes (p. 209).

It is important that, since the 16th century, Machiavelli granted importance to public opinion. He writes in Speeches: It is not without reason the motive for which the voice of the people is like the voice of God, because the public opinion has a remarkable accuracy in prognosis… Powell follows-up on the importance of the public opinion in the modern political system, confirming the importance of the public opinion for a prime-minister. The Survey of the public opinion is an essential instrument of the prime-ministers, but social surveys, such as intelligence secrets, must be handled with care. Without these, a modern leader is blind. At the same time, the author warns that social surveys represent an image of the past, not a vision of the future, thus a leader uses it as if steering while looking behind the boat. The numbers help to find your position in the ocean and may tell something about the state of the waves, but they do not guide the course. That is why a wise leader must use social surveys as an instrument, not as a substitute to his own political instincts.

Of course, we may not agree with the author, if we talk about quality research of the public opinion by focus-groups. But Powell interferes, stating that these are subjective and seldom reveal the visions of those who hold the power

(p. 211). During his period of stay on Number 10, Tony Blair was backed by two American experts from the staff of the president Bill Clinton, concerning the research of the public opinion.

Another useful moment for those practicing the big politics is the so-called pseudo-agenda of the prime-minister. Powell stated that Blair’s day of work was a congested one. Basically, he had no time to think at the big picture. That is why, to overcome this situation, the staff began to insert fictive meetings in his agenda at least an hour or two in the middle of the day, (p. 265). The prime minister sometimes did not understand the code applied by his councillors and requested these meetings to be cancelled.

The relations between the political leader and the press are a different compartment of governance. Machiavelli says that it is not essential for a Prince to have all the qualities enlisted above, but it is mandatory to act as if he had them all. A prince should… be careful not to slip a word from his mouth which may not live -up to those five qualities, because people judge more with their eyes, since they see many but few can understand.

The same thing could be said in regard to the leaders of our days. This phenomenon can be made and controlled with the help of the favourable media. The author admits that each time when things became complicated, it was necessary to refresh the contract with journalists. Blair’s staff made, in this regard, invitations to dinner for chief-editors in the small dining room of Number 10. And there plans for media coverage were made (p. 291). Even if, the author admits, the intimate contact between the leader and the media is not always recommended, Machiavelli says that a prince must always think how


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to avoid actions which could make him hated and despised. A careful prime-minister, advises Powell, will keep a certain distance from the press and will see them so rarely that the journalists will consider the meetings a special event.

At the end of the book, Jonathan Powell writes that the prime-ministers are preoccupied with their legacies. Even in 1998 he suggested that the world will remember Tony Blair for Northern Ireland, the constitutional reform and the political migration towards the centre. However, Tony Blair’s main political will is the change of face of the British politics.

That which finally brings down all leaders is arrogance. The arrogance did not affect Tony Blair. Machiavelli is poorly

understood, says the author at the beginning. The same happens with Tony Blair, writes Powell at the end. When responsible history is written, I will be surprised if Tony Blair will not be seen as one of Machiavelli’s great princes, one upon whom Fortuna smiled and who had the courage and intelligence to take advantage of it.

The book is an attempt to learn a lesson about leadership and about the exercise of power for future practitioners. It deserves a special place in the library of any intellectuals who are interested in the mechanism of governance.

Aurelia PERU-BĂLAN

Institute of European Integration and Political Science Academy of Sciences,

Republic of Moldova


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Alexandru RADU, Politica între proporționalism și majoritarism.

Alegeri și sistem electoral în România postcomunistă [Politics between proportional and majoritarian systems.

Elections and electoral system in post-communist Romania], Institutul European, Iași, 2012, 365 pp.

Professor Alexandru Radu’s

political sciences paper, published in the summer of 2012, analyses in an objective, critical manner, based on bibliographical references, the types of elections which took place in post-communist Romania and the ways in which the leaders were nominated, as well as the degree to which the citizens were represented based on the votes. Instead of conclusions, the author suggests a new election system. The paper’s aimed audience are political sciences specialists, students, researchers and everyone else who has an interest.

The book is not divided into chapters but rather into sections based on the domains the author researches. This way, the author highlights several items, first, the election system through the election theory, differentiating types by election formula and by ballot counting methods, then, the election thresholds by describing constituency sizes, the vote type- plurality voting or party-list voting, on open or closed lists. He also highlights the electoral disproportionality, the absentee percentage and the degree of representation against the type of voting- majority rule, simple plurality or two-ballot plurality, party list voting, and proportional representation in Romania by describing the type of votes: cumulative, limited, single non-transferable voting or transferable voting.

Towards the end the author analyses mixed election systems and their effects.

As far as elections in Romanian history are concerned, the author starts his analysis from the stage before the introduction of an election system, through the “Statute expanding the Paris Convention” in 1858 based on which the Ad-hoc assemblies elections were organised and led to the election of Alexandru Ioan Cuza as ruler in both Romanian Principalities. He then passes on to the census suffrage, plural suffrage and plurality suffrage, a hallmark of the monarchy in the 1866-1918 era under king Carol 1st, and then equal suffrage and electoral primate which granted parliament majority to the party that managed to receive 40% of the votes, an electoral law which governed the whole period between the two world wars. In 1938, the plurality vote is introduced for the first time for the 1st and 2nd of May elections for all men over 30 years old and for all literate women – who could only vote at the Organisation for Adults. Candidates were nominated by the only political formation in the country, The National Rebirth Front and the vote lacked any surprise results1. The Parliament was structured on

1 Florin GRECU, Construcția unui partid unic. Frontul Renașterii Naționale, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2012, pp. 139-172.


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professional categories and the Senate had an obviously corporate look- there were three types of senators: elected, nominated and entitled, the last category being mostly part of the social elites. Next, starting from the corporate-like elections, the electorate and the structure of the Parliament under Carol’s authoritarian monarchy, the author analyses elections and plurality voting under popular democracy defined by unanimous voting.

Another research theme analysed here is the first decade of democracy after the fall of the communist regime. The first elections are considered as foundational and atypical by the author, and the 1992 ones are thought to be the first constitutional elections whereas the 1996 tour gave party stability and political upheaval by creating the first moderate right government after the Revolution. In the second decade of democracy he analyses the 2000 elections, the turn-over test and he continues with the 2004 elections which are considered to be “presidential”. There is therefore a contradiction between the ballots for each party resulted from the votes and the government composition made after the elections – this fact marked Romania’s post-elections political evolution which made volatility into a rule. The 2008 and 2009 elections are two years of electoral show. It was given by parties competing in the election race marked by the diminishment of the role the presidential elections. This diminishment was caused by the separation between the presidential and general elections. Next, the author also analyses the first elections for the European Parliament in the summer of 2009.

The Romanian electoral system has been based on the elections law mechanism established by the 1991 and the 2003 constitutions. It is also based on an original law practice given that politicians’ appetite for reform is substantial with respect to elections. From 1990 to 2012 the elections methods remained unchanged and the contradictions were in the very nature of the laws.

The analysis of the proportional election mechanism discusses parliament, local counsel and European Parliament elections, through which people’s votes are turned into parliamentary seats, from the 1990 to the 2012 elections. The analysis of the majority voting mechanism discusses the election of the country’s President, laid down in the Constitution and how the election of mayors and county counsel presidents is different from that of a President in the degree of majority required by the first round.

The author questions the correctness of Romanian elections because of a lack of official records as far as the composition of circumscriptions is concerned thus leading to a favourable terrain for fraud since the way circumscriptions are made has been continued throughout this period. Although there are 18 million voters listed out there, the author correctly concludes that the real number is lower and the number of decision makers is even lower.

When discussing the democratic concept of representation- proportionality, the author believes that there is a problem of ‘proportional non-representation” – an expression taken from political sciences professor Daniel


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Barbu1, and he also considers the mechanism of indirect seats distribution/redistribution to be a myth. The analysis of the proportional transformation of votes into seats in the Parliament is made by highlighting the differences between the proportional representation system and the party system. Although majority voting and seat distribution were introduced in 2008 by the election law 35/2008, based on the proportionality and representation principles, they are still applied following the majority voting system, which means that seats won by a majority of votes by one candidate are still gained through the proportionality rule. Professor Alexandru Radu’s thesis is that “although the voting is described by the law as being proportional, the law’s effect is of a majority vote nature, thus creating two categories of elected people: those elected by majority votes and those elected proportionally”.

The majority vote law was the declared target when changing the party list voting system through a closer connection between the elected and the elector, but the change of the election system did not aim at changing the double method of seats distribution. Therefore, the process of turning votes into seats resulted in MP’s elected directly and by popularity. Through the distribution of seats, which was made in two stages, it created two sorts of seats: the ones elected and distributed directly in constituencies and the non-elected ones, distributed indirectly at country level. On the other hand, 1 out of 3 MP’s whose connection with the voters is

1 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, ediția a II-a, Nemira, București, 2004, p. 199.

done through the mechanism of distributing seats left empty in the first round in constituencies. Not all votes from under the electoral threshold are used in the second round. Unused votes at constituency level- that is what is left after the electoral coefficient is calculated, come only from parties which went over the electoral threshold. The d’Hondt method for distributing empty seats is used for these votes gathered at a national level by each electoral competitor. By this method, “the votes are given to parties who lost the elections by not making it to the legislature body”2.

Instead of conclusions, the author imagines two types of election systems, which are the novelty and the touch of originality in the book. Alexandru Radu suggests a visionary system: a unicameral parliament elected through a plurality vote, in a relative majority with a first-past-the-post election like the one used in 2008 for the election of county counsel Presidents. By replacing proportional representation with a first-past-the-post one, that is through a majority voting, a more stable government would result. But majority voting is less European and adopting such an election system is not favourable to our kind of democracy

The reformation of the Romanian election system is needed through the improvement of electoral management, that is through managing the election process and trust in the elections. The solution suggested by the author is independent management based on the broadening of the Permanent Election

2 Cristian PREDA, România postcomunistă și România interbelică, Meridiane, București, p. 26.


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Authority during the election period so that it becomes the only independent authority of Executive power through

budget and structure, with roles in managing the election process alongside the Ministry of Justice/ Internal Affairs.

Florin GRECU

Hyperion University of Bucharest


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EVENT

Cultural Diversity and Social Cohesion in a Globalised World The crisis of contemporary education, if there is such a crisis, is generated by

the burst of knowledge resulting from the unprecedented technological development, from demographic and aspirational explosions, on the one hand, and from a dilution of the impact of social models to which human communities relate to, on the other hand. Thereby, the contemporary society is faced with a poignant lack of a model, a model depicting a theoretical or material system that enables us to indirectly study the characteristics and mutations of another system, more complex, to which the first system is similar. This approach to understanding the concept of model is a fundamental pedagogical resource, having the potential of being a direct, multipurpose strategy. For a society, the model with the most profound formative impact is the one of the realist man and his behaviour, who succeeds in imposing certain values, ideas and definitive actions through his own way of being and behaving.

From this point of view, the discussion on the most suitable university model for the 21st century in a globalised and globalising world has become a priority for all actors involved in the educational process.

The international conference “Cultural Diversity and Social Cohesion in a Globalised World” (organised by Ebru Magazine, Atlantic Turkish-Senegalese Association for cultural dialogue, ATSA, in cooperation with the Ministry of National Education of Senegal and Cheikh Anta Diop University from Dakar) took place on 8 and 9 February 2013. Representatives of 25 countries were present at this event, among which: Senegal, Italy, France, USA, Madagascar, Guinean Bissau, Gambia, Morocco, Turkey, South Africa, Belgium and Romania. The University of South-East Europe Lumina was represented by Filip Stanciu (Ph.D., Associate Professor and Rector of UESEL), Ragîp Gokcel (Ph.D., lecturer and president of the Senate UESEL) and Marin Drămnescu (Ph.D., head of Business Administration Department) – the authors of the intervention in the open discussion of the conference.

University is essentially a European institution, because it was born on the old continent, following the fortunate symbiosis of tradition and innovation. More than nine centuries have passed from the creation of the first universities in Salamanca, Bologna, and Paris – Sorbonne, meanwhile they succeeded in asserting themselves as the main cultural institutions of the West – first in Europe, and later in America as well. Since then, university has evolved from a distant and elitist institutional entity to a genuine cradle of research and innovation, open for knowledge reorganization in the benefit of society.

Science, as we understand it today, and the educational system, especially at the university level, are a creation that submits to the European model. An essential trait


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of European societies is their ability to edge and diffuse the breakthroughs of knowledge through the creation of institutions meant specifically for this purpose.

The central axis of the conference was, avowedly, the globalisation process and the associated or derived diversity that implies a multitude of risks on the one side but even more opportunities. What is essential is the answer to the following question: how do we approach globalisation in order to build a peaceful future, one that is as moral as possible and animated by perennial values?

In this context several problems were discussed: the socio-cultural diversity, the role and contribution of the civil society in this context, the cultural, ethnical and religious differences, as part of the diversity policy, as well as aspects of multiculturalism, as significant challenges for the government authorities. At the same time, the need for integration and mutual understanding was accentuated, the essential role of citizenship in the dynamic of intercultural interactions, necessary in order to establish a common public space in which common values can be expressed and reduce disparities and polarisations.

As an effect of diversity, the role of intellectuality, of opinion-makers, of non-governmental organisations and private associations in bringing forth-social cohesion has greatly increased. This fact implies a significant and positive understanding of the realities of the present day and also a critical appreciation of the tight connections between diversity, social cohesion and globalisation. From this perspective, one of the objectives of the conference was that of presenting the implications of globalisation for civil society and analysing this problem in the context of the contributions brought by The Hizmet Movement. It is presently estimated that over 1000 schools – secondary and high schools are active and 20 universities in 140 countries in the world, on five continents, in The Hizmet Movement, that offer an education model adapted for the beginning of the 21st century.

In his intervention “Notes on a case study – The University of South-East Europe Lumina”, assoc. prof. Filip Stanciu, Ph.D., outlined the desired role of university in contemporary society, pointing out the fact that academic institutions nowadays have the tendency to leave behind the university of formation, focusing on sketching an educational environment dominated by scientific and technical values, creating entrepreneurial skills and material success. This type of reality results in an accentuated focus on theoretical research and educational practices of the development of cognitive aptitudes, procedural skills, limited to certain sequences of knowledge and encouraging the manifestation of the cultural attitudes associated with them. On the other side, universities do not consider character development as a part of their curriculum, because of their focus on the accumulation of knowledge, which is considered essential for their future careers. This lack, correlated with a materialistic perspective on educational results, results in the controversial crisis of education, intensely disputed with both for and against arguments.

With a direct reference to the University Of South-East Europe, the problems faced by it were enounced openly. As such, it was shown that setting up a university after 20 years of controversial history of private superior education in Romania is a difficult enterprise, if we take into account the major risks the founders have taken on


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(the numerous legislative modifications, the absence of corroboration in some normative stipulations comprised in the general and specific legislation, a vast secondary legislation, the relatively chaotic or incomplete approaches implemented as a result of the integration of stipulations from European documents to which Romania has adhered, the slightly stained reputation of private universities following public scandals they were involved in, etc.). The emergence of this initiative in the Romanian university environment is hard to depict at its true value if we take into account the fact that it takes place in a period of deep financial crisis, in a time interval almost hostile for excellence in education both in the collective mind and at a macro structural level.

As a conclusion, the university – in the opinion of the authors of the paper – can find its meaning and identity by following a third path that can attest to the reconstruction of the human personality from the inside out but not in an uniform manner, but by sustaining the multiple particular aspects, based on some superior principles that target the education of tolerance, individual and collective identity, interculturalism and multiculturalism. We notice that the balanced development of the personality is not possible in the absence of peace and that it cannot become real without upholding the rights of man and safeguarding his fundamental freedom. A university without spirituality and without a spiritualising effect cannot reinvent itself, by oscillating permanently between a traditionalism that keeps it connected to the past and an entrepreneurial superficial model, continually looking for its sense and identity. In context it was reiterated that the cultural dimension of education must be rethought and revalorized in the perspective of an authentic “educational society”, characterised by, among others, an accentuated cultural pluralism.

MEDMODEL 2012

The first international symposium named “The Mediterranean model and the extended Black Sea region” took place on 7-9 June 2012 in Bucharest and was organised by the University of South-East Europe Lumina and the Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies from Naples.

The Mediterranean model influenced the peoples from the Black Sea area and its extended region for a long time. The two “areas” have even nowadays multiple common elements, between them having taken place interferences, influences and confluences. Those values resulted from the dialogue among numerous cultures. For millennia, those have influenced, complicated and enriched the history of a space of meeting civilisations, idea confrontations and all diversity that is specific to nations.

The world of the Mediterranean has influenced in different proportions almost the entire extended area of the Black Sea and even the fascinating Russian civilisation. Can this extended region of the Black Sea constitute, in its turn, a model with effects comparable to the Mediterranean one? The purpose of the symposium was to find, through scientific debate, possible answers to this question. Within the themed sections, attempts were made to identify the similar elements, interferences and


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reciprocal effects, as well as the specific aspects in culture and civilisation, politics and institutions, as well as economy.

This scientific meeting reunited important personalities from the higher education environment from Italy, Turkey and, of course, Romania. Among these: Luigi di Comite (Aldo Moro Università di Bari), Daniel Barbu (University of Bucharest), Giovanni Lobrano (University of Sassari), Havvanur Şahin (Karaelmas University), Vittore Collina (University of Florence), Maurizio Vernassa (University of Pisa), Luigi Mascilli Migliorini (“Federico II” University, Naples), Marisa Valleri (“Aldo Moro” University, Bari), Cristina Badon (University of Florence).

We mention this scientific event that took place in the spring of the previous university year in order to make a first announcement of participation at the second international symposium under this name that shall take place during May-June 2013 in Bucharest and Constanța, with the purpose of deepening and extending our research area.

Filip STANCIU



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SIGNALS

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

Andreea ZAMFIRA,

Une sociologie électorale des communautés pluriethniques, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012.

Starting from developing a picture of electoral behaviours in multilingual communities, Andreea Zamfira’s book highlights the influence of the ethno-linguistic factor on the electoral behaviour. An important contribution of this paper is represented by the proposal of a new analytical model able to refund the complexity of elections in countries that have experienced the cultural diversity, on long historical periods.

Richard E. WAGNER, James M. BUCHANAN,

Democraţia în deficit. Moştenirea politică a lordului Keynes, translated from English by Radu Şimandan, preface by Robert D. Tollison,

Humanitas, București, 2013.

The Romanian translation of the classic work of Richard E. Wagner and James M. Buchanan, Democracy in Deficit:The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (published for the first time in 1977), recalls the theoretical dispute between the economic school of public choice and the Keynesian model, the stake being the defining of the relationship between business and politics. In this respect, Wagner and Buchanan are taking trenchantly a stand against the Keynesian assumption on the independence and primacy of macroeconomic policy in relation to politics. The book advocates a system of fiscal and monetary rules as a solution to finding the economic optimal balance between lasting stability and growth.


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William BARTLETT, Sanja MALEKOVIC, Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS (eds.),

Decentralization and Local Development in South East Europe, Series: Studies in Economic Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, February 2013.

The post-communist states of South East Europe (SEE) have a strong commitment to decentralisation as a means to contribute to the consolidation of democracy, and to improve institutions for local economic and social development. However, the experience of transition in post-communist SEE has been to deepen regional and local inequalities, creating a vulnerability of the affected regions to external shocks such as the recent economic crisis and its subsequent threats to political stability. This book explores the nature and effectiveness of policies of decentralisation and regional development in this less well studied part of Europe. It identifies the impact of decentralisation and regional development on spatial

inequalities, and evaluates the policy responses in different political and institutional environments.

Vesna BOJICIC-DZELILOVIC, James KER-LINDSAY,

Denisa KOSTOVICOVA (eds.), Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans,

Palgrave Macmillan, January 2013. This book examines the ambiguous role played by civil society in state-building, democratization and post-conflict reconstruction in the Western Balkans. In doing so, it challenges the received wisdom that civil society is always a force that promotes people’s weal. Civil society actors have helped create the conditions for new, more constructive relations inside and between former Yugoslavian countries. But, their agency has also rekindled nationalism by hindering the efforts to rebuild the region after the conflicts of the 1990s. The book demonstrates that diverse civil society effects cannot be captured without querying both the nature of civil society and the complexity of the ongoing transformation. So how can the emancipatory role

of civil society be harnessed? This rigorous case study-driven reappraisal of the ability of civil society to support progressive transformation from an illiberal regime to democracy and from conflict to peace will be a valuable resource to scholars and practitioners alike.


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TO BE PUBLISHED

Johannes STEPHAN, The Technological Role of Inward Foreign Direct Investment

in Central East Europe, Series: Studies in Economic Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, June 2013.

The post-communist states of South East Europe (SEE) have a strong commitment to decentralisation as a means to contribute to the consolidation of democracy, and to improve institutions for local economic and social development. However, the experience of transition in post-communist SEE has been to deepen regional and local inequalities, creating a vulnerability of the affected regions to external shocks such as the recent economic crisis and its subsequent threats to political stability. This book explores the nature and effectiveness of policies of decentralisation and regional development in this less well studied part of Europe. It identifies the impact of decentralisation and regional development on spatial inequalities, and evaluates the policy

responses in different political and institutional environments.

Vera TRAPPMANN, Fallen Heroes in Global Capitalism

Workers and the Restructuring of the Polish Steel Industry, Series: Studies in Economic Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, May 2013.

This book challenges the one-sided account of Poland as a successful transition case, by exploring the huge social costs for workers in terms of impoverishment and employment precarity. The ambivalent role of the European Union in the economic restructuring of Poland emerges through comparisons to earlier rounds of restructuring the steel industry in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. By offering an exemplary case of multi-level analysis, an in-depth case study and biographical research, Fallen Heroes in Global Capitalism provides a compelling reading on post-socialism and the restructuring of the Polish steel industry.


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CONFERENCES 2013

First, the Second International Symposium “The Mediterranean Pattern and the Extended Region of the Black Sea”, organised by The University of South East Europe Lumina and The Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies from Naples, will take place in Bucharest, on 12 - 16 JUNE 2013. The purpose of the symposium is to find, through scientific debate, possible answers to the following question: can the extended region of the Black Sea constitute a pattern comparable to the Mediterranean one? Within the theme sections we will try to identify those elements of similarity, interference and mutual influencing, as well as the specific aspects in the area of culture and civilisation, politics, institutions, as well as economy. This year, the three thematic sections will deal with the following issues: I. Democracy and political representation II. Regional identities and regionalization III. Neo-liberalism and the welfare state today The working languages in the symposium will be: Romanian, English and Italian. For more details, see: http://medmodel.lumina.org Second, the Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest and the Doctoral School of Political Science, University of Bucharest, organizes The International Interdisciplinary Conference “CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION: THE POST-COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE(S)”. The event will take place at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Bucharest (no. 8, Spiru Haret Street), on May 24-25, 2013. The aim of this conference is to explore the challenges of transition and the transformations of the international arena in the aftermath of the collapse of communism and the dissolution of USSR. On this note, doctoral students, researchers and faculty staff from the field of social sciences are invited to participate with papers on the following topics (and not only): theories of transition; processes of democratization; political elites; socio-economic policies; public administration; party systems and electoral systems; political elections and electoral campaigns; the legal system; political culture; civil society; political representation and mass-media; international relations and regionalism; equal opportunities and human rights; the role of the intellectual in post-communist societies. For more details, see: www.fspub.unibuc.ro/doctoralconference Third, on May 24-26, 2013, will take place the 7th edition of “THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY STUDIES”, organized and hosted by "Lucian Blaga" University of Sibiu, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security


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Studies. The aim of the conference is to scientifically debate issues such as: the global economic crisis as a challenge to the traditional views on globalization, the new approaches and policies demanded by the global security and, also, the year 2013 as a switching point in the development of democracy and the existence of the market model. The conference is structured along three tracks, as follows: I. Political Science Track II. International Relations Track III. Security Studies Track For more details, see: http://conferences.ulbsibiu.ro/crissp/

Florin-Ciprian MITREA University of South-East Europe Lumina


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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Daniel BARBU

Ph.D. in History at Babeș-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca and Ph.D in Philosophy at the University of Bucharest. He is professor of political science at the University of Bucharest; former dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences and former director of the Institute for Political Research at the University of Bucharest. Recent publications: Indistincția. O cronică a sfârșitului politicii românești, Art, București, 2010; Politica pentru barbari, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2005; Republica absentă, 2nd edition, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2004; Bizanţ contra Bizanţ, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2001; O arheologie constituţională românească, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, Bucureşti, 2000.

Salvatore CINGARI

Ph.D. in Historical Studies at the University of San Marino. He is Associated Professor of History of Political Thought at the University for Foreigners of Perugia (Department of Human and Social Science). Some of his publications: Un’ideologia per il ceto dirigente del’Italia unita. Pensiero e politica al liceo Dante di Firenze (1853-1945), Olschki, Firenze, 2012; Benedetto Croce e la crisi della civiltà europea, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2003; Alle origini del pensiero “civile” di Benedetto Croce. Modernismo e conservazione nei primi vent’anni dell’opera, Editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 2001; Il giovane Croce. Una biografia etico-politica, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2000.

Florin GRECU

Ph.D. in Political Sciences at the University of Bucharest. He is Ph.D Lecturer of Political Sciences at Hyperion University, Bucharest. Recent publications: Construcţia unui partid unic. Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 2012; “Campania electorală din mai 1939: mecanisme, proceduri și comportament electoral”, Sfera Politicii, No. 169, 2012, pp. 134-144; “Regimul și principiile Constituției de la 1938”, Sfera Politicii, No. 172, 2012, pp. 70-82.

Lucian JORA

Ph.D. in History/ European Studies at Babeș-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca (2010); Research Fellow at the Romanian Academy, The Institute of International Relations (since 1998); senior counselor within the Romanian Ministry of Education, at the Unit charged with European Union financial assistance for Human Resources Development (since 2006). He is also a


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member of the editorial team for the Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations (issued four times a year in Bucharest, under the patronage of the Romanian Academy). Previous appointments include visiting research positions at the Jagellonian University (Cracow, Poland 2002), National Centre for Research on Europe at the Canterbury University (New Zealand, 2002), Shandong University (Jinan, China, 2007) and Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC (2009). Lucian Jora’s academic interests range from Cultural Diplomacy, as a tool for European Integration process, to European Regional integration Strategies.

Florin-Ciprian MITREA

Ph.D. in Political Sciences at the University of Bucharest, with the doctoral thesis entitled “Intellectuals in totalitarianism. Cultural Foundations of the Polish Critique of Communism (1945 – 1989)”; B.A. (2000) and M. A. (2002) at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest; Studies of academic research at the Jagiellonian University of Cracow and at the University La Sapienza of Rome. Presently, he is lecturer at the University of South-East Europe Lumina (Department of International Relations and European Studies), Bucharest. He published several scientific articles in journals such as: Sfera Politicii, Revista de Ştiinţe Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale a Academiei Române, Romanoslavica.

Aurelia PERU-BĂLAN

Ph.D. in Political Sciences; researcher at the Institute of European Integration and Political Sciences and associated professor at the Academy of Sciences of Moldova (Faculty of Jurnalism and Comunication Sciences). Recent publications: “Alegerile prezidențiale din Franța 2012: între valorile gauliste și tradiția stângistă”, Sfera politicii, No. 170, 2012, pp. 36-50; “Agenda-setting și poziționarea candidatului Vladimir Putin în prezidențialele din 4 martie 2012, Rusia”, Sfera politicii, No. 169, 2012, pp. 159-171.

Michele PROSPERO

Ph.D. in Philosophy at University La Sapienza of Rome; Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Sociology and Sciences of Communications (University La Sapienza of Rome). Principal publications: La politica postclassica, (Taviano : Lit. Graphosette), 1986; Politica e vita buona, Euroma La Goliardica, Roma, 1996; Storia delle istituzioni in Italia, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1998; La politica moderna, Carocci, Roma, 2001; Politica e società globale, Laterza, Roma & Bari, 2004; Alle origini del laico, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2006; Filosofia del diritto di proprietà, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2009; Hans Kelsen. Normativismo e diritto privato, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2012.


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Cătălin-Valentin RAIU

Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science, M.A. and B.A. in Orthodox Theology, all at the University of Bucharest; doctoral research fellow at the University of Nottingham (for seven months). He is interested in political theology, political theory and the history of political thought. Recent published book: Ortodoxie, postcomunism și neoliberalism. O critică teologico-politică, Curtea Veche Publishing House, București, 2012.

Gelu SABĂU

Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Bucharest; lecturer at „Hyperion” University (Faculty of Journalism), Bucharest. Fields of interest: Philosophy of religion, Religious dogmas and doctrines, Political philosophy, Religious and political modern ideologies. Published studies: “Church and State in Orient and Occident. The two cities and the conflict between the two powers”, Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Theologia Graeco-Catholica Vardaniensis, Vol. LV, No. 1, 2010, pp. 173-192; “On created and increated in (Pseudo-)Dionysius the Areopagite and the neo-platonic tradition”, Scholé. Independent Review of Philosophy, No. 2, 2011, pp. 5-20; “Religion and modernity. Instruments of ideologizing the religious discourse”, Cogito. Multidisciplinary Research Journal, Vol. IV, No. 4, 2012, pp. 113-132.

Selami Ahmet SALGÜR

Ph.D. in Sociology at the University of Bucharest; M.A. at the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Studies, University of Bucharest; B.A. in Educational Sciences at Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara. He was an international teacher for seventeen years, director of an international school for five years. He participated in many seminars and conferences all over the world. He is head of the International Affairs and Human Resources at the University of South-East Europe Lumina since August 2011.

Victoria SPAU

Completed her undergraduate studies at National School of Administration and Politics, Faculty of Communications, Bucharest (2008). She furthered studied Global Politics MSc (Research) at University of Southampton and wrote her dissertation on the “Influence of Music in Protest Participation” (2011). She was involved in the research project “Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualizing Contestation”, working as one of the research assistants for the UK team. Currently, she works as a Parliamentary Advisor at the Romanian


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Chambers of Deputies. Her main research interests are: social movements, the involvement of the Romanian civil society in the political sphere.

Filip STANCIU

Ph.D. in Sciences of Education, Al.I. Cuza University of Iaşi (2000); Graduated from the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest (1981); Certified in “The management of educational systems, International Institute for Educational Planning”, UNESCO, Paris, 1996; Associate professor Ph.D. and Rector of the University of South-East Europe Lumina, Bucharest. Publications: The Romanian school at the beginning of the 3rd millennium, Paideia Publishing House, București, 1997 (co-author); The anthology of laws in Romanian Education, The Institute of Education Sciences, București, 2004 (co-author); University in a new light... The University of South-East Europe Lumina, Pro Universitaria, București, 2010 (co-author); The fundamentals of education, Vol. I, Pro Universitaria, București, 2010 (coord.).

Gheorghe STOICA

Ph.D. professor at the University of Bucharest, and a principal scientific researcher at the University of South-East Europe Lumina (Faculty of Economic and Political Sciences), Bucharest. His bibliography includes, among other works, the following books: Intelectualii și politica, ISPRI, Bucharest, 2007; Concepte, idei și analize politice, Editura Diogene, București, 2000; Machiavelli, filosof al politicii, Editura Științifică, București, 2000 (translated by the Italian Publishing House Città del Sole, Napoli, 2003); Cultură, umanism, pace, Editura Militară, București, 1989; Gramsci, cultura și politica, Editura Politică, București, 1987; “Il populismo in Romania”, Democrazia e diritto, No. 3-4, 2010. He is the author of over 150 articles and studies published in Romania, as well as abroad. He is a visiting professor at the University La Sapienza (Rome), the University Roma 3, the University “L’Orientale” (Napoli), the University of San Marino, and the University of Tarragona.

Adrian-Marius TOMPEA

Ph.D. Candidate in Sociology at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University from Iași. He is Assistant professor at Petre Andrei University from Iași (Faculty of Political and Administrative Sciences). Some of his publications are: “Raporturile dintre politică şi morală în concepţia lui Petre Andrei”, Revista Transilvania, No. 11, 2011, pp. 67-72; “O analiză contemporană a fascismului” (Sfera Politicii, No. 160, 2012) – Book review (António Costa PINTO (ed.), Rethinking the Nature of Fascism: Comparative Perspectives,Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2011); “Coordonatele populismului în România postcomunistă” (Sfera Politcii, No. 155, 2011) – Book review (Sergiu GHERGHINA, Sergiu MIŞCOIU (eds.), Partide și


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personalităţi populiste în România postcomunistă, Editura Institutul European, Iași, 2010).

Andreea ZAMFIRA

Ph.D. in Political and Social Sciences at University of Bucharest and Université Libre de Bruxelles. She is lecturer at the University of South-East Europe Lumina from Bucharest (Department of International Relations and European Studies), associated researcher at CEVIPOL (Center for the Study of Political Life) from Brussels and associated teacher at the University of Bucharest (Faculty of Political Sciences). She is the author of the book Une sociologie électorale des communautés pluriethniques, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2012 and of several articles and book chapters on interethnicity, political parties and voting behaviour.


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Mandatory Submission Guidelines

I. ARTICLES

Each article will be accompanied by: Last name and forename (Institutional affiliation)

E-mail address - Abstract (no more than 15 lines, in English – including the title); - Mini-CV (in English, of no more than 10 lines, specifying the contributor’s

scientific titles, his/her institutional affiliation, the titles of his/her most important publications);

- Keywords (in English, no more than 5).

Important: Each article should contain an Introduction and Conclusions. General recommandations:

- The desirable dimension of an article is of 40.000-50.000 characters, spaces included (without footnotes).

- The texts shall be written in Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf), in 12-point Garamond font, using 1.0 line-spacing. The footnotes shall be written in font 10, using 1.0 line-spacing.

- Margins: 2.54 cm. (bottom, top, left, right). - Paragraph indent shall be of 1 cm. - All quotations in the text that exceed 3 lines shall be written in font 10 and shall

constitute distinct paragraphs (in italics, with quotation marks). In this case the indent shall be 1 cm (left/ right). The quotations should not exceed 7 lines.

- A maximum of 3 headings are accepted in structuring the paper. Example: 1. CHAPTER; 1.1. Subchapter; 1.1.1. Sub-Subchapter.

- English quotation marks shall be used in the text: “the meaning of ’Nation-building’ in Anderson’s book”.

- Use the specific regime of capital letters in the titles (Ethnicity and Electoral Politics). - The punctuation marks that shall be followed by a blank space are , . ? ! : ; - The one preceded and followed by a blank space is – - The footnotes shall be numbered from 1 to n. -

Quotation system (Footnotes):

The order of the elements of a cited paper is the following: - Volumes: author (Arend LIJPHART), title (in italics), publishing house, town, year, page/ pages (p./ pp.) - Articles: author, title of the article (with quotation marks), title of the journal (in italics), Vol., No, Year, pp. - Chapters in collective volumes: author, title of the chapter (with quotation marks), in, the coordinator’s/ publisher’s name, (ed.)/ (eds.), title of the volume (with quotation marks), publishing house, town, year, pp.


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- For on-line sources, the afore-mentioned order shall be used: Author, Title..., Publishing house, place of publication, Year... . At the end the link shall be placed in square brackets [...].

Note: In case the publishing house or the publication place is not specified, write n.p. (i.e. “no publisher”/ “no place”). In case the year when the work was published is not specified write n.d. (“no date”).

Example: Arend LIJPHART, Electoral Systems and Party Systems. A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-

1990, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 80-90. Iain McLEAN, Arnold B. URKEN (eds.), Classics of Social Choice, The University of Michigan

Press, Michigan, 1995, p. 70. Giulia SANDRI, Carlo PALA, “L’impact du processus de régionalisation sur le système

politique et de partis italien”, in Jean-Benoit PILET, Jean-Michel DE WAELE, Serge JAUMAIN (eds.), L’absence des partis nationaux: menace ou opportunité, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 2009, pp. 97-125.

Antoine ROGER, “Economic Development and Positioning of Ethnic Political Parties: Comparing Post-Communist Bulgaria and Romania”, Southeast European Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002, pp. 20-42.

Repetition of bibliographic references: - If one and the same author appears in successive notes and is quoted with a different paper, starting with the second note use Idem. - If the same paper is cited in successive notes, starting with the second note, the reference shall be Ibidem. - Starting with the second bibliographical reference to one and the same paper, but in non-consecutive notes, ...cit./…cit. (lat., citato) is recommended to be used.

Examples: 1 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, New York & London, 1983. 2 Ibidem, pp. 9-24. 3 Pierre BOURDIEU, The Field of Cultural Production, Polity, Cambridge, 1993. 4 Idem, Ce que parler veut dire. L’Économie des échanges linguistiques, Fayard, Paris, 1982. 5 Antoine ROGER, “Economic Development and Positioning of Ethnic Political Parties: Comparing Post-Communist Bulgaria and Romania”, Southeast European Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002, pp. 20-42. 6 Benedict ANDERSON, Imagined Communities…cit., p. 145. 7 Antoine ROGER, “Economic Development and Positioning...cit.”. Structure of bibliography: - The works shall be enumerated in alphabetical order. - The last name of the author (in capitals) shall precede his forename (in lower-case letters). - On-line sources that cannot be ordered alphabetically (the name of the author is missing), shall be mentioned at the end of the bibliography. - The names of the publication places of the cited works, others than cities belonging to English speaking countries, shall not be translated into English (Write for instance București, Wien,... ).


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Example: LIJPHART, Arend, Thinking about Democracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice,

Routledge, London & New York, 2008. MAYER, Nonna, PERRINEAU, Pascal, Les comportements politiques, Armand Colin, Paris, 1992.

II. BOOK REVIEWS

- The reviewed works should be recent (published no more than 4 years ago). - The recommended dimension of a review is of 3-4 pages (between 8.000-11.000

characters, spaces included). - The reviews shall be written in Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf), in

12-point Garamond font, using 1.0 line-spacing. The footnotes shall be written in font 10, using 1.0 line-spacing.

- The quotations in the reviewed paper shall be followed by the reference to the page/Example: (pp. 17-21).

- The book reviews shall be accompanied by the bibliographic description of the reviewed paper (author/ authors, title, publishing house, town, year, number of pages). Example: Tom GALLAGHER, Romania and the European Union: How the Weak Vanquished the Strong, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2009, 304 pp.

III. ESSAYS, INTERVIEWS, ARCHIVES, CHRONOLOGIES, EVENT RUBRIC

- The recommended dimension is between 10-20 pages (approximately 30.000-55.000

characters, spaces included). - They shall be written Microsoft Word (.doc) or Rich Text Format (.rtf), in 12-point

Garamond font, using 1.0 line-spacing. The footnotes shall be written in font 10, using 1.0 line-spacing.

Authors are fully responsible for the accuracy of all data in their contributions to this journal (articles, book reviews, etc.) The Journal is exonerated from juridical responsibility.

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Sout-East European Journal of Political Science, no. 1, vol. 1, 2013

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Transcript of Sout-East European Journal of Political Science, no. 1, vol. 1, 2013