social capital of women micro vendors in Phnom Penh markets

SOCIAL CAPITAL OF WOMEN MICRO-VENDORS IN

PHNOM PENH (CAMBODIA) MARKETS: A STUDY OF VENDORS’ ASSOCIATION

Kyoko Kusakabe Chan Monnyrath Chea Sopheap

Theng Chan Chham

November 2001

UMP-Asia Occasional Paper No. 53

UNDP / UNCHS (Habitat) / World Bank URBAN MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific

c/o Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), km. 42 Phaholyothin Highway, P.O Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand Tel: (66-2) 524 5779 Fax: (66-2) 524 5778 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.serd.ait.ac.th/ump/

The UMP-Asia Occasional Papers are published periodically by the Urban Management Programme Regional Office for Asia-Pacific (UMP-Asia) with funding support from UNDP and several bilateral assistance agencies. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in these papers are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to UMP-Asia and to its affiliated organizations. UMP-Asia does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in these publications and accepts no responsibility whatsoever for any consequence of their use. UMP-Asia encourages dissemination of its work and will give permission to reproduce portions of the Occasional Papers when the reproduction is for non-commercial purposes and proper acknowledgement of the author(s) and UMP-Asia is made. To encourage information sharing, this paper and other papers in the series of Occasional Paper published in 1995 onwards, are also available on UMP-Asia website at http://www.serd.ait.ac.th/ump/

ABOUT THE AUTHORS KYOKO KUSAKABE, is a faculty and Coordinator of the Gender and Development (GenDev) field of study at the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) in Bangkok, GenDev is one of the key UMP-Asia partners at AIT which manages UMP city consultations on gender and poverty reduction in Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Vientiane (Lao PDR) and Semarang (Indonesia). CHAN MONNYRATH is the Program Officer of the Urban Sector Group in charge of the Women's Economic and Legal Rights Project (USG/WELR) in Phnom Penh. The Phnom Penh's Vendors' Association featured in this report, is formed under the WELR umbrella. CHEA SOPHEAP and TENG CHAN CHHAM are Program Assistants of the USG/WELR who have been directly responsible in data gathering for this particular research report. Carole Williams is acknowledged for her valuable comments and inputs to the earlier draft of this paper.

1 OP 53: Social Capital Of Women Micro-Vendors In Phnom Penh Markets: A Study Of Vendors’ Association

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SOCIAL CAPITAL OF WOMEN MICRO-VENDORS IN PHNOM PENH MARKETS: A STUDY OF VENDORS’ ASSOCIATION

OUTLINE

1. Introduction

2. Public Markets in Phnom Penh

3. Micro-Vendors in Public Market Places

4. Methodology

5. Profile of the Respondents

6. Business Profile of the Respondents

7. Murtual Trust and Gender Norms

8. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation


SOCIAL CAPITAL OF WOMEN MICRO-VENDORS IN PHNOM PENH MARKETS: A STUDY OF VENDORS’ ASSOCIATION

1. Introduction

I

n Cambodia, because of the long history of civil strife, it is said that mutual trust has been destroyed, and

that because of their negative experience with “cooperatives”, there is a stigma on organizing and on working together and sharing information together. Efforts to revive social capital and attempts and initiatives to organize people are taking place in Cambodia. One of such initiatives is the micro-vendors’ association in Phnom Penh markets. With the support of a local NGO Urban Sector Group (USG) and The Asia Foundation, micro-vendors in public market places are forming an association under the Women’s Economic and Legal Rights Project (WELR). This study examines how being a member of the vendors’ association influenced their sense of mutual trust and confidence in making changes in the society, and how such trust in turn influence their gender norms and ideologies and how they see their own positions in the households. Social capital generally refers to a set of norms, networks, and organizations through which people gain access to power and resources (Serageldin and Grootaert, 2000). The definition of social capital is broad and varies across researchers. Putman (1993), who have been instrumental in popularizing the concept of social capital, has used the concept in a relatively narrow way: being a member of an association/group. He claimed that membership in association strengthens political and economic efficiency even though the association itself does not have any role in the polity and the economy. Others define it in a much broader way; people’s relation to each other and the feeling of trust. Fukuyama (1995) has written extensively on the issue of trust, and linked the sense of trust to non-kins as a key to economic

growth and dynamic economy. Coleman (1988) conceptualized social capital as “a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether personal or corporate actors – within the structure.” He used in his analysis three forms of social capital: obligations and expectations, information channels, and social norms. Serageldin and Grootaert (2000) identified the third view of social capital. This builds on the first two, adding formalized institutional relationships and structures such as governments, political regimes, the rule of law, court systems, and civil and political liberties. There is a debate whether social capital is a “capital” and the significance and relevance in conceptualizing it as capital. However, it will not go into this debate here. It is debatable whether being a member of an association/group foster social capital, or when there is higher social capital in general, there will be more voluntary associations. Most probably, it works in both ways. Most of the debate on social capital centered on how social capital contributes to economic development (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Unger, 1998). However, how does such membership in association and/or higher social capital in general affect gender ideologies and women’s views about themselves? Social capital creates a better ground for economic development because of its function as a “glue that holds societies together” (Serageldin, 1996). The merit of social capital also has been recognized in providing safety net and social security for the poor (Moser, 1996). If promoting social capital is to integrate subordinated or marginalized people into the mainstream, assimilating


them without acculturating the society (Hood and Koberg, 1994), it might work to strengthen existing gender norms and ideologies rather than challenging them. In the women’s empowerment debate, one of the method of “empowering” women is to form women’s groups and to raise their political consciousness through collective activities (Rowbotham and Mitter, 1994). In one sense, these organizations are trying to give more

“glues” to stick them to the mainstream society, at the same time, encouraging them to challenge the existing norms. The study will examine how this process and balance is struck in the micro-vendors’ association in Phnom Penh. Through their collective action against the authorities, are they able to overcome the existing economic and social subordination? Or are they encouraging them to conform to the existing norms through building social capital?

Map showing location of Phnom Penh, Cambodia Cambodia

Phnom Penh


2. Public Markets in Phnom Penh

A

fter the Democratic Kampuchea (so-called Khmer Rouge) regime during 1974-1979, when no private

property nor market activity was allowed, Cambodia was under a socialist government of People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). PRK adopted a policy on market liberalization in 1989, and since then promoted private economy. The economy in Cambodia boomed during 1992-1995, with the arrival of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and other international donor agencies. The GDP per capita growth rate in US dollars was 22.5% in 1995 (National Institute of Statistics, 2000a). However, with the aid money decreasing and private investment not being able to take up as fast to cover up the decrease in aid, Cambodia’s economic growth slowed after 1995. Even though Cambodia was not as hard hit by the 1997 Asian economic crisis compared to its neighbor Thailand, the factional fighting in 1997 plummeted aid and investment, and tourist income experienced a 75% decline (Banwell et.al, 2001). There has been negative growth in per capita GDP in US dollars since 1996, and in 1998, it experienced a negative growth of 12.1% (National Institute of Statistics, 2000a). Public markets in Phnom Penh emerged immediately after the fall of Khmer Rouge in 1979. A large barter trade market started in front of the railway station, and also started in old public market places. Many present vendors started their business during this period. Even though Cambodia was under a Socialist regime, some private economic activities were recognized such as small-scale retail trade. Since the government did not have the capacity to distribute all the necessary goods and food to the population in the country, domestic retail trade was permitted and encouraged (Vickery, 1986). Therefore, there has been no significant restriction imposed on retail traders since 1979 especially in the market

stalls1. People who came earlier and had enough people to establish a stall in market places to start business could simply occupy a place to sell. Later when the government started to organize the public markets, these people could get the rights for the stalls that they have been occupying. Those who could not, still remained to be micro-vendors (Kusakabe, 1999). The population in Phnom Penh is estimated to have grown from 812,000 in 1994 to 1,000,000 in 1998 (National Institute of Statistics, 2000a). The number of women engaged in service and shop and market sales workers as primary occupation in Phnom Penh was estimated to be 57,044 in 1994 but grew to be 82,000 in 1997 (National Institute of Statistics, 2000a). Service and shop and market sales workers comprise of 51.1% of the primary occupation that Phnom Penh women are engaged in. There are 26 public markets in Phnom Penh, and the number of market vendors are increasing, especially the micro-vendors.

1 Those in the shophouses did experience occasional harassment, and some had to hide their business. Especially the ethnic Chinese experienced such harassment.


3. Micro-vendors in Public Market Places

M

icro-vendors are defined here as those who do not have a registered stall in public market

places, but those who are engaged in regular or temporary retail trade in these market places. They normally sell goods that need less capital, such as vegetables, spices, fish, fruits, used clothes, etc. Many of them sell in a regular place every day. Even though they do not pay the corporate tax (baton) and profit tax (ponda) that the vendors with registered stalls pay, they pay other taxes and fees such as business operation tax (pasi), rent for the place to stall owner or house owner, some fees to market committee and/or Sangkat (sub-district)/Khan (district) to do business in the place, alongside with security and sanitation fee. Even though they pay such fees, they are constantly under threat of eviction and harassment. Security officers turning over their wares, confiscating them, and/or overcharging fees are frequently reported. Many of the vendors are major household income earners, and are permanent residents of Phnom Penh. With limited occupation alternatives, their livelihoods can be vulnerable to such harassment, especially since most live on day-to-day basis, and one day not working immediately means one day without food. In order to improve such vulnerability, Urban Sector Group (USG) with the support of The Asia Foundation (TAF) started to organize the micro-vendors in the market places. They initially worked in two market places in Phnom Penh: Chaba Amphur Market and Daem Kor Market. Later they expanded to another market: Kandal Market, and planning to go into one more. Orussei Market. They helped the micro-vendors to be organized as an association, provided them with rights education, leadership training and negotiation and advocacy skills training so that they will be able to negotiate with the market committee when harassment cases occur and also to assert their rights as vendors in the market.

Along with such negotiation skills, the association has also come up with other social support services for their members. Households in Cambodia spend on average 21,282 riels per month or 5.9% of total consumption on medical care (National Institute of Statistics, 1999). In Phnom Penh, 74.8% of money for health care come from savings, wages and pocket money, 16.9% come from borrowed money (12.1% with interest) (National Institute of Statistics, 2000b). Among the urban poor, health expenses on average reach 14% of their total household expenditure for first line treatment, increasing for second treatment as they seek trained health providers (Gordon, 2000). With high medicine expenses, their livelihoods can easily collapse when one of their family members are seriously ill. USG has helped vendors to gain access to low-cost healthcare clinics run by NGOs in Phnom Penh. In order to meet the needs of childcare, the association came up with a daycare service. Many vendors have small children. Since vendors do not have anyone at home to look after the children, they either bring the children to the market, or leave the children at home. Some lock the children up in the houses while they are away, so that the children do not stroll around and meet accidents or get abducted. However, the communities that they are living in can be quite vulnerable to fire. One respondent reported of an incident where a vendor lost her children because the children were locked up in the house when the fire broke out. Even when they are not locked up, leaving children at home can be dangerous. One of the respondents left her children at home. One day, her child missed her mother, and tried to come to the market to look for her. But she got lost. The mother tried to find her and after 3 years of search, she was able to locate her child, who has been taken care of by another family. Bringing children to market places not only disturbs the mother’s business, but also can be dangerous and unhealthy. The


environment in the market place can be unsanitary because of garbage and muddy market floors. Credit was one of the urgent needs expressed by the micro-vendors. USG and The Asia Foundation provided seed money for credit activity for each association.

USG also helped the association to widen their occupation alternatives by giving them access to vocational training. However, those who can afford to attend these trainings are the vendors’ children, since the vendors themselves are too busy to attend.


4. Methodology

T

he objective of the study is to compare between members and non-members of the vendors’

association regarding their social capital. It also compared their perception on gender norms and ideologies and their self-perception on their position vis-à-vis their husbands in the households. Important questions raised for this study are: (1) What are the factors that have positive or negative relations with their social capital? How does membership in association as well as their kinship relation in the native provinces reflect on their trust level? How different would be the respondents’ belief in reciprocity and governance/democratic system between members and non-members of the association? (2) What are the gender norms and ideologies and self-perception of women in the household vis-à-vis their husbands? Does membership in the association make any difference? Is there any relationship between social capital and their perception on gender norms and ideologies? Measurement of social capital has been based on the structural and cognitive social capital of Krishna and Shrader (1999). Krishna and Shrader have come up with a set of indicators of social capital that has been proved to be useful measurements. Among the indicators that they developed, this study used the household level indicators, that is; indicators concerning structural social capital such as networks and mutual support organizations, exclusion, collective action, and conflict resolution, and cognitive social capital that includes solidarity, trust, reciprocity and cooperation. The indicators were adapted to the situation of vendors in Phnom Penh

markets (see questionnaire in appendix for the actual statements used). “Gender norms and ideologies” was measured by list of statements on their position in the household vis-à-vis their husbands, women’s leadership roles, conformity to the “traditional” image of women, and women’s participation in politics (see questionnaire in appendix for the actual statements used). Four public markets were selected for the study: three markets that USG is working to organize micro-vendors (Chaba Amphur, Daem Kor, and Kandal Markets) and one market where they have not yet started working (Orussei Market). 30 members were selected randomly from the list of members in Chaba Amphur Market and 31 in Daem Kor market. 14 members were selected randomly from the list of members in Kandal Market. Thirty, thirty-one and sixteen non-member vendors were selected from Chaba Amphur Market, Daem Kor Market, and Kandal Market respectively. They were randomly picked from geographically different areas in the market, and only those vendors who were willing to be interviewed were selected. For Orussei Market, where the organizing activity has not yet started, 30 vendors were randomly picked for interview. Total of 182 vendors (77 are members of association) were selected, and were interviewed with a structured questionnaire. Later, 20 vendors among the 182 were selected for in-depth interviews. These twenty vendors were selected with a mixture of members and non-members, those who were willing to speak more.


5. Profile of the Respondents

A

mong the 182 respondents, the average age was 40.14, the minimum was 14 years old, and the

maximum was 67 years old. 25.3% of them had only literacy training, and the average years of schooling was 3.34 years. There are 9 (4.9%) respondents who had received more than 10 years of schooling. 61.5% of the respondents (112 respondents) are married. 7.7% (14 respondents) are single, 12.1% (22 respondents) are widows, and 23.1% (34 respondents) are either divorced or separated. There is no significant difference in the pattern of marital status between members and non-members of the vendors’ association. The incidence of women-headed households among the respondents is higher (35.2%) when compared to the figure for Phnom Penh as a whole. In the Socio-economic survey 1999, women-headed households in Phnom Penh consisted of 25.8% of total households. The reasons why there are more widows and divorcees among the micro-vendors might be because of the limited income earning opportunities for poor women with lower education level. Secondly it might be because they do not have the option of being a dependent. Thirdly if they already had a business when they were married and were financially independent, they had the option of divorce. They did not have to tolerate violent husbands or infidelity of husbands. Cases of domestic violence are frequently reported among micro vendors. Most of the respondents live near the market (55.5% or 101 respondents). Only 12 respondents (6.6%) live outside Phnom Penh, mostly in the nearby provinces. 59.3% (108 respondents) reported to have their own houses, and 30.8% (56 respondents) rent their residences. Among the 108 respondents who they reported to own their houses, some are living in squatter areas and some are under the

threat of eviction. Many people who rent their residences have their houses in the rural areas or in places far away from the market. There are cases in which vendors rent a room together. These vendors are not necessarily relatives, but sell in the same market. There are 9 respondents (4.9%) who live in the market. They occupy empty stalls in the market and stay overnight there. They pay some rent to the stall owner. It is not a temporary arrangement. Their relatives from the rural areas also come to visit them and stay with them there as well. There are 26 respondents (14.3%) who do not have any children. The average number of children that the respondents have is three. There are very few vendors who live alone. Among the respondents, there was only one who lived alone. On average there are five people living together with the respondent. There are on average 2.16 persons in the household who contribute paying for household expenditures, but at the same time, 26.9% (49 respondents) have to shoulder the household expenditure all by themselves. Most of the respondents were born outside Phnom Penh. There is only 18.7% (34 respondents) that was born in Phnom Penh. The highest number of people (26.9% or 49 respondents) was born in neighboring Kandal province. Many also were born in relatively poor provinces such as Takeo (17 respondents, 9.3%), Svay Rieng (18 respondents, 9.9%), and Prey Veng (17 respondents or 9.3%). 40.4% (70 respondents) of respondents came to Phnom Penh during 1979 and 1980, immediately after the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime. In 1979, DK regime has collapsed, and People’s Republic of Kampuchea has been established. During the DK regime, no one was living in Phnom Penh, and no business activity was allowed. After the DK regime, people rushed in to Phnom Penh, and started business. Therefore, there


have been many respondents who have started business since that time, and still continue to present. Around the period of the first general election year of 1993, there has been a large influx of people to Phnom Penh. Many people moved in to Phnom Penh, not only from the rural areas but also from the refugee camps in the Thai borders. Because of ease of entry, many of them started doing micro-retail trade. 21 respondents (12.2%) came to Phnom Penh during 1992 to 1994. After 1997, economic growth slowed down and there were subsequent years of flood and drought. The flood and drought further pushed many people in the provinces to come to Phnom Penh for work. During 1997-99, 20 respondents or 15% of the respondents came to Phnom Penh. The average year that the vendors’ association members came to Phnom Penh was 1986 while for non-members it was 1988. Non-members came to Phnom Penh significantly later than members (ANOVA significance 0.058). Most of the respondents have their relatives2 in the provinces. Only 15 respondents (8.2%) said that they do not have any relative in the provinces. Most of those who have relatives in the provinces go and visit them at least once a year (67%), most of the time, during the Khmer New Year. It is notable that their relatives also come to visit the respondents quite often. 67.1% of respondents had their relatives from provinces come and visit them at least once a year. Considering their housing and financial situation, it can be quite a burden for the respondents. Some relatives, when they come, will help the respondents with their business or help with household work. There are 15 respondents who were remitting regularly and frequently to their relatives in the provinces. The others send money and receive money more in a reciprocal basis. When they visit their relatives in the provinces, they would give

gifts and cash to their relatives if they can afford. When there are ceremonies and festivals in the province, they are expected to contribute. In Orussei Market, vendors would collect contributions from other vendors and bring all these donation to the province when attending the ceremony. Since it is a contribution from many people, the amount becomes substantial. This shows the vendor’s ability to mobilize financial resources and thus gives her “face” to their relatives in the province. The remittances from relatives in the provinces are also reciprocal. The relatives in the provinces normally carry rice and fruits from the provinces when they come to visit the respondents. Most of the respondents replied that their relatives in the provinces are poor, and they cannot afford to send them anything. When asked whether they would be able to go back to the provinces if their business did not go well or when they get sick, most of the respondents replied negative. They would rather stay in Phnom Penh and try to make a living rather than going back to the provinces and stay with their relatives. Some have relatives in Phnom Penh, and if they do, these are the people that the respondents feel that they can rely on when in need. The respondents generally did not view their relatives in the provinces as their safety net in case things go wrong in the city.

2 “Relatives” were not defined by the researchers but depended on the definition of the respondents.


6. Business Profile of the Respondents 6.1. Trade items The most popular item to be sold by the micro-vendors is fresh vegetables. This needs the least capital to start with, and the demand is high. Normally, micro-vendors are able to sell all their goods within one day. It is not as risky as fruit selling, which requires more capital and there is higher possibility that they end up with a rotten fruit since they have to buy during dark dawn. Used clothes selling is also preferred because it does not rot, and thus the risk is lower. Nearly 70% of the respondents sell in a few trays or baskets.

6.2. Year of starting business Table 1 shows the period that the respondents started business classified by the period of changes in macro-economic situation. The patterns in years that they started business coincide with the patterns of years they came to Phnom Penh. However, it should be noted that the reason why there is a high number of vendors who started their business in recent years compared to the earlier years might be because some of those who started before have already quitted the business either because they made loss or other reasons. Among the respondents, 59.3% (108 respondents) have never changed items that they were selling. 22.3% of them changed more than twice.

Table 1: Year of starting business of respondents

Number of respondents Percentage Average number by year*1 1979-1980 34 18.6 17 1981-1990 39 21.4 3.9 1991-1995 31 17.0 6.2 1996-2001 78 42.9 13

*1 Number of respondents who started business when averaged per year during this period. 6.3. Capital and credit The average amount of initial investment capital is 137,504 riels3. This looks higher than expected because of the wide range in the investment capital of the vendors. 12.6% of the respondents did not have any start up capital. They obtained goods on credit in the morning, and repaid back in the afternoon. The median for the initial capital is 20,000 riels. As for working capital, the average is 165,398 riels while median is 50,000 riels. One micro-vendor that used to be in money exchange and is

now selling used clothes has a large working capital of 1500USD, but this is a very rare case.

3 In June 2001, the exchange rate was 3900 riels to 1 USD.

Most of the respondents said they do not have any credit source. As seen in Table 2, the credit sources that the respondents think they can rely on are their family members, money lenders in the market, and the association. Although there are slightly less respondents among members who said that they do not have any place where they can borrow money from, and slightly more respondents among members who replied that they can borrow from other vendors, the difference is small. Other than the vendors’


association, the available credit source for members and non-members are the same. There are 77 association members among the 182 respondents. Among the members, 65 borrowed money from the

vendors’ association. The fact that not all of them are interested in borrowing money shows that there are varying reasons for vendors to join the association.

Table 2: Possible credit sources of respondents (multiple answer)

Non-member Member Family member 30 (28.6%) 22 (28.6%) Neighbors 5 (4.8%) 2 (1.9%) Vendors nearby 3 (2.9%) 6 (7.8%) Relatives in same village 6 (5.7%) 4 (5.2%) Vendors’ Association 0 31 (40.3%) Money lender in market 38 (36.2%) 23 (29.9%) Money lender in village 4 (3.8%) 1 (1.3%) None 73 (69.5%) 53 (68.8%) Other sources 7 (6.7%) 5 (6.5%) Total respondents 105 (100%) 77 (100%)

Women micro-vendors in Phnom Penh, Cambodia


6.4 Business information Members seem to have more non-family sources of information (Table 3), but the difference does not seem to be large. However, there are some that have mentioned that the information source increased after joining the association.

“Other vendors also help me by introducing clients to me, or tell me places to buy cheap goods. This happened after I joined the association.” (#81)

It is easier to get information on places to sell than places to buy or credit source. Obtaining information on places to buy is more difficult, since only those in the same occupation are able to advise. If there was no vendors’ association, information on credit source is even harder to access. This reflects the lack of credit sources that the vendors can access. Also, it reflects that other credit schemes by NGOs and micro-credit organizations are not widely known or considered to be accessible. Noting that as in Table 2, most of the respondents rely on personal connection for credit, information on credit source cannot easily be shared.

Table 3: Information on places to sell, places to buy, and credit source of respondents

(multiple responses) Place to sell Place to buy Credit source Non-

member Member Non-

member Member Non-

member Member

Family member 20 (19.9%)

6 (7.8%)

15 (14.3%)

7 (9.1%)

7 (6.7%)

4 (5.2%)

Neighbors 6 (5.7%)

9 (11.7%)

3 (2.9%)

5 (6.5%)

2 (1.9%)

2 (2.6%)

Other vendors 7 (6.7%)

3 (3.9%)

8 (7.6%)

5 (6.5%)

13 (12.4%)

5 (6.5%)

Vendor association member

5 (4.8%)

8 (10.4%)

3 (2.9%)

6 (7.8%)

2 (1.9%)

20 (26.0%)

Relative in same village

16 (15.2%)

14 (18.2%)

6 (5.7%)

11 (1.3%)

6 (5.7%)

2 (2.6%)

None 50 (47.6%)

34 (44.2%)

67 (63.9%)

38 (49.4%)

68 (64.8%)

20 (26.0%)

Other sources 2 (1.9%)

5 (6.5%)

3 (2.9%)

7 (9.1%)

7 (6.7%)

29 (37.7%)

Total respondents 105 (100%)

77 (100%)

105 (100%)

77 (100%)

105 (100%)

77 (100%)

6.5. Mentors The respondents were asked of their relations with others in the form of speaking casually as well as discussing problems with others. Under Krishna and Shrader’s classification, this was to be organizational density and characteristics. In this study, these can also be interpreted as their existing and potential mentors. During the interviews, it has been found that people discuss with those

that are older and more experienced, and/or those they think have wider network or more socially active or more established in their business. For example, many respondents in Chaba Amphur Market said that they discuss with one respondent who is one of the leaders and an active member of the association. She also recognizes that others come to her for advice, but she said that she herself does not discuss her problems with others.


Table 4: People that the respondents speak with most and discuss problems on business and family

Spoke with

most*1 Discuss business*2

Discuss family*3

NM M NM M NM M

Family member 84 53 70 59 95 67

Neighbors 23 29 9 9 11 9

Other vendors 195 106 38 35 11 4

Vendors not nearby 2 1

Vendors’ association member 35 64 15 29 3 15

Relative in same village 4 9 10 8 10 8

Customer 4 4 3 1 1

NGO worker 0 2 1 1 0 9

Market committee /security 3 0 0 1 0 1

Association president 2 5 0 51 0 4

Group leader 13 0 3

Stall/place owner 9 3 1 2

Moneylender 1 1

Relatives in provinces 2 2

Local authority 1 2

Others 1 1

None 0 0 12 16 16

Total respondents 105 77 105 77 105 77

*1 Who did you meet with and spoke with most in the last one week? *2 When you have problems in business, who do you discuss with? *3 When you have problems in your family, who do you discuss with? * NM = non members, M=members * These questions were asked and concrete names were indicated by the respondents. The

respondents were encouraged to name as many people as they would like to. The numbers that appear in this table is the sum of all the names that the respondents mentioned.

Table 4 summarized the questions related to who the respondents discuss with. It has counted all the people that the respondents mentioned that they discuss with. As seen in Table 4, respondents speak with other vendors as much as or more than they do with their family members. Since they are in the market most of the time, they are with their fellow vendors longer than they are with their families. However, when it comes to discussing problems, especially on family problems, respondents discuss with family members more than they do with others. If other family members are not into business, it is difficult for them to discuss about business with family members.

Therefore, there are more cases in which they mentioned that they do not have anybody to discuss about the business compared to family affairs. Some vendors noted that they talk much with their fellow vendors, but do not go into serious discussion with each other. They do not trust each other to this extent. They think that if they tell their problems to others, it is not only that others would not be able to help them, but also that they might talk bad about them and criticize them. Rather than being consoled, they will be more upset with the situation. Such lack of trust can be seen in such statement as;


“If I ask them to help me, they will tell me that I am lazy and look down on me. When I am suffering, if others look down on me, the suffering will be much harder. So, I normally tolerate and keep to myself.” (#28)

The need to have sole mates who they can grumble and discuss real problems with can be seen in the demand of the USG worker for personal discussion. With her, the vendors do not mind talking about their problems. This might be because she is an outsider, and because she is a NGO staff who work for their problems. They do reply that they trust each other more and talk with each other more, but it does not seem to reach the point where they openly discuss their problems. However, creation of association has created an opportunity for the vendors to meet each other and to discover that others also have the similar problem. Even though they would not be able to open themselves up, this does create some closeness among them, who used to be quite isolated and struggled with their heavy life problems alone. From Table 4, it is observed that association members tend to have more variety of people that they can discuss with compared to non-members. Among the association members, they have considerable inter-action between members, and especially with the association president. This is also because when association members recruit other members, they call on vendors nearby. Vendors nearby are those who already have good communication relationship with the members. But the relationships might have become stronger after they joined the association. A vendor in Chaba Amphur Market stated,

“Before there was an association, vendors did not help each others much. We did not bother about each other. After the association has been established, we came to know that we share the same problem, and are equally poor with similar suffering and situation. So, we felt close to each

other, and sometimes eat together.” (#19)

The number of people who look up to their association president as a mentor among the members is worth noting. This shows how active the association presidents are, which is an important aspect for the viability of the association. This connection has been made or strengthened after the association was established. It is noticed that even though the number is small, market committee, money lenders, and landlords are included as mentors by some respondents. With all the conflict that the vendors have with market committee, and the exploitative relationships that they have with money lender and landlords, it is important to note that these people are also those who the vendors turn to for advice. It might be because they are accessible since they are always in the market, or because they are more experienced and exposed to other business affairs and could give good advice to them. Most importantly, not only do these people have an interest in the sustainability of the vendors’ business, they also have direct means to help them as well. 6.6 Participation in Vendors’ Association Among the 182 respondents, there are 77 respondents who are members of market micro-vendors’ association. 96 respondents do not belong to any association/ organization/ group. 9 respondents are members of groups organized by other NGOs4.

4 Such as PADEK, LWS, CWS, USG and SUFP, and other groups under ACLEDA and Kampuchea Krom Association.


Table 5: Reasons of respondents for being a member of vendors’ association (multiple response)

Number of responses Percentage Other vendors invited me 25 32.5 It protects us from security 40 51.9 It provides credit 56 72.7 It provides childcare/health services 7 9.1 I can have more friends 31 40.3 To help each other 2 2.6 Want to increase knowledge/skill in business 8 10.4 Save money 1 1.3 Total number of respondents 77 100

As can be seen from Table 5, even though obtaining credit is the largest reason for joining the association, there is a non-negligible number of members who join because of the connection and relation that they can get through the association. One respondent said that before joining the association, no one would have noticed even when she dies. But now that

she is a member of the association, she is rest assured that at least someone will put up a funeral for her. This sense of isolation in the city is described to be quite devastating for micro-vendors, especially for the poor who do not have close relatives in the rural areas nor in Phnom Penh.

Table 6: Experience in going to negotiate with authorities by their attendance in

weekly meetings (number of respondents) Negotiate Attendance in weekly meetings Every week 1-2 times a month < once a month Never Total Yes 17

(50.0%) 12

(35.3%) 4

(11.8%) 1

(2.9%) 34

(100%) No 3

(7.0%) 13

(30.2%) 23

(53.5%) 4

(9.3%) 43

(100%) Total 20

(26.0%) 25

(32.5%) 27

(35.1%) 5

(6.5%) 77

(100%)

* Chi-square value 24.29, degree of freedom 3, significance level 0.00. The reason for being a member of the vendors’ association does not seem to make any significant difference to their attendance in weekly meetings. However, the attendance to weekly meetings in turn makes a significant difference to their experience in negotiating with security officers and market committee. As seen in Table 6, those who have ever been to

negotiate with authority attend the weekly meeting significantly more than those who have never been to any negotiation. On the other hand, when the relationship between obtaining credit and the attendance in meeting is examined, there is no significant relationship (chi-square value 3.54, significance 0.32). This shows that credit does not motivate them to


attend meetings as much as their sense of need to be united against the authorities. In this light, it is interesting to note that among the association members, only 84.4% of them borrow money from the association, even though everyone is eligible for it. Credit might motivate them to become members, but would not strengthen the association and the relationship with each other. When the relationship between use of childcare and health referral services and

the attendance in meetings are examined, there is a significant relationship between the two (Table 7). Those who use the services more, attend weekly meetings more. This reflects the members’ attitude/ perception towards the association. For those who find benefit in helping each other tend to attend meeting more compared to those who only find instrumental benefit such as access to credit in the association.

Table 7: Use of childcare and/or health referral services and attendance in weekly

meetings (number of respondents)

Use service Attendance in weekly meetings Every week 1-2 times a month < once a month Never Total Yes 18

(48.6%) 13

(35.1%) 6

(16.2%) 0 37

(100%) No 2

(5.0%) 12

(30.0%) 21

(52.5%) 5

(12.5%) 40

(100%) Total 20

(26.0%) 25

(32.5%) 27

(35.1%) 5

(6.5%) 77

(100%)

* Chi-square value 26.10, degree of freedom 3, significance level 0.00 No significant relation was found between membership in the association and their relationships with relatives in the provinces in terms of visits and remittances. The hypothesis was that the less the vendors have relatives in the provinces, the more they would be a member of association, and are inclined to be active in the association. It was hypothesized that the vendors would value their social capital in the market more if they do not have any other place to rely

on. The study showed that this is not the case. As noted in section 6, vendors do not feel that they can rely on relatives in the provinces. Therefore, even if they have relatives in the provinces, it does not provide them with the social capital or the social security net that the vendors would need. So, regardless of the existence of relatives in the provinces, micro-vendors value their connection through the association.


7. Mutual Trust and Gender Norms 7.1. Mutual support The study asked the vendors who they can look up to for help when in trouble. It asked five questions regarding this matter: (1) If she has to go to some place and have to leave her children, who would she be able to entrust her children, (2) If she has to attend to something for a week,

who would she be able to entrust her business, (3) If she has to go to some place for several days or weeks, who would she be able to entrust her house, (4) If she is sick and cannot do the business, who can she rely on, (5) If she is sick and cannot do household work, who can she rely on.

Table 8: Persons who respondents can look up to for help (multiple answer)

Family member

Neighbors Other vendors

Relatives in same village

Relatives in province

No one Others

NM M NM M NM M NM M NM M NM M NM M Entrust children

70 55 4 6 0 0 6 19 0 3 36 16 0 1

Entrust business

33 34 2 1 3 2 7 0 1 72 41 0 0

Entrust house

86 55 11 15 0 3 6 23 2 2 14 8 0 4

Rely on when sick

97 79 1 0 0 1 4 4 0 2 11 8 2 2

Rely on household work

105 86 0 1 1 2 4 7 0 0 7 4 0 0

Total 105 77 105 77 105 77 105 77 105 77 105 77 105 77

* NM = non-member, M = member Vendors rely mainly on family members for help (Table 8). Relatives in the same village are the next to be relied upon. Vendors do not rely on other vendors, even for business. Their family members also cannot be relied upon for their business. When they have problem in carrying out the business, they have to either solve the problem by themselves, or quit/temporary stop doing business. This is reflected in their sometimes irregular attendance in the market.

If the responses are compared between association members and non-members, there are significantly less respondents who answered that they do not have anyone that they can entrust their business to among members (chi-square 4.43, significance level 0.035). One non-member said that when the business is bad, mutual help is not there.


“This year, the business is bad, so people just mind their own business…..People are selling separately, and minding their own business.” (#95)

Moser (1996) found a similar tendency in her research of 4 urban communities, noting that when the economy is bad, reciprocal relationship decreases. Association provides other ways to reciprocate besides material reciprocity. Thus, it leaves more room to retain mutual help in bad economic times. There are also significantly less respondents who answered that they do not have anyone that they can entrust their children to among members (chi-square 3.97, significance level 0.046). It should also be noted that among those who think they can entrust their business to other vendors (4 respondents), 3 are association members. There is only one respondent that answered that she can rely on other vendors when she is sick, and this respondent is an association member. There are three respondents who think they can rely on other vendors for household work. Two of them are association members. Although the

number itself is small, these suggest that association members might have more social network that they can depend on when in difficulty than non-members. This also shows that they have higher trust on others (non-relatives) that they will help them. However, it should be noted that the members’ main support networks are family members and relatives in the same village. As noted earlier, association members came to Phnom Penh significantly earlier than non-members, and thus might have established their social support networks better in Phnom Penh than non-members. 7.2. Vendors’ trust on others for problem solving As noted in Table 9, association members tend to think that market committee is accountable for the infrastructure maintenance of the market. Infrastructure maintenance is actually the responsibility of the market committee, and the answers show the greater awareness among the association members of their rights and who to hold accountable for. This can also be seen as their trust to the management system in the market and their ability to make changes.

Table 9: If the road around the market became very muddy and dirty, who do you

think would work together to deal with the situation? (multiple answer) Non- member Member Total Each person individually 47

(44.8%) 24

(31.2%) 71

(39.0%) Vendors nearby work together 22

(21.0%) 35

(45.5%) 57

(31.3%) Market committee 56

(53.3%) 62

(80.5%) 118

(64.8%) Vendors’ association 1

(1.0%) 17

(22.1%) 18

(9.9%) Municipality 6

(5.7%) 11

(14.3%) 17

(9.3%) NGO 6

(5.7%) 20

(26.0%) 26

(14.3%) Do not know 19

(18.1%) 3

(3.9%) 22

(12.1%) Others 12

(11.4%) 6

(7.8%) 18

(9.9%)

* There are 105 non-members, and 77 members among the 182 respondents. Percentages are of the non- members, members, and total respectively.


There is higher responses among the members who responded that vendors nearby work together to improve the physical environment. Vendors in Chaba Amphur Market has got together and made a concrete road in the place where they sell. When the market committee got to know this, they have started to take on that initiative and extended the place where concrete floors are made. Market committee is well-aware that such infrastructure maintenance is their responsibility, and according to the market vendors, they were afraid that the vendors will intrude on their duty, and thus further claim for a legitimate place in the market. The same tendency can be seen in the answers for dealing with harassment from the security officers, and in case there is a theft (see appendix table A5 and A6). But when it comes to problems in the village where they live, there is not much difference between members and non-members (see appendix table A8). At the same time, there are more respondents among members who answered that NGOs should be the one to take initiative to improve the situation. This might show the sense of dependency that the association members are having towards the NGO that helped them to be organized. One can also argue that the higher reliance on authorities among members are the reflection of their dependency. That is, they feel helpless in solving the problem themselves, and rely on top-down decisions. Table 10 shows that this is not the case. Table 10 asked the respondents whether others expect that the respondent gets involved in problem solving in the market. Most vendors expressed that they get involved by expressing their opinion when there is, for example, a dispute between vendors nearby. Respondents said that in the 1980s, they did not care much about others nor did they meddled into other people’s disputes fearing repercussion to her side. However, now, most people feel confident that they can express their opinion without the fear of reprisal. Statistically, there are significantly more association members who think that they are expected to express opinions in

solving market problems than non-members. Being able to express opinions and participate in surrounding processes are signs that they have trust on others, in the sense that they do not feel afraid of any repercussion or backlash or feel intimidated to express their opinion. This also shows their confidence that others would listen to them when they speak. Table 10: Do you think others expect you to take initiative in solving problems in the market place? Non-

member Member Total

Yes 76 (72.4%)

68 (88.3%)

144 (79.1%)

No 29 (27.6%)

9 (11.7%)

38 (20.9%)

Total 105 (100%)

77 (100%)

182 (100%)

* Chi square value 6.83, significance level 0.009. Being able to discuss problems with others shows that the vendors have someone that they can discuss with, and that they have trust on others that they will not use the information against them. Association members have significantly higher cases where they discuss with others on problems (Table 11). Table 11: Have you ever discussed about the problem you face in your workplace or your residence with others? Non-

member Member Total

Yes 49 (46.7%)

47 (61.0%)

96 (52.7%)

No 56 (53.3%)

30 (39.0%)

86 (47.3%)

Total 105 (100%)

77 (100%)

182 (100%)

* Chi square value: 3.68, significance level 0.055.


Table 12: Have you ever notified problems to police or to court or to other authorities?

Non-

member Member Total

Yes 4 (3.8%)

26 (33.8%)

30 (16.5%)

No 101 (96.2%)

51 (66.2%)

152 (83.5%)

Total 105 (100%)

77 (100%)

182 (100%)

* Chi square value: 28.96, significance level 0.000. When asked of whether they have ever notified to the authorities, whether they or others got their wares confiscated, they have met theft cases, etc., there is significantly more respondents among association members who have ever done so. This again show the members’ confidence to access authorities, as well as their trust on the system. It is interesting to know that although association members are most of the time confronting authorities against harassment cases against them, association members have higher trust on the authorities in a sense that the authorities will be able to improve the place and would deal with problems. This also explains why more members notify to authorities compared to non-members. 7.3. Vendors’ general perception of trust among the community and market The respondents were asked to rate in five degrees whether they agree or disagree with the statements that deal with solidarity, trust, reciprocity and cooperation (see Table 13). These statements were made for both in market places and in the neighborhoods that they live in. For convenience, these set of indicators will be called “trust indicators” here. It is not necessarily the case that non-members have stronger identity and trust to their neighborhood community than the market. Significant difference

between the members and non-members are seen in general trust indicators (aggregated of all indicators in Table 13) and trust indicators for market place (aggregated of indicators related to market place; that is, statements 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18 in Table 13), but not for trust indicator for neighborhood (aggregated of indicators related to neighborhood; that is, statements 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18 in Table 13). When compared the aggregate figure for all the trust indicators, there is a significant difference between association members and non-members, with non-members having the average figure of –0.03 and members having an average of 0.135. The difference is more significant when compared for figures for trust indicators for market place only6.

5 Significance level 0.004. 6 For non-members, -0.06, for members 0.14, significance level 0.001.


Table 13: Average values for trust indicators among members and non-members Statements Non-

member Member Total

1. People in the market look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not much concerned with the improvement of the market.

-1.20 -0.69 -0.99***

2. People in the neighborhood look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not much concerned with the improvement of the neighborhood.

-0.86 -0.48 -0.70**

3. If I do a good thing to my fellow vendors, they will also be nice to me.

1.40 1.57 1.47*

4. If I do a good thing to my neighbors, they will also be nice to me.

1.46 1.52 1.48

5. Most people in this market are basically honest and can be trusted.

0.37 0.36 0.37

6. Most people in my neighborhood are basically honest and can be trusted.

0.63 0.56 0.60

7. People are always interested only in their own welfare.

-1.75 -1.43 -1.62***

8. In this market, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you.

-1.50 -1.52 -1.51

9. In my neighborhood, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you.

-1.40 -1.47 -1.43

10. If I have a problem, there is always someone to help me.

0.53 0.80 0.64

11. Most people in this market are willing to help if I need it.

0.53 0.67 0.59

12. Most people in my neighborhood are willing to help if I need it.

0.72 0.80 0.76

13. I feel I have a right as a member of this market. 1.50 1.59 1.54

14. I feel I have a right as a member of my neighborhood.

1.55 1.63 1.58

15. If I drop a purse in the market, someone will see it and return it to me.

-1.94 -1.88 -1.92

16. If I drop a purse in my neighborhood, someone will see it and return it to me.

-1.91 -1.79 -1.86

17. I think my life will be better in the future. 0.62 0.95 0.76**

18. I will be able to improve my life in the future. 0.75 1.15 0.92***

For statements 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9, lower values are assigned if they agree with the statement. For other statements, higher values are assigned if they agree with the statements.

Indicators were calculated by assigning 2 for strongly agree, 1 for agree, 0 for do not know, -1 for disagree, and –2 for strongly agree. For statements 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9, the assigned values are the opposite, having –2 for strongly agree.

The higher the value, higher the trust level of each indicator. *** Significant at the level of 0.01. ** Significant at the level of 0.05. * Significant at the level of 0.07.


As can be seen in Table 13, the most prominent difference between members and non-members is that they believe more in reciprocity, and that others are not selfish, that people will cooperate and help each other, and that they have more hope in the future. One member (#28)7 stated that “Business is not only for selling. It is also for relating with each other (roap aan kania)”.

Before there was an association, sellers did not help each other much. They did not bother about each other. After the association is there, we came to know that we share the same problem, and equally poor with similar suffering and situation. So, we felt close to each other, and sometimes eat together.” (#19)8

Although some differences might be attributed partly to the fact that members started business significantly earlier than non-members.

I think the trust is better. People are honest and can be trusted. For example people around my place will keep the tings for me if I forget. Once I forgot the fish that I bought on the table when I left for home. Person nearby came shouting and came after me to bring the fish for me. This shows that people around are honest and good. Such relationship grew in the last 1-2 years. I have been selling for a long time, so I can enjoy such relationship.” (#64)9

Besides being an association member, what else have positive influence on their level of trust? The trust indicators are higher if the respondent received support

/gift from their relatives in the provinces more than once a year compared to those who have not (significance 0.002). Getting support from others improves their trust on others and strengthens their feeling of reciprocity and others not being selfish. This also means that they have different people that they can rely on, thus have more hope in the future.

7 Widowed vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member since 1993. General trust indicator 0.33, trust indicator for market 0.45. 8 Widowed vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. General trust indicator 0.44, trust indicator for market 0.55. 9 Married used clothes seller in Daem Kor Market. Member. General trust indicator 0.44, trust indicator for market 0.55.

Regardless of membership, it is also found that the more children they have, the more they have hope in the future. In Kusakabe (1999)’s earlier study, it was found that vendors’ expenditure for children’s education is very high, and vendors’ main objective for business was to send children to school. This explains why vendors put any available resources to children’s education. Their business is not a source of hope or indicator of success, but their children are.

“I think my future will be better, because my children will help me. I was not sure before, but after I had my children, and when they are getting bigger, I started to feel good about my future.” (#28)10

“I feel better about the future, since I have taught my child to do business, and now I know that I can depend on my children.” (#24)11

It is noted that among the members, those who attend weekly meetings show higher values in the general trust indicators (significance 0.025). Of course, only from this result, it cannot be concluded that meetings strengthens the members’ sense of trust. It can be the case that those who have higher trust on others and trust on collective action and to make changes are coming to the meetings more. The similar thing can be seen when their experiences in participating in

10 Widowed vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member since 1993. General trust indicator 0.33, trust indicator for market 0.45. 11 Married vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. General trust indicator 1.09, trust indicator for market place 0.94.


negotiation with the authorities are compared (significance 0.000). Those who have ever participated in negotiation scored higher in trust indicator. It is also seen that those who think that others depend on them for problem solving in the market have higher value in general trust indicator (significance 0.000), as well as those who notify to the authorities when there is a problem (significance 0.000). These indicates that those people who take action in terms of negotiating, problem solving, and notifying have trust on the external system, and believe that others will also work for the betterment of other people. They believe that changes can occur and that they can make authorities work for them. Having higher trust is important for dynamic development of their business. The respondents were asked if they had a choice, whether they would like to do a

business that can give a return of 5000 riels alone by themselves, or do a business that gives a return of 15000 riels, but together with another person (Table 14). When compared between these two options, those who answered that they would like to do the business together with others scored higher in trust indicators (significance 0.001). No significant difference has been observed for the willingness to do business together between members and non-members. There has also been no significant difference in trust indicator between members and non-members among those who preferred to do business together. Most of the respondents did not want to do business with others since it might create personal conflicts. There was no respondent that gave the reason of selecting doing business alone based on the amount of return that one can get.

Table 14: Average of trust indicators for market place on willingness to doing business

together Average

Prefer to do business alone and earn 5000r. -0.036 Prefer to do business together with others and earn 15000r. 0.230 Do not know -0.061 Total 0.023

Missing cases: 2 A multiple regression analysis was conducted for trust indicators to examine the effect of association membership when other characteristics are constant (Table 15). Trust indicators for market was selected because the focus is on the effect of vendors’ association membership. Variables taken into consideration are: age, education level, number of children, marital status, number of sources of people who they can discuss for business

problems, whether or not they receive remittances or visit relatives or relatives visited them from the provinces more than once a year, and year of starting business. The number of sources that the vendors can discuss about problems can lead to higher trust level or vice versa. They trust others, therefore, can discuss with more people outside their direct family members.


Table 15: Regression model for trust indicators for market place12 Unstandardized

coefficient Standardized coefficient

t sig

B Std. error Beta (Constant) -13.821 7.714 -1.792 .075 Age 0.008 0.003 0.186 2.580 0.011 Number of sources that respondent

discussed on business problems 0.176 0.044 0.294 3.989 0.000

Receive cash/gifts from relatives in provinces

0.175 0.059 0.205 2.960 0.004

WELR member 0.100 0.060 0.121 1.658 0.099 Year of starting business 0.007 0.004 0.124 1.719 0.087

R square: 0.200, Adjusted R square 0.177 F value = 8.698, significance 0.000 Missing cases: 2 Selection of variables was made by backward method. The excluded variables are: visit relatives in provinces more than once a year, send money to relatives in provinces more than once a year, divorced or not, education level.

The number of sources that the vendors can discuss about problems can lead to higher trust level or vice versa. They trust others, therefore, can discuss with more people outside their direct family members. Visiting relatives in the provinces, sending money to provinces were also considered alongside with receiving money or in-kind from relatives in the provinces in the regression model. However, the relationships of the first two variables were not as strong as with the last one for trust indicators. Receiving things or money from relatives show their connectedness to the relatives in provinces, and also shows that the respondents have people that they might be able to fall back on when in trouble.


“If I am in trouble, like I lose in business, I am sure that my relatives in the province will help me. They can send me capital if I tell them that I lost my business. But normally, I do not tell them about minor problems, since I do not want to make them worried.” (#121)13

However, almost all of the respondents for in-depth interviews answered that they would not like to go back to the provinces and depend on their relatives even when they are in difficulty in Phnom Penh. Although having a close linkage with relatives in the provinces does seem to give them a sense of security and less sense of isolation.

“It is difficult during rainy season, since I cannot sell well. When difficult, I depend on my sister who is in Phnom Penh. My sister is working with a NGO. When I feel difficult, I walk around Wat Phnom. I do not want to go back to the province. I will not go back even when I am sick. When I am old, I will not go back to the province either. It is better to go to the temple. When I am old, I would like to depend on my children.” (#153)14

13 If it is run for trust indicators in the neighborhood and in general, the selected variables are the same except that variable “WELR member” is not significant, and excluded from the model. 13 Married used shoes seller in Kandal market. New member. Trust indicator for market 0.09. For this respondent, the aggregate trust indicator was low because her values in evaluating the honesty of others (statement 15) was very low (-2). She had value 1 for reciprocity in the village (statement 4) and that other people will help her (statements 10, 11, 12). 14 Married vegetable seller in Orussei market. Trust indicator for market 0.55. .Average trust indicator for all the respondents is 0.02, with standard deviation of 0.41.

“When I feel difficult, I stay at home. I do not go to the province. When I am old, I will depend on children. If children cannot be depended, I will depend on my husband.” (#161)15

At the same time, the relatives in the province can be a burden or pressure for the vendors rather than help. This explains why visiting relatives or relatives visiting them did not have relation with trust levels but receiving cash and in-kind from the relatives did. Having relatives alone can be only a burden for the respondentss.

“When I decided to come to Phnom Penh, I was better off. Even now, I think I can feed some of my close relatives back home. I feel ashamed that I have now become poor so I cannot go back to my province.” (#42)16

“Old people in the province depend on me, and expects that I would look after them. I can feel that whenever I go back home.” (#75)17

“Relatives in the province depend on me. But I cannot depend on them. It is not because they are poor. I cannot leave my children to them also.” (#95)18

Even when respondents’ age, year of starting business (which also reflects their experience and connectedness in Phnom Penh), and their connections to the provinces are held constant, membership in the association still makes significant difference in their trust levels. Earlier, it was argued that members might be

15 Vegetable seller in Orussei market. Trust indicator for market 1.09. 16 Married vegetable seller at Chaba Amphur market. Became member after the interview. Trust indicator for market –0.27. 17 Divorced used clothes seller in Daem Kor market. Member. Trust indicator for market 0.36. 18 Married soybean drink seller at Daem Kor Market. Non-member. Trust indicator for market –0.64.


having higher trust level because they have been in the market for a longer period of time than non-members. However, regression result shows that even when the difference in the length in doing business is taken into consideration, still, membership in association has a positive relation with trust level. The regression result does not directly show whether people with higher trust level become members or people’s trust improves through collective activities by being a member of the association. However, interviews show that being an association member improved their perception in the sense that they now feel that others will help them when they are in trouble. One vendor in Chaba Amphur market said that before, even if she died, nobody would have noticed. Now, after she became an association member, she can rest assured that others will know when she is in difficulty, and also someone will hold a funeral for her if she died.

“After I joined the association, I began to have hope in the future. I still remember that when they first came for a survey in the market, I cried, and that A(NGO worker) told me not to lose hope. I still remember that word.” (#19)19 “When I do good to others, but others do not do good to us, I do not get angry. Even if that person do not do good to me, another person will do good to us…. Trust has improved (since there is an association), since people know that we are one, and know our personality. We trust those who are nearby, but not those who are far away. We trust each other even without knowing their houses. But just by being an association member does not make that person trustworthy.

Most important is that they are nearby.” (#24)20

19 Widowed vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. Trust indicator for market 0.55.

“Since I came alone far away from my family, I wanted to have more friends, and that is why I joined the association. It is nice to have more friends, since when there is an accident, others will know.” (#20)21

In Orussei Market, even though the association is not yet formed, their leaders went to the municipality to negotiate, and they think that this experience has improved their trust level.

“There is more trust in the market. I went to municipality twice and to Khan twice on the issue of place to sell. After there were many problems in the police chasing the vendors out, other vendors started to come to me and discussed what to do. This has improved trust among each other.” (#155)22

Before, they used to be quite indifferent to each other, but after the association was formed, they reported that things have changed.

“We can talk with each other easier. When people are fighting, I stop them. If we talk correctly (niyui trew), they will listen. After

20 Vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. Trust indicator for market 1.0. A similar point was made by respondent #155, who is a leader in Orussei Market. Her trust indicator for market is 0.09 21 Leafy vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Widow. Member. Trust indicator for market –0.27. Her indicator is low because she has very low value (-2) for statements 7, 8, and 15, which shows the low trust to others in the market. This is all the more reason that she would like to join the association, since she does not know who to trust in the market. 22 Married pork seller in Orussei Market. One of the vendors who went to the municipality to negotiate with authorities. Trust indicator for market 0.09.


I joined the association, people will come to talk to me about their problem.” (#28)23.

“Before, when I see people fighting in the market, I just looked on. Now, I advise them not to fight. I go and tell them. Others also listen to us.” (#64)24

“Nowadays, when other people are fighting, vendors nearby will try to come in between and stop. Before, it was not like this.” (#153)25

Other members do not necessarily agree to such improvement. One person got into conflict with other members, and thus the whole social capital that she built up through the association membership was gone.

“When I have problem with the vendors nearby, other people do not dare to help me (ot hien chuoi). They do not want to be involved in the problem. They are afraid that if they give comment, they will have problem with others as well. So they just keep quiet.” (#125)26

Some members think that through the association activities, they get to know the activities of other agencies. This allows them to be more effective in helping others.

“Yesterday, I found one girl who ran away from home because her step mother was mean to her. So, I gave her clothes and money. Another time, I met a woman who

ran away from her violent husband. I told her about an NGO working on domestic violence and told her how to go there. I also gave her some money for transportation. I can now help more people because I now know about NGOs more.” (#81)27

23 Widowed vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. Trust indicator for market 0.45. 24 Married used clothes seller in Daem Kor Market. Member. Trust indicator for market 0.55. 25 Married vegetable seller in Orussei Market. Trust indicator for market 0.55. 26 Married vegetable seller in Kandal market. Member. Trust indicator for market 0.27.

Members’ higher trust on the system or governance mechanism can be seen in such quotes as;

“When I have a problem in selling place, security will come quickly to help me.” (#121)28

“When there is a thief in the market, they will call the security, and the security will catch the thief. Vendors nearby do not go out and help catch the thief. It is different in the village. In the village, if there is a thief, villagers will cooperate and catch the thief by themselves, and punish by themselves. They do not bother to call the police.” (#123)29

If compared between those who have ever been to negotiate with the authorities and those who have never been, those with experience have higher trust level30. Some respondents among those who do not belong to any group or organization can also go and negotiate with the authorities in an individual capacity. For these respondents also, the difference in trust indicators between those who have experience in negotiating and those who do not is significant (significant level 0.055), although in a much lesser extent than the cases for members.

27 Married used clothes seller in Daem Kor Market. member. Trust indicator for market 0.27. 28 Married used clothes seller in Kandal market. Member. Trust indicator for market 0.09. 29 Married vegetable seller in Kandal market. Member. Trust indicator for market 0.36. 30 For trust indicators for the market as well as for trust indicators in general, the difference is significant at 0.000.


Nearly half of the respondents think that generally, mutual trust in the market has improved over the last few years31. This might be because the economy is improving, or because they have been selling for a longer time, and the longer they are together, the better the trust can be. Economic situation can influence their trust levels as Moser (1996) pointed out in her research and also as seen in one respondents remark in this study;

“I cannot rely on others, since I do not have anything (to reciprocate). Others also know that I do not have anything, so they do not help me either.” (#42)32

7.4. Gender norms and ideology of the market vendors The study further looked into the differences in their views on gender norms and ideologies between members/ non-members of the association. Table 16 shows that there is a significant difference in indicators related to gender norms and ideology between the members and non-members in terms of their tolerance towards second wives, and women’s participation in politics (statements 3 and 9). Since the association members are getting exposed to negotiating with authorities and talking to bureaucrats, they might be having higher consciousness in political participation.

31 47.8% of the respondents replied that it has improved. Among the non-members 44.8% replied that it has improved. However, the difference between members and non-members is not significant. 32 Married vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur market. Non-member. Trust indicator for market –0.27. After the interview, she got interested in the association, and later decided to join.


Table 16: Average values for gender norms/ideology indicators of association members and non-members

Non-

members Members Total

1. A woman should respect her husband no matter how he behaves.

0.19 0.49 0.32

2. If a woman have higher education than her husband, it will cause problems.

-0.50 -0.29 -0.42

3. A woman should tolerate when her husband has a second wife.

1.09 1.41 1.22**

4. A woman is responsible for house keeping and should serve the men to be comfortable at home.

-0.94 -0.95 -0.94

5. Men are better leaders than women. -0.41 -0.32 -0.37 6. If I earn more than my husband, I am the head of

households. 1.09 1.07 1.08

7. A woman should be soft, sweet, and silent. -1.28 -1.27 -1.27 8. A woman should always follow her husband. -0.15 0.08 -0.05 9. A woman should not bother about politics. -0.46 0.11 -0.22***

Except for statement 6, higher value is assigned if respondent does not agree with the statement. For statement 6, higher value is assigned if respondent agree with the statement. The higher the value, the less “traditional” is the respondent’s view of each gender relations statements. That is, the higher the value, the more the respondents reject the idea of women’s subordination. *** Significant at the level of 0.01. ** Significant at the level of 0.05. Those who approved of statement 7 said that this is Cambodian tradition, it is chabap srei (Women’s Law). Respondent #14, who is a member, replied for statement 3 that she is afraid that the husband will hit her, so she will tolerate. Those who approved of statement 9 said that they want to concentrate on their business and family, and other people are doing politics, so they should leave it to them (#14, #17, #105, #106)33. Others thought that women has always been kept in the dark (#16)34, and women want to know what is their right and be leaders also (#13, #16, #20)35. Respondents #28 (member) and #44 (non-member) stated that women should understand national affairs better, because “if nation better, life would be better”.

33 #14 is a married member, #17 is a married non-member, #105 is a widowed member, and #106 is a divorced non-member). 34 Married member. 35 #13 is a married member, #16 is a married member, and #20 is a widowed member.

As can be seen from Table 16, respondents have scored generally high for statements 3 and 6 compared to other statements. Both of them show women’s economic independence and confidence that they will be financially OK without a husband. They have the option of not tolerating husbands’ misbehavior against them, and also know and recognize that they have higher economic capability than their husbands. The sense of pride is there, that they are the ones who are supporting and sustaining the household economy. When compared between association members and non-members for the aggregate figure of these gender indicators, members have significantly higher value (ANOVA significance 0.009). This indicates that the members replied more positively to less “traditional” gender statements. Members showed more confidence and independence from their husbands as seen in statements 1 and 8. They also showed more interest and positive attitudes to women leaders and


women participating in politics. This can be the reflection of their self-confidence by participating in negotiation with the authorities. It is also noted that these gender indicators have different result among women with different marital status. Those who are widowed or divorced have less “traditional” views on gender relations (Table 17). Since they are running their own household economy all by themselves, they feel that they do not have to depend on husbands. Especially for statements 1 and 4, there are significant differences in their reply among marital status. Those who have divorced did not agree with these statements more than the married or the widowed. One divorced women replied that she respected and served her husband, but he was not good to her (had a minor wife) and left her. These differences in reply not only reveal their differences in experiences but also their deep resentment to the socially-sanctioned gender relations and men’s behavior in the household. Those who are able to or trying to keep to manage socially sanctioned family situation and try to believe that if women follow the “traditional” way, families can stay in tact. In turn, divorced women can be criticized to be “bad” women because they did not conform to the traditional role of women.

“But if a woman is divorced, it is difficult to raise children. Also it is difficult to do business, since she has to look after children at the same time. It was easier to get divorce before, because we did not need much money to survive before. Now, life is expensive, so it is difficult. Even though women have business, expenses are also large. People pity (anat) those who got divorced. They do not look down on her. But if the women is bad, they will criticize. If woman has been good, and respected husband, people will

anat the woman if she is divorced.” (#153)36 .

“When I married, I respected my husband and served my husband well. But it did not help in keeping the marriage.” (#79)37

“I think there are more people who are divorced these days. Especially among the poor. They quarrel over money and they get divorced. If the husband is violent, it is better for the wife to get divorced. If the husband has a minor wife, and he first wife endures about it, people will praise her.” (#64)38

“If divorced, people will criticize her and look down on her, saying that she is not able to educate or advice her husband properly, or she cannot samaki (keep solidarity) in the family. If both are together, at least they will not be looked down upon.” (#81)39

Many respondents expressed the social pressure for women to conform to socially-sanctioned role of women.

“If women do not perform their duty (as housewives), they will be deserted by their husbands, cannot marry, and will not be happy.” (#28)40

36 Married vegetable seller in Orussei market. Gender indicator is –0.44. The average gender indicator for the whole respondents is –0.07, standard deviation 0.48, minimum –1.33 and maximum 1.22. 37 Divorced palm juice seller in Daem Kor Market. Member. Gender indicator –0.22. But still thinks that women should follow and serve husband. 38 Married used clothes seller. Member. Gender indicator –0.11. 39 Married used clothes seller in Daem Kor Market. Member. Gender indicator –0.22. 40 Widowed vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. Gender indicator 0.33.


“If women do not perform her duty, it will cause fight in the household. Husband will be jealous, and call us lazy, and criticize. Other people also become angry with us, would not help us when needed or do not let us borrow something when we want to, or do not ask us to go for da leng together.” (#19)41

“It is difficult for those who are doing business, since one is always a market. When we come back tired, and husband complains about household work, we do not say anything. Sometimes, if there is an opportunity, I try to tell or teach my husband (not to expect too much or to help us). But it is difficult to change them. At present, my husband is away for a business. I feel free and relaxed when he is not around. When he is around, I feel nervous because I would think that he might not like this food, etc. Even when we earn money for the household, it does not change the situation.” (#24)42

“Household work is normally done by children in my house. If the children are not available, my husband will do by himself. He has no problem. He normally comes back earlier than I do. Both my husband and neighbors know that I am busy, so they do not criticize when I cannot do household work. But for some people, it is different. (Pointing at a vegetable seller nearby), when time comes she hurries home. Her hands shake and she has to hurry

home. If she is late, her husband will hit her.” (#155)43

41 Widowed vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. Gender indicator –0.11. 42 Married vegetable seller in Chaba Amphur Market. Member. Gender indicator –0.22. However, her trust indicator is high. Trust indicator for market is 0.94, and general trust indicator is 1.09.

“If women do not do their duty (looking after children and house), people will see her as bad. There will be fight in the family, and people will criticize, both her husband and people nearby.” (#153)44

“If women do not do her duty, married life will not exist. She has to do her duty (as housewife) no matter how she is tired. If not, her husband and he neighbors will criticize her.” (#81)45

Questions were asked who is to blame when there was infidelity in either husband or wife’s side. There was no difference between association members and non-members for this question, but there was a significant difference between the widows and divorced46. Five out of 34 divorced respondents (14.7%) blamed the husband for wife’s infidelity, expressing that the husband might have done bad things to her, and that is why she turned to other men. Noting that for the whole respondent, the response is only 8.2%, more divorced women have such opinion. This can again be understood as one reflection of divorced women’s resent over the stigma attached to divorced women and the blame and burden that is often put more to women when divorced.

43 Married pork seller in Orussei Market. Gender indicator –0.33. 44 Married vegetable seller in Orussei Market. Gender indicator –0.44. 45 Married used clothes seller in Daem Kor Market. Member. Gender indicator –0.22. 46 Fisher’s exact test, exact significance 0.009.


Table 17: Average of gender related indicators among women with different marital status

Married Single Widowed Divorced Total

Average -0.15 -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.07

Number of cases 112 14 20 34 180

* Difference significant at 0.05. Table 18 shows the regression result showing the relations between gender indicators, membership in the association and trust indicators. As can be seen from this table, the higher the education level, the less “traditional” the gender perspective becomes. However, when the relationship between trust indicators and gender indicators are compared, it has a negative relationship. That is, the higher the trust, there is a tendency for respondents to have more “traditional” gender ideology. Considering that there is no significant difference between members and non-members regarding marital status, this result contradicts with the result showing that association members have higher trust indicators

while having less “traditional” gender values. Even when association membership is controlled in regression analysis, they still have negative relationships. One explanation can be that those who have higher trust on the existing system might have more positive views on the existing gender relations and gender norms. This might further lead us to the understanding that group organization and joint activities can foster trust, but would not be able to change the gender relations or raise awareness of the existing gender inequality. However, it should be noted that there are wide variations in the responses, even though the negative correlation between trust and gender indicators is significant47.

Table 18: Regression model for gender indicators

Unstandardized coefficient

Standardized coefficient

B Std. error Beta t Sig (Constant) -0.297 0.062 -4.798 0.000 Divorced 0.212 0.087 0.172 2.438 0.016 Education level 0.027 0.012 0.162 2.273 0.024 WELR member 0.231 0.071 0.236 3.245 0.001 Trust indicator*1 -0.278 0.086 -0.234 -3.214 0.002

*1 For in market and in general. R square = 0.139, Adjusted R square = 0.119. F value = 7.060, significance 0.000. Missing cases: 2 Variables selected by backward method. Excluded variables: receive money/in-kind from relatives in provinces more than once a year, visit relatives in provinces more than once a year, send money to relatives in provinces more than once a year, age of respondent, year of starting business, number of sources of people that the respondent discuss on business problems with. 47 There is a possibility that other factors play an important role in determining gender norms. However, in this study, these factors could not be identified


8. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation The study described the social capital of women micro-vendors in Phnom Penh, and how the membership to the vendors’ association has made difference in the vendors sense of mutual trust and reciprocity. It was further discussed whether such difference in the trust level relates to the vendors’ perceived gender norms and ideologies. It is widely agreed that mutual trust can be fostered by some collective activities, but how it affects gender norms and ideologies has been under-studied. Since the study only had a sample of 182 micro-vendors, and the trust indicators and gender norms indicators that the study used is still experimental, there is limitation in making any generalization from this findings. With this understanding of the limitation, some tentative conclusion and suggestions are made. This study of micro-vendors in Phnom Penh have identified that the association members do have higher social capital, especially in terms of reciprocity, cooperation, mutual help and hope for the future. The more they are active in the association activities like attendance in meeting, the higher their trust level. Those who benefit from health care and child care services of the association have higher trust level than those who do not. Even though we cannot directly conclude only from this statistics itself that the association has improved their social capital, the in-depth interviews have shown that this might be the case. One important point to note was that association members, especially the active members tend to have trust on the possibility to make changes happen, and that they believe in that the social and government system can function to make things happen. They expressed higher tendency to inform and demand to the state, and look up to the state for law and order. In a place like Phnom Penh where democratic governance system is not yet well in place, such support to the system from the grassroots to build up a governance system is important for the

municipality. In this light, fostering and supporting the creation and activity of different associations should be encouraged by the municipality. It has also been pointed out that respondents who have different types of people that they can discuss with, had higher trust level. Networking and mentoring for micro-entrepreneurs are important, and for micro-vendors this is also the case. There is a need to foster not only discussion among the vendors but also to link vendors so that they can discuss or access mentoring services from people in other occupations and social classes. The present role that the NGO staff is playing is important from this point of view. Most of the vendors discuss only with their family members when they have problems. NGO members can give valuable insight and information to the vendors. Since such monitoring role will always be necessary, there is a need to link the association with other legal and commercial bodies. An advisory board can be created for the vendors’ association. Municipality can also set up a unit for consultation and advice for micro-vendors. This unit should not be a window for negotiation between the association and the municipality, but it should be providing information and technical support so that the vendors will know where to look for help when they meet various problems. The third important point to note is that the trust level is higher when the respondents receive cash and in-kind from the relatives in provinces more often. With the lack of any social welfare services at present for these micro-vendors, the sense of being supported provides them with a positive perspective on the society. In this light, in order to foster social capital, it is important to establish social security system. The current trend in development projects is to go for financial sustainability and cost recovery. Welfare projects are seen to be unsustainable because of the dependency that it creates. However, this finding shows that providing


welfare has a long-lasting positive effect by creating a sense of trust to the system and society. The sense of being deserted and excluded is not a good incubator for social capital. Social security system such as low-cost health and emergency support services should be the priority of the municipality in order to create better social capital and thus can lead to more dynamic economic activity. It has been seen that members are more willing to do business jointly. It was initially hypothesized that increasing trust level would lead vendors to feel more independent and confident, thus they would feel less subservient to their husbands. However, an opposite tendency was found in this study. One explanation that can be made is that those who are feeling more integrated in the society express higher trust levels, but also they conform more to the “traditional” gender views, thus making gender indicators lower. This leads to the understanding that only organizing association and encouraging collective action does not lead to challenging existing gender ideologies even when it is an all-women association. Fostering social capital does not in itself lead to a more egalitarian and fair society. It can also be the case that mutual trust is improved by sacrificing the socially weak people by maintaining the present power relations. Even though trust indicators and gender indicators had a reverse relationship,

association members tend to have a more independent and empowered gender views. This is because they have higher political awareness and higher sense of economic independence. The stark difference between members and non-members was that members thought that women should also be involved in politics more, while more non-members thought women should concentrate on their family and business. The political awareness might have been further encouraged by their participation in the association and its collective activities as well as by the success in the series of negotiations. It should also be noted that the NGO USG has provided the members with series of training especially leadership training, which could have boosted their confidence and political awareness. It is important to note that creating association itself even if it is a women’s association does not in itself make the members challenge the existing unequal gender relations. Even though collective action might foster social capital, it does not necessarily lead to higher awareness of women’s subordination. It can even work for the opposite. With the effort to be integrated into the mainstream society and economy, members can opt for acting and thinking that conforms to a dominant gender norms and identity. It is necessary to have conscious activities that will raise gender awareness such as political awareness and confidence building together with any collective action.


Reference: Banwell, Suzanna Stout, Keo Charavuth, Koc Sarun, Moul Samneang, Sin Kim Sean (2001) Vendors’ voices: The story of women micro-vendors in Phnom Penh Markets and an inoovative program designed to enhance their lives and livelihoods, The Asia Foundation, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Coleman, James S. (1988) “Social capital in the creation of human capital” reproduced in Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (eds.) (2000) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Dasgupta, Partha and Ismail Serageldin (2000) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Fukuyama, Fancis (1995) Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity, Hamish Hamilton, London. Gordon, Gill (2000) "Synthesis Report on the Baseline Demand Survey for the Health Services for the Urban Poor Component" Phnom Penh Urban Health Project, a sub-project of the Kingdom of Cambodia Health Sector Reform III Programme Funded by Options (UK) & DFID Hood, Jacqueline N. and Christine S. Koberg (1994) “Patterns of differential assimilation and acculturation for women in business organizations”, Human Relations, Vol. 47, No.2, pp.159-181. Krishna, Anirudh and Elizabeth Shrader (1999) “Social capital assessment tool”, prepared for the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., June 22-24, 1999. Kusakabe, Kyoko (1999) “Women’s participation in the market: A case study of women retail traders in Phnom Penh, Cambodia”, Ph.D. dissertation, Asian Institute of Technology. Moser, Caroline (1996) Confronting crisis: a comparative study of household responses to poverty and vulnerability in four poor urban communities, World Bank, Washington. National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning (1999) Cambodia Socio-economic survey 1999, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning (2000a) Cambodia: Statistical yearbook 2000, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning (2000b) Cambodia: Demographic and health survey, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Putnam, Robert D. (1993) Making democracy work: Civic traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Rowbotham, Sheila and Swasti Mitter (ed.) (1994) Dignity and daily bread: New forms of economic organising among poor women in the Third World and the First, Routledge, London. Serageldin, Ismail (1996) “Sustainability as opportunity and the problem of social capital”, The brown journal of world affairs, Vol.3, No.2, pp.187-203.


Serageldin, Ismail and Christiaan Grootaert (2000) “Defining social capital: An integrating view” in Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (eds.) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Unger, Danny (1998) Building social capital in Thailand: Fibers, finance and infrastructure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Vickery, Michael (1986) Kampuchea – Politics, economic and society, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., Boulder.


APPENDIX 1 Table A1: Five most popular items sold by the respondents

Item Number of respondents Percentage Vegetable 113 62.1 Used clothes 20 11.0 Grocery 8 4.4 Fruit 6 3.3 Fish 6 3.3

Table A2: Five most popular ways of selling among the respondents

Number of respondents Percentage 2-3 trays 48 26.4 1 tray 41 22.5 1 basket 38 20.9 Small table 22 12.1 More than 3 trays 14 7.7

Table A3: Connection with their relatives in the provinces Visit them*1 Relatives visit

us*2 Send to

relatives*3 Relatives send

to us*4 f % f % f % f % Once a month or more

14 8.4% 13 7.8% 15 9.0% 3 1.8%

Once a year < < once a month

51 30.5% 62 37.1% 42 25.1% 35 21.0%

Once a year

47 28.1% 37 22.2% 10 6.0% 27 16.2%

Less than once a year

23 13.8% 14 8.4% 4 2.4% 4 2.4%

Never

32 19.2% 41 24.6% 96 57.5% 98 58.7%

Total 167 100% 167 100% 167 100% 167 100%

* Number of respondents who do not have relatives in the provinces: 15 *1 How often do the respondents go to visit relatives in the provinces. *2 How often do relatives in the provinces come to visit the respondents. *3 How often do the respondents send money or in-kind to relatives in the provinces. *4 How often do the relatives in the provinces send money or in-kind to the respondents.


Table A4: Attendance in weekly meetings and their reason for being members of

vendors’ association

Every week 1-2 times a month

< once a month

Never Total

Protect from security

6 (15.0%)

18 (45.0%)

14 (35.0%)

5 (5.0%)

40 (100%)

To have more friends

9 (27.3%)

10 (30.3%)

13 (39.4%)

1 (3.0%)

33 (100%)

Because of credit*1

11 (19.6%)

21 (37.5%)

21 (37.5%)

3 (5.4%)

56 (100%)

*1 Among this 56 respondents who joined the association because they wanted access to credit, 55 have actually borrowed money from the association.

Table A5: If the security officer harassed a vendor, who do you think would deal with

the situation? (multiple answer) Non-member Member Total f % f % f %

Vendor by herself 64 61.0% 37 48.1% 101 55.5% Vendor and her friends 27 25.7% 22 28.6% 49 26.9% Market committee 47 44.8% 61 79.2% 108 59.3% NGO 6 5.7% 19 24.7% 25 13.7% Vendor's association 1 1.0% 42 54.5% 43 23.6% no one 9 8.6% 0 0.0% 9 4.9% don't know 2 1.9% 0 0.0% 2 1.1% Municipality 5 4.8% 0 0.0% 5 2.7%

Table A6: If there are problems in the market such as theft or bad infrastructure, who do you think would take initiative in dealing with the situation? (multiple answer)

Non-member Member Total f % f % F % Each vendor by herself 34 32.4% 17 22.1% 51 28.0% Vendors work together 29 27.6% 27 35.1% 56 30.8% Vendors' association 2 1.9% 13 16.9% 15 8.2% Market committee 77 73.3% 68 88.3% 145 79.7% Municipality 1 1.0% 1 1.3% 2 1.1% NGO 1 1.0% 6 7.8% 7 3.8% No one 11 10.5% 6 7.8% 17 9.3% Don't know 2 1.9% 0 0.0% 2 1.1% Municipality 1 1.0% 1 1.3% 2 1.1% Police 1 1.0% 4 5.2% 5 2.7%


Table A7: If two vendors had a fight, who do you think would deal with the situation?

(multiple choice)

Non-member Member Total f % f % f % Two vendors themselves 2 1.9% 4 5.2% 6 3.3% Two vendors' family members 14 13.3% 16 20.8% 30 16.5% Vendors' association 0 0.0% 14 18.2% 14 7.7% Other vendors nearby 76 72.4% 47 61.0% 123 67.6% Vendors collectively 0 0.0% 2 2.6% 2 1.1% NGO 0 0.0% 9 11.7% 9 4.9% Market committee 74 70.5% 62 80.5% 136 74.7% Municipality 10 9.5% 9 11.7% 19 10.4% No one 7 6.7% 2 2.6% 9 4.9%

Table A8: If two members in your neighborhood had a dispute with each other, who do

you think would help resolve the dispute? (multiple choice) Non-members Members Total f % f % f % Themselves 5 4.8% 0 0.0% 5 2.7% Family members 16 15.2% 19 24.7% 35 19.2% Neighbors 62 59.0% 40 51.9% 102 56.0% Community leaders 0 0.0% 4 5.2% 4 2.2% Police 18 17.1% 15 19.5% 33 18.1% Village chief 64 61.0% 59 76.6% 123 67.6% No one 1 1.0% 1 1.3% 2 1.1% Don't know 6 5.7% 1 1.3% 7 3.8% Sangkat chief 1 1.0% 6 7.8% 7 3.8%


APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MICRO-VENDORS We would like to know who you have contact with, and how you get information, in order to design a better information dissemination and social service provision network. This information is used only for this research by AIT and USG, and would not be given to any other person. All the information would be kept anonymous. 1. Name of respondent: 2. Market: 3. Selling what/how: (tray, baskets, how many baskets, table, sheet) 4. Location of house: (near market, province, squatter area, etc.) (own house, rent house) 5. Age: 6. Education level: 7. Marital status: 8. Number of children: 9. Who do you live with? (physically live together, share living expenses together)

Among them, who earn income? Who does the household work (cooking, cleaning, washing clothes)?

Physically live with Share expenses Earn income Household work 10. When did you come to Phnom Penh? (which year) Where did you come from? 11. Do you have relatives in the provinces? Where?

How often do you go and visit them? How often do they come to visit you?

Do you send money back home? How often? Do they send you money or in kind (eg. Rice)? How often?


12. When did you start your business?

Business history (started from what item selling where, changed to what and why you changed)

13. What is your initial investment for the present business?

How much is your working capital? 14. Are you a member of the vendor’s association? 15. (for members) Why are you a member?

Other vendors invited me. It protects us from security It provides credit. It provides childcare/ health service. I can have more friends. Others (specify)

Since when are you a member?

How often do you go to the meeting? every week, twice a month, once a month, once in two month, less than that, not at all

Have you ever went to negotiate with the market committee or other authorities? How many times?

Have you borrowed credit from the association? Who informed you about the association? Do you use the health clinic service / childcare service? Who told you about the service? 16. (for non-members of WELR market) Why you do not become a member of the vendor’s association?

Do not know that it exists No one came to invite me. No need to join. Do not want to go to meetings. Afraid. Others (specify)

17. (for non-members)

Have you ever went to negotiate with market committee or other authorities individually or together with other vendors? How many times?


18. Who did you meet and spoke with most in the last one week? (name five) (only one person from members living together) (if do not want to give names, it is OK) What is the relation of these people with you? (family member, neighbors, vendors nearby, wholesale merchants, etc.)

How often do you meet them? Name Relation How often

19. When you have problems in business, who do you discuss with? Name Relation In household Outside household

20. When you have problems in your family, who do you discuss with?

(relation include relatives in the provinces, NGO workers, customers, other vendors, neighbors, government officers, village headman, monk, etc.)

Name Relation In household Outside household

21. Who can you borrow money from? Name Relation In household Outside household

22. Who told you about the availability of selling place in this market? (name and

relation) 23. Who told you where you can buy the products to sell? (name and relation) 24. Who told you where you can borrow money? (name and relation)


25. If you have to go to some place (eg. sickness or business) and have to leave your children, who would you able to entrust your children?

(name and relation) Name Relations Family member neighbors other vendors

relatives in same village relatives in province no one others

Family member neighbors other vendors relatives in same village relatives in province no one others

26. If you have to attend to something for a week, who would you be able to entrust

your business? Name Relations Family member neighbors other vendors



27. If you have to go to some place for several days or weeks, who would you be able to

entrust your house? Name Relations Family member neighbors other vendors



28. If you are sick and cannot do the business, who can you rely on? Name Relations Family member neighbors other vendors



29. If you are sick and cannot do household work, who can you rely on? Name Relations Family member neighbors other vendors




30. Who do you respect most? (name and relations) 31. If the road around the market became very muddy and dirty, who do you think

would work together to deal with the situation? Each person individually Vendors nearby work together Market committee Vendors’ association Municipality NGO Do not know Others

32. If the security harassed a vendor, who do you think would deal with the situation?

the vendor by herself the vendor and her friends market committee / security officer NGO Vendors’ association, no one, others

33. If there are problems in the market such as theft or bad infrastructure, who do you

think would take initiative in dealing with the situation? each vendor individually vendors work together vendors’ association market committee/security officers municipality NGO no one others.

34. If two vendors had a fight, who do you think would deal with the situation?

the two vendors themselves, the two vendors’ family members vendors’ association, other vendors nearby, vendors collectively, NGO, market committee/ security officer municipality / police others no one.


35. If two members in your neighborhood had a dispute with each other, who do you think would help resolve the dispute?

themselves, family members, neighbors, community leaders, monks, police, others,

36. Do you think others expect you to take initiative in solving the problem in the market

place? 37. Do you think others expect you to take initiative in solving the problem in your

neighborhood? 38. Have you ever discussed about the problem you face in your workplace or your

residence with others? Who did you discuss with? 39. Have you ever notified problems to police or to court or to other authorities? 40. Suppose someone in the market had something unfortunate happen to them, such as

an accident in the family. Who do you think they could turn to for help in this situation?

no one family members, neighbors, other vendors in market, relatives in the provinces, monks, vendors’ association community leader in her neighborhood police / government officials NGOs taoke others

41. Suppose some vendor suffered a business failure. In that situation, who do you think

would assist her financially? no one family members, neighbors, other vendors in market, relatives in the provinces, monks, vendors’ association community leader in her neighborhood police / government officials NGOs taoke others


42. Do you think that market vendors generally trust one another in matters of lending and borrowing?

Do trust Do not trust Don’t know / not sure

43. Do you think that your neighborhood people generally trust one another in matters of lending and borrowing?

Do trust Do not trust Don’t know / not sure

44. Do you think over the last few years, this level of trust has gotten better, gotten

worse, or stayed about the same? In market better same worse don/t know In neighborhood better same worse don/t know 45. Suppose someone from the market had to go away for a while along with their

family. In whose charge could they leave their house? Other family member Neighbor Other vendors Anyone from the neighborhood No one Others

46. Suppose a friend of yours in this market faced the following alternatives, which one

would she prefer most? Own business that can earn 5,000 riels per day alone. Own business that can earn 15,000 riels per day with another person. Don’t know.

47. People in the market look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not much concerned with the improvement of the market. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree Don’t know/ not sure

48. People in the neighborhood look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not much concerned with the improvement of the neighborhood. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?



49. If I do a good thing to my fellow vendors, they will also be nice to me.


50. If I do a good thing to my neighbors, they will also be nice to me.


51. Most people in this market are basically honest and can be trusted.


52. Most people in my neighborhood are basically honest and can be trusted.


53. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements

Strongly Strongly Don’t Agree Agree Disagree disagree know

(a) People are always interested only in their own welfare. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (b) In this market, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (c) In my neighborhood, one has to be alert or

someone is likely to take advantage of you. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (d) If I have a problem, there is always

someone to help me. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (e) Most people in this market are willing to

help if I need it. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (f) Most people in my neighborhood are

willing to help if I need it. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ]


(g) I feel I have a right as a member of this market. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ]

(h) I feel I have a right as a member of

my neighborhood. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (i) If I drop a purse in the market, someone

will see it and return it to me. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (j) If I drop a purse in my neighborhood,

someone will see it and return it to me. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (k) I think my life will be better in the future. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (l) A woman should respect her husband

no matter how he behaves. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (m) If a woman have higher education than

her husband, it will cause problems. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (n) A woman should tolerate when her

husband has a second wife. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (o) A woman is responsible for house keeping and should

serve the men to be comfortable at home. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (p) Men are better leaders than women. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (q) If I earn more than my husband,

I am the head of household. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (r) A woman should be soft, sweet and silent. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (s) A woman should always follow her husband. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (t) A woman should not bother about politics. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] (u) I will be able to improve my life in the future.[ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] [ 4 ] [ 5 ] 54. If wife was found to be unfaithful to the husband, who should be punished

No one wife wife’s lover wife and wife’s lover husband, others.

55. If husband was found to be unfaithful to the wife, who should be punished

No one, husband, husband’s lover, husband and husband’s lover, wife, others.


social capital of women micro vendors in Phnom Penh markets

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