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E SummaryThis article analyses some implications for trade unions of social pacts. Unions’ participation in tripartite agreements has been one response to tensions triggered by the decentralisation and individualisation of employment relations. However, their involvement in social pacts renders it increasingly difficult for unions to strike a positive-sum balance between competing logics of influence and membership. Following an analysis of four countries with social pacts, this article shows that trade unions’ participation in social pacts has been most successful when unions have pursued a strategy of ‘articulation’ between their different levels of organisation by enhancing the participation of rank-and-file members in decision making and by strengthening company level representation structures.

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SommaireCet article analyse quelques-unes des implications des pactes sociaux pour les syndicats. La participation des syndicats aux accords tripartites a constitué une des réponses aux tensions suscitées par la décentralisation et l’individualisation des relations d’emploi. Cependant, leur implication dans les pactes sociaux complique de façon croissante la tâche des syndicats d’aboutir à un bilan positif entre les deux logiques d’influence et d’affiliation qui sont en concurrence. Sur base d’une analyse de quatre pays connaissant des pactes sociaux, cet article montre que la participation des syndicats à des pactes sociaux a été plus fructueuse lorsque les syndicats ont poursuivi une stratégie d’ « articulation » (entre leurs différents niveaux d’organisation) en augmentant la participation des membres de la base à la prise de décisions et en renforçant les structures de représentation au niveau de l’entreprise.

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Social pacts, collective bargaining and trade union articulation strategies

Oscar Molina*

* QUIT, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona

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ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag analysiert bestimmte Folgen, die sich für die Gewerkschaften aus Sozialpakten ergeben. In einigen Ländern haben sich die Gewerkschaften als Reaktion auf Spannungen, die durch die Dezentralisierung und Individualisierung der Beschäftigungsbeziehungen entstanden waren, an dreiseitigen Vereinbarungen beteiligt. Durch die Teilnahme an Sozialpakten wird es jedoch für die Gewerkschaften schwieriger, ein positives Gleichgewicht zwischen konkurrierenden Strategien im Bereich der Einflussnahme und der Mitgliedschaft zu erzielen. Anhand einer Analyse von vier Ländern mit Sozialpakten zeigt dieser Beitrag, dass die Beteiligung der Gewerkschaften an Sozialpakten dann besonders erfolgreich war, wenn diese Strategien zur „Artikulation“ ihrer verschiedenen Organisationsebenen verfolgt haben, die zur Verstärkung der Teilnahme der einfachen Gewerkschaftsmitglieder an der Beschlussfassung und der Gewerkschaftsvertretung auf Unternehmensebene geführt haben.

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Keywords: trade unions, social pacts, articulation, neo-corporatism

Introduction

The return to social pacts in some European countries has revived the debate about corporatism, decentralisation and coordination of collective bargaining on the one hand, and the future of organised labour on the other (Regini 2000). A recurrent claim is that peak-level tripartite agreements have positively contributed to enhancing the governability of collective bargaining, hence explaining the success of many countries with otherwise inflationary wage-setting institutions in achieving wage moderation (Hassel 2006). Several studies have also highlighted the important role of political involvement in trade union revitalisation strategies (Frege and Kelly 2005). Unions’ political engagement partly explains why, in spite of fears of decentralisation and disor-ganisation, we have instead observed processes of organised or centrally coordinated decentralisation of collective bargaining (Traxler 1995). Social pacts have been inter-preted as stepping stones to achieve the marriage of opposites between centralisation and decentralisation or protection and flexibility in collective bargaining (Visser 2005).

Achieving the above-mentioned marriage poses two major challenges for trade unions. First, the redefinition of competences and roles within multi-level bargaining systems and the capacity of trade unions to link the instrument of social pacts and partnership to broader organisational objectives (Marginson and Sisson 2004: 138-139). The second challenge is governing and implementing organised decentralisation and managing the conflict underlying the marriage of centralised coordination and decentralised imple-mentation (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980). A critical question is the extent to which social

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pacts have set the conditions for effectively strengthening workplace structures and linking them to other organisational tiers in order to alleviate the tension between national intermediation and local implementation (Levesque and Murray 2005). The development of articulated organisations relying on bottom-up instruments of consul-tation as well as stronger union company representation structures would not only contribute to minimising problems of identification between members and officials, thereby enhancing the stability of centralised forms of bargaining coordination and negotiation (Micheletti 1990), but also provide an invaluable information resource to union leaders.

This article looks at the impact and implications of social pacts and peak-level partner-ship agreements for trade union articulation. More precisely, this article addresses the following questions: Under which conditions have social pacts effectively contributed to revitalising trade unions? To what extent have trade unions managed to link the political instrument of peak partnership agreements with their organisational needs? In order to answer these questions the article will empirically explore the concept of articulation and its relation with social pacts. According to Kjellberg (1983), the reason why Swedish trade unions retained a significant role in the Swedish bargaining system was not only because of their strong peak organisations, but also because of their strength at both national and local level. Similarly, others have highlighted the difficul-ties of encompassing organisations participating in political processes to represent effectively the interests of their constituencies, hence concluding that interest inarticu-lation is a major consequence of corporatism (Micheletti 1990; Streeck 1988). According to Crouch (1993), the exchange underlying interactions between unions and employers at centralised level would only be stabilised under conditions of organisa-tional articulation. More recently, Traxler et al. (2001) have referred to this problem as to how well local bargaining is integrated into the overall bargaining system, an issue that has gained new currency with European integration and multi-level governance (Waddington 2001). There seems to be agreement that articulation is related to the problem of intra-organisational compliance or control, but also to participation and communication within organisations (Martinez-Lucio 2003). Intra-union articulation is accordingly characterised here as a two-dimensional concept entailing not only the control exercised by the peak over lower levels, but, more importantly, processes of participation in decision making as well as the strengthening of lower-level representa-tion structures.

This article draws on case studies of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain where social pacts have been signed since the early 1980s in spite of weak neo-corporatist institutions (with the exception of the Netherlands). Trade unions in these four coun-tries have different degrees of centralisation, and balances of power between levels and fragmentation. The first section discusses the existing literature on the implications of social pacts for trade union revitalisation, followed by a discussion of the concept of articulation and its relevance to understanding the future of trade unions. The second section explores developments in Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The third section summarises and interprets the main findings.

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Political action and trade union articulation

The scholarly debate about social pacts has focused on their emergence and politics. Explaining the paradox of tripartite peak agreements in countries with traditionally adversarial industrial relations and fragmented systems of interest representation has led most scholars to highlight the role of exogenous variables such as EMU (Crouch 1998; Pochet 1999; Rhodes 1998; Regini 2000; Hancké and Rhodes 2005). The mar-ginal role of institutions and organisational features of corporate actors in explana-tions of the resurgence of social pacts contrasts with the importance attached to them in neo-corporatist theory (Schmitter 1974). The most intriguing aspect in the emer-gence of social pacts is precisely the lack of those institutional and organisational attributes (Molina and Rhodes 2002). Accordingly, there is a fundamental difference in the logic underlying corporatism vis-à-vis that of social pacts as organisational char-acteristics served to predict the behaviour of actors in the former, whilst social pacts are forms of tripartite cooperation aimed at changing policy and institutions in order to enhance coordination (Hassel 2006). Particularly important in neo-corporatist the-ory was the degree of control exercised by an organisation’s peak over its affiliates. Compared to neo-corporatism – where cooperation and coordination were a conse-quence of the organisational characteristics of social partners – social pacts are the consequence of conflict and inflationary wage behaviour and aim at creating consen-sus at the peak in order to compensate for the lack of organisational preconditions favourable to cooperation.

Moreover, neo-corporatist theory established a complementary relationship between the horizontal (cooperation vs conflict) and vertical (centralisation vs decentralisation) dimensions of collective bargaining. Hence, a precondition for the existence of a neo-corporatist system were high levels of coordination within unions and employers’ asso-ciations, centralisation in decision making and encompassing organisations able to deliver control over lower-level structures (Schmitter 1974). The literature on social pacts has pictured differently the relation between the vertical and horizontal dimen-sions. The attention is rather towards horizontal coordination and the strategic interac-tions underlying peak tripartite agreements whilst the vertical problem of inter-associ-ational and inter-level relationships has remained secondary in this debate. The under-lying assumption is that peak-level cooperation contributes to enhancing vertical coordination along the lines suggested by the organised decentralisation thesis. However, the success of top-down mechanisms in delivering greater coordination cru-cially depends on the strength and implementation capabilities of lower-level trade union structures, especially so when tripartite agreements seem to rely increasingly on reflexive governance mechanisms which prioritise participation, co-determination and procedural justice (van der Meer et al. 2005).

The literature on social pacts has strongly emphasised the ways in which industrial rela-tions systems in different countries could deliver wage moderation and welfare state recalibration (Hancké and Rhodes 2005). Even though the future direction of the rela-tionship between political action and union strength is unclear, the revitalisation

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literature has regarded as largely positive the political engagement of trade unions in tripartite negotiations with governments and employer organisations (Frege and Kelly 2005). There are however some issues to be considered here. First, trade unions are increasingly viewed as passive pact-takers rather than active pact-makers, as they have lost agenda-setting capacity. Moreover, the centralised character of social pact nego-tiations delivering guidelines requires trade unions to have strong local and company level implementation capacities. Finally, there is a risk of disengagement as union recentralisation and repoliticisation might open a gap between union officials’ views and those of the grass-roots. In order for trade unions to reap the benefits from political action it is necessary for this strategy to be accompanied by other courses of action aimed at strengthening and revitalising lower-level union structures as well as communication and participation mechanisms within trade unions (Hancké 1993). Otherwise, participation in social pacts might undermine union power by demotivating and isolating members.

Figure 1: Social pacts and articulation strategies

The concept of articulation provides a useful device to assess the impact of social pacts and policies of organised decentralisation on trade unions as it complements the neo-corporatist emphasis on control with ideas of participation and empowerment of lower levels. The term articulation has been used in the field of industrial relations referring to vertical relations linking units in the bargaining system and within actors. The most widespread conception refers to the internal characteristics of organisations such as trade unions and employer organisations. Hence Crouch (1993: 54-55) defined an articulated organisation as ‘one in which strong relations of interdependence bind dif-ferent vertical levels such that the actions of the centre are frequently predicated on securing the consent of lower levels’. According to Crouch, the articulation of trade unions and employer organisations was more relevant to explain their behaviour and impact than the neo-corporatist emphasis on centralisation and top-down control and compliance. Waddington (2000: 318) claims that an articulated trade union is one

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‘where vertical inter-linkages are sustained between different levels of union activity thereby ensuring that union organisation at the workplace does not become isolated’. In an increasingly complex multi-level industrial relations environment, articulated organisations will be better able to face the challenges posed by globalisation and its impact on employment relations by means of balancing member representation and political intermediation (Marginson and Sisson 2004).

Drawing on the above insights, this paper looks at the effects for trade unions of recent experiences of political involvement in four countries. At the centre of this analysis is the concept of articulation understood as a two-dimensional variable (Figure 1). It captures on the one hand the democratic process of intra-organisational participation and on the other that of lower-level organisational empowerment. Participation in decision making and the existence of frequent channels of communication between levels in the organisa-tion are necessary in order to enhance legitimacy and avoid disengagement. More importantly, greater participation can also be seen as a mechanism of empowerment of lower levels by allocating greater decision-making powers to them. Control and partici-pation are accordingly complementary in augmenting the articulated character of trade union organisation. Participation can occur in many different ways: through the use of referenda about social pacts or political agreements, through the periodic election of employee representatives at company level (works’ councils elections) and, finally, through the consultation on and ratification of collective agreements.

In addition to the democratic empowerment of members through their involvement in the ratification of peak agreements, trade unions have also used the opportunities opened by social pacts in order to strengthen lower-level organisational structures. One of the lessons learnt by unions following their participation in centralised incomes policies pacts in the 1970s and early 1980s was that too much emphasis on centralisa-tion without improving the position of locals not only limited the impact of what had been negotiated, but was also detrimental to trade union interests in the medium term. A different logic can be discerned in the 1990s’ social pacts. Trade unions tried to make their participation in these bargains compatible with a revitalisation of organisational structures through the exchange of wage moderation (combined with welfare state reform) for institutional changes aimed at strengthening lower-level structures. A greater emphasis on collective bargaining revitalisation through a better connection between levels has accordingly figured as a top trade union priority in order to obtain the benefits of active participation in adjustment processes.

Nonetheless, we will see in the following sections how unions in different countries have faced different problems which have determined the type and extent of benefits accruing from participation in social pacts and the success in linking it with their organisational needs. More specifically, where trade unions entered negotiations hav-ing strong company level structures they have been in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis employers and government in order to obtain organisational benefits and greater articulation. The main concern for trade unions in these countries has been to guarantee members’ involvement in order to avoid disaffection and centrifugal

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movements. By contrast, where trade unions had weaker locals, participation in social pacts has forced them to focus on control rather than organisational empowerment and change. A weak initial bargaining position has impeded the inclusion of organi-sational reform in the agenda, hence severely limiting the positive dynamic effects of social pact involvement.

Organisational articulation of trade unions in four European countries

The four national cases analysed here represent the whole spectrum of industrial rela-tions traditions, collective bargaining institutions and organisation of social partners in Europe with the exception of the Scandinavian type (Table 1; Crouch 1993). Spain and Italy belong to the Latin adversarial model, characterised by fragmented institutions, high conflict rates and intermediate centralisation. The role of the state and legal regu-lation in Spain is remarkable compared to the Italian voluntarist framework. The Netherlands belongs to a continental industrial relations model characterised by rela-tively high bargaining centralisation, a consensual tradition and moderate state inter-vention in wage setting. Finally, Ireland lies within the Anglo-Saxon model character-ised by voluntarism, fragmented industrial relations actors and decentralised bargain-ing. Trade unions in the four countries are also characterised by different degrees of centralisation, workplace representation and union density (Table 1). These differences notwithstanding, unions in all cases have conceived their involvement in social pacts as a crucial component of their renewal strategies. However, the capacity to obtain sig-nificant organisational benefits from participation in social pacts has varied in relation to the balance of power between different levels, an issue which is explored in more detail in the next two sections.

Table 1: Organisational characteristics of trade unions in the early 2000s

Ireland Italy Netherlands Spain

Workplace representation* 53 66 64 41

Collective bargaining centralisation High Intermediate High Intermediate

Coverage of collective bargaining** - 70 88 81

Union density** 38 34 25 16

* % of workplaces with employee representation, EIRO.** %, OECD.

The Netherlands

The Dutch economy has a tradition of government by consensus thanks to the institu-tionalised involvement of social partners in policy-making through the tripartite SER (Social and Economic Council, founded in 1950) and the bipartite Foundation of

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Labour (STAR, founded in 1945). This has permitted a coordinated approach to the reform of collective bargaining starting with the 1982 Wassenaar agreement between employers and trade unions, negotiated under the pressure of a severe economic and employment crisis and a credible threat of state intervention in wage bargaining. Wage moderation and a reduction of working time combined with labour market flexibility became the key ingredients of the ‘Dutch miracle’ (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Moreover, the 1982 agreement initiated a two-stage process of bargaining decentralisa-tion. First, the national tripartite bodies and peak confederations of business and labour agreed that decentralisation had to be governed through sector framing agree-ments setting the terms and conditions for local and company bargaining. These soft or non-binding mechanisms of regulation and the articulation guidelines agreed in the context of the STAR would then be converted into collective agreements at industry and company level. This process was accompanied by a shift towards a new paradigm of industrial relations regulation through a looser type of coordination relying on guidelines and moral suasion instead of formal centralisation of collective bargaining (Visser 2005: 291).

In spite of these changes, collective bargaining remained firmly anchored at sector level, with centralised negotiations in the STAR among trade unions and employer organisations setting guidelines for lower levels. In the middle of a new economic crisis and the threat of government intervention in wage bargaining, the social partners signed a new agreement known as the ‘1993 New Course’ whereby they ratified their commitment to a policy of responsible wage setting. Employers expressed a preference for decentralisation and greater differentiation of employment conditions within the firm. In exchange, trade unions obtained guarantees for the reduction of working time as well as their involvement in decentralised negotiations, hence combining greater dif-ferentiation of wage patterns with enhanced co-determination rights and a stronger position of unions at workplace.

Decentralisation has been facilitated by other legal changes aimed at opening spaces for company level agreements and individual choice. Social partners signed in 1999 an agree-ment in order to promote ‘tailored employment conditions’ (Delsen 2002) hence opening the door to a multiple choice model whereby the individual is given greater scope to negotiate certain employment conditions. Overall, the decentralisation process has none-theless been modest (Slomp 2004) and the impact of centrally negotiated provisions on lower levels is still remarkable (Hendriks 2005: 7-8; Visser and Hemerijck 1997).

The traditional centralisation of trade unions has forced them to look for innovative company level strategies. Workers’ representation at enterprise level takes place mostly through works councils (Ondernemingsraad), which have traditionally dominated com-pany level employee representation over trade union structures (Bedrijsledengroepen). According to Visser (1998), the lack of legal basis to sustain strong union structures at company level – as locals have no direct involvement in pay fixing – and the strategic choice of Dutch trade unions to maintain a centralist approach are major sources of weakness. As pointed out by Hancké (1996: 599), union recognition and intermediation

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in the macroeconomy came at the expense of the locals. The process of decentralisation entailed the risk of weakening articulation as trade unions were losing regulatory capacity. Particularly important has been the expansion in the role of works councils through covenants which manage their involvement in the regulation of employment relations and working conditions. Even though trade unions are supportive of the above-mentioned changes, they want to retain the primacy of the collective agreement over the covenant. This explains their support for a closer collaboration with works councils and the opening of training centres for their members, 60% of whom are trade union affiliates.

In addition to this, Dutch trade unions have enhanced intra-organisational communi-cation and participation. Traditionally, the main source of legitimacy and representa-tiveness came from workplace elections. Collective agreements, though accompanied by frequent consultations, were not as a rule subject to balloting. In an attempt to address problems of representation, decreasing legitimacy and the changes in the col-lective bargaining environment, political action of trade unions was accompanied in the 1990s by strategies of organisational restructuring and democratic revitalisation. A first mechanism consisted in the recourse to referenda about the contents of tripartite peak agreements. In 2003, FNV decided to consult their rank-and-file about the con-tents of an agreement reached with employer organisations and the Balkenende gov-ernment. In spite of low participation (only 20% of membership voted), 56% voted in favour of the pact and 42% against. The success of the referendum in strengthening the leaders’ position and improving internal union governance led the FNV leadership to use it again in 2004. FNV has made a very positive assessment of the move towards greater membership consultation. In a recent document, it stated that referenda have been a beneficial innovation for union democracy and that it will consult members on weighty, overarching and controversial decisions. Moreover, FNV will create more opportunities in the future for members to participate in the preparation and execu-tion of policy. For important recommendations by the Social and Economic Council or the Labour Foundation, the rank-and-file will be consulted in determining the stakes and adopting the outcome.

Italy

The Italian collective bargaining system has gone through several waves of centralisa-tion and decentralisation over the last 30 years as a consequence of a low degree of formalisation, economic and technological change and the political strategies of trade unions (Regalia and Regini 1998). Collective bargaining in Italy used to take place at several levels (national, sector, region, company) without a clear definition of roles. In the early 1970s, decentralised collective bargaining was predominant, coinciding with the strong position of trade unions after the 1969 Hot Autumn wave of strikes. Following the first oil crisis, a process of bargaining centralisation started via the con-centration of decision-making power at confederal level that reached its peak with the 1977 ‘Accordo Programmatico’.

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In 1983 a social pact was signed with the aim of fighting inflation and introducing greater flexibility in the labour market. The agreement included the principle of spe-cialised or non-overlapping negotiations between company and sector levels in an attempt to avoid upward renegotiations, whilst the inter-confederal level would fix ceil-ings for lower-level negotiations (Mariucci 1995). The impact of the 1983 agreement on the articulation of collective bargaining was nonetheless limited due to the non-binding character of the clauses as well as the differences between unions’ and employers’ views with regard to its implementation. The persistence of high inflation led the government to initiate a new process of tripartite dialogue culminating in the 1984 S. Valentino pact which marked the beginning of employer-led disorganised decentralisation due to the reopening of tensions between the three confederations. The lack of clear and formal-ised principles structuring relationships between levels together with the extension of new forms of work organisation plus the strategic paralysis of organised labour explain the extension of forms of micro-corporatism in the 1980s (Regini 2000).

By the end of the 1980s, collective bargaining was characterised by the existence of several levels without a clear distribution of tasks and significant differences between the private and public sectors. The bargaining structure remained at the centre of con-flict between and within trade unions and a source of inflationary pressures hence becoming a central issue in the social pacts of the early 1990s. In 1992, after the repu-diation by Confindustria of the Scala Mobile – the automatic wage indexation mecha-nism – the social partners and the government finally agreed to abolish it, impose a moratorium on company level bargaining and engage in negotiations to reform collec-tive bargaining. The tripartite agreement signed one year later established a two-level system with a clear articulation and distribution of tasks between the two tiers (Carrieri 1995). Under the new structure, broad macroeconomic guidelines are provided by the peak inter-confederal level whilst the national sector agreements set guidelines and minima for negotiations at lower levels. Moreover, the pact specified a series of issues whose regulation had to be left to the lower levels through a process of controlled decentralisation (Bordogna 1997). Notwithstanding its apparent success in bringing down inflation and reducing industrial conflict, the 1993 collective bargaining reform was a contested policy issue in the following years. These tensions resurfaced during negotiations for its revision in 1998 (the so-called Christmas Pact) without delivering a consensus on the future of collective bargaining (Molina 2005).

The 1993 social pact also reformed trade union representation by establishing a mixed channel of union and general worker representation (Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie, RSU). The need for representatives to belong to the same unions signing the industry agreement where the company operates has strengthened coordination and articula-tion between levels but also within trade unions. Moreover, unions maintain direct control over RSU because workplace representatives need their approval to attain the legally protected status conferred to them by the 1992 agreement.

Changes in lower-level structures, together with an increasing recourse to direct par-ticipation of the grass-roots in key union decisions have been critical in enhancing

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unions’ legitimacy and capacity to manage decentralisation. In response to the undem-ocratic behaviour of the three main confederal unions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some factory councils in northern Italy initiated the so-called ‘auto-convocati’ (meaning ‘self-summoned’) movement, characterised by their opting-out from the policies nego-tiated on their behalf by the official unions as well as by their criticisms of the lack of democracy in the Italian trade union movement (Baccaro 2000). Moreover, the 1980s witnessed the appearance and consolidation of autonomous unions and independent workers’ organisations. Many members of these so-called COBAS came from the left sections within CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) that criticised a sectarian and centralising bias in union policy.

As a response to these centrifugal movements trade unions engaged in a series of organisational innovations aimed at increasing internal democracy, including the elec-toral renewal of the workplace representatives and the weakening of some privileges enjoyed by confederation peak officials (Baccaro 2000). Moreover, confederations made efforts to extend the practice of submitting all major collective agreements to balloting of members; centrifugal movements exerted some kind of disciplinary effect on the political behaviour of trade unions in the 1990s as they submitted the major peak agreements and social pacts to the approval of their rank-and-file.

The use of referenda has significantly alleviated centrifugal movements, especially within CGIL. Even though the general secretary’s decision to sign the 1991 agreement sanctioning the abolition of the Scala Mobile was heavily contested, grass-root consulta-tion thereafter has maintained opposition within CGIL rather than outside. Moreover, trade unions have recently taken advantage of the extension of social protest and grass-root mobilisation against neoliberal globalisation in order to strengthen their bargain-ing power. Overall, consultation and changes in company representation structures have proved to be complementary strategies in enhancing organisational articulation and enabling Italian trade unions to benefit from political action and retain control over the process of decentralisation.

Ireland

In the last three decades Irish industrial relations have been subject to significant trans-formations in how working conditions have been determined. The failure of the 1970s centralisation experience to deliver wage moderation due to substantial wage drift highlighted the need to develop new forms of bargaining coordination in a context where collective agreements are not binding and their extension is rare (Roche and Cradden 2003). The 1980s witnessed a return to a largely decentralised and uncoordi-nated pattern, as wage conflicts were settled in a disorganised way, with negotiations taking place both at sector and company levels without any specialisation. This situa-tion mirrored the fragmentation of the trade union movement and hindered any efforts towards coordination or centralisation (Hardiman 1992).

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In spite of these unfavourable conditions a tripartite pact was signed in 1987 providing precise guidelines for wage increases in the coming years. Thanks to their contribution to macroeconomic stability and industrial peace, a practice of periodical renegotiation of these centralised agreements has become the flagship of the Irish social partnership model. Within a voluntarist and fragmented industrial relations context – with no legal means to extend pay deals, a policy conducted within norms of voluntarism and non-binding compliance – centralisation relied upon an active state that brokered peak-level agreements around the exchange between wage moderation and tax cuts. Top-down bargaining coordination through recentralisation and partnership deals has accordingly become an effective instrument for wage moderation and economic growth. Nonetheless, the mechanisms for securing pay deals through workplace bar-gaining are weaker than in most continental European countries. This has raised the question of whether social partnership has contributed to improve the micro-founda-tions of the bargaining system. O’Donnell et al. (2007) have argued that some institu-tionalisation of the partnership process and system has occurred both at micro and macro levels. The 1991 Programme for Economic and Social Progress tried to reintro-duce the notion of two-tier bargaining, which had been a characteristic of centralised agreements in the 1970s (Hardiman 1992). This agreement contained a local bargain-ing clause according to which, under exceptional circumstances, trade unions and employers could negotiate wage increases up to 3% more than national level guide-lines. This clause was not only an employer demand in order to introduce flexibility, but it was also aimed at exerting a positive effect on trade unions by means of empow-ering lower levels. A similar local bargaining clause was again inserted in the 1997-2000 ‘Partnership 2000’ agreement.

Even though compliance with the wage terms of partnership agreements has been high, the efforts to extend partnership practices at local and company level have met with little success. Roche and Geary (2000) present compelling evidence to show how work-place mechanisms for employee involvement have not evolved in tandem with national structures. Indeed, they show how the institutional impact of partnership has consisted in increasing fragmentation, polarisation and divergence in industrial relations prac-tices across sectors and companies. Change is rather characterised by the development of several regulatory models within the same country and even within the same sector. The lack of statutory trade union recognition at company level has allowed multina-tionals arriving in the 1980s and 1990s to adopt a diversity of approaches with many of them following non-union strategies. The top-down coordinating benefits of partner-ship seem to be largely offset by the structural features of the bargaining system that suit the increasingly heterogeneous demands of employers and allow considerable flex-ibility in the management of industrial relations.

Social pacts in Ireland have been accompanied by a recentralisation of trade union activity. Even though workplace structures of representation are strong and based on elected representatives accountable to their members, the Irish trade union confed-eration, ICTU, does not have formal coercive power over their affiliate unions (Baccaro and Simoni 2004). As a consequence, the system remains polarised and

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centralised due to difficulties in extending partnership to lower levels. This same point has been raised by the National Economic and Social Forum, pointing to the weak articulation as a potential problem for the future of partnership as all groups confront a difficulty in linking national representation to local action. Demands for union recognition at company level represent attempts to strengthen their role in decentralised bargaining. A new recognition procedure was established in 1999 under the 1997-2000 ‘Partnership 2000’ agreement. Even though some have made a positive assessment of the impact of the new recognition procedure for union articulation (Waddington 2000), there remains some scepticism about its effectiveness as there is no statutory obligation on employers to grant formal union recognition and Irish employers enjoy a high degree of freedom to adopt differentiated approaches to union and employee involvement.

As a response to these difficulties, trade unions have developed mechanisms of com-munication and consultation in an attempt to involve members and compensate for the above obstacles. The partnership process has been accompanied by institutionalised consultation whereby delegates of ICTU’s affiliated unions meet every three years and ratify agreements. Moreover, through the use of referenda Irish unions have managed to maintain a strong level of communication with their members. In addition, they are looking forward to the implementation of the EU Information and Consultation Directive as an instrument to gain some voice at company level and a potential mecha-nism for workplace revitalisation. Nevertheless, there are increasingly critical voices within the labour movement being raised with regard to partnership either on the grounds that it represents a mechanism for containing the working class (Ollet and Bramble 2007) or because of its inability to protect large sections of migrant workers. Recent conflicts in the public sector show further discontent and division within the labour movement regarding partnership agreements.

Spain

Spain’s collective bargaining system has been characterised by fragmentation and weak coordination. The return to democracy in 1976 was followed by a period of centralised pay setting through social pacts. Even though these pacts managed to bring inflation down, the bargaining system remained fragmented along a multiplicity of levels without a clear distribution of tasks. Due to severe implementation problems in small and medium-sized enterprises, the principles of hierarchy and specialisation contained in the 1980 Workers’ Statute had little impact. The period of concertation and social pacts of the early 1980s came to an end in 1985 as trade unions adopted a strategy of con-frontation leading to three general strikes between 1986 and 1992. Inter-union conflicts and the end of concertation contributed to a process of informal employer-led decen-tralisation. As trade unions became aware of the disappointing outcomes delivered by confrontation, including members’ discontent, in 1996 they resumed social dialogue related to collective bargaining and the labour market. Unions wanted to enhance articulation through a rational distribution of tasks between levels in order to avoid

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overlapping negotiations and decentralisation. This reorganisation was meant to gravi-tate around national-sector negotiations. Although employers were also critical of the lack of articulation, their proposal consisted of further decentralisation.

The exchange underlying the negotiation of several labour market issues allowed an agreement to be reached in April 1997 (Molina 2005). On the vertical dimension, the agreement set principles aimed at rationalising collective bargaining by means of enhancing the regulatory role of the national sector; first, agreements at this level would have competence over a series of issues which could not be renegotiated at lower levels; secondly, the national sector would establish guidelines and recommen-dations for lower-levels agreements, hence becoming an instrument of soft regulation and organised decentralisation. From the unions’ perspective, the 1997 pact was an attempt to recover the bargaining power of national federations whilst preserving firms’ ability to adapt according to their conditions. Overall, this reform contained a strong potential for strengthening the regulatory role of collective bargaining vis-à-vis legal regulation, i.e. to upgrade collective agreements from mere instruments of legal implementation to mechanisms of associational coordination.

The 1997 reform was expected to mark a turning point for industrial relations in Spain towards greater cooperation and coordination through processes of controlled auto-nomy; a revival of collective bargaining vis-à-vis legal regulation as well as a shift away from the statist industrial relations tradition. However, the effective impact of the 1997 agreement has been far less impressive and radical than initially envisaged (Molina 2007). With regard to the vertical dimension little has been achieved to reduce frag-mentation. Collective bargaining is still characterised by a large number of agreements distributed along a multiplicity of intermediate levels without a clear demarcation of roles. This means that the same issues are very often renegotiated at each level.

The two peak confederations in Spain used to have different traditions regarding union activity. These legacies mirrored different degrees of organisational centralisa-tion and internal democracy (Furher 1996); CCOO (Comisiones Obreras) had a more decentralised structure, whilst UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) devel-oped a more centralised and bureaucratic organisation. In spite of these differences, the legal changes introduced by the 1984 Law on Trade Union Freedom, together with a strategic return to cooperation, have triggered some convergence among UGT and CCOO. Although some differences persist between the two, the participatory dimension of trade union democracy remains weak. This notwithstanding, the inter-nal organisation of confederations in Spain is regarded by some as highly democratic (Fuhrer 1996: 154). Particularly important in this respect are the so-called secciones sindicales, shop floor union representation structures that democratically elect a delegado sindical, union delegate. These delegates participate actively in the election of union officials and the decision-making process within the union. Accordingly, the secciones sindicales are critical structures for the direct participation of the grass-roots in trade unions.

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The bureaucratic bias provoked by the participation of trade unions in social pacts in the early 1980s opened a legitimacy crisis and contributed to increasing the gap between the leadership and the grass-roots. The strong links with political parties hindered the attempts of the two confederations to ensure a strong working class appeal. As pointed out by Lantaron (2000: 70-71), ‘Spanish trade unions have been preoccupied with improving their institutional role, to consolidate themselves as political actors and col-laborators of the state in policy-making, thus losing the perspective of the individual worker’ and leaving the union relatively strong in society, but weak in the workplace and collective bargaining (Miguelez 2000: 517). In order to address this situation, unions have conceived concertation as a tool to revitalise collective bargaining. This explains why negotiations have mainly consisted of peak bipartite union-employer agreements on specific issues related to collective bargaining or unions’ member inter-ests. By strengthening their position in the collective bargaining arena, trade unions have tried to close the gap opened in the 1980s between union policies and members’ demands. The dominance of workers’ committees by the two main confederations does not however mean a high degree of articulation between the company and higher levels of negotiation or even within union structures. This is because employee representa-tives (works’ councils) enjoy a statutory right to negotiate wages and call strikes. This endows the Spanish system with a strong centrifugal bias and a low level of governabil-ity as trade unions do not exercise full control over company level structures. This is why Traxler et al. (2001) have argued that the only way of achieving greater articulation would be by means of some form of organised recentralisation in order to empower higher levels with some degree of control over company level developments.

Articulation and the benefits of political action: a discussion

Through political action and the reform of collective bargaining institutions European trade unions have tried to respond to a series of challenges. Their first challenge is that of their reorganisation in order to be able to manage the process of decentralisation and avoid the disorganisation of collective bargaining. The second challenge is retain-ing the commitment of members at the same time as becoming active political actors signing social pacts containing wage restraint, welfare restructuring, etc. The strategic response of trade unions to these challenges cannot be understood in terms of the tra-ditional ‘centralisation/decentralisation’ dichotomy. Instead, the evidence presented in this article shows how a key strategic priority has been the development of articulated organisations which combine two important dimensions: empowerment of lower organisational levels on one hand, and participation of members in union’s decision-making processes on the other. Participation not only alleviates the problem for collec-tive action posed by interest heterogeneity, but it also contributes to strengthening lower-level union representation structures by increasing commitment. Participation can be seen as a mechanism to build class solidarity and strengthen collective action and compliance. Moreover, institutional change aimed at empowering company level

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structures constitutes a precondition for the successful implementation of bargaining reforms and sustains articulated organisations. Taking into account these two dimen-sions Table 2 contains a rough assessment of the degree of trade union articulation in the four countries analysed. Articulation is higher where, as illustrated in Figure 1, trade unions rely on democratic internal decision making and a strong peak exercises control over lower-level structures that are strong enough to implement the guidelines negotiated at central level.

Table 2: Trade union strategies of articulation and outcomes of social pactsUnion strategies of articulation Main pacts and outcomes

Organisation: empowerment of lower levels

Democratic involvement

Ireland Demands for union recognition legislationImplementation of the Information and Consultation Directive

Participation of members in partnership negotiations through consultation and referenda

1987: Recentralisation (company ➛ national)1991: Local bargaining clause; attempts at articulating a two-level structure (national ➛ sector/company)Fragmentation and diversity of workplace regimes continuesImproved implementation and intra-union coordinationWeak-moderate articulation

Italy Changes in workplace representation structures (Rappresentanze Sindicali Unitarie)

Participation of members through referenda and consultation on the main pacts signed

1992-93: Decentralisation and two-level structure (national sector ➛ company)Collective bargaining articulated around two levelsWorkplace structures strengthenedModerate-strong articulation

Netherlands Cooperation with works councils as managers of decentralisationEnhanced co-determination rights

Participation of members in the ratification of the most important pacts

1982 Wassenaar agreement: centralisation (national ➛ industry/ company)1993 ‘New Course’: decentralisation (industry ➛ company)Collective bargaining well articulated along three levelsUnions and works councils remain well established at company levelStrong articulation

Spain Focus on collective bargaining rather than political actionStrengthen national-sector vis-à-vis company structures

Members’ involvement remains restricted to workplace elections

1997 April agreements: recentralisation (sector/province ➛ sector/national [➛ company])Fragmentation of collective bargaining remains highRetrenchment of law: soft mechanisms of coordinationImplementation problems remainWeak articulation

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The four cases analysed here also show how political involvement of trade unions has been instrumental in pursuing coordinated processes of reorganisation in bargaining accompanied by organisational reform (see Table 2). Compared to the essentially dis-tributive character of tripartite negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s, recent social pacts and tripartite peak agreements have included in various forms and to a different extent the reform and reregulation of collective bargaining structures. However, there are significant differences when it comes to the direction of change, the attribution of pow-ers across levels in the bargaining structure and the outcomes for trade unions. Whilst in Italy and the Netherlands the process has clearly pointed towards a decentralisation of collective bargaining, in Ireland and Spain there has been a recentralisation accom-panied by the attribution of significant degrees of flexibility at lower levels.

The analysis shows how political action is more effective for trade union revitalisation when it sets the conditions for articulated organisations. Thus the cases of Spain and, to a lesser extent, Ireland illustrate the limitations of political action to trigger meaning-ful bargaining and organisational articulation. In both cases, top-down logics of bar-gaining reform and lower-level organisational empowerment have delivered poor results due to structural implementation problems. In the case of Spain, the low degree of penetration in small and medium- sized companies has limited the effects of the 1997 collective bargaining reform. In the case of Ireland, voluntarism has hindered the extension of the principles contained in peak-level partnership agreements to company level. Even though partnership agreements in Ireland have been accompanied by par-ticipation of union members, there has been little empowerment of company level action. By contrast, the Italian and Dutch trade unions have followed a strategic mix containing both member participation and institutional changes aimed at improving (strengthening) the position of company level representation structures.

The above results complement the insights provided by the trade union revitalisation literature. In spite of their alleged weakness, unions still exhibit a strong strategic capacity. Nonetheless this article also shows that the benefits for trade unions of polit-ical action depend on the mix of strategies accompanying participation in social pacts and peak concertation. The conceptualisation of articulation as a process involving both the top-down empowerment of lower-level union structures in collective bargain-ing and the bottom-up involvement of members in the decision making is helpful in order to assess the beneficial effects of trade union participation in peak agreements. Not only have strategies of articulation followed by trade unions contributed to achiev-ing a positive-sum equilibrium between logics of influence and membership, but they have also consolidated their role as bargaining agents in a context characterised by strong pressures towards decentralisation and the extension of new mechanisms of regulation of industrial relations. More importantly, as the degree of union articulation increases, it is more likely to observe the consolidation and institutionalisation of social dialogue and concertation. The importance of this concept for the future of trade unions and organised industrial relations thus requires further research with a view to refining and improving our empirical knowledge of organisational articulation.

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