Some metaphysical problems of Cassirer's symbolic forms

LEON R O S E N S T E I N

California State University at San Diego

SOME M E T A P H Y S I C A L PROBLEMS OF CASSIRER'S SYMBOLIC FORMS

Unseen the threads are woven into a whole, And an infinite combination grows.

Faust

If Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms were to be classified in traditional terminology, it could perhaps best be called a critical, functionally- monistic, objectively-relativistic, cultural idealism. The meaning of such a nomenclature as well as its essential inadequacies can o,nly be exposed, however, through an analysis of the structure and purpose of the concept of symbolic forms upon which Cassirer bases his philosophy. It will be seen that these forms area function of the human spirit, since they form the constitutive pre-conditions~ of all experience, knowledge, and activity.

What kind of function are these, forms ? Cassirer daims both that (in his early work) it is a way of seeing (it "may be said of any symbolic form... that in each of these is a particular way of seeing, and carries within itself its particular source of light ... it is not a question of what we see in a certain perspective, but the perspective itself") and that (in his later work) it is a way of acting and becoming, of expressing and existing. 1 Thus, hi s philosophy must be both an analysis of the "structures" of human consciousness per se and a "re-construction" of all that human history has concretely produced in the' form of what may broadly be termed culture. Cassirer himself refers to his philosophy as a critique of cultur 6 "an inquiry which will accomplish for the totality of cultural forms what the transcendental critique has done for pure cognition," and as a "phenomenology of human culture.," showing how Spirit renders the world intelligible to itself through the symbolic forms, which collectively constitute a unity of particular ways of seeing and acting at different stages of human thought. = Thus, "humanity attains its highest insight into objective reality only through the medium of its own activity and the progressive differentation of that activity. ''a Philosophy as comprehending the immanent relations of the symbolic forms to. one another will be a systematic philosophy of culture, the meaning, content, and signif-

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icance of whose forms is dependent upon the. nature o.f those relations. What Cassirer seeks is a unity of "transcendental meditation" in function of the symbolic forms with regard to their "grammar" and "index of refraction. ''* He seeks as well a unity of world and spirit, of the human universe (and not simply "intellectual comprehensiveness" as such), of man and culture as actor in context. Thus, the task of philosophy is the exposition and comprehension of the. function of symbolization in establishing the dynamic cultural community of mankind as achieved in the functional unity of the symbolic forms, and, consequently, the comprehension of the significance, content, relation, and meaning of these forms for mankind as maintained by that functional unity, s

II

If the influence of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel seems particularly apparent in the preceding introductory remarks, this is to expected. Indeed, I believe it will be most fruitful if, before going on to a fuller exposition and subsequent criticism of the symbolic forms, we note briefly which difficulties inherent in the philosophies of his two great predecessors Cassirer tries to avoid and why, which of their positions he accepts, which he rejects.

Beginning with Kant, we find the most basic similarity of approach - - namely, Kant's conceptio,n of epistemology as commencing with the notion of mind "making" experience through constitutive principles, his emphasis upon the necessity of analysing the pre-conditions and limits of knowledge rather than attempting the proof of a correspondence between knowledge and reality. That is, beginning with Kant's thesis that there can be no objectivity without synthesizing forms, Cassirer expands these to include a great variety of syntheses. "Facts" alone are never given and have no meaning, because they are nothing without context, without symbolic form. Cassirer equally maintains Kant's position with regard to the dependence of forms upon intuitions of sense. This mutual dependence is maintained in the Kantian manner through the developed notion of the "schema" (an earlier version of the symbolic form) which is both intellectual (as agree- ment with categories) and sensuous (as having actuality and significance with regard to objects). "The schema is the unity of concept and intuition, the common achievement of both factors. ''" Again, just as Kant took for

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granted the objective facts of science due to, its success, so Cassirer general- izes and accepts the factual givenness and employment of the many forms of culture. These latter somehow are held to justify, presuppose, postulate, or require the entire philosophical characterization of the formulating principles of mind with which he deals.

What Cassirer rejects in Kant is his rationalism and intellectualism, un- derstood as his lack of historical perspective, his indifference to. cultural evolution and its myriad manifestations. Calling for a wider application of the "critical method," he affirms that "cognition... is only one of the many forms in which the mind can apprehend and interpret being. ''7 Thus,

the Copernican revolution with which Kant began, takes on a new and ampli- fied meaning. It refers no longer to the function of logical judgment but ex- tends with equal justification and right to every principle by which the human spirit gives form to reaIity... The fundamental principle of critical thinking, the prindple of the "primacy" of the function over the object, assumes in each special field a new form and demands a new and dependent explanation.., in such a way as to disclose how in all of them there is attained an entirely determinate formation, not exactly of the world, but rather making for the world, for an objective, meaningful context and an objective unity that can be apprehended as such. 8

Likewise, Cassirer drops the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal, for, since symbolization does not permit a real separation of principle and object (of sense and the senses), the dualism of form and content is done away with. Removing, as well, the Kantian distinction between regulative ideals and constitutive principles, 9 we find that purpose also. is constitutive of the understanding of Nature with regard to the organic forms of life and that, consequently, the "whole as product" is constitutive of the understanding o.f culture with regard to human creations (and is therefore historical). Moreover, scientific and/or logical thii~ing, which Kant takes as his paradigm, is not to be thought of (as Kant believed) as an innate characteristic of all human understanding but itself as an historical achievement. lo

Despite the usual emphasis upon Kantianism both by Cassirer himself and his interpreters it seems that Hegel had an equal if not greater influence upon Cassirer's philosophy. Perhaps the' most pervasive mutual presupposi- tion is that the' ultimate subject of philosophy is the development of Spirit in the form of man. n Then, too, there is common view of the internal

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(subjective) as the expression and phenomenal comprehension of the ex-

ternal (objective) - - and vice versa. Coupled with the consequent rejection

of "things in themselves," the historical evolution of mind is conceived of more as taking place in spirit and life rather than as existing between in- quiring subject and fixed object. Again, just as Kant's schema can be seen as the precursor of Cassirer's symbolic forms, so equally can Hegel's concept of the concrete universal and the notion. Thus, Cassirer claims, for example, that symbolic forms are their own criterion - - the achievements o,f each one of which "must be measured by itself, and not by the standards and aims of any other. ''1:2 Then, too, as with Hegel 's dialectic of the notion, Cassirer

conceives of different symbolic forms as each claiming more than is its

"due" in the course of its historical development.

In the course of its development every basic cultural form tends to repre- sent itself not as a part but as the whole, laying claim to an absolute validity, not contenting itself with relative validity, but seeking to imprint its own characteristic stamp on the whole realm of being and the whole life of the spirit. From this striving toward the absolute inherent in each special sphere arise the conflicts of culture and the antinomies within the concept of culture. la

Complementary to this line of thought is the emphasis upon the historical evolution of forms and their possible presence in the present. As he states in his Essay on M a n :

Human works.., are subject to change and decay not only in a material but also in a mental sense.., they are in constant danger of losing their meaning. Their reality is symbolic.., and such reality never ceases to require interpretation and reinterpretation.., a new synthesis - - a constructive act... Behind these fixed and static shapes, these petrified works of human culture, history detects the original dynamic impulses.., and this is where the great task of history begins. 1~

Cassirer's conception of history is also parallel to Hegel 's insofar as he also conceives of the levels of culture (the growth of the spirit), which are

nevertheless historical, as contemporaneously present. Indeed, as we shall see, Cassirer seems to construct a double classification - - the modes or dimensions of the growth of spirit (the principles of differentiation or orientation within given symbolic forms) and the formative or constitutive categories or prindples inherent in all symbolic forms - - not unlike the classification Hegel uses in his philosophy of art, for example, wherein the phases of art (symbolic, classical, romantic) intersect with the various

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art types o.r media of embodiment (architecture, sculpture, poetry, etc.). Neither last nor least of Cassirer's borrowings from Hegel is his insistence upon the comprehension of the parts through the whole., for consciousness cannot posit anything without ultimately everything - - or at least everything within the complex of a given symbolic form. Yet this whole, he claims, is to be construed as a dynamic whole and a unity which is not a simplicity. 15

What Cassirer rejects in Hegel is the latter's conception of philosophy as having reached its end in the exhaustive synthesis which he himself had created. Cassirer conceives of his philosophy as a program to progress, a method to, discover and understand things as they are in the mode in which they appear. Rather than sweeping them in dialectic to become concrete for the castle of the Absolute, Cassirer opposes in principle philosophy's sub- sumation of other cultural forms to itself in such a way as to abrogate the autonomy and independent importance of each by allowing finally only the cultural form of "logic" to be autonomous qua form. Although for Cassirer, too, there exists a unity, it is not a substantial "One," but rather a community of function; and the whole is not such as to exclude its parts as integral and valid appearances. To insist upon a dynamic evolution of the symbolic forms in the same manner as did Hegel with his notions would coalesce the independence and unique structure of each, vitiate their peculiar "directions of creativity," and collapse and negate their internal value and truth. That is why, Cassirer claims, this "metaphysical formula must be transformed into a methodological one. ''16 (As will be seen, however, it remains questionable whether or not Cassirer himself is successful in his attempt to do this.) In any case, Cassirer implies that Hegel's failure on this account is due, first, to his being "too subjective" in forgetting that there must always be something besides mind in the form of givenness, and second, to his insistence upon the determinism of a dialectic bringing forth stages of knowledge in such a way as to make culture entirely contingent

upon necessary history.

III

Whatever a fuller exposition of the Kantian and Hegelian influences upon Cassirer's symbolic forms might disdose - - and it seems evident that Cassirer's philosophy is essentially and must be viewed essentially as an

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attempted synthesis of both these great traditions - - let us turn now to Cassirer's philosophy itself. We have seen how Cassirer is concerned, on the one hand, to deal with the "critical" and cognitive, to describe and analyse the workings of conception, maintaining the objectivity and logic of the Critique, without its narrowness, and yet, on the other hand, to deal with the evolutionary and cultural, to account for the equal truth of the historical and human, including the relativity of all the cultural forms, without re- ducing them. What, then, are these symbolic forms, cultural forms, regulative-constitutive concepts whereby Cassirer hopes to achieve this ? They collectively comprise a mediating function as organs of reality furnishing the regulative contexts of objectivity, constituting and conditioning what (in the various universes of perception, expression, and communication) is meant by "the thing signified" (the object), and thus exhibit "sense in the senses. ''17 And it is through this functional aspect of his philosophy - - rep- resenting the process of mind in material and material in mind - - that Cassirer attempts to avoid both traditional philosophical pitfalls of psycho- logism and ontologism. 18

How do these functions function ? How is it that "a variety o.f media will correspond to various structures of the object, to. various meanings for 'objective' relation"; that "knowledges frame their questions each from its own particular standpoint and, in accordance with this standpoint, subject the phenomena to a special interpretation and formulation"; that

every authentic function.., embodies an original formative power.., creates its own symbolic forms.., none reduced to, or derived from others.., each designating a particular approach in which and through which it constitutes its own aspect of 'reality' ?1,9

To answer this Cassirer sets up various categories or ways of approaching the subject. His prime concept, "symbolic form," covers in its functioning at least three areas. There are, first, the forms of culture proper (myth, art, religion, language, science, etc.). Second, there are what may be alternatively termed "constitutive forms," "categories," "symbolic relations," or "formative p.rincip.les" (space, time; causality, number, etc.). Then, third, there seem to be the three "modal forms," the historical stages, moments, dimensions, or levels of culture, "orientations" of the cultural forms whereby the latter can be shown to exhibit a continuous growth of spirit - - the expressional (affective-emotive), the representational (volitive-teleological- "common"), and the systematically-significatory or intellective-tbeoretical

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(scientific). Through these three general form functions, it is proposed, any phenomenon of nature or creation of culture can in principle be under- stood - - through some formative or constitutive principle by which it is constituted for the mind, on some modal level, and qua some symbolic (cultural) form in whose "world" it will find its definition and "live."

However, to my knowledge Cassirer never in fact systematically takes a phenomenon (material, object, experience, event) through all its possible meanings ("lives") so as to illuminate in a concrete and coherent way both its manifold appearances and the appearance of its manifolds. Let us therefore attempt to, choose a phenomenon and, interpreting it by means of two symbolic cultural forms qua one of its characteristics (i.e., "common" or "analogous" relations), at least point out what would seem to be taking place through some of the functions designated above.

Before taking a particular instance, however, let us outline the nature of this process in general. We begin with an experience or phenomenon, which, n.b., does not however exist as a "primary datum, T M and with a world or

context which does not exist in itself as a necessary and unique antecedent condition given. Rather, there exists always a function or structure of integration and differentiation operating upon the phenomenon. There is, more precisely, a reciprocity: through the "sensed" (object, experience) a world (manifold, complex) comes into, being; by "intending" a world the sensed itself has meaning ("sense"); and by the world intended the object is constituted in its particular objectivity. "What defines each particular is that in it the whole of consciousness is in some form posited. T M It (the object or experience) has a vectoral character, and "this precisely is the nature of a content of consciousness - - it exists only insofar as it immediately goes beyond itself in various directions of synthesis. ''22 This "part" expresses the whole of its context; yet the "whole is not obtained from its parts... does not originate in its parts, it constitutes them. T M Thus from the experience there arises one of a variety of points of view, each under the head of some symbolic form. This form will have its formative principles - - or set o,f categories, "relational forms," "original forms of synthesis," or "universal relations" - - each (or the totality) of which, though having its "own self-contained, formal law," will be viewed under the particular "index of modality' concerned. These formative or constitutive principles are said to be "indispensable wherever.., a manifold is to be broken down and articulated according to determinate forms"; whereas the modal forms

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lend a "common tonality" to the way in which all the "individual structures" are construed in the sphere of the symbolic form in which this articulation is effected. =4 In this way, the index of modality of a relation becomes its "meaning for the' whole" and will be involved in the motive of explanation of an experience; for the' "quality" of the relation - - "the particular type of combination by means of which it creates series within the whole o.f consciousness, the arrangement of whose members is subject to, a special law," as Cassirer calls it 2 ~ may function in different ways. And through the integrated relations thus posited under the given index o,f modality there arises in the constituting intersection of the symbolic form a "world picture."

In particular, let us take as an example the experience or phenomenon of lightning for our illustrated reconstruction of these functions. Let us attempt to apprehend this phenomenon under the two worlds (symbolic cultural forms) of myth and science with regard to the relation (i.e., under the constitutive form) of causality and in accordance with its emergent modal forms. From the point of view of the mythic consciousness (i.e., under the cultural form of myth), one of the constitutive (o.r relational) forms o.f the experience "lightning" - - namely causality - - is conceived (though impli- city) as having the quality of "succession" (an inherent character of the relation) under the principle of simple contiguity in time and space where all factors in general a~e actively present in the integration and expansion o.f the particular. 27 The value of this unique instance is especially of concern for the mythic consciousness. The relation's "index of modality" (the context of the relation and its meaning for the whole) under this symbolic form thus becomes the concern for a motivated efficacy guided by the implicit concept of an originating potency and will. Since the mythic consciousness perceives the drama of physiognomic characters in and through the relation of causality in this fashion, 2~ the cultural level (or dimension) of the modality (the orientation of the form) is the "expressive." The "expression-phenomenon" is "inherently sombre or cheerful, exciting or appeasing, frightening or reassuring. ''~9 An interpretation of the experience of this particular phenomenon in this mythic view, then, in the relation of causality, could well result in the concept "wrath of god." This in turn could (would, has) led to the world picture "all things are full of gods."

From the point of view of the theoretical consciousness, on the other hand, the relation of causality with regard to the experience "lightning" is conceived (here, presumably explicitly) as having the qualiey of succession

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under the principle of differentiation and limitation o,f particulars (here, diverse and not co-temporal or co-spatial). For the theoretical consciousness of especial concern is a rule, as the condition for the relation of specific factors in general. Thus, the index of modality of the relation here being the requirement of a stipulation of the means through which phenomena are constituted in experience, the theoretical consciousness reduces the phenomenon "to, certain universal conditions." Subordinating it "to that universal complex of conditions we call nature.., assigning a place to it within this complex, T M the cultural level o,f this index o.f modality here is the "systematically-significatory and intellective." In this "conception-phenomenon" the "moments which condition the order and structure of the perceptual world are grasped as such and recognized in their specific significance. The relations which on the former levels were, established implicitly are now explicated. T M An interpretation o.f the experience in the scientific view, then, in the relation of causality could well result in the concept "electromagnetic charge." And the parallel world picture might be "all things are determined in their becoming according to causal laws of which the laws of electrodynamics are an instance."

Cassirer distinguishes the "different" causalities (or, more properly, the different indices o,f its modality) as follows :

Mythical thinking is by no means lacking in the universal category of cause... This is evidenced.., by the mythical cosmogonies and theogonies... But mythical causality is distinguished from the scientific prindple of causality by the characteristic to which the opposition between the two concepts of the object ultimately reduces itself... ...In scientific thinking diverse phenomena are grasped as a unity and subjected to one and the same universal rule." This isolating abstraction, which singles out a specific factor in a tor complex as a "condition," is alien to mythical thinking. Here every simultaneity, every spatial coexistence and contrast, provide a real causal "sequence"... whereas empirical thinking is essentially directed to establishing an unequivocal relation between specific causes and specific effects, a=

Apparently, the possible number of formal variations for this phenomenon is indefinite. A similar explication could be made with regard to any formal relation or on any cultural modal level or within any symbolic form complex. So, for example, under the symbolic cultural form of the developed religion of the Greeks, the phenomenon of lightning might be conceived more concre~dy as "weapon of Zeus." In the aesthetic sphere (another

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cultural form), in a painting by Ryder, for example, or in the Sixth Symphony of Beethoven, different conceptions, different meanings of this phenomenon arise. And, in parallel order, depending upon the world (complex, cultural symbolic form) in which it occurs, different factors (constitutive and modal forms) become relevant o.r irrelevant to it. So, the world in which it occurs does not require of Zeus's thunderbolt that it be heard or o,f Beethoven's prograrmmatic dissonant percussions that they be mapped out in length, of lightning as a geometric configuration o,f hot gases that it be held sacred, or of an electrostatic charge' that it be a symptom of will.

Let us take yet another phenomenon, an artificial thing, a book. We may imagine the book to. appear as an object within the world of the mythic consciousness. Among its formative principles we may list "number." Number, though again having its "own self-contained, formal law," will be viewed here under the index of modality called the expressional or affective-emotive. The "meaning" or "quality" of number as a formative principle of the whole will be conceived as having the special characteristic of singularity. It wilt have the appearance, of being a "one and only"; and its especial concern or value for the mythic consciousness will be its holiness, its preeminence. An interpretation of the experience of this particular object phenomenon in the mythic view with regard to, its singularity could well result in the notion "the law of the land." This in turn co,uld lead to the world picture "divinity instructs mortals in their daily affairs." From the point of view of the theoretical consciousness, on the other hand, the relation of number with regard to the experience "book" may be conceived as having the quality of diversity. It will have the appearance of being one sample among many such codifications or concretizations of thought in language and writing. Its especial concern might be the truth value of its contents in comparison with other similar samples. An interpretation of the phenomenon in the scientific view, then, with regard to= this formative principle could well result in the notion "man produces books." And the parallel world picture might be. "books are manifestations of man's attempt to obtain and preserve truth."

In the. above examples I have attempted to, imagine or reconstruct hove Cassirer's forms could be shown to intersect at their "instantiatio,n" in order to reveal the structure and functional unity of consciousness as the representation of one content in and through another. It is precisely this type of functional analysis which would be consistent with Cassirer's metaphysic.

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"Metaphysic' should be taken guardedly, however, since. (as we noted in the foregoing discussion of Kant and Hegel) it is the traditional monolithic and rationalistic conception of Being as the ground of metaphysics to which Cassirer objects. Employing such notions, as symbol rather than ontological structure, vectoral (intentional) content within a relative context rather than objective data, function rather than substance, if Cassirer conceives an ontological ground for his philosophy at all, it is one which is entan- gled in manifold beings perpetually becoming rather than a fully integrated and articulated Being. Yet Cassirer does seek a functional unity and what seems (or should seem) most crucial to him is precisely this unity of function within a diversity of forms, an identity of phenomenal surd behind differences in its intentional possibilities. The critical question is - - Does he (can he) render such an account ?

IV

Do the symbolic forms hold together as Cassirer wishes and yet maintain their independence ? Does he face the same difficulties of Plato's "mixing of the forms" - - the substantial here replaced by the functional ? Is he not, in a more comprehensive way, "deducing" (against Kant's own injunction and as Kant himself nevertheless did) contents out of a prio~'i conditions - - or at least treating that which is empirically distinguished as somehow the consequence of an a priori distinction ? And, influenced by Hegel's evolutionism of spirit's progressive self-enlightenment, does he not propound a significant and unexplained bias towards certain of the "more developed" symbolic forms ? Let us attempt at least partially to. answer some of these questions and to account for the relevance of traditional metaphysical problems to Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms.

Given the preceding exposition of the functions of cultural forms, constitutive forms, and .modal levels, we may now discuss some of the problems inherent in this formulation. How are these functions and the components within them known - - directly through empirical investigation, a priori as preconditions, qua their position within the total system ? What is the essential (or functional) difference between them, since they are, as Cassirer claims, irreducible ?aa Have they a hierarchy ? What is its criterion ? A history ? Then what is its relevance to this hierarchy ? What is the

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number of each ? How definite are the ranges of each ? Ultimately all these questions must be answered before one can come to: understand how their interrelations form a unity or how Cassirer's philosophy forms a unitary system.

Let us begin with the functions of the modal level (the modal forms or dimensions of spiritual growth, as Cassirer calls them) - - the expressive, the representational, and the scientific-theoretical. Apparently these, are known and dinstinguished, not ,r priori, but directly through empirical investigation and through knowledge of their historical evolution and position within the entire, system. Hence, they are not invariant or necessary pre-conditions as such, but, rather, attitudes, modes (moods), possible transfigurations of experience. But Cassirer never goes so far as to say so, much less to say whether o.r not they are the only possible levels. Further, Cassirer gives no definite number o.f them (the theoretic, for example, has itself three stages - - mimic, analogic, and symbolic). Most important, however, there seems to be a difference and hierarchy between them according to their evolution based on the greater or lesser "objective representation" (the polarity of "sense within the senses") which they exhibit. Yet we are offered no, criterion for "objective representation." Further, with the mythic cultural form at one end and the scientific at the other, the cultural forms themselves tend to fall into the various modal levels through the progress of history. But, Cassirer claims, it is more than an historical progression from primitive to modern consciousness which has occurred in and through these modes. It is also psychological (from child to adult) and organic (from animal to human) development, a parallelism of ontogeny and phylogeny. But then it remains to be asked how truly we' now can exist as apprehending creatures in the expressive mode, for example. Can we react to myth, can we see in it, as did primitive man ? Could one ever know, in principle ? Cassirer seems to identify the "a-logical" with the "pre-logical" (particularly in Language and Myth); and so., presumably, anyone who, functions on the expressive level in the mythic world would have to, "grow up" or transverse millenia before he could comprehend Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Such a thesis of historically gro~anded hierarchy and evolution needs support which is not offered.

The internal problems of the cultural forms and constitutive forms are more acute. First of all, is there really a difference between them and what is it ? Are not the cultural forms also constitutive ? Charles HendeI, in his

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introduction to the English translation of Cassirer's The' Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, claims Cassirer "abolishes the Kantian disparity between the regulative ideas and constitutive forms - - all are constitutive. T M He notes that Susanne Langer agrees with this interpretation, whereas Carl

Hamburg disagrees, finding Cassirer "retaining a distinction between constitutive form and cultural form. T M This contradiction, however, seems to be incorrectly conceived. The cultural forms are constitutive, but that does

not make t h e m identical with the constitutive forms or make the latter a subclass of them. As we have already noted with regard to causality, for example, the relational form does constitute an experience with regard to

one of its aspects, bringing to it this specific continuity of series. But the kind of constitution of the experience by the cultural form is not of the same sort, for it brings to the experience a world of meaning valid for all

relations thus constituting "this possible" objectivity. Whether one wishes to call either of these functions regulative or constitutive is a matter of indifference - - neither is more real or necessary than the other.

But what about these constitutive or relational forms themselves ?

Unlike the case of the modal forms, Cassirer seems to think o,f these as being known strictly as preconditions, as the necessary or a priori invariants of all possible experience. Thus, though apparently not agreeing with Kant's

stipulation of the exact number or nature of these relations (most - - time,

space, causality, etc. - - are traditional) and though the "qualities" of each may vary with the modal and cultural forms, their function for conscious- hess remains essentially similar. In consequence they seem to manifest no hierarchy or history in themselves - - though of course, they progressively come to be more and more recognized for what they always were and are. They seem to, be the only set of relations possible. Cassirer refers to them as "ultimate logical invariants which lie at the foundation of every deter- mination," as "constituting the unity of consciousness as such and therefore just as well that of mythic consciousness and that of pure knowledge," and as "the necessary pre-conditions for all meaningful experience. T M What is supposed to be logically invariant is the "self-contained formal law" of the particular relation. But what precisely happens to this "invariant" under the shirtings and transmutations which occur through the indices of modality ? If, for example, the essential quality of causality is, in the mythic consciousness, an amorphous spatio,temporal contiguity and, in the scientific consciousness, a specific and unequivocal condition in accordance with a rule,

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what then remains invariant a priori in this relational form - - especially

since Cassirer believes that only the latter view of causality is genuinely valid of reality - - why are they both "causality" ?

The cultural forms, which (it seems) Cassirer conceives of as the symbolic

forms proper, raise similar, if more complex, questions. This is to be expected, because they are the combination, or better, the "intersection," of

the relational, and morals forms. The first difficulty concerns the knowledge we have of them. Cassirer, on the one hand, thinks of them as historically evolving, empirically discoverable divisions of functions o.f consciousness,

so that, as performing the self-emergence o,f consciousness, "each new

symbolic form.. , signifies a revelation of inner and outer. ''aT On the other

hand, he understands them as in some sense preconditions and a priori

classifications. Not "merely empirical," not reducible in any way to one another, they are "organs o,f reality" which is nothing apart from them. a* Thus, would they be known both (either) by position within the evolved system as found and (or) by that for which they must be necessarily the preconditions ? Or, are. they merely hypothetical postulates ? This ambiguity

might in part be explained by their dual aspects of modality and relational- constitutiveness - - but not entirely. The history, of the cultural forms of

language, myth, and art discloses (as Cassirer himself is the first to assert) that they all have a common origin in the mythopoeic consciousness of the primitive mind. Yet Cassirer never explains how the one time unity was as it was or why the forms separated and distinguished themselves, except to

state it as a fact (necessary or not we are not told) of the development of the self-realization of spirit. Further, we can well ask whether the cultural form of "art," for example, is the same as it was in (or would be to,) the primitive consciousness ? Apparently Cassirer believes so. But even after the distinction of the forms of science, myth, religion, and art had been

made at some theoretical point in history, I think it difficult to. maintain that these forms or worlds of apprehension were the "same" as now, even in so general a way as an attitude oir tuning of consciousness. Mnreover,

granting the evolutionary distinguishment of these forms into. more definite

areas out of some unity, this does not imply, as I think Cassirer would conceive it, that there is a destiny of progressive differentiation. Indeed, in the modern world there seems to be a reconvergence of cultural forms in many areas.

Considering, thus, the "mixing" of the cultural forms, the further

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question of their internal hierarchy arises. That is, if we grant definitive indices of modality for the relational within, say the cultural form of art, what about the internal differences of modality within the culturai form ? Is there a difference between the indices of modality in art in general and such particular arts as music and sculpture', between twelve-tone music and baroque music ? Or in science, is there a difference index of modality of (say) temporality between "science," and biology and geophysics and quantum mechanics ?

But how many forms are there, after all ? ls there a symbolic form of love, of baroque, of leisure, of hippydom ? Cassirer never makes it clear, though there seems to be a limit. But what is the criterion of this limitation; and what is the. criterion for limiting the scope of each ? Like Hegel, Cassirer says that the criterion of the truth of a symbolic form is internal. Where, however, without Hegel's Absolute, can Cassirer find the external criterion even for the number of symbolic forms ? Shall only the "most important" symbolic forms, the top section of the hierarchy, be considered true symbolic forms ? If so, then it must be asked what is meant by "importance," for what and to whom ?a9 Cassirer (early) seems to, think in terms of importance to. cognition for knowledge, and (later) in terms of importance to humanity for the service of mankind. But which of the forms wil fulfill either of these requirements ? Shall it be language, which is "most pervasive.," being basic to. all other symbolic fo~ms, as "an al~ embracing medium in which the most diverse forms meet" ?40 Shall it be art, which is the "richer, more vivid and colorful image o,f reality, and a more profound insight into its formal structure," and which in contra- distinction to. language and science ("abbreviations of reality") is an "inten- sification of reality.., a continuous process of concretion" ?*~ Shall it be science, which is "the last step in man's mental development.., may be regarded as the highest and most characteristic attainment of human culture.., and is the most important subject of a philosophy of man" ?42 Or shall it be some other, say, the. one in which most people, most of the time are happiest ? Cassirer seems clearly to favor science, for this is "the realm of pure meaning; and in it henceforth is grounded all certainty and con- stancy, all final truth and Knowledge. ''4a Yet Cassirer states at the outset that, regarding the symbolic forms in general, "no attempt is made to fit them into a single simply progressing series."44

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What emerges from all this is that Cassirer's attempt at a unity which is functionally homogeneous, historically cumulative, and substantially heter- ogeneous, is at least incomplete. Ultimately, this unity is a promise and a task rather than an accomplishment, for there remains a de facto multi- dimensionality. The symbdic forms are the ideal unification of that which is both a priori and historically contingent, just as in any symbolic instance there exists a polarity of formal and sensuous elements. And yet multi- dimensionality itself appears to. be necessarily the unity of Cassirer's philosophy, for "it is characteristic of the. nature of man that he is not limited to one specific and single approach to reality but can choose his point o.f view and so pass from one aspect of things to, another. ''.5 That is why Cassirer seeks in the symbolic % purely functional unity [which] replaces the postulate of a unity of substance and origin. ''4'6 Nevertheiess Cassirer presents us with an historical unity and cannot entirely avoid the substantial. 47 And though Cassirer does attempt to avoid Being, his symbolic function could be seen as "the ideal center" for "the conviction that the varied and seemingly dispersed rays may be gathered together and brought into a common focus. ''48 And since the unity is functional it is indeed an activity of creative process, 4~ not simply the effect, but the task of culture, its "common project" as the "expression of human spirit. T M For it is only as the community of mankind that the many "configurations towards

Being... are ultimately held together by the unity of meaning. T M In this sense is achieved the

task o4: demonstrating the unity of the spirits as opposed to the multiplidty of its manifestations, - - for the clearest evidence of this unib 7 is precisely that the diversity of the products of the human spirit does not impair the unity of the productive process, but rather sustains and confirms it. 5~

Hence, the "ultimate" in Cassirer's philosophy is the human spirit, for the human spirit as represented in culture is a variety, a functioning, a meaning,

a center, a task, and a unity. And now we can better understand Cassirer's reference to, the Heraclitean "lyre" at the close of the Essay on Man - - the unity of function being the harmonious chord plucked as part of a compo- sition in a given musical style as one of many harmonies and created by many tensions, and the musicality of the lyre itself being that through which all harmonies in all styles have become and do become present.

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Of course some of the general objections cited above to Cassirer's symbolic forms still hold. Ultimately it may be nothing more than Cassirer's bias towards "science," rationalism, and evolutionism which creates several of the difficulties and contradictions we have found there, causing him to assert that the most abstract and historically advanced form is therefore the most "human" - - and not art or myth which are only immediate, implicit, and non-cumulative unities. Likewise the existentiality of the individual and personal becomes subsumed in the historico-cultural unity, for as a critique of culture it becomes difficult to include the functions of the personal. Thus, for example, error, preference, and value cannot be dis- criminated or judged beyond the given symbolic form in which they appear.

In any case, what ultimately is most valuable in Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms is the fecundity of the functional notion of the symbolic form itself. Through it - - and its appreciation of a "perspectivism" and "relativism" not identical with "subjectivity" and "illusion" (however difficult these may be to specify) - - great and necessary breadth is allowed to knowledge and truth. Of no less worth is the continual emphasis upon the humanity of knowledge, the hopeful guarantor of an intelligibility without sterility and perennial progenitor of a creativity without indirection.

N O T E S

1 Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth, trans, by Susanne K. Langer (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), p. ~z (hereinafter cited as LM); Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans, by Ralph Manheim, I (New Haven: Yale University Press, ~955),

8o-8I (hereinafter cited as PSF); and Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New H a v e n : Yale University Press, ~944), P. 68 (hereinafter cited as EM).

2 PSF, I, 84; EMj p. 52.

3 LM, p. 57; cf., also, PSF, I, pp. 47, ~[~. 4 Cf. PSF, III, '3.

5 Ibid., I, ~4 . 6 Ernst Cassirer, Das ErkenntnisprobIem in der Philosophie und Wissenscha# der Neueren Zeit, UI (Berlin : Bruno Cassirer, :~92o), :~x.

7 PSI:, I, 73. 8 PSF,. I, 79-80. 9 At least in part - - we shall investigate this later. 1,0 Cf. EM, p. 207. 1:1 Cf. EM, pp. 67-68. 12 PSF, I, 9~. a3 PSF, I, 8~. Cf. particularly the Heraclitean "strife-lyre" reference in the last paragraph of EM. The problems of this "mixing of the forms" for Cassirer will be taken up later. 14 EM, p. ~85. a5 Cf. PSF. I, 98, ~o~; III, vi ; D~s Erkenntnisproblem, III, 364-65. 1~6 Cf. D ~ Erkenntnisproblem,, I, x6; III, 36~-77; and PSF, I, 83. 17 PSF, III, xo9. I t may as well be emphasized in advance that Cassirer never "proves" this.

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Rather , he of fers an overwhe lming ly comprehens ive and var ied weal th of in format ion on

this possibi l i ty . Of course, he cannot , on his own principles , offer such a " p r o o f . " 18 Cf. PSF, II , 2:5 .

19 PSF, I, 76"77. 2o Cf. PSI:, I, 274; I I , 1:2o. 21 PSP, I, qS. 22 PSF, I, 1:o4. 23 PSF, I, ~oa-1:o3. 24 PSF, I I I , ~3- 25 PSF, I, 95. 2,6 Any phenomenon would do, not only for scientif ic in terpreta t ion, but also for myth ic interpreta t ion. Indeed, every phenomenon "ca l l s f o r " one, if not all possible in terpreta t ions .

Cf. EM, p. 73- 27 PSF, I I , 43-59- 28 Cf. EM, p. 76; PSF, III , 524. 29 Cf. PSF, I I I , 85; EM, p. 78. 30 PSF, II , 49; III , ~48; LM, p. 27. 31 PSF, III , 330. 32 PSF, I I , 45-46 . 33 Cf. PSF, I, 95; LM, p. 9. 84 PSF, I, 52.

35 Cf. Paul Ar thu r Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Ernst Cassire D The Library of Living Phi losophers , Vol. VI ( E v a n s t o n : The Library of L iv ing Phi losophers , Inc., 1:9#9), PP. 393 and 394 respectively. It m a y be noted that in the same collection of essays Profs . H a r t m a n and Stephens also disagree. 36 Cf. , Cass i rer , Substance and Function, t rans , by Wi l l i am Curt is Swabey and Mar ie

Collins Swabey (New Y o r k : Dover Publ icat ions, Inc. , 1:953), PP. 269, 411:; and PSF, II, 78. 37 PSF, I, 47. 38 Cf. PSF, I, 95; LM, pp. 89. 39 For the ma in tenance of a h ie ra rchy of the symbolic fo rms , too, which Cass i rer seems to require, the Hege l i an Absolute (which Cass i rer rejects) or some such r ank ing fo rmula is lacking. 4o PSF, I, 86. 41 EM, pp. 145 , 1:7o. 42 EM, p. 2o 7.

43 PSF, III , 527. 44 PSF, I, 95. 45 EM, p. ~-9o. 4,6 PSF, I, 77. 47 Cf. PSF, I, 80-82. 48 EM, p. 222; PSF, I, 8o. 40 EM, pp. 68-7o. 5,0 PSF, I, 8o-81:. 51 PSF, I, ~o 7. 52 PSF, I, ~ 4 .

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Some metaphysical problems of Cassirer's symbolic forms

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