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Social Welfare Institution(Compiled General Readings)

Introductionhese readings have been selected and compiled fromacknowledged open sources for students to give thema general reading outline on the definition, description and

dynamic of Social Welfare Institutions (SWIs). This willgive students some theorist whose contribution oftheories has influenced thoughts in the domain of socialwelfare institutions. SWIs have been derived from thesocial welfare institution. Types of governmentsincluding welfare states have evolved socialinstitution. Social institution itself lay at the heartof social welfare and Welfare. Students will have togive attention to examining both public and privatesocial welfare institutions responsible for implementingwelfare programs derived from government policies basedon national constitution. SWIs are examined not inisolation but as existing within the broader socialinstitution (including economic and political). Readingscover the structures of these institutions as well asthe problems and challenges that hinder theireffectiveness and efficient performance in respectivecountries and in Ghana. Students should find theoriesand best practices that enhance effective and efficientperformance of SWIs. Readings include terms in SWIs andwhat they refer to have been placed under “Other SocialActivities” in this compilation of readings.

T

Al Saah, 3/10/2012

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Figure 1: conceptual framework of Compiled General Readings

ContentsA. Social Welfare Institution..............................2B. Social Institutions....................................11C. Social Welfare.........................................36D. Welfare................................................37E. SWIs in Ghana..........................................45Bibliography..............................................55Recommended Readings List.................................58

Overview: Government, Social Welfare Institution and Citizens

There exists a relationship between Government, Social Welfare Institution and Citizens. In this world there are societies

Humanity has different resources for meeting needs of its members.

Countries have different types of governments with the aim of meeting the needs of its citizens

Governments have over the years assumed the role

The governments have used their social institutions to

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Overview: Government, Social Welfare Institution and Citizens

deliver these resources.

The social welfare institutions to deliver these resources.

Figure 2: A framework relating Government, Social Welfare Institution andCitizens

Countryo People (residents, visitors, citizens)o Resources (land, etc)o Framework of Government

Citizens and Governmento Citizenso Government

Responsible and Responsive governanceo Social policy

welfareo social institution

social welfare institution other social institutions (include economic,

political, family, educational, religious and medical)

Welfare Programs and Projectso Programs

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Overview: Government, Social Welfare Institution and Citizens

o Projects Social Welfare Institution

o Homeo Centreo Residential Educational Institution

Wellbeing and Social Supporto A minimal level of wellbeing

Health Human resource

o Social support Public social welfare Private social welfare

Citizens o functionalo fulfilled o fruitful

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A. Social Welfare Institution A Social Welfare Institution is an agency that operates daily oraround the clock where people are cared for and if necessaryprovided with treatment, nursing, education and therapy.

The Social Welfare Institution Deals with well-being and social functioning of

individuals. Deals with the provision of supports to sustain or attain

social functioning and a higher quality of life. Also, it deals with the distribution of goods and services

Around-the-clock social welfare institutions are specialized –separate ones exist for children, the elderly, the disabled andother individuals who are not coping socially. Social welfareinstitutions may be state or local government institutions, orlegal persons governed by public law or private law.

Social Welfare Institutions refer to institutions taking care ofold people without children, handicapped people and orphans.They include social welfare institutions run by civil affairsdepartments, children welfare institutions, social welfareinstitutions for mental patients, collective-owned old people’shomes in rural areas, convalescent homes and community servicecenters with the capacity of receiving those people. Thisindicator reflects the input in social welfare institutions.

Types of social welfare institutions These include three main categories from literature; (i) home,(ii) centre and (iii) educational institution. The types ofsocial welfare institutions are the following:

Day-use centre – institution providing daytime care. Support home – an institution that provides daytime or

periodic night-time care for disabled persons living athome.

Shelter – an institution offering individuals temporaryaround-the-clock assistance and support and protection.

Substitute home – place where substitute home service isprovided to children.

Youth home – an institution established for living andrehabilitation for youths over the age of 15 who are from asubstitute home, home for students with special needs or a

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residential educational institution or who have beendeprived of parental care.

General nursing home – an institution established for theelderly and disabled persons, where they can live, receivecare and rehabilitation.

Residential educational institution – an institutionestablished for disabled school-age children, where theycan live, receive care, develop, and study.

Social rehabilitation centre – institution established foractive rehabilitation of persons with special needs.

Special nursing home – institution established for thementally ill and people with severe mental disabilities,where they can live, receive care and rehabilitation.

Social Welfare Institutions also receive assistance from ZakatFund1. The following Social Welfare Institutions receive cashassistance from Zakat Fund.

1. Orphanages (home)2. Home for Destitute and underprivileged women. 3. Home for mothers and children. 4. Home for old and infirm persons. 5. Home for destitute and needy girls. 6. Home for abandons Babies and Destitute Children. 7. Special education Centre for disabled persons / mentally

retarded persons. 8. Rehabilitation Centers for Disabled persons.

The working structures in SWIsSet up as NGO or Government Agency or social welfare departmentor social institution has a structure that will make suchorganizations manageable toward fulfilling their mandate givenby government, and the vision and mission they have setthemselves, and the mobilize the needed pro vision required.

1 http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Departments/Zakat/Social-Welfare-Institutions.php

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The working structures in SWIs

Typical pyramid model – top to bottom approach

Figure 3: organizational structure (secretariat)

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Figure 4: organizational structure (non official)

Social Welfare Services -- Republic Of Cyprus

http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/sws/sws.nsf/dmlchart_en/dmlchart_en?OpenDocument

Organizational structure

The Social Welfare Services personnel consist of 257 SocialWelfare Services Officers and 149 Residential Officers whooccupy posts at all levels of the Services hierarchy. TheSecretarial personnel, consists of 8 Secretarial Officers and 41Assistant Secretarial Officers. The number of the StateInstitution’s hourly wage personnel is 360.

Social Welfare Officers are placed at the Central Office of theSocial Welfare Services and at the six Social Welfare ServicesDistrict Offices, in Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca, Pafos,Ammochostos (seat in Paralimni) and Morphou (seat in Evrichou).A sub-office in the District of Pafos operates in PolisChrysochous.

State Institutions’ officers are placed in the followingInstitutions:

Nicosia State Institution for Children Nicosia Youth Hostel (boys) Youth Hostel for teenage girls

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“Latsia” State Institution for the Elderly and the Disabled “Anthoupoli” State Institution for the Elderly and the Disabled State Institution for people with severe mental retardation “NeaEleousa” State Institution in the Community for people with severe MentalRetardation 2nd State Institution in the Community for people with severeMental Retardation 3rd State Institution in the Community for people with severeMental Retardation 4th State Institution in the Community for people with severeMental Retardation

Limassol State Institution for Children “Agios Athanasios” Day Care Centre for pre-school age children “Ypsonas” Day Care Centre for pre-school age children “Agios Panteleimonas” State Institution for the Elderly and theDisabled “Merimna” State Institution for the Elderly and the Disabled State Institution in the Community for people with severe MentalRetardation

Larnaca State Institution for Children State Institution for Teenage Boys “Ormideia” Day Care Centre for pre-school age Children “Kokkines” Day Care Centre for pre-school age Children “Agioi Anargiroi” Day Care Centre for pre-school age Children “Makarios III” Day Care Centre for pre-school age children “Agios Georgios II” State Institution for the Elderly and theDisabled “Kokkines” State Institution for the Elderly and the Disabled

Pafos State Institution for Children “Pafos” Day Care Centre for pre-school age Children “Nefeli Talioti” State Institution for the Elderly and Disabled

Famagusta State Institution in the Community for people with Special Needs

Working within SWIs as Professional Social Workers

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Social work is a professional and academic discipline that seeksto improve the quality of life and wellbeing of an individual,group, or community by intervening through research, policy,community organizing, direct practice, and teaching on behalf ofthose afflicted with poverty or any real or perceived socialinjustices and violations of their human rights. Research isoften focused on areas such as human development, social policy,public administration, program evaluation and international andcommunity development. Social workers are organized into local,national, continental and international professional bodies.Social work, an interdisciplinary field, includes theories fromeconomics, education, sociology, medicine, philosophy, politics,and psychology.

History of social work The concept of charity goes back to ancient times, and the practice of providing for the poor has roots in many major ancient civilizations and world religions.

Social work has its roots in the social and economic upheavalwrought by the Industrial Revolution, in particular the struggleof society to deal with poverty and its resultant problems.Because dealing with poverty was the main focus of early socialwork, it is intricately linked with the idea of charity work,but it must now be understood in much broader terms. Forinstance it is not uncommon for modern social workers to findthemselves dealing with the consequences arising from many other‘social problems’ such as racism, sexism, homophobia, anddiscrimination based on age or on physical or mental ability.Modern social workers can be found helping to deal with theconsequences of these and many other social maladies in allareas of the human services and in many other fields besides.

Whereas social work started on a more scientific footing aimedat controlling and reforming individuals (at one stagesupporting the notion that poverty was a disease), it has inmore recent times adopted a more critical and holistic approachto understanding and intervening in social problems. This hasled, for example, to the reconceptualisation of poverty as morea problem of the haves versus the have-nots rather than its

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former status as a disease, illness, or moral defect in need oftreatment. This also points to another historical development inthe evolution of social work: once a profession engaged more insocial control, it has become one more directed at socialempowerment. That is not to say that modern social workers donot engage in social control (consider for example statutorychild protection workers), and many if not most social workerswould likely agree that this is an ongoing tension and debate.

Contemporary professional developmentSocial Work education begins in a systematized manner in highereducational institutes (universities, colleges etc.), but isalso an ongoing process that occurs though research and in theworkplace.

The International Federation of Social Workers states, of socialwork today, that “social work bases its methodology on asystematic body of evidence-based knowledge derived fromresearch and practice evaluation, including local and indigenousknowledge specific to its context. It recognizes the complexityof interactions between human beings and their environment, andthe capacity of people both to be affected by and to alter themultiple influences upon them including bio-psychosocialfactors. The social work profession draws on theories of humandevelopment, social theory and social systems to analyze complexsituations and to facilitate individual, organizational, socialand cultural changes.

Qualifications for professional social workProfessional social workers are generally considered those whohold a degree. Often these practitioners must also obtain alicense or be professionally registered.

The education of social workers begins with a Bachelor’s degree(BA, BSc, BSSW, BSW, etc.) or diploma in Social Work. Somecountries offer Postgraduate degrees in Social Work likeMaster’s (such as MSW, MA, MSc, MRes, MPhil etc.) or PhD(doctoral studies). More and more graduates of social workcontinue to post-doctoral studies. It has been argued thatsocial work education is supposed to be a lifelong process.

In a number of countries and jurisdictions, registration orlicensure of people working as social workers is required andthere are mandated qualifications.[2] In other places, a

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professional association sets academic and black requirementsfor admission to membership. The success of these professionalbodies’ efforts is demonstrated in the fact that these samerequirements are recognized by employers as necessary foremployment.[3]

Professional associationsThere are a number of associations for social workers, whichexist to provide ethical guidance and other forms of support fortheir members and social work in general. Theseassociations/organizations are distinguished in international,continental or semi-continental, national and regional. The maininternational ones are the International Federation of SocialWorkers (IFSW) and the International Association of Schools ofSocial Work (IASSW). In the United States the main one is theNational Association of Social Workers.

Social Workers working in SWIs

Most social workers specialize. Although some conduct researchor are involved in planning or policy development, most socialworkers prefer an area of practice in which they interact withclients.

1. Child or adult protective services social workersinvestigate reports of abuse and neglect, and intervene ifnecessary. They may initiate legal action to removechildren from homes and place them temporarily in anemergency shelter or with a foster family.

2. Child welfare or family services social workers may counselchildren and youths who have difficulty adjusting socially,advise parents on how to care for disabled children, orarrange for homemaker services during a parent’s illness.If children have serious problems in school, child welfareworkers may consult with parents, teachers, and counselorsto identify underlying causes and develop plans fortreatment. Some social workers assist single parents;arrange adoptions; and help find foster homes forneglected, abandoned, or abused children. Child welfareworkers also work in residential institutions for childrenand adolescents.

3. Clinical social workers offer psychotherapy or counselingand a range of diagnostic services in public agencies,clinics, and private practice.

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4. Criminal justice social workers make recommendations tocourts; prepare presentencing assessments; and provideservices to prison inmates, parolees, probationers, andtheir families. (Probation Officers and CorrectionalTreatment Specialists are discussed elsewhere in theHandbook.)

5. Gerontology social workers specialize in services forsenior citizens. They run support groups for familycaregivers or for the adult children of aging parents.Also, they advise elderly people or family members aboutthe choices in such areas as housing, transportation, andlong-term care; they also coordinate and monitor services.

6. Healthcare social workers help patients and their familiescope with chronic, acute, or terminal illnesses and handleproblems that may stand in the way of recovery orrehabilitation. They may organize support groups forfamilies of patients suffering from cancer, AIDS,Alzheimer’s disease, or other illnesses. They also advisefamily caregivers, counsel patients, and help plan forpatients’ needs after discharge by arranging for at-homeservices—from meals-on-wheels to oxygen equipment. Somework on interdisciplinary teams that evaluate certain kindsof patients—geriatric or organ transplant patients, forexample.

7. Mental health social workers provide services for personswith mental or emotional problems. Such services includeindividual and group therapy, outreach, crisisintervention, social rehabilitation, and training in skillsof everyday living. They may also help plan for supportiveservices to ease patients’ return to the community.(Counselors and Psychologists, who may provide similarservices, are discussed elsewhere in the Handbook.)

8. Occupational social workers usually work in a corporation’spersonnel department or health unit. Through employeeassistance programs, they help workers cope with job-related pressures or with personal problems that affect thequality of their work. They often offer direct counselingto employees whose performance is hindered by emotional orfamily problems or substance abuse. They also developeducation programs and refer workers to specializedcommunity programs.

9. School social workers diagnose students’ problems andarrange needed services, counsel children in trouble, andhelp integrate disabled students into the general schoolpopulation. School social workers deal with problems such

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as student pregnancy, misbehavior in class, and excessiveabsences. They also advise teachers on how to cope withproblem students.

10. Social work administrators perform overall managementtasks in a hospital, clinic, or other setting that offerssocial worker services.

11. Social work planners and policy makers developprograms to address such issues as child abuse,homelessness, substance abuse, poverty, and violence. Theseworkers research and analyze policies, programs, andregulations. They identify social problems and suggestlegislative and other solutions. They may help raise fundsor write grants to support these programs.

12. Substance abuse social workers counsel drug andalcohol abusers as they recover from their dependencies.They also arrange for other services that may help clientsfind employment or get training. They generally areemployed in substance abuse treatment and preventionprograms.

Other Social Activities within SWIs

Number of People Taken in by Social Welfare Institutions refersto the number of old people, children, totally dependenthandicapped people and mental patients taken in by socialwelfare institutions run by civil affairs departments and thoserun by collective units in urban and rural areas. This indicatorreflects the capacity of social welfare institutions.

Social Welfare Enterprises are collective owned enterpriseswhich employ the blind, deaf-mute, and other handicapped peoplewho are able to work in cities and towns and enjoy exemptionfrom state taxes, including welfare plants, welfare commercialservices, artificial limb plants and farms, etc. This indicatorreflects the preferential policies toward disabled persons.

Rural Households with Livelihood Guaranteed in Five Aspectsrefer to the households in which there are old people withoutchild, orphans and handicapped people who are unable to work andwithout financial resources in rural areas. They are taken careof by the collective units and their food, clothing, housing,medical care, funeral expenses (or schooling for orphans) areguaranteed to be provided for. This indicator reflects the totalnumber of disadvantageous groups of rural population.

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Proportion of Deaf Children Enrolled in Ordinary Pre-school andPrimary Education refers to the proportion of deaf children whoare enrolled in ordinary kindergartens or primary schools duringthe year in the total number of deaf children underrehabilitation programs (not including new comers into therehabilitation programs during the year). This indicator mainlyreflects number of rehabilitated deaf children entering ordinarykindergartens or primary schools.

Number of Mental Patients under Integrated Prevention andRehabilitation Program refers to mental disease patientsreceiving integrated prevention and rehabilitation treatment ofvarious forms under open environment in areas with mentaldisease rehabilitation programs. This indicator reflects thecondition of metal patients receiving rehabilitation treatment.

Supervision Rate refers to the percentage of patients among thetotal number of registered mental disease patients, whoparticipate in social integrated and open treatment andrehabilitation programs through various forms such assupervision groups, family treatment, employment or guidancefrom psychiatric institutions. This indicator reflects theimplementation of various measures aimed at rehabilitating thosemetal patients.

Social Participation Rate refers to proportion of mental diseasepatients who are able to manage their daily life and participatein economic activities to the total number of mental diseasepatients under supervision. This indicator reflects thecondition of recovery of those metal patients and theirparticipation in social activities.

School-age Disabled Children not in Schools refer to childrenwith disability in sight, listening, speaking, mentality, limbsor multi-disability who are obliged to compulsory education bylaw but have not been enrolled in schools due to variousreasons. The definition of school age for disabled children isdecided by the definition of school age as specified byprovincial governments in line with the local laws on compulsoryeducation. This indicator reflects the annual change of school-age disable children not entering schools by various reasons. Itwill provide foundation for the formulation of development plansof compulsory education for those disable children, and forrelated principles, policies and measures as well. It is also

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the base for the job of funding those disabled children back toschools across the countries.

Lawyers are certified legal workers according to law, and whoare employed by legal counseling firms to act as legal advisers,agents in criminal or civil lawsuits, or defenders in criminallawsuits, or to handle non-litigious legal affairs, to advise onmatters of law or to write legal papers for others, and provideservice to the public.

Notary Personnel refers to people working for notary officesincluding: directors, deputy director, notaries, assistantnotaries, and other people providing assistance.

Notary Documents refer to the judicatory notary documents drawnup by the request of the party and are in accordance with factsand laws and following certain legal proceedings. According tousage and locality, the notary documents are divided intofollowing 4 types: domestic notary documents, domestic economicnotary documents, foreign-related civil notary documents andforeign-related economic notary documents.

Mediators refer to workers on people’s mediation committeesresponsible for mediating in civil disputes and cases of slightinfraction of the law. They include members of the mediationcommittees and mediators of mediation groups. This indicatorreflects the number of people engaged in meditation.

Mediation of Civil Disputes refers to number of cases made bymediation committees in mediating in civil disputes concerningcivil rights and duties through persuasion and education inaccordance with the provisions of law on a voluntary basis, soas to solve disputes by helping the parties involved come to anagreement and understanding, including those unsuccessful ones.This indicator reflects the workload of the mediationcommittees.

Acceptance of Case refers to the decision made by the people’sprocuratorate office on reported cases, prosecution,impeachment, surrender, self-found criminal clues or suspectsafter initial investigation to confirm the act of crime and tostart legal proceedings of the case as criminal case.

Large Cases refer to cases involving a corruption or bribery ofover 50,000 yuan; or a misappropriation of over 100,000 yuan.

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Cases of collectively illegal possession of public funds,unstated sources of large properties, or disguised overseassavings deposits involving 500,000 yuan, or a case that has beenit may be defined by the “Standard on Serious and Large Cases ofMisconduct and Tortious that Directly Accepted by People’sProcurators Office (trial)”. This indicator mainly reflectsnumber of accepted cases of job-related criminals that causedserious economic losses or extremely harmful to the society.

Key Cases refer to cases committed by government officials witha ranking of division director or county administrator. Thisindicator mainly reflects the recorded and spied on cases by thepeople’s procurators offices toward government official with aranking of division director or county administrator.

Decision on Arrest refers to decision made by people’sprocurators office, in accordance with laws, to arrest thesuspect(s) in the cases that are accepted and to be investigatedby procurators office. This indicator mainly reflects theimplementation of the decision on arrest by people’s procuratorsoffice.

Approval for Arrest refers to the decision made by people’sprocurators office, in accordance with laws and relevant facts,to approve the arrest of the suspect(s) that is proposed by thepublic security departments, state security departments orauthority of prisons. This indicator reflects approved arrestsmade by people’s procurators office that are proposed by relateddepartments.

Decision on Prosecution refers to the decision made by people’sprocurators office, in accordance with laws and relevant facts,to institute proceedings to the people’s court against thesuspect(s) of criminal cases handed over by the public securitydepartments, state security departments or authority of prisons,or by the anti-corruption departments within the procuratorsoffice. This indicator reflects the condition of theprosecutions made by people’s procurators office toward thepeople’s court.

Appeals refer to cases transferred to the appeal departments ofprocurator’s offices after initial review by departments dealingwith complaint letters and calls of the public. Included areappeals against decisions made by procurator’s offices andappeals against court rules and verdicts.

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Number of Labor Dispute Cases Accepted refers to the number ofcases of labour dispute submitted that, after being reviewed bythe labor dispute arbitration committees in line with therelevant state regulations, are accepted and registered fortreatment.

Basic Endowment Insurance1. Number of people participating in the insurance program: by

the end of reference period, number of staff and workersparticipating in the insurance program in line withnational laws, regulations and related policies, includingthose who cannot make regular payment or interrupt paymentbut not terminate the insurance program.

2. Revenue of social comprehensive funds: according tonational provision, payments made by units covered in basicendowment insurance program, and income from otherresources, including: income of social comprehensive fundspaid by unites, financial subsidies, interest income andothers.

3. Expenditure of social comprehensive funds: refer to paymentmade to those retired and resigned people covered inendowment insurance program in terms of pension orcompensation within the expenditure scope and standardsaccording to related national policies, and the expenditureoccurred due to shift of the insurance relationship oradjustment funds among agencies, including: basic pension,transitional pension, pension for resigned people, pensionfor retired people, pension for people quitting jobs,subsidies, funeral subsidies and other expenditure.

4. Balance of social comprehensive funds: refer to the balanceof basic endowment insurance of social comprehensive fundsat the end of the reference period, including: banksavings, special fiscal account, investment in bonds andothers.

Retired or Resigned Personnel refers to people who have formallygone through the formalities for their retirement or quittingwork and enjoy the corresponding treatments.

Basic Medical Care Insurance: 1. Number of people participated in the insurance program:

refer to number of people participated in the basic medicalcare insurance program according to related regulation bythe end of reference period, including: number of staff and

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workers and retired persons participated in this insuranceprogram.

2. Revenue of social comprehensive funds: according tonational provision, payments made by units covered in basicmedical care insurance program, and income from otherresources, including: income of social comprehensive fundspaid by unites, financial subsidies, interest income andothers.

3. Expenditure of social comprehensive funds: refer to paymentmade to those retired and resigned people covered in basicmedical care insurance within the expenditure scope andstandards according to related national policies,including: expenditure on fee-for-service in hospital,expenditure on fee-for-service in clinic and otherexpenditure.

4. Balance of social comprehensive funds: refer to the balanceof medical care insurance of social comprehensive funds atthe end of the reference period, including: bank savings,special fiscal account, investment in bonds and others.

Unemployment Insurance1. Number of people participated in unemployment insurance

program: number of staff and workers in urban enterprisesor institutions and other people according to localgovernment regulations participated in unemploymentinsurance program in line with national law, regulationsand related policies by the end of the reference period.

2. Sum of Unemployment Insurance: refer to total amount ofinsurance paid to un-employees to guarantee their basiclives according to related regulations.

Insurance and Welfare Funds refers to labor insurance andwelfare fund paid by enterprises, organizations and institutionsto their staff and workers as well as retired and resignedpersons in addition to their wages and salaries， excluding laborprotection fees, wages paid to medical workers from insuranceand welfare fund and wages paid to staff members working incollective welfare agencies and to people with over 6 months ofsick-leave.

Insurance and Welfare Funds for Retired and Resigned Staff andWorkers covers:

1. Pensions for retired veteran cadres: They refer topensions, other subsidies, and additional allowances paidto retired in line with relevant government documents.

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2. Pensions for Retirement: They refer to living allowance;other subsidies and additional allowances paid to retiredstaff and workers in line with the relevant governmentdocuments.

3. Resignation Allowances for Living Expenses: They refer toliving allowance, and additional allowances subsidies paidto resigned staff and workers in line with relevantgovernment instructions.

4. It also includes living subsidies and prices subsidies paidto retired and resigned staff and workers.

5. Medical Care Allowance: refer to fee-for-service, cost ofmedical care and per diem subsidies during hospitalizationsof retired and resigned staff and workers.

6. Others: They refer to other expenses, including other typesof insurance and welfare fund, fees for funerals, travelingsubsidies and heating subsidies during the winter time.

B. Social Institutions

Descriptive definition of Social Institutions

First published Thu Jan 4, 2007; substantive revision Tue Feb 8, 2011The term, “social institution” is somewhat unclear both inordinary language and in the philosophical literature (seebelow). However, contemporary sociology is somewhat moreconsistent in its use of the term. Typically, contemporarysociologists use the term to refer to complex social forms thatreproduce themselves such as governments, the family, humanlanguages, universities, hospitals, business corporations, andlegal systems. A typical definition is that proffered byJonathan Turner (Turner 1997: 6): “a complex of positions,roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of socialstructures and organizing relatively stable patterns of humanactivity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and insustaining viable societal structures within a givenenvironment.” Again, Anthony Giddens says (Giddens 1984: 24):“Institutions by definition are the more enduring features ofsocial life.” He (Giddens 1984: 31) goes on to list asinstitutional orders, modes of discourse, political

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institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions. Thecontemporary philosopher of social science, Rom Harre followsthe theoretical sociologists in offering this kind of definition(Harre 1979: 98):”An institution was defined as an interlockingdouble-structure of persons-as-role-holders or office-bearersand the like, and of social practices involving both expressiveand practical aims and outcomes.” He gives as examples (Harre1979: 97) schools, shops, post offices, police forces, asylumsand the British monarchy.

In this entry the above-noted contemporary sociological usagewill be followed. Doing so has the virtue of groundingphilosophical theory in the most salient empirical discipline,namely, sociology.

At this point it might be asked why a theory of socialinstitutions has, or ought to have, any philosophical interest;why not simply leave such theorizing to the sociologists? Oneimportant reason stems from the normative concerns ofphilosophers. Philosophers, such as John Rawls (Rawls 1972),have developed elaborate normative theories concerning theprinciples of justice that ought to govern social institutions.Yet they have done so in the absence of a developed theory ofthe nature and point of the very entities (social institutions)to which the principles of justice in question are supposed toapply. Surely the adequacy of one’s normative account of thejustice or otherwise of any given social institution, or systemof social institutions, will depend at least in part on thenature and point of that social institution or system.

The entry has five sections. In the first section varioussalient accounts of social institutions are discussed. Accountsemanating from sociological theory as well as philosophy arementioned. Here, as elsewhere, the boundaries between philosophyand non-philosophical theorizing in relation to an empiricalscience are vague. Hence, it is important to note the theoriesof the likes of Durkheim and Talcott Parsons as well as those ofJohn Searle and David Lewis.

In the second section so-called collective acceptance theoriesof social institutions are discussed (Searle 1995 and 2010;Tuomela 2002 and 2007.

In the third section a teleological account of socialinstitutions is presented (Miller 2001 and 2010). Teleological

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explanation is out of fashion in many areas of philosophy.However, it remains influential in contemporary philosophicaltheories of social action.

In the fourth section, the so-called agent-structure question isaddressed. At bottom, this issue concerns the apparentinconsistency between the autonomy (or alleged autonomy) ofindividual human agents, on the one hand, and the ubiquity andpervasive influence of social forms on individual character andbehavior, on the other.

In the fifth and final section the specific normative issue ofthe justice of social institutions is explored. This sectionincludes a discussion of intra-institutional justice, e.g. thejustice or injustice of the reward system within an institution,as well as extra-institutional justice, e.g. the justice orinjustice of a power relationship between a government andrefugees.

1. Accounts of Social InstitutionsAny account of social institutions must begin by informallymarking off social institutions from other social forms.Unfortunately, as noted above, in ordinary language the terms“institutions” and “social institutions” are used to refer to amiscellany of social forms, including conventions, rules,rituals, organizations, and systems of organizations. Moreover,there are a variety of theoretical accounts of institutions,including sociological as well as philosophical ones. Indeed,many of these accounts of what are referred to as institutionsare not accounts of the same phenomena; they are at bestaccounts of overlapping fields of social phenomena.Nevertheless, it is possible, firstly, to mark off a range ofrelated social forms that would be regarded by most theorists asbeing properly describable as social institutions; and,secondly, to compare and contrast some of the competingtheoretical accounts of the “social institutions” in question.

Social institutions need to be distinguished from less complexsocial forms such as conventions, rules, social norms, roles andrituals. The latter are among the constitutive elements ofinstitutions.

Social institutions also need to be distinguished from morecomplex and more complete social entities, such as societies orcultures, of which any given institution is typically a

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constitutive element. A society, for example, is more completethan an institution since a society—at least as traditionallyunderstood—is more or less self-sufficient in terms of humanresources, whereas an institution is not. Thus, arguably, for anentity to be a society it must sexually reproduce itsmembership, have its own language and educational system,provide for itself economically and—at least in principle—bepolitically independent.[2]

Social institutions are often organizations (Scott 2001).Moreover, many institutions are systems of organizations. Forexample, capitalism is a particular kind of economicinstitution, and in modern times capitalism consists in largepart in specific organizational forms—including multi-nationalcorporations—organized into a system. Further, some institutionsare meta-institutions; they are institutions (organizations) thatorganize other institutions (including systems oforganizations). For example, governments are meta-institutions.The institutional end or function of a government consists inlarge part in organizing other institutions (both individuallyand collectively); thus governments regulate and coordinateeconomic systems, educational institutions, police and militaryorganizations and so on largely by way of (enforceable)legislation.

Nevertheless, some institutions are not organizations, orsystems of organizations, and do not require organizations. Forexample, the English language is an institution, but not anorganization. Moreover, it would be possible for a language toexist independently of any organizations specifically concernedwith language. Again, consider an economic system that does notinvolve organizations, e.g. a barter system involving onlyindividuals. An institution that is not an organization orsystem of organizations comprises a relatively specific type ofagent-to-agent interactive activity, e.g. communication oreconomic exchange, that involves: (i) differentiated actions,e.g. communication involves speaking and hearing/understanding,economic exchange involves buying and selling, that are; (ii)performed repeatedly and by multiple agents; (iii) in compliancewith a structured unitary system of conventions, e.g. linguisticconventions, monetary conventions, and social norms, e.g. truth-telling, property rights.

In this entry the concern is principally with socialinstitutions (including meta-institutions) that are alsoorganizations or systems of organizations. However, it should be

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noted that institutions of language, such as the Englishlanguage, are often regarded not simply as institutions but asmore fundamental than many other kinds of institution by virtueof being presupposed by, or in part constitutive of, otherinstitutions. Searle, for example, holds to the latter view(Searle 1995: 37). A case might also be made that the family isa more fundamental institution than others for related reasons,e.g. it is the site of sexual reproduction and initialsocialization.

Note also that uses of the term “institution” in suchexpressions as “the institution of government”, are oftenambiguous. Sometimes what is meant is a particular token, e.g.the current government in Australia, sometimes a type, i.e. theset of properties instantiated in any actual government, andsometimes a set of tokens, i.e. all governments. Restricting thenotion of an institution to organizations is helpful in thisregard; the term “organization” almost always refers to aparticular token. On the other hand, the term “institution”connotes a certain gravity not connoted by the term“organization”; so arguably those institutions that areorganizations are organizations that have a central andimportant role to play in or for a society. Being central andimportant to a society, such roles are usually long lastingones; hence institutions are typically trans-generational.

Having informally marked of social institutions from othersocial forms, let us turn to a consideration of some generalproperties of social institutions. Here there are four salientproperties, namely, structure, function, culture and sanctions.

Roughly speaking, an institution that is an organization orsystem of organizations consists of an embodied (occupied byhuman persons) structure of differentiated roles. These rolesare defined in terms of tasks, and rules regulating theperformance of those tasks. Moreover, there is a degree ofinterdependence among these roles, such that the performance ofthe constitutive tasks of one role cannot be undertaken, orcannot be undertaken except with great difficulty, unless thetasks constitutive of some other role or roles in the structurehave been undertaken or are being undertaken. Further, theseroles are often related to one another hierarchically, and henceinvolve different levels of status and degrees of authority.Finally, on teleological and functional accounts, these rolesare related to one another in part in virtue of their

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contribution to (respectively) the end(s) or function(s) of theinstitution; and the realization of these ends or functionnormally involves interaction among the institutional actors inquestion and external non-institutional actors. (The assumptionhere is that the concept of an end and of a function is distinctconcepts.) The constitutive roles of an institution and theirrelations to one another can be referred to as the structure of theinstitution.

Note that on this conception of institutions as embodiedstructures of roles and associated rules, the nature of anyinstitution at a given time will to some extent reflect thepersonal character of different role occupants, especiallyinfluential role occupants, e.g. the British Government duringthe Second World War reflected to some extent WinstonChurchill’s character. Moreover, institutions in this sense aredynamic, evolving entities; as such, they have a history, thediachronic structure of a narrative and (usually) a partiallyopen-ended future.

Aside from the formal and usually explicitly stated, or defined,tasks and rules, there is an important implicit and informaldimension of an institution roughly describable as institutionalculture. This notion comprises the informal attitudes, values,norms, and the ethos or “spirit” which pervades an institution.Culture in this sense determines much of the activity of themembers of that institution, or at least the manner in whichthat activity is undertaken. So while the explicitly determinedrules and tasks might say nothing about being secretive or“sticking by one’s mates come what may” or having a hostile ornegative attitude to particular social groups, these attitudesand practices might in fact be pervasive; they might be part ofthe culture. Naturally, there can be competing cultures within asingle organization; the culture comprised of attitudes andnorms that are aligned to the formal and official complex oftasks and rules might compete with an informal and “unofficial”culture that is adhered to by a substantial sub-element of theorganization’s membership.

It is sometimes claimed that in addition to structure, functionand culture, social institutions necessarily involve sanctions.It is uncontroversial that social institutions involve informalsanctions, such as moral disapproval following on non-conformityto institutional norms. However, some theorists, e.g. Jon Elster(1989: ch. XV), argue that formal sanctions, such as punishment,

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are a necessary feature of institutions. Formal sanctions arecertainly a feature of many institutions, notably legal systems;however, they do not seem to be a feature of all institutions.Consider, for example, an elaborate and longstanding system ofinformal economic exchange among members of different societiesthat have no common system of laws or enforced rules. Again, aspoken language such as pidgin English, is presumably aninstitution; yet breaches of its constitutive norms andconventions might not attract any formal sanctions.Thus far we have informally marked off social institutions fromother social forms, and we have identified a number of generalproperties of social institutions. It is now time to outlinesome of the main theoretical accounts of social institutions.

Notwithstanding our understanding of social institutions ascomplex social forms, some theoretical accounts of institutionsidentify institutions with relatively simple social forms—especially conventions, social norms or rules. At one level thisis merely a verbal dispute; contra our procedure here, suchsimpler forms could simply be termed “institutions”. However, atanother level the dispute is not merely verbal, since what weare calling “institutions” would on such a view consist simplyof sets of conventions, social norms or rules. Let us refer tosuch accounts as atomistic theories of institutions (Taylor 1985:Chapter 7). Schotter is a case in point (Schotter 1981) as isNorth (North 1990). The best known contemporary form of atomismis rational choice theory and it has been widely accepted in,indeed it is in part constitutive of, modern economics. The mostinfluential philosophical theory within a broadly rationalchoice framework is David Lewis’ theory of conventions (Lewis1969). According to Lewis, conventions are regularities inaction that solve coordination problems confronted by individualagents. Agents conform to the regularity because they prefer todo so, given others conform, and they believe that others willconform. (For criticisms see Miller 2001: Chapter 3.)

The “atoms” within atomistic accounts themselves typicallyconsist of the actions of individual human persons, e.g.conventions as regularities in action. The individual agents arenot themselves defined in terms of institutional forms, such asinstitutional roles. Hence atomistic theories of institutionstend to go hand in glove with atomistic theories of allcollective entities, e.g. a society consists of an aggregate ofindividual human persons. Moreover, atomistic theories tend toidentify the individual agent as the locus of moral value. On

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this kind of view, social forms, including social institutions,have moral value only derivatively, i.e. only in so far as theycontribute to the prior needs, desires or other requirements ofindividual agents.

The regularities in action (or rules or norms) made use of insuch atomistic accounts of institutions cannot simply be asingle person’s regularities in action (or a single person’srules or norms prescribing his or her individual action alone);rather there must be interdependence of action such that, forexample, agent A only performs action x, if other agents, B and Cdo likewise. Moreover, some account of the interdependence ofaction in question is called for, e.g. that it is not the sortof interdependence of action involved in conflict situations(although it might arise as a solution to a prior conflictsituation).

Assume that the conventions, norms or rules in question aresocial in the sense that they involve the requiredinterdependence of action, e.g. the parties to any givenconvention, or the adherent to any such norm or rule, conform to(respectively) the convention, norm or rule on the conditionthat others do. Nevertheless, such interdependence of action isnot sufficient for a convention, norm or rule, or even a set ofconventions, norms or rules, to be an institution. Governments,universities, corporations etc. are structured, unitaryentities. Accordingly, a mere set of conventions (or norms orrules) does not constitute an institution. For example, the setof conventions comprising the convention to drive on the left,the convention to utter, “Australia”, to refer to Australia, andthe convention to use chopsticks does not constitute aninstitution. Accordingly, a problem for atomistic accounts ofsocial institutions is the need to provide an account of thestructure and unity of social institutions, and an account thatis faithful to atomism, e.g. that the structure is essentiallyaggregative in nature.

By contrast with atomistic accounts of social institutions, holistic—including structuralist-functionalist—accounts stress the inter-relationships of institutions (structure) and their contributionto larger and more complete social complexes, especiallysocieties (function). Thus according to Barry Barnes (Barnes1995: 37):”Functionalist theories in the social sciences seek todescribe, to understand and in most cases to explain theorderliness and stability of entire social systems. In so far as

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they treat individuals, the treatment comes after and emergesfrom analysis of the system as a whole. Functionalist theoriesmove from an understanding of the whole to an understanding ofthe parts of that whole, whereas individualism proceeds in theopposite direction”. Moreover, (Barnes 1995: 41),”such accountslist the “functions” of the various institutions. They describethe function of the economy as the production of goods andservices essential to the operation of the other institutionsand hence the system as a whole.” Such theorists includeDurkheim, Radcliffe-Brown and Parsons (Durkheim 1964; Radcliffe-Brown 1958; Parsons 1968 and 1982). Of particular concern tothese theorists was the moral decay consequent (in their view)upon the demise of strong, mutually supportive socialinstitutions. Durkheim, for example, advocated powerfulprofessional associations. He said (Durkheim 1957 p.6):

A system of moral morals is always the affair of a group and canoperate only if the group protects them by its authority. It ismade up of rules which govern individuals, which compel them toact in such and such a way, and which impose limits to theirinclinations and forbid them to go beyond. Now there is only onemoral power—moral, and hence common to all—which stands abovethe individual and which can legitimately make laws for him, andthat is collective power. To the extent the individual is leftto his own devices and freed from all social constraint, he isunfettered by all moral constraint. It is not possible forprofessional ethics to escape this fundamental condition of anysystem of morals. Since, then, the society as a whole feels noconcern in professional ethics, it is imperative that there bespecial groups in the society, within which these morals may beevolved, and whose business it is to see that they are observed.

Moreover, here the meta-institution of government obviously hasa pivotal directive and integrative role in relation to otherinstitutions and their inter-relationships, even thoughgovernment is itself simply one institution within the largersociety. Further, holistic accounts of institutions lay greatstress on institutional roles defined in large part by socialnorms; institutional roles are supposedly largely, or evenwholly, constitutive of the identity of the individual humanagents who occupy these roles. (Individuals participate in anumber of institutions and hence occupy a number ofinstitutional roles; hence the alleged possibility of theiridentity being constituted by a number of differentinstitutional roles.)

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Many such holistic accounts deploy and depend on the model, orat least analogy, of an organism. A salient historical figurehere is Herbert Spencer (Spencer 1971, Part 3B—A Society is anOrganism). On this holistic, organicist model, socialinstitutions are analogous to the organs or limbs of a humanbody. Each organ or limb has a function the realization of whichcontributes to the well-being of the body as a whole, and nonecan exist independently of the others. Thus the human bodyrelies on the stomach to digest food in order to continueliving, but the stomach cannot exist independently of the bodyor of other organs, such as the heart. Likewise, it issuggested, any given institution, e.g. law courts, contributesto the well-being of the society as a whole, and yet isdependent on other institutions, e.g. government. Here the“well-being” of the society as a whole is sometimes identifiedwith the stability and continuation of the society as it is;hence the familiar charge that holistic, organicist accounts areinherently politically conservative. This political conservatismtransmutes into political authoritarianism when society isidentified with the system of institutions that constitute thenation-state and the meta-institution of the nation-state—thegovernment—is assigned absolute authority in relation to allother institutions. Hence the contrasting emphasis in politicalliberalism on the separation of powers among, for example, theexecutive, the legislature and the judiciary.

Holistic accounts of social institutions often invoke theterminology of internal and external relations. An internalrelation is one that is definitive of, or in some way essentialto, the entity it is a relation of; by contrast, externalrelations are not in this way essential. Thus being married tosomeone is an internal relation of spouses; if a man is ahusband then necessarily he stands in the relation of beingmarried to someone else. Likewise, if someone is a judge in acourt of law then necessarily he stands in an adjudicativerelationship to defendants. Evidently, many institutional rolesare possessed of, and therefore in part defined by, theirinternal relations to other institutional roles.

However, the existence of institutional roles with internalrelations to other institutional roles does not entail aholistic account of social institutions. For the internalrelations in question might not be relations among institutionalroles in different institutions; rather they might simply be

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internal relations among different institutional roles in thesame institution. On the other hand, the existence ofinstitutional roles with internal relations does undermine theattempts of certain forms of atomistic individualism to reduceinstitutions to the individual human agents who happen toconstitute them; ex hypothesis, the latter are not quaindividual human persons in part defined in terms of theirrelations to institutional roles.

Here it is important to distinguish the plausible view thatinstitutions are not reducible to the individual human personswho constitute them from the controversial view thatinstitutions are themselves agents possessed of minds and acapacity to reason. Peter French is an advocate of the latterview (French 1984). (See also Margaret Gilbert’s notion of a“plural subject” (Gilbert 1989: 200)). If we ascribe intentionsto organizations, e.g. ascribe to Gulf Oil the intention tomaximize profits, then we are apparently committed to ascribingto Gulf Oil a whole network of sophisticated propositionalattitudes concerning economic production, the workings ofmarkets, and so on. Moreover, a being with such a network ofpropositional attitudes would be capable of high level thought,and therefore be possessed of a language in which to do thisthinking. Further, this agent’s thought processes would includeplanning for its future and doing so on the basis of its pastmistakes, and the likely responses of other corporations. Such acorporate agent is self-reflective; it not only distinguishesits present from both its past and its future, and itself fromother corporations, it reflects on itself for the purpose oftransforming itself. Such a being has higher order propositionalattitudes, including beliefs about its own beliefs andintentions, and conceives of itself as a unitary whole existingover time. In short, it looks as though we now have a fullyconscious, indeed self-conscious, being on our hands. Nor domatters rest here. For if we are prepared to grant Gulf Oil amind, then why not all its subsidiaries, as well as all othercompanies and subsidiaries worldwide. Indeed how can we stop atcorporations? Surely governments, universities, schools,supermarkets, armies, banks, political parties, trade unions,English soccer teams’ supporters’ clubs (at least) now all haveminds, albeit in some cases smaller minds (so to speak). Notonly do we have a self-conscious mind, but apparently we have anever expanding community of self-conscious minds; or so it couldbe argued.

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Thus far we have discussed atomistic and holistic accounts ofsocial institutions. However, there is a third possibility,namely, (what might be termed) molecular accounts. Roughlyspeaking, a molecular account of an institution would not seekto reduce the institution to simpler atomic forms, such asconventions; nor would it seek to define an institution in termsof its relationships with other institutions and itscontribution to the larger societal whole. Rather, eachinstitution would be analogous to a molecule; it would haveconstitutive elements (“atoms”) but also have its own structureand unity. Moreover, on this conception each social institutionwould have a degree of independence vis-à-vis other institutionsand the society at large; on the other hand, the set ofinstitutions might itself under certain conditions form aunitary system of sorts, e.g. a contemporary liberal democraticnation-state comprised of a number of semi-autonomous public andprivate institutions functioning in the context of the meta-institution of government.

A general problem for holistic organicist accounts of socialinstitutions—as opposed to molecular accounts—is that socialinstitutions can be responses to trans-societal requirements orneeds. Accordingly, an institution is not necessarily aconstitutive element of some given society in the sense that itis both in part constitutive of that society and whollycontained within that society. Examples of such trans-societalinstitutions are the international financial system, theinternational legal system, the United Nations and some multi-national corporations. Indeed, arguably any given element ofsuch a trans-societal institution stands in some internalrelations to elements of other societies.

This raises the question as to whether or not the category ofsocial institution might be conceptually independent of thecategory of society in the sense that it might be conceptuallypossible for there to be an institution without there being asociety. This is consistent with the impossibility of therebeing a society without institutions. That is, perhaps societiespresuppose social institutions, but not vice-versa.

Here we need to distinguish conceptual (or logical)impossibility from practical impossibility. For example, it mightwell be that no society and no system of institutions can exist,practically speaking, without the meta-institution ofgovernment; absent government, societies and social institutions

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tend to disintegrate. However, it would not follow from thisthat the institution of government is logically necessary forthe existence of societies and (non-government) institutions.

The claim that institutions are conceptually independent ofsocieties goes hand in glove with the proposition that humansocial life is dependent on institutions, but not necessarily onsocieties as such. The picture here is of human beings who aremembers of many different social groups, e.g. academicphilosophers, EU citizens, speakers of the Spanish language,each of which group is sustained by one or more socialinstitutions; however, there are no societies as such. For thosewho lived, or are living, in traditional tribes or clans thispicture might be incomprehensible. However, it does have someresonance for those living in contemporary cosmopolitansettings.

In response to this claim of the independence, and perhapspriority, of institutions vis-à-vis societies it can be pointedout, those trans-societal institutions presuppose societies. Thisis true enough. However, this would not rescue the holisticorganicist conception; for such trans-societal institutions arenot generally—and certainly not necessarily—constitutive“organs” of some larger society. Moreover, internationalinstitutions presuppose only nation-states, and the latter mightbe conceived of in narrowly political terms. Contemporarynation-states are not, it might be insisted, complete and self-sufficient societies, such as traditional tribes or clans mighthave been.

In this section atomistic and holistic accounts of institutionshave been discussed in general terms. It is now time to focus ontwo recent molecular theories, namely, the collective acceptancetheory and the teleological theory.

2. The Collective Acceptance Theory of InstitutionsBoth collective acceptance and teleological accounts of socialaction in general, and of social institutions in particular,fall within the rationalist, individualist, philosophy of actiontradition that has its roots in Aristotle, Hume and Kant and isassociated with contemporary analytic philosophers of socialaction such as Michael Bratman (Bratman 1987), John Searle(Searle 1995) and Raimo Tuomela (Tuomela 2002). However, thisway of proceeding also has a place outside philosophy, insociological theory. Broadly speaking, it is the starting point

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for the voluntaristic theory of social action associated withthe likes of Max Weber (Weber 1949) and (the early) TalcottParsons (Parsons 1968). For example, the following idea inrelation to social action is expressed by Parsons (Parsons 1968:229):

actions do not take place separately each with a separate,discrete end in relation to the situation, but in longcomplicated ‘chains’ … [and] the total complex of means-endrelationships is not to be thought of as similar to a largenumber of parallel threads, but as a complicated web (if not atangle).

However, unsurprisingly, the teleological account lays muchgreater explanatory emphasis on the means-end relationship incollective action contexts and much less on collectiveacceptance. That said, the starting point for both kinds of theory has beenthe notion of a joint action. Examples of joint action are twopeople lifting a table together, and two men jointly pushing acar. However, such basic two person joint actions exist at oneend of a spectrum. At the other end are much more complex,multi-person, joint actions, such as a large group of engineers,tradesmen and construction workers jointly building a skyscraperor the members of an army jointly fighting a battle.

Over the last decade or two a number of analyses of joint actionhave emerged (Gilbert 1989; Miller 2001; Searle 1995; Tuomela2002). A number of these theorists have developed and appliedtheir favored basic accounts of joint action in order to accountfor a range of social phenomena, including conventions, socialnorms and social institutions. At the risk ofoversimplification, I suggest that the tendency has been toeschew so-called individualist accounts in favor of so-calledsupra-individualist accounts, or at least in favor of theoccupancy of some hoped-for anti-reductionist middle ground.

Individualism (of which more below) is committed to an analysisof joint action such that ultimately a joint action consists of:(1) a number of singular actions; (2) relations among thesesingular actions. Moreover, the constitutive attitudes involvedin joint actions are individual attitudes; there are no suigeneris we-attitudes.

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By contrast, according to supra-individualists, when a pluralityof individual agents perform a joint action, then the agentshave the relevant propositional attitudes (beliefs, intentionsetc.) in an irreducible ‘we-form’, which is sui generis and assuch not analyzable in terms of individual or I-attitudes.Moreover, the individual agents constitute a new entity, asupra-individual entity not reducible to the individual agentsand the relations among them.

If the starting point for theorists in this strand ofcontemporary philosophy of action is basic joint action (and itsassociated basic collective intentionality), it is by no meansthe endpoint. Specifically, there is the important matter of therelationship between joint action and social institutions. Forexample, while it is a matter of controversy whether or notjoint actions per se necessarily involve rights, duties andother deontic properties, it is self-evident that socialinstitutions do so. Theorists within this recent tradition agreethat joint actions—or perhaps the collective intentionalitydefinitive of joint actions—is at least one of the buildingblocks of social institutions. However, the question remains asto the precise relationship between joint actions (and itsassociated collective intentionality) on the one hand, andsocial institutions on the other.

According to collective acceptance accounts, social institutionsare created and maintained by collective acceptance. Collectiveacceptance accounts are constructivist; institutional facts and,therefore, institutions exist only in so far as they arecollectively believed to exist or are otherwise the content of acollective attitude. Such collective attitudes are not to beunderstood as reducible to individual attitudes or aggregatesthereof. Moreover, collective acceptance is not simply a matterof psychological attitudes standing in some straightforwardcausal relation to the external world as is the case, forinstance, with common or garden-variety intentions, includingthe joint intentions definitive of basic joint actions. The ideais not that a group forms a joint intention to (say) push aboulder up a hill and, thereby, jointly cause the boulder to berelocated to the top of the hill. Rather the notion of aperformative is invoked (Austin 1962).

Examples of performatives are: ‘I name this ship the QueenElizabeth’—as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem;‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’—as occurring in a

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will (Austin 1962: 5). Performative are speech acts which bringabout an outcome in the external world (e.g. that the name ofthe ship is the Queen Elizabeth or that my brother is the ownerof what used to be my watch). Specifically, performatives aresayings which are also doings. In Searle’s terminology, merelysaying something (‘I do’) counts as something else (becoming awife). An important species of performatives are declarativespeech acts (e.g. saying ‘I declare war’ in a certain contextcounts as going to war). A key point about performatives appearsto be that it is by virtue of a convention that saying such andsuch in a given context brings the outcome about (Miller 1984).Accordingly, the outcome depends on collective acceptance (inthe sense of compliance with the convention) and, indeed, tothis extent the outcome is in part constituted by collectiveacceptance (in this sense). Searle himself speaks ofconstitutive rules at this point; rules that have the form ‘Xcounts as Y in context C’.

Searle in fact holds that declaratives have a fundamental rolein the construction of social institutions. Thus he says (Searle2010: 12–13): “With the exception of language itself, all ofinstitutional reality, and therefore, in a sense, all of humancivilization is created by speech acts that have the samelogical form as Declarations.”

Favorite examples of collective acceptance theorists are moneyand political authorities. Thus Tuomela says (Tuomela 2007: 183)‘performative’ collective acceptance must have been in place forsquirrel pelt to become money.”

Searle says (Searle 1995: 91–2): “More spectacular examples areprovided by the collapse of the Soviet empire in the annusmirabilis, 1989. It collapsed when the system of status-functionswas no longer accepted.”

Searle’s theory of social institutions makes use of threeprimitive notions, namely, collective intentionality, statusfunctions and a language with declaratives. I have describeddeclaratives, what of collective intentionality and statusfunctions?

Collective intentionality is for Searle a primitive notionexpressed by locutions such as “we-intend” and embodied (as wesaw above) in joint action. A we-intention is not reducible toan individual intention, or to an individual intention in

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conjunction with other individual attitudes such as individualbeliefs (Searle 1995: 24-6; Searle 2010: Chapter 3). So Searlebelongs to the anti-reductionist camp, albeit he appears not towant to embrace supra-individualism. According to Searle, we-intentions only exist in the heads of individual human agentsand, therefore, do not imply the existence of a ‘super’ agentthat is the possessor of any given we-intention.

An important feature of collective intentionality, as Searleunderstands it, is its ability to impose functions on objects.Searle’s notion of function concerns what it is that a groupcollectively imposes on physical phenomena. For example, ifmembers of a community began to sit on a log then the log wouldin effect have become a bench. So a function—that of being usedto sit on—would have been collectively imposed on a physicalobject.

On Searle’s conception, some functions—such as the function ofbeing a chair—depend on the specific physical properties of theobject on which they are imposed. Thus a log can become a benchonly if it has a certain size and shape. By contrast, the keyfeature of institutional facts is that they involve functionswhich are not able to be imposed simply by virtue of thespecific physical properties of the phenomena on which they areimposed. Rather possession of the function exists by virtue ofthe collective character of the imposition (Searle 1995: 39). Sobeing a chair is not an institutional fact; rather itsfunctionality exists by virtue of its specific physicalproperties. On the other hand, being a medium of exchange is aninstitutional fact; its functionality supposedly exists byvirtue of collective imposition rather than specific physicalproperties.

According to Searle, institutions necessarily involve what hecalls status-function, and something has a status-function—asopposed to a mere function—if it has, or those who use it have,deontic properties (rights and duties) and, therefore, deonticpowers. Thus a police officer has a status-function, andtherefore a set of deontic powers, including rights to stop,search and arrest people under certain conditions. A five dollarbill is a piece of paper (a physical object) the bearers ofwhich have various deontic powers, including the right toexchange the bill for goods to the value of five dollars. Thesestatus-functions, and therefore deontic powers, have beencollectively imposed in the sense that the relevant members of a

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community accept or agree to or otherwise treat the objects orpersons that possess these status-powers as if they do in factpossess them. But in accepting or so treating, for example, thepolice officer as if he has the right to arrest people, thepolice officer comes to have that right. By Searle’s lights, ifno-one ever paid any attention to police officers they wouldcease to have any deontic powers and therefore any status-function; indeed they would cease to be police officers.Similarly, if no-one was prepared to exchange five dollar billsfor goods then these bits of paper would cease to have anystatus-function, and the bearers of them would cease to have anydeontic powers.

In his latest work (Searle 2010) argues that the collectiveacceptance involved in the creation and maintenance of statusfunctions (and, therefore, deontic powers) necessarily involvesdeclaratives. Thus Searle says (Searle 2010: 101): “But when wecount pieces of paper of a particular sort as twenty-dollarbills we are making them twenty dollar bills by Declaration. TheDeclaration makes something the case by counting it as, that, bydeclaring it to be, the case.”

There are a number of objections to Searle’s account includingthe following ones centering on the notion of collectiveacceptance in play and its relation to deontic properties andassociated powers.

Firstly, in invoking declaratives and, therefore, performatives,does not Searle thereby necessarily invoke institutional formsconstitutive of language and, in particular, conventions? If so,does not his account of institutional facts presuppose at thevery least an unexplained social form (convention) and perhapsone that is part and parcel of institutions and, thereby,renders his account to some degree circular?

Secondly, and more generally, does collective acceptance(whether on Searle’s account or other accounts) necessarilygenerate deontic properties in the relevant cases? For example,a set of individuals might use a certain sort of relatively rareshell as a medium of exchange, and do so notwithstanding thefact that no-one had any desire to possess these shellsindependent of the fact that they could be used as a medium ofexchange. In this scenario all that is required is that eachexchanges shells for goods, and goods for shells, intends tocontinue to do so, and believes that all the others do and

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intend likewise. So in Searle’s terms, there has been collectiveimposition of a function, namely, the function of being a mediumof exchange. Moreover, unlike in the above-mentioned example ofa chair, this function does not crucially depend on specificphysical properties of the shells; pretty much any small objectof a consistent shape or color would suffice. Of course it wouldadd greatly to the stability of this arrangement if these shellswere somehow authorized as an official medium of exchange, andif a (rule constituted) system of rights and duties in relationto the exchange of these shells was introduced and enforced.However, such a deontological structure is not seen to be anecessary feature of the system of exchange.

Thirdly, do deontic properties in themselves necessarily implythe actual ability to undertake an institutional role (thepossession of deontic powers, to use Searle’s terminology)?Arguably, even where a deontological framework has been adopted,the relevant deontic properties do not subsume, take the placeof, provide the basis for, or go hand in hand with, thefunction-driven (or ends-directed) actions of the persons inquestion. Consider an incompetent surgeon who is incapable ofperforming a successful operation on anybody, and who largelyavoids doing so or, when he absolutely has to, always ensuresthat he is part of a team comprised of other competent surgeonsand nurses who actually do the work. By virtue of being a fullyaccredited surgeon this person has a set of deontic properties,including the right to perform surgery, and others have deonticproperties in relation to him, including the right that heperforms operations competently and with due diligence.Moreover, these deontic properties are maintained in part by,say, the Royal College of Surgeons, his colleagues and thecommunity. However, the surgeon simply does not possess thesubstantive functional capacities of a surgeon. The deontologyis there but the underlying functional capacities are not.Accordingly, it is arguably false to claim that he is a surgeon.If someone cannot perform, and knows nothing about, surgery heis surely not a surgeon, irrespective of whether he is thepossessor of the highest professional qualification available,is treated as if he were a surgeon, and indeed is widelybelieved to be the finest surgeon in the land; in short,irrespective of whether he is collectively accepted as a surgeonand the relevant institutional raiment of deontic properties isin place.[14]

3. A Teleological Account of Institutions

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As noted above, the central concept in the teleological accountof social institutions is that of joint action (Miller 2001 Chapter2). On the teleological account, joint actions consist of theintentional individual actions of a number of agents directed tothe realization of a collective end. (Note that intentions arenot the same things as ends, e.g. an agent who intentionally andgratuitously raises his armex hypothesi has no end or purpose in doingso.) Importantly, on the teleological account, a collective end—notwithstanding its name—is a species of individual end; it isan end possessed by each of the individuals involved in thejoint action. However it is an end, which is not realized by theaction of any one of the individuals; the actions of all or mostrealize the end. So contra anti-reductionist theorists such asGilbert and Searle, the teleological account holds that jointactions can be analyzed in terms of individualist notions.

Collective ends can be unconsciously pursued, and have notnecessarily been at any time explicitly formulated in the mindsof those pursuing them; collective ends can be implicit in thebehavior and attitudes of agents without ceasing to be ends assuch. Further, in the case of a collective end pursued over along period of time, e.g. by members of an institution overgenerations, the collective end can be latent at a specific pointin time, i.e. it is not actually being pursued, explicitly orimplicitly, at that point in time. However, it does not therebycease to be an end of that institution—which is to say, of thosepersons—even at those times when it is not being pursued.

As we saw above, organizations consist of an (embodied) formalstructure of interlocking roles. These roles can be defined interms of tasks, regularities in action and the like. Moreover,unlike social groups, organizations are individuated by the kindof activity which they undertake, and also by theircharacteristic ends. So we have governments, universities,business corporations, armies, and so on. Perhaps governmentshave as an end or goal the ordering and leading of societies,universities the end of discovering and disseminating knowledge,and so on (Miller 2010: Part B). Here it is important toreiterate that these ends are, firstly, collective ends and,secondly, often the latent and/or implicit (collective) ends ofindividual institutional actors.

On the teleological account, a further defining feature oforganizations is that organizational action typically consistsin, what has elsewhere been termed, a layered structure of joint actions.

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One illustration of the notion of a layered structure of jointactions is an armed force fighting a battle. Suppose at anorganization level a number of “actions” are severallynecessary[5] and jointly sufficient to achieve some collectiveend. Thus the “actions” of the mortar squad destroying enemy gunemplacements, the flight of military planes providing air-coverand the infantry platoon taking and holding the ground might beseverally necessary and jointly sufficient to achieve thecollective end of defeating the enemy; as such these “actions”constitute a joint action. Call each of these “actions” level-two actions. Suppose, in addition, that each of these level-two“actions” is itself—at least in part—a joint action whosecomponent actions are severally necessary and jointly sufficientfor the performance of the level-two “action” in question. Callthese component actions, level-one actions. So the collectiveend of the level-one actions is the performance of the level-two“action”. Thus the individual members of the mortar squadjointly operate the mortar in order to realize the collectiveend of destroying enemy gun emplacements. Each pilot, jointlywith the other pilots, strafes enemy soldiers in order torealize the collective end of providing air-cover for theiradvancing foot soldiers. Finally, the set of foot soldiersjointly advance in order to take and hold the ground vacated bythe members of the retreating enemy force. The actions of eachof the individual foot soldiers, mortar squad members andindividual pilots are level-one actions.

On the teleological account a further feature of many socialinstitutions is their use of joint institutional mechanisms.[8] Examplesof joint institutional mechanisms are the device of tossing acoin to resolve a dispute and voting to elect a candidate topolitical office.

Joint institutional mechanisms consist of: (a) a complex ofdifferentiated but interlocking actions (the input to themechanism); (b) the result of the performance of those actions(the output of the mechanism), and; (c) the mechanism itself.Thus a given agent might vote for a candidate. He will do soonly if others also vote. But further to this, there is theaction of the candidates, namely, that they present themselvesas candidates. That they present themselves as candidates is (inpart) constitutive of the input to the voting mechanism. Votersvote for candidates. So there is interlocking and differentiatedaction (the input). Further there is some result (as opposed toconsequence) of the joint action; the joint action consisting of

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the actions of putting oneself forward as a candidate and of theactions of voting. The result is that some candidate, say,Barack Obama is voted in (the output). That there is a result is(in part) constitutive of the mechanism. That to receive themost number of votes is to be voted in is (in part) constitutiveof the voting mechanism. Moreover that Obama is voted in is nota collective end of all the voters. (Although it is a collectiveend of those who voted for Obama.) However, that the one whogets the most votes—whoever that happens to be—is voted in is acollective end of all the voters, including those who voted forsome candidate other than Obama.

On the teleological account, as on more broadly functionalistaccounts, the definition of an institution will typicallyinclude a description of the human good or social benefit thatit purports to produce. For example, universities purport toproduce knowledge and understanding, language enables thecommunication of truths, marriages facilitate the raising andmoral development of children, economic systems ought to producematerial well-being, and so on. Such goods or benefits arecollective in character.

The notion of a collective good in the context of a teleologicalaccount of social institutions is not that of a public goodfamiliar in economics. Rather a collective good can beunderstood as a good (Miller 2010: Chapter 2): (1) produced,maintained and/or renewed by means of the joint activity ofmembers of organizations (e.g. schools, hospitals, governments,business firms) i.e. by institutional role occupants; (2) madeavailable to the whole community (e.g. food, security, bankingservices); and (3) one which ought to be produced (or maintainedor renewed) and made available to the whole community becausethey are desirable (as opposed to merely desired) and such thatthe members of the community have an (institutional) joint moralright to them (Miller 2010: Chapter 2).

Note that the community in question is not necessarily themembership of a given nation-state or some other politicalcommunity. Rather it is to be understood in terms ofparticipation in an institutional arrangement and, therefore,relativised to the reach of the social institution in question.But some social institutions, e.g. the global economic system oforganizations, transcend national boundaries. Accordingly, theparticipants and, therefore, contributors and bearers of jointrights to the collective goods in question, are not necessarily

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defined in terms of their membership of a nation-state or otherpolitical entity.

If the end realized in joint action, and organizational actionin particular, is not merely a collective end, but also acollective good, then moral properties may well be generated. Inthe first place, the collective good might consist in anaggregate of basic human needs that have been met, as in thecase of welfare institutions. But, arguably, such needs generatemoral obligations; other things being equal, the desperatelypoor (for example) morally ought to be assisted by the ongoing,organized joint action of those able to assist.

In the second place—at the, so to speak, production, as opposedto the consumption, end of joint action—the realization ofcollective ends that are also collective goods may well generatejoint moral rights. It is easy to see why some agents, and notother agents, would have a right to such a good; they are theones responsible for its existence, or continued existence. Inthis connection consider the managers and workers in a factorythat produces cars which are sold for profit. Managers andworkers in the factory—but not necessarily others—have a jointmoral right to be remunerated from the sales of the cars thatthey jointly produced—and not simply on the basis of somecontractual arrangement that they have entered into. It is alsoclear that if one participating agent has a moral right to thegood, then—other things being equal—so do the others. That is,there is interdependence of moral rights with respect to thegood. Moreover, these moral rights generate correlative moralduties on the part of others to respect these rights. Naturallythese prior joint right and duties can be, and are,institutionalized including by way of contract based legalrights and duties that to some extent respect the relativecontributions made by the participants.

This point about joint rights (and correlative duties) can begeneralized across and among institutions so as to generate aweb of interdependence (and hence joint rights and duties).Consider that the participants in any business rely oncommunication, transport, educational, security and otherinfrastructure directly provided by others and indirectlyprovided by all (or most) via taxes.

Unlike the collective acceptance account the teleologicalaccount introduces moral deontology at the ground floor (so to

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speak) and tries to generate institutional deontology on theback of this prior moral deontology. As such it is open to thecharge that moral deontology presupposes institutional forms.The concept of a right, for example, might be held to make nosense outside an institutional environment. Indeed, Searle(Searle 2010: Chapter 8) offers this kind of argument, includingin relation to human rights.

In this section the teleological account of social institutionshas been elaborated. In the following section the so-calledagent-structure question is addressed.

4. Agency and StructureIt is convenient to conceive of social institutions as possessedof three dimensions, namely, structure, function and culture.However, it needs to be kept in mind that this is potentiallymisleading since, as we saw above, there are conceptualdifferences between functions and ends. On some accounts,function is a quasi-causal notion (Cohen 1978 Chapter IX), onothers it is a teleological notion, albeit one that does notnecessarily involve the existence of any mental states (Ryan1970 Chapter 8).

While the structure, function and culture of an institutionprovide a framework within which individuals act, they do notfully determine the actions of individuals. There are a numberof reasons why this is so. For one thing, rules, norms and endscannot cover every contingency that might arise; for another,rules, norms and so on, themselves need to be interpreted andapplied. Moreover, changing circumstances and unforeseeableproblems make it desirable to vest individuals withdiscretionary powers to rethink and adjust old rules, norms, andends, and sometimes elaborate new ones.Inevitably, the individuals who occupy institutional roles arepossessed of varying degrees of discretionary power in relationto their actions. These discretionary powers are of differentkinds and operate at different levels. For example, senior andmiddle level public servants have discretion in the way theyimplement policies, in their allocations of priorities andresources, and in the methods and criteria of evaluation ofprograms. Indeed, senior public servants often exercisediscretion in relation to the formulation of policies. Considerthat Gordon Chase, the New York Health Services Administrator,conceived, developed and implemented the methadone program inNew York in the early 1970s, notwithstanding political

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opposition to it (Warwick 1981, p. 93). Lower echelon publicservants also have discretionary powers. Police officers have tointerpret rules and regulations, customs officers have thediscretionary power to stop and search one passenger rather thananother, and so on.

Traditionally, members of the so-called professions, such asdoctors, lawyers, members of the clergy, engineers andacademics, have enjoyed a very high degree of individualautonomy, notwithstanding their membership of, and regulation byprofessional associations. In recent times they haveincreasingly been housed in large bureaucratic organizations inwhich their professional autonomy has evidently diminishedsomewhat.

So certain categories of individual institutional actors havediscretionary powers and a reasonable degree of autonomy in theexercise of their institutional duties. However, it is not onlythe individual actions of institutional actors that are notfully determined by structure, function and culture. Many jointor cooperative actions that take place in institutions are notdetermined by structure, function or culture. For example, asenior public servant might put together a team of likemindedpeople and they might pursue a specific agenda which is not onedetermined by the prevailing institutional structure, functionor culture, and is even in part inconsistent with them.

It should also be noted that legitimate individual or collectivediscretionary activity undertaken within an institution istypically facilitated by a rational internal structure—includingrole structure—by rational policy and decision makingprocedures, and by a rational institutional culture. Byrational, it is here meant internally consistent, as well asrational in the light of the institution’s purposes. Arguably,the corporate culture in many contemporary corporations, e.g.Enron, is not rational in this sense. In particular, a cultureof greed, recklessness and of breaking the rules is—from thestandpoint of this rationality, as opposed to the rationality ofsome self-interested factions within these organizations—inconsistent with a hierarchical organizational structurepreoccupied with accountability. Accordingly, it is likely thatmany (individual and collective) discretionary judgments will beones that do not contribute to the realization of theinstitution’s purposes, even if they do facilitate the narrowself-interest of individuals and factional elements.

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Aside from the internal dimensions of an institution, there areits external relationships, including its relationships to otherinstitutions. In particular, there is the extent of theindependence of an institution from other institutions,including government. One thinks here of the separation ofpowers among the legislative, executive and judicialinstitutions in the United States of America and elsewhere.

It should be noted that, strictly speaking, independence is notthe same thing as autonomy, but is rather a necessary conditionfor it. An institution possessed of independence from otherinstitutions might still lack autonomy, if it lacked the kindsof rational internal structure and culture noted above. Indeed,internal conflicts can paralyze an institution to the pointwhere it becomes incapable of pursuing its institutionalpurposes. A university, for example, might enjoy independencefrom outside institutions, including government, but might beparalyzed by internal conflict between staff and students. Suchconflict might take the form (in part) of ongoing demonstrationsthat disrupt classes, and thereby prevent lectures and tutorialsfrom being held.

Granted that institutional actors have a degree of discretionarypower, nevertheless, they are constrained by institutionalstructure, and specifically the role structure, of the role thatthey occupy. As is often pointed out, institutional structurealso enables the action of institutional actors. Policeofficers, for example, have significant powers not possessed byordinary citizens. However, a question arises as to the nature of the relationshipbetween institutional structure and the agency of institutionalactors. More specifically, a question arises as to whether ornot one of these is logically prior to the other (or whetherneither is). Thus some theorists, e.g. Emile Durkheim (Durkheim1964) are held to conceive of structure as sui generis in relationto individual agency; and indeed, at least in the case ofstructuralists such as Althusser (Althusser 1971), explanatoryof human ‘agency’. The proposition of structuralists such asAlthusser is that institutional structures (in the sense of astructure of social roles and social norms) are a basic, non-reducible feature of the world and the actions, values, self-images and the like of individual human agents must conform tothese structures because individual agency, properly understood,is in fact constituted by such structures. An individual human

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agent is simply the repository of the roles and values of theinstitutions in which the ‘agent’ lives his or her life. Othertheorists, e.g., arguably Max Weber (Weber 1949) andmethodological individualists, conceive of institutionalstructure as simply an abstraction from the habitual andinterdependent actions of individual human beings actors. Socialreality is wholly compromised of individual human agents andtheir ongoing, patterned interactions; there is no structure assuch. (Theorists such as Durkheim occupy a mid-position in whichthere is both sui generis structure and non-reducible agency;such theorists now confront the problem of conflict betweenstructure and individual agency—which overrides which?)

In relation to this issue Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1976 and1984) has attempted to reconcile the felt reality of individualagency with the apparent need to posit some form ofinstitutional structure that transcends individual agency.

According to Giddens, structure is both constituted by humanagency and is the medium in which human action takes place(Giddens 1976, p. 121). This seems to mean, firstly, thatstructure is nothing other than the repetition over time of therelated actions of many institutional actors. So the structureconsists of: (i) the habitual actions of each institutionalagent; (ii) the set of such agents; and (iii) the relationshipof interdependence between the actions of any one agent and theactions of the other agents. But it means, secondly, that thisrepetition over time of the related actions of many agentsprovides not just the context, but the framework, within whichthe action of a single agent at a particular spatio-temporalpoint is performed. Structure qua framework constrains any givenagent’s action at a particular spatio-temporal point. (Inaddition, and as Giddens is at pains to point out, structure quaframework enables various actions not otherwise possible, e.g.linguistic structure enables speech acts to be performed.)

This seems plausible as far as it goes; however, we are owed anaccount of the interdependence among the actions of differentagents. On a teleological account of institutions thisinterdependence is in large part generated by the ends of theinstitutions.

Here we need to remind ourselves of a characteristic feature ofinstitutions, namely, their reproductive capacity. Institutionsreproduce themselves, or at least are disposed to do so. On the

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teleological account of institutions, this is in large partbecause the members of institutions strongly identify with theinstitutional ends and social norms that are definitive of thoseinstitutions, and therefore make relatively long termcommitments to institutions and induct others into thoseinstitutions.

However, it has been suggested by, for example, Roy Bhaskar(Bhaskar 1979: 44) that this reproduction of institutions is theunintended result of the free actions of institutional actors ininstitutional settings. By way of support for this propositionBhaskar claims that people do not marry to reproduce the nuclearfamily or work to reproduce the capitalist system.

The first point to be made by way of response to Bhaskar is thateven if the reproduction of an institution was an unintendedconsequence of the intentional participation of agents in thatinstitution it would not follow that those agents did not havevarious other institutional outcomes as an end. For example,members of a business might have the maximization of profit asan explicit collective end, even if the reproduction of thecompany was not intended by anyone.

The second point is that having an outcome as an implicit and/orlatent collective end is not equivalent to individually explicitlyintending to bring about that outcome. But it is the former, andnot the latter that is in question. What is the evidence for theformer in relation to Bhaskar’s chosen examples?

It is plausible to assume that in the typical case of a nuclearfamily in a contemporary western setting the couple married inorder to, i.e. having as a collective end to, establish andmaintain a single nuclear family; indeed, such a couple triesalso to ensure that their adult children in turn establish andmaintain nuclear families. Moreover, in their interaction withmembers of other families and with potential fathers, mothers,husbands and wives, let us assume that the married couple inquestion express—often explicitly—not only their own commitmentto their own nuclear family, and to the present or futurenuclear families of their adult children, but to nuclearfamilies in general. Further, where appropriate and possible,such a married couple—let us assumes—often assists members ofother families to establish and maintain their own nuclearfamilies. Arguably, these fairly plausible assumptions, if theyobtain, taken in combination constitute empirical evidence that

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each member of the large set of such typical married individualshas—jointly with each or most of the other members of the set—animplicit and (much of the time) latent collective end toreproduce the institution of the nuclear family.

Similarly, assume that the owners and managers of a company workto maintain the existence of their company and—through training,recruitment and so on—to ensure that it continues beyond theirretirement or resignation. Moreover, assume that in theirongoing interaction with customers and with other businesses,they knowingly—and in the case of sales and marketing personnel,intentionally—establish and maintain specific economicrelationships. More generally—let us assume—they express, oftenexplicitly, not only their commitment to their own business, butto the market system in general. Further, let us assume thatwhere appropriate and possible, they assist in the maintenanceand further development of that system, e.g. by voting for amarket oriented political party. Now consider a set of suchcompanies. Arguably—given these fairly plausible assumptions—each of owner and manager of any of these companies has—jointlywith the others—an implicit and (much of the time) latentcollective end to reproduce the market system.

Further, there are institutions, such as schools and churches,and policymaking bodies, such as governments, that are explicitlyengaged in the enterprise of reproducing a variety of socialinstitutions other than themselves. They contribute to thereproduction of various social institutions by propagating the“ideology” of these institutions, but also by advocating and, inthe case of government, by implementing specific policies toensure the reproduction of these institutions.

Doubtless, unintended consequences—or, more precisely,consequences not aimed at as an end—have an important role inthe life and for that matter, the death, of institutions(Hirschman 1970). Such consequences might include ones producedby evolutionary style causal mechanisms, or ones involved in so-called “hidden hand” mechanisms. (Albeit, as we saw above,“hidden hand” mechanisms are often the product of deliberateinstitutional design, and so their consequences are in a generalsense aimed at by the designers, if not by the participatinginstitutional actors themselves.)

More specifically, habitual action is a necessary feature ofindividual and collective—including institutional—life; and each

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single action performed on the basis of a habit, contributes inturn, and often unintentionally, to the maintenance andreinforcement of that habit. So the fact that institutionalactors necessarily act in large part on the basis of habit meansthat many of their actions unintentionally contribute to thereproduction of the institution. However, this is consistentwith a teleological account of social institutions—since, asnoted above, there are outcomes other than institutionalreproduction, and many of these are outcomes that are clearlyaimed at. Moreover, it is consistent even with a teleologicalexplanation of the reproduction of social institutions, sincethe establishment and periodic justificatory review of habits arethemselves susceptible to teleological explanation.

In this section we have addressed the so-called agent-structureQuestion. Let us now turn in the final section of this entry toa specific normative aspect of institutions, namely theirconformity or lack of it with principles of distributivejustice.

5. Social Institutions and Distributive JusticeJustice is an important aspect of many, if not all, socialinstitutions. Market economies, salary and wage structures, andtax systems, judicial systems, prisons, and so on are all inpart to be evaluated in terms of their compliance withprinciples of justice.

Here it is important to distinguish the concept of justice from,on the one hand, the related concept of a right—especially ahuman right—and from goods, such as well-being and utility, onthe other hand. Self-evidently, well-being is not the same thingas justice. However, there is a tendency to conflate justice andrights. Nevertheless, arguably the concepts are distinct; or atleast justice in a narrow relational sense should bedistinguished from the concept of a right. Genocide, forexample, is a violation of human rights—specifically, the rightto life—but it is not necessarily, or at least principally, anact of injustice in a relational sense. A person’s rights can beviolated, irrespective of whether or not another—or indeedeveryone—has suffered a rights violation. However, injustice inthe relational sense entails unfairness as among persons orgroups; injustice in this sense consists in the fact thatsomeone has suffered or benefited but others have not (and thereis no adequate justification for this state of affairs).Although the concept of a right and the concept of justice (in

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this sense) are distinct, violations of rights are typicallyacts of injustice (and vice-versa).

Moreover, the concept of justice is itself multi-dimensional.Penal justice (sometimes referred to as retributive justice),for example, concerns the punishment of offenders for theirlegal and/or moral offences, and is to be distinguished fromdistributive justice. Thus it is a principle of penal justice,but not distributive justice, that the guilty be punished andthe innocent go free.

Distributive justice is essentially a relational phenomenon todo with the comparative distribution of benefits and burdens asamong individuals or groups, including the distribution ofrights and duties but not restricted to the distribution ofrights and duties, e.g. the injustice of excluding blacks (butnot whites) from voting in elections to determine the nationalgovernment in apartheid South Africa or of lower wages beingpaid to women than those paid to men for the same work. (Theseare also instances of rights violations.)

On the view of distributive justice being propounded here,justice is but one moral value and distributive justice but onedimension of justice. Accordingly, it is always an open questionwhether or not some action or policy required by the principlesof distributive justice is morally required all things considered.

Distributive justice is an important aspect of most, if not all,social institutions; the role occupants of most institutions arethe recipients and providers of benefits, e.g. wages, consumerproducts, and the bearers of burdens, e.g. allocated tasks and,accordingly, are subject to principles of distributive justice.Moreover, arguably some institutions, perhaps governments, haveas one of their defining ends or functions, to ensure conformityto principles of distributive justice in the wider society.However, distributive justice does not appear to be a definingfeature, end or function of all social institutions. By this I donot mean that some social institutions are unjust, e.g. theinstitution of slavery; though clearly many are. Rather I amreferring to the fact that a number of social institutions, suchas the English language or even the institution of theuniversity, are not defined—normatively speaking—in terms ofjustice, but rather by some other moral value(s), e.g. truth.Communication systems, such as human languages, are arguablydefined in part in terms of the end of truth, but not in terms

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of justice; hence, a communicative system would cease to be acommunication system if its participants never attempted tocommunicate the truth, but not if its participants failed torespect principles of distributive justice, e.g. in terms of thenumber of occasions on which particular speakers were allowed tospeak.

The principles of distributive justice can be applied at anindividual level, at an intra-institutional level, at a societallevel and at a global level. If principles of distributivejustice are applied at an individual level then the questionsarises as to the scope of the application: Is it, for example,the individuals who happen to occupy a neighborhood, theindividuals who comprise a society, the individuals who comprisethe human race, or some other demarcated set of individuals?

Moreover, if the principles of distributive justice are appliedat an institutional level then an analogous question arises inrelation to the scope of the application: Is it, for example, aparticular institution or a structure of institutions? If thelatter, Is it the institutional structure of a society or theglobal institutional structure? Famously, John Rawls addressedand privileged the question of the distributive justice of thestructure of institutions in a given (liberal democratic)society (Rawls (1972) and (1999)). Arguably, this is a somewhatnarrow focus, whatever one thinks of the specific account ofdistributive justice that Rawls elaborated in relation to thestructure of institutions at the societal level. Why is it not,for example, important to focus on the application of principlesof distributive justice in relation to the global structure of,say, political and economic institutions? At any rate, ourconcern here is with the application of the concept ofdistributive justice at the institutional level (though notnecessarily only with respect to the structure of institutionswithin a given society, let alone liberal democratic society).The contrast here is between the institutional level and theindividual level. However, it is important to determine whatthis distinction consists in.

Justice is a moral (relational) property and as such, I suggest,is only properly applied either to the actions of individual humanbeings or to the relations among individual human beings, includingtheir relative wealth, status and power. More specifically, asocial entity or relation among social entities is not per sejust or unjust, notwithstanding that in ordinary speech social

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entities and their relations to one another are said to be justor unjust, e.g. the USA is sometimes said to be an unjustsociety. Rather claims ascribing justice or injustice to socialentities and/or their relations are translatable into claimsregarding the actions of, and relations among, individual humanbeings, e.g. the distribution of income among the individualcitizens of the USA is unjust.

Given this individualistic conception of justice (and of moralproperties more generally) how is a distinction to be maintainedbetween the application of principles of distributive justice atan institutional level, on the one hand, and at an individuallevel, on the other? Quite simply put, by helping ourselves tothe concept of an institutional role occupant (and therelations, actions and effects on role occupants qua roleoccupants).

Institutional role occupants are individual human persons.However, they are individual human persons who happen to occupyone or more institutional roles, including in contemporarynation-states the role of citizen. As such, they have certaininstitutional rights and duties, in the manner adumbrated inearlier sections of this entry.

Accordingly, an institution is in some respect or on someoccasion unjust in one of two main ways, intra-institutionallyunjust and externally institutionally unjust. An institution isin some respect or on some occasion intra-institutionally unjust if arole occupant(s) of this institution qua role occupant(s) ofthis institution: (a) stands in an unjust relation to some otherrole occupant(s) within this institution qua role occupant(s) ofthis institution or (b) performs an action(s) that is unjust tosome role occupant(s) of this institution qua role occupant ofthis institution. For example, a company in which the CEO’ssalary is 50 times the wage of the lower echelon workers isprima facie unjust in respect of its system of rewards.

An institution is in some respect or on some occasion externallyunjust if a role occupant(s) of this institution qua role occupantof this institution: (a) stands in an unjust relation to someother non role occupant(s) of this institution; or (b) performsan action(s) that is unjust to some non role occupant of thisinstitution, e.g. the members of a parliamentary cabinet jointlydecide to remove the minimum wage level in the interests of

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economic growth and notwithstanding that this policy willfurther impoverish the least well-off.

Accordingly, the unjust actions of, and unjust relations among,ordinary human beings are actions and relations at theindividual non-institutional level by virtue of not being acts of,and relation among, individuals qua institutional roleoccupants. Thus if a group of wealthy entrepreneurs buy a large(but allowable) number of tickets to soccer matches in somenational league and then sell them at grossly inflated prices towealthy soccer fans (again, this is allowable) then arguablythere has been an injustice to the relatively impoverishedsoccer fans who would otherwise have been able to afford thesetickets and attend the matches of their beloved home teams.However, these are not acts of injustice at the institutionallevel, since there are no institutional actors involved in thisinjustice.

Notice that on the account of the distinction between theinstitutional and the individual levels of just/unjust actionsand relations, if a role occupant (acting qua role occupant)treats some non-role occupant unjustly then this is, nevertheless,an injustice at the institutional level. So if the members of anapartheid government refuse to enact legislation giving the voteto (currently unenfranchised) blacks then this is aninstitutional injustice.

Note also that on this way of drawing the distinction it doesnot matter whether the institution in question is an intra-societal institution, e.g. an institution within a nation-stateor an extra-societal, including global institution, e.g. theUnited Nations.

On the other hand, this way of drawing the distinction betweenthe individual and the institutional level of the application ofprinciples of distributive justice assumes that some relevantinstitution has been established. However, it is possible thatthere are in fact no institutions designed to deal with somepressing issue of distributive justice and, therefore, noinstitutional role occupants to rectify the injustice. Surely,it might be argued, such an injustice is an injustice at theinstitutional level. I suggest that such cases are not cases ofthe injustice of institutions per se, but rather of theinjustice of the absence of institutions. Such cases point to theneed to make a threefold, rather than a merely twofold,

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distinction in this area: (i) injustice at the individual level;(ii) injustice at the institutional level; (iii) injustice atthe individual level that is of such magnitude as to warrant theestablishment of an institution.

It might further be argued that a crucial factor in all this hasbeen ignored, namely, groups of individuals, e.g. socio-economicclasses, ethnic and gender-based groups. The application ofprinciples of distributive justice at the institutional levelis, or ought to be, in large part the application of suchprinciples not so much to individuals per se, but to groupswhose members are known to be, say, systemically discriminatedagainst. Doubtless, much injustice is group-based. To the extentthat institutional actors are themselves guilty of group-basedinjustice, e.g. politicians whose policies discriminate againstindigenous people, employers who exploit young workers in termsof pay and conditions, then this is a matter of injustice at theinstitutional level, as this notion has been characterizedabove. However, there is a further point at issue here.

Group-based injustices can exist primarily at the individuallevel rather than primarily at the institutional level. Somegroups of individuals might have significant advantages in thecompetition for scarce goods, such as wealth, power and status,by virtue of their greater initial wealth, their access tosocial networks etc. and so on. That is, they have no formalinstitutional advantages. Moreover, it is not self-evident thata given institution, e.g. corporation, university, medical orlegal profession etc., is unjust simply by virtue of the factthat some groups enjoy informal and highly generic advantages inrelation to the competition for access to and progress withinthe institution in question; surely it is too much to insistthat every institution must ensure complete equality ofopportunity if it wants to avoid the charge of injustice.

However, it might be argued that this line of argument fails toaccommodate group-based injustices of the kind in question.Indeed, the Rawlsian difference principle might be invoked atthis point; the system of institutional arrangements within asociety taken as a whole should work to the advantage of theleast advantaged.

In response to this, I suggest that such group-based injustices,if injustices they be, are not necessarily injustices at theinstitutional level, but rather might well be injustices at the

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individual level. Nevertheless, they might be injustices at theindividual level that are of such a magnitude that they need tobe addressed institutionally. However, they are not injusticesin respect of which there is no relevant remedial institution inexistence. Rather existing institutions, especially governments,are presumably obliged to formulate appropriate policies to dealwith such group-based injustices. Such policies might includedeath duties and/or tax scales with very high marginal rates oftaxation at the top end of the scale.

On the other hand, if such group-based injustices are in factthe result of the practices or structures of institutions (takenindividually or collectively) within the society then they wouldconstitute injustices at the institutional level. For example,if the quality of educational preparation necessary to become adoctor or lawyer was in fact only available to the very rich,then arguably the educational institutions themselves areunjust, i.e. there is injustice at the institutional level. Inmany societies socio-economic group-based injustices exist atboth the individual and the institutional level. That is,relevant institutions are both failing to take steps to redressprior group-based injustices at the individual level and furtherexacerbating those injustices by adding another layer ofinjustice at the institutional level.

There is a category of institutions in respect of which thedistinction between group-based individual injustices andinjustices at the institutional level collapses, namely,institutions that have as a defining purpose to redress large-scale distributive injustices in the wider society, i.e.governments.

The assumption here is that the institutional end of governmentgoes beyond protecting human rights to, for example, life andliberty, and providing necessary means to the realization ofthose rights, e.g. basic health, education and conditions of lawand order that enable citizens to pursue their variousindividual and collective projects. For, as we have seen, theconcept of a right, especially a human right, needs to bedistinguished from the concept of justice, includingdistributive justice; and the realization of human rights is amore pressing moral imperative than compliance with theprinciples of distributive justice.

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On the other hand, minimalist conceptions of the institution ofgovernment might stop short of advocating a major role forgovernment in applying principles of distributive justice in thewider society.

A further question that arises here pertains to the putativeobligation of governments to protect the human rights ofcitizens of other states (or for that matter, non-citizens).Arguably, all individuals and institutions, includinggovernments, have a moral obligation to protect human rights,e.g. not to violate the right to life or liberty. And some ofthese human rights evidently include positive rights to securityand the provision of basic necessities, such as food and water.Some have argued that there are no such obligations on the partof governments, other than to their own citizens. This viewmight prove difficult to sustain, given that the principle notto infringe a human right applies universally, and given thatthe notion of a human right cannot easily be restricted to so-called negative rights, i.e. cannot easily be restricted torights not to be interfered with.

Perhaps ironically, a conception of the institution ofgovernment that is minimalist in respect of the nature of itsobligations, i.e. government exists only to protect the humanrights of its citizens, might generate (presumably unwittingly)maximalism in respect of the scope of those obligations, i.e.other things being equal, the government has an obligations toprotect the human rights of all, whether they be its citizens ornot. Naturally, other things are not equal, e.g. there arepracticalities and a certain division of labor in respect of theprotection of the human rights of different groups. Australia,for example, cannot presumably be expected to protect the humanrights of the Tibetans, given the relative power of China vis-à-vis Australia. On the other hand, Australia might be reasonablyexpected to intervene to protect the human rights of the EastTimorese.

Some (Blake 2001) have argued: (a) that a liberal democraticgovernment has a moral obligation to ensure respect for thehuman rights of its own citizens and others alike, but only hasmoral obligations to ensure that its own citizens comply withprinciples of distributive justice (specifically, the(controversial) Rawlsian difference principle), and (b) that thereason for this is that its own citizens alone are legitimatelysubject to the coercive authority of the government. The latter

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claim (b) is open to question (Anderson (1999)). No doubtcitizens subject to the coercive authority of a government havea moral right to political rights, e.g. a right to vote and tostand for political office; they relinquish a degree of theirindividual autonomy in favor of a degree of jointly heldautonomy (as well as (at least) protection of their humanrights, and law and order). However, it is difficult to see whycitizens being subject to the coercive authority of a government(willingly or, for that matter, unwillingly) generates a moralobligation on the part of the government in question to applyprinciples of distributive justice—specifically, thecontroversial Rawlsian difference principle—to the interactionsamong the citizens.

On the other hand, arguably, the coercive authority ofgovernment does generate a moral obligation on the part ofgovernment to enforce respect for contracts among citizens thatare freely entered in to. For the latter are expressions of theautonomy of citizens, and in accepting the coercive authority ofthe government, citizens have relinquished a further aspect oftheir individual autonomy, namely their individual rights toenforce the contracts that they freely enter in to.

In conclusion, a final point about liberal democraticgovernments and distributive justice. There is at least oneimportant and uncontroversial principle of distributive justicethat arises in the context of collective enterprises (jointaction); namely that, other things being equal, the benefitsproduced by joint actions should flow back to those whoperformed the joint action. Let us assume that inevitablycitizens of a given polity participate in collectiveenterprises; whereas this is not necessarily the case forindividuals who are not citizens of the same polity. (In thecontemporary globalizing world this assumption is increasinglyimplausible; but let us grants it for the sake of argument.)Surely this principle of distributive justice, if any, should beenforced by governments in relation to their own citizens butnot in relation to non-citizens. Perhaps, at any rate, one keytest of this proposition is whether or not individuals would bemorally entitled to enforce such a principle of distributivejustice in the absence of government. If the answer is in theaffirmative, i.e. individuals have a “natural” right to enforcethis principle of distributive justice, then presumablygovernments have a right to enforce it; after all, as we haveseen above, according to liberal democratic theory individuals

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relinquish to government whatever pre-existing moral rights toenforcement they might have had.

What if the answer to our question is in the negative; does itfollow that the government has no moral right to enforce thisprinciple of distributive justice? Not necessarily. For onething enforcement of such a principle of distributive justice isnot necessarily the violation of a human right; if it were, thiswould be a moral constraint on governmental action in thisregard. For another thing, in the context of a liberaldemocratic state citizens can make legitimate joint decisions—via their representative governments—that are simply unavailableto them when they are functioning as lone individuals; and oneof these joint decisions might well be to enforce such aprinciple of distributive justice in their society on thegrounds that it is a weighty moral principle the enforcement ofwhich is morally required.

Now consider—as is in fact the case—a world in which many jointeconomic enterprises are in fact trans-societal, e.g. a multi-national corporation. Naturally, the citizens of differentsocieties (polities)—or at least their representativegovernments—might also make a joint decision to (jointly)enforce this principle of distributive justice in relation totrans-societal joint economic enterprises involving citizensfrom both polities, e.g. wages in a poor society would need toreflect the contribution of the wage-earner to the overallbenefits produced by the multi-national corporation. And if thecitizens are committed on moral grounds to the enforcement ofthis principle of distributive justice in relation to intra-societal economic interactions, it is difficult to see why theyshould not be likewise committed to it in trans-societal economicinteractions.

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Figure 5:

GovernmentA government is an institution entrusted with making andenforcing the rules of a society as well as with regulatingrelations with other societies. In order to be considered agovernment, a ruling body must be recognized as such by thepeople it purports to govern. A person or group that considersitself the leading body of a society has no power if the membersof the society do not recognize the person or group as such.

Types of GovernmentsMost of the world’s governments fall into one of fourcategories: monarchy, democracy, authoritarianism, ortotalitarianism.

MonarchyMonarchy is a political system in which a representative fromone family controls the government and power is passed onthrough that family from generation to generation. Most of theworld’s monarchies are constitutional monarchies, in which thereigning member of the royal family is the symbolic head ofstate but elected officials actually do the governing. ManyEuropean countries have constitutional monarchies.Example: Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. Until recently it was an absolute monarchy,meaning that the king had complete control of the country. The Saud royal familyintroduced a constitution in 1992.

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DemocracyDemocracy is a political system in which citizens periodicallychoose officials to run their government.Example: El Salvador has a democratic form of government. Throughout most of thenineteenth century, El Salvador was beset by revolution and war, and from 1931 to1979 it was ruled by military dictators. From 1980 to 1992, the country was torn apartby civil war. The country currently has a stable government and elected president.

AuthoritarianismAuthoritarianism is a political system that does not allowcitizens to participate in government.Example: Zimbabwe is controlled by an authoritarian leader whose human rightsviolations and disastrous economic policies have brought on internationalcondemnation. However, not all authoritarian governments are outcasts. China has anauthoritarian government, but it is a member of the World Trade Organization and amajor player in international politics.

Authoritarian or Totalitarian?There is disagreement among theorists about the exact differencebetween authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Both tend to usebrutal tactics to suppress perceived opposition. Totalitariangovernments, however, extend their control into virtually allaspects of people’s lives and feature a “cult of personality”around their leader.

TotalitarianismTotalitarianism is a political system under which the governmentmaintains tight control over nearly all aspects of citizens’lives.Example: Cambodia under the regime of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge from 1976 to1978 was totalitarian. Under the banner of socialism, Pol Pot attempted a radicalreformation of Cambodia. He forced the evacuation of the country’s cities andrelocated citizens to communal farms in the countryside, where they were to be“reeducated” to become part of an idealized communist agrarian society. Pol Pot’ssecret police tortured and murdered over a million “dissenters”, especially those heviewed as urban intellectuals.

U.S. PoliticsIn the early years of America’s nationhood, individualism andindividual rights were valued above all else. Citizens of theUnited States wanted as little governmental interference intheir lives as possible and believed that people should be freeto make of their lives whatever they could. Today, most peoplein the United States recognize the need for government controlof such things as schools, roads, and national defense, but

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citizens disagree about where to draw the line when it comes tothe size and scope of government’s involvement.

The Welfare StateA welfare state is a type of government in which the stateprovides for and promotes the social and economic well-being ofits citizens. The government provides some sort of socialinsurance, or benefits, for families or individuals in direneed. The welfare state also includes provisions for governmentfunding of education, health services, and housing.

Since the Great Depression and the New Deal, the United Stateshas greatly increased the welfare programs it offers to itscitizens. The amount the United States spends on welfare,however, is still much smaller than the amount spent by otherWestern nations. In 1996, Congress ended the federal publicassistance that guaranteed some income to all poor Americans.

Party PoliticsThe United States has a two-party political system, in which theDemocratic Party and the Republic Party are the dominantpolitical forces. The Democratic Party believes that the government should play

an active role in promoting the general welfare of thecountry and takes a liberal stand on social issues.

The Republican Party believes that the government should takea limited role in providing social services and takes aconservative stand on social issues.

Weber’s Power TheorySociologist Max Weber identified power—the ability to achieveends even in the face of resistance—as the foundation ofgovernment. Getting people to comply with a government’s rulealso requires authority, which is power people believe is just.Weber labeled three kinds of authority: traditional authority,which rests on well-established cultural patterns; rational-legal authority, which rests on rules and laws; and charismaticauthority, which depends on the personal magnetism of oneperson.

Governments in ConflictConflicts in governments generally take three forms:

1. Revolution: A violent overthrow of the government by itscitizens. Often, a group of charismatic philosophers andintellectuals sparks the movement.

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2. War: Armed conflict between nations or societies. Societieshave always waged war over rights to land and resources orbecause of conflicting moral, political, or religiousobjectives. In the twentieth century, the nature of warchanged dramatically with the development of nuclearweapons. Massive stockpiling of weapons of mass destructionhas made the threat of global annihilation a strongdeterrent to war among industrialized nations.

3. Terrorism: A politically motivated violent attack oncivilians by an individual or group. Since few nations havethe military strength to attack the United States directly,terrorism by extremist groups within and outside thecountry has become an increasingly potent threat.

Social Welfare AgenciesSocial Welfare Agencies in the US and around the world are atthe tips of your fingers. If you’re looking for employment insocial work, a volunteer position, or if you are looking for ahelping hand, start your search here. There are social welfareagencies on local, national and international levels. Religiousgroups have charity organizations as well. One of these is theCatholic Church, which has a plethora of such groups.

There are many different kinds of social welfare agencies outthere. There are social welfare agencies that offer an array ofservices, varying from help for domestic abuse situations, tohealth issues, to world hunger and beyond. To help you specifythe area of social welfare you would like to get informationfrom, a list of organizations follows.

An inspiration to many people in charity work is the late MotherTheresa. A story shared in the book, Mother Theresa In My OwnWords, by Jose Luis Gonzalez-Balado, is an example of the kindof compassion she inspires.

“Some years ago Calcutta experienced a great shortage of sugar.One day, a boy of about four years old came to see me with hisparents. They brought me a small container of sugar.

When they handed it to me the little one said to me: I havespent three days without eating any sugar. Take it. This is foryour children.’

The little one loved with an intense love. He expressed it bypersonal sacrifice. I repeat: he was no more than three or four

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years old. He could hardly say my name. I did not know him I hadnever seen him before. Nor did I know his parents. The boy madethat decision after he found out, from the grownups, about mysituation.”

National Agencies America’s Charities (http://www.charities.org/) Independent Charities of America - over 400 national

charities (http://www.independentcharities.org/default.html)

Health and Medical Research Charities of America(http://www.hmr.org/)

Misc. Agencies Local Independent Charities (http://www.lic.org/) Charities @ Work - Home Page

(http://www.charitiesatwork.org/index.html) Charities @ Work Site Guide

(http://www.charitiesatwork.org/siteguide.html) CharityWeb - Web-based Fundraising for Charities

(http://www.charityweb.net/) United Kingdom Charities (http://www.uk-charities.org/) Kosair Charities Homepage (http://www.kosair.org/) Charities Direct - Home Page

(http://www.caritasdata.co.uk/)

Catholic Agencies Cleveland Catholic Charities Home Page

(http://www.cathcharitiescle.org/) Catholic Charities Archdiocese of Boston

(http://www.ccab.org/) Catholic Charities - Home (http://www.ccaoc.org/index.html)

“We should learn how to give. But we should not regard giving asan obligation, but a desire.” --Mother Theresa.

By Ursulla Schiller (Uschille@niu.edu). Nov. 20, 1998.

Northern Notes from Northern Illinois UniversityTo other student pages prepared by the NIU journalism program‘sintermediate news writing class.

Types of Social Institutions Economic Institutions Political Institution

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Family Institution Educational Institution Religious Institution Medical Social Welfare Institution

C. Social WelfareA Functional Definition of Social Welfare

This view argues that for society to survive, individualsmust function as interdependent units, each carrying outthe full range of his or her roles and responsibilities

To ensure a functional society, human kind has establishedsocial institutions.

Types of Social Welfare

While it is government that now has the prime responsibility forsocial welfare, the private sector continues to play animportant role in the provision of social welfare.

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Figure 6:how

welfareprovides

forcitizensthroughprivateand

publicsocialwelfare

We should distinguish between public and private social welfare.

Public social welfare: Canada is a federal state. This means there are three levels;federal, provincial, and municipal all of which play a role inpublic social welfare. There are also public non-governmentagencies, advisory boards and appeal boards. Not only isgovernment involved, but also parliament, the bureaucracy, andjudiciary and political parties, all of which play a role insocial welfare, from the formulation of social welfare policy toadministration.

Private social welfare: is provided by non-profit or not-for-profit, and commercial or for-profit firms. Many social agenciesor organizations are incorporated as non-profit companies. Theyreceive funds from one of the levels of government, as well asprivate donations to carry on their work. They may also receivefunds through contracts to carry out work on behalf of a privatecompany or government.

Commercial, or for-profit, agencies are prevalent in the nursinghomes, industry and in-home care. Services are purchasedprivately by individuals or they are purchased by governments. Industrial welfare is a third type of welfare available throughemployment. Everything from dental plans, and optical plans toon site counseling programs are available.

It is all of these forms of social welfare which taken togetherare referred to as the Welfare State.

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D. WelfareWelfare refers to a broad discourse which may hold certainimplications regarding the provision of a minimal level ofwellbeing (quality of life) and social support for all citizens.In most developed countries, welfare is largely provided by thegovernment, in addition to charities, informal social groups,religious groups, and inter-governmental organizations. In theend, this term replaces “charity” as it was known for thousandsof years, being the act of providing for those who temporarilyor permanently could not provide for themselves. In a moregeneral sense, welfare also means the well-being of individuals ora group - in other words, their health, happiness, safety,prosperity, and fortunes.

Welfare programs have included: Early welfare programs in providing welfare payments to the

poor the establishment of retirement homes, public clinics, and

pauper’s graveyards the system of workhouses. Providing work and stimulating the economy through public

spending on projects, rather than on cash payment. New welfare programs have integrated the multidimensional,

social risk management, and capabilities approaches intopoverty alleviation. They focus on income transfers andservice provisions while aiming to alleviate both long- andshort-term poverty through, among other things, education,health, security, and housing. Unlike previous programsthat targeted the working class, new programs havesuccessfully focused on locating and targeting the verypoorest.

Guarantee some income

In the following readings we find more of how welfare programsof governments derived from government policies are implementedby SWIs within economic and political structures.

1 Forms of Welfare

Welfare can take a variety of forms, such as monetary payments,subsidies and vouchers, health services, or housing. Welfare canbe provided by governments, non-governmental organizations, or a

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combination of the two. Welfare programs may be funded directlyby governments, or in social insurance models, by the members ofthe welfare scheme.

Welfare systems differ from country to country, but welfare iscommonly provided to individuals who are unemployed, those withillness or disability, the elderly, those with dependentchildren, and veterans. A person’s eligibility for welfare mayalso be constrained by means testing or other conditions.

Subsidy Subsidizing a good is one way of redistributing wealthto the poor. It is money that is paid usually by a government tokeep the price of a product or service low or to help a businessor organization to continue to function. In a budget constraintbetween ‘all other goods’ and a ‘subsidized good’, the maximumamount of ‘all other goods will remain the same but the budgetconstraint will shift outward for the ‘subsidized good’ becausethe cost of the ‘subsidized good’ is reduced for the consumerand so they have the ability to consume more of said good. Somepeople do not want to use subsidies because they want the poorto consume the subsidized good or service in a specific way orbecause subsidizing goods (such as health care) can lead to anover consumption of the good.

Voucher A voucher is like a subsidy that can only be consumed ina specific way like a school voucher or section 8 housing. Forinstance, families who receive school vouchers may only use themto send their children to schools to help pay tuition costs.Schools then exchange the voucher for cash. Similarly, insection 8 housing, families with this voucher can only use thevoucher to pay a portion of their living costs in specifiedunits or in a private sector. In a budget constraint between‘all other goods’ and a ‘voucher good’ our budget constraintwill shift out parallel to an amount equal to the amount of thevoucher but the money we have to spend on ‘all other goods’remains capped at the same amount we had to spend before thevoucher. Voucher programs can make us worse off because of thecap on our ability to spend on ‘all other goods’ ourindifference curves could limit us.

Direct Cash This is straight cash with no restrictions on how itcan be consumed. Direct cash may cause greater budget constraintbecause the recipient can spend the cash subsidy on all ‘othergoods’ or on a ‘subsidized good’. Direct cash increases the

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entire budget constraint and shifts the indifference curvesoutward allowing us to maximize individual utility.

2 Provision and funding of welfare

Welfare may be provided directly by governments or theiragencies, by private organizations, or by a combination. Theterm welfare state is used to describe a state in which thegovernment provides the majority of welfare services; the phrasealso describes those services collectively.

Welfare may be funded by governments out of general revenue,typically by way of redistributive taxation. Social insurance-type welfare schemes are funded on a contributory basis by themembers of the scheme. Contributions may be pooled to fund thescheme as a whole, or reserved for the benefit of a particularmember. Participation in such schemes is either compulsory, orthe program is subsidized heavily enough that most eligibleindividuals choose to participate.

Examples of social insurance programs include the Social Security and Medicare programs in the United States.

Some opponents of welfare argue that it affects work incentives.They also argue that the taxes levied can also affect workincentives. A good example of this would be the reform of theAid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. PerAFDC, some amount per recipeint is guaranteed. However, forevery dollar the recipient earns the monthly stipend isdecreased by an equivalent amount. For most persons, thisreduces their incentive to work. This program was replaced byTemporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF). Under TANF, people wererequired to actively seek employment while receiving aid andthey could only receive aid for a limited amount of time.However, states can choose the amount of resources they willdevote to the program. Some people believe this is how we shouldreform Medicaid.

3 Ethnic heterogeneityIt has been argued that the main reason the United States doesnot have welfare state similar to that in Europe is the greaterethnic heterogeneity in the United States. Reluctance toredistribute to other ethnic groups is argued to cause this.This has caused debate within the Left which has traditionallybeen both pro-immigration and pro-welfare. Research have found a

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statistically significant but relatively weak negativerelationship between increasing ethnic heterogeneity and supportfor redistribution and welfare as well as the degree of actualpublic spending. Increased ethnic heterogeneity also causes ashift in public spending towards forms that can targeted towardsspecific ethnic groups (“ethnic patronage”). Related to this isthat increased ethnic heterogeneity is also associated withdecreased social trust and social participation in thecommunity.

4 History In the Roman Empire, social welfare to help the poor was

enlarged by the Caesar Trajan. Trajan’s program brought acclaim from many, including Pliny the Younger.[5]

In Jewish tradition, charity (represented by tzedakah) is amatter of religious obligation rather than benevolence. Contemporary charity is regarded as a continuation of the Biblical Maaser Ani, or poor-tithe, as well as Biblical practices, such as permitting the poor to glean the cornersof a field and harvest during the Shmita (Sabbatical year).Voluntary charity, along with prayer and repentance, is believed to ameliorate the consequences of bad acts.

Distributing alms to the poor, abbey of Port-Royal des Champs c. 1710

The Song dynasty (c.1000AD) government supported multiple forms of social welfare programs, including the establishment of retirement homes, public clinics, and pauper’s graveyards [6]

According to Robert Henry Nelson, “The medieval Roman Catholic Church operated a far-reaching and comprehensive welfare system for the poor...”[7][8]

The concepts of welfare and pension were put into practice in the early Islamic law [9] [not in citation given] of the Caliphate as forms of Zakat (charity), one of the Five Pillars of Islam, since the time of the Rashidun caliph Umar in the 7th century. The taxes (including Zakat and Jizya) collected in the treasury of an Islamic government were used to provide income for the needy, including the poor, elderly, orphans,widows, and the disabled. According to the Islamic jurist Al-Ghazali (Algazel, 1058–1111), the government was also expected to store up food supplies in every region in case a disaster or famine occurred.[9][10] (See Bayt al-mal for further information.)

There is relatively little statistical data on welfare transfer payments before the High Middle Ages. In the

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medieval period and until the Industrial Revolution, the function of welfare payments in Europe was principally achieved through private giving or charity. In those early times, there was a much broader group considered to be in poverty as compared to the 21st century.

Early welfare programs in Europe included the English Poor Law of 1601, which gave parishes the responsibility for providing welfare payments to the poor.[11] This system was substantially modified by the 19th-century Poor Law Amendment Act, which introduced the system of workhouses.

It was predominantly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that an organized system of state welfare provision was introduced in many countries. Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany, introduced one of the first welfare systems for the working classes. In Great Britain the Liberal government of Henry Campbell-Bannerman and David Lloyd George introduced the National Insurance system in 1911,[12] a system later expanded by Clement Attlee. The United States did not have an organized welfaresystem until the Great Depression, when emergency relief measures were introduced under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even then, Roosevelt’s New Deal focused predominantly on a program of providing work and stimulating the economy through public spending on projects, rather than on cash payment.

5 Welfare systems in some countries

5.1 FranceSolidarity is a strong value of the French Social Protectionsystem. The first article of the French Code of Social Securitydescribes the principle of solidarity. Solidarity is commonlycomprehended in relations of similar work, shared responsibilityand common risks. Existing solidarities in France caused theexpansion of health and social security.

5.2 GermanyMain article: Hartz_concept#Hartz_IVThe welfare state has a long tradition in Germany dating back tothe industrial revolution. Due to the pressure of the workers’movement in the late 19th century, Reichskanzler Otto vonBismarck introduced the first rudimentary state social insurancescheme. Today, the social protection of all its citizens isconsidered a central pillar of German national policy. 27.6percent of Germany’s GDP is channeled into an all-embracing

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system of health, pension, accident, longterm care andunemployment insurance, compared to 16.2 percent in the US. Inaddition, there are tax-financed services such as child benefits(Kindergeld, beginning at €184 per month for the first and secondchildren, €190 for the third and €215 for each child thereafter,until they attain 25 years or receive their first professionalqualification), and basic provisions for those unable to workor anyone with an income below the poverty line.

Since 2005, reception of full unemployment pay (60-67% of theprevious net salary) has been restricted to 12 months in generaland 18 months for those over 55. This is now followed by(usually much lower) Arbeitslosengeld II (ALG II) or Sozialhilfe, which isindependent of previous employment (Hartz IV concept).

Under ALG II, a single person receives €379 per month plus thecost of ‘adequate’ housing and health insurance. ALG II can alsobe paid partially to supplement a low work income.

5.3 CanadaMain article: Social programs in CanadaCanada has a welfare state in the European tradition; however,it is not referred to as “welfare”, but rather as “socialprograms”. In Canada, “welfare” usually refers specifically todirect payments to poor individuals (as in the American usage)and not to healthcare and education spending (as in the Europeanusage).

The Canadian social safety net covers a broad spectrum ofprograms, and because Canada is a federation, many are run bythe provinces. Canada has a wide range of government transferpayments to individuals, which totaled $145 billion in 2006.[16]

Only social programs that direct funds to individuals areincluded in that cost; programs such as medicare and publiceducation are additional costs.

Generally speaking, before the Great Depression, most socialservices were provided by religious charities and other privategroups. Changing government policy between the 1930s and 1960ssaw the emergence of a welfare state, similar to many WesternEuropean countries. Most programs from that era are still inuse, although many were scaled back during the 1990s asgovernment priorities shifted towards reducing debt and deficit.

5.4 Italy

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Main article: Italian welfare stateThe Italian welfare state’s foundations were laid along thelines of the corporatist-conservative model, or of itsMediterranean variant. Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, increasesin public spending and a major focus on universality brought iton the same path as social-democratic systems. These policiesproved to be financially unsustainable, as public debt andinflation grew alarmingly, preventing the welfare state fromdeveloping completely. In the 1990s, efforts moving towardsdecentralization and privatization were used in an attempt tocope with European pressures for economic stability, which werefinally reached by 2001.

5.5 SwedenMain articles: Swedish welfare and Social Security (Sweden)Sweden has been categorized by some observers[who?] as a middle waybetween a capitalist economy and a socialist economy.[citation needed]

Supporters of this system assert that Sweden has found a way ofachieving high levels of social equality, without stiflingentrepreneurialism. The perspective has been questioned bysupporters of economic liberalization in Sweden.

Government pension payments are financed through an 18.5%pension tax on all taxed incomes in the country, which comespartly from a tax category called a public pension fee (7% ongross income), and 30% of a tax category called employer fees onsalaries (which is 33% on a netted income). Since January 2001the 18.5% is divided in two parts: 16% goes to current payments,and 2.5% goes into individual retirement accounts, which wereintroduced in 2001. Money saved and invested in governmentfunds, and IRAs for future pension costs, are roughly 5 timesannual government pension expenses (725/150).

5.6 JapanMain article: Social welfare in JapanIn Japan, the Oita district ruled on October 18, 2010, thatforeigners with permanent residency have no rights to welfarebenefits.[17][dead link]

5.7 United StatesMain article: Social programs in the United States

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Overall decline in welfare monthly benefits (in 2006 dollars) [18]

The welfare system in the United States began in the 1930s,during the Great Depression. After the Great Society legislationof the 1960s, for the first time a person who was not elderly ordisabled could receive aid from the American government.[19] Aidcould include general welfare payments, health care throughMedicaid, food stamps, special payments for pregnant women andyoung mothers, and federal and state housing benefits.[19] In1968, 4.1% of families were headed by a woman on welfare; by1980, the percentage increased to 10%.[19] In the 1970s,California was the U.S. state with the most generous welfaresystem.[20] Virtually all food stamp costs are paid by the federalgovernment.[21] In 2008, 28.7 percent of the households headed bysingle women were considered poor.[22]

Before the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, welfare was “onceconsidered an open-ended right,” but welfare reform converted it“into a finite program built to provide short-term cashassistance and steer people quickly into jobs.”[23] Prior toreform, states were given “limitless”[23] money by the federalgovernment, increasing per family on welfare, under the 60-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.[24]

This gave states no incentive to direct welfare funds to theneediest recipients or to encourage individuals to go offwelfare (the state lost federal money when someone left thesystem).[25] Nationwide, one child in seven received AFDC funds,[24]

which mostly went to single mothers.[21]

In 1996, under the Bill Clinton administration, Congress passedthe Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity ReconciliationAct, which gave control of the welfare system back to thestates. Because welfare is no longer under the control of thefederal government, there are basic requirements the states needto meet with regards to welfare services. Still, most statesoffer basic assistance, such as health care, food stamps, childcare assistance, unemployment, cash aid, and housing assistance.After reforms, which President Clinton said would “end welfareas we know it,”[21] amounts from the federal government were givenout in a flat rate per state based on population.[25] Each statemust meet certain criteria to ensure recipients are beingencouraged to work themselves out of welfare. The new program iscalled Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).[24] Itencourages states to require some sort of employment search inexchange for providing funds to individuals, and imposes a five-

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year lifetime limit on cash assistance.[21][24][26] The billrestricts welfare from most legal immigrants and increasedfinancial assistance for child care.[26] The federal governmentalso maintains an emergency $2 billion TANF fund to assiststates that may have rising unemployment.[24]

Following these changes, millions of people left the welfarerolls (a 60% drop overall),[26] employment rose, and the childpoverty rate was reduced.[21] A 2007 Congressional Budget Officestudy found that incomes in affected families rose by 35%.[26] Thereforms were “widely applauded”[27] after “bitter protest.”[21] TheTimes called the reform “one of the few undisputed triumphs ofAmerican government in the past 20 years.”[28] However, critics ofthe reforms sometimes point out that the massive decrease ofpeople on the welfare rolls during the 1990s wasn’t due to arise in actual gainful employment in this population, butrather, was due almost exclusively to their offloading intoworkfare, giving them a different classification than classicwelfare recipient. The late 1990s were also considered anunusually strong economic time, and critics voiced their concernabout what would happen in an economic downturn.[21]

Aspects of the program vary in different states. Michigan, forexample, requires recipients to spend a month in a job searchprogram before benefits can begin.[21] Saying that it is “unfairfor Florida taxpayers to subsidize drug addiction”, FloridaGovernor Rick Scott signed the Welfare Drug-Screen Measure whichrequires welfare applicants to undergo drug screening. The lawwent into effect on July 1, 2011. It was later revoked by aFederal Judge.

National Review editorialized that the Economic Stimulus Act of2009 will reverse the welfare-to-work provisions that BillClinton signed in the 1990s, and will again base federal grantsto states on the number of people signed up for welfare ratherthan at a flat rate.[25] One of the experts who worked on the 1996bill said that the provisions would lead to the largest one-yearincrease in welfare spending in American history.[28] The Housebill provides $4 billion to pay 80% of states’ welfarecaseloads.[24] Although each state received $16.5 billion annuallyfrom the federal government as welfare rolls dropped, they spentthe rest of the block grant on other types of assistance ratherthan saving it for worse economic times.[23]

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Eligibility for welfare depends on a variety of factors,including gross and net income, family size, and othercircumstances like pregnancy, homelessness, unemployment, andmedical conditions.

Arguments on the Social and Economic Benefits of WelfareWelfare is a form of social protection, as it is concerned withovercoming adverse situations that affect needy individuals.Although social protection was established to assist the workingclasses and to address transient poverty, it has come toencompass a greater variety of issues surrounding poverty.

The purpose of welfare is to assist individuals in need. Theultimate goal is to lift welfare recipients out of poverty andmake them self-sufficient. Séverine Deneulin and Lila Shahani [29]

have considered welfare as a mode of economic development,terming it the human development and capability approach. Thecapability approach focuses on people and not simply on economicgrowth. While this approach still considers economic growth andmacroeconomic stability, the aim is to “expand what people areable to do and be”. This people-centered focus is “one thatenables people to enjoy a healthy life, a good education, ameaningful job, physical safety, democratic debate and so on”.

Amartya Sen argues that enhancing an individual’s capabilitiesresults in the greater likelihood for individual success andsociety’s success. Enhancing freedoms is one means fordevelopment. Sen discusses “unfreedoms,” which can includefamine, lack of healthcare, and gender discrimination. In thisregard, welfare provides individuals with the basic needsnecessary to live a healthy life with the capability to enjoythe freedoms that are inherently available to all. Therefore, itis essential to note the importance of welfare forunderprivileged individuals who need governmental assistance inthe form of welfare.

Welfare StereotypesWelfare has come to be associated with poverty. Additionally,blacks have overwhelmingly dominated images of poverty over thelast few decades. As Martin Gilens, assistant professor ofPolitical Science at Yale University, states, “white Americanswith the most exaggerated misunderstandings of the racialcomposition of the poor are the most likely to oppose welfare”.This perception possibly perpetuates negative racial stereotypes

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and could increase Americans’ opposition and racialization ofwelfare policies.

In FY 2009, African-American families comprised 33.3% of TANFfamilies, white families comprised 31.2%, and 28.8% wereHispanic. Since the implementation of TANF, the percentages ofblack and Hispanic families have increased, while the percentageof white families has decreased. In 1992, blacks represented37% of those on welfare; by 2002, this number increased slightlyto 38%. In that same time period, the percentage of Hispanicsrose from 18% to 25%. On the other hand, the percentage ofwelfare recipients who were white decreased from 39% to 32% inthat same time frame.

Timeline 1880s-1890s: Attempts were made to move poor people from

work yards to poor houses if they were in search of relief funds.

1893-1894: Attempts were made at the first unemployment payments, but were unsuccessful due to the 1893-1894 recession.

1932: The Great Depression had gotten worse and the first attempts to fund relief failed. The “Emergency Relief Act”,which gave local governments $300 million, was passed into law.

1933: In March 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt pushedCongress to establish the Civilian Conservation Corps.

1935: The Social Security Act was passed on June 17, 1935. The bill included direct relief (cash, food stamps, etc.) and changes for unemployment insurance.

1940: Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) was established.

1964: Johnson’s War on Poverty is underway, and the Economic Opportunity Act was passed. Commonly known as “theGreat Society“

1996: Passed under Clinton, the “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996” becomes law.

5.8 Latin America

5.8.1 HistoryThe 1980s marked a change in the structure of Latin American social protection programs. Social protection embraces three major areas: social insurance, financed by workers and

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employers; social assistance to the population’s poorest, financed by the state; and labor market regulations to protect worker rights. Although diverse, recent Latin American social policy has tended to concentrate on social assistance.

The 1980s had a significant effect on social protection policies. Prior to the 1980s, most Latin American countries focused on social insurance policies involving formal sector workers, assuming that the informal sector would disappear with economic development. The economic crisis of the 1980s and the liberalization of the labor market led to a growing informal sector and a rapid increase in poverty and inequality. Latin American countries did not have the institutions and funds to properly handle such a crisis, both due to the structure of the social security system, and to the previously implemented structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that had decreased the size of the state.

New welfare programs have integrated the multidimensional, social risk management, and capabilities approaches into povertyalleviation. They focus on income transfers and service provisions while aiming to alleviate both long- and short-term poverty through, among other things, education, health, security, and housing. Unlike previous programs that targeted the working class, new programs have successfully focused on locating and targeting the very poorest.

The impacts of social assistance programs vary between countries, and many programs have yet to be fully evaluated. According to Barrientos and Santibanez, the programs have been more successful in increasing investment in human capital than in bringing households above the poverty line. Challenges still exist, including the extreme inequality levels and the mass scale of poverty; locating a financial basis for programs; and deciding on exit strategies or on the long-term establishment ofprograms.

Latin America’s most recent shift in social policiesThe economic crisis of the 1980s led to a shift in social policies, as understandings of poverty and social programs evolved (24). New, mostly short-term programs emerged. These include:[37]

Argentina: Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Bolivia: Bonosol Brazil: Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia

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Chile: Chile Solidario Ecuador: Bono de Desarollo Humano Honduras: Red Solidaria Mexico: Oportunidades (earlier known as Progresa) Panama: Red de Oportunidades Peru: Juntos

Major aspects of current social assistance programs Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) combined with service

provisions. Transfer cash directly to households, mostoften through the women of the household, if certainconditions are met (e.g. children’s school attendance ordoctor visits) (10). Providing free schooling or healthcareis often not sufficient, because there is an opportunitycost for the parents in, for example, sending children toschool (lost labor power), or in paying for thetransportation costs of getting to a health clinic.

Household. The household has been the focal point of socialassistance programs.

Target the poorest. Recent programs have been moresuccessful than past ones in targeting the poorest.Previous programs often targeted the working class.

Multidimensional. Programs have attempted to address manydimensions of poverty at once. Chile Solidario is the bestexample.

CritiquesIncome transfers can be either conditional or unconditional.There is no substantial evidence that conditional transfers aremore effective than unconditional ones. Conditionalities aresometimes critiqued for being paternalistic and unnecessary.

Current programs have been built as short-term rather than aspermanent institutions, and many of them have rather short timespans (around five years). Some programs have time frames thatreflect available funding. One example of this is Bolivia’sBonosol, which is financed by proceeds from the privatization ofutilities—an unsustainable funding source. Some see LatinAmerica’s social assistance programs as a way to patch up highlevels of poverty and inequalities, partly brought on by thecurrent economic system.

Others argue that the effectiveness of the programs relies onthe ability of mostly free-trade oriented economic systems toaddress poverty.

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E. SWIs in GhanaSWIs effectiveness and efficiency performance in Ghana's Social Welfare system--the role of the Ministries

Problems and challenges that hinder SWIs effective and efficientperformance in Ghana are crucial to any study of SWIs in Ghana.How do they ensure that citizens are provided a minimal wellbeing and social support? How do the vulnerable receive healthand human resource development and receive public or privatesocial support delivery?

There are two Ministries in Ghana that link social welfareinstitutions to economic and socio-cultural issues. Theseministries in Ghana are: the Ministry Of Employment and SocialWelfare, and the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs.

What problems and challenges that hinder SWIs effective andefficient performance in Ghana are dealt with by the saidMinistries?

What problems and challenges that hinder SWIs effective andefficient performance in Ghana are dealt with by the saidMinistries?

Examine these Ministries to find what in them provide adequatecapacities to SWIs structures in Ghana to function effectively.

Ministry Of Employment and Social Welfare

The Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare exists to promotesustainable employment opportunities, management and vocationalskills development, training and re-training, harmoniousindustrial relations, safe and group formation and socialintegration of vulnerable, excluded and the disadvantaged forthe development and growth of the economy.

We do this through the formulation and implementation ofpolicies, co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation of theperformance in the sector; guided by our belief in improvedproductivity, efficiency, equity and prompt responsiveness toour clients. The latter comprises the labor force, employers,people with disabilities, the disadvantaged and vulnerable.

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Aims & Objectives: Enshrined in the 1992 Constitution are the rights of allcitizens to work. With this provision, the Ministry has come outwith the following objectives:

promote and encourage an enabling environment foraccelerated growth and employment;

institute special employment schemes for those vulnerablegroups by-passed by the growth process, including theassetless and the unskilled, the extremely poor, and thosefalling victim to the growth process, that is, re-deployed,the retrenched, and the educated unemployed;

promote adequate wage and self-employment opportunities toproductively absorb new entrants into the labor market;

facilitate the process of formalization of employmentthrough appropriate policy intervention;

develop a comprehensive labor market information system andprovision of improved employment services;

ensure safe and healthy working environment in selectedsegments of formal and informal sector;

promote improved labor-management relationships; improve and promote opportunities for technical and

vocational training especially in the rural areas; improve the provision of management and business skills

training; promote the organization of short-term competency-based

and demand-driven vocational training programs; develop a comprehensive National Manpower Development

Policy.

Functions: Vocational Skills Training and Development Employment Generation and Labour Market Relations Co-operative Development Occupational Safety and Health Productivity Improvement Social Welfare and NGO Registration and Co-ordination.

Achievements: Recognizing the high youth unemployment problem, the Ministry isexpanding all its vocational/technical and skills traininginstitutions to maximize their intake. Arrangements have beenmade to open all social welfare training institutions as well asrehabilitation centers for the disabled to the public.

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So far, ten new NVTI institutions and 25 new ICCES facilitieshave been opened in various districts in the rural areas. WithCabinet’s decision to pay salaries of ICCES instructors, thecapacity of ICCES to enroll more youth for training wasincreased.The vocational training curricula have been reviewed to increasetheir relevance to the current labor market. Entrepreneurshipand co-operative programs have been added, and graduates will beexposed to micro-financing to encourage the youth to enter intoself-employment.

There is a new focus on short-term competency-based trainingprograms, which are readily marketable. The curricula alsoinclude processing of prevalent raw materials in the communitiesin which training institutions are located.

To ensure quality standards and relevance in skills training, acollaborative committee made up of NVTI, ICCES, OIC and GhanaNational Association of Private Vocational and TechnicalInstitutions (GNAVTI) has been established to co-ordinate thetraining programs.

Integrated Community Centres for Employable Skills (ICCES) ICCES is currently providing courses of 2-3 years duration invarious trades to eleven thousand eight hundred (11, 800)trainees in ninety-one (91) centers throughout the country. Newshort-term courses have also been introduced. This year, (2002),3,022 trainees are expected to pass out to compared to 2,833 in2001. Studies indicate that 62% of ICCES graduates are self-employed in the rural areas.

A feasibility study has been completed on the viability oftraining the youth in bamboo/rattan craft at Anyinam, Offinso,Akrokerri, Wassa Saa and Assin Jakai.

Opportunities Industrialisation Centre In 2002, one thousand two hundred and eighteen (1,218) traineescompleted training and were awarded certificates at the Accraand Sekondi/Takoradi OIC. Out of the total number were 104 non-literate and semi-literates trained in employablevocational/technical skills through a special outreach programin partnership with Master Craftsmen/women in a projectsponsored by the European Union Commission.

Currently, a total of nine hundred and forty-five (945)

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disadvantaged youth (J.S.S. & S.S.S dropouts and graduates) havebeen enrolled at the O.IC. in Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi.

In addition, one hundred and five (105) non-literate and semi-literate youth have been enrolled in an outreach improvedapprenticeship-training program in partnership with Mastercraftsmen/women, which is being sponsored by EZE of Germany.

The Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs(MOWAC)

Accessed 3/23/2012 from official website of The Ministry ofWomen and Children’s Affairs; http://www.mowacghana.net/

The Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (MOWAC) wasestablished by an Executive Instrument (EI 8) in January 2001.This was as a result of the realization by government that,there was the urgent need for high level sector organization,which will specifically be responsible for coordinating nationalresponse to gender inequality and to promote the implementationof activities that address the rights of women and childrentowards advancing the status of women and the growth, survivaland development of our children.

MOWAC is now therefore the National Women’s Machinery (NWM), astructure that most governments have created to respond to theneed for institutional arrangement for addressing issues onwomen’s advancement. The UN defines National Women’s Machineryas a ‘single body or complex organized system of bodies, oftenunder different authorities, but recognized by the Government asthe institution dealing with the promotion of the status ofwomen’. As a relatively new WM, MOWAC has the opportunity tolearn from challenges that others have overcome and to createdecentralized National machinery that effectively promotes thestatus of women in Ghana.

The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was established inJune 1946 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN.This Commission by its mandate is required to report to theGeneral Assembly through the Council. Successive annual sessionsof the Commission has been devoted to substantive discussions onthe implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the strategicobjectives in each of the (12) twelve critical areas of concernof the Beijing Platform of Action (BPA). MOWAC participates

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actively in meetings of the Commission. MOWAC also presents itsperiodic reports to the CEDAW committee and is currently up todate on its reporting.

The Ministry of Women and Children Affairs has since 2001spearheaded a vigorous national drive to overcome the challengesof gender inequality. With the elevation of the NationalMachinery to a cabinet status and also as a Central ManagementAgency (CMA), gender issues have continued to receive attentionat the highest level of decision making.

MANDATE The mandate of MOWAC is to initiate/formulate policies topromote gender mainstreaming across all sectors that will leadto the achievement of gender equality and empowerment of womenand facilitate the survival, development and growth of children.MOWAC as a Central Management Agency (CMA) with Cabinet statushas the responsibility to monitor policy formulation andprogramme implementation in the sector areas, coordinate cross-sector issues on women and children and evaluate the impact ofsector policies on women and children. The strategic position ofMOWAC lies in the fact that issues related to women and childrenare cross cutting and therefore, require collaborative sectorefforts to achieve desired goals.

VISION The vision of the Ministry is the creation of “a harmonioussociety with equity and equality between male and female sexesin which the survival, protection and development of the childare guaranteed” within the National Policy Framework.

MISSIONMOWAC exists “to enhance its contribution to the development ofGhana by achieving equal status between men and women; tofacilitate enforcement of the rights of women and children; topromote the survival, development, protection of children; andincrease the participation of both women and children in thedevelopment process through skilled and committed staff”.

DEPARTMENTS The Ministry is supported by two main Departments which are theimplementing agencies in the delivery of its mandates. These arethe Department of Women and the Department of Children.

WHO ARE WE?

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The Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs (MOWAC) wasestablished by an Executive Instrument (EI 8) in January 2001.This was as a result of the realization by government that,there was the urgent need for high level sector organization,which will specifically be responsible for coordinating nationalresponse to gender inequality and to promote the implementationof activities that address the rights of women and childrentowards advancing the status of women and the growth, survivaland development of our children.

MOWAC is now therefore the National Women’s Machinery (NWM), astructure that most governments have created to respond to theneed for institutional arrangement for addressing issues onwomen’s advancement. The UN defines National Women’s Machineryas a ‘single body or complex organized system of bodies, oftenunder different authorities, but recognized by the Government asthe institution dealing with the promotion of the status ofwomen’. As a relatively new WM, MOWAC has the opportunity tolearn from challenges that others have overcome and to createdecentralized National machinery that effectively promotes thestatus of women in Ghana.

The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was established inJune 1946 by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN.This Commission by its mandate is required to report to theGeneral Assembly through the Council. Successive annual sessionsof the Commission has been devoted to substantive discussions onthe implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the strategicobjectives in each of the (12) twelve critical areas of concernof the Beijing Platform of Action (BPA). MOWAC participatesactively in meetings of the Commission. MOWAC also presents itsperiodic reports to the CEDAW committee and is currently up todate on its reporting.

The Ministry of Women and Children Affairs has since 2001spearheaded a vigorous national drive to overcome the challengesof gender inequality. With the elevation of the NationalMachinery to a cabinet status and also as a Central ManagementAgency (CMA), gender issues have continued to receive attentionat the highest level of decision making.

POLICIES, PROGRAMMES AND ACTIVITIES

SECTOR MEDIUM TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN:

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MOWAC has recently finalized its 4-year Sector Medium Term Development Plan (SMTDP) 2010 – 2013 with six (6) major stated objectives.

1. To promote Gender mainstreaming and Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB) in MDAs and MMDAs through capacity building

2. To improve the socio-economic status of women and children,the vulnerable and marginalized groups through targeted interventions

3. To enhance evidence-based decision-making on gender equality and women empowerment by collecting gender and sex-disaggregated data in all the districts

4. To protect and promote the development and the rights of women and children through awareness creation and effectiveimplementation of National and International Policy Framework and Legislations

5. To assess progress on the implementation of women and childrelated programmes and projects and evaluate policy outcomes and impact through effective monitoring and evaluation framework to provide inputs for gender and children policy review and planning

6. To create awareness and support the implementation of government’s development policies affecting women and children in Ghana

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:In Ghana, as in most African countries, violence tends to be condoned under certain cultural practices and religious beliefs,particularly when the violence takes place within the home. Domestic Violence (DV) thus remains the most hidden form of violence in Ghana and elsewhere. Some actions to address domestic violence in Ghana include:

Enactment of the Domestic Violence Act (2007), Act 732, which proscribes violence in all forms, punishes perpetrators and provides interventions to rescue and rehabilitate victims of domestic violence;

Establishment of the Domestic Violence (DV) Secretariat to coordinate all interventions on domestic violence in Ghana and to implement the National Plan of Action (NPA) for the implementation of the law;

Inauguration of the Domestic Violence (DV) Management Board(DVMB) to provide technical advice to the Minister on policy issues in tackling DV;

A National Plan of Action which focuses on Coordination, Social Services, Prevention and Protection has been

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developed and launched. Copies of the Policy and National Plan of Action have been disseminated to stakeholders;

Consultative meetings have been held with some development partners for support to which the UN System and the Embassyof the Kingdom of Netherlands (EKN) are currently providingfinancial support for the implementation of the NPA on Domestic Violence.

Establishment of implementation frameworks, mechanisms and guidelines for DV Secretariat and Management Board to coordinate activities outlined in the NPA and DV Policy guidelines;

Facilitation of processes for the development of a Legislative Instrument (LI),

Development of Protocols, strategies, service manuals and other standards of operation to guide capacity development and service delivery;

Undertaking Research and Data collection to develop indicators for monitoring and evaluation of DV issues.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING:Ghana is noted as a destination, transit and origin of human trafficking (HT). Research indicates that about 70% of human trafficking cases are internal with about 78% of victims being children aged between 6-15 years. To address this canker, the Ministry with support from the UN Systems, IOM and the Danish Embassy in Ghana, have adopted the following interventions:

Enactment of a Human Trafficking Act, 2005 (Act 694) which proscribes, punishes perpetrators of human trafficking and provides for the rescue, rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of human trafficking;

Establishment of Human Trafficking Secretariat to coordinate activities of the Management Board and other related issues on human trafficking;

Inauguration of a Human Trafficking Management Board (HTMB)to provide technical advice to the Minister on initiatives to tackle human trafficking in the country;

Production of documentaries on human trafficking to sensitize and create awareness on the dangers associated with trafficking.

Information, Education and Communication materials have been designed on human trafficking. These materials highlight the nature of trafficking, hazards associated with the phenomenon, prosecution of offenders, and victim protection messages.

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Between 2009/2010 the capacities of over 151 law enforcement officers, including the police, immigration, CEPS, Navy, the judiciary and prosecutors have been built on emerging issues relating to human trafficking;

Establishment of Community Child Protection Committees (CCPCs) throughout the country to serve as surveillance groups against acts relating to child protection in generaland dealing with human trafficking in communities;

Community sensitization and advocacy activities to create awareness on the nature and hazards associated with this crime and to solicit the support of families and communities in addressing human trafficking have been extensively embarked upon;

Establishment of 5 Anti-Human Trafficking Units within the Ghana Police Service in selected regions to handle human trafficking cases; (Central region, Ashanti Region, Upper East Region, Greater Accra Region and Western Region

Establishment and launch of a National Database on Human Trafficking (NDHT) in collaboration with Rescue Foundation with support from the British High Commission.

o About 19 human trafficking cases have been prosecuted so far. This is expected to serve as deterrent to bothperpetrators and would-be perpetrators,

o About 625 victims have been reintegrated in their communities in the form of formal education, skills training, micro-credit, etc

o An estimated number of 671 victims have received some form of rehabilitation such as medical services, feeding, clothing, etc

o About 12, 268 persons have received some form of training in prevention, protection and prosecution of human trafficking cases

CHILD RELATED ISSUES: Information Research and Advocacy

Some of the research undertaken on child related issues include:

o Study on children’s perception on the use of corporal punishment in Ghana;

o Study on the Use of the Internet by Children: A case study of the Accra Metropolis;

o Two dissemination fora for school children of Dansoman2 Junior High School (JHS) and Osu Salem Cluster of Schools on the above reports have also been undertaken.

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Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) National ECCD Coordinating Committee Meetings and Review of

the Early Learning Standards and Indicators for 4 – 5 year olds being undertaken

Organized Training of Trainers Workshops on ECCD programming for regional stakeholders

Monitoring of the Child Health Promotion Week in the Upper East region

Collaborated with GES to hold a training of trainers workshop on the ECCD policy implementation and Emerging Educational Issues and

Held regional orientations on ECCD policy implementation and Emerging Educational Issues

GENDER RESPONSIVE SKILLS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (GRSCDP): The design of the Gender Responsive Skills and Community Development Project, as an intervention, is aimed at promoting gender equitable socio-economic development through institutional capacity building and improvement of women’s gainful employment and entrepreneurship. The focus of the project is sustained poverty alleviation among women at both national and local levels. The project is jointly sponsored by AfDB and GOG.

Key Accomplishments: GRSCDP was launched on November 30, 2009 with participation

from all key stakeholders and beneficiaries; Procurement process for consulting services is at 80% level

of completion Officials and technical staff of the 59 beneficiary

District Assemblies have been sensitized on the project through various regional seminars held between February andJune 2010

Funding of a 4-month ICT training program at GIMPA for 15 MOWAC staff

Selection process to award scholarships to 4 staff of MOWACfor 6-12 months Gender Studies abroad

Undertaken field visits to all 25 Vocational and Technical Training Institutes within the 10 regions to assess the infrastructure and equipments needs.

GENDER ISSUES: The Women’s Organizations Monthly Meetings (WOMM)

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Women Organizations Monthly Meeting (WOMM) is a platform for sharing information and educating women’s groups on government policies, health, social and other related issues of concern to women in general. The meeting also seeks to elicit feedback from the women to influence policymaking at the national level.

WOMM is one of the various ways through which MOWAC’s programs are disseminated.

The Women’s Groups comprise the following;

Queen Mothers AssociationsWorkplace women organization Professional Women groups – e.g. Ghana National Associationof Teachers Ladies Association, etc.Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) mainly Christians and Muslims Economic Grouping of Women – e.g. Market Women Association,Business Women Groups Community Based Organizations (CBOs) etcNon-governmental Organizations (NGOs) Other Women Groupings – Old Girls Association

Women Economic Empowerment in Ghana Women constitute about 80 per of informal productive sectors of the economy and control more than 50 per cent of informal sectorbusinesses. However, women continue to encounter difficulties inaccessing credit as compared to their male counterparts. The lack of access to finance with regard to women engaged in micro and small scale enterprises mostly in the rural communities is therefore a major impediment to the country’s ability to reduce poverty by half by 2015.

It is for this reason that the Ministry since 2002 has beeninvolved in the promotion of the economic rights of women by providing them with economic opportunities in order to improve their livelihood. These opportunities include access to Micro Credit and Small Loans, provision of Agro Processing Equipment, Skills Training and Information Sharing.

The main goal is to empower women- socio economically and reduce poverty among them. Agro processing equipment that GRATIS Foundation was

contracted to produce and distributed to women groups in all the Regions by the Ministry include:

Palm Nut/Oil Processing Machine

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Groundnut Processing Machine Cassava Processing Machine Shea Butter Processing Machine Palm Kernel Processing Machine Fruit Juice Extraction Machine

Economic Empowerment Support through Management Training and Capacity Building Programs

The Ministry carried out training workshops for women’s groups in the informal sector throughout the country. A total of 23, 187 from 464 communities have benefited fromthe training program.

The women have acquired skills in business management (credit management, saving mobilization, marketing, customer relations, records keeping, financial management, costing and pricing), food processing, bambooprocessing and soap making.

MAJOR CALENDAR OF EVENTS FOR THE MINISTRY INCLUDES: Conference on the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) International Women’s Day International Day of Family World Day Against Child Labor AU Day of the African Child International Day Against Drug abuse and illicit

trafficking Children’s Day Women’s Health Awareness Month World Day for the Prevention of Child Abuse Universal Children’s Day and African Charter on the

Rights and Welfare of children 16 Days of activism Against Gender Based Violence World AIDS Day

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: Participation in the 54th Session of the United Nations

Commission on the Status of Women (CSW): In March 2010, a 23 member government delegation led by

the Minister, Hon. Mrs. Juliana Azumah-Mensah (MP) participated in the Conference to review achievements of Ghana, with the rest of the world at the Commission on the Status of Women Conference (CSW).

Presented Ghana’s Beijing + 15 Report on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment and deliberations also focused onthe way forward for gender equality

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A Side Event was organized at the Conference to showcase the achievements of MOWAC.

The Side Event concentrated on showcasing the re-engineering efforts of MOWAC to make its programs relevant to the grassroots.

A one day decentralization forum on the outcomes of the CSW was held to enable MOWAC interact with its relevant partners to strategize on the way forward.

One -day Validation Workshop to Finalize Ghana’s National Plan of Action for the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

A one day workshop on the preparation and development of a National Plan of Action on UNSCR 1325 was organized for stakeholders on women’s issues.

The stakeholders included MDAs, CSOs, NGOs, Development Partners and International Organizations such as the Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Center.

The Ministry is also in the process of establishing a network of women on peace and security in Ghana.

Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW MOWAC in collaboration with Cabinet and Parliament ratified

the Optional Protocols to the CEDAW in 2009. MOWAC will forward the ratified Optional Protocol to the

United Nations and organize sensitization programs for stakeholders and the general public.

Submission of Mid-Term Review of the Commonwealth Plan of Action on Gender Equality (CPoA) to the Commonwealth Secretariat

MOWAC completed assessment on the Mid-term Review of CPoA on Gender Equality in 2009 and submitted it to the Commonwealth Secretariat for further action.

COLLABORATION & NETWORKING:Effective collaboration and networking with the major stakeholders has greatly assisted in propelling the Ministry to higher realms and kept it focused on its mandate. Despite some key challenges and constraints being encountered since the establishment of the Ministry, modest but significant achievements and interventions have been made to address women, gender and child related issues.

We acknowledge the numerous financial support given the Ministrythrough selected projects/programs, technical aid and interventions made by other national, regional and internationalagencies and some development partners. The Ministries,

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Departments and Agencies (MDAs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and Women’s Groups,Traditional Leaders, Private Corporations, the ECOWAS, International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Systems, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and a host of foreign embassies in the country, deserve special mention.

KEY CHALLENGES/ CONSTRAINTS: Low participation of women in decision making at all levels Harmful socio-cultural practices Violence against women/ Children Increasing number of kayaayes/ streetism in urban areas Inadequate disaggregated data (gender, sex and age) Inadequate capacity (technical, financial and human) of

institutions to implement programs for women and children Inadequate shelters for women and children in extremely

difficult situation Low coverage of women under the Social Security Scheme Low access to credit and support facilities by women Commercial sex exploitation of women and children Low representation of women in conflict management Inadequate capacity of ECCD, Human Trafficking and DV

Secretariats (financial, technical and human). Inadequate leisure and recreational facilities for children Low birth registration in rural areas Increasing incidence of women and children’s HIV infections High infant/maternal mortality rates Poor resource allocation for the implementation of the ECCD

Policy.

WAY FORWARD: Despite the above challenges, MOWAC intends to undertake the following:

Intensify advocacy and awareness creation on the mission and mandate of MOWAC

Facilitate the re-engineering process of MOWAC to enable iteffectively and efficiently undertake its mandate

Implementation and Sensitization of the Ghanaian Public on the outcomes of the 54th CSW

Formation and launching of a Network of Women on Peace and Security in Ghana

Formally inform the UN CEDAW Committee on the ratification of the Optional Protocol and to also sensitize the Ghanaianpublic on the provisions of the Optional Protocol

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Work with the Public Services and the Office of Head of Civil Service to establish District Offices of DOW/DOC

Establishment of shelters to promote victim protection and facilitate prosecution of offenders. MOWAC is committed to build 2 shelters this year

Facilitate the development of the Legislative Instrument onthe Human Trafficking and Domestic Violence Acts

Lobby government for adequate resource and also hold discussions with development partners on alternative ways of funding. MOWAC has held discussions with UNFPA, UNICEF, etc in this regard

Strengthen collaboration with our partners especially NGOs,CSOs, among others

Downloads (6): Human Trafficking Act, National Gender and Children Policy, Children’s Act, Domestic Violence Act, Early Childhood Care and Dev. Policy and UN CSW Ghana technical paperDepartments (2): Department of Women and Department of Children Secretariat (3): Domestic Violence Secretariat, Human Trafficking Secretariat and Early Childhood Secretariat Other (2): Launch of Affirmative action Bill (AAB) and Child Protection Network

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fromhttp://www.uic.edu/classes/socw/socw550/INTSWEL/sld001.htm

Mainoo, G. A. Nature Of Social Work Vol. 2., Ghana: Lisaco PressSmith, R. (2009). Doing Social Work Research. England: Open UniversityPress

Glossary

Aid to Families withDependent Children (AFDC)program2

Al-Ghazali3 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aid_to_Families_with_Dependent_Children3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Ghazali

Alms4 Amartya Sen5 Bayt al-mal6

4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alms5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amartya_Sen6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayt_al-mal

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Biblical Maaser Ani7,8

Blacks9 Block grant10 Caesar Trajan11

California12 Caliphate as forms of Zakat (charity)13, 14

Capability approach15

Capitalist economy16 Chancellor17 Charities18

Charity19

Child Protection Network20

Civilian Conservation Corps21

Clement Attlee22

Conditional Cash Transfer23 Congress24 Congressional Budget Office25 Conservative26 Corporatist27

7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bible8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maaser_Ani9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African-American10 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_grant11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trajan12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zakat15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_approach16 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitalist_economy17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chancellor_of_the_German_Empire18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charitable_organization19 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charity_(practice)20 http://www.mowacghana.net/REPORT%20xxx.pdf21 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_Conservation_Corps22 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_Attlee23 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conditional_Cash_Transfer24 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Budget_Office26 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservative27 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporatist

David Lloyd George28 Debt29

Decentralization30 Deficit31

Department of Children32 Department of Women33

Disability34

Disaster35

Domestic Violence Act36

Domestic Violence Secretariat37

Early Childhood Care and Dev.Policy38 Early Childhood Secretariat39 Economic development40

Economic Opportunity Act41 Economic Stimulus Act of200942 Economics43

Education44

Elderly45

Elderly, the46

28 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lloyd_George29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt30 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decentralization31 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_budget_deficit32 http://www.mowacghana.net/dept%20of%20children/deptcmain.htm33 http://www.mowacghana.net/DeptW/DeptWmain.html34 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability35 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disaster36 http://www.mowacghana.net/download/Domestic%20Violence%20Act.pdf37 http://www.mowacghana.net/domv/index.html38 http://www.mowacghana.net/download/Early%20Childhood%20Care%20and%20Dev.%20Policy.pdf39 http://www.mowacghana.net/earlyc/index.html40 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_development41 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Opportunity_Act42 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_Stimulus_Act_of_200943 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economics44 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education45 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_age46 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elderly

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English Poor Law of 160147,48

Entrepreneurialism49

Europe50 Exit strategies51

Famine52 Federation53

Five Pillars of Islam54

Flat rate55 Food stamp56 Food stamps57 Formal sector58 Free schooling59 GDP60

Gender61 Gender discrimination62

Ghana63

Ghana, Ministry Of Employmentand Social Welfare64

Ghana, Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs65

Government, Liberal66 Great Britain67 Great Depression68

47 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poor_Law48 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/160149 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entrepreneurialism50 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe51 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exit_strategy52 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Famine53 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_federalism54 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Pillars_of_Islam55 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flat_rate56 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_stamp57 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_stamps58 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_sector59 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_education60 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GDP61 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender62 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender_discrimination63 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghana64 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/governance/ministries/334--ministry-of-employment-and-social-welfare-65 http://www.mowacghana.net/66 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Party_(UK)67 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Britain68 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression

Great Society69 legislation ofthe 1960sGross income70

Hartz IV concept71

Health insurance72

Henry Campbell-Bannerman73

High Middle Ages74

Hispanic75 Homelessness76 House bill77 Household78

Human capital79 Human development80

Human rights81

Human Trafficking Act82

Human Trafficking Secretariat83 Illness84

Income85 Indigenous knowledge86 Individual retirementaccounts87

69 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Society70 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_income71 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartz_concept#Hartz_IV72 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Health_insurance73 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Campbell-Bannerman74 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Middle_Ages75 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hispanic76 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homeless77 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives78 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Household79 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_capital80 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developmental_psychology81 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights82 http://www.mowacghana.net/download/Human%20Trafficking%20Act.pdf83 http://www.mowacghana.net/humant/index.html84 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illness85 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Income86 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Traditional_knowledge87 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_retirement_accounts

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Industrial Revolution88

Inflation89 Informal sector90 IRAs91 Islamic law92

Welfare state Italian93

Johnson’s War on Poverty94

Labor market95 Labor power96

Latin American97 Launch of Affirmative Action Bill (AAB)98

Liberalization99 License100 Licensure101 Macroeconomic102

Means testing103

Medicaid104

Medicare programs105

Medicine106

Medieval107 Medieval Roman Catholic Church108

88 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_Revolution89 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation90 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informal_sector91 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_retirement_account92 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia93 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_welfare_state94 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_on_Poverty95 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_market96 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labor_power97 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_American98 http://www.mowacghana.net/Launch%20of%20AAB.pdf99 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalization100 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/License101 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Licensure102 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macroeconomic103 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Means_test104 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicaid105 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicare_(United_States)106 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medicine107 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medieval108 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholic_Church

Mediterranean109 MSW110

National Association of Social Workers111

National Gender and Children Policy112 Children’s Act113

National Insurance114 New Deal115 Non-governmental organizations116 Orphans117

Otto von Bismarck118 Parishes119 Paternalistic120 Pension121 Personal Responsibility andWork OpportunityReconciliation Act, of 1996122

Philosophy123

Pliny the Younger124

Politics125 Poor126

109 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediterranean110 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Master_of_Social_Work#Graduate_Schools_of_Social_Work111 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Association_of_Social_Workers112http://www.mowacghana.net/download/National%20Gender%20and%20Children%20Policy.pdf113 http://www.mowacghana.net/download/childrens_act.pdf114 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Insurance115 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Deal116 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization117 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orphan118 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck119 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parish120 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paternalism121 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pension122 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_Responsibility_and_Work_Opportunity_Reconciliation_Act123 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy124 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pliny_the_Younger125 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics126 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poverty

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Poor houses127 Poor Law Amendment Act128

Poor Laws of England, the129 Poor-tithe130

Population131

Poverty132

Poverty line133

Prayer134 Pregnant135 Privatization136 Professional bodies137

Professional social work138

Professional Social Workers139

Provinces140

Psychology141 Public education142 Public spending143 Qualifications144

Quality of life145

Racial stereotypes146

Recession147

Redistributive taxation148

127 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poor_houses128 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poor_Law_Amendment_Act129 http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/boyer.poor.laws.england130 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tithe131 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population132 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poverty133 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poverty_line134 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prayer135 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pregnant136 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privatization137 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professional_bodies138 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualifications_for_professional_social_work139 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_work140 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Canada141 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychology142 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_education143 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_spending144 http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/qualification145 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quality_of_life146 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racial_stereotype147 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recession148 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redistribution_(econom

Registered149

Registration150 Religions151

Repentance152

Revenue153

Roman Empire154

Salary155

Shmita (Sabbatical year)156

Social Activities157

Social equality158

Social injustices159 Social Institution160

Social Institutions, definition of 161

Social Institutions, types of162

Social Insurance163

Social insurance scheme164

Social insurance-type welfareschemes 165

Social policy166

Social programs, Canada167

ics)149 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Licensure150 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Licensure151 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religion152 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Repentance153 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revenue154 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Empire155 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salary156 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shmita157 http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/yb2004-e/html/23ie.htm158 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_equality159 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_injustice160 http://www.sparknotes.com/sociology/social-institutions/section2.rhtml161 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/162 http://www.uic.edu/classes/socw/socw550/INTSWEL/tsld025.htm163 http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop032_062.pdf164 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck#Welfare_state165 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_insurance166 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_policy167 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_programs_in_Canada

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Social programs, United States168

Social protection169

Social risk management170

Social safety net171

Social Security Act, the172 Social Security, Sweden173

Social Security, USA174

Social support175 Social trust176

Social Welfare Agencies177 Social Welfare Institution178 Social Welfare Institution, the179

Social Welfare ServicesOrganizational structure180

Social Welfare Services,Republic Of Cyprus181 Social Welfare, definition of182

168 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_programs_in_the_United_States169 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_protection170 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_risk_management171 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_safety_net172 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Security_Act173 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Security_(Sweden)174 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Security_(United_States)175 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_support176 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trust_(social_sciences)177 http://www3.niu.edu/newsplace/nnwelfare.html178 https://www.eesti.ee/eng/teemad/toetused_ja_sotsiaalabi/sotsiaalteenused/hoolekandeasutused179 http://www.uic.edu/classes/socw/socw550/INTSWEL/tsld037.htm180 http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/sws/sws.nsf/dmlchart_en/dmlchart_en?OpenDocument181 http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/sws/sws.nsf/dmlchart_en/dmlchart_en?OpenDocument182 http://www.uic.edu/classes/socw/socw550/INTSWEL/tsld016.htm

Social Welfare, Functional Definition of 183

Social welfare, Japan184 Social Welfare, Ministry Of Employment185 Social Welfare, Types of 186

Social work187

Social Work, International Association of Schools of 188

Social workers189

Social Workers, InternationalFederation of190 Social-democratic191 Socialist economy192

Society193

Sociology194

Solidarity195 Statistical196

Structural adjustment197 Subsidies198 Sweden199

183 http://www.uic.edu/classes/socw/socw550/INTSWEL/tsld016.htm184 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_welfare_in_Japan185 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/governance/ministries/334--ministry-of-employment-and-social-welfare-186 http://www.socialpolicy.ca/cush/m1/m1-t16.stm187 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_social_work188 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Association_of_Schools_of_Social_Work189 http://socialworkschool.tripod.com/socialworkcareer2.html; (Note: this information was adapted from the Occupational Outlook Handbook http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos060.htm) 190 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Federation_of_Social_Workers191 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social-democratic192 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_economy193 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Society194 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociology195 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solidarity196 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistic197 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_adjustment198 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidies199 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden

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Swedish welfare200 Tatsachen-ueber-

deutschland.deTax201 Temporary Assistance forNeedy Families202 (TANF)The Times203 Transfer payments204 Treasury205

Tzedakah206

UN CSW Ghana Technical Paper207

Unemployed208

Unemployment insurance209

Unsustainable210 Utilities211

Veterans212

Vouchers213

Welfare214 Welfare reform215 Welfare Reform Act of 1996216

Welfare state217 Welfare-to-work218 WellbeingWestern European219

200 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_welfare201 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax202 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Temporary_Assistance_for_Needy_Families203 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Times204 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transfer_payment205 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treasury206 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzedakah207 http://www.mowacghana.net/UN%20CSW%20GH%20technical%20paper.pdf208 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unemployment209 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unemployment_insurance210 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unsustainable211 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilities212 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Veteran213 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vouche214 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare215 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare_reform216 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare_Reform_Act_of_1996217 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare_state218 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Welfare-to-work219 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Europe

White families220

Widows221

Workfare222

Workhouses223

Working classes224

yuan225

Zakat and Jizya226

Zakat Fund227.

220 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Hispanic_Whites221 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Widow222 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Workfare223 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Workhouse224 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Working_class225 6.9396 Chinese Yuan Renminbi (CNY) is equal to 1 US Dollar. Assessed 3/24/2012 from Answer.com website http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_many_yuan_equal_one_dollar226 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jizya227 http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/Departments/Zakat/Social-Welfare-Institutions.php