Transcultural Studies, 4 (2008), 13-26.12 Transcutrural Stlldies

Pantocrator. This refers to the separation of the one Sophia into two: a primeSophia in heaven, and a secondary one wandering through the lower worlds.The period in which this pieture was first conceived is uncertain, the earliestexamples being from the early sixteenth century. But the motif was probablyinvented in Palaeologian times, perhaps under the influence of Monophysite-Nestorian ideas, which flourished for instance in the Caucasus, or of Jewishmysticism. It has considerable importance, however, because it seems that theicon of Christos-Sophia influenced Russian Sophiology of later times.

Sophia, wanderer and bridgeIn all cases Sophia stands between the Divine and the cosmos of the

humans. That causes her double nature and her movements: her dance andwanderings as weil as her mediating. Sophia is thus the bridge that links theLight or Divine and the lower worlds, the human, and even the darkness.Sophia is the bridge over which the upper and the lower communicate. But asthe tension weakens between the Divine and the human cosmos, the morethese are only thought of as opposites, and the less space there is for Sophia tomove and to mediate through her double-nature.

That conditions the other wandering of Sophia, her wandering from onephilosophical or religious tradition to the other. All the traditions mentionedhere have derived major components of their teachings from Sophia, who hasthereby become a bridge between these traditions and cultures. But none ofthese "sides" in the end wanted to give her a permanent dwelling, and even the"philosophers" finally accepted her only as philosophia. And so in thisrespect, too, Sophia is wandering, wandering between the traditions andteachings that she has touched, but precisely by this wandering, this twofoldwandering, she remains a bridge.

Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Seiences and Arts, Brussels /University of Hildesheim

THOMAS KLlBENGAJTIS

SOPHIA IN SCHELLING'S WORK: FROMDIVINE WISDOM TO HUMAN SCIENCE

Descartes, Kant and Fichte as introductory path to Schelling's conceptionof the Absolute

For Schelling, human wisdom means taking part in creating life of the Ab-solute where wisdom, as God's first potency, dweils, and from where it startsto work in and through the world. Therefore, in order to depict Schelling'sdoctrine of wisdom, we first have to outline his conception of the Absolute[das Absolute], followed by the doctrine of potencies and concluded by thetheory of Wissen, that is, knowledge. The idea of wisdom will be present onevery stage of these considerations. However, in order to achieve a synthesis,one has to start with the analysis.

It is stated that every great philosopher has had only one essential ideawhich they later developed in a system. The Leitmotiv of Schelling's system,even if he is said not to have developed one,' is the idea of the Absolute. It isal ready sketched in his earliest work, 2 where he tries to solve aporetic diffi-culties resulting from the Cartesian, Kantian and Fichtean subjectivist-idealistic approach.'

Descartes' / as the lynchpin of modern philosophyDescartes located the ground of reality and thought in the subject's flow of

consciousness, if one may translate the famous cogito ergo sum in such afashion." In his methodological skepticism, borrowed from Augustine's "sienim fallor, sum,"s Descartes reckons that even if the subject doubts every-thing, he cannot doubt his own activity of doubting. From this point of view

I. 1. Kirchhoff, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Sche//ing (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt,1988), p. 58. Xavier Tilliette, one of the foremost Schelling experts of the twentieth century, re-gards in Schelling's main work his philosophy not as a system, but as "philosophy in the rnak-=s" (philosophie en devenir). See X. Tilliette, Sche//ing. Une philosophie en devenir, 2 vols.(Paris: Vrin, 1970).

2. Vom ich als Prinzip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen(1795) .

. 3. SChelling's philosophy as the overcoming of Kantian philosophy is depicted in M. Frank,Eine Einführung in Schel/ings Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), pp. 23-47.

4. Descartes, Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison et ehereher la verite dansles sciences (Paris: Vrin, 1987), pp. 31-32 (IV. I according to different Descartes editions).

5. Augustinus, De civitate Dei, Liber Xl, cap. XXVI, in B. Dombart and A. Kalb, eds, CorpusChristianorum (series latina) 48 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1955), pp. 345-46.

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he construes the proof for the existence of God as a being more perfect thanthe doubting subject." Since the existence of the subject is self-evident and theexistence of God results from the imperfection of the first, it is the existence ofthe world which should be proved. According to Descartes, the subject canonly be sure of ideas and notions contained in his reason. At least so me ofthem have to be true, because God, being perfect and veracious, would notplace entirely false ideas and not ions into the human mind.' Hence, withoutthe certitude of God's existence nothing extemal to the subject's mind can beproven. It is essential to emphasize this idealistic and subjectivist tuming pointin the history ofphilosophy. According to Descartes the I is the substance.f By"substance" he means, in line with the scholastic tradition, something whichstands for itself and exists in itself," contrary to the accident which exists insomething else.'o Certainly nobody before Descartes doubted that, for in-stance, a single human being or a single chair is a substance. However, sub-stance, understood as a single flow of consciousness, independent from thebody - since Descartes rejected the testimony of the senses, and independentfrom the extemal world, which could be a work of a malignant demon - issomething crucially new in the history of philosophy. Hence, according toDescartes, substance is nothing which exists outside the perceiving I assomething independent from it. It is, therefore, only the I that can define whatis real or unreal. Whereas in the pre-Cartesian epoch nobody, following moreor less the sensual cognition, truly doubted the reality of the world, since Des-cartes the world has had to ask the subject's permission to enter into its mind.Even the epistemic solutions of ancient Skepticism - such as the suspension ofjudgement [epoche], which resulted from the equal contrariness of the givenopinions [izosthenes diafonlas - aimed only to help individuals achieving theirpeace of rnind [ataraxia], not to question the reality of the extemal world.Contrary to the Cartesian subjectivist skepticism, the ancient Skepticism was arealistic one. According to the latter doctrine nobody should worry about a re-ality he cannot properly conceive, which, however existing independentlyfrom the subject, exerts influence on it.

Kantian division ofrealityImmanuel Kant begins his theory of Pure Reason with an analysis of the

Cartesian point of view, according to which we have only access to ideas andnotions of our own mind. Hence, for Kant, "pure" - a priori - means "inde-

6. Descartes, Discours, pp. 33-36 (IV. 4-5).7. Ibid., p. 39 (IV. 8).8. Ibid., pp. 32-33 (IV. 2).9. Cf. Aquinas, "Summa theologiae. Pars prima, Queastio 3, Art. 5 ad l(substantia enim est

ens per se subsistens)," in R. Busa, ed., S. Thomae Aquitatis opera omnia, 2 (Stuttgart-BadCannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), p. 189.

10. /bid., "Summa theologiae. Pars secunda, Q. 53, Art. 2 ad 3," p. 422.

Sophia in Schelling's Works: From Divine Wisdom to Human Scicnce 15

pendent from experience."!' Experience - according to the philosopher fromKönigsberg - implies no necessity. In regard to experience we have to say thatwe did experience things in this concrete way until now, but we cannot claimthat nobody, nowhere and never will experience them in a different way.Therefore, the inductive method does not comprehend all cases, but only thepercentage examined until now.12 Hence, experience cannot sufficiently serveto develop science, since it has to contain universal and necessary proposi-tions. For these reasons Kant developed his own theory, which did not start itsepistemological approach from the experienced things, but from reason. Thiskind of philosophy Kant called "transcendental.r'':' Since, according to him,things outside reason [die Dinge an sich] are in-cognizable," we do not expe-rience things outside our minds directly, but only through representations, in-tuitions [Anschauungen] and categories ofreason. "We necessarily attribute tothings a priori all the properties which constitute conditions under whichalone we can cogitate them," writes Kant.15 The subject is therefore active notonly in reading, but also in creating the reality which is always its subjectivereality. No objective reality exists as such, nevertheless the objectivity ortrans-subjectivity of knowledge is granted by the sameness of the subjects'categories. The Kantian division of reality in representations and things inthemselves shifted the ontological center of gravity to the I, since its mentalcontent is, in a way, more real than the experienced things.

Fichte 's way from the individual I to the Absolute IThe land the Kantian approach form the starting point of Fichte's philoso-

phy, called by himself the Wissenschaftslehre - "theory of science" or "doc-trine of scientific knowledge." Fichte described his own philosophical accountas "nothing other than the Kantian philosophy properly understood.r''" WhileKant ascribed the form of things to the subject, as its categories, and the con-tent of things to the influence they exert on the subject, Fichte claimed that theform and the content of things are only the products of the I's mental activ-ity.17 The reason for this assumption was a practical one. Fichte maintainedthat idealism was the only philosophy compatible with freedom, contrary to

11. Irnmanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Introduction I, in Kant-Werke (Berlin: Re-imer, 1904), p. 45.

12. Ibid., Introduction 2, p. 47.13./bid., p. 63.14.lbid., pp. 27, 78.15. Ibid., p. 26.16. D. Breazeale, "Fichte and Schelling: The Jena Period," in R. C. Solomon and K. M. Hig-

gins, eds, Routledge History 0/ Philosophy, The Age 0/ German Idealism (London and NewYork: Routledge, 1993), p. 149.

17. W. Röd, Der Weg der Philosophie von den Anfängen bis ins 20 Jahrhundert. ZweiterBand /7. bis 20 Jahrhundert (München: Beck, 1996), p. 214; cf. P. Baumanns, 1. G. Fichte. Kri-tische Gesamtdarstellung seiner Philosophie (München: Alber, 1990), pp. 56-60; D. Henrich,Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio KJostermann, 1967), pp. 10-16.

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dogmatism, which made men Ha product of things't'" since, in dogmatism,things - that is, the nature outside the I - are ruled by determinism not byfreedorn." Assuming that these detennined things worked on the I, dogmatismhad to conclude that they cause, or at least influence, the I's decisions whichare made on grounds of the acknowledged reality. Consequently tbe I, beingruled by things and consequently by the determinism to which they are sub-ject, would not be free, which is to say, capable of making etbical choices forwhich it can take responsibility. However, freedom is a fact. It is tbe principlefrom which human duties derive and society and state are formed. Therefore,we have to assume that the I is independent from exterior influences and inde-pendent from everything but itself. But what about the I's representations[Vorstellungen] and experiences [Erfahrungen]? Fichte did not reject tbeir re-ality, but in his early period he recognized them as deriving from the activityof the I.

Fichte maintained that we are aware of ourselves before we become awareof things and therefore, following Descartes, the I's self-awareness is its pri-mordial fact/act [Tathandlung]?O Thus, when Fichte writes that "the I freelyposits itself as 1,',21by "positing" [setzen] he means that the I considers itselfas real.22However the self-awareness of the I presumes its "subjective unity"(subjective Einheit),23 which supposes arealm where representations, formingthe subject and predicate of a proposition, are connected. According to Fichte,by saying "the sky is blue" we in fact mean: "the I, where the representation ofthe sky abides is identical with the I, where the representatiori oftbe blue colordwells." Because tbe I recognizes the sky's blue within the I as a unity, wbichemerged from two representations (color blue and sky), Fichte can shortenevery proposition to "I = L" 24Tbis principle, expressed in logical terms as (A= A), is the first axiom of Fichte's entire Wissenschaftslehre/? Since the I ispresent in every proposition, as a primordial principle of cognition, every ex-

18. 1. G. Fichte, "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre [1794]," in R. Lauth and J.Jacob, eds, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Stuttgart-BadCannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1965), 1.2, p. 280.

19. J. G. Fichte, "Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten," in Lauth and Ja-cob, eds, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, 1.3, p. 36.

20. Fichte, "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre," pp. 255-56.21. Jbid., p. 259.22. Röd, Der Weg der Philosophie von den Anfängen bis ins 20 Jahrhundert. Zweiter Band

17. bis 20 Jahrhundert, p. 216; Baumanns reads "setzen" as "state" [feststellen], "identify"[identifizieren] or "give reasons" [begründen). Cf. P. Baumanns, 1. G. Fichte. Kritische Ge-samtdarstellung seiner Philosophie, p. 67.

23. J. G. Fichte, "Eigene Meditationen über ElementarPhilosophie. Logik der ElementarPhi-losophie," in Lauth and Jacob, eds, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, 11.3, p. 21.

24. Fichte, "Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten Philosophie," inLauth and Jacob, eds, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, I. 2, p. 139; Fichte, "Grundlage der gesammtenWissenschaftslehre," p. 255.

25. Fichte, "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre," pp. 255-64.

Sophia in Schellings Works: From Divine Wisdom 10 Human Science 17

perience can be explained only in, through and by the 1.26 But what does the Iexperience? Fichte answers: the non-I [das Nicht-Ich],27 by w~ich he meansthe world, other people, life circumstances, in one word everything beyond theI itself. It is the second axiom of Fichte's system, expressed also as A * _A?8However, since according to Fichte, the I cannot be limited by anything out-side itself, which would be incompatible with its freedom, the I posits the non-I within itself. 29Thus Fichte can claim: "Everything that exists, exists only in-sofar as it is posited in the I. Besides the I there is nothing.v'" However in or-der to avoid a contradiction, which would occur by assurning that "two oppo-site things could be united in one,,,31Fichte introduces, in his early writings,"something third" "wh ich partly corresponds with the one, being at the sametime contrary to the other.,,32In his logical writings he calls it C and describesthe logical relation as: C * AUe * _A?3 In the non-logical writings Fichtecalls C the absolute I [das absolute Ich],34 by which he means a "somethingthird" that forms a hyper-unity, in which the land the non-I can dwell withoutmerging. While in his early writings Fichte considered the absolute I assomething that forms human subjectivity, in his later period he conceived it ina very broad sense as God or the Absolute itself. The Absolute I, called by thelate Fichte das Fürsichsein - that is, "being in itself' - appears as somethingobjective beyond the different, individual Is forming their ontological founda-tion.35The step from the individual I of the early period, wbich contained eve-rything within itself, to the Absolute I, of which the individual I is only apart,was made by Fichte to save the absoluteness and certainty of knowledge [Wis-sen].36 Knowledge, in order to be knowledge, has to be one and tbe same foreverybody, which means that its object has to be outside the individual I.Therefore the late Fichte placed the ultimate cause of knowledge and realitywithin the Absolute I - the Absoluter" He considered it the supra-individualreason that posits itself within the rnind of the individual I and tberein creates

26. J. G. Fichte, "Versuch einer neuen Darstellung des Wissenschaftslehre [1797/98]," inLauth and Jacob, eds, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, 1.4, p. 186.

27. Fichte, "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre," p. 266.28. lbid., pp. 264-67.29. Jbid., p. 277.30. Jbid., p. 99.31. Fichte, "Eigene Meditationen über ElementarPhilosophie," p. 31.32. Jbid.33. Logical deduction can be found, for instance in Fichte, "Eigene Meditationen über Ele-

mentarPhilosophie," pp. 36-66.34. Fichte, "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre," pp. 271-72,279.35.1. G. Fichte, "Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. Aus den Jahren 1801-1802," in Lauth

and Jacob, eds, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, pp. 149-72.36. Jbid., pp. 197-98.37. More about Fichte's late philosophy, see W. Janke, Vom Bilde des Absoluten. Grundzüge

der Phänomenologie Fichtes (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993).

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. d . f hi 38representations an expenences 0 t mgs. Consequently the individual [ be-comes the manifestation of the Absolute, wh ich is the true "being in itself'[An-sich].39 Since the Absolute creates representations of things within themind of the individual I, the things themselves are outside the individual I,existing within the Absolute. lt is crucial to mention that the late Fichte redis-covered, in a roundabout way, dogmatism - that is, realism - earlier rejectedby Kant and later by the young Fichte hirnself. Since humans can recognizethe absolute knowledge and the Absolute, because he or she participates in it,reason is capable of metaphysics. Consequently, God can be proven by theo-retical reason and ceases to be only a postulate of the practical reason, as Kantclaimed. It is interesting to observe that the late Fichte retumed, through Kan-tism and his own idealism, to a modified view of Spinozism - the philosophyof his youth. It seems that also in regard to some philosophers the Frenchsaying proves true: on revient toujour ci sa premiere amour.

Schelling's conception of the AbsoluteIt was Fichte's idea of the Absolute I that gave Schelling the impulse to de-

velop his own doctrine of the Absolute." Contrary to the early Fichte, whomaintained that the self-conscious I must be the originating act and generativematrix of the entire philosophical system, Schelling claimed that the I has tobe seen as a result of the Absolute-I (in Fichte's terms), or of the Absolute[das Absolute], or the Unconditional [das Unbedingte] in Schelling's ownterminology. It is important to note that Schelling's entire philosophy has twomain objectives. The first of them was how to make subjectivism objectiveand idealism realistic; the second was how to reconcile the idea of the onecreative and immanent God with human freedom. Schelling's conception ofthe Absolute gives a solution to both these questions.

The starting point of his system is the assumption that "every knowledge[das Wissen], in order to be knowledge, has to have its own reality.?" In otherterms, "all knowledge is based on the correspondence between the objectiveand the subjective.vf By "objective" Schelling means - contrary to Fichte _

38. J. G. Fichte, "Bestimmung des Menschen," in Lauth and Jacob, eds, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, 1.6, pp. 294-96.

39. Röd, Der Weg der Philosophie von den Anfängen bis ins 20 Jahrhundert. Zweiter Band17. bis 20 Jahrhundert, p. 220." 40. Some parts of this general introduction into Schelling's philosophy I owe to A. Bowie,Fnednch Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling,' in E. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-

losophy (Winter 200 I Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win200 I/entries/schelling/. Themost recent literature survey conceming Schelling's philosophy from theological and mainlyGerman-speaking POIntof view can be found in A. Franz, "Wozu Schelling?: aktuelle Schelling-Literatur aus theologischer Perspektive," Theologische Revue, 98, 4 (2002), pp. 267-94.

41. Schelling, "Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie," in Schelling-Werke (Stuttgart-Augsburg: Cotta 1856-1861), vol. I, p. 14.

42. Schelling, "System des transzendenten Idealismus," in Schelling-Werke, vol, 2, p, 13.

Sophia in Schelling's Works: From Divine Wisdorn to Human Science 19

not the representations within the self-conscious I, but the objects outside it.::The philosopher clearly bases hirnself on the correspondence theory of truthwhen he argues that every knowledge, in order to verify or falsify itself, has. to

me to an ultimate point - the Realgrund - that is, "the real cause" - whichco . . Ikn Iroves whether or not the entire system is consistent. Since all partia ow -edge is dependent on other knowledge, the former is bedingt, or "condi-tioned," by the latter. The Realgrund of all knowled~e, however, has to be un-bedingt - "unconditioned," or absolute.45 If one abolishes the Realgrund as theUnconditioned, he has to assurne a regress ad infinitum, which me ans thatthere is no knowledge at al1.46 Therefore, the Unconditioned or the Absolute,as the object of absolute knowledge, has to "actualize and originate itself byits thinking. The principle of its essence and the principle of its thinking

. id ,,47should COIllCI e.According to Schelling, such an absolute object of knowledge is present

both in nature and in the subject's representations. By this solution Schellingbridges the Kantian gap between the representations of the subject and thingsin themselves, which is also a gap between idealism and realism. Schellingnever tires of repeating that the Absolute manifests itself as nature, from itsreal side, and as representations of the self-conscious I, from its ideal side.48

But it remains the same Absolute in every case, since every distinction be-tween real and ideal is only made by us. In the Absolute, however, real equalsideal and vice versa.49 This is the shortest version of Schelling's Identität-sphilosophie, or philosophy of identity. The free subject can establish, via hisrepresentations, an epistemic contact with the things in them, because both ofthem are parts of a hyper-unity called the Absolute. This approach sounds andis very Fichtean, but in Schelling's philosophical system, in contrast toFichte's, freedom does not exclude influence from the things. In Schelling'sopinion freedom is not opposed to determinisrn for the reason that freedom, asdemonstrated in the Freiheitsschrift, is placed in the Absolute itself.5o Conse-

43. Schelling, "Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie," pp. 16-17.44. The famous "veritas est adequatio intellectus et rei" by Thomas Aquinas (Oe Veritate, q.

I, a I) reads in Schelling's version: "One knows the true only. The truth however can be found inthe correspondence between the representations and their objects." Cf. Schelling, System destranszendenten Idealismus, p. 13.

45. Schelling, "Vom lch als Prinzip der Philosophie," p. 16.46.lbid.47.lbid.48. SChelling, "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," in Schelling-Werke, vol. I, pp. 162-63;

SChelling, "System des transzendenten Idealismus," pp. 13-16; Schelling, "Bruno, oder über dasgöttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge," in Schelling-Werke, vol. 2, p. 506; Schelling, "Vor-lesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums. Erste Vorlesung. Über den absolutenBegriff der Wissenschaft," in Schelling-Werke, 2: 546.

49. Schelling, "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," pp. 158-59.. 50. SChelling, "Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit,"In Schelling-Werke, 3: 435-36; 442-43.

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quently, in Sehelling's system, we do not have the ehoiee between the sub-jeet's freedom and the determinism of things. There is a botb-and relationbetween freedom and eausality ruling the world, sinee both of them are partsor appearanees of the Absolute, whieh is all in all.51 This Absolute reveals it-self to us in a eonseeutive and "linear" way, sinee we are unable to grasp themultiplieity it possesses at onee. The revelation of the Absolute ehiefly takesplaee in philosophy.V It is important to note that Sehelling, in speaking about"the Absolute," in fact means God. While in some parts of his work he usesboth terms synonymously, in others he prefers the philosophical term "the Ab-solute.,,53 This attitude resulted from his panentheistic conception of God,ca lied by Schelling himself, "pantheistic.v'" This conception, however, wascertainly not in line with the nineteenth century orthodox theism. Schelling, incontrast to the traditional theism of his times represented chiefly by Leibnizand Aquinas, did not conceive God as an entity [ens] among others, not evenas the highest, but as an hyper-entity, which he (Schelling) named the Hyper-Godhead [die Übergottheit],55 which includes everything in itself.56 It is note-worthy that Schelling, similar to Fichte, starting from the idealistic approach,reached the same conclusions as Spinoza.

51. /bid., p. 505.52. Cf. "Vorlesungen 6. Über das Studium der Philosophie insbesondere," in Schelling-

Werke, p. 602.53. Schelling's conception of theism has been subject of various researches. See e. g. X. Til-

liette, "L'absolu et la philosophie de Schelling," Laval theologique et philosophique, 41, 2(1985), pp. 205-13; E. Brito, "Trinite et creation: l'approche de Schelling," Ephemerides the-ologicae Lovanienses, 62, I (1986), pp. 66-88; A. Franz, "Schellings Philosophie der Offen-barung und die Theologie," Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 104,2 (1997), pp. 373-89; W. Ehrhardt,"Schellings Gottesbegriff," in A. Franz, W. Jacobs, eds, Religion und Gott im Denken der Neu-zeit (Padeborn: Schöningh, 2000), pp. 126-35.

54. Schelling calls pantheism "the doctrine of imrnanence of things in God," cf. Schelling,"Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit," pp. 435, 442. Hedistinguishes between his view of pantheism and others, e.g. Spinoza's, views, wh ich assume "atotal identification of God and things," cf. lbid., p. 436. According to Schelling, pantheism is thedoctrine offree entities, not things, derived from free God: Ibid., p. 436. Since freedorn in Schel-ling's view of God-world is granted, we cannot speak of pantheism, but of panentheism. Thevery term "pantheism" was probably first coined in 1829 by the German philosopher Karl Chris-tian Krause: id., Vorlesungen über die Grundwahrheiten der Wissenschaji (Göttingen: Dieterich,1829), p. 484 (cited in N. Gregersen, "Three Varieties of Panentheism," in P. Clayton, A. Pea-cocke, eds, In whom we live and move and have our being. Panentheistic Rejlections on God'sPresence in a Scientific World (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans, 2004), p. 28, n. 14). For this rea-son Schelling, whose Freiheilsschrift was printed in 1834 could not have known it.

55. Schelling, "Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Erlanger Vorträge," inSchelling-Werke, 9: 217.

56. Schelling, "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," p. 160; Schelling, "Bruno, oder überdas göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge," p. 464; Schelling, "Fernere Darstellungen ausdem System der Philosophie," in Schelling-Werke, 4: 445.

Sophia in Schelling's Works: From Divine Wisdom 10 Human Science 21

Wisdom as the first potency of the AbsoluteSince Schelling calls philosophy "the science of the Absolute" [Wissen-

schaft des Absoluten],57 the Absolute is the object ?f both'philosophy and. sei-ence. Because philosophy is considered by Schelling as love and pursuit ofwisdom,,,S8 wisdom seems to be superior to philosophy as "the aim,,59 of thelatter. We have then the up-down sequence: Absolute, wisdom and philosophyas science. The relation between wisdom and philosophy seems clear, but

hat is the relation between wisdom and the Absolute? Wisdom, Schellinganswers. is the first potency in the Absolute and as such apart of the divine

. If60being itse .In order to explain the meaning of "potencies" in Schelling, we first have to

outline his view of monotheism. Schelling claims that by saying "monothe-ism " we assurne that there is one and only one absolute and absolutely freeGOd, besides whorn there is nothing." However, if there would be only Godas the only entity, it would be pointless to speak of "monotheism," derivedfrom monos theos - "one God." There would be no other entity to be differen-tiated from God, nor anybody who could differentiate God from other entitiesor utter the word "monotheism." The term "monotheism" thus implies the ex-istence of other gods, not being God in the proper meaning, but gods of lesserquality or "hidden causes.,,62 Otherwise it would be sufficient to speak of"theism" instead of "monotheism." And the something besides God whoseexistence is implied in the terms "theism" and "monotheism" is creation.Since only God is God in the proper meaning - that is, the only and absoluteentity - creation, as something different from God, can derive only from Hirn."Monotheism as a dogma makes sense only insofar as God can enable the pro-cess of creation," says Schelling.i" Creation takes place, he continues, whenGod "posits the forms of his essence as potencies of an entity different fromHimself.v" In other words, Schelling situates "the other gods" or "the hidden

57. Schelling, "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," p. 162-63; cf. Schelling, "Philosophis-che Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit," pp. 444; 445.

58. Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung. 13. Vorlesung," in Schelling-Werke, 3: 740.59. Schelling, "Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit,"

p. 5 I I.

60. More about Schelling's theory of potencies can be found in E. Beach, The Potencies ofGod(s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1994), in particular pp.108, 117-27 and in Malte Dominik Krüger, Göttliche Freiheit. Die Trinitätslehre in SchellingsSpälphilosophie (Religion in Philosophy and Theology 3 I, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008), pp.123-128,163-182,191_218.

61. Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Ojfenbarung. 20 Vorlesung, W. Ehrhardt, ed.(Hamburg: Meiner, 1992), I: 125.

62. Ibid.; Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung. 13 Vorlesung," pp. 820-22, 829.63. Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung. 20 Vorlesung, p. 125.64. Ibid.: "Der Monotheismus als Dogma ist nur möglich in der Vorraussetzung jenes Aktes,

durch welchen Gott die Gestalten seines Wesens als Potenzen eines von ihm verschiedenen Seinsaußer sich setzen kann."

22 Transcultural Studics

causes," whose existence is necessary to use the term "monotheism " in theproper meaning, within the one and only God. God creates the world by split-ting Himself into three potencies, by which He initiates the process of crea-tion.65 This splitting within God was necessary in order to bring some "rno-tion" into His inner life. God, by dwelling within Hirnself before the splitting,was actus purissimus, and hence void of the motion necessary to initiate theprocess of creation.f" The first result of the splitting was the first potency,identical with wisdom, from which the other potencies took their beginning.I"

Wisdom is, Shelling writes, God's part and creature at the same time. In or-der to describe this ambivalent relation Schelling employs the Old Testamentfigure of wisdom - Sophia - as depicted in Proverbs 8:22-31. Wisdom was"rejoicing in God's presence" (Proverbs 8:30) as God's delight, which Godhad by dwelling in Himself/" God saw in wisdom "the prologue of His futurecreation" and these "views" were exactly the ideas meant by Plato.69 In thisfirst phase, the wisdorn-Sophia was God's self-reflection, "the mirror of divinepower." Hence, it could be conceived as something "passive and feminine" inGod.

70In the period before the creation God's attributes were identical with

His essence and at that time wisdom was identical with God's "power, intentand necessity.':" Wisdom was and is arealm where God can be God, wherethe Ideal [das Ideale] within God is identical with His Real [das Reale] andvice versa. "In the primordial wisdom [uranfängliche Weisheit] God realizesHirnself as ideal and archetype,,,72 says Schelling. Hence, God is wisdom parexcellence.73 As mentioned above, wisdom, as God's first potency, was con-stituted by His will as "the prius of becoming" [prius des Werdens], in orderto start the motion of creation within the motionless GOd.74 But as long aswisdom dwelled within God as His part, it was unaware of itself. Schellingcalls this state Urstand, or "primal stand.,,7) But as soon as wisdom started topart from God, wh ich occurred not against (as in gnosis) but according to

65. Jbid., p. 130.66. Jbid.; Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung. 13 Vorlesung," pp. 808, 816.67. Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung. 20 Vorlesung, pp. 131-32; Schel-

ling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung. 2/ Vorlesung, p. 133; Schelling, "Ideen zueiner Philosophie der Natur," pp. 269-273, 319-22; Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung. 13Vorlesung," pp. 801-29.

68. Schelling, "Die Weltalter," in Schelling-Werke, 8: 297, 307; Schelling, Urfassung derPhilosophie der Offenbarung. 20 Vorlesung, p. 132.

69. Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung. 20 Vorlesung, p. 131; cf. Plato,Tim., 50d-52a, Resp. X 596 b - 597 d.

70. Schelling, "Die Weltalter," p. 297.71. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums," p. 550.72. Schelling, "Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit,"

p.494.73. Jbid., p. 511; Schelling, "Über die atur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Erlanger Vor-

träge," p. 223.74. Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung, 1.2,I," in Schelling-Werke, 3.1: 302-03.75. Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung. 21 Vorlesung, p. 134.

23Sophia in Schelling's Works: From Divine Wisdom 10 Human Science

God's will, it became the self-aware reason [Verstand] of the motion of crea-. 76 From thisperspective wisdom as Verstand appears as the World Soulnon.

[Weltseele].

Wisdom as World Soul .Schelling adopts the Platonic conception of World Soul [Weltseele] which

. "the principle animating the world.,,77 World, consisting of organic and in-~rganic nature and human ideas, derives from t~e A~solute as an embodied

irit Schelling argues. Hence the whole world IS enlivened and ensouled bysp , . he inorzani d"the one common principle which, by fluctuating between t e inorgamc anorganic nature, is the first cause of its entire change, which contains the finalreason for its entire activity.,,78 World soul is wisdom which, after havingplayed before GOd,79 became "the catena between the supreme and the lowestin order to inhabit in men.,,80 As catena, or "the bond of things among eachother,,,81 wisdom is present on every level of creation. As Schelling writes, "itascends and descends the musical scale of entities.,,82 Since wisdom is presentin every part of life and nature, we can also claim that life, nature, world, theobjective course of things, in one word - being itself - is wise.83 According toSchelling we can only be wise because the objects we recognize outside our-selves are wise toO.84 Thus, wisdom ceases to be only a human virtue. It re-sides, rather, in world's objective course participating in God's wisdom.

Wisdom and clevernessAs many philosophers before him, Schelling differentiates between wisdom

[Weisheit] and cleverness [Klugheit]. In contrast to the Platonic-Aristoteliantradition, however, which considered prudence [Klugheit] as something posi-tive, namely as the practical wisdom, Schelling holds a negative view ofKlugheit. For that reason Klugheit and klug will be translated as "cleverness"and "clever," not as "prudence" and "prudent," which would be appropriate ina different context. Whereas the object of wisdom is always ethical, good andeternal, the object of cleverness, according to Schelling, is partial and oftenimmoral. 85 On this account, as already mentioned, cleverness is for him achiefly negative quality. According to Schelling, we call clever [klug] those

76.lbid.77. Schelling, "Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur," p. 142.78. Schelling, "Von der Weltseele," in Schelling-Werke, I: 443.79. lbid., p. 466.80. lbid., p. 298.81. Jbid., p. 466.82. fbid.83. Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung. 10. Vorlesung," p. 742.84. fbid.85. Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung," 2, 3, p. 202.

24 Transcultural Studies

people who primarily know how to avoid evil in their Iives." Wisdom on theother hand, being' something positive, does not start with the withdrawingfrom something negative, such as by avoiding evil. Wisdom, as the quest forultimate causes of reality, is a quest for something good, since in God - who isthe ultimate object of wisdom - real and ideal, good and wise coincide.V Theclever ones, contrary to the wise ones, look for the shortest and easiest way totheir temporary goals, regardless whether these are good ar wrong.88 Thus,Schelling concludes that cleverness tolerates purposes which are in fact nonesince that which is irnrnoral cannot be a purpose at al1.89Othe~ise we 'had t~accept that "the end justifies the means," with all irnrnoral consequences re-sulting from it. Since wisdom strives for the true, which is to say, the ethicalend, it cannot be attributed to those who aim either for irnrnoral ends or whoaim for moral ends but by irnrnoral means." In regard to cleverness, however,such an attitude is possible. By behaving in an irnrnoral way the clever ones donot see the true end - that is, that which should be [das sein Sollende] - butonly that which is possible [das Mögliche], here and now." It thus follows thatfor Schelling, cleverness is opportunistic and short-sighted, while wisdom isaltruistic and far-sighted, Contrary to cleverness, which often presupposes, in-volves and causes irnrnorality, wisdom requires, from people striving for it, anethical purity. "It gives itself to the pure souls, for the Pure itself reveals onlyto the pure ones,,,92 Schelling concludes.

Wisdom in knowledge, science and academicsAs already mentioned, according to Schelling nature (the Real) and ideas

(the Ideal) form a unity within the Absolute.Therefore, wisdom, as the firstpotency of the Absolute, after having parted from God, reveals itself as thecreated and creating nature (the Real) and as knowledge (the Ideal). The latteris adopted as ideas by human minds. Schelling describes a circular movementof wisdom, consisting of two, complementary vectors. In the top-downmovement, from the Absolute's side, wisdom tries to find itself within nature.In the second, bottorn-up movement, from the human side, wisdom returns tothe Absolute, after having fulfilled the work of creation and "idealization," bywhich Schelling means the intermediation of ideas to humans. Hence it fol-lows that the work of wisdom would be in vain, if nobody - that is, if no ra-tional beings - were capable of receiving it. "It was wisdom's excellent de-

86. Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung," Bd. 3, p. 740.87. Schelling, "Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit"

p.494. '88. Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung," 2, 3, p. 202.89. Jbid.90. Jbid.91. Jbid.

92. Schelling, "Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft," p. 246.

Sophia in Schelling's Works: From Divine Wisdom 10 Human Scicnce 2S

light and highest aim to ~how God man's ~rc.hetype," 93 says Schelling in ~e-rd to the time when wisdorn dwelled within the Absolute. Therefore, WlS-

ga . d ,,94 I·· If I ithi ddorn as "the principle of human rruno, can rea ize itse on y Wl m anthrough humans,95 since nature will never give a co-creative response to thewisdom's proposal.

Since wisdom abides in God, it also takes part in His Urwissen ("pre-knowledge,,)96 and Urbewußtsein ("pre-awareness,,).97 All human science andknowledge is valuable, therefore, only if it participates in wisdom and, conse-quently, in God's Urr:issen and Urbew.ußt~ei~.9~Philosop~~, clos~~t to wis-dom, is the highest science and acadernic discipline. In addition to the questfor wisdom," Schelling also calls it "science in its highest potency.,,99 ForSchelling, however, philosophy is much more than one academic disciplineamong others. It is "the quest for Urwissen,"lOo in which other academic disci-plines can also participate.l'" This is because Urwissen is the topos, where,ideally, all Wissen (science, knowledge) has its beginning. By Wissen Schel-ling means much more than the simple knowing of things. Wissen is for hirn"the quest for community with the divine being.,,102 Since all science [Wissen-schaft] leads to knowledge [Wissen], all academic disciplines therefore haveaccess to wisdom, wh ich, "by concealing itself in scholarship, ennobles it.,,103Only through and by wisdom something new - knowledge [Wissen] - devel-ops. In nature we can observe only areplacement of forms, when somethingdead or used is replaced by another, equivalent entity: animal by animal, plantby plant, atom by atom, and so on.104 According to Schelling, this formalrepetition hinders "the objective progress" of wisdom, 105for "only knowledge[Wissen] is the open point, where wisdom can search for itself and find it-self.,,106 Wissen as such is new and changeless at the same time. It is new, be-cause it becomes new in humans, who learn, discover or invent it. Wissen,however, being iden tica I with the eternal wisdom, stays changeless as weil.Hence Schelling can call Wissen "das beständig eins- und doch immer ein-

93. Schelling, "Philosophie der Offenbarung," 1.2, I, p. 303.94. Jbid.

95. Schelling, "Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft," pp. 244, 255.96. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums I," pp. 547-48.97. Schelling, "Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft," p. 244.98. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums I," pp. 547-48.99. Schelling, "Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen 3," in Schelling-Werke, 7: 474.100. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums I," p. 548.101. lbid.102. Ibid.

103. Schelling, "Über die Natur der Philosophie als Wissenschaft," p. 246.104. Jbid., p. 244.105./bid.106. Jbid.

I

26 Transcultural Studies

anderes-Sein" - "being-constantly-the-sarne and something different at thesame time.,,107

Schelling's Wissenschaftslehre - his "theory of science" or "doctrine ofscientific knowledge" - presents the different acadernic disciplines (philoso-phy, mathematics, science, law, history, medicine and art) as organic partici-

. . Urwi 108S ki f" h . f U· ,,109 thpation 10 rwtssen. pea ng 0 t e orgarnsm 0 rwtssen as e em-bodiment of "the organism of Wissen,,,llo Schelling claims that the true Wis-sen is only one.111 For that reason the different disciplines represent only anaspect of it. Since the Absolute, and the wisdom dwelling in it, reveals itself asthe Ideal and the Real, disciplines such as philosophy, mathematics and partlyart have to deal with its idealistic way of appearance. On the other hand sei-ence, law, history and medicine deal with the realistic side of wisdom. Despitetheir differences, however, all academic disciplines form the one "tree ofknowledge.t''V enrooted in Urwissen and thus in wisdom. The acadernicworld can get inspired and ingenious on1y by thinking in accordance with theAbsolute. I13Without participating in this higher bond a scholar is doomed tolive a hard-working, but fruitless life of a neuter bee. That would meana Iifewith plenty of work and hardship, but with a total lack of mental productivity,such as ideas. Schelling regards these species not that rare in the academicworld.114 It was something he probably experienced hirnself. May Schelling'sdoctrine of wisdom save us from living such a life? May it open us to creativ-ity, wh ich results from participation in divine wisdom?

Technische Universität Dresden

107.lbid.108. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums I," pp. 545, 547.109. Jbid., p. 611; Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums 7,"

p.612.110. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums 7," p. 613.111. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums 4," pp. 578-79.112. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums I," p. 545.113. Jbid., p. 547.114. Ibid.; cf. Schelling, "Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums 2," p.

563.

Transcultural Studies, 4 (2008),27-39.

FABIAN LINDE

SERGE] O. PROKOF'EV -A CONTEMPORARYREPRESENTATIVE OF RUSSIAN SOPHIOLOGY?

Sophia was one of the most intruiging concerns of Russian religi.ousphilosophy at the end of the nineteenth and the b~ginning of the twentiethcentury.1 Having appeared earlier in Orthodox iconography and chur~harchitecture, in the Western theosophical tradition, and in older esotencteachings such as the Kabbalah and Gnosticism, Sophia was transformed andintegrated into the modem Russian philosophical discourse through the effortsof Vladimir Solov'ev (1853-1900), regarded by some as Russia's greatestphilosopher? Emanating from his wor~, thi~ sophianic i~pulse sprea? indifferent directions and influenced Russian thmkers and wnters of the SilverAge. However, with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and the ensuing ideolo-gical conformity enforced by the party during the Soviet era, the trac~s. ofSophia become more scattered and difficult to i~entify. T?e C~nshanphilosophers who were active at the time of the revolution were either silencedor exiled the most notorious case being that of the "philosophy steamers"sailing frorn Petrograd in 1922. From then on, the philosophica1 Sophiologicalmovement was concentrated abroad, with the exception of Pave1 Florensky,who remained in Russia. Although it has been pointed out that the charactersof Lara in Boris Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago and Margarita in MikhailBulgakov's The Master and Margarita bear some resemblance to the SO?h!afigure.' it has thus far proven difficult to further trace her development withinRussia during the Soviet period. Mention should never-theless be made ofDaniil Andreev (1906-1959) and his metahistorica1 magnum opus The Rose ofthe World [Roza mira], wh ich, among other things, treats the m~stery. offemininity, and may be at least indirectly related to the Sophiologicaltradition.4

l. This article was originally presented as a paper at the international conference Sophia -TransclIltural Bridglet, June 27-28, 2007, at Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

2. The literature on Solov'ev is extensive. Suffice it to mention here arecent volume ofscholarly articles: Vladimir Solov'ev: Reconciler and Polemicist, Eastern Christian Studies 2,wn van den Bercken, Manon de Courten and Evert van der Zweerde, eds. (Leuven: Peeters,2000).

3. Per-Ame Bodin, "Boris Pastemak and the Christian Tradition," Forum Jor Modern Lan-guage Studies, 26, 4 (1990): 393 f. . .

4. Daniil Andreev Roza mira (Moscow: Mir Uranii, 2004 [1991]). For a good introducnonand analysis, see Mikhail Epstein, "Daniil Andreev and the Mysticism of Femininity," in SemlceGlatzer Rosenthai, ed., The Occult in Russian and Soviet Culture (Ithaca, NY and London: Cor-