Sniffer Packets & Firewalls By Kay Hearn BA, Grad Dip Journalism ...

Sniffer Packets & Firewalls

By

Kay Hearn BA, Grad Dip Journalism

Murdoch University W.A.

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy Communication

University of Canberra

June 2008

©

Sniffer Packets & Firewalls 2

Abstract

Falun Gong protesters, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the spy plane incident and a series of mine accidents are just some of the events over the past decade that involved the Internet. In each incident the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was caught off guard by the circumvention of informational flows as a consequence of the Internet. This is in some ways indicative of the impact the medium is having on the ability of the CCP to manage political discourse within the confines of the country. This thesis examines the way that political discourse in contemporary China is managed in response to the development of the Internet, using the concepts of time and space as conceived by Harold A. Innis.

This historical study considers the strategies used in the management of time and space in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) across a broad range of ways in which the medium is used by particular groups, such as online gamers, bloggers, hackers, and activists. I have also looked at the way information flows are managed during a crisis or disaster using critical textual analysis of Internet sources, and specific examples. These sources are both official and unofficial including Chinese government sites, journalistic sources both Chinese and Western and Chinese legal databases that appear on the World Wide Web (WWW). The study finds that there is an emerging shift from propaganda based media manipulation and suppression to a style of stage managed spin. The CCP have used three strategies to contain and maintain their hold over central power, including the rule of law, investment in the development of content and technological means. The development of the Internet in China is marked by a dialect of desire for the technology for economic purposes and the perceived need to control the technology for political purposes. The Internet has also enabled the central government in Beijing to reassert its position as a central authority over local and provincial governments.

This study contributes to the existing knowledge about Chinese media policy and the Internet, and will shed light on the ways in which the tehcnology influences the production and consumption of media and the impact that the development of this medium has upon media policy in China. Furthermore, this study will contribute to a greater understanding of CCP’s ability to manage information and the impact that this medium will have on the operations of Chinese politics within the space of the Internet, as well as the impact of the technology on politics, and China’s interaction with the international community.


Acknowledgements

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr Ann Willis for her assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. Thanks also to the members of the faculty for their valuable input.

In addition I would also like to thank my family for their support whilst writing this thesis, and to especially thank my son Jack Lowrie for his advice on the chapter on online games. Also my husband Ian Lowrie for his constant encouragement.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the efforts of Ann Beveridge and Taryn Miller for their support and editing expertise.


Table of Contents

Part I

Chapter 1

Introduction 7 Old and New Media 7

The Democratising Potential of the Internet 10China and the Management of Informational Flows 12Purpose of the study 15Time and Space 17Habermas 18 Methodology 19The Development of the Net 21Literature Review 22The Internet in China 22The Public 26Globalization 27The Internet 28The Layout 30The Media 30Modes of Censorship 30NGOs 31Hacking 31Disasters & Starbucks 32The Blogosphere 33Online Games 33Conclusion 33

Chapter 2

Theoretical framework 34 Medium Theory 34

Chapter 3

The Media in China 41Policy 42The Impact of the Market or Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 44Conclusion 45

Chapter 4

Building and Censoring the Great Firewall 47The Politics of Control 49Filtering: Technical means of Censorship 52Regulations 56


Internet Cafes 58The Internet Police and Other Hit Squads 59The Development of Content 61Breaking through the Great Firewall 64Conclusion 66

Part II

Chapter 5

Official/Unofficial: The Management of Non Government Organisations 67Civil Society and the Public Sphere 67Small Government Big Society 74NGOs Environmental Groups 76Green Riots and Unofficial Discourse 77HIV/AIDS 84Conclusion 91

Chapter 6

Hacking: Circumnavigating the great firewall 93Legal Framework 95Military & Cyber warfare 96Taiwan 102Tibet 104Unofficial Nationalism & Hacking for the Nation 106Nationalism & Hacking 107Hactivism & Democracy 110Conclusion 112

Chapter 7Disasters & Starbucks 114Jianxi School Explosion 116Starbucks 117The Black Kiln Scandal 119Workers Rights 124History Revisited the Karamay Fire 127Conclusion 128

Chapter 8The Management Of China’s Blogosphere 129Promotion Tinged With Fear 131Regulations 134A Nail House in Chongqing and the Birth of Citizen Journalism 136Regulating Code 143Microsoft 144Conclusion 149


Chapter 9Lei Feng Lives on in Cyberspace 150Regulations 154 Direct Investment & The Shaping Of Content 156Propaganda 159Nationalism 161Online Protests and Nationalism 162Wow With Chinese Characteristics 167Conclusion 172

Part III

Chapter 10

Conclusion 172

Bibliography 182Abbreviations 198Appendix I 199Appendix II 205Appendix III 206Appendix IV 208Appendix V 210Appendix VI 214Appendix VII 215


C h a p t e r 1

Introduction:

The number of Internet users in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reached 210

million ((CNNIC), 2008) as of June 2008, making it the largest national population on

the Internet. The technology has been hailed as a democratising force and that is

facilitating the emergence of a new form of publicsphere. It is my contention however

that the development of the Internet in China is marked by a dialect of desire and

control; a desire for the technology of for its economic benefits and the perceived

need to control the technology for the political purposes of the CCP (Communist

Party of China). The strategies used by the CCP to manage the technology of the

Internet include legislation, the development of content and technological means, and

by this I mean the code used to construct the architecture of the Internet. The

development of the Internet has also enabled the leadership of the CCP in Beijing to

assert central authority over the local and provincial governments at the margins.

Therefore the technology is not inherently democratic and is not leading to the

formation of Habermas’s notion of a public sphere and democratization.

Old and New Media Environments

The Internet remains a rapidly evolving networked digital media environment which

cannot be simply defined as a form of ‘new media’. Such a definition ignores what

constitutes this environment that has stemmed from the convergence of ‘traditional’

(analogue) media to ‘new’ (digital) media. Further, and importantly, as a media

environment, the Internet contains all the components of historical modes of

communication including the spoken word, the image (moving and still), sound and

text. The new digital interactive modes of communication form a vast archive of

commercial and non-commercial information, where advertising, government, non-

Government organisations (NGOs), entertainment, pornography and games, to name

but a few, coalesce. In addition to this boundless form of content is the speed at which

information is produced and sent and consumed via these networks across the planet.

The architecture of the Internet is decentralised, re-routable, non-hierarchical and now

comprises a multitude of networks, intranets, and Sub-Webs. The history of the


Internet is well documented: in short, the Internet was originally designed by the

United States of America for military purposes so there could be no central command

post. Thus in the event of an ‘attack’ communications could be re-routed to other

sites. Internet access, in combination with promotion for its use via both

‘underground users’ and commercial industries synergetically incorporating the work

and personal computer, leads to the creation of socio/political and economic utopian

and dystopian discourses regarding potential communications possibilities and

ramifications (Barlow, 1996; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006a; Kalathil & Boas, 2003). A

predominant utopian discourse created by commerce, governments and citizens was

that as a decentralised communications tool, the Internet via human agency had the

potential to deliver democracy to the most totalitarian countries, and also perhaps lead

to the rebirth of ‘the media as fourth estate’ or ‘public watchdog’1 with a twist - via

activities such as citizen journalism whereby individuals or groups could disperse

information not being released by government or reported by the traditional news

sources. Flew also argues that “…citizen journalism can in a sense be defined by

some of its more conspicuous examples…” (Flew, 2008, p.143). Some examples Flew

uses include Crikey, New Matilda and On Line Opinion in Australia. The Drudge

Report in the USA and sites such as OhMyNews in South Korea, and the

malysiakini.com site in Malaysia. These sites have previously broken stories that were

later picked up by the mass media or they have served as focal points for political

activism. The Drudge Report site, based in North America, first broke the news of the

Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinsky scandal, which then made the mainstream news in

North America only after journalists hit the ‘Drudge’ site first for information. An

example of this from the PRC is the blog run by Zola, dubbed the first ‘citizen

journalist’, a vegetable seller who travelled the country covering stories that were not

being touched by mainstream Chinese media. Zola’s story is covered in detail in

chapter eight. The point here is that these sites share a commonality in that they

represent both an emergent form of ‘new media’ and public opinion. These new

forms, be they collective in views or based on personal opinion, are not (in general)

1 “Traditionalist liberal thought argues that the primary democratic role of the media is to act as a public watchdog overseeing the state. This is usually defined as revealing abuses in the exercise of state authority, although it is sometimes extended to include facilitating a general debate about the functioning of government. The watchdog role is said to override the importance of all other functions of the media, and to dictate the form in which the media should be organized…Once the media becomes subject to public regulation will it lose its bite a watchdog and may be transformed into a snarling Rottweiler in the service of the state” (Curren & Gurevitch, 1991, pp. 82-117)


subject to state media regulations and protocol. In addition, they also again carry

traces of the ‘…bourgeois public sphere’… (Curren & Gurevitch, 1991, p.84) because

not all the ‘public’ can participate in such modes of ‘new media’ citizen

opinion/journalism due to affordability and new media literacy skills.

In this sense, elements of ‘new media’ citizen journalism hark back to Jurgen

Habermas’s concept of the public sphere that argues:

The development of early modern capitalism brought into being an autonomous arena of public debate. The economic independence provided by private property, the critical reflection fostered by letters and novels, the flowering of discussions in coffee houses and salons and, above all, the emergence of an independent, market-based press, created a new public [sphere] engaged in critical discussion. From this was forged a reason-based consensus which shaped the direction of the state (Curren & Gurevitch, 1991, p.84).

It was the creation and formation of new spaces of public debate that Habermas

identified as the public sphere. Curren and Gurevitch (1991, p. 84) argue that:

Habermas traces the evolution of the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ - a public space between the economy and the state in which public opinion was formed and ‘popular’ supervision of government was established - from the seventeenth to the first half of the of the nineteenth century. Thereafter, he argues, the public sphere came to be dominated by an expanded state and organized economic interests. A new corporatist pattern of power relations were established in which organized interests bargained with each other and the state, while increasingly excluding the public.

In general, the “…fostering of a new public [sphere] engaged in critical discussion…”

(Curren & Gurevitch, 1991, p. 84) unsurprisingly became re-established and re-

narrativised into the new media utopian discourse of the late 1980s and early 1990s,

largely for commercial and political reasons. It fuelled the concept of the ‘democratic’

potential of new media, particularly the democratic potential of the Internet discourse

that could act as a conduit, providing ideal virtual interactive public discussion and

debate forums akin to seventeenth century face–to-face ‘town hall’ meetings

regarding community/politics/socio economic matters. In short, this utopian discourse

is pertinent to my thesis in that it considers the Internet has the potential to provide

people/citizens with both a ‘voice’ and the ability to connect with others regardless of


spatial issues, national boundaries and government regulations and restrictions. This

thesis rejects the utopian position and agues that while the Internet has enabled

Chinese citizens to achieve a higher level of engagement with one another and the rest

of the world, there are still clearly defined limits to that participation in public life and

those limits are set by the CCP.

Another pertinent theme of my thesis argument that is unavoidably connected to the

techno-utopian discourse is argument regarding new media technology. The provision

of the production of content and speed of access accorded to digital technology allows

an infinite array of information to be dispersed. In what is construed as an

‘uncontrollable’ new media environment there are numerous regulatory issues and

problems for governments, primarily because the new media environment directly

challenges the ability to manage flows of information, particularly ‘unoffically

sanctioned’ socio-political information. This aspect means that users who have access

to the Internet can exacerbate the government problematics of information

management and media flow. In conclusion, creating strategies to manage media

information flows by governments in an era of digital technological convergence is,

as stated at the beginning of this chapter, in its infancy. The primary focus of this

thesis is to analyses the PRC’s government strategies to manage the flow of media

information. The CCP efforts to manage the Internet have largely been successful in

reinforcing their position as the central authority of the country.

The Democratising Potential of the Internet

It is a myth that the Internet is somehow inherently democratic, and though this myth

is no longer plausible it is persistent. Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu (2006a, p.14)

write:

… it was widely believed that cyberspace might challenge the authority of nation-states and move to a new, post territorial system. Today, notions of a self governing cyberspace are largely discredited. But the historical significance of these ideas cannot be ignored. They had an enormous impact on Internet writers and thinkers firms, and even the US Supreme Court- an influence that is still with us today.


The myth that the Internet will deliver a western democratic model has been very

persistent, particularly in regards to authoritarian states such as China. Catharin

Dalpino argues that displays of ‘people power’ have immense influence on the

American public and the view of civil society as a means of change influences US

policy towards authoritarian regimes (Dalpino, 2000, p.52). On the contrary Shanthi

Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas “argue that the Internet is not inherently a threat to

authoritarian rule. Rather than sounding the death knell for authoritarianism the

global diffusion of the Internet presents both opportunity and challenge for

authoritarian regimes” (Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p.136).

James Boyle also looks at the myth that the Internet is somehow free and open and

that it would be resistant to regulation by the state. Boyle (1997, n.p.) argues that:

It was not so much that nation states would not want to regulate the Net, it was that they would be unable to do so; forestalled by the technology of the medium, the geographical distribution of its users and the nature of its content. This tripartite immunity came to be a kind of Internet Holy Trinity, faith in it was a condition of acceptance into the community

In fact the Internet is subject to human agency like any other form of technology and

there are several ways in which management and power are exercised over it.

Primarily this is done through legislation and the technology itself. Legislation is used

first and foremost to manage what can appear, while the code and the architecture can

be used to manage informational flows technologically, and this is done in China,

Europe, Australia, USA and elsewhere.

At this point it is important to emphasise the idea that the flow of information is

managed rather than controlled, because realistically it is well known that information

in the environment of the Internet cannot be totally controlled. In the west, the

business Public Relations (PR) model of spin is knowingly applied by governments

and individuals to manage information and perceptions. The distinction between

control and management is the difference between direct force and coercion through

social, political and legal means. Control implies total power and management means

that power is maintained through specific mechanisms. Thinking about the

management of the flow of information rather than total control of that flow


recognises that there are attempts to control the flow of information and that this will

not always be successful. In China, where information has been subject to tight

control and suppression there is, I would argue, an emerging understanding that

information management and spin is more likely to succeed than suppression. To take

the position that information can be completely controlled is naïve at best. Most

governments have realised this and so seek to contain the impact and consequences of

the technology largely through legislation, and some countries additionally attempt to

manage informational flows on the Internet through technological means. All

countries that are connected to the WWW are, in some way or another, attempting to

manage the flow of information based on a wide variety of socio-political legal and

ideological reasons.2

Civil libertarians in the West are constantly arguing that governments are eroding our

privacy, and that the technology has the potential for surveillance of its citizens. The

difference is the terms used by western governments to justify the implementation of

policies and technology that enhance the surveillance aspects of the Internet. The

surveillance aspects of the Internet have been likened to George Orwell’s tele-screen

in the novel 1984 which acts as a giant panopticon in which networks can be used for

the surveillance of private citizens. Users leave electronic fingerprints where ever they

go, through cookies3 placed in a computer by a website that can track which site the

user has visited, to the records that are left on server computers operated by Internet

Providers. James Boyle has looked at the potential for surveillance that the Internet

represents, and using Foucault and his mediation of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon

prison he argues that the Internet is a decentralised collection of privately owned

panopticons. Boyle writes that “the position is less clear if that information is

guarded by digital fences which themselves are backed by a state power maintained

through private systems of surveillance and control” (Boyle, 1997, n.p.). The utopian

2 In Germany it is Neo Nazis, in Australia it is Online gambling, and in the USA a lot has been made of the way that the Net can be used to catch terrorists, and in each case the justification is the same; national security and public safety. A specific example would be in the United States following the events of September 11 the government there introduced the Patriot Act, which allows for electronic surveillance.3 A cookie is a small parcel of text used to differentiate users and authenticate information when a users revisits a website. Cookies can also be used to track information about users.


idea of the Internet as democratising force begins to appear a little tarnished in light of

Boyle’s analysis.

China and the Management of Informational Flows

The perception that Chinese authorities are ‘heavy-handed’ in their attempts to control

the Internet seems to confirm the old command-submission model of Chinese media

theory (W. Sun, 1996) that has informed much of the West’s analysis of the Chinese

media since 1949. This is a literal interpretation of the media as the mouthpiece of

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the way that the media is hierarchically

organized, with Beijing news organizations at the center that dictate policy to the

subservient margins.

The situation is much more complex than is implied by the simple command

submission model, a situation where according to an old Chinese proverb ‘you need to

kill the rooster to frighten the monkey’ (杀鸡儆猴), in other words sometimes you

need to make an example of someone. In this scenario the centre is all powerful and

demands passive submission by citizens and provincial governments at the margins. A

number of factors need to be taken into account in order to grasp the challenge the

Internet presents to the current closed and authoritarian political regime in China.

These include the manner in which elite politics is organized in Beijing, the tensions

inherent in superimposing a market driven economic model on a command driven

culture, the regulatory regime that emerges from these tensions, the regional

disparities that currently inform Chinese society and the role of Western firms in

providing software and infrastructure to China.

It is important at this point to make a clear distinction between management and

control. Control implies that the CCP or rather the Central Committee of the CCP has

all the power and all the authority to impose their will over the flow of information

and the Internet as well as control over China’s citizens. Historically, such citizen and

media control may have been largely attainable, but this is just not possible, and the

CCP is well aware of this. The notion of management rather than of control needs to

be applied to both informational flows as well as to the way in which the media and

politics operate in China in general. With this in mind it is my contention that the


CCP seek to maintain the dominant voice in all spheres of influence, and in the ways

in which they are mediated, but they are learning to do this via management rather

than total ‘control’ and suppression.

To argue the CCP still seeks total control is to continue to buy into the top down

interpretation of the way in which the media and indeed the CCP operate, and this is

not the case. The ongoing wave of crackdowns and relaxation on the flow of

information and the visible attempts to control the Internet is generally in response to

an event or events that are beyond the control of the CCP. In addition crackdowns

coincide with important dates such as the recent leadership meetings. For example

there was a widespread crackdown on the Internet in China prior to the 16th Party

Congress at which Jiang stepped down and appointed his anointed successor Hu

Jintao. Instances like this are examples of the CCP seeking to maintain its position as

the dominant voice over the issue using traditional modes. More often the CCP seeks

to contain informational flows bordered by the parameters they set. Realistically this

is limiting what can be said rather than controlling the information. So it is better to

think of this as managing the flow of information rather than an out and out attempt to

control it, and this is more consistent with notions of Public Relations spin used in the

west.

Anne-Marie Brady4 asserts that Western PR techniques and advertising methods were

first introduced in the 1980’s, but were not really taken on until the early 1990’s.

Brady contends that, “Propaganda work is playing a central role in the repackaging of

the CCP. Propaganda - publicising the government’s activities and educating the

population – has always been an essential element of the CCP hold on power” (Brady,

2006, p. 58). She argues that since the 1990’s the CCP “has focused on the goals of

uniting public opinion in China, strengthening government power, and improving

both the party and the military’s image” (Brady, 2006, p. 58). The theme of unifying

public opinion behind the CCP underlies their response to many of the examples used

in this thesis, for example, the spy plane incident and the embassy bombing in

Belgrade. This was also a feature of the handling of the Black Kiln Incident in chapter

seven and the nailhouse in chapter eight.

4 Brady provides excellent background on adoption of PR practices as a part of modernizing propaganda in China.


Events that occur outside of the government have often ended in either a crackdown

on the Internet, such as the Falun Gong demonstrations of 1999, or a reason to clean-

up corruption, as in the case of the Nandan mine disaster in 2002. Access to the

Internet is also being used to exhibit the willingness of the CCP to participate in

global affairs, for example the availability of CNN during the APEC meeting in

October 2001. The cycle of crackdown and relaxation on information flows is a part

of the way in which the CCP manages the country and this cycle highlights the

tensions inherent in the reform process.

The provision of the Internet and the interactive forms of communication that are now

available to Chinese citizens has also created a new window through which public

opinion can be viewed. In recent years the government has also sought public opinion

through the Internet, such as in 2007 when the government were making changes to

the public holiday system ("Support for new holiday plan may depend on wording of

polls," 2007, n.p.), and when opinion was sought on a draft for a self-discipline code

for blog services ("China eases off proposal for real-name registration of bloggers,"

2007, n.p.).

The CCP is caught in a bind over the paradox of the desire for the infrastructure for

economic development and the perceived need to manage the flow of information for

political purposes. Tan, Foster and Gordon argue “there is evidence of a positive

correlation between telecommunications infrastructure and economic growth around

the world” (Tan, Foster, & Gordon, 1999, p.45). Information infrastructure also

facilitates economic growth. The CCP views the ability to manage information as

essential to its ability to govern the country, as the party has limited mechanisms for

dealing with any form of dissent and seeks to confine debate within certain

parameters. As David S. Goodman points out “the CCP is the framework for all

political activity” (Goodman & Hooper, 1994, p.13). Thus the CCP is the only

channel for political activity, and it must negotiate a successful way to retain this

control within the context of new media and technologically educated society. Thus

the Internet in the PRC has been developed in consistiency with the notion that the

CCP is the only framework for political activity.


Purpose of the Study

The Internet is often regarded as uncontrollable and therefore presenting a major

threat to authoritarian states such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Much has

been made of the CCP’s attempts to control what appears to be uncontrollable and this

has fuelled the myth that the Internet will inevitably deliver democracy to countries

like the PRC. In the case of China several works have emerged linking the

inevitability of democracy to Habermas’s concept of the public sphere and this is

discussed in more depth in chapter 5. Though it must be acknowledged that the

introduction of the Internet has enabled Chinese citizen’s broader engagement with

one another and with the rest of the world, there are still clearly defined limits to

public life within the space of the Internet and that those limits are defined by the

CCP. The aim of this thesis is to dispel the myth that the Internet is somehow

inherently democratic and to explore the methods used by the CCP to manage and to

shape Chinese political discourse as a consequence of the development of this

seemingly unmanageable online media environment in relation to information

dissemination and human agency. In order to do this I have looked at specific

historical events which serve as examples of the strategies utilized by the CCP to

adapt to the new media/online environment. The examples that I have used also

underscore the dichotomy of the desire by Chinese authorities for the development of

the technology for its economic benefits and the desire to want to ‘control’ the

technology for political purposes. Primarily this thesis looks at the way in which the

CCP has responded to certain incidents where private citizens have been able to

circumvent traditional information flows via the Internet and the CCP’s framework

for political discourse, and the relationship these events have with the management of

information. It is about the adaptation of the CCP to a changing media environment as

a result of the development of the Internet. This thesis rejects claims that the Internet

is inherently free and will lead the PRC down a direct path to democracy. It is my

contention that the strategies utilized to maintain the CCP position as the central

authority of political power in the PRC include legislation, investment in the

development of content and the code used to construct the Internet itself. I have

sought out examples where there are clear contradictions highlighting the degree to

which the Internet can be ‘controlled’ when there is the will to do so. The use of

these strategies indicates a shift by the CCP from the suppression of information to


the management of information. I have also used examples where Chinese citizens

have been determined to tell their stories and directly challenge government decisions.

These examples serve as my empirical evidence.

The case studies also highlight centre margin relationships between the leadership of

the CCP in Beijing at the centre and provincial authorities and citizens at the margins

as they are played out in the media and via the Internet through the events crises and

dissent that is expressed in the forums that are present in this space. Thus the case

studies often shed light on the way in which Beijing at the centre has reinforced its

position of authority over provincial governments at the margins. The core/periphery

analysis highlighted by the cases studies is informed by the work of Harold A. Innis

and his conception of the relationship between communications technologies and the

management of time and space.

Time and Space

The theoretical framework used for this thesis is medium theory, in particular the

ideas of Harold Innis, and this is dealt with in depth in chapter two. The core of

Innis’s concepts of time and space can be found in Empire and Communications

(1972) in which he traces the history of communications from ancient Egypt to the

printing press, and in the collection of essays The Bias of Communication (1951).

These works form the basis of the theoretical framework for this project. In these

essays Innis argues that power and influence are derived through the formation of

monopolies of knowledge that are built up and exerted over time and space via

communications technologies. In Innis’s theory, communications technology is used

to construct a particular reality that is reflective of its monopoly of knowledge. There

are also similarities to Marx’s conception of time in the modern era, in that Innis’s

conception of time is also tied to the idea of the commodification of time in all its

manifestations and in modern communications technologies and the tendency towards

monopoly.

Spatially oriented communities, in Innis’s terms, are similar to Benedict Anderson’s

(1993) imagined communities. Both Anderson and Innis draw on the varying concepts

of time to argue that history is used in the organization of space. In Imagined


Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (1993),

Anderson argues that the nation-state is a community imagined through literature,

poetry, music and print capitalism and the rituals of official nationalism as articulated

by the state. Anderson’s concept of imagined communities was useful in my tracking

of the management of the online game sector of the Chinese Internet. Many of the

games that have been developed for the Chinese market emphasise the ideology of

‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and this is discussed in chapter nine.

Anderson’s work was also pertinent when looking at the way that hacking has been

managed and this is discussed in chapter six. Anderson is more concerned with the

process of identity construction rather than power relationships that arise out of the

consequences of the creation of space communities and nation states, and the tensions

that are embedded therein through coalitions of vast regional differences. The

theoretical framework is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

Habermas

The use of Habermas’s concept of the civil society and the public sphere has been

used by a number of scholars to look at the development of the Internet in China

(Hartford, 2000; Kalathil & Boas, 2003; Tai, 2006; X. Wu, 2006; Yang, 2003a,

2003b; Yang & Calhoun, 2007; Zheng, 2008; Yongming Zhou, 2006). The argument

here is that the Internet has the potential to transform China’s political culture from

the bottom up as people congregate in the space of the Internet and possibly

influencing the government. This concept is outlined in more detail in chapter 5. This

thesis contends that Habermas’s concept of civil society has a number of

shortcomings when related to the Internet in China, for instance the way that it

diffuses attention away from unequal power relationships that are inherent in all

political interactions, whether these groups are able to influence the government or

not5. It overstates the role that groups outside the government have in influencing the

government and political decisions at this stage, and is inadequate for understanding

the internal politics of the CCP and the government. The situation is much more

complex when tensions between the central and provincial governments and internal

bureaucratic machinations are taken into consideration.

5 This is discussed in much more depth in chapter 5.


The concept of civil society also overlooks the restrictions and regulations that are

placed on the formation of associations, particularly in the case of authoritarian

countries such as China. Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas point out that civil

society organisations in scores of authoritarian countries are weak as a consequence of

state activities aimed at dominating the political culture within these countries

(Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p.144). Kalathil and Boas also say that “Internet use is more

common among civil society organisations that are not necessarily opposed to the

regime that governs their country” (Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p.144).

My own position is more closely aligned with that of Kalathil (2003, p. 490) who

argues that “ultimately, the Chinese government is attempting to mould the Internet

business sector under the strategy it has devised for Internet development in general:

allowing a degree of liberalization while making sure to set the broad rules of the

game”. I seek to extend this argument by including other strategies employed by the

CCP, in particular the strategies of the development of content, and the use of code to

create the architecture of the Internet itself. I also aim to contextualise the impact of

these strategies on some of the uses of the Internet such as blogs, online games, and

hacking, as well as the use of the Internet in official and unofficial civic participation.

What distinguishes this study on the Internet in China from other studies, is the

theoretical framework, a broad focus on the identified strategies of management and

the impact these strategies have had on the development of particular types of content

such as games and blogs, as well as the ways in which the medium has been used by

bloggers, gamers and hackers and the changing way in which official and unofficial

discourse are managed as a consequence of the development of the technology. My

aim is to look at the way that the Internet as it is viewed in Mainland China is shaped

by the CCP and how resistance is articulated and silenced or incorporated into

existing discourses. More broadly the Internet only empowers certain groups within

society because it suits the CCP. When an event occurs that can be used by to advance

a particular line then the Internet is allowed to empower society. When an event runs

contrary to the CCP line, such as the riots in Lhasa Tibet in 2008, there is a

crackdown and a public relations/propaganda offensive follows. Thus content

development is a key feature of the overall management strategy; to ‘control’ the

Internet through careful management.


Methodology

The method employed was a critical textual analysis of the English language versions

of news articles that reported these events in both the Chinese and Western media.

Many of the primary sources for this thesis came from official Chinese media

websites such as the Peoples Daily Online, Xinhua (the official Chinese News

Agency), the China Daily, and China.org.cn, a news portal run by the China Internet

Information Centre under the State Council Information Office, the highest

administrative authority in the PRC. All of these websites offer news services in

Chinese and the Peoples Daily, Xinhua, and China.org.cn also run sites in Spanish,

French, Arabic, and Russian. In addition I have looked at Western media websites

which include the Australian ABC, CNN, Wired, The BBC Online, China Online, and

Muzi.com. Some of the Western media websites represent ‘offshore’ Chinese websites

produced from areas outside of China. This has been supplemented further by

information from the EastSouthWestNorth blog maintained by Roland Song in Hong

Kong. Song translates and comments on news articles and stories circulating in the

Chinese media. Many of Song’s translations come from the Gangzhou newspaper

Southern Daily (Nanfang Daily 南方日报) and its weekend counterpart the Southern

Weekend (南方周末), both of which have been most valuable. These papers have a

reputation for good investigative journalism and the papers often test the boundaries

of what can be published. The Danwei website also translates and comments on

stories circulating in the Chinese press. Other sources include Amnesty International’s

website and Reporters without Borders and the China Digital Times website run by

the Berkley China Internet Project through the Graduate School of Journalism at the

University of California. This list is not exclusive by any means as the Internet has

provided me with a vast reservoir of sources and information.

One of the interesting aspects of examining these ‘translated’ versions is the double

rearticulation that occurs when language is translated for public consumption on new

media forms like the Internet. Many websites can be accessed in a variety of

languages depending on where they are produced and for whom. Usually there is the

primary/native language of the country for which the site is predominantly designed,

but users of the Internet – particularly users of nodes such as the World Wide Web


(WWW) and search engines like Google can accommodate translations. That is users

can request and/or click on which language they want to read a website or article in.

Whilst these translations need to be checked they at least give a rough idea of the

content of a website.

Even though I have studied the Chinese language in China at Hangzhou University

and worked in Beijing teaching English my level of Chinese is intermediate, hence I

have chosen to analyse the English versions/translations that appear in the

aforementioned websites. In addition to this I have had discussions with the Peoples

Daily Online in Beijing and have done some work polishing stories for this website,

though this was done mainly in Australia via the Internet. This website also has a

small staff and so generates a small number of stories. As a result the bulk of the

stories are direct translations of what appears in the hardcopy Chinese language

version or stories that come from the English section of the official Xinhua news

agency. In the end I have still looked at the two competing versions of China and the

CCP that circulate on the Internet. The official Chinese government version and the

version generated by the Western media and Chinese dissidents: The West’s

authoritarian version of the CCP and the benevolent ‘serve the people’ version of the

CCP of itself.

The Development of the Net

The first computer network in China was established in 1987 (Tan & Foster, 1998,

p.114). As in many other countries the first network was developed for academic

purposes. CAnet (China Academic Network) was developed so that Chinese

researchers could exchange information with the European Research network. The

China Research Network followed CAnet, and in 1993 the Institute for High Energy

Physics (IHEP) developed the first network to have full access to the Internet (Tan &

Foster, 1998). In 1997 the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)

released its first survey and estimated that the number of users was 620,000

((CNNIC), 1997). As Alex Tan points out these figures are problematic because they

do not count the number of users sharing Internet subscriptions, nor the number of

people who have access to the various Intranets that do not access the Internet (Tan &


Foster, 1998). Nor did the original survey take into account the number of users

whose only means of access is at Internet café.

Since the release of the first report in 1997 the CNNIC the semi-annual surveys have

become more sophisticated in the way that data is collected and are now seen as one

of the most authoritative sources of information on the growth of the Internet in

China. According to the 21st CNNIC Survey released in January China looks poised to

overtake the United States of America as the world’s largest Internet market. As of

January 2008 China boasted 210 million Internet users, just 5 million short of the

USA ((CNNIC), 2008).

Literature Review

The literature reviewed has been divided into that concerned with the concepts that

are used to understand the management of informational flows of information and its

relationship to the management of time and space, and literature where the major

focus is the Internet and democracy.

The Internet in China

The earliest literature to appear on the Internet in China mainly gave background to

the development of the infrastructure, and this is discussed in chapter two. A

significant source of historical background on the development of the Internet that is

pertinent to this thesis is by Zixiang (Alex) Tan and Will Foster. Though their report

entitled "Internet Diffusion in the Peoples Republic of China" (1998) is quite dated

now, it still provides excellent background on the early development of

telecommunications infrastructure. Another paper by Zixiang (Alex) Tan, Milton

Mueller, and Will Foster, "China’s New Internet Regulations: Two Steps Forward,

One Step Back", published in 1997, also provides good background to the policy

process and Internet development in the PRC. The report sheds light on the politics of

decision making concerning the Internet in the early days, particularly the battle for

control over the Internet in China by all the ministries that have a perceived stake in

this kind of development. Unfortunately the report appeared in March 1998, just

before the final outcome of this struggle, which was the formation of a ‘super


ministry’6, the Ministry of Information Industries, headed by Wu Jichuan. This new

ministry includes the former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Ministry

of Electronics Industries, the Ministry of Broadcasts Film and Television.

Earlier studies that focused on the battle for bureaucratic control of the Internet

include “Convergence and China’s National Information Infrastructure” by John Ure

and Liang Xiong-Jian (2000), which is a more up to date analysis of China’s

information infrastructure (CNII). This paper examines the political process that led to

the amalgamation of the MII. The authors argue that the merger was not a shift

towards a convergence of policy and regulation of information, and communications

industries, but rather close inspection of the political process involved revealed it was

merely a part of a more general overhaul of the bureaucracy and an exercise in cutting

state expenditure.

To date, the literature on the Internet in China largely reflects the paradoxes outlined

above. Some of the literature suggests that the Internet is a catalyst for change that is

facilitating private citizen’s participation in politics, while at the same time other

sectors of the literature claim that the CCP has been successful in the control of the

medium. Dark Guests and Great Firewalls: The Internet and Chinese Security (2002)

by Ronald J. Deibert looked at the debate surrounding the impact of the Internet on

Chinese politics and security policy. Deibert separates the debate into two camps,

cyber libertarians, and a more pessimistic group who argue that the technology of the

Internet has surveillance qualities and therefore represents a threat to privacy and

reinforces the authority of the state. The cyber libertarians argue that the Internet is

uncontrollable and they accentuate the contradiction between the attempts to control

territorial space and the challenge that the Internet represents to this because of the

spread of the technology around the globe. Diebert’s work is important in that it

clearly outlines the dichotomy of freedom and control that permeates much of the

literature in this area.

6 Super Ministries are when a number of ministries are amalgamated, and form very large bureaucratic bodies.


One of the earliest papers to deal with the Internet in China which supports the idea

that the government would not be able to control the technology of the Internet is a

paper by Geoffrey Taubman. These claims were made because of the seemingly

uncontrollable nature of the technology. Taubman (1998, p.268) writes that:

given the rapid pace of diffusion of the Internet and related tools, along with the growth in content providers and the decentralized and increasingly inexpensive nature of the technology , governments will have difficulty preventing Internet-driven information pluralism without incurring significant economic and political problems in the process.

Taubman claimed that the demise of the CCP was inevitable as a consequence of the

Internet. Now ten years on it is easy to critique Taubman’s position as deterministic,

however Taubman still highlights the assumptions made about the inevitability of

democracy and the ability to control the Internet.

The censoring of the Internet in China has become a big global issue and this is

reflected in the literature. Much of the work here has focused on regulation and

technological means to filter and censor the Internet in China (Endeshaw, 2004;

Sohmen, 2001). Randolph Kluver has looked more specifically at the development of

e-government and the way that the Internet might be used for modernisation of the

government (Kluver, 2005). The most significant study on global Internet filtering

was undertaken by The OpenNet Initiative, a joint-venture between the Munk Centre

for International Studies, University of Toronto, Berkman Center for Internet and

Society at Harvard Law School, and the Advanced Networks Research Group at the

Cambridge Security Program (Centre for International Studies) at the University of

Cambridge. This study culminated in a report on Internet filtering in 2004 2005, and

provides valuable insights and material for the section on censorship ("Internet

Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study," 2005). The study and the report

have also generated the book Access Denied (2008) edited by Ronald Diebert, John

Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathon Zittrain.

In their essay “Who is Setting the Chinese Agenda? Impact of Online Chatroom on

Party Press”, Li Xituang and Qin Xuan argue that the Internet represents a serious

challenge to the Party controlled press and its ability to control the significance of


events. The paper uses content analysis of the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) and the

Chatroom Strong Nation Forum (Qiangguo) in the days following the mid-air plane

collision between an American Spy Plane and a Chinese Jet Fighter in 2001 to argue

that the Internet has an impact on the setting of an agenda in Chinese politics. While

the writers do not acknowledge the limited number of Internet users in China at the

time and in what ways they are representative of the population at large, they have

illustrated the way in which the free flow of information has the potential to

undermine the authority of the CCP. However, their argument about the agenda

setting ability of the Internet fails to take into consideration the ability of the CCP to

limit or silence the media.

Other studies have specifically focused on the intensification of nationalism on the

Internet in China (S.-D. Liu, 2006; X. Wu, 2006; Yongming Zhou, 2005). These

studies have focused on protests following incidents such as the spy plane incident,

the bombing of Belgrade embassy, and the Diaoyou islands dispute. Both Zhou

Yonming and Xu Wu argue that the emergence of nationalism on the Internet in

China is independent of state-sponsored nationalism. However, nationalist sentiments

have been allowed to flourish at different times, such as the disputes named above,

and have been tapped into by the state to advance their negotiations in those disputes,

and toned when the disputes were no longer of great significance to the CCP.

Nationalism is one of the central themes of this thesis and is particularly relevant to

my discussions of online games and hacking.

Many of the works to appear on the development of the Internet in China and its

impact on the political culture of the country use Jurgen Habermas’s concept of the

public sphere and civil society (Hartford, 2000; Kalathil & Boas, 2003; Tai, 2006; X.

Wu, 2006; Yang, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Yang & Calhoun, 2007; Zheng, 2008;

Yongming Zhou, 2006). The literature in this area has generally focused on the

argument that the Internet is providing the means to make over China’s political

culture from the bottom up through the creation of a space in which citizens can

participate within public life and influence the government, and this is a pre-requisite

to the formation of democracy within China. Both Historicizing Online Politics by

Zhou Yongming and The Internet in China: Cyberspace and Civil Society by Zixue

Tai look at the development of the Internet and its potential for the development of


civil society. Xu Wu’s book Chinese Cybernationalism also uses the concepts of the

public sphere and civil society to argue that the Internet has enabled a new form of

Chinese nationalism to emerge that is not state sponsored and is an extension of the

nationalist movements of the last century. Goubin Yang and Craig Calhoun also argue

that the Internet has been instrumental in the development of what they call a green

public sphere, in their exploration of the management of environmental issues in

contemporary China. Yang has also written several other journal articles that are

influenced by the work of Jurgen Habermas, and which argue that the Internet is

facilitating the development of a public sphere (Yang, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Yang &

Calhoun, 2007). Zheng Yongnian in his book Technological Empowerment argues

that the Internet empowers both the state and society through the creation of a forum

for conducting politics which has opened up new forms of civic engagement that

promotes political liberalisation through increased political transparency and

accountability (Zheng, 2008, p.167) .

The Public

John Hartley makes similar argument to Anderson’s Imagined Communities, about

the creation of the public domain from pictures. In his book The Politics of Pictures

(1992, p. 35) he writes that:

nowadays there is no physical public domain, and politics is not ‘of the populace’. Contemporary politics are representative in both senses of the term; citizens are represented by a chosen few, and politics is represented to the public via the various media of communication. Representative political space is literally made of pictures-they constitute the public domain.

Essentially Hartley is arguing that a ‘public domain’ is created by the media and is

viewed through pictures. For Hartley the media is the site through which the public

process of politics is played out and visualised, or physically created through pictures

The Internet is another visualisation of the public only through text and pictures the

construction of which is in part manufactured by the Internet using public through

chatrooms BBS bulletin boards blogs, social networking sites such as Facebook, and

MySpace. However, this space is increasingly fragmented by language, age and

location that splinter ‘the public’ into many ‘publics’.


Viewing the Internet as a space in which the public can be imagined and observed is

a theme that runs throughout this thesis. To some degree the CCP uses the Internet as

a window on public opinion. Xu Wu writes “People.com.cn and Xinhuanet.com also

set up online ‘hotlines’ to gather people’s feedbacks on some policy issues and lead

to information on criminal activities. In fact, this type of online forum has already

become the party’s wind vane to test public opinion and a new source of Internal

References”8 (X. Wu, 2005, p. 222). There is now emerging evidence that the

Internet is being used to solicit opinions such as the proposed changes to the public

holiday system in late 2007 ("China makes 3 traditional festivals holidays," 2007). In

January 2008 it was reported on the China.org.cn Web site that many ministers and

high-level bureaucrats kept in touch with public opinion through the Internet.

However, all stressed the need for caution on the validity of public opinion in this

forum ("Web media challenge governmental spokesmen ", 2008). In June 2008 Hu

Jintao ("President promises divergent voices be heard online," 2008) said in chat

with ordinary citizens that “I try to know through the Internet what people are

concerned about and what they think (on a wide range of topics). "I'm willing to get

an idea on people's complaints of and proposals to the work of our Party and the

government…. The Internet is an important space to know about people's thoughts”

.

Globalization

The calls for the development of the Internet by anyone with a vested interest in the

medium’s development are often based on assumptions about globalization,

particularly in the way globalization relates to the imperatives of global

communication and capitalism. The Internet is also being claimed as global cultural

space, and as such the concept of globalization needs further examination. The myth

about the democratizing effects of the Internet is tied to myths about globalization.

There is some controversy over the precise meaning of the term globalization.

However, as Majorie Ferguson points out, there is general agreement about certain

points. Ferguson argues that globalization is an historical, economic and cultural

8 Internal References is the internal (neibu) media that is confined to the ruling elite. For more on this see Lowel Dittmer in Chin Chuan Lee’s (ed) (1998)China’s Media, Media’s China.


process, and that it is a journey with a destination, which is the globalized state

(Ferguson, 1992). Ferguson’s essay “The Mythology about Globalization” published

in 1992 is important because it exposes many of the underlying assumptions made

about globalization by examining the discourse surrounding the concept, as well as

the associated problems of meaning and empirical evidence. In her evaluation of the

concept she argues there are myths about globalisation that are used to serve

ideological and explanatory ends. These are ‘Big is Better’, ‘Time and Space have

disappeared’, ‘Global Cultural, Homogeniety’, ‘Saving Planet Earth’, ‘Democracy for

Export via American TV’, and the ‘New World Order’. For Ferguson the formation of

a global culture is greatly exaggerated and mythologised by those whose interests are

closely tied to its implementation. In terms of the myths that Ferguson describes little

has changed since the essay was written. My main criticism of Ferguson’s essay is

that at times it is unclear what kind of status she wants to give to the increased activity

of transnational capital and the media in particular. What Ferguson’s essay does best

is to remind us that it is important to note who is saying what, and that the basic

assumptions behind such concepts should be closely examined. Ferguson’s essay

interrogates the underlying assumptions that form the basis of the monopoly of

knowledge that Western civilization uses to advance its quest in space. Though the

term globalization is problematic it is still useful as a framework for understanding

transnational media flows and the consequences of this flow.

The Internet

The literature on the Internet is now quite wide ranging, and as such I will confine my

discussion to the literature that deals with the Internet and the way it is controlled or

rather managed by governments. Generally, here the questions are: Is the Internet a

democratic space, and what are the implications for democracy that stem from the

development of the Internet?

Ronald J Diebert uses medium theory to examine the shifts that he sees taking place

in political power as a result of the development of digital telecommunications

technology. He argues that the Internet “favours a complex diffusion of production

across territorial/political boundaries by facilitating multilocational flexibility,

transnational joint ventures, and both global and localization and “local” globalization

–the latter best evidenced by the commercialisation of the World Wide Web” (1997,


p. 204-205). Diebert’s work is of significance in order to understand of the CCP’s

adaptation to a changing media environment in that it provides a framework for

thinking about how the CCP has managed the consequences of the adoption of the

technology. This position emphasises the role that society plays in the adoption of

new technologies and rejects a technological deterministic position such as the myth

that the Internet will force China to become democratic. In addition, Diebert’s postion

stresses the importance of the active role that governments and societies in general

play in the way that technologies are used and adapted to local cultural and politcal

conditions.

Other works in this area focus on how the Internet can be controlled. Laurence Lessig

critiques the libertarian notions that the Internet was first founded upon and the

rhetoric upon which its development was promoted. Lessig’s main argument is that it

is the code that is used to develop the architecture of the Internet that is the basis of

the regulation of cyberspace and as such he equates code with law. Lessig (2006, p. 6)

writes that:

We can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are fundamental. Or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values to disappear. There is no middle ground. There is no choice that does not include some kind of building. Code is never found; it is only ever made and only ever made by us.

Lessig’s notion of code as law is particularly pertinent as the use of code to manage

and regulate the behaviour of Internet users in China is the basis of what is often

referred to as the Great Firewall.

The theme of regulation has also been taken up by Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, who

critique the myth that the Internet is uncontrollable, rendering territorial governments

irrelevant. Goldsmith and Wu (2006a, p. 66) argue that governments have been able

to assert control over offshore Internet communications through coercion at the local

level. Goldsmith and Wu looked at the way that different governments around the

world have sought to regulate the Internet, and the ways that different governments

have sought to shape the architecture of the Internet itself, so as to correspond to each


state’s ideological vision. They argue that “ the China example shows, a

government’s failure to crack down on certain types of Internet communication

ultimately reflects a failure of interest or will, not a failure of power” (Goldsmith &

Wu, 2006a, p. 89).

Similar arguments are made by Kalathil and Boas in their assessment of the ability of

authoritarian regimes to control the Internet. They argue that the Internet poses no

real threat to authoritarian regimes and they are able to do this through “the Internet’s

physical and policy architecture” (Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p. 136). They write that,

“in fact, the state plays a crucial role in charting the development of the Internet in

authoritarian regimes and in conditioning the ways it is used by societal, economic,

and political actors” (Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p.136). I seek to extend the arguments

made by these writers by including the development of content as a part of the overall

strategy for managing the consequences of the Internet, analysing the CCP’s direct

attempts at shaping the physical content of the Internet itself within the context of

China.

The Layout

This thesis has been divided into three parts, with the first part, chapters 1-4 providing

background on the development of the Internet in China and the changing media

environment. This section also covers the theoretical framework in chapter 2. Part

two, chapters 5-9 deals with the ways in which the Internet is used and how those uses

are managed, and the final section is the conclusion.

The Media Chapter 3

The changes in China’s mediaspheres as a consequence of the Open Door policy have

seen a shift from public consumption of media to the private consumption of media.

The once ubiquitous loud speaker has been replaced by and large by the television, a

change which is in a sense symbolic of this shift. Chapter 3 examines the changing

media policy environment and the ever more complex mediasphere where the state

owned and run media are increasingly subject to market forces. The implementation


of media policy is further complicated by the centre margin relationships between

Beijing at the centre and the provinces at the margins.

Modes of Censorship Chapter 4

Chapter 4 outlines the strategies used by the CCP to censor the Internet. The CCP has

sought to develop an Internet in China that is separate from the rest of the World

Wide Web, through strategies that have been employed to maintain the CCP’s

monopoly of knowledge. That is, through legislation, the code used to construct the

architecture of the Internet that has facilitated surveillance, and the blocking

capabilities of the authorities. The development of content has also been a part of the

strategy of the CCP to separate and maintain their authority over the monopoly of

knowledge in circulation within the borders of the country, and to engage with and to

present the CCP’s point of view to an international audience.

NGOs Chapter 5

Jurgen Habermas’s concept of the public sphere has been central to the debate about

the impact of the Internet and its potential to force China to become more democratic.

To date the four leading texts (Tai, 2006; X. Wu, 2006; Zheng, 2008; Yongming

Zhou, 2006) that seek to analyse the medium and its impact on Chinese politics and

society have used the concepts of civil society and the public sphere to talk about the

changes that have taken place since the widespread introduction of the technology and

the growth in the number of users. There have been a number of journal articles by

Goubin Yang who also uses Habermas’s notion of the public sphere to explain the

changes in China that he sees as a consequence of the development of the Internet.

Hacking Chapter 6

The myth that the Internet is uncontrollable is in part perpetuated through the ability

of networks to be hacked into. Hacking has been used by groups for both political and

criminal purposes. In 2002, 2003, and 2004 Falun Gong hacked into Chinese satellite

and cable television networks that beam into the mainland and broadcast messages.

International incidents such as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in


1999, and the mid air collision between a USA military spy plane and a Chinese

fighter pilot in 2001 sparked hacking wars between Chinese and American

nationalistic groups. Chapter 6 looks at the ways in which hacking has been reported

by the Chinese and Western media, how this centre/margin relationship is played out,

and how this is visualized in the media. In the context of this chapter core/periphery

relationships refer to the interaction between sovereign nations and the interactions

between the citizens and their interactions with the state, and foreign states. This

chapter also looks at the way that democracy dissidents outside of China have made

use of hacking to promote their views.

Disasters & Starbucks Chapter 7

The management of information in a disaster is crucial to the way in which a crisis is

resolved. Modern China has a history of covering up the extent of disasters and their

causes, and traditional modes of communication allowed local officials to prevent the

spread of information about disasters. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

(SARS) outbreak in 2003 that began in southern China has had a profound impact on

the way that disasters and accidents are handled because of the use of the Internet and

mobile phones to spread information about the outbreak. The way that this incident

was handled by officials demonstrates the way in which the Internet was used by

private citizens to circumvent official channels of information. In the case of the

SARS outbreak, Xu Wu (2005, p. 222) makes the suggestion that the Internet and

mobile phone sources of information were more reliable than the state media. There

has also been an admission made in the Chinese press that the SARS outbreak made

the government rethink the way that information is handled. The editorial said that “It

was SARS that made the Chinese authorities aware of the importance of protecting

the public’s right to know and the dangers and risks of a possible government cover-

up. This year, the Chinese media did not hesitate to report big events like the severe

winter weather in southern China, the Lhasa riot on March 14, and the derailment and

collision of passenger trains in Shandong Province on April 28” ("Commentary:

Quick media response reveals transparent gov't in China," 2008). This is another clear

indication of the shift from the suppression of information to the management of

information.


The Blogosphere Chapter 8

Many journalists in China maintain their own weblog or blog and they do so because

the medium allows them more freedom to write about what they are interested in than

their day jobs allow. Blogs have also been used by activists in China to get the word

out on the issues that they are campaigning for. Blogs and the material found on them

is managed in the same way that other areas of the Internet are managed and that is

though legislation, the code used to construct the architecture of the Internet and

through the development of content. In chapter seven I look at the ways in which

China’s blogosphere is managed and the advent of ‘citizen journalism’ through the

coverage by bloggers of the destruction of a family home when the owners refused to

move for a development. It is the examination of events such as this that reveal the

ways in which blogs have been used by marginal groups outside of the party and

reveals the tensions and shifts that occur in these relationships that are constantly

under negotiation.

Online Games Chapter 9

Online games in China are big business and attract millions of players. Chapter 9

charts the management strategies of this sector of the Internet as part of their bid to

create a virtual Chinese world. The growth of online games and the development of

the industry through direct investment by the government in the game content have

led to the creation of games with a nationalistic theme.

Conclusion Chapter 10

The thesis concludes with an overview of how media information flows are managed

by the CCP, and a discussion on the prospects for political change for China. The

continued change will not come so much from the Internet itself, but in the ways that

people will make use of the technology and the limits that the CCP place on that use.

This must also be contextualized against China’s own internal politics and its

deepening engagement with the international community. For example, hosting the

Olympics in Beijing has resulted in an enormous amount of international pressure on

China to address human rights across the country but particularly in Tibet.


C h a p t e r 2

“Imagine if the Internet took hold in China. Imagine how freedom would spread.”(George W. Bush in Phoenix, Arizona during a GOP Debate, Dec 7, 1999)

“In the new century, liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem … We know how much the Internet has changed America, and we are already an open society. Imagine how much it could change China. Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the Internet --- good luck. That’s sort of like trying to nail Jello to the wall.” (Former President of the United States Bill Clinton 8 March 2000)

The above quotes highlight the assumptions that are often made about the Internet,

and the alleged ability of the technology to somehow deliver democracy. It is often

seen as deterministic, and these kinds of assumptions about the impact of innovations

in communications technology are not new. The views expressed above are consistent

with a libertarian view of informational flows and the Internet whereby the

architecture of the Internet is somehow neutral and information can flow freely. This

is because the purpose for which the Internet was built has lent itself well to the kinds

of ideas expressed in the quotes above. This chapter outlines the theoretical

framework and that ties together many of the themes of this thesis, the themes of the

dichotomy for the desire for the technology and the perception of the need to ‘control’

it, the myth that the Internet is inherently democratic and the management strategies

employed by the CCP to manage information flows via the legislation, the investment

in content and the code used in the architecture of the Internet.

Medium Theory

It is often assumed by medium theorists (Carey; Comor; R. J. Deibert; Drache &

Beyer; Harold A Innis; M. McLuhan & Fiore) that the introduction of a new form of

communications technology into a society will directly affect and alter a country

and/or culture both socially, cognitively, economically, and politically. For example,

Marshall McLuhan (1997; 1967; 1989) argues that innovations in communications

technology directly influence and change a country and/or culture a society,

politically, and economically. As well as changing the way in which people process

information. This media effect concept is a limited technologically deterministic one.

My view is that the introduction of the Internet into China cannot be studied in

isolation, or from a technologically determinist position, but must be studied within


the context of the social and knowledge flows that comprise modern China. In order

to study the impact of the Internet in China in relation to how information flows are

managed internally and externally, I will utilize the concepts of medium theory, in

particular the ideas of Harold Innis (1951, 1952, 1972, 2004). This is because his

work was concerned with the interaction between the interests of those who controlled

the flow of knowledge and the vehicle for the dissemination of information. Innis

(1951) argued that communications technologies are used to exert influence over time

and space, and that they are subject to the interests of a particular group who, in his

words, represent a ‘monopoly of knowledge’. He asserts that (1972, p.7):

The concepts of time and space reflect the significance of media to civilization. Media that emphasize time are those that are durable in character, such as parchment, clay and stone. The heavy materials are suited to the development of architecture and sculpture. Media that emphasize space are apt to be less durable and light in character, such as papyrus and paper. The latter are suited to wide areas of administration and trade. The conquest of Egypt by Rome gave access to supplies of papyrus, which became the basis of a large administrative empire. Materials that emphasize time favour decentralization and hierarchical types of institutions, while those that emphasize space favourcentralization and systems of government less hierarchical in character.

Innis was not arguing the case for technological determinism, but rather through his

examination of different media within different historical moments showed a certain

interaction between the management of time and space and communications

technology which he always saw as having a contradictory potential (Drache &

Beyer, 1996). Innis (1951, p.75) states that in regard to the Middle Ages:

A balance between concern with space or extent of territory and duration or time appears to depend on a dual arrangement in which the church is subordinated to the state and ensures that the mobilization of the intellectual resources of the civilization concerned by religion or by the state, will be at the disposal of both and that they will be used in the planning for a calculated future in relation to the government of territory of definite extent.

It is also worth noting that Innis (1993) was interested in communication in China,

especially the impact of Western technologies on traditional Chinese communication


patterns that remained an amalgam of the oral and the written until very recently. This

interest focused on the manner in which perceptions of time and space changed in

China after the introduction of the modern press and the manner in which the

Western-style press disrupted the balance between traditional orality and written

communication.

Primarily, Innis was concerned with the impact and challenges that new forms of

communications had on existing power relationships. He argued that new forms of

communication facilitated a shift in the monopolies of knowledge and power among

ruling elites. He states that, “inventions in communication compel realignments in the

monopoly of knowledge” (1951, p. 4).

Edward Comor (2001, p.280) argues that Innis observed a “dialectic between what he

called ‘monopolies of knowledge’ and ‘monopolies of power’. Comor (2001, p.280)

writes

By monopoly of power, Innis was addressing the predominance of entities capable of applying extraordinary military resources. By a monopoly of knowledge, he addressed those interests possessing extraordinary control over what information is available and/or those having a predominant influence over more complex patterns orhabits of social thought. In other words, this latter ‘monopoly’involves explicit and/or implicit control over the social pool of information and how that information is used in developing what is ‘known’.

In the case of China the CCP clearly has clear control over the ‘social pool of

information’. Though the Internet has enabled Chinese citizens, with acces to the

Internet, to participate in a new form of public life there is still no space in which

dissent from the governments point of view is allowed. As far as the Internet is

concerned the CCP has sought to maintain its autority over ‘what is known’ through

the developmnet of content and through the code used to construct the architecture of

the Internet. Code is also used to develop content especially in the development of

online games.


Innis’ concept of a monopoly of knowledge is comparable to Foucault’s (1979)

conception of discourse, in that knowledge is produced and defined by a particular

group who control the means of communicating that knowledge. In the case of Innis,

communications technology is subordinated to the interests of particular monopoly of

knowledge. Both seek to chart the power relationships that arise from the way that

knowledge is disseminated and controlled. Foucault was also interested in the way

that technology was used to manage societies. James Boyle (1997) uses Foucault’s

theories of discourse and power to look at the attempts to regulate Internet content in

the USA. Boyle (1997 n.p.) contends that “Foucault argued that, rather than the

public and formal triangle of sovereign, citizen and right, we should focus on a series

of subtler, private, informal and material forms of coercion organised around the

concepts of “discipline" and "surveillance.”

Both Foucault and Innis looked at the interaction between society and technology and

the ways in which technology shaped society and society shaped technology. The

Internet within the Chinese context is often likened to Bentham’s panopticon as

mediated by Foucault. Lokman Tsui’s (2001) unpublished Masters thesis uses

Foucault’s mediation of the panopticon to look at surveillance of online activity in

China, and so does Gudrum Wacker (2003) in her chapter The Internet and

Censorship in China, in the book China and the Internet: Politics of a digital leap

forward. The technology is used for surveillance of citizens and Chinese management

strategies emphasize self-censorship or self-discipline in their use of the medium.

Using Innis’s notion of time and space in this context the Internet is a tool for

managing the population within China, and managing time in terms of influence and

ideas, through the construction of an official voice in Chinese cyberspace. Foucault

(in Horrocks, 2004) writes that “space is fundamental in any exercise of power”. As

Comor (2001, p.283) puts it “efforts to control space and/or time also involve

attempts to monopolize force which, according to Innis, involve a range of control

activities from brutal oppression to the more subtle implementation of surveillance

technologies”.

The Internet can be viewed as a sphere of influence and another site in which multiple

versions of reality or versions of an event can be constructed from various locales and

their monopolies of knowledge. As Cox (1995) determines, “Innis’ concern lay in the


thought processes through which people of different civilisations define their vision of

reality . . . [H]is focus is less on the individual than on the character of the society that

produces individuals and either releases or suppresses their creative potential.” The

Internet then serves as a point at which multiple versions of reality can be observed.

Innis quotes Hume (1951) to argue that public opinion is all that supports any

government. Hume writes “As force is always on the side of the governed, the

governors have nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion that

government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and the most

military governments as well as to the most free and most popular” (in Harold A

Innis, 1951, p.4). This is similar to the Chinese proverb water can carry a boat, but it

can also overturn it (水能載舟,水能覆舟).

The notion of a monopoly of knowledge is also similar to the concept of hegemony

whereby a ruling class maintains power over subordinate classes through the constant

negotiation and struggle over ideas or worldviews that are circulating within a society,

or between different states. The concept of hegemony is rooted in class struggle,

where as Innis’s ideas about the monopoly of knowledge and its connection to the

management of time and space are traced through examining power relationships and

their connections to communications technology. Hegemony as the management of

perceptions is similar to the management of time; however Innis was talking about

multiple conceptions of time: biological time, archaeological time, scientific time,

historical time, and the way these different conceptions of time are used to serve a

monopoly of knowledge. Comor (2001, p.284) writes

For Innis, throughout history, efforts by a particular group, collectivity or class to assert power, explicitly or implicitly, usually involves problematic efforts to control the temporal and spatial conditions (both mental and physical) of day-to-day life. Through historically structured biased media, powerful concerns often will attempt to normalize their interests as if they were natural, universal, inevitable.

Time or the management of time within the context of the CCP means not only a

hegemonic attempt to manage current perceptions or a particular view of the world,

but also means managing continual historical narratives, past and present. In addition

to this the management of time in relation to media form is highly pertinent when


studying the production, dissemination and flow of information. This has become

more and more apparent as media forms become lighter and more easily transportable

and in the case of electronic and digital information what we have is simply pure data

– hence time in relation to information management is now focussed on the speed at

which one can manage the production, disseminate access, censor and alter

information. The management of information in relation to time, speed and digital

media is being played out via the online reportage of the case study events and creates

ruptures in the interaction between the ruling Chinese elite, and the margins (material

and ephemeral) of Chinese society, and beyond the borders of the mainland to Hong

Kong, Taiwan and Diaspora communities across the globe.

International relationships are played out through meetings and staged events such as

the G8 Summit and ASIA Pacific Economic Co operation (APEC) meetings. These

summits involve meetings press conferences and photo opportunities and it is in this

sense that politics and international relations are played out visually for the media.

These events themselves are played out and constructed for the purposes of

visualising politics. For example the ‘shirt shot’ at APEC where the leaders line up for

a photo in matching shirts signify the host nation, or the door stop interview as leaders

enter parliament house in Australia are examples of this constructedness and

visualisation. These instances are also a feature o the management of time as the

representation and presentation of reality. Time in this sense is the construction of

reality.

The Internet is also a site where China’s interaction and relationships with other

nations can be viewed on some levels this occurs when competing versions of the

same event exist within the same space. These versions of events consist of official

statements from the heads of governments and a form of foreign relations is played

out in this way. This happens at the level of the state and at the level of citizens

interacting with one another. The incidents and the way that they have been played

out in the media in China and elsewhere are a visualisation of spatial relationships.

For example in the case of the spy plane there is both the official Chinese and United

States versions of events as well as unofficial versions accessible from the Internet.

Via the Internet it is possible to trace the negotiations between China and the USA to

repatriate the crew of the plane via official statement from the leaders of both


countries. Further to this both China and the USA present their views of the world in

each other’s language to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of a global audience. The

relationship between the two countries can be examined on many levels. There is a

growing English language press on the Internet through official publications such as

The Peoples Daily, China Daily, Jiefang Bao, and China.org.cn. designed to counter

what is perceived to be the CNN view of the PRC.

Hegemonic relations are evident when considering the inherent tensions that exist

between the ruling Chinese elite and the rest of Chinese society, and China’s

interaction with the USA when viewed online as evidenced in the differing versions

of the same events reported via the various websites this thesis examines. Here, the

use of Innis’s conceptions of time and space more adequately explain these

hegemonic tensions, beyond that of class struggle. Hegemony overstates the position

of class struggle, and does not take into consideration the role of spatial relationships

both internally and externally, that is within the PRC and its relationship with other

nations and the Chinese Diaspora. This is demonstrated in chapter 6 on hacking and

the interaction between Beijing, the USA Germany, Britain, Australia and New

Zealand.

There are tensions and interactions between the centre and the margins, the centre

being the ruling elite and margins the rest of society including provincial

governments. Hegemony implies that the centre has an implicit power over the

margins. The ideas that are generated from the margins are absorbed by the ruling

elite, and this is inadequate for explaining the changing relationship that the ruling

elite has with the rest of Chinese society. These changes are not just a result of the

development of the Internet, but of the reform process and the opening of the

economy and society. An exploration of the interaction between centres and margins

allows flexibility in the articulation of points of view in the management of space and

this counters a position that sees the management of information as hegemonic.

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework for this thesis. The case studies

in Part Two will illustrate the ways in which the CCP has sought to manage time and

space in response to the development of the Internet. The following chapter looks at


the media in China and explores some of the consequences of the reform of this sector

of the economy. Many of the broader issues that affect the media also impact upon the

way in which informational flows are managed within the PRC as a consequence of

the Internet. In effect what I have done in the next chapter is to look more closely at

the way in which time and space are managed via the media in Mainland China.


C h a p t e r 3

The Media in China

In 1992 my morning slumber was shattered by the echoing calls of “good morning

Hangzhou University”, as it reverberated throughout the campus on a network of loud

speakers. Half-hour broadcasts of official news and information marked time

throughout the day when transmissions resumed at lunchtime and then again in the

evening at 5pm. The blaring loudspeakers were also a common feature when I was

travelling between Hangzhou and Shanghai, as every factory seemed to have them.

When I returned to China in 2002 for fieldwork this once common feature of the

Chinese media was gone. The absence of the once ubiquitous and public loudspeaker

signifies a shift from public consumption of the media in China to private

consumption, and in some ways characterizes the shifts that have been taking place in

the media in China since 1978. This chapter explores the changing media policy

environment and the complexities of a mediasphere that is owned by the state but is

increasingly subject to market forces. Overlaying this is the interaction between the

central and provincial governments, and the way that policy is formulated and

implemented. This chapter also highlights the way in which space is managed via

communications technologies in the PRC and the way in which spatial relationships

are negotiated between the central authorities of the CCP in Beijing and local and

provincial governments at the margins.

The table 1 traces the development of China’s media and comes from Media in China

Consumption, Content and Crisis edited by Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, Michael

Keane, and Yin Hong (2001, p.6). The table charts the shifts that have occurred since

1945 and helps to conceptualise the changes that have taken place in this sector. The

overall feature is the impact reform has had on the Chinese media.


Table 1 Development of Chinese Media

Pre-reform 1980-99 2000-Economic System Command Economy The high cost of

upgrading technological infrastructure. The threats of foreign content and the impact of the WTO accession. Controlling the technology of the Internet.

Market reform; gradual decentralization of management

State capitalism authoritarian liberalism

Media Regulation Engineer state model Deregulation and gradual diminution of subvention of media industries

Architect state model (state facilitates regulatory guidelines for investment in infrastructure

Social stratification Egalitarian rice bowl New middle classes with economic capital; social capital residing in bureaucrats

Emerging digital divide; increasing economic stratification

Function of media Propaganda/mobilization of masses Pedagogic/reform of attitudes and conduct (spiritual civilization)

Informational; provision of repertoire of cultural choices

Types of media Print, posters, radio loudspeakers networks, film terrestrial TV

On-line news; chat rooms; pay and satellite platforms; DVD VCD; cellular telephones

Broadband cable; digital TV, WAPs iMode; new media technologies

Media characteristics Mass Line; cultural despotism Diversification; shift to entertainment function and entrepreneurial self sufficiency

Convergence; internationalisation of content

Crisis Establishing control and controlling factions within the press. Making the media into the mouthpiece.

Coming to terms with the costs of maintaining a public media infrastructure. Increasing tensions among media workers and problems of maintaining the traditional role of the media

The high cost of upgrading technological infrastructure. The threats of foreign content and the impact of the WTO accession. Controlling the technology of the Internet.

(Hemelryk Donald et al., 2001, p. 6)

Policy

The Open Door Policy, which began with the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central

Committee in 1978, encouraged local political autonomy through the decentralisation

of decision-making and economic management (Goodman & Segal, 1994, p. 4). The

reform process that followed has increased the autonomy of decision making at the

provincial level, and this has also impacted upon media policy in China. Goodman

(1994, p. 13) writes that “The centre lays down the broad outline of a policy, with the

provinces adopting specific local measures for implementation”. This has given rise to

a political culture that is increasingly marked by regionalism. Xu Wu (2002, p. 12)

argues that:

In reality, it is not rare that the central policy has been interpreted differently, if not oppositely at the local level. The common situation is that fierce rivalries also thrive between many different layers of


government. Sometimes one particular province made a lot of deals with foreign companies, without getting any central governments Okay. In other cases, Beijing denied the province’s permission, but lacked enforcement power.

This thesis looks at the impact of the Internet on regionalism as centre/margin

relationships. It is my contention that the Internet has enabled Beijing, as the centre,

to reinforce its central position of authority over provincial governments at the

margins.

The impact of economic reform on the media has led to a diversification in the way

that the media is structured; including an expansion in the sources and the types of

media available to the Chinese people further facilitating regionalism. Wu Guoguang

(2000, p. 47) notes that the media has gone from being concentrated in Beijing to

being dispersed throughout the country, further facilitating regional interests. Wu

(2000, p. 49) writes that, “while party-organ newspapers at the national and provincial

levels have suffered steep decreases in circulation since 1980, party-organ newspapers

at the district, city, and county levels have increased circulation at an average of 20

percent per year (except in 1981)”. Wu also points out that this has happened in other

forms of media such as television. The growth of television and its impact has been

well documented by James Lull (1991).

The decentralised nature of the Internet also radically challenges the traditional

hierarchical structure of the flow of information in China that filters from Beijing to

the municipal county and prefectural levels. The hierarchy of the national media

reflected the hierarchy of the CCP (W. Sun, 1996, p. 40). The national press for

example, is still headed by the Peoples Daily and is directly managed by the

Politburo. It is essentially a policy document, sections of which are often reprinted in

other papers throughout the country. The Provincial and County levels of the Party

also publish newspapers (Somerlad, 1981). Other media such as radio and television

are structured in the same way. For example the bureaucratic organization regulating

television operates in this way. That is, Beijing formulates and directs policy, which is

interpreted and implemented in each region and municipality. Policy directives are

usually vague and allow localised forms of interpretation and implementation. This

creates tensions between Beijing at the centre and regional interests at the margins.


The result of this is that at times policy implementation becomes more important than

policy formulation, as the margins resist and at times defy the centre (Shoesmith,

1998).

In addition to the increase in the number of provincial players in the newspaper sector

there has been an increase in the number of official mass organizations state

sanctioned professional bodies that also publish their own newspapers. This includes

the Communist Youth League, official trade unions and women’s groups. Wu (2000)

argues that much of this non-state media has increased autonomy since the reform era

began, however it is still only allowed to exist with political sponsorship.

The table 2 illustrates the growth of non-party organ papers to 1994. The statistics do

not extend beyond 1994 because of a change in the way that information of this kind

is compiled.

Table 2 Growth of Non-Party Papers

Party Organs versus Other Newspapers, 1976-1994 No. Of NewspapersYear Party Organs Others1976 236 51977 238 61978 252 71979 270 101980 260 1201981 250 4511982 280 3801983 300 4901984 350 7001985 384 1,3261986 361 1,7901987 374 1,6851988 407 1,9151989 410 1,4961990 406 1,0361991 422 1,0921992 436 1,2301993 440 1,3501994 460 1,411

Source: Zhongg’lo xinwen nianjian, various years (G. Wu, 2000)

The Impact of the Market or Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

Media policy in the PRC must increasingly serve two competing interests, the CCP

and the market. On the one hand there is a policy that stipulates that the media is an

organ of the CCP and on the other there are the increasing demands of


commercialisation and privatisation as the media is forced to operate within a market

model as government subsidies are withdrawn. There is also an increase in the

number of private media companies, and this has eroded the absolute power that the

party once exerted over the media (W. Sun, 1996). In 2001 this process of

commercialisation was further expanded to include foreign owned media operators

into the market. At that time Rupert Murdoch’s Star TV and AOL were able to begin

operations within the PRC, beyond the confines of large hotels and foreign

compounds, and the limited geographical area adjacent to Hong Kong, in Guangdong

province.

Privatisation is further complicated by investment by party run papers such as the

Peoples Daily. Wu (2000, p. 61) writes “as a partial response to the reduced market

share, the party press has established a series of umbrella newspapers and magazines

under its own auspices. A party newspaper is thus partially transformed into an

enterprise group in which the party newspaper remains as a core with other

periodicals acting as the branch companies”.

Despite increased commercialization of the media in the PRC it remains subordinate

to the interests of the party. In June 2008 Hu Jintao outlined his views on the media,

reiterating the position outlined by his predecessor Jiang Zemin and his concept of

‘guidance of public opinion’ that emerged after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989

where the position of maintaining public order would be achieved by continuing to

control news coverage (Bandurski, 2008a, n.p.). In part this should be achieved by

“actively setting the agenda (Bandurski, 2008a, n.p.). Hu also said that “we must

integrate the metropolitan media, Internet media and other propaganda resources”

(Bandurski, 2008a, n.p.)

Conclusion

The relationship between the Internet and media policy in the PRC has yet to be fully

developed, however the Internet is still subject to the same sorts of political relaxation

and restrictions as the more traditional media such as newspapers, television and

radio. The way in which the Qigong sect Falun Gong has been dealt with is a good

example of this. Once it was decided that Falun Gong was an “enemy of the state” the


Falun Gong Internet site was banned and an intensive campaign to denounce the sect

was played out on the Internet in much the same way that it has been played out in

traditional media. The next chapter traces the development of the Internet and

explores the methods that are used to censor and manage the flow of information in

more depth.


C h a p t e r 4

Building and Censoring the Great Firewall

Censorship comes in many forms on the Internet in China. Censorship is about

defining the limits of what can and cannot be said. The goal of censorship of

cyberspace within the context of the PRC is to present a particular Chinese view of

the world that is branded and sanctioned by the CCP so as to maintain and preserve

the authority of the Party. The CCP aims to have the dominant voice in Chinese

cyberspace and this approach is consistent with the management of time through the

maintenance of the monopoly of knowledge. In this sense time is the management of

official discourse by defining the limits of what can be said and what subjects can be

discussed. It is also about attempting to limit voices of dissent, by eliminating and

demonising voices that oppose the government. This chapter will look at the ways the

central government has sought to manage the flow of information through the use of

technology and legislative mechanisms, and issues in relation to the development of

content.

The idea that the Internet can somehow deliver democracy because it is uncontrollable

and inherently ‘free’ is a myth. There is a paradox about the technology which is on

the one hand impossible to control, and on the other hand has the potential to be a

giant surveillance system tracing our every step through cyberspace. In this sense the

Internet is a giant interconnected panopticon with numerous central viewing points. It

is multiple panopticons that are interconnected technically but not always for the same

purpose. Boyle (1997, n.p.) argues that Internet has given rise to a number of ‘privatised

Panopticons’, and this can be extended to include government owned networks. There are

countless governments that are using the Internet for many different kinds of

surveillance of their citizens, as well as an enormous number of privately owned

companies using the Internet to collect information on users for marketing purposes.

Everything that anyone does on the Internet leaves some kind of electronic fingerprint

that says you have been there and that someone could be watching you. Even if you

do things anonymously through proxies, the machine that you view the Internet on

keeps a history of what you have done. To call it free and open is absurd.


Most countries that are connected to the Internet seek to regulate the behaviour of

citizens through legislation. In the United States there is the Patriot Act, which is not

that, dissimilar to the regulations covering the Internet and its uses in China. The

Patriot Act means that the government can order ISPs to handover details of citizen’s

Internet activities. In Australia similar anti terror laws came into affect in 2005. The

justification for such laws in Australia, China and the USA are the same; national

security and public safety. The difference is how those factors are defined. In

countries like the United States of America, and Australia it is the threat of terrorism

that is used to defend this kind of legislation and surveillance of private citizens. In

China the justification is to maintain the stability and security of society. In both cases

there is the defining of a threat to national security, and this is the rationalization for

the need to use the surveillance capabilities of the Internet which is enshrined in

legislation.

The Internet is also a hotly contested space as different groups and governments fight

for influence. It is a sphere of influence and the space in which the struggle for hearts

and minds can be viewed. In terms of spatial management it is the creation of a sphere

of influence and this is an aspect of censorship, and is the other side of eliminating

other voices. Censorship not only aims to remove those voices that are not seen as

desirable, it also aims to create a particular view. In these scenarios the voices that are

not desirable are eliminated, and the voices that are seen as desirable are circulated

and promoted making it the officially sanctioned point of view. It is like the rhetoric

used by John Howard and George Bush; say it long and say it loud, you won’t drown

out the dissent but you will leave a lasting impression.

The CCP knows that it is impossible to control the Internet. What they seek to do is

maintain control over the identity of Chinese cyberspace. Censorship is a part of this

strategy. The main concern of the government in relation to the Internet has been to

develop the infrastructure and at the same time establish guidelines and possible

means of managing the flows of information. In order to do this the CCP has sought

to maintain their position as the dominant voice on the Mainland Internet and that is

through the development of content, and more directly through technological and

regulatory means. Content is shaped through legislation in terms of what can and

cannot be said, and this is supplemented further by the technology that is used to


shape the architecture of the Internet so as to reinforce the legislation. Content has

also been developed through direct investment, such as the development of

government funded websites and direct investment in online games.

The position that I am taking is similar to Gudrum Wacker’s (2003) who also

acknowledges the paradoxical nature of the Internet as well as the CCP’s paradox of

desire and control of the technology. Wacker uses the work of Lawrence Lessig

(2006) who identified four elements that have the potential to contribute to shaping

online behaviour. These include “regulations, social norms, the market and the

architecture of the Internet itself” to look at the effectiveness of censorship” (Wacker,

2003, pp. 59-60). Wacker concludes that the CCP has been effective in its attempts to

censor the seemingly impossible, though the limits of control are constantly being

tested. For Lessig the way to understand how the Internet might be regulated is to

look at the architecture of the Internet or what Lessig calls the ‘code’. An example of

how the code can be used to regulate behaviour is when you have to provide

passwords to gain access to certain websites, or the use of encryption for privacy.

Wacker (2003,p. 60) writes that in order “to find out how cyberspace is regulated,

therefore we need to discover how the code regulates, who the code writers are, and

who controls the code writers.”

The Politics of Control

The number of government players involved in the control and development of the

Internet within China problematize the formulation and implementation of media

policy in this competitive environment9. The ministries involved included the former

Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, the former Ministry of Electronics Industry,

the former Ministry of Radio Film and Television, Xinhua News Agency, Propaganda

Department of the CCP, and the Chinese Academy of Science. To counter the internal

competition between government players the Ministry for Post Telecommunications

and the Ministry for Electronics Industries and the Ministry for Radio Film (MRFTV)

and Television was amalgamated to form the Ministry of Information Industry (MII)

in March 1998. The MRFTV was relegated to the level of State Bureau.

9 See Appendix III for the entities involved in Internet Regulation in China.


The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) has overseen the development of the

Internet, but responsibility was divided between the MII and the State Council

Information Office (SCIO) in 2000. The MII will continue to control Internet Service

Providers (ISP) and the infrastructure, and the SCIO is to be responsible for content.

In April 2000 the SCIO set up the Internet Information Management Bureau to

oversee and regulate Internet Content Providers (ICP), headed by Wang Qingcun,

previously a senior official with the SCIO. There are plans to replicate this bureau at

the provincial level as well. In addition, the State Administration of Radio, Film and

Television (SARFT) and the Ministry of Culture still have an interest in the

development of the Internet, as does the Netnews Bureau of China Internet

Information Centre, which is also run by the State Council. However, the MII is still

able to assert influence over content through the control and regulation of ISP. This

restructure reflects the traditional Chinese political methods of dividing authority and

responsibility.

In 2001 the Informationization Leading Group was established by the State Council to

co-ordinate the government stakeholders, and to settle disputes among them, but its

ultimate goal is to ensure that various policies “serve the interests of the state, rather

than the limited interests of a specific government ministry” (Tan & Wu, 2002, p. 18).

Tan writes:

In summary, the three kinds of decision-makers have their own characteristics. The Leading Group for Informatization is a political ‘task force’ that is led by China’s top leaders and is closely tied to the agenda of these top political leaders. Its power of coordinating and influencing other agencies and ministries are mostly political, which includes the nominations of ministers. The inter-ministry commissions, the State Development and Planning Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission mostly rely on their control of funding for the entire industry to influence the ministries and corporations. Ministries and other agencies implement their agendas through publishing regulations and issuing operation licenses to control corporations and individuals (Tan & Wu, 2002,p. 19).


Figure 1 below shows the complexities in the structure of decision making with

regards to the Internet. The State Council is the highest party organ of power and

administration.

Figure 1 shows the structure of decision-making

(Tan & Wu, 2002,p. 18)

The table 3 shows the levels of Government and policy responsibilities with regard to

the Internet, and e-commerce. The table highlights the complexity of the policy

formulation environment and comes from a paper by Alex Zixiang Tan.


Table 3 State organs and their Internet responsibilities and ecommerce.

(Tan & Wu, 2002, p. 19).

Filtering: The Technical Means Of Censorship

The Internet in China is heavily filtered and the systems and strategies used to do this

are very sophisticated and are precise enough to block exact types of information. The

Golden Shield Project started in 1998 to manage and oversee the technological

aspects of Internet management. The project is owned by the Ministry for Public

Security (MPS) and was to be completed in 2006. Greg Walton (2001, p. 16) in his

report for Canadian based Human Rights, argues that the purpose of the Golden

Shield is to:

…build a nationwide digital surveillance network, linking national, regional and local security agencies with a panoptic web of surveillance. Beijing envisions the Golden Shield as a database-driven remote surveillance system – offering immediate access to registration records on


every citizen in China, while linking to vast networks of cameras designed to cut police reaction time to demonstrations.

The filtering of certain subjects is consistent. The list of banned topics includes Falun

Gong, Democracy, the Dali Lama and Tibetan or Taiwanese independence. The

blocking of websites though is not consistent and is not uniform. The architecture of

Chinese networks has been structured to filter the content of the web at multiple

locations as it is viewed within the PRC10.

The Chinese have created a two-tier system of Interconnecting Networks and Access

Networks. There are 8 Interconnecting Networks which are connected to the global

networks of the World Wide Web, and these are closely connected to government

agencies. The Access Networks are the same as ISPs in the West, and they are not

legally able to directly connect to the global Internet, but do so through

interconnecting networks. There is quite a high level of competition between ISPs in

the cities (Tan & Foster, 1998, p. 20). By restricting the number of Internet Service

Providers (ISP) able to connect to the global networks that make up the Internet, it is

theoretically easier to filter or to block sites that are deemed unsuitable by the CCP

(Tan, Foster, & Gordon, 1997). The limiting of connection points to the global

networks has created bottlenecks in the system and they can act as a gate and a point

at which filtering can occur.

In addition to the creation of bottlenecks it appears that filtering capabilities have

been physically incorporated into the networks. There have been reports that “Cisco

specifically designed and developed a special router/firewall box for China” ("Internet

Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study," 2005). Cisco has also provided

routers which have packet filtering capabilities, and while these routers were designed

to combat different kinds of Internet attacks such as viruses and worms they can still

be used to block content ("Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country

Study," 2005, p. 7). When information is sent across the Internet it is broken into

packets and is then sent to routers in the network. Routers are computers that send the

packets of information from one point in the Internet to the next. The routers provided

10 For a list of banned words see Appendix V.


by Cisco can be used to intercept information as well as perform keyword searches

("CHINA: Volunteers help Beijing control Internet ", 2006b).

In 2002 reports began to emerge in the western press that Chinese authorities were

using packet sniffer software to filter Web-based email and Internet sites. Packet

sniffing software programs are used to monitor networks, and are programmed to

capture packets containing specific information (Tyson, 2006). It is interesting to note

that in the USA the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed its own program

called Carnivore for the purpose of electronic surveillance. This project was

abandoned in 2005 for other forms of surveillance ("FBI Tosses Carnivore to the

Dogs," 2005; Tyson, 2006).

The effectiveness of China’s filtering system has been tested by the OpenNet

Initiative (ONI), a collaborative research project aimed at investigating and

challenging filtering and surveillance practices of countries known to filter the

Internet. ONI is made up of very prestigious institutions, the University of Toronto,

Harvard University, Cambridge University and Oxford University. They examined

the level of filtering and the effectiveness of circumvention technology and identified

China’s system as one of the most sophisticated.

ONI’s extensive report on filtering in China in 2004-2005 argues that China’s system

of filtering the net is “the most sophisticated in the world”("Internet Filtering in China

in 2004-2005: A Country Study," 2005). According to the report, filtering is carried

out at an assortment of control points and changes over time("Internet Filtering in

China in 2004-2005: A Country Study," 2005, p. 3), and while certain topics are off

limits many websites from American media outlets are usually accessible.

The blocking of foreign websites is at times arbitrary. According to ONI, Britain’s

BBC News Online is consistently blocked and accessibility to sites such as CNN and

Time magazines is inconsistent ("Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country

Study," 2005). Sometimes they are available and sometimes they are not. The

Australian ABC website became inaccessible from within China in April 2002, in

what appeared to be a routine crackdown. Following protests by the Australian

government the website was restored. It appears that the website was either caught up


in a routine crackdown, or it was in response to an impending visit by the Dali Lama

("ABC Online gets China's okay," 2002). What this incident might also suggest is that

there is something about China’s relationship with Australia that led to the restoration

of the site, also suggested by the fact that it was available in the first place. As I

mentioned earlier the BBC’s news services appears to be almost permanently blocked.

ONI concludes that:

Importantly, China’s filtering efforts lack transparency: the state does not generally admit to censoring Internet content, and concomitantly there is no list of banned sites and no ability for citizens to request reconsideration of blocking, as some other states that filter provide. The topics defined as sensitive, or prohibited, by China’s legal code are broad and non-specific, and enforcement of laws such as the ban on spreading state secrets discourages citizens from testing the boundaries of these areas. China’s legal and technological systems combine to form a broad, potent, and effective means of controlling the information that Chinese users can see and share on the Internet ("Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study," 2005, p. 59).

Pressure has also been put on large international search engines such as Google,

Altavista, Microsoft’s MSN and Yahoo to censor content for Chinese audiences. In

the case of Google this pressure began with disruptions to access of the site from

within China. In 2002 the site was blocked for a week and since then it has been

sporadically banned or requests for the site would be redirected to search engines that

are sanctioned by the CCP. The Berkman Center for Internet & Society Harvard Law

School, which is a part of the ONI research group carried out research on the

accessibility of Google in 2002. They found that:

Current testing suggests that filtering may vary across China. Some parts of China may not filter Google keywords at all, while other parts may disconnect a user’s Internet connection (even an "always-on" high-speed connection) in response to a search for a prohibited term. Prohibited terms seem to include “Jiang Zemin” and “cache”; the latter is typically associated with requests to use Google’s system for viewing archived content from other web sites (Berkman Center for Internet & Society Harvard Law School, 2002).

In response to this pressure, Google and other international content providers such as

Yahoo and MSN have conformed to the wishes of Chinese authorities. All three


companies have, as a result of conforming to filtering content, come under a lot of

criticism in the USA. In 2004 Google defended their actions by saying that is was

better to remove banned material in order to improve the experience for Chinese

users. A company spokeswoman Debbie Frost said at the time that “Google has

decided that in order to create the best possible search experience for our mainland

China users we will not include sites whose content is not accessible” ("CHINA:

Google conforms to censorship," 2004).

In January 2006 Google launched a search engine in China amidst criticism for

censoring results and this time they argued that they were complying with the law of

the country. In a statement to CNN Google stated:

In order to operate from China, we have removed some content from the search results available on Google.cn, in response to local law, regulation or policy. While removing search results is inconsistent with Google ‘ s mission, providing no information (or a heavily degraded user experience that amounts to no information) is more inconsistent with our mission (Loren, 2006).

Microsoft, Yahoo and Google operate within a paradox that requires different

demands in different locales. In China they are willing to comply with the

Governments wishes for censorship, and in the USA these companies have actively

defied Government’s requests for details of user information. In December 2005 the

United Attorney General sought data from Yahoo, Google and MSN on user activity

in order to defend the Child Online Protection Act in the Federal Court in

Pennsylvania. Google has refused to comply with the requests (2006). The World

Privacy Organisation suggests that if the search engines are forced to comply then the

Internet could possibly become the world’s largest surveillance tool (2006).

Regulations

The main feature of Chinese Internet regulations is that they promote self-censorship

at every level, and loosely define the parameters of Internet activity. This is done by

making the user, the ICP, and the ISP responsible for the content that is posted on


websites, chatrooms, blogs11, and BBS12. The regulations promote ISP and content

providers to monitor and censor what is posted on websites, blogs, and BBS. Under

the regulations concerning Internet café owners are also meant to monitor customers.

The State Council approved the first regulations that attempted to control the content

of the Internet in China in December 1997 (Zhang, 1997). The regulations are based

on the desire to protect computer networks in China from hackers, and as the CCP

puts it "to preserve the social order and social stability" (Chinalaw Home Page, 1999).

It is these regulations that loosely define what is and what is not permissible, and this

includes pornography and sites that are deemed to incite the people to overthrow the

government or the socialist system, inciting division of the country, harming national

unity, or sites that promote terrorism, and feudal superstitions ("Cult hinders viewers

seeing media reports," 2003). The regulations also stipulate that all users must register

with the Ministry of Public Security though this does not appear to be enforced.

The regulations concerning the Internet were updated three times during 2000, which

suggests that there was some debate on how to deal with the Internet within the ruling

elite. The State Secrecy Protection Regulations For Computer Information Systems

promulgated in January 2000 are primarily concerned with security issues, but they

also outline some of the issues pertaining to the publication of news by privately

owned websites and portals. These issues were dealt with more specifically by the

draft regulations Management in Regard to Internet Content Provision handed down

by the State Council ("State Council approves new rules on Net content, telecom,"

2000). These regulations encourage self-censorship because the owners of websites

and portals are responsible for what is posted on sites, and this has led to the

employment of people to specifically observe what is posted in Chatrooms and on

Bulletin Boards.

In September 2005 Internet regulations were updated again with the introduction of

The Administrative Regulations of Internet News Information Service. These

regulations were issued by the State Council’s Information Office and the Ministry of

11 The regulations pertaining to weblogs (blogs) will be discussed in more detail in Chapter eight. See also Appendix III.12 See Appendix II for regulations on BBS and Chatroom.


Information Industry (Song, 2006). The focus of these regulations is to enhance self-

censorship of content providers by making them responsible for what is posted on

websites, including weblogs and BBS. These regulations also further define news and

who can produce and disseminate it. According to Song Huang and Chen Lingli

(2006):

In general, only news agencies directly under the supervision of the central government, provinces, autonomous regions, directly-administered municipalities, or municipalities where provincial governments are located, are qualified to apply to the State Council’s Information Office for approval to establish an entity engaging in Internet news information services or the publishing of original news information.

In addition to reinforcing self-censorship the regulations also help to ensure that news

comes from official sources. The effect of this is to reaffirm Beijing’s authority over

the management of public discourse and the flow of information.

Internet Cafés

The CCP has paid a lot of attention to Internet cafés, as 33% of Chinas netizens

accessed the Internet via cafés (See CNNIC report for January 2008)13. The regulation

and surveillance of Internet cafés adds another layer to the matrix of management

strategies employed by the CCP to manage the flow and types of information that are

available in Chinese cyberspace. The strategies for cafés are the same as the broader

strategies for managing the web: regulation, self-censorship and surveillance. The

justification for the management is also the same: network safety and security.

Essentially, this means café owners are meant to monitor what patrons are accessing

during their sessions. Patrons are also meant to register with the cafés using official

forms of identification. During my field work I was only asked to register when I

went to large cafés. The justification for the management of Internet cafés is the same

as other forms of Internet regulations and that is network safety and security.

13 Internet café regulations are discussed in more depth in Chapter nine.


Children under 16 are banned from Internet cafés following the introduction of

regulations in 2002 aimed specifically at cybercafés. These regulations followed the

deaths of some teenagers in a fire at an Internet café in Beijing. The fire was the

impetus for many of the regulations of Internet café, and again the emphasis was on

public safety. In May 2006 a crackdown on Internet café and bars was aimed at

keeping youths out of these places ("CHINA: Beijing launches Internet cafe

crackdown," 2006). This is discussed in more detail in chapter 9 on online games.

During field work in 2002 I regularly went to a large Internet café at the top of the

Wanfujing Bookstore. It was during school holidays and the majority of patrons were

teenagers and most appeared to be playing online games. I also visited a number of

other Internet cafés throughout the city, and most were patronised by teenagers

playing online games. Friends that live in the city tell me that Internet cafés regularly

come and go. They open and then are closed by authorities.

The Internet Police and Other Hit Squads

To further backup the technological and regulatory strategies of supervising Internet

activity there is an army of Internet Police. The exact number of Internet Police is

unknown, however it was estimated in 2004 that there are approximately 40,000

(Mooney, 2004). I have at this stage not been able to find more up to date figures for

the number of Internet police operating throughout China. The figures are often

quoted in the Western press as being between 30,000, and 50,000 ("CHINA:

Volunteers help Beijing control Internet ", 2006b). The details about who makes up

this army of police are also sketchy, and this may include the army of volunteers who

also help with Internet surveillance. The Peoples Daily Online reported on the

establishment of China’s first Internet Police in Anhui province in 2000 ("Chinese

Internet Police," 2000). In the report the head of the Anhui Internet Police said “the

main task of the group is to administrate and maintain order on computer networks”

("Chinese Internet Police," 2000).

In 2006 The Internet Security and Surveillance Division of Shenzhen Public Security

Bureau created two cartoon characters to appear on websites and web forums in

Shenzhen. The characters are called Jingjing and Chacha and the names are made up


from the word police, ‘jing cha’ (警察), in Chinese. The purpose of these characters is

to scare users into complying with Internet regulations. Jingjing and Chacha are

pictured below (Qiang, 2006). Users can click on the icons for information on Internet

regulations (Yan, 2006).

Figure 2 Jing Jing and Cha Cha China’s Internet Police

In a story on Jingjing and Chacha in the Beijing Youth Daily The Internet Security and

Surveillance Division of Shenzhen Public Security Bureau was quoted as saying:

The Internet police has existed for a long time. This time we publish the image of Internet Police in the form of a cartoon, the purpose is to let all Internet users know that the Internet is not a place beyond of law, the Internet Police will maintain order in all online behaviours (Qiang, 2006).

The director also said that “the main function of Jingjing and Chacha is to intimidate,

not to answer questions” (Qiang, 2006). The story was translated by China Digital

Times, a prestigious site that collects and translates news stories from China and is run

by the Berkeley China Internet Project.

In May, 2006, it was announced that The Ministry of Public Security deemed Jingjing

and Chacha a success and their virtual patrol program was to be extended to eight

other cites. According to a report by Xinhua the cartoon cyber cops “have received an


accumulated 100,000 clicks, provided more than 600 legal consultations and received

more than 1,600 reports on online crimes, 235 of which have been proved effective”

(Yan, 2006). The report also claims that the appearance of Jingjing and Chacha had

reduced the amount of hazardous information on Shenzhen’s major websites by 60%

(Yan, 2006). Security guards will also patrol inside chat rooms and delete information

that is deemed as harmful (Cai, 2006).

The use of the Internet to facilitate self-censorship and the active participation of

private citizens in the surveillance of other private citizens is nothing new. ISP’s

could report activity and ICPs that were involved in illegal activities. It was reported

at the time that the site had “received more than 143,000 complaints, of which 67.5

percent relate to pornographic material, 4.4 percent to cult activity, 3.4 percent to

online fraud, 1.9 percent to online gambling, and 1.6 percent to intellectual property

rights infringements” (Q. Chen, 2005).

When these things are reported in the Chinese media it is interesting to note that

details of the crimes are those that involve gambling and pornography and not

political dissent. Conversely in the Western media the reporting of arrests or criminal

activity in China as it relates to the Internet is more commonly associated with

political dissent. Each story or version of Internet crime as it appears in China is

consistent with the view of its particular sphere of influence, Chinese cyberspace, or

western, or rather English language cyberspace.

The Development of Content

The development of content is not only managed through regulation, it is also

managed through campaigns aimed at self-censorship and through creating a presence

in Chinese cyberspace. These campaigns and the development of content in general

are about the defining of the monopoly of knowledge in the construction of time as a

version of reality defined and sanctioned by the CCP that is used to manage space,

both physical and cyber. Campaigns, such as the Civilized Internet Program in 2006

where volunteer students are recruited to watch their classmates in chat rooms and

online forums, as well as to promote ‘politically suitable’ topics for discussion

("CHINA: Volunteers help Beijing control Internet ", 2006a), are used to help ensure

that the government’s voice in this space is the most prominent. In addition to


surveillance there is another kind of Internet Police who pose as commentators in

Chatrooms and other web forums to promote the government’s view, and this forms a

part of the development of content. The army of pro government commentators are

known as the ‘Fifty Cent Party’ the ‘Red Vests’ and the ‘Red Vanguard’. According

to David Bandurski (2008a, n.p.) the army of commentators has:

just one mission: to safeguard the interests of the party by infiltrating and policing a rapidly growing Chinese Internet. They set out to neutralize undesirable public opinion by pushing pro-partyviews through chat rooms and web forums, reporting dangerous content to authorities.

The estimated 280,000 strong army of commentators, trained by the Ministry of

Culture, was described by Hu Jintao as being part of a ‘new pattern of public-opinion”

(Bandurski, 2008a, n.p.). On January 23 2007 Hu Jintao (Bandurski, 2008a, n.p.) said

that party leaders should “assert supremacy over online public opinion, raise the level

and study the art of online guidance, and actively use new technologies to increase the

strength of positive propaganda”, and that the Party needed to “use” the Internet as

well as control it. Renowned Chinese Blogger, Issac Mao (in Bandurski, 2008a, n.p.),

commented that “the goal of the government is to crank up the ‘noise’ and drown out

progressive and diverse voices on China’s Internet, This can be seen as another kind

of censorship system, in which the Fifty Cent Party can be used both to monitor

public speech and to upset the influence of other voices in the online space.”

Increasingly the CCP is turning to PR spin methods in order to develop content. An

example of this was in June 2008 when President Hu Jintao took part in an online chat

with a member of the general public. The first question he answered was on his

Internet activities and whether or not he looked at the Internet everyday. Web users

watching the interaction online began searching for the identity of the citizen who

identified themselves as ‘Picturesque Landscape of Our Country’ and they turned out

to be a member of the ‘Fifty Cent Party’ as discussed in chapter 4.

Other types of programs that promote the government’s view point have sought

pledges from Internet content providers. These campaigns have been aimed at ICPs

in a bid to ensure self-discipline or to gain public agreements to self-discipline. In


2002 ICPs signed an agreement to “control” the material published on their sites

("China internet firms 'self-censoring'," 2002, n.p.). In April 2006 43 websites in

Beijing signed a pledge to self censor, and as a result more than 2000 chat rooms

were closed and millions of online comments were deleted (Cai, 2006).

In April 2007 a campaign to promote the use of the cn domain name was launched,

supported by the Ministry of Information and the Information Office of the State

Council, State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform and the Academy of

Sciences. The ‘One Million Websites Using Chinese Domain Names’ program was

officially launched by China Internet Network Information Centre (CCNIC) the body

responsible for allocating domain names in China ("CNNIC Urges Websites To Use

CN Domain Name," 2007). The story appeared on the Internet Society of China’s

website says that many officials believe that “China’s Internet security is best

maintained by the use of cn domain names because China has more direct control

over those top-level domain name servers and registrars, while China has very little

control over .COM or other TLD services” ("CNNIC Urges Websites To Use CN

Domain Name," 2007). According to the Internet Society of China, CNNIC reported

that “about 53% of Chinese netizens believe that giving priority to developing Internet

services within a native language environment will help promote the development of

the country’s Internet business” ("CNNIC Urges Websites To Use CN Domain

Name," 2007).

The interesting thing to note about these campaigns is that they are consistent with the

style of campaigns used in China to manage all number of things. In a way it is like

public theatre, in that it shows that people and organisations support the government.

It puts the desired spin on events and modes of management, for example campaigns

to combat HIV/AIDS as discussed in chapter 5, and Learn from Lei Feng campaigns

that are outlined in chapter 9.

A limit on foreign investment in the media is another strategy adopted by the CCP to

manage the flow of information and to shape content. Foreign investment in Chinese

media, including the Internet, has been confined to joint ventures. This enables the

government to limit foreign influence on Chinese media, while continuing to enable

the CCP to shape and maintain Chinese cyberspace.


The shaping of Chinese cyberspace also extends to the development of content. In

March 2000 Xinhua reported the first official news website was launched,

www.21DNN.com.Thsi 21 Dragon news. The site brought together nine official and

prominent Beijing news websites including: the Beijing Daily, Beijing Youth Daily,

Beijing Evening News, Beijing Economic Daily, Beijing TV Station Group, Beijing

People’s Broadcasting Station, Beijing Cable Broadcasting Station, Beijing Morning

Post and the Beijing Broadcast and TV Weekly ("China's First Authorized News

Website Launched," 2000).

The level of investment in the provision of content has logically extended to the

development of online games, given that 59.3% of China’s netizens play online games

((CNNIC), 2008)14. In April 2006 the Government announced plans to invest 2 billion

dollars in the development of online games. According to a BBC news report Chinese

gamers paid 500 million dollars to subscribe to online games in 2005 (R. Taylor,

2006). Part of the reason for this kind of investment has been to ensure that certain

features appear in the games that are commensurate with the government’s desires for

this sector and this is covered in more detail in chapter nine. There are concerns in

China as there is in the Australia about the effects that games have on players long

term. The features that are added to the games are things like a fatigue system where

the game is designed to run down after a certain number of hours of play (R. Taylor,

2006).

Breaking through the Great Firewall

The West is very big on berating China for failing to take up western style democracy

and there are campaigns that have been taken up by western governments to counter

Chinese efforts to censor the web. For instance the Safe Web Project. In 2001 the

international broadcaster Voice of America VOA and the CIA’s venture capital arm

In-Q_Tel, invested in Safeweb to develop software called Triangle Boy, designed to

assist Internet users in authoritarian countries such as China to anonymously access

proxy servers to circumvent surveillance systems. Not long after news of Safeweb

was announced, reports emerged that access to Safeweb in China had been blocked.

14 Chapter nine covers online games.


In an ironic twist the BBC reported that Safeweb and VOA had put a filter on the

server side to censor pornography, and that would have included homosexual rights

pages (Hennock, 2002). The project was suspended in 2002.

Another example of the west putting pressure on China’s Internet policies include the

2007 Yahoo settlement of a lawsuit with a Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, and cyber

dissident Wang Xiaoning, who are both serving 10 year jail terms. The settlement was

seen as a response to pressure from the USA House Foreign Affairs Committee. The

Committee’s Chairman Tom Lantos, a Democrat, described the actions of Yahoo as

“inexcusably negligent behavior at best, and deliberately deceptive behaviour at

worst” (Mendoza, 2007). The lawsuit was launched by the World Organization for

Human Rights USA on behalf of both the activists. They alleged the company

‘willingly’ provided their e-mails and personal information to the Chinese

government, which led to them both being jailed. Shi was arrested in April 2004 for

‘leaking state secrets’ in emails he sent to the Minzhu Luntan dissident website

revealing details from the propaganda department’s directives to media outlets on

how to cover the 15th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident (Mendoza,

2007, n.p.). Wang was imprisoned “for ‘incitement to subvert state power’ after he

posted a message on a Yahoo ! Group about the necessity of democratic reform”

(Mendoza, 2007, n.p.).

Whilst the regime’s strategy of containment of the Internet in terms of filtering, legal

measures and the development of content are successful in moulding the identity of

Chinese cyberspace, the technology also allows for circumvention of the official CCP

version of events. The consequence is that there have still been incidents that the CCP

has had to respond to, and it is the investigation of these incidents that provides an

insight into the formation and operation of marginal groups within the PRC. It also

sheds light on the way these things are viewed in China and in the West. The

government of the United States of America is active in putting pressure on China to

discontinue its policies of censorship and has in the past sought to directly undermine

attempts to censor the web. For example in the lead up to the Beijing Olympics the

USA pressured China to allow journalists in the city unfettered access to the Internet


during the games ("Defiant China hits out at US, stands firm on Internet," 2008).

Activist groups in the USA have also been active in developing software to help

Chinese citizen’s circumvent the Great Firewall, and this is explored more fully in

chapter 6. These examples also highlight the interplay of spatial relationships between

the United States of America and the PRC and are a visualisation of the tensions and

the negotiations that go on between the China and the west.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the strategies used by the CCP to maintain and develop the

monopoly of knowledge and manage the flow of information across Chinese

cyberspace. The strategies include the use of regulations, the development of content

and the use of code to censor the Internet in the PRC. These strategies are used by the

leadership of the CCP to reinforce their position as the central power of the PRC and

to exert influence over local and provincial governments at the margins.


Chapter 5

Official/Unofficial: The Management of Non Government Organisations

The Internet and the development of Non Government Organizations (NGO) have

enabled the formation of associations of people around a myriad of interests. At the

end of 2006 there were an estimated 354,000 NGOs according to the Ministry of Civil

Affairs. However according to Jia Xijin, an associate professor in the School of

Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University, the real figure was likely to be

more than 1 million (Guan, 2007, n.p.). The Internet has enabled these groups to

organise and exchange ideas, and these developments are often pointed to as the

beginnings of a civil society, a prerequisite for democracy. This chapter looks at the

concepts of civil society and the public sphere and the way that official and unofficial

discourses such as public debate are managed. It is my contention that the concepts of

civil society and the public sphere are inadequate for understanding the way in which

informational flows are managed as a consequence of the development of the Internet.

I will begin by looking at the concept of civil society and its application to the

opening of the economy and the Internet in China. I will argue that the concepts of

state corporatism, corporatism and bureaucratic authoritarianism are more appropriate

for understanding the strategies used to manage information flows and the shaping of

official discourse. As a way of supporting my claims I will then look at the way that

official discourses are managed through NGOs, specifically those that are based on

the environment and HIV/AIDS. I will confine my discussion to the overall

management of environmental and HIV/AIDS NGOs. Because there are so many of

these groups it is beyond the scope of this chapter to investigate them in depth and it

would constitute a PhD in its own right. I will then contrast the official discourses

with the unofficial discourses in the form of an event in Huaxi/Huankantao where

riots occurred in response to pollution and the reporting of an HIV/AIDS activist and

her blog in the PRC.

Civil Society and the Public Sphere

The formation of NGOs and the networking capabilities of the Internet in China is

often given as evidence of the beginnings of a ‘civil society’, and an emerging public

sphere, and both of these are seen as a fundamental precondition for democracy. The


discourse in China on the concept of civil society has led to a reinterpretation of

Marxism by Chinese scholars (Ma, 2005, p. 22)15. Indeed, much of the scholarship

concerning the Internet in China uses theories of civil society as a framework, and

they are influenced by Habermas’s notion of the public sphere and civil society inside

and outside of China (Tai, 2006; X. Wu, 2006; Yang, 2003a, 2003b; Yongming Zhou,

2006). In general the arguments here are that the Internet is providing the means to

transform China’s political culture from the bottom up through the creation of a space

in which groups can form and have the potential to influence the government. It is in

this sense that the Internet is seen as a public sphere that is a democratizing force. Wu

uses the notion of public sphere to explain the emergence of a non official ideology of

nationalism that is articulated on the Internet in China. Goubin Yang argues that the

Internet and civil society form a nexus of mutual benefit. He states that “the Internet

facilitates civil society activities by offering new possibilities for citizen participation.

Civil society facilitates the development of the Internet by providing the necessary

social basis-citizens and citizen groups-for communication and interaction” (Yang,

2003a).

These notions of civil society and the public sphere are closely associated with the

work of Jurgen Habermas who looked at the formation and articulation of public

opinion and debates in 18th century Western Europe. Habermas wrote that “by ‘the

public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something

approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A

portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private

individuals assemble to form a public body” (Habermas, 1974, n.p.). Habermas traced

the materialization, transformation and collapse of the public sphere as a consequence

of a highly commercialised mass media that reshaped and confined political

discussion to the media. According to Habermas, public opinion was formed through

face to face discussions in coffee houses over newspapers; now the articulation of

public opinion and discussion is confined to the media itself. Habermas (1989, p. 103)

states:

15 Ma provides excellent background debate in both China and the West on the civil society and its application to NGO activity in China.


The sounding board of an educated stratum tutored in the public use of reason has been shattered; the public is split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use nonpublicly and the great mass of consumers whose reception is public but uncritical. Consequently, it completely lacks the form of communication specific to a public.

It is worth noting at this point that Habermas’s theory of a public sphere is similar to

Innis’s appraisal of the ancient Greek’s oral tradition which emphasised discussion.

Both writers saw the periods on which they wrote as golden ages in the history of

thinking and culture and both looked at the relationship between modes of

communication and the cultural changes that they facilitated. Innis (1951) argued that

the oral tradition in Greece fostered thinking that was flexible, rather than a point of

view that was tied to the dogma of a written script, such as the codification of laws.

He contends that Greece made the written language subordinate to the demands of

their oral traditions and in doing so enabled the flourishing of Greek culture at that

time; the influence of which is still felt in the West to this day. Innis (1951, p. 65)

writes that “the power of the oral tradition in Greece which checked the bias of a

written medium supported a brief period of cultural activity such as has never been

equalled”.

Definitions of civil society are much more hotly contested, and this in itself raises

some of the problems with the concept. The London School of Economics, Centre for

Civil Society provides a definition that is widely accepted as the seminal definition

("What is civil society?," 2004, n.p.),

Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community groups, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trades unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.

This definition deemphasises power relationships that are embedded in the potential

formation of civil society groups in authoritarian countries, where these groups are


only allowed to exist with government sponsorship, legal or financial. A broad based

definition of civil society based on voluntary associations deemphasises the political

nature of the interactions of these groups and fails to account for the inbuilt inequality

in these interactions. The definitions based on voluntary associations are too broad as

this could include sporting clubs and groups outside the law such as triads, or gangs

(Ehrenberg, 1999, p.235-236; Rodan, 2003, p. 506). The problem with civil society is

that it diffuses attention away from unequal power relationships that are inherent in all

political interactions, whether these groups are able to influence the government or

not. The concept of civil society is deterministic in its assumptions about the ability of

people to organize associations and the inevitability of a form of pluralistic

democracy in that it overlooks the restrictions and regulations that are placed on the

formation of associations, particularly in the case of authoritarian countries such as

China. The tracing of centre/margin relationships provides a better framework for

negotiations of influence and power as it assumes that these contests are unequal from

the start and that they are under constant arbitration, resulting in wins and losses on

each side.

Guobin Yang argues that the Internet has helped to establish the beginnings of a civil

society in China and points to growth in voluntary organisations that are beyond the

reach of the government as evidence of the emergence of a civil society. Yang writes

that (2002);

The existence of voluntary civic organizations outside the control of the state is an important basis of democracy. In China, civic organizations have proliferated in recent years, yet they hardly fall outside state control. Even some self-proclaimed NGOs cannot claim sufficient autonomy. Again, the Internet is proving to be an important tool for these organizations. Officially registered environmental NGOs rely heavily on the Internet to advance their causes. A growing number of web-based environmental groups have appeared in the past five or six years. They are unable to register because of the constraints of the regulative climate. Some of these groups started as virtual communities before evolving into web-based voluntary organizations. Others first organized offline and then went online. In all cases, the Internet provides a space for ordinary citizens to organize and act collectively. This was unimaginable even as recent as ten years ago.

The inability of these groups to register means that their influence is also limited and

to some degree has the potential to impair their mobilization, as they could be made


illegal at any time and forced to cease their activities or move their operations

underground. Unregistered groups may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the state and

this marginalises these groups and their activities, even though these groups only exist

because the government has allowed it. The Falun Gong case and the ongoing

campaigns to prevent the return of the organisation makes it abundantly clear that if

the government wishes to ban an organisation and remove it from the ‘public sphere’

it is quite capable of doing so. The degree to which unregistered groups are able to

forge links (guangxi 关系) with the government is unclear and this also presents a

problem for any sort of evaluation of the effectiveness of these groups.

In terms of using the Internet as the basis for a civil society the CCP has sought to

manage the flow of information to prevent the formation of groups that would

seriously challenge their role and political authority. The argument I am trying to

make here is similar to the one made by Gary Rodan in relation to Singapore, where

the government there has also been very successful at preventing the formation of an

effective opposition to the ruling Peoples Action Party (PAP). Rodan (2003, p. 503)

argues that:

In contrast with some other parts of Southeast Asia, challenges to media controls in Singapore have been limited and ineffectual. Lately the government has been refining legislation to try and keep it that way. But this strategy is not principally based on the unrealistic objective of direct information control. Rather, preventing the emergence of organized social and political forces that could lead to a genuine civil society lies at the heart of the strategy.

There is the emergence and formation of groups in China independent of the

government and to some degree they are autonomous. However the degree to which

they are regulated by the CCP means that they are managed and shaped so that these

groups conform to the CCP’s monopoly of knowledge and view. In addition many

registered NGOs cultivate state relationships as a means of sustaining their operations.

There are other NGOs actually organised by the state and these are referred to as

Government Organised Non Government Organisations or GONGOs, Ma Qiusha

(2005,p. 97) writes that “ironically NGOs have tried to become more independent by

holding on to their relationships with the government ….[They] often have to rely on


government’s authority to increase the size and influence of their projects.” The

problem with the application of the concept of civil society and the public sphere is

that it fails to adequately acknowledge the power relationships imbedded within these

institutional arrangements. This not is not to say that the way power in China is

exercised by the CCP totalizing and that there is no room for civic participation. Nor

does it imply that these groups are not the creation and visualisation of new spheres of

influence outside of the party. However, there are limits to what can be said and

clearly the CCP still define those boundaries. The application of civil society

overstates the ability of these groups to potentially challenge the government.

The formation and regulation of NGOs is more consistent with development theories

of state corporatism or corporatism and bureaucratic authoritarianism. Ma Qiusha

(2005) argues that the function of civil associations, since the emergence of NGOs in

the mid 1990’s, has evolved along both civil society and state corporatist lines. This

model acknowledges the kinds of relationship that is shared by the state and NGOs in

China. In a corporatist system the state usually channels the interests of a group into a

single organization. Jonathon Unger and Anita Chan (1995, p. 30) argue that “the

state determines which organizations will be recognized as legitimate and forms an

unequal partnership of sorts with such organizations. The associations sometimes

even get channelled into the policy-making processes and often help implement state

policy on the government’s behalf”. The corporatist model is likened to the Fascist

states of the 1930’s, where business and labour interests were subordinate to the state.

Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Tawain have all been described as corporatist in

earlier stages of their development. This is supported by the argument of Unger and

Chan (1995, p. 30):

Corporatism, moreover, usually involves more than just a working relationship between the state and the associations representing interest groups. An actively interventionist state often helps to organize the relations between the various sectoral organizations. It bases its intervention as a grand arbiter or mediator on the premise that the government is the guardian of the common good, of a national interest that supersedes the parochial interests of each sector. Yet within such a corporatist framework, the state does not attempt to dominate directly. It leaves some degree of autonomy to the organizations within each of their respective spheres of operation. But to ensure that the compacts and agreements achieved at the top get implemented effectively, it demands


that the organizations exercise some discipline and control over their own memberships.

The strategy outlined above by Rodan is much the same as in the PRC, and this is not

surprising as China has often looked to Singapore for models of development and

containment of informational flows on the Internet. In terms of the development of

civil society and the limits of autonomy of civic association it is the CCP who still

defines the limits to any public discourse and they alone remain the final arbiters of

what can and cannot be said. Whilst the political process has opened up to some

degree there are limits to what can be said. The hosts of websites, Blogs, online

games, BBS and Chatrooms all conform to the boundaries set by the CCP in order to

remain in the market. In the case of voluntary and autonomous association this is still

largely dictated by the CCP. For example there are no trade unions that are

independent from the government. The corporatist model better explains the CCP’s

attempts to manage informational flows. Unger and Chan (1995, p. 32)write that

“harmony is the catchword of a corporatist system, regardless of whether this

harmony is truly consensual or imposed from above. And it is very often a goal-

oriented harmony, orchestrated to serve a national mission”. Hu Jintao’s concept of

‘social harmony’ echoes Unger and Chan’s sentiments, and the formation of NGOs

and their function in Chinese society as defined by the CCP is to support ‘social

harmony’.

The qualification that Ma (2005) makes in her argument about the formation of civil

associations and NGOs as consistent with both civil society and corporatist lines

enables her to account for CCP management and power relationships as well as the

emerging influence and role that these groups play in Chinese society. Ma (2005, p.

137)writes that:

The experience of Chinese associations indicates that the state has generated mechanisms for adopting profound economic and social structural changes in corporatist relations the state stills holds control. At the same time, associations, bottom-up ones in particular, are raising their voices in the implementation and even making of policy; there are clear indications that civil society is evolving.

Ma’s fusing of civil society and corporatism is similar to Innis’s notions of centre

margin relationships and the negotiation of a monopoly of knowledge and the


management of time and space. Ma argues that this approach provides a better

explanation of the ways in which the CCP has sought to manage and contain NGOs

from the top down while at the same time explains the impact and formation of NGOs

from the ground up.

Small Government Big SocietyThe government encouraged the formation of NGOs and Non Profit Organisations

(NPO) in reaction to some of the consequences of the Open Door Policy and reforms

that were begun in 1978 under the slogan ‘Small Government Big Society’. Some of

the reasons behind the promotion of NGOs has been to help fill the gap that was left

in welfare services after the iron rice bowl16 was rolled back, and to help with

response to disaster relief. NGOs have also been useful to the government in the

development of the economy. Ma (2005, p. 47) says that “the government believes

that the resources, development program and services brought in or provided by the

non-governmental sector domestic or international will help the CCP restore its

legitimacy.” At the same time the CCP had sought to manage NGOs through

registration and regulation under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Another role of NGOs

in China is to act as a conduit for discontent and directing complaints through official

channels. In the case of environmental groups their function has been to steer victims

of pollution through the courts, rather than riot in the streets.

Twenty years after the launch of the Open Door Policy, China sought to develop a

legal structure to deal with Social Organisations (SO) and in 1998 the first regulations

aimed at this sector were introduced (Ma, 2005, p. 76). Ma (2005, p. 77)argues that

“the current state of Chinese NGOs is shaped by the present political culture, the

party-states continuing intervention in the private sector, and the mixed influences of

Western ideas and traditional Chinese thoughts”. The official CCP NGO policy is one

of “nourishment, development, supervision, regulation (peiyu, fazhan, jiandu, guanli,

培育,发展,监督,管理) (2005, p. 69).

16 The iron rice bowl 铁饭碗 tiě fàn wǎn refers to the work unit system of lifetime employment that guaranteed housing and other benefits through employment in Sate Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The reforming of the economy has effectively ended this system.


An example of how the government limits civic participation by NGOs was the

closure of the online journal China Development Brief and the civil society journal

Minjian in November 2007. Minjian was published under the sponsorship of the

social and citizenship development research center of Zhongshan University in

Guangzhou. Minjian’s publication license was withdrawn by the news publishing

bureau by the municipal government of Guangzhou in July ("China Raids Blogger's

Home, as Political Arrests Double," 2007).

The closures highlighted the precarious legal position that the publications of NGOs

are in. The journals had been operating without a publishing license (kanhao 刊号),

and this was the legal justification for the closure. However, thousands of NGOs run

publications without licenses. “In China all licenses for publishing are held by

sponsoring institutions, or zhuguan danwei ( 主管单位 ), that are responsible for

ensuring party propaganda discipline at publications under their watch” (Bandurski,

2007b, n.p.). Zhai Minglei the editor of Minjina stated;

all of the internal organizational publications and materials of NGOs in China are illegal publications . . . [a]nd so it is with all of those small booklets we circulate among friends and acquaintances in China as a form of interaction or to seek the appreciation of friends, or those various poetry collections we call people’s publications ( 民刊 ), all reading materials shared among colleagues. All they need is to be printed and they are illegal publications (Bandurski, 2007b, n.p.)

Zhai turned to his blog after the magazine was closed, his home was raided by the

police and his hard drive confiscated.

In another incident in November 2007 a website aimed at providing information and

contact for those with Hepatitis B was closed after six years of operation without any

meddling from the government ("China Raids Blogger's Home, as Political Arrests

Double," 2007). The website was owned by an NGO and the closure followed the

reclassification of the site as a healthcare service provider. The sites forums were

removed after recommendations were made by the Ministry of Health("China Raids


Blogger's Home, as Political Arrests Double," 2007). Again, this illustrates the ability

of the government to silence critics when they have a will to do so.

NGOs Environmental GroupsThe state of China’s environment is one of the most serious problems facing the

country today and the CCP has widely promoted the Beijing Olympics as the Green

Olympics. In 2006 Zhu Guangyao, Deputy Chief of the State Environmental

Protection Agency, put the cost of environmental damage at USD $200 billion, 10%

of the country’s Gross Domestic Product ("Pollution costs equal 10% of China's

GDP," 2006). The environment was also identified as a problem by Hu Jintao (2007a)

in his report at the Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist

Party of China on October 15, 2007. The damage to China’s environment is now seen

as a serious threat to economic growth as well as a consequence of that growth and

development. In 1998 the government launched the ‘Three Green Project’ to develop

what it called a green market to promote green consumption ("Environmental NGOs

Encouraging Green Actions ", 2007). Pan Yue, Vice Minister of the State

Environmental Protection Administration, stated that, “the ultimate force to solve

China’s environmental problems lies in the public, or in another word, every ordinary

people [sic]. Chinese people are approaching the absolute green consumption step by

step,” in an article that promoted the use of NGOs in solving China’s environmental

crisis ("Environmental NGOs Encouraging Green Actions ", 2007).

A large number of NGOs have formed around the environment, and in June 2007 the

All-China Environment Federation claimed that there were 2,770 environmental

NGOs (T. Zhang, 2007). Despite the official numbers of NGOs most are

underdeveloped and many more remain unregistered. Given this I will briefly outline

the ways in which the largest and most influential environmental NGOs are promoted

and managed by the government.

The oldest and most influential environmental organization is Friends of Nature

(FoN) which was the first NGO to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1994.

Global Village Beijing (GVB) is another influential environmental group, and both

are located in Beijing. Both of these groups run education programs, and are active in


developing smaller NGOs throughout the country. The leaders of FoN and GVB,

Liang Congjie and Liao Xiaoyi respectively, were both appointed to the Beijing

Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG).

In 2005 the All China Environment Federation was established and promoted by the

government. At the opening ceremony for the Federation, the Vice Premier,

Zeng Peiyan, said that he “encouraged the federation to further study the major

ecological problems and offer better consultation to government decision-

makers”("New NGO founded to rally all Chinese people against worsening

pollution," 2005). In October 2006 China’s environmental NGOs were called upon

by Zhu Guangyao, the deputy head of the State Environmental Protection Agency, “to

play a bigger role in promoting supervising environment protection” ("Chinese

Environmental NGOs Called on to Play a Bigger Role ", 2006) Zhu (2006) stated that:

Environmental protection has become a major task of China’s modernization. Environmental capacity has become a major consideration in planning development projects. Environmental administration has become a major means to adjust economic structure. Environmental standard has become a major condition for market access. Environmental cost has become a major factor in the price formulation mechanism. The new circumstances have given non-governmental organizations (NGOs) more opportunities to advise the government on environmental affairs, protect the environmental rights and interests of the public, mobilize the public to participate in environmental protection and promote international exchanges and cooperation in this field.

Though there have been incidents when these groups have challenged the

government, the relationship these NGOs share with the CCP is evident and the

promotion of these groups and official sanctioning of their positions is a way of

channelling their influence and limiting or confining their activities. In doing so the

government has by default effectively managed their communication strategies as

well as confining and shaping environmental discourse. In addition to this the

registration process also acts as a filter because it is costly and time consuming,

however to avoid bureaucratic red tape and rigorous selection procedures many NGOs

turn to industrial and commercial administrative bureaus for registration because the

process is easier and quicker (Xin, 2005).


Green Riots an Unofficial Discourse

The promotion of NGOs by the government in the media is generally of the good

news story variety. For instance the State Environmental Protection Administration

(SEPA) website mainly covers good news stories relating to China’s environment.

The CCP plans to showcase their ability to clean up the environment as a part of the

2008 Olympics. In July 2007 the SEPA launched a two-month campaign to clean up

the country’s rivers and recovered 725 million yuan (USD$146 million) in fines from

polluting businesses ("China targets 750 firms in war on pollution ", 2007). This lies

in stark contrast to the number of environmental riots and protests that are reported in

the international press. When these stories do appear in the Chinese media they are

often reported very differently.

A number of small-scale rural protests are common and unless they are large they do

not make it into the national or international press. A report in the New York Times in

2005 put the number of protests at 74,000 incidents, up from about 10,000 a decade

earlier (French, 2005). Environment-related riots, protests and disputes in China

increased by 30% in 2006 to more than 50 000 ("Increase in environmental protests

causes instability in China," 2006). As with many stories in the international press

about China they are often initially generated from the Chinese media. Local press

may cover an event and then it gets picked up by the international media, these stories

are then rearticulated and re-circulated for a wider audience. This was also the case

with the Nandan mine disasters in 2001 and the Jiangxi school explosion where the

stories were first released by local press and then picked up by foreign media. The

Western press often cast these stories as a David and Goliath clash, whereas the

Chinese media will often cast rioters having been stirred up by a small group of

troublemakers. An example of this occurred in April 2005 when it was estimated that

thousands18 of residents of Huaxi a town in Dongyang, a city south of Hangzhou,

rioted against police over pollution from chemical plants in a nearby industrial park.

The residents of Huaxi and nearby Huankantao had been complaining about the

pollution and how it affected their health and the productivity of their farms for four

years prior to the riots. The residents made petitions to the SEPA and had sent

delegations to the Zhejiang Provincial Headquarters in Hangzhou and to Beijing prior

18 The reports on the number of rioters vary from 20,000 to 60,000.


to the riot (Cody, 2005). The local paper Dongyang Daily blamed local agitators for

the riot (Yardley, 2005). By way of contrast the New York Times cast the protesters

as victims of pollution and official corruption (Yardley, 2005).

The Phoenix Weekly, which is available on the Internet, is a subsidiary of Phoenix TV

in Hong Kong is legally received by ordinary Mainlanders with access to cable or

satellite television, ran extensive coverage of the incident which has since been

translated by Roland Soong of the EastSouthWestNorth Blog. According to the

translation by Soong the Phoenix Weekly noted conflicting stories in the Mainland

media that also conflicted with the stories that their journalists were picking up on the

ground at the riots. Phoenix Weekly ("The Long Story About Huaxi/Huankantou,"

2005)stated:

Although the mainland media were instructed not to report on the matter, the incident was rapidly disseminated in Zhejiang. The people called it a peasant rebellion, the Hong Kong media called it a "large-scale riot" but the local government said that "the removal of illegal structures in Dongyang city was obstructed" because "the desire of the citizens for environmental protection was used by a small minority of individuals with ulterior motives..

Soong also claims that much of the coverage of the incident by foreign journalists

came from Chinese media reports and Internet sources. This is due to the fact that

journalists would not have been able to gain access to the area; in fact one foreign

corespondent was briefly detained. Access to Dongyang was blocked and check

points were set up at all of the major entrances to the town, making it even more

difficult to report on the riots. This tactic was also used in the Jiangxi school

explosion. The residents of Huaxi responded in the same way that the parents did at

Jinagxi, they turned to the Internet as a means of revealing the story to a wider

audience. According to Roland Soong news of the event “was rapidly transmitted

from the local chat rooms, but the local government immediately blocked the chat

rooms and other channels. The local media were also ordered not to report on this

case. Yet, foreign media and Hong Kong newspapers were able to report on this

incident through the chat room information sources” ("The Long Story About

Huaxi/Huankantou," 2005). The riots began on the night of the 10th of April and were

discussed in Internet forums up until the 13th of April when this source of information


and discussion was shut down and posts deleted19. Despite this, Western news reports

claimed victory for the people of Huaxi/Huankantou as six of the thirteen factories

were ordered to shutdown following the protests and nine residents were arrested

(Cody, 2005; Ramirez, 2006).

In October 2005, six members of Green Watch were arrested by the Public Security

Bureau in Hangzhou. Green Watch is an environmental group that formed after

members monitored the riots in Huaxi. According to Human Rights in China one of

the members of “Green Watch Lai Jinbiao, was placed under criminal detention from

April 12 until May 11 on the charge of ‘illegally providing intelligence overseas’”

("Environmental Activists Detained in Hangzhou ", 2005). It can be confidently

hypothisiesd that Lai was talking to foreign journalists who had converged on the area

to cover the story due to China’s hardline practices.

In 2007 I searched the Internet again for information on the riots and what had

happened in the town of Huaxi and I did not find much information. What remains on

the Internet that is accessible outside of China are stories of the riots in 2005.

Searches on official websites such as the China Daily, Xinhua, and the Peoples Daily

are good news stories about the prosperity of the town and how it is one of the

wealthiest in China.

In terms of the management of time as official discourse or history, the CCP deletes

and blocks stories from the Internet that do not concur with their own view of the

event. This is a theme that has runs throughout many of the case studies in this thesis,

in that an event occurs, and traditional informational flows are circumvented and new

flows are created through the Internet. Information of these events is managed

according to CCP needs, so stories are either eliminated or rewritten and absorbed and

used in the CCP’s efforts at image building. Events that are seen as a challenge to the

authority of the CCP are contained and are systematically removed from Chinese

cyberspace, as in the Jiangxi school explosion and the Huaxi/Huankantao riots. At

other times stories have been absorbed by the CCP and used to push a line that the

19 Roland Soong translated a number of posts from Chinese Internet forum comments (via Boxun). He cites this as an “example of citizen reporters taking over when the mainstream media are missing in action” ("Citizen Reporters On The Huankantou/Huaxi Incident," 2005). See Appendix VI.


party wants. This technique was employed in the Black Kiln case in Chapter seven.

The result is that China has, to some extent, built a separate Internet. It is separate in

what it carries as history or as journalistic accounts of an event with material that is

different in focus and content from the broader World Wide Web. An example of this

blatant absence of history is that accounts of 1989 Tiananmen Square incident that are

absent from the Chinese Internet.

The CCP has responded quickly to the changes in informational flows as a

consequence of the Internet. This adaptation to a changing environment is consistent

with Diebert’s extension of the ideas of Innis in Diebert’s use of Darwin’s theories of

evolution applied to changes in communications technology and his application of

medium theory. Diebert (1997, p. 30) argues that “a change in the mode of

communication (environment) will ‘favour’ certain social forces and ideas (species)

by means of functional bias towards some and not others, just as natural environment

determines which species prosper by selecting for certain physical characteristics”. By

social forces Diebert (1997, p. 32) means “actual social groups, actors, and various

forms of social organisation or normative or goal driven social behaviour”. My aim

here is to extend this and to argue that survival of a species in an evolutionary sense is

about the adaptation of a species to a changing environment. Just as some species are

able to adapt and change, some social groups are able to adapt and change. It is not so

much the environment that chooses which species or ideas survive and flourish, but

rather the way in which a species or a group, in the case of communications

environments, adapt to those changes. In the case of China as elsewhere the

government has adapted to the changing communications environment. The CCP has

been actively involved in shaping that environment through the strategies that they

employ to manage the Internet, which includes the management of code as a means of

censorship, the legal framework and the development of content. In the end the

Internet is a tool that both facilitates change and can be shaped and modified by those

who use it. It is because of this that it is more important to look at what people do

with the technology rather than the technology itself.

The management of the Huaxi/Huankantao riots also highlights the negotiation of

centre/margin relationships between Beijing at the centre and officials in Zhejiang

province at the margins, as well as centre margin relationships in Zheijiang between


Hangzhou, the provincial capital, and the Dongyang officials at the margins.

Goodman and Segal argue that this negotiation of regionalism is a consequence of the

Open Door policy. Goodman (1994, p. 13) argues that “the centre lays down the

broad outline of a policy, with the provinces adopting specific local measures for

implementation.” What the Internet did in the case of the Huaxi/Huankantao riots was

to provide a window for the central government to more closely observe what is going

on at the margins, thus reinforcing the authority of the centre. Traditional modes of

communication allowed provincial officials to cover up or paint a picture of what

Beijing ‘at the centre’ wanted. For example, the famine that was a consequence of the

Great Leap Forward in the 1950’s is largely seen as a result of poor central planning

and the policies of the campaign. Food shortages were exacerbated by the boastful

claims about grain output that was exaggerated at every level of government to paint a

picture of success for the central government20 . This has also contributed to the

perception that official figures in China are notoriously unreliable.

As previously mentioned the environment has been identified by the government as

one of the most serious issues facing the stability of the country. In response to this

impending crisis there have been experiments with new forms of public participation

so as to avoid riots like that in Huaxi/ Huankantao. The Xiamen PX (paraxylene)

plant in Fujian is a good example of this, and is being hailed as a win for people

power in the PRC21. In 2007 construction began on the plant, and by May residents of

the area were complaining that it was already giving off an industrial odour. A mass

protest was organised via SMS (Short Message Service) text messages via mobile

phones (see figure 3). News of the event spread across the Internet via social websites

such as Twitter, Flickr space, and it also emerged as an issue on blogs and other

forums. Zoula, also known as the first citizen reporter, descended on Xiamen to cover

the story on his blog and website22. As is often the case, as the story grew the local

press stopped covering the story, however coverage of the story was allowed to

continue nationally. A columnist for the Southern Weekend, Lian Yue, wrote at length

20

For more detail on the causes of the famine see Wei Li, and Dennis Yang Tao (Wei Li & Tao, 2005).

21 For more background on the development see Roland Soong’s Blog EastSouthWestNorth http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20070601_1.htm22 Zoula’s Blog is covered in Chapter 8.


about the issue on his blog. He also suggested that Xiamen residents start websites

("SMS Texts Energize a Chinese Protest ", 2007).

Figure 3: The following translation comes from the China.org website run by the State

Council. “The Taiwan-funded Xianglu Group has begun building a PX plant. It’s like

an atomic bomb in Xiamen.

("SMS Texts Energize a Chinese Protest ", 2007)

Many people will suffer leukaemia and more babies will be born with congenital defects." A paraxylene project should be at least 100 kilometres from a major urban settlement, but we are only 16 km from the project. For the sake of our future generations, please forward the message to all your friends” ("People vs. chemical plant ", 2008). The end of the message calls for people to protest on the streets on the 1st of June.

An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 people took to the streets on the 1st of June to protest

against the plant. The Xiamen press followed the familiar pattern of blaming an

individual or a small group of agitators for the unrest. In an editorial published in the

Xiamen Daily it stated “that both the government and concerned citizens had

Xiamen’s best interest at heart, but that one individual, the SMS writer named

XiamenWave22, was “misleading the public and provoking hostility between the

government and the masses”("SMS Texts Energize a Chinese Protest ", 2007).

In an unusual twist the project was stalled by the government, on June 7, a week after

the street marches, when the government put a hold on the project pending an

environmental assessment and public consultation. This is unprecedented and

represents a form of experimentation with public participation. On December 27 there

was an announcement that the project would be moved and that the provincial

government would compensate the plant’s owners.


The new forms of experimentation with public participation follow from the 17th

Party Congress where Hu Jintao called for the expansion of socialist democracy. Hu

(2007b, n.p.) argued China needed to:

Expand socialist democracy and better safeguard the people’s rights and interests as well as social equity and justice. Citizens’ participation in political affairs will expand in an orderly way. The rule of law will be carried out more thoroughly as a fundamental principle, public awareness of law will be further enhanced, and fresh progress will be made in government administration based on the rule of law. Primary-level democracy will be improved. The government will markedly enhance its capability of providing basic public services

The way in which the protests over the Xiamen PX plant were played out in the media

is a visualisation of public opinion, and of how centre/margin relationships are

negotiated on the Internet. These groups do not necessarily speak to one another

directly; they do this via the media. In this instance the CCP allowed the expression of

public opinion to drive the outcome of the project. If they wanted the plant to go

ahead and silence the protesters they would have done, just like they did in Huaxi. If

the authorities want to close down Chatrooms and BBS they can, if they want to wipe

blogs and stop people posting they can. They can do this because technologically this

can and is being done. If the CCP choose to do this it is probably because they are

showing an emerging understanding that ‘spin’ type management usually has more

positive and fewer negative consequences.

HIV/AIDSThe unreliability of official figures in China on the number of HIV/AIDS sufferers

makes it difficult to get an accurate picture of the extent of the problem. The first

case was reported in 1985 and the disease has spread rapidly since that time. In 2005 a

joint study by the Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization and United

Nations AIDS (UNAIDS) put the number of people living with the virus at 650,000,

75,000 of whom had developed full blown AIDS (Z. Wang, 2007). In 2006 the

number of cases was reported the number of infections as 183,733 and it was said this

was up 30% on the previous year. In another report in 2007 the number of people

infected with the virus was put at 214,300 with 56,758 having full blown AIDS (H.

Wang, 2007). “An official report released just prior to World AIDS Day on December


1 2007 said that “China officially reported 223,501 HIV contracted cases, including

62,838 AIDS patients, by October 2007 while about 700,000 people are estimated to

be living with HIV/AIDS” ("Premier Wen revisits AIDS-suffering villages ", 2007).

In the news reports that I researched for this chapter there also seemed to be a time lag

in the way in which figures were reported. For instance, several of the official CCP

news stories from 2007 used figures from 2005. Despite the inaccuracies in the

figures the CCP has encouraged the development of NGOs to address the epidemic23.

The rhetoric from the CCP on the fight against HIV/AIDS is as contradictory as the

management of the environment and the Internet. On the one hand there is the

promotion of the development of NGOs to assist the government in tackling the

epidemic and at the same time the government has attempted to silence other groups.

The aim is to manage debate within the confines of an official version of the outbreak

of HIV/AIDS and its management. The official version is acknowledgement of the

problem to some degree, and through the use of the media is trying to convey that it is

being addressed and well managed by the government. In part the management of the

official version of the epidemic is via the management of NGOs, in much the same as

it is done with environmental groups. That is, NGOs are bounded by regulation and

the need for government support in order to exist and this in turn affects the way in

which NGOs operate.

As in the case of environmental NGOs there are hundreds of groups and very few of

them are recognized by the government; consequently few are funded by the

government. For example in 2007 the Central Government announced an alliance of

HIV/AIDS NGOs to assist in the fight against the disease. The NGOs, the Chinese

Association of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS Prevention and Control, will

oversee the alliance as well as integrate and coordinate the participation of Chinese

and international NGOs ("NGO Alliance to Step Up Fight Against HIV/AIDS ",

2007). This is similar to the integration of Environmental groups, and centralizes the

management of NGOs.

23 Avert.org provides good background on the different phases of the epidemic from the first case to current policies.


In the run up to world AIDS day in 2007 there was the launch of a new campaign to

combat the spread of the virus and to curb the prejudice aimed at those who suffer

with the disease. The campaign included a series of television commercials featuring

Jackie Chan. The Premier, Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao both made public appearances

to promote AIDS awareness and this is consistent with western PR practices ie, the

photo opportunity. Premier Wen has been making the photo opportunity pilgrimage to

Henan province since 2003. During these visits the Premier visits orphanages and

reiterates the central government’s position and policy which is the provision of free

medicine and doctor’s consultations to people infected with the virus, and free

education for children orphaned by AIDS. Hu Jintao also visited communities and

doctors in northern Beijing as part of World AIDS Day. Both Hu and Wen were using

these visits to promote awareness about the virus and to address the prejudice against

those with the virus ("Premier Wen revisits AIDS-suffering villages ", 2007). These

visits are tightly controlled by both central and provincial authorities who hold their

own ‘shows’: one for the world, one for the central government and one for the

people.

As is often the case there is a gap between central policy and regional

implementation. According to the Washington Post provincial hospitals fail to run the

correct tests to reveal the virus or they purposely misdiagnose the virus in order to

cover up the extent of the problem, and this has been exacerbated by corruption (Fan,

2007). Regional differences are also reflected in the different modes of transmission

of the virus. This is due in part to regional economic conditions and issues that have

arisen out of the open market economy. For instance, in central China the main mode

of infection has been through the collection and transfusion of blood products. In

coastal cities it has been through prostitution, and in western China it is through

prostitution and intravenous drug use (Ma, 2005, p. 133). Nationally, though, in 2005

unsafe sex was cited as the main mode of transmission ("Report: unsafe sex major

cause of HIV infection," 2007). The number of reported cases vary in from region to

region and this is reflected in the diverse attitudes to the management and prevention

of the disease in different provinces (Bezlova, 2005).

One of the most tragic cases of mismanagement and corruption involved the

medically acquired infection of thousands of rural peasants in Henan. In the 1990’s


officials in Henan, one of the poorest provinces encouraged peasants to supplement

their income through the sale of their blood. At the time there was no screening for

disease and blood was often collected in unhygienic conditions which led to the rapid

spread of the virus. In some cases this was exacerbated by attempts to prevent

anaemia through the practice of injecting regular donors with unscreened red cells

extracted from the valuable plasma ("China: House Arrests Stifle HIV/AIDS

Petitions," 2006). In 2001 the scandal broke nationally and the central government

responded by ordering the collection clinics to be phased out and the screening and

regulation of blood products be tightened. However, the practice continued and there

are still occasional reports about illegal blood clinics. In June 2007 a new campaign

was launched in central China to crackdown on the practice ("New Campaign to Curb

Illegal Blood Collection," 2007).

It is not clear how many people were infected as a result of this practice, however

official figures put the number at 35,232 reported HIV carriers, including 21,828 with

AIDS at the end of 2006 ("China: House Arrests Stifle HIV/AIDS Petitions," 2006;

Illegal Blood Trade Main Cause of AIDS in Henan," 2007). The effect has been

devastating and in some instances has wiped out entire villages and left thousands of

children orphaned and abandoned by their extended families and the broader

community ("China: House Arrests Stifle HIV/AIDS Petitions," 2006). The situation

in Henan is comparable to the hardest hit communities in Africa and it is the worst

affected area in Asia (Beyrer & Csete 2003).

The mismanagement and corruption of blood collection practices is not confined to

Henan and the pattern of neglect of AIDS victims and the denial of the problem is

reflected in other parts of the country. The epidemic is not seen as a national tragedy

but an economic problem and a major source of embarrassment for the government.

Both cases highlight the negotiation of spatial relationships between Beijing at the

centre and provincial governments at the margins. Chris Beyrer and Joanne Csete

(2003) argue that “China’s stalled responses to the outbreak, and its treatment of those

few courageous citizens who have exposed it, reflect the state of civil society, rule of

law, rights of citizens, and emerging center-periphery dynamics of the new China.”

Government officials in Henan were actively involved in trying to cover up the

tragedy, and this is a feature of many of the case studies of this thesis including the


Jiangxi school explosion, the mine disasters, and the SARS outbreak. There were also

reports that courts in Henan had refused to hear compensation cases of those infected.

Human Rights Watch said that the “Health Minister Gao Qiang was quoted in the

international press as saying that the courts should admit those cases and make fair

judgments”("China: House Arrests Stifle HIV/AIDS Petitions," 2006). In another

incident in 2006 the New York based Human Rights Watch claimed that numerous

sufferers of HIV/AIDS in Henan were placed under house arrest to stop them from

petitioning the National People’s Congress to prevent them from seeking redress from

the government after being infected by tainted blood products. Corruption also

became a feature of centre/margin relationships when local officials were arrested and

others sacked for the theft of aid from the central government and private donors in

2006.

The Henan provincial government have also gone to great lengths to contain the

activities of high profile activists. Dr Gao, an internationally acclaimed

gynaecologist, first brought the scandal of Henan to light after her lengthy

investigation into the number of people presenting to her with the symptoms of the

virus. Dr Gao used her own funds to treat people with the virus and has often been

threatened and harassed for her work with victims of the virus. Her attempts to

uncover the extent of the crisis were thwarted by local officials who told her to stop

what she was doing. Furthermore she was prevented from visiting villages. The

campaign against her was stepped up when her children lost their jobs. When Dr Gao

tried to take her findings to Beijing she was detained by authorities in Henan. Dr Gao

was awarded Model Citizen by the Ministry of Education in Beijing in 1999 and was

prevented from being able to pick up the award by Henan authorities. In August 2002

she was interviewed by China Newsweekly about her work, which was reprinted in

other publications. Following the publication of the interview, Henan Provincial

officials ordered her not to talk with journalists ever again (Gao, 2001, My "AIDS

Prevention Journey). Her story and her findings were eventually taken up by the

international media when a Beijing based journalist for the New York Times covered

her story and that of the victims of Henan (Beyrer & Csete 2003).

Dr Gao was awarded the Jonathan Mann Award for Health and Human Rights from

the Global Health Council in 2001, and the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public


Service in 2003, but was denied the right to travel to receive her awards. China

Central Television designated her one of the “Ten People Who Touched China in

2003”. There has been outcry from the international community over Dr Gao’s

treatment and she was given permission to travel to the United States of America to

receive an honor bestowed upon her by the Vital Voices Global Partnership, a

nonprofit organization in 2007. Initially she was denied permission to travel but this

was later revoked. As Beyrer and Csete point out, it appears that under international

pressure Beijing ordered the Henan government to “ease its threats and harassment.

When asked why the Chinese communist government did not want her to travel to the

United States to receive awards, she answered, “They’re afraid that I will expose the

fact that (illegal) blood selling is the main reason for the AIDS epidemic in China” (C.

Sun & Tian, 2007).

In a situation that seems to have changed track Peter Piot, Director of UNAIDS,

visited China in July 2007 to meet with Dr Gao in Henan and visit families affected

by the virus. Dr Gao was also visited by Henan officials as part of a photo story for

local papers during Chinese New Year celebrations, even though she was under house

arrest and was being prevented from travelling overseas (Yardley, 2007). Dr Gao and

her story have been absorbed into the central government’s version of the AIDS

epidemic, and their attempts to use her for their own propaganda confirm this. In July

2007 the government admitted that illegal and unhygienic blood collection practices

in Henan are the main cause of HIV/AIDS in the province. However, they still cite

other reasons such as unprotected sex with foreigners and prostitution in other

provinces ("Illegal Blood Trade Main Cause of AIDS in Henan," 2007).

There are definite tensions being played out here between Beijing at the centre and

Henan at the margins, but the extent to which Beijing is in control or has a clear line

on Dr Gao is unclear. Despite the apparent back down, Dr Gao is still effectively

under house arrest but has been allowed to maintain a blog that was still accessible as

of November 2007. The blog could easily be shut down if Beijing wanted it that way,

all of which suggests that there seems to be a lack of consensus about how to deal

with Gao and what she represents. Dr Gao’s treatment by Henan officials also

confirms this.


Other prominent HIV/AIDS activists such as Hu Jia, Zeng Jinyan and Wan Yanhai

have been treated in a similar way. Wan, the founder of the grass roots organisation

AiZhi (ai爱 as in love, and Zhi 知 as in knowledge), was arrested in August 2002 for

posting “illegally acquired interior classified documents of relevant state departments

to overseas individuals, media sources” on a website ("Anti-AIDS Leader Freed,"

2002). Wan was released after confessing his crimes and after intense international

pressure (Beyrer & Csete 2003; Ma, 2005). In an interview following his release Wan

said that “AIDS became an ideological weapon to attack Western culture. The media

didn’t talk much about AIDS in the 1980s—at least not AIDS in China. There was no

limit to talking about AIDS internationally, but the media kept silent on AIDS

domestically” (Rosenberg, 2006, n.p.) .

In one of China’s most famous cases Zeng Jinyan and her husband Hu Jia

environmental and AIDS activists, were detained by Chinese authorities in Beijing

and spent 214 days under house arrest between August 2006 and March 2007 without

any legal proceedings. Hu had been posting information on his website and blog about

dissident and peasant protests. Zeng told their story in a blog that detailed their

surveillance by secret police and her husband’s disappearance. Naturally her blog was

blocked but she continued to blog via email to a blog site outside of China. This

occurred despite her Internet connection being regularly cut (Bristow, 2007). The

couple won the Sarkhavrov Prize, a human rights workers award from the European

Parliament in September 2007. In the same year Time also named Zeng one of the

world’s 100 most influential people. The couple have also turned their detention and

surveillance into a documentary called Prisoners of Freedom City, and when they

attempted to leave China in May 2007 to show the film overseas they were detained

and placed under house arrest once again. The documentary is available on Youtube

outside of China.

On December 27, 2007 Hu Jia was arrested and Zeng and their two month old baby

were placed under house arrest. The only visitors she is allowed are their parents.

Hu’s lawyers have been prevented from seeing him because his case is said to involve

‘state secrets’. Threats have also been made to take the baby away in between feeds,

and friends and supporters of the couple have been prevented from delivering baby


formula to Zeng; some friends have been taken in for questioning according to Radio

Free Asia (Mudie & Chen, 2008). Bloggers have come out in support of Hu and

Zeng and there is an online petition calling for his immediate release. It is quite

feasible that Hu and references to him can be cleaned from the Internet using

technological means. In the Western media Hu’s arrest was tied to a pre-Olympics

crackdown on dissident activities. Radio Free Asia also reported that Dr Gao’s family

has been threatened and harassed; email has been blocked and her phone has been

tapped (Mudie & Chen, 2008).

All three cases and the way they played out in the international media and the Internet

are also a visualisation of the negotiation of centre/margin relationships between

Beijing and the international community. These cases also highlight the tensions in

those relationships and the contradictory nature of the way in which the Internet and

its impact on the management of information can be viewed. A case can be made for

either an emerging democracy or for further authoritarian oppression, as is evident in

the reporting of these incidents. The gaps and the contradictions that are evident in

some of the case studies also allude to differences in the party at different levels.

Conclusion

NGOs represent an official voice as they have been sanctioned by the CCP, they are

regulated and registered. Then there is the unofficial, this includes individuals who

post videos of China’s pollution on YouTube for the world to see and riots that are

reported in the international press. The rioters and the YouTube posters are often there

in response to an event or a crisis as was evident in the mine disasters, the SARS

outbreak, the Jiangxi school explosion, and the Brick Kiln incident. They become

events in a broader sense when they hit the Internet and then become staged events

when the government begins to mount their response. Even a riot, though

spontaneous, is a constructed event, albeit a chaotic one. A riot is still a form of

protest. In addition, the way that local officials handle these things has come under

increasing scrutiny from the central government in Beijing and the Huaxi/Huankantao

riots bear this out. The management and harassment of HIV/AIDS activists has been

played out on the international stage through the Internet to some extent, because to

some degree international relations are played out in the media through press

statements, interviews and events. In the end though what all of these case studies


reveal is that in order to understand the effect of the medium you must look at the

context in which people are using it and how authorities manage that use. The ways in

which authorities manage information flows needs further contextualization in

relation to the issues that a country faces such as environmental degradation, and the

AIDS epidemic, and the image China wishes to present to the world at the Olympics

in 2008. In addition, the increasing pressure from the international community over

issues such as Beijing’s involvement in Dafur and the handling of the situation in

Tibet is also having an impact on the way in which information is managed in China.


C h a p t e r 6

Hacking: Circumnavigating the Great Firewall Hacking is circumnavigating the great firewall or any firewall for that matter. It is a

direct challenge to any information management strategies that the CCP use to contain

the consequences of the development of the Internet. The most spectacular hack

attacks were carried out by Falun Gong in 2002 when sect members hacked into

satellite and cable networks to broadcast messages in support of the sect. There have

also been claims of officially sanctioned hack attacks against the sect’s websites in the

USA, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia24. In 2001 there was a spate of tit

for tat attacks between the USA and China following the spy plane incident. This

chapter will focus on the kinds of hack attacks that have been reported in both the

Western and Chinese press and the strategies employed by the PRC to deal with

hacking.

Reports on hacking fall into two kinds of stories, those that suggest the hacking has

been officially sanctioned or hacking that is unofficial. There were suggestions during

the hack attacks associated with the spy plane incident that they were officially

sanctioned. The hack attacks carried out by Falun Gong were beyond the control of

the government and therefore unofficial. The strategies employed by the CCP to

manage the flow of information in regards to hacking are regulation, surveillance

using the code that is used to build the Internet, the promotion of self surveillance,

and content development. In order to do examine those strategies I will look at some

of the hack attacks on China, and some that were generated within the PRC and how

they have been reported by both the western and Chinese media. More specifically

this chapter will focus on how the relationship between nationalism and hacking and

how this is played out in news stories. Hacking in this context represents another

forum in which centre/margin relationships between the PRC and other countries and

are visualised through media reports of these incidents. This is because hacking

constitutes a virtual form of interaction between the CCP as the central authority of

the PRC and other groups such as democracy dissidents and nations. This chapter also

24 For more details see Michael Chase & James Mulvenon’s (2002) book You’ve Got Dissent! Chinese Dissidents Use of the Internet and Beijing’s Counter-Strategies


looks at the way that time as an official dialogue is managed in response to hacking.

In addition to this I will look at democracy dissidents outside of China and their use of

hacking.

Hacking usually refers to someone who tries to disrupt or gain unauthorised access to

a computer system. Patrice Riemens (2002, n.p.) says that:

Hackers, also often, but inexactly referred to as "computer pirates" or other derogatory term, constitute without doubt the first social movement that was intrinsic to the electronic technology that spawned our networked society. Hackers, both through their savyness and their actions, have hit the imagination and have been in the news right from the onset of the "information age," being either hyped up as bearers of an independent and autonomous technological mastery, or demonized as potential "cyber-terrorists" in the process. More recently they have been hailed in certain "alternative" intellectual and cultural circles as a countervailing power of sorts against the increasingly oppressive onslaught of both monopolistic ICT corporations and regulation-obsessed governments and their experts. Transformed into role-models as effective resistance fighters against "the system," their garb has been assumed with various degrees of (de)merit by a plethora of cultural and political activists associated, closely or loosely, with the "counter-globalization movement.

Though this definition is aimed at western notions of hacking and hacking culture it is

still useful as a starting point to discuss the kinds of activities that characterize the

incidents that are covered in this chapter. This kind of definition is also significant

because it encompasses one of the themes of this thesis, which is the mythology of the

democratising prospects of the Internet. What the above definition fails to take into

account more generally though is the kinds of official and officially sanctioned

hacking and crime based hacking the goes on internationally.

Regardless of the intention of a hacker, whether they are hacking for political reasons

or ‘criminal’ reasons, many of the methods remain the same. These activities include

the use of junk email to flood and disrupt websites, the writing of viruses to disrupt a

network, or the changing of content on a website. So, it is within this context that it

becomes important to look at who is hacking for whom, in much the same way that

Lessig (2006, p. 6) argues we must look at who the code writers are and who they

work for. Before looking at that aspect in more detail, I will first outline the legal


framework that is used to manage hacking as one of the strategies for managing the

Internet.

Legal FrameworkThe first laws that were directly aimed at the prevention of hacking were endorsed at

the 19th session of the Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee

in December 2000. The resolution made it illegal for the following activities ("First

Net Security Law Endorsed ", 2000):

-- To enter networks concerned with national security;

-- To create and spread computer viruses and to interrupt computer networks or communication services;

-- To spread rumours and slanders or publicize harmful information on Internet;

-- To steal or disclose state secrets, intelligence or military secrets through Internet;

-- To stir up ethnic hatred and discrimination, and sabotage national unity through Internet;

-- Using Internet to organize a cult organization and keep in tough with members of the cult organization, undermining the enforcement of state laws and regulations;

-- Using Internet to sell fake and substandard products or advertise goods and services in a deceitful way;

-- Using Internet to damage other people’s business reputation and commodity reputation;

-- Using Internet to infringe upon other people’s intellectual property;

-- Using Internet to fabricate false information affecting securities and futures trading or disturbing financial order;

-- To set up pornographic websites or web pages, provide access to pornographic websites, or spread pornographic books, movies, video products and photos on Internet;


-- To defame other people on Internet;

-- To illegally intercept, alter or delete other people’s e-mail or other data, infringing upon citizens’ freedom and confidentiality of communications; and

-- Using Internet to commit theft, fraud and atrocities

The regulations were updated in 2006 when the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)

though these were aimed at preventing the spread of computer viruses, junk emails or

spam and pornography. In justification a report on the China Internet Information

Centre website Wu Heping, a spokesman with the MPS, said that “more than 80

percent of the domestic computers were once infected by viruses annually in recent

years and the daily junk mails flowing to domestic users exceeds 60 million, making

China a giant country of sending and receiving junk mails” ("New Regulations to

Ensure Internet Safety ", 2005).

In 2001 there were calls to strengthen network security through the development of

Internet technology within China. Bai Yi, director of China National Laboratory of

Computer Network and Information Security, said on June 5 in 2001 “that China

should develop its own information industry on the one hand and stipulate strict

regulations on management and prevention on the other in order to strengthen the

management of information security”("Dual Tactics Adopted to Ensure Information

Security in China," 2001). Bai Yi also said that “China should develop its own

information industry to gradually take the place of imported products with homemade

ones, such as the operating system, router and chip [sic]” ("Dual Tactics Adopted to

Ensure Information Security in China," 2001). At the time these kinds of statements

also had a lot to do with concerns about back door programs placed inside foreign

software for the purposes of spying on China. In February 2000 the government

banned the importation of foreign encryption software, though by March they had

backed down from this position ("Government to Ban Trade in Foreign Encryption

Software ", 2000; Olesen, 2000).

Military & Cyber warfareThe management of information flows and the protection of networks were built into

the Internet from its inception. Protecting information and networks from external


threats and attacks is a part of national security and this is a consideration for all

nations connected to the Internet. There were reports in the Jiefangjun Bao (PLA

Daily) that the army was preparing for cyber warfare as early as 1999, and that there

was to be a new branch or ‘network army’("China's PLA Prepares For Network

Warfare ", 1999). The paper said that “the invasion of the "network space" will be

considered a violation of national sovereignty, and the gravity of the crime will not be

treated any less than a territorial violation by land, sea and sky…. Network

sovereignty has the same economic, political and military significance as territorial

land, sea and sky sovereignty” ("China's PLA Prepares For Network Warfare ",

1999).

Network protection is still an important feature of the PRC’s overall military strategy.

In November 2006 Liberation Army Daily commentator argued that: (Office of the

Secretary of Defense, 2007):

[The] mechanism to get the upper hand of the enemy in a war under conditions of informatization finds prominent expression in whether or not we are capable of using various means to obtain information and of ensuring the effective circulation of information; whether or not we are capable of making full use of the permeability, sharable property, and connection of information to realize the organic merging of materials, energy, and information to form a combined fighting strength; [and,] whether or not we are capable of applying effective means to weaken the enemy side’s information superiority and lower the operational efficiency of enemy information equipment.

The 2002 Chinese White Paper on Defence recognises the importance of information

warfare and the significance of electronic networks in the management of information

in military situations. The paper outlines China’s strategy in relation to Network

based warfare and says that “rapid and drastic changes are taking place in the military

field around the world, and a new serious disequilibrium has occurred in the balance

of military power. The extensive applications in the military field of new and high

technologies led by IT have stretched the battlefield into multidimensional space

which includes the land, sea, air, outer space and electron” (PLA, 2002). By electron

it is assumed to mean the information sphere. Finally, the White Paper acknowledged

that the PLA was studying and had done training that investigated models of

integrated network electronic warfare (INEW) (Thomas, 2005). The USA also has

cyber warfare plans including a unit of hackers (Lasker, 2004).


China is often identified as the origin of hack attacks on Western computer systems

and as such the United States Government takes seriously the potential threat China

may pose to American network security. Toshi Yoshihara, from the Institute for

Strategic Studies, writes that “it is therefore conceivable that information warfare

(IW) could provide China with the capacity to hinder American military operations in

the Asia-Pacific, a region of central importance to U.S. national security interests.

Hence, the direction of China’s IW strategy has direct policy relevance to the United

States” (Yoshihara, 2001). In 2000, the Department of Defence warned that, “China

has the capability to penetrate poorly protected U.S. computer systems and potentially

could use CNA [computer network attacks] to attack specific U.S. civilian and

military infrastructures” (Farrell, 2002).

According to the annual report to United States Congress on Military Power of the

People’s Republic of China 2007 the PLA is investing in electronic counter measures.

The report says that (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007):

China’s computer network operations (CNO) concepts include computer network attack, computer network defence, and computer network exploitation. The PLA sees CNO as critical to achieving electromagnetic dominance” early in a conflict. Although there is no evidence of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine, PLA theorists have coined the term “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” to prescribe the use of electronic warfare, CNO, and kinetic strikes to disrupt battlefield network information systems. The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, and tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks. In 2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive CNO into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks.

There have been a number of media stories about hack attacks on Western military

networks and government websites. The most widely reported were the attacks

following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and again in 2001

following the spy plane incident. In the case of the spy plane incident there was the

suggestion that the attacks were officially sanctioned by the Chinese government, in

particular the attacks carried out by the Red Honker Union. It is plausible that the


group did have official sanctioning as they had a website in China and were never

arrested for their activities. In addition, the State Council sponsored website of the

China Internet Information Centre25 reported the break up of the Red Honkers in

2005, and dubbed them the ‘guardians’ of Chinese cyberspace. .According to the

report “membership of the group was once as high as 80,000 and it organized many

website attacks on overseas government sites as well as those of schools and private

companies, and engaged in virtual skirmishes with groups of foreign hackers”

("Largest Hacker Group in China Dissolves," 2005). The re-grouping of Red Honkers

later that year was reported on by the Peoples Daily who said that “the task of the

alliance was to prevent hacking attacks from foreign countries” ("China's anti-hacking

alliance regrouped," 2005). The appearance of the story on a website with such a

strong connection to the State Council, headed by the Premier Wen Jiabao, and the

People’s Daily means that the Red Honkers are sanctioned by the CCP at the highest

levels.

In 2007 there were a number of reports in the Western media alleging hack attacks

that originated in the PRC. An official with the Naval Network Warfare Command in

the USA suggested that the majority of hack attacks on Department of Defence

websites and networks came from China, and that the frequency and intensity of

attacks “has reached the level of a campaign-style, force-on-force engagement”(Rogin,

2007). As is often the case it was also suggested that there was a high probability that

the attacks were officially backed by the government, based on the number of attacks

and the allegation that the attacks were very deliberate.

In August 2007 accusations were made against the Chinese government’s

involvement in a number of hack attacks on Germany, Australia, New Zealand,

France, the USA and the United Kingdom. The story first broke when the German

Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Beijing. Her trip was shadowed by allegations from

25 China Internet Information Centre’s runs an authorised government website, www.china.org.cn which is published under the auspices of the State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group in Beijing. The State Council Information Office is run by the State Council, the highest administrative authority in the PRC.


Spiegel that the Chinese government had hacked into “a large number of computers in

the German chancellery as well as the foreign, economy and research ministries had

been infected with Chinese spy software” ("Merkel's China Visit Marred by Hacking

Allegations," 2007). Trojan Horses26 were used to infect the computers and the

attacks were launched from the north western province of Lanzhou and in the South in

Guangdong province ("Merkel's China Visit Marred by Hacking Allegations," 2007).

According to Spiegel “German officials believe the hackers were being directed by

the People’s Liberation Army and that the programs were redirected via computers in

South Korea to disguise their origin” ("Merkel's China Visit Marred by Hacking

Allegations," 2007).Premier Wenjiabao denied the claims and said that “the Chinese

government attaches great importance to the hacker attack on the German government

networks. China would take ‘determined’ and ‘forceful’ measures to combat hacker

activities” ("Premier Wen tells Merkel China opposes hackers," 2007).

In early September 2007 the British newspaper the Financial Times alleged that The

Pentagon had been hacked by China’s military and that 15,000 computers had to be

checked and cleaned. According to the London based publication Computing, a

former Pentagon official was quoted as saying that “the PLA has demonstrated the

ability to conduct attacks that disable our system ... and the ability in a conflict

situation to re-enter and disrupt on a very large scale” (Thomson, 2007). According to

the Financial Times, “Senior US official said the Pentagon had pinpointed the exact

origins of the attack. Another person familiar with the event said there was a "very

high level of confidence . . . trending towards total certainty" that the PLA was

responsible” (Sevastopuloin & McGregor, 2007). The Chinese government denied the

charge and a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, said in Beijing that “the

Chinese government has consistently opposed and vigorously attacked according to

the law all Internet-wrecking crimes, including hacking. Some people are making

wild accusations against China ... They are totally groundless and also reflect a Cold

War mentality. China would like to work with other countries to take measures to

crack down on web crime” ("China denies U.S. charge it hacked Pentagon network,"

26 Trojan Horse is a malevolent program that poses as legitimate program with a back door allowing hackers to make changes to the systems it has infected.


2007). When the attacks on Britain were denied in the Chinese Press, Yang Yi,

Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies under the National Defense University

was quoted as saying “China is a responsible country and we never do this kind of

despicable thing…As a matter of fact, China has never had so called military hackers.

Although we stick to the road of peaceful development, many countries still see China

with suspicion and guess subjectively if anything strange happens. China pursues a

defensive strategy and will never be the first to launch an attack. Any military move is

conducted in line with this strategy” ("Military expert: international cooperation to

fight hackers," 2007).

More allegations of officially backed Chinese hack attacks emerged in May 2008

from South Korea and India. South Korea also alleged that China was responsible for

54% of the attacks on the country ("Gov't transparency in quake relief not "forced

reaction" for hosting Olympics ", 2008). The Times of India reported that there were

attacks on Indian government and private computer networks (Bagchi, 2008).

These kinds of incidents are to a large extent played out in the international media.

There are few instances where direct conversations between officials from China and

the countries they have supposed to have hacked into are reported in the media, and in

general these are confined to official visits and are thus stage managed events by all

concerned. That is not to say that Merkel did not say anything to Wen during their

discussions. However, if they did discuss the hack attacks on German websites it was

not reported in the media. The point I am making is that international relations are

played out in the arena of the Internet through websites and news portals. The media

becomes a forum that charts and visualizes the relationship and it is via these outlets

that centre/margin relations are played out through the discussion of events like

hacking. The hacking of government websites by other governments also signifies a

virtual war and has opened up a new space in which nations are able to spy on one

another as well as a new space to fight over. Rather than just viewing international

relations as being carried out in official meetings and communiqués it is also played

out in the media and the Internet through official pronouncements on web sites and in

press releases, press conferences and door stop comments. World leaders read the


papers, watch the television and monitor news on the Internet. It is way to

communicate without a direct conversation.

TaiwanThere have been reports about a virtual war going on between Taiwan and the PRC

since 1999 when Ian Buruma first reported on this (Buruma, 1999). In August of 1999

there were 72,000 cyberspace attacks launched from mainland computers, 165 times

with success (Buruma, 1999). At the time success meant placing a picture of the PRC

flag on the Taiwanese intelligence agency’s website (Buruma, 1999). In the same year

the “Ministry of Public Security in Beijing set up a special unit to combat enemy

hackers, or, as it was officially put, ‘to prevent an invasion of hostile forces’ (Buruma,

1999). In that year many of the attacks were triggered by statements by the Taiwanese

President Lee Teng Hui when he put forth the ‘two state theory’ where he was

suggesting that the Mainland and Taiwan should have a state to state relationship.

This was seen as a declaration of Taiwanese independence by Lee (Jame, 1999). In

2002 it appeared that Taiwan was the place where hack attacks into Mainland

television satellites were launched by Falun Gong ("Taiwan downplays China TV

hacking," 2002). In 2006 The Tapei Times claimed that Taiwan had suffered 250,000

cyber attacks between 1996 and 2006, making Taiwan the most hacked country in the

world.

Hacking in Taiwan had become such a serious problem by 2003 that Taiwan sent a

formal letter to the PRC to ask for help to track down hackers who had allegedly sent

a virus to the Taiwan based Eha Technology Limited software company via an email

("Taiwan asks China to help track hackers," 2003). The source of the emails was four

websites registered in Hubei and Fujian provinces. A letter was sent by the Straits

Exchange Foundation, a semi official organisation that handles Taiwan’s relations

with the mainland as there are no formal ties between the two countries. The letter

said “we would like the relevant authorities to help in quickly finding the motives, the

aims and the true identities of the perpetrators,” ("Taiwan asks China to help track

hackers," 2003).

In 2004 Taiwan’s Koumintang website was hacked into by a man claiming to be a

military veteran from the PRC. The website’s homepage was replaced with pro-China


photos and China’s national anthem playing in the back ground. The new photos were

of a PLA soldier aiming a rifle at a target and another showed two men raising the

PRC flag (" Hacker gives Kuomintang Web site pro-Chinese look with PRC photos ",

2004). The hacker had also written “I’m proud of being a Chinese and a Chinese

veteran”(" Hacker gives Kuomintang Web site pro-Chinese look with PRC photos ",

2004).

The above represents some of the incidents that have been reported on hacking

between Taiwan and the Mainland. The use of the Internet and hacking signifies an

interaction between these two states and hacking in this way represents another arena

in which centre/margin relationships between the two countries is played out, and

fought over. The negotiation of this relationship happens on an official and unofficial

level and this arena is even more significant because there are no official channels of

communications between Taiwan and the Mainland. The limits of this kind of

interaction are difficult to gauge as there are no official figures on the number of hack

attacks that are carried out officially or otherwise. The media’s reporting of hacking in

this instance though provides a window on the way that the relationship is negotiated

between Taipei and Beijing. The mainstream media becomes the forum in which

these two countries discuss their differences and this is then rearticulated through the

Internet with news from wider number sources that exist, often on the same event.

The rituals of the state are also used in the centre/margin dialogue between the

Mainland and Taiwan. By this I mean rituals such as the opening of parliament or the

national days or state visits. There is ritual involved in all of these kinds of events and

they are reported in the media. These rituals of the state are also the foundations of

what Anderson calls the ‘cultural products of nationalism’ and these are the basis of

what he called imagined communities (Anderson, 1993) . For example dialogue is

orchestrated through official rituals such as the 17th Party Congress in October 2007

where Hu Jintao “called for a peace agreement with Taiwan under the one-China

principle” ("Peace pact with Taiwan proposed," 2007). In a report to the 17th National

Congress of the CCP Hu said “we would like to make a solemn appeal: On the basis

of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between

the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful

development of cross-Straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful


development ("Peace pact with Taiwan proposed," 2007). The party congress is the

place in which these statements are articulated and the media is the vehicle through

which they are disseminated for consumption beyond the borders of the PRC.

Because of the lack of official channels between Tawain and the PRC the relationship

between the two is imagined in the media and these imagined communities slug it out

in a virtual space, that of the Internet and mainstream media that is then rebroadcast

across the space of the Internet. On an even more fundamental level the tensions of

the relationship are played out through hacking that on some levels appears to be

officially sanctioned.

TibetTibet is another sensitive topic on the Chinese Internet and the CCP go to great

lengths to define the parameters of what can and cannot be said on this topic in the

same way they define their relationship with Taiwan. There is no room for debate and

so it is not surprising that there have been incidents of hacking into the websites of the

Tibetan government in exile and the Tibetan Support Group (TSG) ("Tibetans allege

cyber invasion," 2004). The TSG claimed that the source of the attacks was the

official journal of the Tibetan administration in Beijing ("Tibetans allege cyber

invasion," 2004). In 2002 the Chinese government was first accused of hacking into

the Dali Lama’s computer network. The charges were vigorously denied by the CCP

whose response was “China opposes all forms of hacking”

A report in the Times of India claims that reports on the attacks of Tibetan exile

websites began in October 2003("Tibetans allege cyber invasion," 2004). In 2003 the

computers of Tibetan government in exile and their support groups around the world

were caught by a major virus attack and they alleged that it was the work of Chinese

government officials ("Virus attacks on Tibetan network; Chinese blamed," 2003).

“The International Campaign for Tibet said in a statement that it had traced e-mail

containing the virus to an Internet company based in Beijing. After the news of the

attack spread, the attackers changed mailing addresses two weeks ago, making them

appear to belong to Tibet support groups” ("Virus attacks on Tibetan network;

Chinese blamed," 2003). At the time the exiled government’s had a network of around

400 computers and was said to be well protected.


In 2004 the Times of India ("Virus attacks on Tibetan network; Chinese blamed,"

2003) reported that Tibetan government in exile and support groups were attacked

again. This time hackers sent emails that appeared to be from other official Tibetan

websites, and they contained the Trojan Horse which is a hidden program that installs

malicious software on the recipient’s computer. The hidden program can then be used

to gain unauthorised access and do damage to a computer ("Trojan horse," 2006).

Following the riots in Lhasa in March 2008 there was another round of reports of

hack attacks on pro-Tibetan websites (Johnson, 2008).

The relationship between Beijing and Tibet is very similar to Beijing’s relationship

with Taiwan in that there are no official channels with exiled leaders for dialogue.

There are no formal channels between the CCP and the Tibetan government in exile

headed by the Dali Lama. The relationship is in part played out in the international

media and via Internet as these are the only channels for communication between the

Dali Lama and with the CCP. Again, this is carried out via press statements, press

conferences, and official websites. The media coverage of this dialogue and the

coverage of the hack attacks of the exiled government’s website are the arena in

which the centre/margin relationship between these two groups is played out.

China’s relationship with Japan is also played out virtually in the arena of the Internet

and hacking. In 2000 China was accused of hacking into Japanese government

websites and posting messages condemning Japan for the 1937 Nanjing Massacre.

The attack appears to have been triggered by a forum that was held in Osaka where

there was a denial that Japanese soldiers killed 300,000 Chinese citizens after the fall

of the city.

In the Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the Peoples Republic of

China addressed the future of nationalistic hacking in the PRC and concluded that:

Nationalistic hacking is likely to occur during periods of tension or crises. Chinese hacking activities likely would involve extensive web page defacements with themes sympathetic to China. Although the extent of Chinese government involvement would be difficult to ascertain, official statements concerning the leveraging of China’s growing presence on the Internet, and the application of the principles of “People’s War” in “net


warfare,” suggest the government will have a stronger role in future nationalistic hacking”(Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2003)

Unofficial Nationalism & Hacking for the Nation

Hactivism within the context of the PRC goes beyond the state and is mostly based on

nationalistic sentiments. For example, a hacker defaced China’s Nike website in 2004

and left wishes for a happy new year in bold red letters in both Chinese and English

("Hackers Wreak Havoc with Nike," 2004). There was a suggestion at the time that

the attack was in retaliation for a Nike television commercial featuring a famous

American basketball player, LeBron James, battling animated dragons and Kung Fu

masters. The advertisement had been banned in China, and was described as an

“insult to the country’s national dignity”("Hackers Wreak Havoc with Nike," 2004).

Nike had also just been found to have plagiarised the design of a Chinese flash

animator and had been ordered to pay damages ("Hackers Wreak Havoc with Nike,"

2004)

The Southern Metropolis ran a story in October 2007 on a computer virus known as

the ‘patriotic virus’. The Win32/KillDPT (the patriotic virus), an update of the

W32.Welchia.B, is a virus that can decide to suspend the operating system of a

computer or create intrusive damage based on different languages used on the

computer. (D. Zhang, 2007). The virus enters the computer and assesses what kind of

operating system it has and what language the system is in. If the operating system is

in simplified Chinese then the virus is completely benign and will have no effect.

However, if the infected machine is running in Indonesian or Japanese the virus fills

the destroys the hard drive of the machine (D. Zhang, 2007). If the operating system is

in English the virus leaves a pop up message that reads “Your luck’s so good!” See

figure 4 below.


Figure 4

(D. Zhang, 2007).

The virus has other nationalistic features such as declaring opposition to ‘Taiwan

independence’. If the virus is on a computer that uses traditional characters such as

those used in Taiwan a pop up will appear with “Down With A-bian!’ (Chen Shui-

Bian’s nick name) and other nationalistic pop ups such as “Comrade Chen Shui-bian,

you like Taiwan independence? Do you have any dignity or face? ... You want to be

condemned by history? Go away! We are Chinese! Even after death, our souls will

belong to China” (D. Zhang, 2007).

Nationalism & Hacking

Nationalism incorporates an historical past into the imagining of a community and

that is used to define and signify centre/margin relationships between nations. One

way this has traditionally been done is the way history is reconstructed via differing

nations, ‘ideological state apparatus’ (Aulthusser27), ‘official’ discourses of events,

all the things that construct a monopoly of knowledge. Interestingly, with regards

to China, Japan, Taiwan and Tibet, this is played out beyond the borders of each

nation and within these ISA’s via the hack attacks on these countries through the

27 ISA is defined by John Hartley as various social institutions that arise in civil society (the sphere of the private, as opposed to the state). They perform regulatory functions and reproduce ideology on behalf of the state. They include education, the family, religion, and the legal system, culture and communication. They are characterised by consent rather than coercion, and by their relative autonomy from the dominant economic class or its representative in the state (O'Sullivan, John Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery, & Fiske, 1994).


choice of target, or the date of attack, hence confusing and altering - in a style similar

to tactics of culture jamming, the official version of historical events that are

sanctioned and subscribed to. For example, the competing versions qua voices of the

Nanjing massacre that triggered the attack sited above, the role and sovereignty of

Tibet or Taiwan have an historical context and the dates that are chosen are evidence

of the importance of the hegemonic use of history in the negotiation and contestation

of centre/margin relationships, by ISA’s and individuals hackers and hacker

collectives and in these instances are quite often officially sanctioned.

Analogue calendar time has and is still signified via events and anniversaries and

hence assisting the process of ’marking time’ and /or moment in time. The calendar

acts as a metaphorical marker for a historical ‘moment’ or ‘pause in time’ in relation

to a nation’s construction of it’s socio/economic/cultural and political history and

identity officially, and unofficially. Within the context of differing countries time

zones are based on the analogue calendar and their differences in marking

time are measured in a linear fashion. However, within the context of the Internet, the

digital (or net -time) transverses linear measured times zones, and the analogue

calendar. The Internet replaces it with the concept of near-instantaneity causing a

clash regarding, when and how something happens and means in which an event is

reported, distributed, consumed, altered, managed or circumvented by national

governments. Hacking into one another’s websites and challenging competing

versions of events of reality and carrying out virtual cyber wars is an example of this

where the issue regarding the above is dependent upon speed (in terms of

circumvention, management etc). This can be equated with Kern’s concept of the

simultaneity of experience in relation to experience, consumption and

reproduction, and also draws attention to Anderson’s mediation of Walter Benjamin’s

notion of empty homogenous time. Anderson (Anderson, 1993, p.24) writes that, “it

views time as something close to what Benjamin calls Messianic time, as a

simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present”. Anderson (1993, p.24)

goes on to say that the “idea of ‘homogenous, empty, time,’ in which simultaneity is,

as it were, transverse, cross, time marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by

temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.” In the instances

described above within the context of the digital time via the Internet, we


find national governments now competing and struggling with speed and simultaneity

in relation to their ISA management of events that comprise both digital and analogue

versions. In short, this has huge ramifications regarding the management of

information by nations trying to control the construction and reconstruction of

national events and officially sanctioned historical discourses regarding a nation in

terms of the past, and future.

Paul Virilio sees these things as a kind of convergence of time where local time and

history congregate in a single system to form what he calls global time. He writes that

“the very word ‘globalization’ is a fake. There is no such thing as globalization, there

is only virtualization. What is being effectively globalized by instantaneity is time.

Everything now happens within the perspective of real time: henceforth we are

deemed to live in a ‘one-time-system’ (Virilio, 1995). Vrilio goes on to argue:

For the first time, history is going to unfold within a one-time-system: global time. Up to now, history has taken place within local times, local frames, regions and nations. But now, in a certain way, globalization and virtualization are inaugurating a global time that prefigures a new form of tyranny. If history is so rich, it is because it was local, it was thanks to the existence of spatially bounded times which overrode something that up to now occurred only in astronomy: universal time. But in the very near future, our history will happen in universal time, itself the outcome of instantaneity - and there only (Virilio, 1995).

Foucault’s (1986, p.23) discussion of Heterotopias in Of Other Spaces is also relevant

here as heterotopias are a topology of sites “which are something like counter-sites, a

kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that

can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and

inverted.” As Martin Procházka says that “as a result, instead of creating an

imaginative unity, the transversal, "cross-time" linkage of fragmentary discourses

generates the signs and images of otherness, cultural differences and heterogeneity,

which tend to be formalized and mythologized in contemporary discourses of

multiculturalism”(Procházka, 2006). So in this sense the Internet represents a


heterotopic space in which time as history becomes heterogeneous as multiple

versions are juxtaposed and contested through hacking and rewriting in a single space.

Hactivism & Democracy

Hacking for the nation is tolerated to some degree as the above incidents reveal.

However, hacking is not tolerated when it directly challenges the CCP and their

monopoly on political power. Apart from the Falun Gong hack attacks there have

been few reports of hacking activity by democracy dissidents. The most notable

hacking case involving a democracy activist is that of Blondie Wong and the Yellow

Pages. In 1998 a group of North American hactivists, the Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc),

interviewed the reclusive leader Blondie Wong and the interview was published in

Wired magazine and other places on the Internet. In 1997 Wong, a dissident

astrophysicist living in Toronto, claimed to have disabled a Chinese satellite and was

planning to establish a global network of hackers to protest Western investment in

China (Hesseldahl, 1998). Wong is also alleged to have had “operatives stationed in

Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Beijing - including three ‘highly placed’ technicians

working in Beijing, and a handful of government bureaucrats, many of whom lost

family members at Tiananmen Square” (Hesseldahl, 1998). Blondie seems to have

vanished into the ether, as I can at the time of writing find no further details of his

exploits.

The Boston based hactivist group ‘Hactivismo,’ an international group of activists

dedicated to hacking for human rights and free speech, claimed to have members in

the PRC. In July 2001 they announced in the preamble to their declaration that:

Hacktivismo and the CULT OF THE DEAD COW have decided that enough is too much. We are hackers and free speech advocates, and we are developing technologies to challenge state-sponsored censorship of the Internet” Most countries use intimidation and filtering of one, kind or another including the Peoples Republic of China, Cuba, and many Islamic countries. Most claim to be blocking pornographic content. But the real reason is to prevent challenging content from spreading through repressive regimes. This includes information ranging from political opinion, "foreign" news, women’s issues, academic and scholarly works, religious information, information regarding ethnic groups in disfavor, news of human rights abuses, documents which present drugs in a positive light, and gay and lesbian content, among others (""A Special Message of Hope"," 2001).


Hactivismo aimed to have people in China, and other countries where there is heavy

Internet censorship, post content, using steganography, that would otherwise be

filtered in plain view by hiding the content in websites that would be acceptable to

authorities. Ruffin, a member of Hactivismo, said that “Steganography is a kind of

encryption that allows one to bury digital content in a digital content base. Think of a

Web page displaying a picture of the Mona Lisa. Steganography would allow you to

hide a copy of the Declaration of Independence, an MP3, or any other piece of content

digitally rendered in Da Vinci’s masterpiece” (Ruffin, 2004). The application was

called Camera/Shy and was dedicated to the memory of Wang Ruowang, a former

Chinese dissident leader.

Hactivismo has developed other tools to assist Chinese citizens circumvent the Great

firewall, one of those was called Six/Four, a direct reference to the 1989 Tiananmen

Demonstrations and the colloquial term for the massacre on June 4, 六四 literally six

four. The Six/Four protocol is a peer to peer system like those used to share music

files across the Internet. This allows users to create a virtual network on the Internet

that is invisible to all but its own members ("Hackers target web censorship," 2002).

Another tool they have developed is ScatterChat a secure instant messaging service.

In Hactivismo ("Hacktivismo Launches ScatterChat for Secure, Private

Communication," 2006) press release for the service they said that:

ScatterChat is unique in that it is intended for non-technical human rights activists and political dissidents operating behind oppressive national firewalls. It is an instant messaging client that provides end-to-end encryption over the Electronic Frontier Foundation-endorsed Tor network. Its security features include resiliency against partial compromise through perfect forward secrecy, immunity from replay attacks, and limited resistance to traffic analysis, all reinforced through a pro-actively secure design.

In February 2006 Hactivismo also kicked off a campaign against Google and their

censoring of the Chinese Internet by encouraging people to print up T-shirts with the

graphic below (Fig 5).


Figure 5 Googlag altering of Google logo.

("cDc launches global campaign against Google," 2006)

There are also stories in the Western press that allege that Chinese authorities are

hacking the email of dissidents. In 2005 the story of Chong Yiu-kwong, a key figure

in the Civil Human Rights Front in Hong Kong, claimed that hackers from within the

Mainland had been tampering with his e-mail account ("Hong Kong Activist Says

Chinese Hackers Read His E-mails ", 2005). In 2005 Chong told Radio Free Asia that

his Internet activities had been monitored by someone within the Mainland since

April 2004. He said “I didn’t know that my computer had been monitored ever since

[April 2004], until I found that all my e-mails from the account registered to the

University of Hong Kong disappeared all of a sudden ("Hong Kong Activist Says

Chinese Hackers Read His E-mails ", 2005). Following his discovery Chong

approached the computer center of Hong Kong University. He said “they told me that

my account had been monitored by three different IP addresses from China and that

information from the account had been downloaded every few minutes”("Hong Kong

Activist Says Chinese Hackers Read His E-mails ", 2005).

ConclusionTracing the activities of democracy hactivists is tracing the negotiation of

centre/margin relationships and the way that these have been reconfigured in space by

the advent of the Internet. These groups are scattered across the globe and have come

together with a common interest to test the limits of a centre identified as

China/Beijing. The outcome of cDc and Hactivismo has not resulted in the tumbling

of the CCP and the beginning of democracy despite their best efforts.

The writing of viruses and hacking into computer networks represents the most direct

challenge to any network. In essence hacking is about creating disruption on a

network or even its breakdown. The challenge to code in this way comes from many


groups, criminals, hactivists and the military. In the case of China there is little

evidence to suggest that the Internet has been used in this way to over throw the

government and replace it with democracy. Even though hacking is illegal in China

and the government denies that there have been any officially authorized attacks,

there still appears to be sufficient evidence to suggest that there are officially

sanctioned hack attacks that have taken place. The hack attacks by the Honker’s

Union appear to be officially sanctioned.


C h a p t e r 7

Disasters & Starbucks

There have been a number of incidents since the Internet emerged as a popular

medium where news stories have broken on the Internet first, circumventing

traditional informational flows, or where the Internet was a feature of the occurrence

itself. This includes incidents such as the Belgrade Embassy bombing in 1999 where

the story first broke on the Internet and the Falun Gong demonstrations in 1999 at

Zhongnanhai where the protest was organised online. Both of these stories also made

their way into the international press and then were played out to some degree online.

There have been incidents since that challenge traditional informational flows, and it

is my aim in this chapter is to map the ways in which these kinds of incidents have

been dealt with by the CCP. I also wish to look at how the incidents have challenged

the CCP’s monopoly over political power and the way they have been used by the

party to preserve their position and power. The examples used here show how the

Internet can be viewed as both liberating and a tool of repression and serve as

practical illustrations of the ways in which code, content and regulation are used to

maintain the CCP’s authority and the way in which time as the official version of

events is used to manage spatial relationships with provincial and local governments.

In addition to this the case studies allow me to map the double rearticulation of the

incidents as they are played out on the Internet in a more international forum. By this

I mean the way that the stories are covered and articulated for the domestic and

international audiences, as well as those that play out international relations. In these

instances the stories are used to speak to many different kinds of audiences, for

different political purposes. For this it is necessary to look at who is speaking and to

whom and in which forum? For example in January 2002 George W. Bush, in his

State of the Union address named Iran Iraq, and North Korea as a part of an axis of

evil ("The President's State of the Union Address ", 2002). This was only four months

after the September 11 attacks, and he was speaking to a domestic audience. In China

the speech was not well received, and President Bush was criticized for using

inflammatory language ("China Disapproves Use of 'Axis of Evil' in International

Relations," 2002). During George W. Bush’s visit to China in February 2002 there

were no official talks on the issue and the visit was hailed by both sides as a success


as the American President made his way through a number of staged events that are a

part of any official visit by the head of state to any country. So the strong rhetoric

used by Bush was for a domestic audience and the remarks were toned down for an

international audience.

The management of informational flows on the Internet in China are tied to existing

discourses, and the way they are dealt with is consistent with the CCP view of those

discourses. That is, news is guided by the CCP and subverted for political purposes in

order to reinforce and help maintain the CCP’s position of authority, and content on

the Internet is developed in accordance with this. As a consequence of this journalists

in China are able to investigate and evaluate certain issues, however the media is not

permitted to comment on general or universal problems. Journalists can say what they

like so long as they do not criticize the government. Anne-Marie Brady says that “the

propaganda line is saying that investigative journalists in China can talk about local

problems, but can’t look at systemic change” (in Funnell, 2007). In this sense it is

therefore allowable to investigate corruption, but not to comment on the problem by

identifying underlying shortcomings of the system, such as the lack of the rule of law.

This is not to say that journalists are passive in this process, and of course they are

constantly pushing the boundaries. For example papers such as the Southern Weekend

(南方周末 ) have a well deserved reputation for colourful investigative reporting,

however in order to stay in print the paper does not act as a watchdog, and the

government has at times sacked staff and there is always the potential threat of being

closed down.

The CCP’s strategies for the maintenance of their position of authority is to attempt to

maintain control over the narrative of events, so as to guide public opinion, and this is

done chiefly through the development of content. In this sense time is a Meta

narrative that is used to describe the way in which history and the narrative of events

unfold in the media and the way in which the CCP seeks to maintain control over the

narrative of those events. The notion of time or the Meta narratives used to control

time form the basis of the monopoly of knowledge used by the CCP to control space.

The management of time is necessary for the continued perpetuation, replication and

legitimation of a particular political system over space. This is the underlying theme

of the relationship between elite politics and the media in China. The media is one of


the means by which time and space are managed and is the means by which policy is

articulated and disseminated. The media also forms a space in its own right and

provides a forum in which factional struggles of elite politics are played out. As such

the media are the mechanism through which the current reality is constructed. This

reality is a ‘communist’ reality, which at present is subject to market forces with

‘Chinese characteristics’. Content is developed in accordance with this and thus the

desire to manage the narratives of history can be understood within this context.

These narratives are used to unify the nation.

The coverage of the incidents that make up the examples in this section can be

thought of in three ways as they relate to the strategies employed to maintain power.

Incidents that are tied to broader campaigns aimed at reinforcing central authority,

nationalistic incidents and incidents that represent dissent. As Brady points out

“amongst the toolkit for the party’s bid to maintain power are a renewed emphasis on

nationalism, including strengthening notions of both the foreign Other and the

Chinese Self: an ongoing effort to present a negative picture of post-communist

societies in order to bolster fears of the potential for chaos in China if the CCP was

overturned: image building activities in order to mould public opinion in favour of

both the CCP and the PLA: as well as targeted campaigns focusing on perceived

threats to CCP power, such as Falungong and Muslim separatists in Xinjiang” (Brady,

2002).

Jiangxi School Explosion

In March 2001 a school exploded in Fanglin village in Jiangxi Province killing 42

students and teachers and injuring 27. The official government version of the event

was that a suicidal madman went into the school with two sacks of fireworks, and

blew himself up along with the school ("Truth About Jiangxi School Building

Collapse Known," 2001). The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) also reported that

officials had done a good job of handling the situation ("School Explosion Aftermath

in Jiangxi Well Handled," 2001). This lies in stark contrast to the first reports of the

accident that were released by the Guangzhou media, including the Southern Weekend

and later picked up by the foreign press in which it was reported that the school had

been forcing students to work producing fireworks in order to subsidize their


education when the explosion occurred. Following the breaking of the story in the

Chinese press foreign journalists descended upon the area and parents told them of

their complaints to the authorities about this dangerous situation for three years

("School Blast Parents in China Furious Complaints Went Unheard," 2001). The local

police sealed off the town from foreign press and the Foreign Ministry branded the

overseas media reports as “absurd and erroneous”("China Slams Local, Foreign

Media Over School Blast," 2001). The then Prime Minister Zhu Rongji appeared on

television to apologise and to tone down accusations of child labour. The official

version of events was further undermined by the discussion of the tragedy on Internet

Chatrooms within China until these were closed down by the sites owners for fear of

the wrath of the government ("Internet Challenges the Party Line in China," 2001)

This event and the manner in which it was dealt with by the Chinese authorities

highlights the challenges the Internet represents to the management of informational

flows within China and illustrates some of the strategies employed by the CCP to deal

with what they perceive as being a negative consequence of the technology.

The Jiangxi School explosion was one of the first disasters to escape traditional

informational flows in this way and it illustrates some of the consequences of the

Internet and the way in which the CCP has adapted to a changing communications

environment. That is the story broke and circumvented traditional media flows and

the CCP responded by asserting Beijing’s authority over the story by emphasizing a

particular version of the event. There have been numerous instances since the school

explosion including the Nandan mine disasters in 2001, later the SARS out break in

2004, and more recently the Black Kiln incident in 2007, which is discussed at length

later in this chapter. The explosion of the school illustrates the way in which the CCP

has adapted and subverted the technology so as to construct a CCP version of the

events and retain dominance over the management of information. There was in this

instance a tension between people of Wanzai County and the central authority in

Beijing and it was quickly silenced. To some extent the incident was rewritten as

authorities circulated an official version of events that was contrary to the version

circulated by the parents who lost their children in the tragedy and the media that

descended on the village after the accident.


Starbucks

In 2000 Starbucks opened an outlet near the Forbidden City in Beijing triggering a

debate about the coffee chain’s location on the Internet. The popular portal Sina.com

ran a survey that found “over 70 percent of nearly 60,000 people surveyed were

opposed to the cafe’s entry into the Forbidden City, the main reason being the

damaging effects to Chinese cultural heritage and its atmosphere” ("Starbucks Cafe in

Forbidden City Under Fire ", 2000). The debate died down and Starbucks removed a

large sign and became inconspicuous within the palace museum.

In 2007 the debate was kicked off again by a blog entry by CCTV English Channel

newsreader Rui Chenggang. The blog entry, “Why Starbucks Needs to Get Out of the

Forbidden City?” attracted 530,000 hits and thousands of online responses and

according to the Peoples Daily Online. Most of the comments were against the

location of Starbucks arguing that it was damaging to the historical site. Rui wrote

that “it is not globalizing, but trampling Chinese culture to have a Starbucks in the

Forbidden City, a symbol of Chinese civilization” ("Starbucks should be verboten in

Forbidden City, say netizens," 2007) .

In March 2007 the Starbucks debate was raised during the National People’s Congress

when a deputy from Heilongjiang province, Jiang Hongbin, submitted a motion to the

Congress to close the outlet. He was quoted by the China Daily and Xinhua as saying

that "the Forbidden City is one of the un-tradable products as its value cannot be

measured with money. As long as it (Starbucks) stays in the imperial palace, it poses a

challenge to our traditional culture”("Lawmaker calls to remove Starbucks from

Forbidden City," 2007).

The story was picked up by the foreign press and featured on many western news

sites, including CNN, The Guardian, The Financial Times and the Daily Telegraph.

Some of the foreign press coverage suggested that the posting and the ensuing debate

were in the lead up to forthcoming renovations and the Olympic Games. The

suggestion was that the museum wanted Starbucks out for final renovations and the

games and that Starbuck’s presence in the palace was much more inconspicuous than

that of American Express who has advertising throughout the museum. The question

of the location of the Starbuck’s was also used by the People’s Daily Online to


generate discussion, as a banner on the website for about six months and in one article

suggested that it was a campaign to kick the franchise out of the palace museum. On

the 15th of July the outlet was closed after negotiations with the company.

The calling for the removal of Starbucks in the Forbidden City easily taps into

Chinese nationalistic sentiments and the way that the story was presented and played

out implies a level of official encouragement and is illustrative of the way in which

the Internet has been used to develop content as a part of the CCP’s management

strategies for the Internet. Starbucks decision to move from the site seems to confirm

this as well. In addition Rui is a Party member, and the promotion of the debate by the

People’s Daily Online is further evidence of official sanctioning. This invocation of

nationalist sentiment tied to the protection of an historical past is a common feature of

the Post Mao era and is used to unify the country in the decline in the importance of

ideology. According to Brady, “throughout the 1990s, CCP propagandists worked to

foster a sense of antagonism towards Western countries, especially focusing on the

imperialist past. Numerous books, films, television programs, and exhibitions

continually reminded Chinese citizens of the wrongs enacted against Chinese society

by foreign countries”(Brady, 2002, p. 3). This process of Othering is used to actively

reaffirm and define ‘Chineseness’ as sanctioned by the CCP. The encouragement of

Nationalistic sentiments gives the appearance of an open debate, even though debate

is engineered to reaffirm support for the CCP as the guardian of the national Chinese

identity. The active contsructedness of identity in a nationalistic way uses history to

give authority to present actions and is as Benedict Anderson suggested a part of the

way in which a political community is imagined (Anderson, 1993). In terms of the

management of time and space history is often used to justify the present in the

manufacture of consent. Niectzshe said “knowledge of the past is at all times needed

to serve the present and the future, not enfeeble the present or to tear out the roots of

the vigorous powers of life for the future”(in Harold A Innis, 1951, p. 61). Time with

regaurds to this incident was used to manage space as China’s historical past was used

to serve the needs of the present in order to move Starbucks out of the Palace Museum.

The Black Kiln ScandalIn June 2007 somewhere between 548 and 600 people including an estimated 51

children, some as young as 8, were rescued from slavery in Shanxi and Henan

provinces. The story unfolded over several months before breaking nationally, it first


emerged in April with a report in the Democracy and Legal Times (Minzhu yu Fazhi

Shibao 民主法制时报) on the large number of illegal mines operating in Shanxi

province. On the 18th of May 2007 Zhengzhou television reported on a group of

parents claiming that their children had been kidnapped and sold into slavery to work

in illegal coal mines and brick kilns. The following day 1000 parents turned up at the

television station asking for help to find their children. On the 7th of June 400 parents

posted an open letter on the Dahe net and then on the Tianya Club website claiming

that their children had been abducted and forced to work in illegal brick kilns. The

parents had attempted to free their children but had been frustrated by local police and

authorities. The story was then picked up nationally as rescue stories appeared in the

media and fuelled an outburst of public anger in support of the parents and calls on

the central government to address the situation. A crackdown was launched

nationally, with the main focus on Shanxi and Henan and targeted brick kilns and coal

mines. By the end of June there were numerous reports of slaves being freed from

illegal mines and brick kilns. Initial reports of the crackdown on the 16th of June said

that “a total of 468 workers, 251 in Shanxi Province and 217 in Henan Province, who

were forced to work as "slaves" have been freed from brick kilns and other illegal

work places” ("Central government forms work team to investigate into "slave labor"

incident," 2007). The People’s Daily reported on the 21st of June that “about 45,000

policemen had raided more than 8,000 kilns and small coal mines in the two

provinces and freed 591 workers, including 51 children”("China to launch nationwide

labor investigation after "brick kiln scandal"," 2007). Officially there was also an

estimated 1000 children across the country that may have been sold into slavery

("China brickwork slave children may number 1,000," 2007).

An investigation into the scandal was launched and sanctioned by Hu Jintao and Wen

Jiebao, as both leaders were said to be watching over the situation personally, further

highlighting the leadership’s commitment to the situation. On June 20 Wen Jiabao

presided over a meeting of the State Council where a preliminary report was handed

down on the handling of the incident. The report was compiled by an investigation

group made up from the “Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of

Public Security and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions” ("Shanxi governor

makes self-criticism for slave labor," 2007). It was decided that those involved

should be severely punished, and the Shanxi government was ordered to step up the


investigations and compensate the victims. Yu Youjun, Governor of Shanxi Province,

also made a self-criticism on behalf of the Shanxi government. The meeting also

urged local governments to learn a lesson from the scandal ("Shanxi governor makes

self-criticism for slave labor," 2007). The governor later chastised the “local publicity

department for failing to respond quickly to the media when news of the brick kiln

forced labour scandal hit the headlines”("Shanxi governor criticizes publicity officials

for handling of media during forced labor scandal ", 2007).

In the early phase of the campaign The Internet Bureau, CPC Central Office of

External Communication when they issued the following instructions to websites on

the 15th of June:

All External Communication Offices, Central and Local Main News Websites: Regarding the Shanxi “illegal brick kilns” event, all websites should reinforce positive propaganda, put more emphasis on the forceful measures that the central and local governments have already taken, and close the comment function in the related news reports. The management of the interactive communication tools, such as online forums, blogs, and instant messages, should also be strengthened. Harmful information that uses this event to attack the party and the government should be deleted as soon as possible. All local external communication offices should enhance their instruction, supervision and inspection, and concretely implement the related management measures (Ming, 2007).

Despite the above statement the reporting of the incident was bold even in the staid

official state press such as the People’s Daily and the China Daily. The Southern

Daily (Nanfang Daily 南方报业) and its weekend version Southern Weekend carried

graphic images of the some of the victims and parents holding photos of their lost

children. There were also graphic images of the injuries victims received at the hands

of their captors. The slaves had been beaten and held captive by vicious dogs, and

forced to live in intolerable living conditions. The coverage in the Southern Daily and

Southern Weekend featured personal stories of traumatised victims, rather than

focussing on government measures to liberate the slaves and bring those behind the

incident to justice which was the focus of the Peoples Daily. The reporting of the

incident by the China Daily was very candid: and featured editorials berating the


government for inaction and accusations that local authorities in Henan had attempted

to muzzle the media ("China orders crackdown on labor abuse," 2007). On the 18th of

June the Xinhua Newsagency ran an opinion piece that was also published on the

People’s Daily website, which berated the government and labour protection officials

for allowing the abuse to happen. The editorial said “it is high time the government

stepped up labour protection and spurred idle officials to do their jobs properly if we

are to come even close to building a ‘harmonious society’(Yan Zhou, 2007).

There appears to be a level of open debate about what the government should do,

however, the incident was used to advance a line on certain issues by the Party and to

reassert Beijing’s authority of the margins, specifically provincial/local governments.

The crackdown was national and involved the exposure and closure of illegal factories

and kilns in Wuhan, and Xinjiang and the closure of job agencies in Xian. Much of

the criticism for supporting illegal activities was blamed on local authorities. In an

article that was repeated on the China.org and China Radio International websites

the Vice-Minister of the State Council Information Office Wang Guoqing, , said that

“ ‘blocking bad news’ was becoming more difficult, given the wide use of new

information technologies such as the Internet, mobile phones and the central

government’s commitment to information transparency”(W. Liu, 2007).

The campaign that followed the breaking of the story was carefully engineered to

unify public opinion behind the central government on a number of fronts, including

greater media transparency, the release of laws on the reporting of disasters and the

adoption of the Emergency Response Law, requiring officials “to provide accurate,

timely information on emergencies” ("Road of free information flow cautious but

resolute," 2007). At the time there was also a campaign to ban cheap bricks, and the

tightening of regulations on official corruption. There were also calls for the

promotion of migrant workers rights and the unionizing of labour; and the banning of

slavery and child labour and this was followed up with new labour protection laws. In

July Xinhua reported that the All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) had called for

slavery to be incorporated into China’s Criminal Law (Y. Sun, 2007b). In the previous

April “China adopted regulations on ‘open government information’ that were

intended to promote “public access to information on a range of issues including

government spending, drug and food safety, and land seizures. These new regulations


were intended to curb the abuse of power. The media decree takes effect in May 2008,

three months before the Olympics” ("Road of free information flow cautious but

resolute," 2007).

The Black Kiln incident was used to call for a greater role of the media in coverage of

accidents and disasters. An official of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate said that

“our past experiences have shown that dereliction of duty is always behind major

accidents. Prosecutors should learn to investigate official negligence when major

accidents are exposed by media” ("China investigates dereliction of duty in forced

labor scandal," 2007).

On the 24th of June it was announced by the Chinese press that draft laws for the

reporting of disasters and accidents had been discussed by the Standing Committee

for the National People’s Congress for a second reading. “Emergencies are defined in

the draft as industrial accidents, natural disasters, and health and public security

crises”(Y. Sun, 2007a). It was reported in the People’s Daily that the legislation was

hotly debated particularly the provision on the “news media that irregularly report the

development and handling of emergencies without authorization or release fraudulent

reports will be fined between 50,000 yuan (or 6,250 US dollars) and 100,000 yuan, if

the reports lead to serious consequences (Y. Sun, 2007a). The People’s Daily

suggested that “some said information transparency is crucial to handling emergencies

and that the media’s contribution should be affirmed and praised”(Y. Sun, 2007a).

The report went further by saying that “the expression "irregular reports" was

ambiguous, and could be used by some local governments as an excuse to prevent

objective reporting by news organizations. Media supervision was needed to ensure

that government officials did not hide or misrepresent information regarding

emergencies, they said”(Y. Sun, 2007a). The report concluded with “currently,

China’s media are providing timely reporting on emergencies, such as bird flu cases,

coal mine accidents, explosions and air crashes (Y. Sun, 2007a).

The dereliction of duty of officials is a theme of the draft laws for reporting accidents

and disasters and this fitted in well with a continuing crackdown on corruption. On

June 22 Xinhua reported that China’s Supreme Peoples Procuratorate was planning to

amend the criteria for major cases of power abuse or the dereliction of duty (Han,

2007). Professor of Sociology, Xia Xuelan of Beijing University was quoted by


Xinhua as saying that “some officials, bought off by illegal brick kiln owners, who are

usually powerful and wealthy, tend to harbour them and turn a blind eye to their

vicious conduct….noting that exposure of this case should be a warning to them”

(Han, 2007). Much of the outrage was directed at local officials and police who had

been complicit with kiln owners in the scandal.

Workers’ RightsThe public shock and disgust at the treatment of migrant workers was fuelled to

support workers’ rights and safety. China’s army of migrant workers and the abuse

that they suffer is often tied to rising social unrest and riots, and so the protection of

workers rights is increasingly seen as essential to the promotion of ‘social harmony’,

Hu Jintao’s slogan to promote stability28. The number of migrant workers is

increasing steadily as more and more people move to the cities to try and find work,

and is also tied to income gap which is perceived by the CCP as one of the most

significant problems facing the stability of the country. In light of this the Black Kiln

crackdown/campaign called for an increased role for trade unions in the PRC, and this

was followed up by legislation. Labour officials came under fire in an editorial in

Xinhua that said “first of all, labour protection officials must shoulder a large portion

of blame. They are paid to ensure that workers’ rights are protected through a labour

contract with their employers, minors are not employed, weekly working hours do not

exceed 40 and all workers are paid on time and in full” (Yan Zhou, 2007).

The Black Kiln incident and the crackdown also appeared around the same time that

accusations were being levelled at China for using child labour to produce official

Olympics products and the government made assurances that they would investigate

the claims. The crackdown on the illegal brick kilns and mines and the liberation of

slaves gives credence to the idea that the government was seen to be doing something

about stamping out the practice of child labour. This then speaks to both a domestic

and international audience. Domestically it is the communicating of the policy on

child labour, and internationally it signals the government policy. The crackdown and

the way it is played was out in the media is a visualisation of the articulation and

negotiation of centre/margin relations. It is the central leadership of the CCP in

28 Social Harmony has not been full articulated at this stage, but is a slogan used to address issues that are the potential source of social unrest.


Beijing articulating and reinforcing their position in their relationship with the

provincial and local governments at the margins. In addition it is the playing out of

foreign relations in the same way that is media announcements are the visualisation

and articulation of the Beijing’s relationships with the international community.

The apparent openness with which the Black Kiln incident was reported can best be

understood against the broader backdrop of policy changes with regards to the

development of socialist democracy and more political openness. There have been

some signals at the top that there are moves towards greater public participation in

politics. This is evident in the calls for transparency in the reporting of disasters.

There was further evidence at the opening session of the National People’s Congress

in March 2007 when the Peoples Daily said “Chinese leaders have stressed on many

occasions that to build a ‘harmonious socialist society’, which features “democracy, a

rule of law, equity, sincerity, fraternity, vitality, stability and the harmony of human

and nature”, is a historic task of the country ("China's parliament starts annual session

with focus on social harmony," 2007)”. At the end of June 2007 Hu Jintao

emphasised the significance of putting into practice “the scientific concept of

development, promoting social harmony and building an overall well-off

society”("China's parliament starts annual session with focus on social harmony,"

2007). Hu said “to develop socialist democracy is our long-term goal. The

government should expand political participation channels for ordinary people, enrich

the forms of participation and promote a scientific and democratic decision-making

process"("Chinese president delivers keynote speech on national development ",

2007). Hu made the remarks in a speech at a senior course for ministerial officials and

provincial heads at the CCP Central Committee’s Party School, setting the tone for

the 17th national congress of the CCP to be held in 2007.

There is evidence that experimentation is going on with public consultation. New

policy initiatives are generally experimented with at the margins29 for example the

Xiamen PX development discussed in chapter 5 is confirmation of experimentation

29 See Goodman and Segal China Deconstructs: Politics Trade and Regionalism


with new forms of public consultation. Other examples include the June 2007

announcement of the establishment of a national centre to receive petitions and

public complaints ("China to establish national centre to receive public complaints,"

2007). There was also the setting up of a website to receive complaints of official

corruption, and this crashed within hours of opening.

It is important to emphasise once again that the reasons for what looks like, for all

intents and purposes, a move towards an opening of the political system is not solely a

consequence of the development of the Internet, but rather must be contextualized

against broader historical and political developments. The Beijing Olympics in 2008

for example is an opportunity to showcase the country and the achievements of the

Open Door policy in regards to the development of the country and is of the utmost

importance to the CCP. This showcase is not just for an international audience but an

opportunity for the leadership to bask in the light domestically for their

accomplishments, and to consolidate the currents leaderships place in history. This

event alone highlights internationally human rights in the country and the leadership

of the CCP appears to be eager to show the world that things have and are improving

in this area. Ultimately though the goal of the leadership is to maintain what they call

‘social harmony’, and this does not necessarily mean the CCP is ready to let go of

their position as the final voice in Chinese politics. Any discussion of democracy by

the CCP is underscored by the phrases ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and

Hu’s referral to ‘socialist democracy’ and this does not mean that the leadership is

moving towards a liberal style democracy.

In the run up to the 17th Party Congress the media was reminded to remember that

their duty to is to guide public opinion ( 舆论导向 ). On August 22 the Guangming

Daily (光明日报), run by the Central Propaganda Department, and several major

Websites ran a speech by Yuan Zhifa (袁志发) a former editor of the Guangming

Daily in which he reiterated the party line on the role of the media, he said:

Guidance of public opinion is the lifeblood of news propaganda. Correct guidance of public opinion means the prosperity of the party and the people, while incorrect guidance spells disaster for both. The question of


correct and incorrect guidance concerns the fate of the party and the country (in Bandurski, 2007a).

History Revisited the Karamay Fire

The final example here is of the Karamay fire in 1994 and the storory’s re-emergence

on the Internet in 2007. The significance of this story highlights the contradictory

nature of the media in China and how the past and re-writing history can be used to

serve the interests of the present. In 1994 an estimated 288 children perished in a fire

at a Karamay theatre after the children were instructed to remain seated so that

officials could leave after the blaze broke out. At the time the tragedy was blamed on

locked exits and a lack of safety checks to organise a safe evacuation. A documentary

made on the disaster was posted by its maker Chen Yaowen, a reporter for China

Central Television and generated a lot of discussion and disgust on the Internet.

Chen’s attempts at filming the report were often thwarted by local officials and the

reluctance of victims to talk to him after being pressured by officials.

The former president of CCTV Yang Weiguang (杨伟光) gave an interview about his

role in the reporting of the fire to Southern Weekend which was translated by China

Digital Times, he said:

At certain times, there’s a delicate question of balancing the "degree." Otherwise, what do we call censorship? The most typical example was, when some kids died from a fire in Karamay (克拉玛依). I finished the program and thought it was well done and very touching. But I said, there are some passionate emotions in Karamay there. I said, if this program is aired, will it calm down the emotions of the local public, or it will add fuel to the fire? If it’s adding fuel to the fire, then we cannot broadcast it. If it can calm things down and it won’t trigger some unrest, then we can air it. The problem is, the situation over there was red hot, and if you air this, it will anger the parents of the kids and add pressure to local officials. And the reporter of the program wept with a sunken head. Three days later, the Central Propaganda Department issued an official notice, banning reports about the accident. And people said that I did the right thing to kill the program (Zhao, 2007).


The Karamay fire and its re-emergence, which was not long after the Black Kiln

incident, can also be seen as in terms of the visualisation of centre/margin

relationships, as this story was also used to bolster public support for the reporting of

disasters legislation, and the reinforcing of Beijing authority over local authorities.

Overall the incidents and the official narratives constructed to manage these events

and the governments responses to those events were used by the leadership of the

CCP in Beijing to assert their authority over local and provincial governments. The

incidents here and the CCP handling of those events amount to PR spin that is used to

manage time as a narrative of a current event and that is used to assert authority over

spatial relationships. The public response on the Internet to the re-emergence of the

story is also a visualisation of the public and public opinion.

Conclusion

The appearance of debate is a common feature of the Black Kiln incident, the

Karamay fire and the Starbucks campaign. The use of BBS and websites to reveal and

promote give the appearance of a debate and have led some writers to suggest that this

is evidence of this kind represents the potential formation of a civil society (Tai, 2006;

Yongming Zhou, 2006). Because these forums are tightly censored postings identified

as contrary to the government line can be quickly erased. The Jiangxi school

explosion demonstrates just how quickly voices can be silenced if the government has

a will to do so. Again this indicates that any liberalisation of government policies is

not necessarily a consequence of the Internet but rather willingness by the government

to reform. This is a clear incident of the relationship between the management of

informational flows and the management of time and space.


C h a p t e r 8

The Management of China’s Blogosphere 博客 boke (Blog)

‘When you open the window, some flies may come in’ (打开窗户，苍蝇可能会飞进

来) Deng Xiaoping on the Open Door Policy.

Blogs or weblogs are online journals that are regularly updated, and cover thousands

of topics. In a way Blogs represent the free speech philosophy of the early days of the

Internet in that they allow users to distribute opinion on an enormous variety of

topics, and in some countries relatively uncensored opinion, though potentially they

can be monitored everywhere. The blogosphere creates a new space in which public

discourse can be widened and viewed. Indeed my research for this thesis has relied

heavily on an excellent blog called EastSouthNorthWest, where a variety of articles

from China’s media are translated and posted, with some comment and analysis.

During the Burma protests in September 2007 blogs were one of the few sources of

information about the unrest not directly controlled by the Junta. Reporters without

Borders claims on its website that “Bloggers are often the only real journalists in

countries where the mainstream media is censored or under pressure” ("Handbook for

bloggers and cyber-dissidents ", Unknown).

Authoritarian regimes are often cast by western media as under threat from the

Internet and more recently blogs have been hailed as the final nail in the coffin of the

CCP, though so far this has not happened. This chapter will look at the regulations

and the promotion of self-censorship to manage China’s Blogosphere. The strategies

are the same as those employed to manage the flow of information and the circulation

of ideas as outlined in chapter 4 and that has been through the development of

content, regulation and the code and architecture itself as means of filtering and

censoring information. This chapter also looks at the way in which centre margin

relations have been played out in relation to the development and management of

blogs and how the strategies of content development, legislation and code are used to

maintain the CCP’s influence over time and space.


Technocrati, a blog search engine, says that globally they are “currently tracking

101.3 million blogs and over 250 million pieces of tagged social media ("Welcome to

Technorati," 2007). At the end of 2006 Xinhua reported that there were 20.8 million

bloggers in China and of those 3.15 were said to be ‘active authors’ ("China has 20.8

million bloggers," 2007). The July 2007 CNNIC report said that of the 137 million

Internet users across China 19.1% of those had blogs. The most popular are those

written by celebrities ("Chinese bloggers to reach 100 million in 2007," 2006). Most

are based on individuals and very few are based on news. At the end of 2007, CNNIC

released the findings of a survey on bloggers, which estimated 72 .82 million blogs

spaces in China, and 47 million blog writers, making about one quarter of all

Mainland netizens (CNNIC, 2007). In 2007 the website 163.com, and its search

engine youdao.com, looked at data from millions of blog entries and concluded that

the most popular topics on blogs in the first half of the year was Mother’s day,

followed by the television program Super Boys. Other topics in the top ten list

included April Fool’s Day, Qing Ming Festival, Dragon Boat Festival and Father’s

Day ("Hottest Topics in Chinese Blogs 2007," 2007). CNNIC’s 2007 report said that

“In terms of major content the blogs covered, 47% of the blogs are written about the

inner monologues or record of emotions of the writers. Next are the narration of daily

life, personal interests and hobbies. Most of the blogs are for the writers to record

their own life status and conduct self demonstration, with the blogs having a more and

more obvious tendency of self-media attributes” ((CNNIC), 2007). Though these

figures are not accurate, because bloggers come and go, it still gives a rough picture

of the extent of the Chinese blogosphere.

The attempts to manage blogs are the same as with other areas of the Internet, that is

through legislation the management of the code used in the creation of the

architecture of the Internet and the development of content in order to promote self-

censorship through these mechanisms. The difference here though is there has been

less direct investment by the government to develop content in this area unlike news

and the games sector. Instead, there has been the promotion of the use of blogs by

party members to promote CCP sanctioned views. Blogs have also been used as a

forum for public feedback.

Promotion tinged with fear


Blogging has not been embraced by the government in the same way that other

sectors of the Internet have been. There has not been the same high level of

investment in blogs, nor has there has been a high level of official content

development by the CCP. This lies in stark contrast to other sectors of the Internet

such as news and the gaming sector where there has been a high level of investment

of government sponsorship. It is difficult to find information at this stage that might

shed some light on the number of CCP member blogs, and there are no official figures

on this. Blogs are seen as another avenue in which government and party officials can

communicate with citizens, however the CCP prefer the use of websites to promote

government policy. There were reports on the use of blogs by delegates and

journalists at the National Peoples Congress in March 2006, and even the suggestion

that Premier Wen Jiabao should set up a blog (Qing, 2006, n.p.). There are also

reports of government sponsored Internet commentators whose job it is to promote the

government’s views in blogs.

According to the China Daily “in Suqian, a mid-sized city in East China’s Jiangsu

Province, 81 middle and high-ranking officials in the municipal government have

opened blogs on the government website (http://blog.suqian.gov.cn/)” (S. Wang,

2007, n.p.). The China Daily said the highest-ranking official to write a blog is Zhao

Qizheng, former director of the State Council Information Office, who at the time of

writing was the President of the Journalism School of Renmin University in Beijing.

In August 2007 he launched his blog "Zhao Qizheng and his books" where he has

uploaded several chapters of his latest work ‘In the One World – 101’ (sic) Tips on

How to Communicate with Foreigners’ (S. Wang, 2007, n.p.).

The reports in the government press on blogs and stories that are linked to blogs are

often used to promote a party line or policy such as the story ‘Govt bloggers followers

only a clique away’ in the China Daily in August 2007. The story outlines some of the

uses government officials have put their blogs to and promotes these blogs as a way

for officials to get in touch with the public, a forum for public feedback and this

practice is viewed as a form of democracy by the CCP. The article quoted Xie

Chuntao, professor at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of China in Beijing as saying that "it is a good thing that officials opened blogs

and strengthen their communication with the ordinary citizens," (S. Wang, 2007,


n.p.). The China Daily article features contrasting stories of public feedback on

official blogs one that sees feedback in a traditional form. A form in which is citizens

publicly pledge subordination. In another where the blog was used to promote an

issue and gather feedback. At the same time the report finished with the idea that

blogs should be secondary to the use of websites as a means of getting in touch with

the people.

Within the report was a story on the pledges of subordination that occurred in

response to the blog of Jiangsu Communist Party secretary, Zhang Xinshi, who was

said to have written on a variety of topics including climate change and education.

The report said that "Zhang hopes that those who are in charge at the different

government organs can also have blogs so that they can express their ideas, attract

people’s discussions and build an efficient channel of communication between

officials and ordinary citizens” (S. Wang, 2007, n.p.). Most of the blogs that I have

looked at have a feature for readers to post comments. The example of feedback that

the article gave on the pledge of subordination involved a posting by Zhang on

‘civilized behaviour’. This posting prompted the local Suqian Daily to run a column

about the topic, and this was followed up by more than 100,000 pupils and high

school students distributing pamphlets on civilized behaviour in the streets (S. Wang,

2007, n.p.). The China Daily lamented that “almost each of Zhang’s online articles

was read more than 400 times, but there have been few posted responses from the

public. When a comment was made, it often turned out to be a pledge of a subordinate

to implement the Party secretary’s ideas, not public feedback” (S. Wang, 2007, n.p.).

In contrast to public participation based on subordination was a story that featured

more meaningful feedback. This was feedback generated by the blog of Liao Xinbo,

deputy director of the provincial health bureau of South China’s Guangdong Province.

The report said that Liao’s is the most popular blog run by an official (S. Wang,

2007, n.p.). Liao launched his blog in April 2007 and it is the sixth most popular blog

in Guangdong Province (S. Wang, 2007). The story hailed Liao’s blog, and the way in

which he has used it to bolster and garner public opinion is hailed as an example of

democracy in action. The China Daily report says “Liao’s blog, with its inspiring

discussions, provides a prime example of a form of "direct democracy"(S. Wang,

2007).


Liao, or as he calls himself Doctor Brother Bozi, writes on health issues and has

promoted the idea of contracts for doctors. He reminds readers that Doctors are meant

to ‘serve the people’. The China Daily report said that “Liao also argued in his blog

that health services were not a commodity that should be "bought" by patients, a key

point that health providers need to serve the public, instead of trying to rake in

money” (S. Wang, 2007, n.p.). The posting that kicked of this rather staged debate

was when Liao “posted an article by an anonymous doctor which blamed China’s

apparent failure on medical reform over the last 30 years on the lack of fair pay for

doctors”(S. Wang, 2007, n.p.).

Liao sought feedback on his blog. He said "I have never studied laws and cannot give

any comments. I wish my friends who are interested to give their ideas" (S. Wang,

2007, n.p.). People who agreed with Liao urged him to lobby his allies at the

provincial people’s congress - the legislative body - to draft a law especially for

medical contracts. There was even a drafting, by a netizens, for a medical contract law

posted on the blog. The China Daily said that “whether or not the fact the netizens’

law proposals were right or wrong, their interaction with this sort of blogging

demonstrates how ordinary people can debate the merits of such proposals” (S. Wang,

2007, n.p.).

The final part of the article seems to advocate the use of official websites as a

platform for the dissemination of information and public feedback, and features

comment from Mao Shoulong, a political scientist from the Renmin University. Mao

in 2006 said in a commentary in the Peoples Daily that "by further exploring the

communication possibilities of blogs, officials may better win the citizens’ trust if

there is successful communication between the two sides,"(S. Wang, 2007, n.p.). The

quote was reprinted in an article extolling the virtues of blogs in the China Daily in

August 2007. The report went on to quote Mao Shoulong as saying "actually, if we

want the government to get nearer to the ordinary citizens, we can make more efforts

on improving our democratic system instead of using the highly personalized blogs.

At the current stage, we can improve the government websites that widely exist, and

make them work better in publicizing policies and communicating with netizens. This

is a more constructive choice” (S. Wang, 2007, n.p.).


What the article reveals in a limited way is the debate about the role that blogs should

play in the governments overall egovernance construction of the Internet, and gives a

glimpse of what the CCP notion of democracy could and should look like. The article

is also illustrative of the centre/margin relationship on the development of policy in

this area as they are played out in the media. The leadership of the CCP is the centre

of these relationships and local and provincial party members are placed in the

margins. In these examples it is possible to view via the reporting of the examples and

the sources of the articles an interaction between the centre and the margins. Activity

in the margins has often been used for experimentation of policy initiatives and the

Liao case may serve as an example of the role official blogs may have in serving

future government policy formation and dissemination30.

Regulations

The main feature of the regulations that relate to blogging is the promotion of self

censorship. Thus ultimate responsibility for what is posted lies with blog providers.

Bloggers are subject to the existing laws governing the Internet, as well as being

subject to attempts to further tighten management through the introduction of a code

of conduct for bloggers. The code and the pledge are vague in detail; for example item

5 says “blog service should obey Chinese laws and regulations, protect the legal rights

of blog users and the public” (MacKinnon, 2007a, n.p.). Item 10 says that “if a

blogger doesn’t adhere to the terms, the service provider has a right to delete any

illegal or bad information, or terminate the blogger’s service” (MacKinnon, 2007a,

n.p.). 31 Making BSP’s responsible for what is posted is the simplest way to block

undesirable content.

In August 2007 the "self-discipline code for blog services" was drawn up by the

Internet Society of China (ISC) ("China's main blog service providers subscribe to

self-discipline code ", 2007). The code had input from bloggers, blog providers and

lawyers, and encouraged the use of real name registration. When the pledge was

originally announced there was a call for the compulsory registration of real names of

30 Regional policy experimentation was covered in Chapter 3. For more detail see Goodman, D.S and G. Segal (1994) China Deconstructs Trade & Regionalism31 For more detail see Appendix IV


users, but this was met with fierce opposition. The People’s Daily online said that

“real-name registration is only to be ‘encouraged’ instead of being made compulsory,

originally the intention of the government until it met with fierce opposition. Blog

service providers are required to ensure security and confidentiality of information

that bloggers prefer to keep secret, according to the code”("China's main blog service

providers subscribe to self-discipline code ", 2007). Ten major blog providers have

signed the code including MSN China, Yahoo ! China, Sina, Sohu and cn.MSN .com,

Tianya and the Peoples Daily. An Huang Chengqing, secretary general of the ISC

said "conditions are not yet mature for implementing real-name registration as we

lack reliable technology for privacy protection and identity verification,"("China's

main blog service providers subscribe to self-discipline code ", 2007).

All of this suggests that there appeared to be some level of debate over real name

registration of bloggers. The level of debate, the open reporting of the debate and

what appears to be a win for bloggers with the watered down registration program is

more suggestive of the emergence of a wider level of public discourse and a relaxing

of political authority, rather than the emergence of blogs themselves. What the

government has allowed in the way of debate has been incorporated and absorbed into

the existing management strategies for public opinion and debate.

The debate about real name registration is also evidence of centre/margin negotiations

of power, with the authorities’ demands for real name registration at the centre and

opposing bloggers at the margins. In this sense the creation of China’s blogosphere is

also the creation of a new space in which centre margin relationships can be viewed

and played out. Despite the introduction of real name registration there is still the

potential for those who are determined to remain anonymous to do so, provided they

have the technological skills, BBS however are a much more viable option for

remaining unidentified (MacKinnon, 2007b, n.p.).

A Nail House in Chongqing and the birth of Citizen Journalism

The examination of centre margin relationships highlights or reveals the tensions and

the shifts that occur as these relationships are played and are constantly negotiated

and how things change over time. Centre margin relationships are constantly in a state

of flux and blogging has facilitated the emergence of new margins to appear, but only


because the government has allowed this. It is therefore worth looking at the ways in

which blogs have been used by marginal groups and how centre margin relationships

are negotiated within the Chinese Blogosphere.

There have been incidents that suggest that bloggers are able to challenge the

government in some ways. Ultimately though, these challenges happen because the

government has allowed it or more pointedly because it suits them to allow it. The

anti-Starbucks blogs was one such incident, as was the Tianya BBS posting by the

fathers of abducted children that seemingly kicked of the Black Kiln incident. The

Nail House in Chongqing and the reporting of the story by bloggers is an incident was

still to some extent stage managed. The reporting of the incident spilled from citizens

blogs to the mainstream media. Blogging on the subject of the Nail House and the

ensuing media coverage only occurred because the government allowed it.

A nail house (钉子户) is a privately owned home where the owner has refused to sell

out to property developers. Stories about nail houses spread across cyberspace in

March and April 2007. The most famous of these was in Chongqing in Sichuan

province where the owners of a house refused to move and their home became an

island in a ten metre pit as the development went on around them. The story of “The

most awesome nail house in Chongqing” as it became known first broke on a blog

and this sparked a wave of blog coverage to this form of protest. This led to a number

of citizens heading to the site of the nail house and using mobile phones to capture

images of its final demise, and they became known as citizen reporters or journalists.

Part of what sparked interest in the nail house was the introduction of property laws

that had been passed in mid March 2007 during the session of the National Peoples

Congress, laws that would not come into effect until October of that year.

Images of the scene littered the Internet as the debate about the house and what should

be done became more intense. On the Tianya forum the photo (Fig 6) was and the

following comment was attached to it (Goldkorn, 2007, n.p.);

At the beginning of March, a photo called "the coolest nail house in history" stirred up a lot of debate. Within the space of a few days, this photo was widely circulated and posted all over the Internet, and a lot of


media as well as the general populace were interested in the affair. This happened at the same time as the Property Law [was being discussed at the NPC], so people were even more curious about it. The final fate of "the coolest nail house in history" will be a famous monument to the progress of the Property Law.

Figure 6 The Nail House Chongqing

The Danwei website said that “Tianya post has hundreds of comments representing

many different points of view about the Property Law, the evils of state- and

privately-owned real estate development, and the rights of tenants (Goldkorn, 2007,

n.p.). The China Daily said that “on China’s portal websites like sina, 85 percent of

those polled showed support for the couple. China passed its landmark property law

last month, highlighting the protection of private property” ("'Nail house' in

Chongqing demolished," 2007).

On March 28 a young blogger from Hunan arrived in Chongqing to cover the story

and because of his efforts he became known as the first citizen reporter in China.

Zhou Shuguang (周曙光) who blogs under the name of Zola, also became a story as

the Southern Metropolis Daily profiled the young blogger and his quest to cover the

Nail House story. John Kennedy has translated Zola’s blog entry on his initial report


from ‘ground zero’, the site of the Nail House. Zola writes that (Kennedy, 2007b,

n.p.);

As everyone knows, some reports of news like this which involves the government will surely never be reported, and [online] stories will be deleted at the request of unknown “relevant departments”. There had been a Sina blog reporting 24 hours a day on the situation, but that blog later disappeared. That’s why I realised this is a one-time chance, and so from far, far away I came to Chongqing to conduct a thorough investigation, in an attempt to understand a variety of viewpoints…

Mainstream media picked up the incident after a local court ordered the house for

demolition at midnight on March 23. According to a post on EasSouthWestNorth the

local and national media could not update the story as quickly as the bloggers (W.

Chen, 2007, n.p.). There was live coverage on several forums and websites through

blogs including MOP, NetEase.com, KDnet, Tianya, MOP and Sina. Things heated

up on the Internet and a blogger who goes by the name of Naked Running Dog (裸奔

的狗) began broadcasting directly through his mobile phone and sent video to an

administrator at MOP (W. Chen, 2007, n.p.). On the night of the demolition MOP

Hodpodge ran to live broadcast posts, and had received 7,000 or 8,000 comments (W.

Chen, 2007, n.p.). Du Peiyuan the leader of MOP Hodgepodge said “the significance

is about the future because this is where the trend is heading” (W. Chen, 2007, n.p.) in

response to “the simultaneous appearance of so many large-scale live reports at the

various forums can be considered a milestone in the history of the development of the

Internet in China” (W. Chen, 2007, n.p.).

EastSouthWestNorth said that (W. Chen, 2007, n.p.)

Du Puiyuan’s view, the "most awesome nailhouse" was able to give birth to "citizen journalism" because it contained several major factors: the "Property Rights Law" itself (which was brought out during the recently concluded National People’s Congress); the coincidence between this "most awesome nailhouse in history" and the "Property Rights Law"; and the highly symbolic deadline (March 23 midnight) for the forced demolition all drew heavy attention within the same period of time.


On March 29 the China Youth Daily ran an editorial criticising the Nail House and

the bloggers who supported them (Fig 7). The editorial, written by Lu Gaofeng ( 陆高

峰 ) ("China Youth Daily editorial calls for greater professionalism in Chongqing

"nail house" reports," 2007), said “some media have used (or abused) coverage of the

"nail house" in Chongqing to manufacture public sympathy for the ‘weak’ in the

pursuit of bigger audiences. In the editorial Lu argues that while officials must face

media scrutiny ‘pure-heartedly’, the media need to hold up their bargain, namely to

“preserve impartiality and cool-headedness, not gallery, not misleading the public,”

and that ‘rational analysis’ insufficient in coverage of the ‘nail house" story’ ("China

Youth Daily editorial calls for greater professionalism in Chongqing "nail house"

reports," 2007).

Figure 7. Screen Capture from China Youth Daily

A settlement was finally reached between the owner and the developer and the house

was demolished on the 2nd of April, when the owners were given an apartment of a


similar size. The China Daily said that “experts believe that the outcry reflects a

growing dissatisfaction among common people about the way sites are

commandeered and buildings demolished”("'Nail house' in Chongqing demolished,"

2007).

The incident itself and the coverage of the story on blogs and BBSs illustrates a level

of debate about issues that government seems comfortable with. Dan Southerland of

China Brief said at the time that “the lenient treatment of Wu Ping may have helped

the government to make a propaganda point, namely that the government respects

private property, at least in certain cases. Yet, the “nail house” case may also reveal

that downtrodden individuals in China are becoming more willing to challenge the

system through unconventional means (Southerland, 2007, n.p.).However the incident

reveals once again that the ability to censor and delete postings that are deemed in

appropriate means that the government is still able to silence debate if they have the

will to do so.

On March 24 the Information Office of the State Council released a notice that said

there was to be “no more reporting and commenting on the "nailhouse" event. All

news related to this event must be pushed to the backend. All special feature pages are

deleted. All comments function on this news are closed”("Chinese Government

Forbids Media Reporting of The "Nailhouse" Story," 2007) . Some Internet portals

such as Sina, Sohu, Netease and QQ had deleted all their special reports 15 minutes

after the notice went out. Blogs were not completely exempt. There are some reports

that some blogs had been deleted, though those established on Sina on the 22nd of

March had remained. The blog had attracted 156,393 visitors and 16,534 comments

had been posted, though by the 24th the comments page was locked and the comments

could not be read("Chinese Government Forbids Media Reporting of The "Nailhouse"

Story," 2007) .

Zola’s success in his coverage of the nailhouse made him something of a celebrity in

the Chinese blogosphere and fans urged him to cover other stories. Zola is not without

his detractors and has been criticized for taking money to finance his travels to cover

other stories. He had also changed blog hosts to one outside of China because his


Chinese blog host was subject to censorship. In March he went to Xiamen32 and

reported on an anti-chemical plant demonstration and in July he covered a pro-

democracy rally in Hong Kong.

In November 2007, at the Chinese Blogger Conference, Zola announced his intention

to bring to an end to his blogging and return to selling vegetables. His retirement was

short lived when a story about the plight of ant farmers in Shenyang in Liaoning

province hit the headlines in November. The ant farmers hit the streets in protests

when the Yilishen Tainxi Group makers of traditional herbal medicines went bankrupt

and failed to pay dividends to thousands of people who lost their life savings after

investing in the company or buying ant farming kits to produce ants for herbal

medicines and aphrodisiacs.

The story of the ant farmers follows a familiar pattern. The story was broken and was

everywhere in the media and on the Internet, it was then deemed politically sensitive

and was heavily censored and the story then disappeared from the media. The state

owned media released the official version, claiming the riots or the protestors were

caused by a few malcontents. In the ant farm scandal the state media laid the blame

for the protests on the company chairman Wang Fengyou. Xinhua said that

“thousands of ant farmers had gathered at the company offices to demand their

money, but Wang allegedly paid 46 employees 1.03 million yuan (139,000 U.S.

dollars) and company executives 160,000 yuan and 30,000 U.S. dollars to organize

protests outside government buildings instead” ("Company chairman arrested for

instigating social unrest ", 2007).

Reports on the Global Voices website suggested that bloggers were scrambling to

save video of the protests (Kennedy, 2007a, n.p.). Rebecca MacKinnon tested several

blogs and blogsites following the crackdown on the story including Tianya, and

Sohu, and found that she was unable to post information on the protests, and the word

Yilishen was being blocked on search engines (MacKinnon, 2007c, n.p.). Zola went

to report on an Ant Farm protest in Shenyang where he was detained and said to have

been beaten and made to make detailed reports on all the people that he met since his

32 The Xaimen PX plant demonstrations are covered in chapter 5.


arrival in the city. Later he was put on a plane and sent back to Changsha at his own

cost and has been instructed not to go too far (MacKinnon, 2007c, n.p.)33.

In another incident in January 2008 Wei Wenhua, the general manager of a

construction firm, was hailed a brave ‘citizen reporter’ and a martyr by bloggers after

he was beaten to death by officials for trying to use his mobile phone to film a protest

over the dumping of rubbish (Barboza, 2008, n.p.). The mainstream media also

covered the story and an investigation was launched into Wei’s death. The incident

was seized upon by Beijing to promote the rule of law and to clarify the limits to

official’s (chengguan 城管) power. Following the incident a meeting of 100 officials

from across the country gathered in the capital to condemn those involved and to

declare that those involved had "trampled the law and violated human rights” ("Para-

police officials condemn beating death of man in Hubei," 2008). The chengguan,

short for Chinese City Management Administration and Implementation of Law (城市

管理行政执法局 ), are quasi-law enforcement officials with a wide range of

responsibilities that mainly focus on keeping illegal vendors and sellers of pirated

goods off the streets, deterring beggars and turning away distributors of commercial

leaflets. The chengguan are not popular and in 2006-2007 there were a number of

reports across the nation suggesting that many were using standover tactics in order to

force vendors into paying protection money. Radio Free Asia suggested that there

have been other incidents involving violence perpetrated by chengguan in Hunan and

Sichuan ("China: Who are the chengguan?,"). Beijing used the incident to reassert

their authority over the margins, in this case the chengguan and those directly

responsible for them, local governments. The delegation of chengguan officials in

Beijing was a staged event and a visualisation of the negotiation of centre margin

relationships, and in this instance the subordination of the margins to the centre.

Regulating Code

The blocking and banning of words and websites is the most common way that code

is used to manage the content of the Internet and this is also the case with the

blogosphere. According to Global Voices, a number of blog hosts have been blocked

33 For more detail on Zola’s arrest and her extensive testing of blog censorship following the scandal see Rebecca Mackinnon’s blog post http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2007/12/nailhouse-blogg.html


over the years. In June 2005 it was reported by Rebecca McKinnon and Asiapundit

that all Typepad blogs were being blocked and that included access to MacKinnon’s

blog. In March 2007 Livejournal, Xanga, Blogsome, and Technocrati were also

blocked ("Access Denied Map: Mapping Web 2.0 Censorship," 2007). The examples

above also illustrate the ease with which code is used to delete and block what is

deemed undesirable in the Chinese blogosphere.

Blog hosts play an important role in the government’s strategy to manage

informational flows as this is easiest point in the architecture to filter for words that

are deemed dangerous. Blog Hosts, like all content providers, are coopted into

censoring on behalf of the government through regulation as discussed above.

Rebecca MacKinnon calls this the out sourcing of censorship (MacKinnon, 2007b,

n.p.). There are lists of banned words that are used to monitor and filter what is posted

online, and these lists are maintained by private companies. Tennecent QQ was

among the Blog Service Providers (BSP) to sign the code of conduct. In 2004 an

inventory of banned words was discovered by Chinese hackers who located the list in

a document in the installation package of QQ instant messaging software34. QQ is

owned by Tenecent and the instant messaging software is the most popular in China,

with millions of users each day. According to the China Digital Times(CDT) it is

more difficult to filter words at the server end because of the high volume of traffic. It

is for this reason that Tenecent put the filtering program into the installation package.

When the software is installed on a computer, a program file called COMToolKit.ddl

is automatically included, and this is the file that contains the list of words that can be

automatically blocked (Qiang, 2004, n.p.).

CDT ran the story and carries a detailed description of the list. The story it was noted that (Qiang, 2004, n.p.),

Recently, some Chinese hackers located this file and released it on the Internet. The censored key words list is commonly used not just for QQ, but also for all websites, BBS and text messaging services. One Internetuser did a rough breakdown of the list: About 15 percent of the words are sex related, the rest are all related to politics. About 20 percent of the words are Falungong related, including “师父” (master) and “弟子”

34 For more details on the list see Appendix IV


(disciple); about 15 percent are names of current officials and their relatives; about 10 percent are words used in the liberal political discourse such as “democracy”, “freedom”, and “dictatorship”; and about 5 percent are related to certain nationalistic issues, such as ”保钓” (defend Diaoyu Island), “俄国边界” (Sino-Russian Border) , “卖国” (selling out the country) etc. About 15 percent of the forbidden words are related to anti-corruption, such as “走私” (smuggling), “公款” (public funds); etc. Other censored words include names of dissidents,writers, and intellectuals, and names of certain foreign publications.

Microsoft

It seems that, as many stories that appear suggesting that the Internet in China is

becoming freer, just as many stories appear about crackdowns and the extent to which

Chinese authorities are trying to ‘control’ the flow of information. In January 2006 it

emerged that Microsoft had blocked Zhao Jing’s (Michael Anti) blog because he

criticized the government for firing editors at a progressive Beijing newspaper (K.

Chen & Fowler, 2006, n.p.). The Wall Street Journal said at the time that “efforts to

access the site from inside and outside China trigger a notice that "the space is

temporarily unavailable” (K. Chen & Fowler, 2006, n.p.).

Waggener Edstrom from one of Microsoft’s public relations agencies said that blog

“has been blocked to help ensure the service complies with local laws in China”(Kirk,

2006, n.p.). This line was again reiterated by Microsoft Chief Executive Officer

Steve Ballmer when he said, “we have an obligation in all the countries where we do

business to abide by the laws and the government decrees in those countries," Ballmer

said. "We do here, we do in Europe; we also do in places like China. And anybody

can choose not to do business in any country. We all have that option” (Kirk, 2006,

n.p.).

Several Internet companies including Yahoo and Google have used the line of

observing local law to justify their decisions, and have received harsh criticism in the

West for doing so. Yahoo handed over information to the government which led

directly to the arrest and ten year imprisonment of Shi Tao, a journalist who was

“convicted for divulging state secrets to foreigners after passing along an e-mail that

contained a warning from the Chinese government urging its officials to watch out for

dissident activity ahead of the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre”

(Kirk, 2006, n.p.). Google has also come into criticism for running a censored version


of its search engine which filters out information that the government does not want

its citizens to see.

Microsoft later changed its policy following a public backlash to the blocking of blogs

in China. In a statement made by Microsoft senior vice president and general counsel

Brad Smith, it said that “Microsoft will remove access to content only in the country

issuing the order. When blog content is blocked due to restrictions based on local

laws, the rest of the world will continue to have access” ("Microsoft revises policy on

shutting blogs after China backlash ", 2006). Compliance with local laws is often the

justification used by multi-national companies when they are criticized for the

blocking of information or as in the case of Yahoo for giving the names of people

who post sensitive information.

The reporting and blocking of Zhao Jing’s blog and the position and subsequent back

down by Microsoft visualise the negotiation between centres and margins. In this

instance the CCP and the Beijing Government acts as a centre of power and authority

and Zhao Jing acts at the margins. There is also negotiation between Beijing as a

centre and Microsoft at the margins, as well as foreign relations as centre/margin

relationships being played out between the United States of America which held an

inquiry into the behaviour of Microsoft and their dealings with China and Beijing.

The inquiry into Internet company behaviour in China is like a staged event to

highlight opposition to China’s position on freedom of speech and human rights.

The East West relationship is further played by Western NGOs that seek to help

political activists in authoritarian countries such as China circumvent the

government’s system of censorship. Reporters without Borders for example, have

published an online handbook that offers information to bloggers who want to defend

themselves from recrimination and censors. The guide was partly funded by the

French government and gives people tips on how to set up and publicise a blog, and

how to establish credibility. ("Blog censorship handbook released," 2007). However,

there is no doubting that the government’s systems of censorship have been very

effective at filtering out discussion of what they do not want posted for a mass

Internet audience. The editor of the US-based China Digital Times Xiao Qiang, said


that “censorship’s most direct impact on blogging is that there is a lack of ‘political

bloggers’ in the Chinese blogosphere. Pure politics is simply too dangerous. The

small numbers of campaigning bloggers are not dissidents; they do not call for the

overthrow of the Communist Party. But they are at the forefront of debate on specific

social issues” ("China trembles at the power of the blog," 2007). Isaac Mao also

argues that explicit political activism is not possible. Mao says “The priority now is to

help people help themselves constructively through technical means, not political

means. (Obvious reason: overt political activism is not feasible” ("I Still Believe

Some Day I'll Change The World In My Way," 2007, n.p.). That is to help individual

citizens find ways around the censorship of the Internet in China and for people to

educate themselves and to learn to communicate freely.

Examination of East West conflict as it is mediated in incidents involving the

circumvention of traditional informational flows does divert attention from what is

going on in other sectors of China’s blogosphere. The examination of these points of

resistance, conflict and negotiation do however reveal the tensions that are inherent in

spatial and temporal relationships and the way in which information is managed in

response to these things. Saptial relationships in this instance include those between

Beijing at the centre and local and provincial governements at the margins, and

Beijing's relations with the west. By temporal relationships I mean competing

versions of events. It is the charting of centre/margin relationship both within China

through the exploration of what can and cannot be said. It illustrates how the

boundaries of debate are often in a state of flux and renegotiation. Examination of

these points of resistance also demonstrate how the boundaries of debate are subject

to temporal issues, such as the use of history to serve the needs of the present as is the

case with the anti-Japanese rhetoric that is allowed to flourish at different times and is

held back at others. Temporal cycles can be found in Chinese politics as certain dates

approach, such as the crackdowns that coincide with June 4, October 1 National Day

and the 17th Party Congress or the opening of the National Peoples Congress session.

Public debates and the limits to what can and cannot be said are managed in

accordance of these dates and the significance given to them by the CCP and the

opportunities that marginal groups may see in the terms of being able to protest. At

the same time the examination of the conflict or incidents of circumvention of CCP

political discourse also reveals tensions in spatial centre margin relationship that

China has with the west and specifically the USA. In this sense the USA as the worlds


remaining super power is the centre and Beijing as and emerging superpower is at the

margins. Examination of these points of resistance exposes the assumptions inherent

in the reporting of these events and the way in which world news is also a way of

talking to a global audience.

Points of resistance are not always overtly political. The Nail House in Chongqing

and the actions of the bloggers was provocative and obviously linked to the property

law, it was not however overtly political in the sense that people were looking to

overthrow the government. It is these kinds of incidents and people’s uses of the

Internet, blogs and bulletin boards that reveal the limits to the strategies employed by

the CCP for the management of informational flows and the extent to which those

boundaries are resisted. Thus looking at these kinds of incidents is useful for the

charting of centre/margin relationships. These include those relationships that have

traditionally existed such as those between the CCP and Beijing at the centre and the

provinces at the margins. Blogs also create a new space in which other marginal

groups may emerge and interact with the CCP and Beijing at the centre. The ways in

which these kinds of incidents are reported in the Western press allow a visualisation

of the relationship between Beijing and the West.

There is evidence of social change and that China is on many levels moving toward a

more open society even though there are many subjects that are still taboo and blogs

and the Internet are facilitating that process of openness to some extent, though major

BBS and online forums may be more influential ("Chinese Bloggers, Podcasters and

Webcasters," 2005). As Rebecca MacKinnon says “if one combines the growing

online space for private civic discourse provided by blogs with a functionally

effective system of censorship and filtering, the result appears to be a recipe for

gradual, slow evolution—not democratic revolution” (MacKinnon, 2007b, n.p.).

MacKinnon also makes the important point that over focusing on the points of

conflict misses many of the other things that are going on in China’s blogosphere;

outside observers of Internet and politics in China would do well to focus on the impact of blogs beyond the narrow scope of overt political protest and obvious political change. Most Western media attention focuses on those instances where bloggers clash with government censors or the


web hosting companies who act as proxies for government censors. But to look only at these instances of conflict is to miss a great deal of what is really happening, much more quietly, under the surface(MacKinnon, 2007b, n.p.).

An example of MacKinnon’s point was when Western reporters were caught out by

over focusing on censorship issue when two prominent Chinese bloggers staged a

hoax that made it appear that their blogs had been shut down, and the western

reporters assumed it was the government as did some Chinese people. The blogs

called Massage Milk and Massage Pig staged the shut done in order to make fun of

Western Journalists. Wang Xiaofeng the author of Massage Milk said (MacKinnon,

2006, n.p.),

"I just wanted to make fun of Western journalists? [content] doesn’t need to be serious on the Internet. I don’t like it that Western media take a distorted view of China, though China does have problems," Wang told Interfax in an emailed statement, "I thought that if I closed my blog, it would stir their imagination and then they would begin blah blah. It really is as expected. So let’s they have an April Fool’s day in advance."

The story also reveals the assumptions made by the western media in relation to the

way in which the Internet operates in China. Isaac Mao argues that blogs are

establishing networks of trusted information that circumvent traditional media

informational flows. He uses the example of the Nail House in Chongqing and how

people trusted Zola the blogger over traditional media. Mao says that “trusted

networks are also very fast in spreading information because people believe

information coming from people they trust. (Unlike government controlled media

which is generally not so trusted.) Though there are cracks in the Great Firewall it is

still well maintained through legislation, the development of content and through the

architecture.

Conclusion

The strategies used to manage the Chinese blogosphere are the same as other areas of

the Internet, that is through the development of content, legislation and the code used

to construct the architecture of the Internet. Content in this sense comes via Blogs and

this has been hailed as the birth of citizen’s journalism, and the Zola case is

interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly when he was allowed to report on


incidents that were used by the CCP to promote an issue of there interest. This was

the case during the nail house in Sichuan. However when he was reporting on stories

that the CCP wanted to suppress he was silenced. It is worth noting once again that

Zola and his coverage of the nail house was used by the central government in Beijing

to reinforce its central position over provincial governments at the margins.

Exploration of the management of the Chinese blogosphere has also enabled me to

look at centre margin relations between the government at the centre and bloggers at

the margins.


C h a p t e r 9

Lei Feng Lives on in Cyberspace

Walk into any Internet café in China and you will most likely find that it is full of

young people playing online games. Indeed, every time I went to the large Internet

café on top floor of the Wangfujing Bookstore, during my field work in 2002, the

place was full of teenagers playing online games. “China is the fourth largest online

games market in the world (U.S. is No.1) and the third largest in Asia following South

Korea and Japan. (Taiwan is fourth)” (Jenkins, 2006, n.p.). The state media cited a

survey in September 2007 that found the vast majority of Chinese school children

stayed home during school holidays and played online games and surfed the Internet

("Most Chinese kids spend vacation online," 2007). The update 21st Statistical Survey

Report on the Internet said that there were 210 million Internet users and of these

59.3% are playing online games, and the average monthly expenditure for online

games is 84 Yuan ((CNNIC), 2007, 2008). An industry survey in 2007 revealed that

the number of online gamers was 40.1 million ("Industry survey: China's online

gaming population exceeds 40 mln," 2008).

The industry in China is huge, it was estimated to be worth 1.04 billion USD at the

end of 2006 and is expected to have enormous growth potential in the next three years

("China's online game industry on a roll," 2007). Massively Multiplayer Online Game

(MMOG) and Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGs) are

the most common. These kinds of games enable thousands of people to play at the

same time. The government has sought to manage the industry and is shaping content

in the same way that it has other areas of the Internet. That is through government

promotion, direct investment; regulations and the shaping of content through the code

used to construct content, and this is overshadowed by the dialectic of desire and

control. That is the desire for the technology for its economic benefits and the

perceived need to control the technology for political purposes. This chapter explores

the ways in which the government has sought to manage this sector of the Internet in

their bid to create a virtual Chinese world and the tensions that have arisen in the

management of informational flows and ideas within the virtual space of online

games. Centre/margin relationships are played out in this space via the development


of games. Fore example there is a heavy emphasis on nationalism within the gaming

sphere of the Internet and this also applies to China. In fact the Chinese government’s

heavy investment in this area has lead to the creation of games with nationalistic

themes. Nationalist sentiments are also evident from gamers themselves. The

development of content in this way ensures that the CCP retains dominant voice in

Chinese cyberspace thus reinforcing the monopoly of knowledge used to manage time

and space via communications technologies. Centre/margin relations are explored

here as they are played out between gamers and the government, as well as gamers

and gamer owners and gamers in China and the west.

The CCP’s relationship with the game sector is the same as it is with other sectors of

the Internet, in that it is underscored by the dichotomy of desire and control. The CCP

desires and promotes the gaming sector for its economic benefits and at the same time

it is demonized for harming China’s youth. There is major concern about gaming

addiction rather than about challenge to the political authority of the CCP which

underlies the government’s broader fears about the Internet and its other forms of

informational flows. The gaming sector is at times portrayed as a threat to a

‘harmonious society’ as is currently articulated by Hu Jintao. Henry Jenkins argues

that “the Chinese government has both sought to regulate game-playing and to

promote the use of computer games for cultural education -- in a sense seeing the

growth of gaming in their country as both a social problem and a pedagogical

opportunity” (Jenkins, 2006, n.p.).

Below is a screen capture (fig 7) from the official news outlet China.org.cn that

clearly shows this dichotomy in relation to Internet café which are closely tied to the

gaming sector as this is the place that many gamers have access. According to The

21st Statistical Survey Report on the Internet 33.3% of Internet users access the

Internet in Internet café ((CNNIC), 2008). The story is about an ongoing crackdown

on illegal Internet café. Note in the related headlines section on the left the first

headline says ‘Gov’t to Promote Internet Café Business’, followed by a headline that

says ‘Long-term Mechanism to Watch over Internet Café’, and the next says ‘China

Closes 16,00 Internet Cafés’ and ‘China Shuts Down 8,600 Illegal Internet Cafés’.


Figure 8 Screen Shot China.org.cn

("Internet Cafes in Beijing Under Scrutiny," 2006)

The next screen capture (fig 8) from the same website also gives a good visualisation

of the dichotomy, and again it is the linking of related stories that best illustrate the

contradiction. The headlines ‘Online Games Set Time Limits Against Addiction’,

‘Internet Games May be Wrongly blamed’, ‘Tougher Measures to Regulate Games’,

‘15 Online Games Recommended for Minors’, ‘Unhealthy Online Games Targeted’,

‘E-Game Industry Soars in China’, show the inconsistent way in which news of the

industry and how it is perceived.


Figure 9 Screen Shot China.org.cn

("Online Game Industry Enjoys Galloping Development," 2006)

Though the dichotomy appears as desire and control it is not necessarily the view of

the CCP. By this I mean the CCP knows that these things cannot be controlled they

can only be managed; it is a kind of balancing act between what are seemingly

competing interests. The negative consequences that are of concern to Chinese

authorities in relation to online games include the physiological and psychological

health of the nation’s youth. As with many other countries there is concern about the

pornography and violence. The dichotomy of desire and control appears in the

western and Chinese media, where it is often cast as a glittering market and a space

that is corrupting and dangerous. The way in which the games industry is dealt with

by the media is much the same as it is with the Internet in general. It is managed

within the confines of the dichotomy cast in terms of something to be desired because

it brings economic growth and something to be feared as it may in some way

challenge notions of a ‘harmonious society’. Jenkins (2002, n.p.) argues that:

…most Western discussions of the Internet and China describe the rise of digital access and consumer culture as liberating forces that cultivate democratic aspirations behind the repressive government’s back. MIT professor Jing Wang notes, however, that the expansion of consumerism has been actively promoted by the government throughout the last decade.


Embracing a rhetoric of "one nation, two systems," the state has encouraged a shorter work week, recreational activities, entrepreneurship, and more material goods per citizen. The goal has been to facilitate economic and technological change without promoting political destabilization.

The government is well aware of this dichotomy and has used the strategies that they

have employed elsewhere on the Internet to shape virtual game worlds with Chinese

characteristics and to address what are perceived to be the negative consequences of

online gaming. Games, like other areas of content, are also seen as a tool that can be

used to promote certain values seen as consistent with the CCP’s view of a

‘harmonious society’. It is a space that can propagandise the party line and promote

their interests, and values and content is made to promote that line. The strategies

include the shaping and development of content through investment, regulation and

the code used to construct games.

Regulations

Gaming regulations have mainly been aimed at curbing game addiction. There are

three main areas, name registration for online gamers, time limits on some games to

prevent over use, and a rating system for games. To some extent the rules governing

Internet café have been aimed at young gamers. The government’s rationale for the

regulation of online games has been mainly aimed at the prevention of addiction,

corruption and health issues. According to an official statement made in 2005 games

that “break the constitution, threaten national unity, sovereignty and territorial

integrity will be banned. Anything which threatens state security, damaging the

nation’s glory, disturbing social order and infringing on other’s legitimate rights will

also be banned” (Jenkins, 2006, n.p.).

In October 2006 it was announced that games would get a suitability rating so as to

“shield teenagers from online violence, pornography and terror, despite heavy

resistance from game producers”("Computer Games to Get Suitability Ratings,"

2006). The initial Green Game Assessment Meeting organized by the China Youth

Association for Network Development (CYAND), a government-sponsored civil

organization whose aim is to promote good online behavior, rated six of the most

popular computer games ("Computer Games to Get Suitability Ratings," 2006). At the


meeting they established the ‘green game criteria’ the rating that applied to games

suitable for players under the age of 18 ("Computer Games to Get Suitability

Ratings," 2006). The rating system at this stage is not legally binding.

In January 2007 President Hu Jintao ordered officials to “build a ‘healthy online

culture’ and to protect the government’s stability” (Powell, 2007, n.p.). Hu was

quoted in state media in April as urging Communist Party leaders to “curb the spread

of decadent and backward ideological and cultural material online” ("China to help

clean up the Internet," 2007). This was followed by a campaign in April 2007 that

sought to clean up the Internet and targeted pornography and violence. In July that

year it was announced that time limits on online games were to be introduced by the

General Administration of Press and Publication. China.org.cn said “the General

Administration of Press and Publication has decided to develop an anti-indulgence

system to control the unhealthy gaming habits of adolescents”(R. Zhang, 2007, n.p.).

The time limits are aimed directly at underage players and they must substantiate their

age when they log onto a game by using an official form of identification. After three

hours of continuous play an under age player will only receive fifty percent of the

points and upgrades earned after that time in a single day. “After five hours the player

receives no points or upgrades” ("Computer Games to Get Suitability Ratings," 2006).

Gamers tried to get around the time limit by opening up multiple accounts, but this

was thwarted by the introduction of real name identification and official forms of

identification. In June 2006 the General Administration of Press and Publications

announced that gamers would have to register their real names and provide

identification numbers to play Internet games ("Gamers to Register Real IDs," 2006).

Though technically there seems to be no real reason why real name registration was

not introduced for Bloggers it may well be that it was easier politically to impose this

on gamers as this sector of Internet users are children or teenagers and it had wide

support from parents. It is also further evidence that the government has the power to

impose restrictions on the Internet to some degree if they have the will to do so.

According to China.org.cn the introduction of time limits on games was seen as not

going far enough by some parents. China.org.cn said that “some parents suggested to

China.org.cn.cn that the real move should be to strengthen government departments’

scrutiny and administration on Internet café; otherwise, the so-called ‘anti-indulgence


system’ is not useful ("Computer Games to Get Suitability Ratings," 2006). The

development of content is to some extent shaped by code because this is what is used

to build and regulate behaviour and this in turn helps to shape content by defining

who users are, and what they are allowed to do.

Direct Investment & the Shaping of Content

Laurence Lessig argues that code is law and that online games such as MMOGs

represents a space that is regulated through code, as outlined in chapter 4. By this

Lessig means the architecture that is used to construct the virtual world of the game is

used to regulate the behaviour of gamers. He writes that “in MMOG space regulation

comes through code. Important rules are imposed, not through social sanctions, and

not by a state but by the very architecture of the particular space. A rule is defined,

not through a statute, but through the code that governs that space” (Lessig, 2006,

p.26). Lessig is not suggesting that the construction of MMOG space through code is

not subject to human agency, what he is suggesting is that it is important to look at

who writes the code and for whom, as a way of better understanding the means by

which the Internet and online games are regulated.

In the case of China most of the code writers are indirectly working for the

government as they are one of the biggest investors in this industry, and has such the

government has had a big hand in the shaping and development of online game

content. The government has heavily promoted and invested in the online games

industry. In 2003 online game technology was listed on the ‘863’ High-Tech Program

("Nation Promotes Home-made Online Game Business ", 2003), and in June 2004 the

State Administration of Press and Publication launched the National Online Game

Publishing Project to develop 100 online games by 2009 ("China to Develop Online

Games ", 2004) . The government has also set up four online game industry bases in

Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Sichuan ("China's online game industry enjoys

galloping development," 2006).

The promotion and investment in the online games market has two main themes,

economic development and the promotion of Chinese history and culture. Many of the

Chinese based news stories that I have looked at as research for this chapter involved

these two themes. Most stories that relate to investment and government promotion of


the industry talk about the size and potential growth of this sector of the economy and

then would add that the games developed in these programs would or should feature

Chinese history and culture. In 2004 a report on the official news portal

China.org.cn.cn35 said that:

The Chinese Internet games will have to feature Chinese culture, insiders

say. In another word, Chinese game developers should consider seriously

how to blend Chinese culture with homebred games.

Developers should make more efforts in turning China’s both traditional

and modern cultural resources into digital products and form an advantage

in Internet games, they suggest”("Millions of Chinese to Become Internet

Game Players in 2004 ", 2004).

China.org.cn.cn further outlined the justification of the government’s position in

relation to gaming and their objectives for the industry saying:

Chinese online game players will begin to meet new images other than the invariably blond figures. By the end of this year, 30 large-scale online games based on traditional Chinese legends will be issued to break the foreign monopoly in the online gaming market.

Shi Zongyuan, director of the State Administration of Press and Publication, said Tuesday that “the administration encouraged the making of large-scale online games and flash works based on China’s traditional culture, noting it would help the youngsters to gain deeper understanding of Chinese heritage” ("Made-in-China Online Games Available ", 2004).

In 2006 this line was still heavily promoted by Kou Xiaowei, Vice-Director of

GAPP’s A/V, Electronics, and Internet Administration Department, who said at the

2006 Online Gaming Conference in Chengdu that “the Asian market is very similar to

the Chinese market and is therefore ripe for the introduction of new products. In

addition, China has 5000 years of culture and history with a powerful appeal. In the

West traditional Chinese culture appears more and more in foreign gaming products

35 China.org.cn is run by the State Council, headed by the Premier Wen Jiabao and is highest executive organ of state power.


in the pursuit of the international market which also illustrates the charm of the

Chinese Market” (Kao, 2006).

In 2005 the Ministry of Culture collected what they called “homemade and healthy

online games for minors, to guide them to play with healthy entertainment

products”("Ministry of Culture Solicits Online Games for Minors," 2007). The

government;s position was summed up by Xu Jian, a professor of law and a senior

official with China Research Institute of Juvenile Delinquency, who said that the

“Internet has become an important part of modern society and serves as a good

instrument. It is imperative to standardize the web-related business, including online

games, rather than banning it”("Ministry of Culture Solicits Online Games for

Minors," 2007).

The shaping of game content is governed by the concerns of the government and their

main concern with gaming is the impact that it has on young people, the disruption

that it can have on schooling and in particular, what has been described as Internet

addiction. This is not just a concern for China, many countries are concerned about

the impact that Internet addiction has on young people, and specifically young men,

and this is used as the justification for the management of the gaming industry. The

breakdown of traditional life and its consequences are blamed on the addiction as

much as the technology itself in China. This was the case in 2002 when two teenage

boys were refused entry to an Internet café and later returned to deliberately set the

place on fire, resulting in the deaths of 24 people and the injury of 13 others. News of

the fire set off discussions on BBS and Chatrooms about the incident. When the boys

responsible for the fire were arrested the, People’s Daily reported that the main

concern was about social stability. The article said:

As soon as news of the arrest broke, China’s Internet chat rooms---one of

the freest public forums for discussions available to Chinese people---

erupted with shock, anger and concern about social stability. ‘This is not

an issue of Internet bars. It’s a problem in the education of our youth,’

said one writer. “These two boys were going to school. How can the

school allow them to have haircuts like that? ... Did the teachers and


principal bother to pay attention to them?” one participant asked ("Arrest

of Alleged Child Arsonists for Internet Cafe Fire Shocks China ", 2002).

The incident was used to unify the nation behind the CCP’s concerns about social

stability. This is in part done through stressing traditional Chinese values of filial

duty, and the importance of education, in a bid to demonise the technology and

Internet addiction. Code is the means by which the values deemed important by the

CCP are imbedded in the games. Code is also the means by which some of the

regulations are enforced, such as time outs and real name registration. The stressing of

traditional values is a theme taken up in the development and shaping of content. The

use of code to shape and develop online game worlds that are consistent with the

values of filial duty and the importance of education are then imbedded in the games

themselves and these are to a large extent directed by the CCP.

Propaganda

Though the government promotes the idea of Chinese culture and history as the main

focus of game development there have been other themes that have more obvious

propaganda features. Currently there are several games available that have obvious

propaganda characteristics; they are Incorruptible Warrior 清廉战士 and Learn from

Lei Feng 向雷锋同志学. A third game is being developed called Chinese Heroes

which will feature historical figures such as Lei Feng, and Zheng Chengong, a general

also known as Koxinga who seized Taiwan from Dutch colonial rule in 1661 ("China

heroes mark time before foreign Web game assault," 2006). These propaganda games

directly address government concerns and priorities. Both games seek to use the past

to serve the present, especially in the case of the Lei Feng game, and all feature strong

nationalistic themes. Kou Xiaowei, an official with China’s General Administration of

Press and Publication (GAPP), the main sponsor of the Chinese Heroes games, said

“we hope the game will teach players about Chinese ethics” ("Chinese Heroes vs.

World of Warcraft ", 2006).

Games often use the past and the present, for example Incorruptible Warrior allow

players to battle corrupt officials and their bikini-clad mistresses in a virtual world

with real world name places from Ningbo. Gamers are lead by characters from


China’s history and legends, including the first emperor Kangxi who ruled from 1661-

1772. In order to win the game players are required to learn government anti-

corruption measures and to kill corrupt officials while avoiding attacks by their

henchmen and their mistresses. The game was released on July 25 2007 and

reportedly attracted over 10,000 players by beginning of August ("Anti-corruption

game shut down after less than a month," 2007). It was so successful that the game

was shut down a month after its launch, by East China’s Ningbo Haishu District

Discipline Commission, so that it could be updated to accommodate more players as

the original version could only accommodate 600 players ("Anti-corruption game shut

down after less than a month," 2007).

Incorruptible Warrior mixes the past and the present by creating a contemporary

virtual world that addresses contemporary concerns but a world in which players are

guided by characters from Chinese history and legends. There are other games that

use the past to serve the present, such as Learn from Lei Feng and the popular

Fantasy Journey West. All of these games draw on historical figures as the characters

of the games. The object of the online game called Learn from Lei Feng is to do

enough good deeds to obtain Chairman Mao’s autograph, and the past is used to

promote values that are personified by Lei Feng. The mythical figure Lei Feng is an

iconic figure signifying altruism, and selflessness. The first ‘Learn from Comrade Lei

Feng’ campaign was launched by Mao in 1963, and he is still held up as the model

Chinese citizen. The story goes that at 20 he joined the People’s Liberation Army and

spent all his spare time and money helping the needy. Following his death at the age

of 22 his diary was published. Though his story has not been historically verified his

life is commemorated every year on March 5.

The Learn from Lei Feng game in this context is a remote and interactive Lei Feng

campaign, which uses features commonly found on other games, such as treasure

hunts and users must complete a number of tasks before moving to the next level, and

there is little violence. Learn from Lei Feng, like the campaigns that have borne his

name in the real world, is based on the themes of hard work, leading a simple life and

showing a willingness to help others ("Lei Feng becomes online game hero," 2006).

To earn points a player must darn socks, volunteer on building sites and fight some

enemy agents. When your health gets low you go and talk to the party secretary to be


revived. As the game progresses your clothes become plainer and the treasure hunt is

for a copy of Chairman Mao’s collected works. This is more evidence of the way in

which temporal and cultural concerns are used to address contemporary issues.

Nationalism

There are more overt forms of nationalism in Chinese computer games. A most

notable example is a game called Anti-Japan War Online, which was developed with

the Communist Youth League (CCLY). The game uses the past to serve the interest of

the present in the same way that Incorruptible Warrior and Learn from Lei Feng do.

Xinhua reported “the game will allow players, especially younger players, to learn

from history. They will get a patriotic feeling when fighting invaders to safeguard

their motherland” (""Anti-Japan War Online" game to hit the market," 2005).

According to Xinhua, CCLY said in a statement “that few games on the Chinese

market today generate a "national spirit" that can educate young players. As a result,

the CCYL will actively partner with online gaming companies to jointly develop

"patriotic" online games. “Anti-Japan War Online’ is a patriotic online game that is

both interesting and instructive, and can attract and guide young players” (""Anti-

Japan War Online" game to hit the market," 2005). The CCYL is also developing

other online games with similar historical and nationalistic themes, these include titles

such as Sim Battle: Long March, Sim Battle: Blue Helmet China and Sim Battle: Sky

Dragon (""Anti-Japan War Online" game to hit the market," 2005).

China is not the only country to engage in this kind of development. The United

States Army has developed an online game called America’s Army, and claims to use

state of the art training simulation technology as part of the game. The game first

launched in 2002 and owned by the United States government can be accessed from

some official Defence Department websites. America’s Army is used for ‘public

relations’ purposes, and is a part of the army’s recruitment strategies. According to

the games website ("America's Army Game," 2007):

America’s Army provides civilians with an inside perspective and a virtual role in today’s premier land force: the U.S. Army. The game is designed to provide an accurate portrayal of Soldier experiences. The game is an entertaining way for young adults to be educated about the U.S. Army and see some of the career opportunities available to Soldiers in the U.S. Army — all this as a virtual Soldier. America’s Army emphasizes teamwork, values and responsibility as means to achieving the goals.


Propaganda in this form is directed from a single central point and can be accessed

remotely from multiple locations. It is private and public at the same time. Public

because the Internet is a public space as are MMORG’s and private because it can be

accessed from private locales. Accessing MMORG’s from Internet café is access and

participation in a public space. Propaganda directed from a single point in the form of

online games helps to reinforce Beijing’s position as the central source of authority

and directing its view to the margins who in this case are the gamers themselves.

Online Protests and Nationalism Online games are sites in which nationalist sentiments are often expressed by gamers

themselves36. In recent years there have been a number of online protests involving

gamers in China. Generally protests involve in-game issues. An example of this

amongst Chinese gamers was a “mass suicide” protest in the World of Warcraft

(WoW) against the government’s decision to introduce fatigue shutdowns (Jenkins,

2006, n.p.).

Fantasy Journey West 梦幻西游 (FJW) was launched in 2004, and according to

Netease’s website at its peak there have been more than 180,000 concurrent users

("Fantasy Westward Journey,"). On July 4 in 2006 an incident occurred in the game

that sparked one of the world’s largest online protests. A player’s avatar in the game

was locked up in a virtual prison and the guild that he founded was dissolved. The

player’s avatar was called ‘Kill the Japs’ (干死 4 小日本) and his guild- with 700

members one of the top 5 in the game, was called ‘The Alliance To Resist Japan’ (抗

日同盟会). The prison is called ‘The Great Tang Permanent Incarceration Prison’ (大

唐永禁). In a statement Netease ("Freedom of Identity, Speech and Assembly on the

Internet," 2007) said:

Although the names of individuals, guilds, stalls, shops, pets and beasts may be chosen as you wish, Netease is running a healthy and green game. In order to maintain the purity and harmony in the game world, Netease will not permit any names that include (but this list is not restricted solely to) those that attack, insult or mislead with respect to

36 See the work TL Taylor on WOW in which she argues that guilds on the European English Server have formed around national identities (T. L. Taylor, 2006).


race, nationality, national politics, national leaders, obscenity, vulgarity, libel, threat, religions and religious figures.

If found and verified, the following penalties may be imposed:

Warning;Loss of speech rights;Change of name;Forced offline;Temporary quarantine;Permanent quarantine;Dissolution of guild.

Netease offered further explanation and defence of their decision with the following statement:

In changing the name of an individual player or handling the case of an individual guild, we do not want to cause any unhappiness to people. We do not want such an incident to affect the patriotism of everybody. But this is a game. When we operate this game, we follow the state’s regulations on Internet administration and we are monitored by the National Internet Supervisory Bureau. People come here to experience joy, and we therefore emphasize health, relaxation and happiness and we should not bring in politically sensitive topics. The experience of history tells us that patriotism should be expressed rationally under the grand theme of protecting the interests of the nation and the people. Patriotism requires passion, but it requires rationality even more so. Passion and rationality form our correct way of expressing our patriotism ("Freedom of Identity, Speech and Assembly on the Internet," 2007).

At the time of the of the jailing and the banning of the guild there were rumours

circulating that the game was to be sold off to Japanese interest, and that they were

making changes to the game. For example there were rumours that Chinese lion

statues, often found guarding the entrances to buildings and traditionally a symbol of

unity and the Emperor, would be turned into pigs (Jenkins, 2006, n.p.). On July 7 a

symbol on a wall in the game kicked off China’s largest protests involving around

10,000 gamers (Soong, 2006, n.p.). The symbol was in a section of the game called

the Jianye city government office and was thought by many players to have a close

resemblance to the Japanese ‘rising sun’ flag. See fig 10 below. July 7 coincides with

the date of the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge incident which is often recognised as the

beginning of the Sino-Japanese War and the war in the Pacific in World War 2. This

is a sensitive date and is commemorated by the nation each year. The protest stands in


stark contrast to the official celebrations of the date which involved an exhibition at

the bridge. ("Citizens cherish memory of Lugouqiao Incident," 2006).

Figure 10 Screen Capture of protesters assembling on The Fantasy Journey West

(Soong, 2006, n.p.)

Avatars representing gamers from across the nation milled around an area of the game

known as the ‘Summer Palace’ to express their anger. The screen capture below

(fig11) shows the protest and the IDs of all the disgruntled gamers (Soong, 2006, n.p.)

Figure 11 Screen Capture of largest online game protest


(Soong, 2006, n.p.)

In response to this Netease explained that the rising sun motif was based on a classic

Chinese painting, "Sunrise in the East," and was intended to reflect aspects of

traditional Chinese culture. The picture below was also posted by Netease (fig 12).

Figure 12

(Soong, 2006, n.p.)


In Netease’s defence the company posted the following on its website:

... We appreciate everybody’s patriotism. Like everybody else, we deeply remember the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Marco Polo Bridge incident, the Nanjing massacre, the Diaoyutai issue and so on. These solemn histories make us want to become stronger because we are all Chinese. Patriotism is a form of respect, and it is a belief. Patriotism is the soul of our people, it is the soul of our nation. But we sincerely hope that everybody’s patriotic actions are rational. We hope and we believe that everybody can make rational expressions ("Freedom of Identity, Speech and Assembly on the Internet," 2007).

Jenkins argues that “What’s striking about the protest march in FWJ and Neteases’s

response to the protest is the degree to which all involved saw issues of national

honour and patriotism as at stake in this dispute. This wasn’t a struggle over an in-

game asset: it was a struggle about how the game fit within larger debates about

Chinese nationalism and about the country’s relations to Japan” (Jenkins, 2006, n.p.).

Indeed it became another site in which the tensions between China and Japan were

played out. Centre margin relationships were played out between China and Japan and

the Central government and gamers. The extent to which anti-Japanese sentiments can

be expressed often reveal the tensions the CCP has with invoking nationalist

sentiments, its relationship to history and its use in the management of internal centre

margin relationships, those between the government and Chinese citizens and the

external spatial relationships between China and Japan. There is a point where the

internal Chinese expression of nationalistic and anti-Japanese sentiments can be

expressed before they start to do harm to China’s relationship with Japan. Japan is a

big trading partner and the source of many tourists. Xu Wu (2006) points out several

incidents where the relationship between the two countries has deteriorated due to the

expression of online nationalistic and anti-Japanese sentiments. Wu (2006, p.80)

writes that:

The growing influence of the online public opinion made Chinese government’s Japan policy decision making more complicated. In addition to politics and pride, the CCP leaders had to consider economics and stability. When these two forces collide, as it is often the case in the Sino-Japan relationship, the leaders had to make a tough decision, quickly and unequivocally. However, no opposition seemed to be both politicallycorrect and economically beneficial. In reality the Chinese leaders had to play a tricky game and double-faced political game. Publicly, the CCP


government stood firmly behind the cyber nationalist groups. Privately, however, the leaders managed to put a leash on those increasingly unruly activists.

For the CCP it is about the management of a number of competing interests that

manifest itself as centre margin relationships, and these interactions are played out via

the Internet.

WoW with Chinese CharacteristicsThe virtual worlds of gamers are spaces in which national communities are articulated

and imagined. Games that can be played internationally such as the MMORPG

World of Warcraft (WoW) have multiple servers around the world running games in

different languages and are an example of the negotiation of centre margin

relationships on an international level. Global and local interests are negotiated

between the company that runs WoW and the locales in which it can be accessed. It is

not the same game all over the world. For example in China the company Blizzard

that runs WoW has a local partner to run the game. The game and its adaptation to the

Mainland market have been fraught with tensions. Examination of these tensions

reveals the negotiation of centre margin relationships that take place within real space.

Specifically this relates to the management of the flow of information and the

articulation of Chinese national identity, such examinations reveals the CCP’s

negotiation with gamers and their ability to participate and create these imagined

spaces of national identity and the government’s commitment to managing that

identity, through the management of informational flows through regulation,

investment, and the way in which code is shaped to achieve the desired identity.

World of Warcraft (WoW) and other internationally played games have been modified

to suit the Chinese market. In June 2004 a censorship committee was set up to look at

the content of games more closely after a game from Sweden, Hearts of Iron, depicted

Tibet, Xinjiang and Manchuria as independent nations ("China censors online video

games," 2004). The Norwegian game Project IGI2: Covert Strike outraged officials

because of the way in which the Chinese military was characterized. The justification

for censorship was “online games with content threatening state security, damaging

the nation’s glory, disturbing social order and infringing on other’s legitimate rights


will also be prohibited,” said Tuo Zuhai an official with the Ministry of Culture

("China censors online video games," 2004). Tou Zhuai said that “the Ministry of

Culture will import some foreign online games whose contents accord with Chinese

national conditions and bring positive effects to young people’s mentality”("China

censors online video games," 2004).

The popular MMORPG World of Warcraft has had a rocky relationship with China

and has been involved in a two of law suits. One involved the suicide of a young

gamer and the second involves the alleged theft of character fonts. The game has 8.5

million players worldwide and more than 3.5million of those are in China ("Bones,

skeletons buried in Chinese version of fantasy game," 2007). In July 2007 the WoW

game was modified to suit Chinese conditions. Skeleton characters in the Chinese

version of the game had their bones covered in flesh, and bones that signify dead

characters were changed to graves ("Bones, skeletons buried in Chinese version of

fantasy game," 2007). The changes triggered criticism from users on official WoW. In

a report from the People’s Daily Online “an employee of the public relations

department of The9, which runs WoW in China, was quoted by Guangzhou-based

Southern Metropolis Daily as saying the changes were made according to "China’s

particular situation and relevant regulations. It’s to promote a healthy and harmonious

on-line environment," the staff member said ("Bones, skeletons buried in Chinese

version of fantasy game," 2007). Figures 13 & 14 show the changes made to the WoW

game for the Chinese audience. Censorship in this case is not just aimed at developing

content that is seen as favourable by the Chinese government, it is also a way of

shaping the level of foreign content and reducing the influence of foreign producers

so as to develop the industry in China. In economic terms it is a form of

protectionism, and within the theoretical framework for this thesis it is also about the

management of time and space, that is the creation of a Chinese version of time in the

way that the virtual reality is constructed and the management of the virtual space

with Chinese characteristics.


Figure 13 Harmonised Skeletons in the WoW

(Soong, 2007, n.p.)

Figure 14 Graves in WoW signifying the dead


(Soong, 2007, n.p.)

World of Warcraft has also spawned virtual factories where people in China work for

up to 12 hours per day playing the game in order to collect gold in the game to sell on

to gamers in the USA for hard currency. Below is a screen shot from one of the many

websites devoted to this kind of trade.

Figure 15

("Cheap World of WarCraft Gold, Buy World of Warcraft Gold," 2007)

In March 2007 the government began to crack down on the trade of virtual money

after concerns were raised that it could be a mechanism to launder money or involve

other illicit trade. There was also speculation that the trade could complicate “the

government’s ability to control the flow of real currency, and the central bank has

issued a warning about the use of virtual money” ("China cracks down on 'virtual

money' ", 2007).

Gold farming has caused a lot of controversy within the WoW game and is at times

the source of nationalistic tensions among gamers (T. L. Taylor, 2006). T.L. Taylor

describes the suspicion with which certain characters are treated and stereotyped


within the game based on certain characters in the game and their command of

English. Taylor writes that “the issue is not only the imagined ethnic construction of

the player harvesting in-game resources but that those who do not have a command of

English and are hunting in a particular area may be automatically assumed to be hired

worker” (T. L. Taylor, 2006, p. 332).

The outsourcing of leisure activities in this way may be viewed as a new spatial

relationships that have their origins in the management of time. In this case the time

poor and resource rich gamers in the USA and Europe are able to use contract labour

in China. This kind of interaction has produced a new form of economic relationship

that is governed to some extent by individuals, rather than large corporations. The real

money trade (RMT) is made outside of the game and is mediated by individuals in

different locales.

Conclusion

As this sector of the Internet gets larger it will become more significant as a cultural

space and like other cultural spaces in China it will remain under the management of

the CCP. As Jenkins puts it, “arguably, the Chinese government’s efforts to regulate

game playing -- and to promote games as part of the national culture -- have

transformed what might have been a mere pass-time into a more politically charged

environment” (Jenkins, 2006, n.p.). Online games and the addition of Chinese cultural

and historical content are seen as vital to the promotion of the industry in China.

Online games are the creation of another space in which the CCP view of China and

its identity can be constructed and imagined, and though this is interactive and gamers

are active in the construction of identity through participation it is still bounded by the

CCP. The content of the online games is managed through the laws and regulations

that govern this sector and the code that is used to construct the games. Innis’s work

was concerned with appraising and considering the attitude and the role of time in

economic history in regards to communications technology.


C h a p t e r 1 0

“It was SARS that made the Chinese authorities aware of the importance of protecting the public’s right to know and the dangers and risks of a possible government cover-up. This year, the Chinese media did not hesitate to report big events like the severe winter weather in southern China, the Lhasa riot on March 14, and the derailment and collision of passenger trains in Shandong Province on April 28” ("Commentary: Quick media response reveals transparent gov't in China," 2008).

In order to understand the impact of the Internet on informational flows in China it is

necessary to look at, the ways in which various groups use the technology, including

the CCP. The above quote from an editorial in the Peoples Daily37 acknowledges the

challenge to the containment of information in light of the development of the

Internet. Information flows are managed in China so as to reinforce and preserve the

CCP’s monopoly over political power. The preservation of power in relation to the

Internet is in part maintained through the development and management of content

and this is shaped by regulation and the architecture used to construct the Internet.

Content is further shaped by limiting the number of news sources, a high level of

investment in content by the Government, and the use of media campaigns aimed at

shaping policy in particular ways. This is further supplemented by the government

through the use of government sponsored commentators who appear on BBS,

chatrooms and Blogs. The strategies employed by the CCP to manage the

consequences of the Internet have allowed the party to adapt to a changing

information environment where their traditional modes of control were no longer

viable.

The Internet and the CCP’s adaptation to its consequences cannot be studied in

isolation and must be contextualized within specific historical and political

circumstances. For example, the Open Door Policy has permeated every aspect of

Chinese life and its consequences are both social and physical. These consequences

underlie most of the changes taking place within China including the development of

the Internet, and are based on view that China must develop at all costs and driven by

37 The editorial was repeated on a number of websites including the CCTV website, the Peoples Liberation Army Daily, and on the Sina website. Xinhua also carried a similar editorial.


an economic imperitive. Deibert (1997, p. 29) argues that “we must underscore the

“social embeddness” of technology. We must place greater emphasis on the historical

and social context in which technologies are introduced, an insight most forcefully

made by social constructivists of technology”. This is because synergistically one

informs the other through the interplay between society and modes of communication.

In order to look at the interplay between society and modes of communication I have

utilized the concepts of medium theory, particularly the works of Harold A. Innis. The

theoretical framework takes into account the interaction between the interests of those

who control the flow of knowledge and the medium through which knowledge is

disseminated. Innis (1952, p. 74) said that:

I have attempted elsewhere to develop the thesis that civilization has been dominated at different stages by various media of communication such as clay, papyrus, parchment and paper produced first from rags and then from wood. Each medium has its significance for the type of script, and in turn for the type of monopoly of knowledge which will be built and which will destroy the conditions suited to creative thought and be displaced by a new medium with its peculiar type of monopoly of knowledge.

The interplay between society and the Internet and the interplay between time and

space has been mapped out via the examples of this thesis. My final examples are the

riots and the crackdown in Tibet 2008 and the earthquake in Sichuan, two events

which have occurred since the main research for this thesis was undertaken. These

events best illustrate how well the CCP has adapted to the new media environment

and the success they have had in managing the consequences of the Internet. While it

is beyond the scope of this conclusion to analyze these events in depth it is worth

noting that both incidents highlight the limits to what can and cannot be said and

underscored the effectiveness of the management of the Internet. These two events

have been used to rally the country behind the CCP as the saviors of the nation so as

to reinforce their authority over the country. In the case of the Tibet the riots the

regime was backed by a cacophony of support that echoed throughout the Mainland

Internet and in the case of the earthquake united the nation behind the government led

rescue efforts.


The Chinese media coverage of the earthquake in Sichuan in May 2008 was marked

by its apparent openness, and as such would make an excellent case study. The

coverage of disasters and accidents is the most significant change I have observed,

and the changes are apparent in the Chinese media coverage of the earthquake. The

government was quick to respond to most aspects the coverage of the quake,

including frequent updates on the number of casualties and the areas affected. Xinhua

and China Central Television (CCTV) interrupted programming to run 24 hour

coverage of the disaster. The disaster was used to rally the people around the CCP and

to promote further openness. The handling of the earthquake was an opportunity for

the CCP to show that they were following through on the Law on Emergency

Responses enacted in November 2007 and the Provisions on the Disclosure of

Government Information, which took effect on the 1st of May 2008 in much the same

way that they did during the Black Kiln Incident. Interestingly the Law on Emergency

Responses erased a provision from the final draft which prohibited the media from

reporting accidents as they emerged ("Commentary: Quick media response reveals

transparent gov't in China," 2008), while the Provisions on the Disclosure of

Government Information is meant to “improve transparency and protect the right to

know and public scrutiny of official acts” ("Commentary: Quick media response

reveals transparent gov't in China," 2008). On May 29 Hu Jintao (Bandurski, 2008b,

n.p.) said that,

1. Chinese media, particularly state media, must “keep a firm grasp” on initiative in reporting.2. China needs to raise the effectiveness of news, reporting at the first available moment.3. China needs to increase the transparency of news reporting. 4. China needs to utilize the strengths of all kinds of media, including the Internet and the mobile phone network.

The development and the improvements in the transparency of the reporting of

disasters has enabled Beijing as the centre to take the upper hand in reinforcing its

position of authority over the provincial governments at the margins, and thus enables

Beijing to take control over the narrative of events. This has been evident in many of

the examples used throughout this thesis where provincial governments have sought

to cover up information from the central government. These examples have also

highlighted the tensions and negotiations of centre/margin relationships. David


Bandurski (2008b) of the Chinese Media Project argues that the apparent transparency

on the reporting of disasters is a more nuanced strategy for maintaining control over

the media. He writes that:

This means, essentially, that leaders have recognized the disadvantage of hitting hard with control initially, and then opening up only after pressure has been applied (by the public, by international media, etc.). SARS in 2003 was the perfect example of this, and Tibet arguably was too. By moving first (先发制人 for you Sun Tzu fans) with timely reporting, the government can, to a certain degree, control the direction of coverage more effectively.

Examples in this thesis such as the Black Kiln Incident, Chongqing nailhouse, the

protests over the Xiamen PX (paraxylene) plant in Fujian, are often hailed as a sign

that the Internet will force China to become more democratic. Much has been made of

the democratizing potential of the Internet because it is mythologized that the

technology is uncontrollable. If China’s political processes are becoming more open

the Internet is only one aspect of that process and it is because the CCP wants and has

allowed this, it’s not simply as a result of the development of the technology. The

adherence to the Open Door Policy is behind the opening up of the economy and any

attempts to reform the political system, and at present the current leadership of the

CCP remain committed to this ideal, in principle at least.

Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007 called for reform of the political

system and increased forms of public participation in the political process, and

following his speech some experimentation at the margins has begun. On the

concluding day of the annual session of the National Peoples Congress in March 2007

Premier Wen Jiabao said “we must promote reform in the political system. We should

work to diffuse concentration of power and enhance public supervision of the

government. All the decisions on administrative approval, particularly those

concerning the interests of the general public, must be made in an open, fair and

transparent way” ("Officials have no power except for the people," 2007).

Debate on some issues relating to the Internet appear to be opening up, for example

there appears to be a degree of open debate about the introduction of real name


registration for Bloggers and online gamers. There was also some open resistance to

these proposals originally and in the end the final regulations have been watered

down. The Internet provides a window on public opinion and is being used to promote

a CCP version of democracy that involves a higher degree of public consultation.

There is some opening of the political process and there seems to be an increasing

level of public consultation, though the degree to which this is being done is hard to

gauge as in some instances it looks as though it is still heavily staged managed. This

was evident in the case of the nail house and the property law that was established.

The Starbucks incident in the Forbidden City was stage managed, and many aspect of

the Brick Kiln incident were stage managed in the media. It is worth re-stating at this

point that 60% of Internet users are aged between 18-35 and most of those are urban

dwellers, so it is really only a narrow window on public opinion ((CNNIC), 2008).

There is a dialectic of desire and control for the technology that is represented in both

Western and Chinese media and that dialectic is managed in order to maintain social

order, or as it is often put by the current leadership of the CCP, as the promotion of a

‘harmonious society’. The promotion of a harmonious society is like a grand narrative

for all policy objectives not just within the cultural sector but all sectors of society and

the economy. It is also about Hu Jintao putting his stamp on the Chinese political

landscape for the future.

All countries connected to the Internet are grappling with the dialectic of desire and

control, as all governments that want the Internet also have to deal with what they

perceive to be the negative consequences of the technology. In the USA it is feared

that terrorists will use the Internet to attack the country, in Germany and France it is

feared that the Internet will be used to promote racial unrest. In all cases there seems

to be the fear that the Internet has the potential to create social unrest; China is not

alone on that score. The main priority of the CCP is the preservation of their position

as the rulers of the PRC, as they steer the country through a tumultuous change that

involves all aspects of Chinese society and culture and not just what appears on the

Internet. What the Internet does is to reveal gaps through which images and voices

can escape, and when they do the CCP looks for a way to close the gap. At the same

time the Internet is used to promote and to preserve the CCP’s position by absorbing

the Internet into existing methods of managing information by perpetuating the CCP


line. Essentially this thesis maps the dialectic and the process via looking at the

strategies that the CCP has used to grapple with the consequences of the use and

adoption of the technology. That is through code, content and legislation.

The main way that the CCP has sought to preserve their position through the

maintenance of the flow of Information on the Internet is through the architecture or

code that is used to construct the Internet and through the legal framework. Both these

mechanisms are used to shape the content. The architecture has surveillance points

built into it to prevent certain types of information from going in or out of the PRC.

The Golden Shield Project is a remote surveillance system that will have face

recognition capabilities and the be able to monitor phone calls and be linked to

databases with immediate access to the registration records of every Chinese citizen

To support this further there is an army of people engaged in surveillance and

regulation of what can and cannot be said by deleting postings on BBS and steering

conversations towards a government sanctioned point of view. The legal framework is

also used to shape content by defining legally what can and cannot be said. In addition

to this there has been heavy investment in the development of content. The main

source of content and news in particular comes from official government sources, and

in the gaming sector there has also been a high level of investment. Even the most

popular BBS is run by the Peoples Daily Strong Nation Forum Qianggou 强国.

The limits of censorship and the boundaries of what can be said are constantly being

tested. In addition to this, civil liberties groups in the west are attempting to facilitate

free speech through projects that aim to provide Chinese netizens, and other Internet

users in countries where there are high levels of control, web browsing tools to

circumnavigate government filters and to access unfiltered Internet access. The list of

topics that seem to be permanently banned are the Dali Lama, Taiwan independence,

Falun Gong, Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 freedom of speech and access to

Marxist sites. Despite the concerted efforts of groups in the West to facilitate more

open access for Chinese netizens the Great Firewall remains, and by and large it does

so because the CCP want it that way. As Goldsmith and Wu argue “as the China

example shows, a government’s failure to crack down on certain types of Internet


communication ultimately reflects a failure of interest or will, not a failure of power”

(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006b, p. 89).

The case studies have mapped the dialectic of control and desire for the technology

for its economic benefits and the perceived need to control the technology for the

CCP’s political purposes. This is particularly evident in the development of online

games, where the games are promoted as an economic gain and demonised as the

cause of addiction and the erosion of traditional values. The promotion of blogs has

been much more conservative. However they are seen to some extent as a vehicle for

government opinion. The incidents that make up these case studies have shown the

CCP allows protests to flourish when the demands are consistent with the party and

their policies; and when they are not they are silenced. The Belgrade Embassy

bombing, the spy plane incident, the mine accidents and slavery incident and the

Starbucks in the Forbidden City are all incidents when public opinion matched the

wishes of the CCP. As the case studies show, the incidents where there seems to be

some simpatico of public opinion and the wishes of the CCP, in particular incidents

that strike a chord with nationalists sentiments there is a certain amount of freedom of

expression. Such incidents include the embassy bombing, the spy plane incident and

the Starbucks issue. This lies in stark contrast to the absence of any alternative view to

that of the government and the continued practice of locking up political activists.

The case studies are also illustrative of the double rearticulation of the CCP’s position

in a number of areas, as all these incidents were played out to some degree in the

international media as well as specific mediaspheres in the USA and in China. The

Belgrade bombing and the spy plane are the most obvious here, as to some degree the

negotiations and the diplomacy was played out in the media of both countries. The

role of the media in an international incident such as these is a moment when the

audience is not just ordinary citizens but another opportunity to define and speak with

the other. What marks the space of the Internet here is that the incident is played out

at the official and unofficial level, but in the case of China the unofficial is closely

defined and shaped by the CCP.

Western News coverage of these events often held up the use of the Internet as some

sort of proof of the power of the technology to shape public opinion and shift public


policy, and though superficially there seems to have been some shifts in public policy

as a consequence of these incidents they were all engineered to some extent by the

CCP, in particular the debate about the location of Starbucks in the Forbidden City.

The blog that kicked off the debate again in January 2007 was by the high profile Rui

Chengeng CCTV news anchor on CCTV4 and columnist for the Beijing Youth Daily,

and his blog is attached to the channel’s website. By virtue of his position this man

knows what a safe topic is. The blog is a part of his job and as such is sanctioned the

CCP because it is attached to CCTV, and the Beijing Youth Daily was founded by the

Communist Youth League and is owned by the Beijing Municipal Government. “

The Brick Kiln incident in which an estimated 600 adults and 29 children were freed

from slavery in Henan and Shanxi coincided with a crackdown on the use of child

labour in the lead up to the 2008 Olympics. This incident should also be viewed

within the wider context of anti corruption campaigns and crackdowns on unsafe and

illegal mines and factories and the use of slave labour. As Xinhua put it “it is high

time the government stepped up labour protection and spurred idle officials to do their

jobs properly if we are to come even close to building a “harmonious society”

(Xinhua, 2007). So even though the incident was sparked by the online letter signed

by 400 fathers it was allowable and used publicly to promote a view sanctioned by the

CCP, and of course Xinhua is a party mouthpiece.

The Falun Gong demonstrations and the aftermath of the Jianxi school explosion were

not of any use to the government in terms of advancing an existing campaign or

consensus building for a particular issue. These incidents constitute more serious gaps

in the Great Firewall because both incidents represent the boundaries of freedom of

expression in the PRC as defined by the CCP. In both cases the CCP was caught off

guard, but they were effectively able to swiftly silence those involved. It is easier to

define these incidents as public dissent because the CCP was opposed to the position

taken by those involved. The strategies of informational containment have been

applied in other instances such as the Huaxi riots in 2005 covered in chapter five.

There is a shift from a mode that is dominated by traditional propaganda to a method

based on modern western political spin, where public opinion and perceptions are

directed through careful stage management of events and their subsequent portrayal in


the media. As such China is not moving towards western style democracy but is

moving towards a state corporatist or bureaucratic authoritarian system that is similar

to Singapore, and politics and public life will continue to be scripted and stage

managed. Cracks will no doubt continue to appear, but the CCP has adapted to the

changing media environment that has been facilitated by the development of the

Internet.

Ultimately it will not be the Internet alone that will act as a catalyst for reforms to the

political system. The Beijing Olympics and China’s increasing participation in

international affairs, both politically and economically, has also had a big impact on

pushing the CCP towards reforming the political system. Following Steven

Spielberg’s resignation from the Olympic Games over China’s involvement with the

Sudanese government, the CCP renewed talks with the USA on human rights. In

April 2007 the ‘Open Government Regulations’ were adopted that promise “public

access to information on a range of issues including government spending, drug and

food safety, and land seizures” ("Road of free information flow cautious but resolute

", 2007). The regulations take effect in May, three months before the commencement

of the Beijing Olympics. The games has thrown China into the centre of the

international stage and highlighted the arrest of dissidents such as Hu Jia and Zheng

Jinyan, the CCP’s involvement with the Government in Dafur and the appalling level

of pollution in the nation’s capital. The CCP’s response to this has been to call for the

games not to be politicized, while responding to some aspects and continuing with

business as usual with others. China’s relationship with the international community

is mapped out via the media and this becomes the site or vehicle through which centre

margin relationships can be viewed.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

(CNNIC), C. I. N. I. C. (1997). 1st Survey Report: China Internet Network Information Center.

(CNNIC), C. I. N. I. C. (2007). The 20th CNNIC Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China. Retrieved August 2007, 2007, from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/download/2007/20thCNNICreport-en.pdf

(CNNIC), C. I. N. I. C. (2008). Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008) (No. 21). Beijing: China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC).

ABC Online gets China's okay. (2002, Posted: Wed, 24 Apr 2002 19:13 AEST). 2002, from http://search.abc.net.au/search/cache.cgi?collection=abcall&doc=http/www.abc.net.au/news/justin/nat/newsnat-24apr2002-94.htm

Access Denied Map: Mapping Web 2.0 Censorship. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/maps/

America's Army Game. (2007). Retrieved 12/9/07, 2007, from http://www.goarmy.com/aarmy/

Anderson, B. (1993). Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Revised ed.). London: Verso.

Anti-AIDS Leader Freed. (2002). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Sep/43727.htm

Anti-corruption game shut down after less than a month. (2007, 28/8/07). China Daily Retrieved 28/8/07, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/28/content_6062692.htm

"Anti-Japan War Online" game to hit the market. (2005, 12/9/07). Xinhua News Agency, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-08/31/content_3426802.htm

Arrest of Alleged Child Arsonists for Internet Cafe Fire Shocks China (2002, June 2002). People's Daily Online Retrieved Thursday, June 20, 2002 from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200206/20/eng20020620_98229.shtml

Bagchi, I. (2008, 5/05/08). China mounts cyber attacks on Indian sites. Retrieved 5/5/08, 2008, from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3010288,prtpage-1.cms

Bandurski, D. (2007a). Chinese leaders meditate loudly on the philosophy of censorship as 17th Congress nears. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://cmp.hku.hk/2007/08/30/584/

Bandurski, D. (2007b). “ Tolerance evaporates ” : Editors from two ill-fated journals try in vain to reason with Chinese authorities. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://cmp.hku.hk/2007/12/06/766/

Bandurski, D. (2008a, 14/08/08). China’s Guerrilla War for the Web. Far Eastern Economic Review, from http://www.feer.com/essays/2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web

Bandurski, D. (2008b). Guangdong journalists recalled from the earthquake zone. Retrieved 5/6/08, 2008, from http://cmp.hku.hk/2008/06/04/1047/

Barboza, D. (2008). Bloggers Push China to Prosecute Beating Death Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/world/asia/18china.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print


Berkman Center for Internet & Society Harvard Law School. (2002, September 24, 2002). Replacement of Google with Alternative Search Systems in China Documentation and Screen Shots. from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china/google-replacements/

Beyrer, C., & Csete , J. (2003). An epidemic of denial. Harvard International Review 25(2), 64.

Bezlova, A. (2005). HEALTH: CHINA BEGINS WAKING UP TO THE SPECTER OF HIV/AIDS. Global Information Network

Blog censorship handbook released. (2007). Journal, (2005/09/22 11:05:31 GMT). ‘Retrieved from’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/4271062.stm

Bones, skeletons buried in Chinese version of fantasy game. (2007, July 2007). People's Daily Online Retrieved 12/07/07, 2007, from http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/90875/6213865.pdf

Boyle, J. (1997). Foucault In Cyberspace:Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors Retrieved 28 May 2006, 2006, from http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/Brady, A.-M. (2002). Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of

Propaganda in the PRC. International Journal 57(4, Autumn 2002.).Brady, A.-M. (2006). Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda

Department in the Current Era. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 31(Spring), 58-77.

Bristow, M. (2007). Web dissent on the rise in China. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7045744.stm

Buruma, I. (1999). China in Cyberspace. November 4 1999. Retrieved 29/10/1999, from http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/wwwfeatdisplay.cgi?199991104009f

Cai, J. (2006). CHINA: Internet patrol system extended. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp? parentid=45562

Carey, J. W. (1989). Space Time and Communications: A Tribute to Harold Innis. In Hyams (Ed.), Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society. London: Unwin.

cDc launches global campaign against Google. (2006). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.cultdeadcow.com/archives/2006/02/cdc_launches_global_.php3

Central government forms work team to investigate into "slave labor" incident. (2007). Journal, (09:39, June 16, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/200706/16/eng20070616_384858.html

Chase, M., & Mulvenon, J. (2002). You've Got Dissent! Chinese Dissidencts Use of the Internet and Beijing's Counter-Strategies Santa Monica: RAND

Cheap World of WarCraft Gold, Buy World of Warcraft Gold. (2007, 2007 ). Retrieved 15/09/07, 2007, from http://www.world-of-warcraft-gold.com/

Chen, K., & Fowler, G. A. (2006). Microsoft Defends Censoring a Dissident's Blog in China Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2006/01/microsoft_defends_censoring_a_dissidents_blog_in_china.php

Chen, Q. (2005, June 10, 2005). China's 'Safesurf' Website Turns One. 2006, from http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_Text?info_id=131614&p_qry=in...

Chen, W. (2007). The Nailhouse Case and the Birth of Citizen Journalism. Journal, (March 29, 2007.). ‘Retrieved from’ http://zonaeuropa.com/20070331_1.htm


China's anti-hacking alliance regrouped. (2005). Journal, (24/04/05). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/26/print20050426_182719.html

China's First Authorized News Website Launched. (2000). Journal. ‘Retrieved. doi:RN: A59903560

China's main blog service providers subscribe to self-discipline code (2007). Journal, (09:03, August 22, 2007 ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/6245199.html

China's online game industry enjoys galloping development. (2006, 15/9/07). People's Daily Online Retrieved 08:21, January 12, 2006, from http://english.people.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234786.html

China's online game industry on a roll. (2007, 2007-04-13 ). China Daily Retrieved13/07/07, 2007, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/13/content_850411.htm

China's parliament starts annual session with focus on social harmony. (2007, 13:13, March 05, 2007). People's Daily Online. Retrieved June 2007, 2007, from http://english.people.com.cn/200703/05/eng20070305_354288.html

China's PLA Prepares For Network Warfare (1999). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/infotech/NewsArchive/Secure/1999/november/C9111102.asp

China brickwork slave children may number 1,000. (2007, 2007-06-15 23:50). People's Daily Online. Retrieved 2007-06-15 2007, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/15/content_895588.htm

China censors online video games. (2004, Tuesday, 1 June, 2004, 10:32 GMT 11:32 UK ). Online. Retrieved 27/8/07, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3766023.stm

China cracks down on 'virtual money' (2007, 26/09/2007). The Age, from http://www.theage.com.au/news/games/china-cracks-down-on-virtual-money/2007/03/08/1173166819859.html#

China denies U.S. charge it hacked Pentagon network. (2007). Journal, (19:52, September 04, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6254757.html

China Disapproves Use of 'Axis of Evil' in International Relations. (2002). Peoples' Daily Online Tuesday, February 05, 2002. Retrieved 20 June 2007, 2007, from http://english.people.com.cn/200202/04/eng20020204_89911.shtml

China eases off proposal for real-name registration of bloggers. (2007). Journal, (May 23, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/200705/22/eng20070522_376909.html

China has 20.8 million bloggers. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved China heroes mark time before foreign Web game assault. (2006, 28/8/07). from

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-08/29/content_676900.htmChina internet firms 'self-censoring'. (2002). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_2098000/2098530.stm

China investigates dereliction of duty in forced labor scandal. (2007, 20/06/07). Retrieved 20/06/07, 2007, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/20/content_6268689.htm

China makes 3 traditional festivals holidays. (2007). Journal, (16/12/2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-12/16/content_6324571.htm


China orders crackdown on labor abuse. (2007, 2007-06-19 17:05). China Daily. Retrieved 2007-06-19, 2007, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/19/content_897777.htm

China Raids Blogger's Home, as Political Arrests Double. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.rfa.org/english/china/2007/11/30/china_internet/

China Slams Local, Foreign Media Over School Blast. (2001, March 12, 2001). March 12, 2001. Retrieved 07/06/2001, 2001, from http://www.insidechina.com/news.php3?id=308127&brief=text

China targets 750 firms in war on pollution (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.straitstimes.com/Latest+News/Asia/STIStory_154648.html

China to Develop Online Games (2004, 19/9/07). China.org.cn Retrieved June 16, 2004, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/scitech/98387.htm

China to establish national centre to receive public complaints. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/200706/25/print20070625_387306.html

China to help clean up the Internet. (2007, 4/23/2007 10:51 AM). Retrieved 15/7/07, 2007, from http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-04-23-china-civilized-net_N.htm

China to launch nationwide labor investigation after "brick kiln scandal". (2007). Journal, (08:28, June 21, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/200706/21/eng20070621_386168.html

China trembles at the power of the blog. (2007). Journal, (31 August 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://news.independent.co.uk/media/article2836677.ece

China Youth Daily editorial calls for greater professionalism in Chongqing "nail house" reports. (2007). Journal, (March 29 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://cmp.hku.hk/look/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=1&NrIssue=1&NrSec...

CHINA: Beijing launches Internet cafe crackdown. (2006). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/print.asp?parentid=45468

CHINA: Google conforms to censorship. (2004). Monday, September 27, 2004. Retrieved 24/4/2006, 2006, from http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=15153

China: House Arrests Stifle HIV/AIDS Petitions. (2006). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/11/china12874.htm

CHINA: Volunteers help Beijing control Internet (2006a). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp? parentid=45555

CHINA: Volunteers help Beijing control Internet (2006b). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp? parentid=45555

China: Who are the chengguan? Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://rfaunplugged.wordpress.com/2008/01/09/china-who-are-the-chengguan/

Chinalaw Home Page. (1999). 1999, from http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/lawtran1.htmChinese bloggers to reach 100 million in 2007. (2006). Journal, (06-05-2006 10:29:).

‘Retrieved from’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/06/content_4513589.htm

Chinese Bloggers, Podcasters and Webcasters. (2005). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://zonaeuropa.com/20050918_1.htm

Chinese Environmental NGOs Called on to Play a Bigger Role (2006). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/186754.htm

Chinese Government Forbids Media Reporting of The "Nailhouse" Story. (2007). Journal, (2007-03-24). ‘Retrieved from’


http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/03/chinese_government_forbidden_media_reports_about_the_na.php

Chinese Heroes vs. World of Warcraft (2006, 19/9/07). People's Daily Online Retrieved August 30, 2006, from http://english.people.com.cn/200608/30/eng20060830_298142.html

Chinese Internet Police. (2000, Saturday, August 05, 2000, updated at 08:52(GMT+8)). from http://english.people.com.cn/english/200008/05/eng20000805_47390.html

Chinese president delivers keynote speech on national development (2007, 08:05, June 26, 2007). People's Daily. Retrieved June 26, 2007, 2007, from http://english.people.com.cn/200706/26/eng20070626_387526.html

Citizen Reporters On The Huankantou/Huaxi Incident. (2005). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://zonaeuropa.com/20050524_1.htm

Citizens cherish memory of Lugouqiao Incident. (2006, 23/9/07). People's Daily Online, from http://english.people.com.cn/200607/08/eng20060708_281284.html

CNNIC. (2007). CNNIC Releases 2007 Survey Report on China Weblog Market Number of Blog Writers Reaches 47 million Equaling One Fourth of Total Netizens.

CNNIC Urges Websites To Use CN Domain Name. (2007). Retrieved 23 May 2007, 2007, from http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca408341.htm

Cody, E. (2005, Monday, June 13, 2005). For Chinese, Peasant Revolt Is Rare Victory Farmers Beat Back Police In Battle Over Pollution. Washington Post Foreign Service, p. A01, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/12/AR2005061201531.html

Commentary: Quick media response reveals transparent gov't in China. (2008, Monday, May 26, 2008). Monday, May 26, 2008. Retrieved 26/5/08, 2008, from http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/news-channels/2008-05/24/content_1272355.htm

Comor, E. (2001). Harold Innis and the Bias of Communication. Information, Communication & Society, 4(2), 274-294.

Company chairman arrested for instigating social unrest (2007). Journal, (December 12, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/235277.htm

Computer Games to Get Suitability Ratings. (2006, 9/9/07). China.org.cn, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/184682.htm

Cox, R. W. (1995). Civilizations: encounters and transformations. Studies inPolitical Economy 47, 7-31.Cult hinders viewers seeing media reports. (2003, 2003-10-17 08:30:35). 2005, from

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/04/content_311483.htmCurren, J., & Gurevitch, M. (Eds.). (1991). Mass Media and Democracy', in Mass

media and society. London, New York, Melbourne, Auckland:: Edward Arnold.

Dalpino, C. (2000). Despairing Democracy: Promoting Openness In Authoritarian Regimes. Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Defiant China hits out at US, stands firm on Internet. (2008, 02/10/08). Jul 29, 2008. Retrieved 02/10/08, from http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jPl75iNlA5thQKGfw4Sa26Xa2V6Q

Deibert, R. J. (1997). Parchemnt, Printing, and Hypermedia Communication in World Order Transformation. New York: Columbia Univeristy Press.


Deibert, R. J. (1997). Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia Communication in World Order Transformation. New York: Columbia University Press.

Deibert, R. J., Palfrey, J. G., Rohozinski, R., & Zittrain, J. (Eds.). (2008). Access Denied

The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. Cambridge: The MIT Press.Drache, D., & Beyer, R. (1996). States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalisation.

London: Routledge.Dual Tactics Adopted to Ensure Information Security in China. (2001). Journal,

(06/06/2001). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/14157.htmEhrenberg, J. (1999). Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. New York: New

York University Press.Endeshaw, A. (2004). Internet Regulation in China: The Never Ending Cat and

Mouse Game. Information and Communications Technology Law, 13(One), 41 - 57.

Environmental Activists Detained in Hangzhou (2005). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/press?revision_id=25771&item_id=25770

Environmental NGOs Encouraging Green Actions (2007, 2007-11-09 ). 2007-11-09 Retrieved 15/11/07, 2007, from http://english.sepa.gov.cn/zwxx/hjyw/200711/t20071109_112767.htm

Fan, M. (2007). Provinces Undermine Beijing's Goals on AIDS. Journal, (Wednesday, September 19, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/18/AR20070918020...

Fantasy Westward Journey. Retrieved 9/9/07, 2007, from http://corp.163.com/eng/games/fantacy_westward.html

Farrell, N. (2002). Chinese crackers prepare for cyber war. Journal, (23 May 2002). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.vnunet.com/articles/print/2118852

FBI Tosses Carnivore to the Dogs. (2005, 2005-01-19 09:07:00.0). Retrieved 10 May 2006, 2006, from http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66327,00.html

Ferguson, M. (1992). The Mythology About Globalization. European Journal of Communication, 7(1), 69-93.

First Net Security Law Endorsed (2000). Journal, (2/12/2000). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/2000/Dec/5888.htm

Flew, T. (2008). New Media An Introduction (3 ed.). South Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and punish : the birth of the prison. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Foucault, M., & Miskowiec, J. (1986). Of Other Spaces. Diacritics, 16(No.1 Spring ), 22-27.

Freedom of Identity, Speech and Assembly on the Internet. (2007, 10/7/06). 10/7/06. Retrieved 5/9/07, 2007, from http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20060710_1.htm

French, H. W. (2005). Anger in China Rises Over Threat to Environment (Publication. Retrieved 25/10/07: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/19/international/asia/19china.html?_r=1&pagewant...

Funnell, A. (2007, 12 July 2007). Three perspectives on China 12 July 2007. Retrieved 12 July 2007, 2007, from

http://www.abc.net.au/rn/mediareport/stories/2007/1974183.htm


Gamers to Register Real IDs. (2006, March 21, 2006). 2007, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/Life/162728.htm

Gao, Y. (2001). My AIDS Prevention Journey. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/gaoyaojie--aidsprevention.html

Gao, Y. ( My "AIDS Prevention Journey). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/gaoyaojie--aidsprevention.html

Goldkorn, J. (2007). Property rights: the coolest nail house in history. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.danwei.org/bbs/property_rights_the_coolest_na.php

Goldsmith, J., & Wu, T. (2006a). Who Controls the Interent? Illusions of a Boarderless World. New York: Oxford University Press.

Goldsmith, J., & Wu, T. (2006b). Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World. New York: Oxford University Press.

Goodman, D. S., & Hooper, B. (Eds.). (1994). China's Quiet Revolution New Interactions Between State and Society. New York: Longman and Cheshire.

Goodman, D. S., & Segal, G. (Eds.). (1994). China Deconstructs: Politics Trade and Regionalism. London: Routledge.

Gov't transparency in quake relief not "forced reaction" for hosting Olympics (2008, 26/5/08). Retrieved 26/5/08, 2008, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/26/content_8257840.htm

Government to Ban Trade in Foreign Encryption Software (2000). Journal, (Thursday, February 24, 2000, updated at 16:58(GMT+8)). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200002/21/eng20000221T121.html

Guan, X. (2007, 2007-05-25 ). NGOs have more room to develop. China Daily, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-05/25/content_880124.htm

Habermas, J. (1974). The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia article New German Critique, 3(Autum), 49-55.

Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge Mas: MIT Press.

Hacker gives Kuomintang Web site pro-Chinese look with PRC photos (2004). Journal, ( 2004-05-10). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=970&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0

Hackers target web censorship. (2002, 20/20/07). BBC News, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2129390.stm

Hackers Wreak Havoc with Nike. (2004). Journal, (December 31, 2004). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Dec/116507.htm

Hacktivismo Launches ScatterChat for Secure, Private Communication. (2006, July 21, 2006). Retrieved 12/10/07, 2007, from http://mediaserver.prweb.com/pdfdownload/414312/pr.pdf

Han, P. (2007, 2007-06-22 15:34:20). Supreme Procuratorate to amend regulations on official corruption Xinhua News Agency, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/22/content_6278182.htm

Handbook for bloggers and cyber-dissidents (Publication. (Unknown). Retrieved 10/10/07, from Reporters Without Borders: http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=542

Hartford, K. (2000). Cyberspace with Chinese Characteristics. Current History(September).

Hartley, J. (1992). The Politics of Pictures The Creation of the Public in the Age of Popular Media. London: Routledge.


Hemelryk Donald, S., Keane, M., & Hong, Y. (Eds.). (2001). Media in China Consumption, Content, and Crisis: Curzon Press Ltd.

Hennock, M. (2002). The cost of China's web censors. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2264508.stm

Hesseldahl, A. (1998). Hacking for Human Rights? Journal, (09:15 AM Jul. 14, 1998 PT). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,13693,00.html

Hong Kong Activist Says Chinese Hackers Read His E-mails (2005). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.rfa.org/english/news/2005/07/02/china_internet/

Horrocks, C. (2004). Introducing Foucault. London: Icon Books.Hottest Topics in Chinese Blogs 2007. (2007). Journal, (August 7, 2007)). ‘Retrieved

from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/220070.htmHu, J. (2007a, 15/10/07). Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese

Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 15, 2007. Retrieved 15/10/07, 2007, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/25/content_6225977.htm

Hu, J. (2007b). Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress. Journal, (16/10/07). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-10/25/content_6226673_4.htm

I Still Believe Some Day I'll Change The World In My Way. (2007, 2/10/07). Chris-daydreamer Blogspot Retrieved APR 25, 2007, from http://chris-daydreamer.blogspot.com/2007/04/isaac-mao-and-michael-anti-at-hong-ko...

Illegal Blood Trade Main Cause of AIDS in Henan. (2007, 26/11/07). China Internet Information Center Retrieved March 13, 2007), from http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/202834.htm

Increase in environmental protests causes instability in China. (2006). Journal, (Wed 06 September 2006). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.greenclippings.co.za/gc_main/article.php?story=20060906170952367

Industry survey: China's online gaming population exceeds 40 mln. (2008, 16/1/08). People's Daily, from http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6339549.html

Innis, H. A. (1951). The Bias of Communication. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Innis, H. A. (1952). Changing concepts of time. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Innis, H. A. (1972). Empire and Communication (2 ed.). Toronto: University of

Toronto Press.Innis, H. A. (1993). Printing in China in the 19th and 20th Century. Continuum, 7(1),

132-139.Internet Cafes in Beijing Under Scrutiny. (2006, May 12, 2006). Retrieved 13/07/07,

2007, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/168160.htmInternet Challenges the Party Line in China. (2001, March 11, 2001). March 11,

2001. Retrieved 07/06/2001, 2001, from http://www.insidechina.com/news.php3?id=307081&brief=text

Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study. (2005). Journal, 2005. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/

Jame, F. (1999). China, Taiwan in Web hacking 'war'. Journal, (August 10, 1999, 5:00 PM PT). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=137


Jenkins, H. (2002, 13/9/07). The Chinese ColumbineHow one tragedy ignited the Chinese government's simmering fears of youth culture

and the Internet. Technology Review Retrieved August 2, 2002, from http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=12913&ch=infotech&a=f

Jenkins, H. (2006). National Politics within Virtual Game Worlds: The Case of China. Retrieved 8/9/08, 2007, from http://www.henryjenkins.org/2006/08/national_politics_within_virtu_1.html

Jesse, E. (2006). The Cutest New Cops. Newsweek, 0.Johnson, B. (2008). Hackers attack pro-Tibetan websites. Journal, (Thursday April 10

2008 ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/10/olympicgames2008.china2

Kalathil, S. (2003). China's new media sector: keeping the state in. The Pacific Review, 16 (4), 489-501.

Kalathil, S., & Boas, T. C. (2003). Open Networks Closed Regimes. Washington D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Kao, X. (2006). How will national online games be able to break into the international market? Paper presented at the China Online Gaming Conference, Chengdu.

Kennedy, J. (2007a). China: Bankrupt ant farmers prepare to protest Journal, (November 20th, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2007/11/20/china-bankrupt-ant-farmers-prepare-to-protest/

Kennedy, J. (2007b). China: Nation's first citizen reporter? . Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2007/03/30/china-nations-first-citizen-reporter/http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2007/03/30/china-nations-first-citizen-reporter/

Kirk, J. (2006). Microsoft shuts down Chinese blogger's site Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A=/article/06/01/06/...

Kluver, R. (2005). The Architecture of Control: a Chinese Strategy for e-Governance. Journal of Public Policy, 25(One), 75 -97.

Largest Hacker Group in China Dissolves. (2005). Journal, (February 22, 2005). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Feb/120819.htm

Lasker, J. (2004). U.S. Military's Elite Hacker Crew. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.wired.com/print/politics/security/news/2005/04/67223

Lawmaker calls to remove Starbucks from Forbidden City. (2007). Journal, 2007(2007-03-12 ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2008/2007-03/12/content_825307.htm

Lee, C. C. (1998). China's Media, Media's China. In C. C. Lee (Ed.). Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Lei Feng becomes online game hero. (2006, 28/8/07). China Daily Retrieved 2006-03-15 15:14, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/15/content_539633.htm

Lessig, L. (2006). Code Version 2. New York: Basic Books.Liu, S.-D. (2006). China's popular nationalism on the Internet report on the 2005 anti-

Japan network struggles. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 7(1).Liu, W. (2007). Transparency Key to Public Faith. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/16/content_5435353.htm


The Long Story About Huaxi/Huankantou. (2005). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://zonaeuropa.com/20050601_1.htm

Loren, B. (2006, @ 12:32 am). Google China Kowtows to Censorship Laws. 1 January 2006. from http://www.searchenginejournal.com/index.php?p=2832

Lull, J. (1991). China Turned On: Television and Resistance. London: Routledge.Ma, Q. (2005). Non-Governmental Organisations in Contemporary China: paving the

way to a civil society? . New York: Routledge.MacKinnon, R. (2006). The Great Chinese Censorship Hoax. Journal, (March 14,

2006). ‘Retrieved from’ http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2006/03/the_great_chine.html

MacKinnon, R. (2007a). Chinese bloggers thumb their noses at "self discipline". Journal, (August 28, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2007/08/chinese-blogg-1.html

MacKinnon, R. (2007b). Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China. Public Choice(9 June 2007).

MacKinnon, R. (2007c). "Nailhouse blogger" detained & interrogated, web crackdown on "ant farmer" story continues... Journal, (December 07, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2007/12/nailhouse-blogg.html

Made-in-China Online Games Available (2004, 20/9/07). China.org.cn Retrieved June 15, 2004, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/98409.htm

McLuhan, E., & Zingrone, F. (Eds.). (1997). Essential McLuhan. London: Routledge.McLuhan, M., & Fiore, Q. (1967). The medium is the message. Harmondsworth:

Penguin.McLuhan, M., & Powers, B. R. (1989). The global village : transformations in world

life and media in the 21st century. New York: Oxford University Press.Mendoza, J. (2007). US: Yahoo! settles in Chinese journalists' lawsuitJournal, (Friday, November 16, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’

http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-world.asp?parentid=82174Merkel's China Visit Marred by Hacking Allegations. (2007). Journal, (August 27,

2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,502169,00.html

Microsoft revises policy on shutting blogs after China backlash (2006). Journal, (02.01.2006, 01:21 AM). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.forbes.com/technology/feeds/afx/2006/02/01/afx2490270.html

Military expert: international cooperation to fight hackers. (2007). Journal, (September 23, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/225476.htm

Millions of Chinese to Become Internet Game Players in 2004 (2004). China.org.cn Retrieved February 5, 2004, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/scitech/86308.htm

Ming, M. (2007). A Notice from the Central Government to Censor News Related to Shanxi Brick Kilns Event: China Digital Times: BERKELEY CHINA INTERNET PROJECT.

Ministry of Culture Solicits Online Games for Minors. (2007, July 10, 2005). Retrieved 12/9/07, 2007, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Jul/134531.htm

Mooney, P. (2004). China's 'Big Mamas' in a Quandary. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3676


Most Chinese kids spend vacation online. (2007, 5/9/07). The Age 5/9/07. from http://www.theage.com.au/news/WORLD/Most-Chinese-kids-spend-vacation-online/2007/09/05/1188783280572.html

Mudie, L., & Chen, P. (2008). Well-wishers Detained Outside Hu Jia's Beijing HomeJournal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.rfa.org/english/china/2008/01/23/china_hujia/'Nail house' in Chongqing demolished. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-04/03/content_842221.htmNation Promotes Home-made Online Game Business (2003, 19/9/07). China.org.cn,

from http://www.china.org.cn/english/scitech/81815.htmNew Campaign to Curb Illegal Blood Collection. (2007). Journal, (June 9, 2007)).

‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/health/213394.htmNew NGO founded to rally all Chinese people against worsening pollution. (2005).

Journal, (April 24, 2005). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200504/24/eng20050424_182520.html

New Regulations to Ensure Internet Safety (2005). Journal, (December 30, 2005). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/153719.htm

NGO Alliance to Step Up Fight Against HIV/AIDS (2007). Journal, (March 7, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/health/201894.htm

O'Sullivan, T., John Hartley, Saunders, D., Montgomery, M., & Fiske, J. (Eds.). (1994). Key Concepts in Communication and Cutural Studies (2 ed.). London: Routledge.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2003). Military Power of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved. from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2007). Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS. Retrieved 13/10/07. from www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf

Officials have no power except for the people. (2007, 19 June 2007). People's Daily Online Retrieved 19 March 2007, from http://english.people.com.cn/200703/19/eng20070319_358925.html

Olesen, A. (2000). China Reverses Encryption Regulations. Journal, (March 14, 2000). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.virtualchina.com/news/mar00/031400-cryptoreg-alo-jsl.html.

Online Game Industry Enjoys Galloping Development. (2006, January 12, 2006). Retrieved 13/07/07, 2007, from http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/154888.htm

Para-police officials condemn beating death of man in Hubei. (2008). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-01/21/content_6409247.htm

Peace pact with Taiwan proposed. (2007). Journal, (08:18, October 16, 2007 ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/6283633.html

People vs. chemical plant (2008). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/239503.htm

PLA. (2002). Full text of China's defense white paper in 2002. Retrieved 18/10/07. from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-12/10/content_654851.htm.

Pollution costs equal 10% of China's GDP. (2006). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/06/content_609350.htm

Powell, G. (2007, April 25th, 2007 ). The Internet must clean up its act in China. Retrieved 17/07/07, 2007, from


http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/it/2007/04/25/the-internet-must-clean-up-its-act-in-china/

Premier Wen revisits AIDS-suffering villages (2007). Journal, (2007-12-01 ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-12/01/content_6292466_2.htm

Premier Wen tells Merkel China opposes hackers. (2007). Journal, (2007-08-28 11:17:45). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinavoc.com.cn/NewsCenter/ShowArticle.aspx?Id=11523

The President's State of the Union Address (2002, 9:15 P.M. EST). Retrieved 20 June 2007, 2007, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html

President promises divergent voices be heard online. (2008, 21/06/08). Online. Retrieved June 21, 2008, from http://www.china.org.cn/government/focus_news/2008-06/21/content_15865804.htm

Procházka, M. (2006). Introduction to the Sub-Project activities and research themes. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www2.lingue.unibo.it/Acume/sb/Introduction_prochazka.htm

Qiang, X. (2004). The words you never see in Chinese cyberspace163Journal, (2004-08-30, 10:37 PM). ‘Retrieved from’

http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2004/08/the_words_you_n.phpQiang, X. (2006). Image of Internet police: JingJing and Chacha online - Hong Yan

（洪燕）. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2006/01/image_of_internet_police_jingjing_and_chacha_online_hon.php

Qing, H. (2006). Blogs provide platform to air different opinions. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/09/content_528896.htm

Ramirez, L. (2006). Pollution a Major Source of Discontent in China; Government Lacks Comprehensive Strategy. Journal, (08 May 200608 ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-05/2006-05-08-voa23.cfm

Report: unsafe sex major cause of HIV infection. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/20/content_6566946.htm

Riemens, P. (2002). SOME THOUGHTS ON THE IDEA OF "HACKER CULTURE". Multitudes, 2(8).

Road of free information flow cautious but resolute (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-11/08/content_6240752.htm

Road of free information flow cautious but resolute. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-11/08/content_6240752.htm

Rodan, G. (2003). Embracing electronic media but suppressing civil society: authoritarian consolidation in Singapore. The Pacific Review, 16(4), 503-524.

Rogin, J. (2007, 13/02/2007). Cyber officials: Chinese hackers attack 'anything and everything' February 13, 2007. 2007, from http://www.fcw.com/online/news/97658-1.html?page=2

Rosenberg, T. (2006). SEED INTERVIEW: WAN YANHAI. Journal, (JAN/FEB 2003). ‘Retrieved from’ http://seedmagazine.com/news/2006/08/seed_interview_wan_yanhai.php

Ruffin, O. (2004, March 28, 2004). Hacktivism, From Here To There. Paper presented at the CyberCrime and Digital Law Enforcement Conference., Yale Law School.


School Blast Parents in China Furious Complaints Went Unheard. (2001, March 8, 2001). March 8, 2001. Retrieved 07/06/2001, 2001, from http://www.insidechina.com/news.php3?id=304742&brief=text

School Explosion Aftermath in Jiangxi Well Handled. (2001, Friday, March 09, 2001, updated at 10:07(GMT+8)). Friday, March 09, 2001, updated at 10:07(GMT+8). Retrieved 07/06/2001, 2001, from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200103/09/eng20010309_64548.html

Sevastopuloin, D., & McGregor, R. (2007, Sep 04, 2007). China 'hacked' into Pentagon defence system, p. 1, from http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=hacking+china&aje=true&id=070904000597&ct=0&nclick_check=1

Shanxi governor criticizes publicity officials for handling of media during forced labor scandal (2007). Journal, (June 27, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/200706/27/eng20070627_388133.html

Shanxi governor makes self-criticism for slave labor. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/21/content_898823.htm

Shoesmith, B. (1998). No Sex! No Violence! No News! Satellite and Cable Television in China. Media Asia, Volume 25(Number 1).

SMS Texts Energize a Chinese Protest (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=520&Itemid=31

Sohmen, P. (2001). Taming the Dragon: China’s Efforts to Regulate the Internet. Standford Journal of East Asian Affairs 1(Spring), 17 - 26.

Somerlad, E. L. (1981). Communication in the New China. Media Asia.Song, H., LinliCheng. (2006). Digital Divide New Rules on Internet News

Information. China Law & Practice, (2005, December/ January 2006). 18-20.Soong, R. (2006, July 7, 2006). Red Rubber Ball. Retrieved 5/09/07, 2007, from

http://zonaeuropa.com/20060709_1.htmSoong, R. (2007, 08/24/2007). Has World of Warcraft Been Harmonized? .

Retrieved 08/24/2007, 2007, from http://zonaeuropa.com/200706.brief.htm#101

Southerland, D. (2007). China's Media Controls: Could Bloggers Make a Difference? Journal, 2(8). ‘Retrieved from’ http://jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373334

"A Special Message of Hope". (2001). Journal, (July 4th, 2001). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.cultdeadcow.com/cDc_files/declaration.html

Starbucks Cafe in Forbidden City Under Fire (2000). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/english/200011/24/eng20001124_56044.html

Starbucks should be verboten in Forbidden City, say netizens. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/200701/18/eng20070118_342364.html

State Council approves new rules on Net content, telecom. (2000). Retrieved 2000, 2000, from http://www.chinaonline.com/topstories/000920/1/C00092019.asp

State Security Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems On the Internet. (2000). January 1 2000. 2000, from http:www.chinaonline.com

Sun, C., & Tian, X. (2007). Gao Yaojie: A Doctor with Conscience. Journal, (March/April 2007 ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.chinamemo.org/chinascope/magazine/20070304/3


Sun, W. (1996). In search of new frameworks Issues in the study of Chinese Media in the era of Reform. Media International Australia(February Number 79), 40-48.

Sun, Y. (2007a). Draft emergency response law bans false information on accidents. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/24/content_6284373.htm

Sun, Y. (2007b, 2007-07-10 16:06:06). Lawyers call for "slavery" to be added to Chinese criminal law Retrieved 2007-07-10 2007, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-07/10/content_6354435.htm

Support for new holiday plan may depend on wording of polls. (2007). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6301600.html

Tai, Z. (2006). The Internet in China Cyberspace and Civil Society. New York: Routledge.

Taiwan asks China to help track hackers. (2003). Journal, (WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2003 11:53:17 AM). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=612&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0

Taiwan downplays China TV hacking. (2002). Journal, (Wednesday, September 25, 2002 Posted: 12:37 PM EDT (1637 GMT)). ‘Retrieved from’ http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/09/25/taiwan.falungong/

Tan, Z. A., & Foster, W. (1998). Internet Diffusion in Peoples Republic of China. March 1998. 1999, from http://www.//china.sry.edu//chinainternet0398.pdf

Tan, Z. A., Foster, W., & Gordon, S. (1997). China's New Internet Regulations: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back. Communications of the ACM, 40 Number 12(December), 11-16.

Tan, Z. A., Foster, W., & Gordon, S. (1999). China's state co-ordinated Internet infrastructure. Communication of the ACM, 42(6), 44-52.

Tan, Z. A., & Wu, O. (2002). Globalization and E-commerce I: Factors Affecting E-commerce Diffusion in China. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 10, 4-32.

Taubman, G. (1998). Tuesday Not-So Worldwide Web: The Internet in China, and the Challenges to Nondemocratic Rule. Political Communication, 15, 255 - 272,.

Taylor, R. (2006). China Game Wars Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.bbcworld.com/content/clickonline_archive_14_2006.asp?pageid=665&co_...

Taylor, T. L. (2006). Does WoW Change Everything?: How a PvP Server, Multinational Player Base, and Surveillance Mod Scene Caused Me Pause. Games and Culture, 1(4).

Thomas, T. L. (2005). Chinese and American network warfare. Joint Force Quarterly..

FindArticles.com. 18 Oct. 2007. (July 2005).Thomson, I. (2007). US blames China for Pentagon hackPeople's Liberation Army responsible, say officials

Journal, (04 Sep 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.computing.co.uk/vnunet/news/2197972/chinese-hackers-attack-pentagon

Tibetans allege cyber invasion. (2004). Journal, (29 Jan 2004, 1801 hrs IST,IANS ). ‘Retrieved from’ http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/453079.cms


Trojan horse (Publication. (2006). Retrieved 17/10/07, from SearchSecurity.com http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci213221,00.html

Truth About Jiangxi School Building Collapse Known. (2001, Friday, March 09, 2001, updated at 16:23(GMT+8)). Friday, March 09, 2001, updated at 16:23(GMT+8). Retrieved 07/060/2001, 2001, from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200103/09/eng20010309_64546.html

Tyson, J. (2006). How Carnivore Worked. from http://computer.howstuffworks.com/carnivore.htm

Unger, J., & Chan, A. (1995). China Corporatism and the East Asia Model. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 33(January), 29-53.

Virilio, P. (1995). Speed and Information: Cyberspace Alarm! ctheory.net.Virus attacks on Tibetan network; Chinese blamed. (2003). Journal, (Friday October

31, 2003). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=728&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0

Wacker, G. (2003). The Internet and Censorship in China. In C. R. a. G. W. Huges (Ed.), China and the Internet: Politics of the digital leap forward. New York: Routledge Curzon.

Walton, G. (2001). China's Golden Shield Corporations and the Development of Surveillance Technology in the Peoples Republic of China: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.

Wang, H. (2007). HIV/AIDS cases on rise in China Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-09/08/content_6687991.htm

Wang, S. (2007, 08/30/2007). Govt bloggers' followers just a clique away. China Daily, p. 12, from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-08/30/content_6066927.htm

Wang, Z. (2007). Domestic Media Partnership Urged for AIDS Awareness Journal, ( August 22, 2007). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/health/221744.htm

Web media challenge governmental spokesmen (2008). Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/240634.htm

Wei Li, & Tao, D. Y. (2005). The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster. Journal of Political Economy, 113(4), 840.

Welcome to Technorati. (2007, 30/8/07). Retrieved 31/8/07, 2007, from http://technorati.com/about/

What is civil society? (2004). Journal, 2007(1/11/07). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/introduction.htm

Wu, G. (2000). One Head, Many Mouths: Diversifying Press Structures in Reform China. In C. C. Lee (Ed.), Power, Money and Media Communication Patterns and Bureaucratic Control in Cultural China. Evanston:: Northwestern University Press.

Wu, X. (2002). Doing PR in China: A 2001 Version-Concepts, Practices and Some Misconceptions Public Relations Quarterly, 47( 2), 10-18.

Wu, X. (2005). Red Net over China: China’s New Online Media Order and its Implications

Asian Journal of Communication, 15( 2 July 2005), 215-227.Wu, X. (2006). Chinese Cyber Nationalism: evolution characteristics and

implications. Plymouth: Lexington Books.Xin, Q. (2005). China curbs civil society groups Journal, (Apr 19, 2005). ‘Retrieved

from’ http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GD19Ad07.html


Xinhua. (2007, 18 June 2007). Brick kiln slavery scandal demonstrates poor governance. People's Daily Online English, from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200706/18/eng20070618_385386.html

Yan, Z. (2006). China's cyber police curbs online crimes. Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://news3.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/15/content_4549226.htm

Yang, G. (2002). Between Democracy and Development:The Impact of New Information Technologies On Civil Society in China. Retrieved 2/11/07, 2007, from http://programs.ssrc.org/itic/publications/civsocandgov/yangpolicyrevised.pdf

Yang, G. (2003a). The Co-Evolution of the Internet and Civil Society in China. Asian Survey,, 43(3), 405-422.

Yang, G. (2003b). The Internet and Civil society in China: a preliminary assessment. Journal of contemporary China, 12(36), 453-475.

Yang, G., & Calhoun, C. (2007). Media, Civil Society, and the Rise of a Green Public Sphere in China. China Information XX(2), 211-236.

Yardley, J. (2005). Rural Chinese Riot as Police Try to Halt Pollution Protest. Journal, (

April 14, 2005). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/14/international/asia/14riot.html

Yardley, J. (2007). China Covers Up Detention of AIDS Doctor. The New York Times, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/16/world/asia/16china.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin

Yoshihara, T. (2001). CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE: A PHANTOM MENACE OR EMERGING THREAT? Retrieved 18/10/07. from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=62.

Zhang, D. (2007). Can a Computer Virus be “Patriotic”? . Journal. ‘Retrieved from’ http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/10/can_computer_virus_be_patriotic.php

Zhang, M. (1997, November 15 1997). China issues new rules strengthening regulatory structure over Internet. East Asian Executive Reports, 19, 9-12.

Zhang, R. (2007, 8/9/07). Time Limit Penalties Now Mandatory for Online Games. Chinanews.cn, China.org.cn by from http://www.china.org.cn/english/entertainment/217375.htm

Zhang, T. (2007). Grassroots NGOs Struggle for Legitimacy. Journal, 2007(2/22/07). ‘Retrieved from’ http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/214835.htm

Zhao, M. (2007). Why I Gagged the Karamay Fire Story - Yang Weiguang (杨伟光). Journal. ‘Retrieved

Zheng, Y. (2008). Technological Empowerment The Internet, State and Society in China. Stnadford: Standford University Press.

Zhou, Y. (2005). Informed Nationalism: military websites in Chinese cyberspace. Journal of Contemporary China, 14(44), 543 - 562.

Zhou, Y. (2006). Hitoricizing Online Politics Telegraphy, The Internet and Political Particpation in China. Standford: Standford University Press.

Zhou, Y. (2007, 2007-06-18 17:42:30 ). Commentry: Brick kiln slavery scandal demonstrates poor governance. Retrieved 2007-06-18 2007, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-06/18/content_6258515.htm


ABBREVIATIONS

APEC Asia Pacific Economic Co Operation

BBS Bulletin Board

BSB Blog Service Provider

CCP Chinese Communist Party

cDc Cult of the Dead Cow

CNA Computer network attacks

CNNIC China Internet Network Information Center

CCLY Communist Youth League

FoN Friends of Nature

ICP Internet Content Provider

IO Information operations

ONI Open Networks Initiative

INEW Integrated network-electronic warfare

ISP Internet Service Provider

IW Information warfare

MII Ministry of Information Industry

MPS Ministry of Public Security

MMOG Massive Massively multiplayer online game

MMORPGs Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games

MSS Ministry of State Security

NCW Network-centric warfare

NGO Non Government Organization

NPO Non Profit Organization

PRC Peoples Republic of China

PSB Public Security Bureau

SCIO State Council Information Office

SOE State Owned Enterprises

RSS Feed RSS is a means of updating and distributing content in a variety

of ways such as blog entries news headlines, or podcasts.

WWW World Wide Web


APPENDIX I

Time Line

1987

The first network in China developed.

1993

Institute for High-Energy Physics (IHEP) connects to the Internet.

1995

Development in the World Wide Web facilitates global interest in the Internet, as well

as China. First BBS board.

1996

In February the State Council issues the “Interim Regulation on International

Interconnection of Computer Information Networks in the PRC”.

1997

The “Interim Regulation on International Interconnection of Computer Information

Networks in the PRC” is updated in May.

CNNIC releases its first report, and puts the number of users at 620,000 and the

number of Chinese websites at 15,000.

1998

The Ministry of Information Industry is established.

The number of uses reaches 1.175 million, and the number of Chinese websites is

37,000.

1999

May 7: NATO bombs the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

September 14: Wu Jichuan head of the MII reiterates that foreign investment is not

allowed in China’s Internet sector.

September 15: Gunagming Daily raises concerns over news content on Internet

Portals and Websites, but also argues that traditional media should shift their function


from propaganda to a reporting function.

September 25: Guangming Ribao runs story critical of the news coverage and

potential of Portals in China.

November 30: economist Zhou Qiren argues that foreign investment should be

allowed in ISP and ICP. This story appears in the China Business Times.

2000

January 1: Secrecy Regulations introduced.

January 2: Beijing Qingnian Ribao calls for Internet café to be regulated.

January 31: New encryption rules take effect

February 2: The Legal Daily calls for the establishment of laws to control online

information, define online services responsibilities, e-commerce, and consumer

protection

February 3: Hua Sheng Overseas Chinese Newspaper reports that the State Council

will provide funding for Sate owned media websites. Xinhua, China Daily, Peoples

Daily, State Council News Office (china.org.cn), China International Broadcast

Station (cnradio.com).

February 7: State Council approves funding for official news websites, China Daily

Renmin Ribao, Xinhua Sate council News Office, China International Broadcast

Service.

February 15: Wang Qingcun Deputy bureau chief of the State Council News Office

calls for rules to guide news dissemination on the Internet and he announces that

commercial website are allowed to carry news from traditional media and that new

commercial websites must get approval from the relevant government departments

(ChinaEconomicTimes, 2000).

March 2: A spokes person from the Sate Council News Office Network Division


announces that restrictions on the financing for traditional news websites will be

loosened. This appears in a lengthy article in the Financial Times and outlines the fear

that official news website will be overwhelmed by commercial websites.

March 3: CCIDnet is launched, claiming to be China’s largest technology and

information portal and is the Centre of Computer and Microelectronics Industry

Development, the development arm of MII.

March 7: www.21DNN website launched by 21 Dragon News Network. This is the

first official news website, and made up of nine major media organizations from

Beijing. Beijing Ribao, Beijing Qingnian Ribao Beijing Economic Daily, Beijing

Evening News, Beijing Peoples Broadcasting Station, Beijing Cable Broadcasting

Station, Beijing Broadcast and TV Weekly, and the Beijing Morning Post.

March 14: The State Council Information Office announces funding for the building

of five of the major central media organizations. The five are the Peoples Daily, China

Daily, China Radio International, the China Internet Information Centre and Xinhua.

The last two share an extensive website

March 15: Government announces regulations for Internet café. Internet café must

get approval form the Administration of Industry and Commerce and the Public

Security Bureau and they must establish reliable security systems.

March 22: “Circular on Further Strengthening the Management of Reprints by

Newspapers and Periodicals” issued by the State Press and Publication

Administration. This circular demands that these news organizations be more

accountable.

March: announcement made for new ISP regulations to be ready by the end of March.

April: Internet Information Management Bureau set up under the State Council

Information Office, headed by Zhao Qizheng. Zhao has close ties to Jiang Zemin that

date back to Shanghai.


April 17: The Internet Propaganda Administrative Bureau is established and is

responsible for “guiding and coordinating Chinese web sites and news content. The

director of the bureau is Wang Qingcun. (ChinaOnline, 2000b)

April 24: Wang Qingcun, Bureau Chief of the Internet Information Management

Bureau tells China Online that “China’s ICP’s may soon be allowed to have their own

news reports and release information, so long as they abide by Chinese laws and

regulations.

April 25: The Peoples Dailly Renmin Ribao announces Commercial Websites Given

No Right for News Coverage

May: Shanghai Orient Network Information Centre receives permission from the

SCIO to put news on its website. Ten of Shanghai’s most influential media

organizations have shares in this website. This includes Jiefang Ribao (Liberation

Daily), Shanghai Qingnian Bao (Shanghai Youth Daily) and radio and television

stations.

May 11: Qinghua University establishes an Internet content laboratory to study

Internet content and to give advice to news Websites.

June 19: Shanghai hosts Online Journalism Seminar.

June: In an interview with the US magazine Science, President Jiang Zemin called for

“China’s web surfers to be protected from distorted facts”, He said “One thing must

be ensure: that facts should not be distorted. And I think this should also apply to the

Internet.” (PeoplesDaily, 2000a) This interview is recounted in the Peoples Daily.

June 20: Peoples Daily announces the drafting of Internet copyright laws to protect

literary works from piracy.


July: Jiang talks to 60 Minutes in the USA and reiterates his earlier comments about

the Internet.

August 9: Editorial in the Peoples Daily stating that both Jiang Zemin and Li Peng

view the Peoples Daily Renmin Rebao on line every day.

September: New Telecom and Internet Regulations released.

October 10: Five Year Plan released with a focus on agriculture and technology, this

includes the Internet.

November 6: Provisional Regulations of Internet News Releasing issued

December 28 Resolution on maintaining the security of computer networks passed by

the 19th session of the Ninth National Peoples Congress.

2001

January: CNNIC puts the number of Internet users at 22.5 million.

March: A school in Jiangxi Province explodes. Chatrooms were closed down after

parents of the victims posted messages that blamed the government for the incident.

April: Spy Plane crash. The war of words extended into cyberspace as hackers in the

USA and the PPC launched a virtual war, disabling official sites and planting flags

and slogans.

July: The Nandan mine disaster. News of the Nandan mine spread across the web and

reached Beijing despite the efforts of local officials to prevent news of the disaster

from leaking out.

2002

March: The ABC’s website is suddenly blocked and then unblocked after negotiations

with Embassy Staff.

May: The Washington Post and other foreign Websites suddenly unblocked.


Representatives from over 100 Internet businesses signed a pledge to promote self-

discipline in the industry.

September: Google is found to be blocking sites in China, and France.

October: Falun Gong hacks into television satellites and cable television and transmits

messages.

November: 16th Party Congress held in Beijing. Jiang Zemin own and Hu Jintao as his

successor.

December: Cyber dissident, Li Zhi is sentenced to eight years in prison for

subversion. Yahoo is accused of providing information on Li’s account.

November: The Golden Shield Project is launched, with the aim of enhancing

surveillance capabilities, through the integration of online databases, and Internet

surveillance.

2004

November: Falun Gong hijacks the AsiaSat satellite from Hong Kong and transmits

Falun Gong messages.

2005

September: The Administrative Regulations of Internet News Information Service are

issued by the State Council’s Information Office and the Ministry of Information

Industry.

2006

January: CNNIC puts the number of Internet users at 111 million, 64.4% of those

users have access through broadband.


Freezing Point a weekly supplement of the state-run China Youth Daily is banned

following the publishing of an article criticizing the countries official history text

books.

In the United States of America the Congressional Human Rights Caucus accuses

Google, Microsoft, Cisco and Yahoo of collaborating with Chinese authorities to

censor the Internet.

2007

The Black Kiln Incident exposed slavery rackets in Shandong and Hubei provinces

when a group of 400 fathers posted a letter looking for the children on a website.

Novemeber: The civil society journal Minjian was closed along with the online non-

profit journal China Development Brief. Both journals are attached to the NGO sector

and appear to be caught up in a crackdown on NGO activities.

Yahoo settled a lawsuit with a Chinese journalist Shi Tao and cyber dissident Wang

Xiaoning. The lawsuit was launched by the World Organization for Human Rights

USA on behalf of both the activists.


Appendix II

Entities Involved in Internet Regulation in China

• Central Propaganda Department

• Department of Commerce

• Department of Telecommunications

• General Administration of Press and Publications

• Ministry of Culture

• Ministry of Information Industry

• Ministry of Public Security

• Public Security Bureau

• State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television

• State Council

• State Council Information Agency

• State Secrets Bureau


Appendix III

Chapter II. Security Mechanism Articles 8, 9, 10, & 11 deals with Bulletin Boards and Chat Rooms:

Article 8. The management of secrets concerning information on the Internet shall be based on the principle of "whoever places materials on the Internet takes the responsibility." Information provided to or released on Web sites must undergo a security inspection and approval, which shall include departmental management. Related units shall, in line with state laws and regulations on guarding secrets, establish and improve a leadership responsibility system for the examination and approval of information intended for the Internet. Units that provide the information shall establish a security system for information examination and approval in accordance with certain work procedures.

Article 9. As for information collected for the purpose of Internet information services, not including what has been published by other news media, organizers shall obtain the approval of the units providing the information before releasing it on the Internet. Any expansion or updating of information on the Internet shall adhere strictly to the security system for information examination and approval.

Article 10. Units and users that establish a BBS chat room or network news group shall be verified and approved by the relevant organizations to clarify the requirements and responsibilities concerning the protection of secrets. No unit or individual shall release, discuss or disseminate information about state secrets on a BBS, chat room or network news group.

For BBS, chat rooms or network news groups that are open to the public, the organizer or its high-level competent department shall strictly carry out its responsibilities concerning the protection of secrets, establish a complete management system and strengthen supervision and inspection. If it discovers leaked information, it shall take timely measures and report this to the local authorities for the protection of secrets.

Article 11. Users who exchange information on the Web via email shall abide by regulations concerning the guarding of state secrets. They shall not deliver, forward or copy information concerning state secrets via email. National backbone networks and Internet access providers shall clarify to their email users their requirements for protecting secrets and shall improve their management systems("State Security Protection Regulations for Computer Information Systems On the Internet," 2000)).


Appendix IV

5. blog service should obey Chinese laws and regulations, protect the legal rights of

blog users and the public

6. a good blog service needs:

(1) comprehensive management

(2) sufficient technical and content management staff

(3) sufficient data security measures, including user data privacy, blog content

security

(4) obey all other existing laws

7. provide good creative environment for users guide them to create excellent cultural

works

8. blog service provider should have user agreement with user, and blog host has a

right not to give service to those who refuse to terms of service

9. terms of service should include:

(1) blogger agrees to abide by china’s laws, regulations, etc, will use the web in a

civilized manner, not disseminate pornography,

or illegal information

(2) blogger agrees not to denigrate and other ethnicities and religions

(3) blogger agrees not to disseminate rumours and false information, or information

that harms others or violates the legal rights of others

(4) blogger agrees not to disseminate information that violates the copyrights of others

(5) blogger agrees to monitor and manage postings, and to delete postings that are

illegal or bad

(6) blogger wont use blog to disseminate viruses or other things that would harm other

people’s computers

10. if blogger doesnt adhere to the terms, the service provider has a right to delete any

illegal or bad information, or terminate the blogger’s service

11. encourage blogger to use real name, and register real full name, contact address,

phone number etc.

12. blog service will use proper security to manage the information of bloggers who

use their real names, protect the user private data, and not give it to third parties or

publicize it without the blogger’s permission except under circumstances when law

requires.


13. blog service should reserve the right to manage the bloggers postings, and the

blogger should manage their postings and delete illegal or inappropriate information.

14. blog service should establish online customer service window, and set up a

hotline, to accept public comments and complaints about the blog service and content,

and resolve things in a timely manner


Appendix V

The following list of banned words was published by the China Digital Times.

From Program Files\Tencent\QQGame\COMToolKit.dll:

bitch

shit

falun

sex

tianwang

cdjp

av

bignews

boxun

chinaliberal

chinamz

chinesenewsnet

cnd

creaders

dafa

dajiyuan

dfdz

dpp

falu

falun

falundafa

flg

freechina

freedom

freenet

fuck

GCD

gcd

hongzhi

hrichina

huanet

hypermart

incest

jiangdongriji

lihongzhi

making

minghui

minghuinews

nacb

naive

nmis

paper

peacehall

playboy

renminbao

renmingbao

rfa

safeweb

sex

simple

svdc

taip

tibetalk

triangle

triangleboy

UltraSurf

unixbox

ustibet

VOA

VOA chinese

wangce

wstaiji

xinsheng


yuming

zhengjian

zhengjianwang

zhenshanren

zhuanfalun

bitch

fuck

shit


三个代表|表一党|党多党|党民主|民专政|政行房|房自慰|慰吹萧|萧色狼|色胸罩|罩内裤|裤底裤|裤私处|私爽死|爽变态|态妹疼|疼妹痛|痛弟疼|疼弟痛|痛姐疼|疼姐痛|痛哥疼|疼哥痛|痛同房|房打炮|炮造爱|爱性交|性性爱|性作爱|作做爱|做

操你|操日你|日日批|日日逼|日鸡巴|鸡我操|操操死|操乳房|乳阴茎|阴阳具|阳开

苞|苞肛门|肛阴道|阴阴蒂|阴肉棍|肉肉棒|肉肉洞|肉荡妇|荡阴囊|阴睾丸|睾捅你

|捅捅我|捅插我|插插你|插插她|插插他|插干你|干干她|干干他|干妓女|妓射精|射口交|交手淫|淫口淫|淫屁眼|屁阴户|阴阴门|阴下体|下龟头|龟阴毛|阴避孕套|套你妈逼|逼大鸡巴|鸡性高潮|性性虐待|性性高潮|性大法|法弟子|弟大纪元|元真

善忍|忍明慧|慧大法|法洪志|志红志|志洪智|智红智|智法轮|轮法论|论法沦|沦法

伦|伦发轮|轮发论|论发沦|沦发伦|伦轮功|功轮公|公轮攻|攻沦功|功沦公|公沦攻

|攻论攻|攻论功|功论公|公伦攻|攻伦功|功伦公|公打倒|倒民运|运六四|四台独|独王丹|丹柴玲|柴李鹏|鹏天安门|安江泽民|泽朱容基|基朱镕基|朱李长春|春李瑞

环|瑞胡锦涛|锦魏京生|魏台湾独立|湾藏独|藏西藏独立|藏疆独|疆新疆独立|疆警察

|察民警|警公安|公邓小平|邓嫖|嫖大盖帽|帽革命|命武警|警黑社会|社交警|警消

防队|消刑警|刑夜总会|夜妈个|个公款|款首长|首书记|记坐台|台腐败|腐城管|管

暴动|暴暴乱|乱李远哲|哲司法警官|司高干|高高干子弟|弟高干子女|女人大|大尉健

行|健李岚清|清黄丽满|满于幼军|军文字狱|狱宋祖英|英天安门|门自焚|焚骗局|骗

猫肉|猫吸储|储张五常|张张丕林|丕空难|难温家宝|温吴邦国|邦曾庆红|庆黄菊|黄

罗干|罗吴官正|官贾庆林|庆专制|制卖淫|淫三個代表|表一黨|黨多黨|黨民主|民專

政|政行房|房自慰|慰吹蕭|蕭色狼|色胸罩|罩內褲|褲底褲|褲私處|私爽死|爽變態

|態妹疼|疼妹痛|痛弟疼|疼弟痛|痛姐疼|疼姐痛|痛哥疼|疼哥痛|痛同房|房打炮|炮造愛|愛性交|性性愛|性作愛|作做愛|做操你|操日你|日日批|日日逼|日雞巴|雞我操|操操死|操乳房|乳陰莖|陰陽具|陽開苞|苞肛門|肛陰道|陰陰蒂|陰肉棍|肉

肉棒|肉肉洞|肉蕩婦|蕩陰囊|陰睾丸|睾捅你|捅捅我|捅插我|插插你|插插她|插插

他|插幹你|幹幹她|幹幹他|幹妓女|妓射精|射口交|交屁眼|屁陰戶|陰陰門|陰下體

|下龜頭|龜陰毛|陰避孕套|套你媽逼|逼大雞巴|雞性高潮|性性虐待|性性高潮|性大

法|法弟子|弟大紀元|元真善忍|忍明慧|慧大法|法洪志|志紅志|志洪智|智紅智|智

法輪|輪法論|論法淪|淪法倫|倫發輪|輪發論|論發淪|淪發倫|倫輪功|功輪公|公輪

攻|攻淪功|功淪公|公淪攻|攻論攻|攻論功|功論公|公倫攻|攻倫功|功倫公|公打倒

|倒民運\|運\ 六四|四台獨|獨王丹|丹柴玲|柴李鵬|鵬天安門|安江澤民|澤朱容基|基朱鎔基|朱李長春|春李瑞環|瑞胡錦\濤|錦\ 魏京生|魏臺灣獨立|灣藏獨|藏西藏獨立|藏疆獨|疆新疆獨立|疆警察|察民警|警公安|公鄧小平|鄧嫖|嫖大蓋帽|帽革命|命

武警|警黑社會|社交警|警消防隊|消刑警|刑夜總會|夜媽個|個公款|款首長|首書記

|記坐台|台腐敗|腐城管|管暴動|暴暴亂|亂李遠哲|哲司法警官|司高幹|高高幹子弟

|弟高幹子女|女人大|大尉健行|健李嵐清|清黃麗滿|滿於幼軍|軍文字獄|獄天安門|門自焚|焚騙局|騙貓肉|貓吸儲|儲張五常|張張丕林|丕空難|難溫家寶|溫吳邦國|邦曾慶紅|慶黃菊|黃羅幹|羅賈慶林|慶專制|制賣淫|淫八九|八八老|八巴赫|巴白立

朴|白白梦|白白皮书|白保钓|保鲍戈|鲍鲍彤|鲍暴乱|暴暴政|暴北大三角地论坛|北

北韩|北北京当局|北北京之春|北北美自由论坛|北博讯|博蔡崇国|蔡藏独|藏曹长青|曹曹刚川|曹柴玲|柴常劲|常陈炳基|陈陈军|陈陈蒙|陈陈破空|陈陈希同|陈陈小同|陈陈宣良|陈陈一谘|陈陈总统|陈程凯|程程铁军|程程真|程迟浩田|迟持不同政见|持

赤匪|赤赤化|赤春夏自由论坛|春达赖|达大参考|大大法|大大纪元|大大纪元新闻网|大大纪园|大大家论坛|大大史|大大史记|大大史纪|大大中国论坛|大大中华论坛|大大

众真人真事|大戴相龙|戴弹劾|弹登辉|登邓笑贫|邓迪里夏提|迪地下教会|地地下刊物|地弟子|弟第四代|第电视流氓|电钓鱼岛|钓丁关根|丁丁元|丁丁子霖|丁东北独立|东东方红时空|东东方时空|东东南西北论谈|东东社|东东土耳其斯坦|东东西南北论坛|东动乱|动独裁|独独裁政治|独独夫|独独立台湾会|独杜智富|杜多维|多屙民|屙俄国|俄发愣|发发轮|发发正念|发法愣|法法抡|法法仑|法法伦|法法轮|法法论|法法十

轮十功|法法十轮十功|法法谪|法法谪功|法反封锁技术|反反腐败论坛|反反攻|反反共|反反人类|反反社会|反方励之|方方舟子|方飞扬论坛|飞斐得勒|斐费良勇|费分家在|分分裂|分粉饰太平|粉风雨神州|风风雨神州论坛|风封从德|封封杀|封冯东海|冯冯

素英|冯佛展千手法|佛付申奇|付傅申奇|傅傅志寰|傅高官|高高文谦|高高薪养廉|高

高瞻|高高自联|高戈扬|戈鸽派|鸽歌功颂德|歌蛤蟆|蛤个人崇拜|个工自联|工功法|


Appendix IV

Time Line

1998 Blondie Wong claims to have hacked into a Chinese satellite

1999 Cyber war between Taiwan and the Mainland

Websites in the USA attacked following the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

2000 China is accused of hacking into Japanese government websites

2001 First Regulations to combat hacking introduced

2001 Cyber war between China and the USA following the spy plane incident

2002 White Paper on Defence released identifying information warfare and network security as an issue.

Falun Gong Hacks into television satellites

2003 Chinese government accused of hacking into the Dali Lama’s computer networks.

2004 The Indian Times reports on hack attacks by the Chinese on Tibetan exiles computers.

2005 USA Department of Defence computers under attack from emails containing Trojan Horses

China accused of hacking into

2006 China suspected of hacking into USA Navy site and Commerce Department

2007 China accused of hacking into military sites in the USA Germany the United Kingdom, France Australia, and New Zealand. China vehemently denies the accusations and claims that they are the victims of a large number of hack attacks.


Appendix VII

Citizen Reporters On The Huankantou/Huaxi Incident

In the matter of the Huankantou/Huaxi incident, I had two previous posts. The post A New Chinese Tourist Mecca was an eyewitness account by a visitor a few days after the incident. The post Q&A about Huaxi/Huankantou is a collection of various pieces about the background as well as the event itself. This current post collects a number of Chinese Internet forum comments (via Boxun) translated into English. As such, you are reminded that there is no guarantee on accuracy, but this is an example of citizen reporters taking over when the mainstream media are missing in action.

The event took place on early April 10, and these posts occurred between April 12 and April 13. Thereafter, all Internet posts on the subject were deleted by the Internet Nanny. So this was a brief window of opportunity in which free exchange of information was permitted to occur. These posts are also interesting because they illustrate the interaction between government and citizenry in Undercover Internet Commentators on the Chinese Internet. Among the commentators were a couple of people who were present at the scene from the government side. You can read this fascinating exchange among the people, including both their perspectives as well as the tone and style of interaction. But just as we were getting both sides of the story, the rhetorical devices got in the way and communication was broken off. If the conversation had continued, there might have been a collaborative effort to ferret out whether two elderly ladies were really killed (note: some local person must know their names), why a government worker got the tendons in his legs severed with knives by the rioters in the customary manner of Chinese triad gangs (note: some local person must have seen it), and other details.

Like it or not, this was better than hearing from the government only through official press releases on one side and the citizens trying to outdo each other in bashing the government on the other side. In this case, the government workers were not the type who hoist the red flag high and sing praises of the leadership. I just wished the dialogue could have continued further along.

Eyewitness [4s4s4s4s123@sohu], April 12, 2005, 22:00.

Let me explain what happened on April 10th in detail.

At around 1am on April 10, I received a telephone call to assemble at 3am for an emergency meeting (it was Sunday, and I really didn’t want to go). At 4am, we assembled in front of the municipal government building and we boarded vehicles. Each vehicle had a number. If my memory serves me right, the last bus should be number 50.

At 430am, the vehicles entered the village. At around 5am, the militia set up a security cordon outside the bamboo sheds, and the workers from the various


units (several dozens of them came from the Women’s League; they were women, and some of them were more than 50 years old) entered the bamboo sheds to persuade the elders to leave. After those people left, the workers from the municipal government began to dismantle the sheds.

At 530am, the dismantled material were loaded onto the vehicles, and the workers were ready to leave the scene. By this time, more and more spectators had shown up. There was a clash between the crowd and the police who were maintaining order on the road, and there were isolated instances of rock throwing at the police and the workers. The police and the militia used their bodies to erect a human wall, and the workers entered successfully into the school. During the clash, a small young man wearing glasses was dragged by the police into the group of workers. He was probably one of the more ‘excited’ local people, but the police did not do anything to him because they probably did not have time to worry about him.

When was it? I forgot. At the school sports field, we can hear waves and waves of shouting from the outside. I went up to the third floor of the classroom building. Heavens! There were a lot of people outside (actually, this was just the start and many more people would be coming). Two ambulances, a medium-sized bus and two lorries parked on the outside of the school were ready to leave. At the time, they had thought about there might be injured workers or people who cannot be persuaded to leave, so that was why they were parked outside.

When was it? I forgot. When the five vehicles got to the peasant houses nearest to the bamboo sheds, the crowd’s roar got louder and then bricks and rocks were thrown at the vehicles like a hailstorm. The sounds of the screaming bricks (in Dongyang, the locals are famous for throwing rocks; not only can they throw far, but they can actually throw with sound), the windows breaking and the people yelling were loud. The ambulance from the People’s Hospital was in the front, followed by the ambulance from the Chinese Medicine Hospital next, then the bus and the lorries.

When was it? I did not have time to look at my watch! The anti-riot police (actually, they were just formed from the ordinary police) was forced to fire off tear-gas canisters. A total of five canisters were released. I can see that clearly. (To the forum master, here I have to ask you, Do you know why they used only five canisters? And then they did not use any more even when the situation got out of control!? Let me tell you, the Public Security Bureau instructed their people very clearly before setting out -- if the people scream and curse you, you must not respond; if the people assault you, you must not hit back. Thus, they never expected the locals to be like this! Therefore, they only used five canisters, and even those five canisters had been borrowed. The batons and shields of the several dozens of anti-riot police were in fact the only weapons of self-defense for the more than 2,000 government workers). At that time, the crowds dispersed quickly. Some bold ones continued to throw rocks at the militia, and one person was arrested by the police. At that time, the vehicles were able to get through. During the process, there were some elders who tried to stop the vehicles, but a police station director persuaded them to make way. (I don’t want to give the details of the names, because I don’t want to cause them or me any problems. Please pardon).

As for what happened next, it was something that nobody wanted to see! To tell the truth, if was not so much shocking as terrifying. It let me see how "human qualities were trampled"!!!


11678 [110011678_2002@sohu], April 12, 2005, 22:23

Let me tell you what you people did. Why were people throwing rocks? Because your vehicles rolled over elderly ladies and then you fired off tear gas canisters. That was why the people started to throw rocks. When you people were loading the vehicles, an innocent person was assaulted by your people and was seriously injured. Why won’t you say so? That was the paper factory boss near the small bridge, and he only came out to retrieve his dog. Is this not the truth? Would you care to say that this was not the truth?


My mobile phone suddenly went off. A colleague who came with me told me not to watch anymore, but to come downstairs and get on the bus immediately. (At the time, I was so glad that I was not on one of those five vehicles. But the latter developments would show me how pitifully wrong I was). When I got on the bus, I told my colleagues about what I saw before. Then we heard the loud yelling from the school entrance, because the local villagers have begun to attack the school (afterwards, I found out that they were spreading rumors that the vehicles had killed some people). The anti-riot police stopped them repeatedly and then they also rushed outside (even now, I don’t understand why they wanted to rush outside). The anti-riot police were able to break out, but the ordinary police behind them could not get out. Therefore, the job of defending the entrance fell to them (because the anti-riot police did not come back). At that time, some injured personnel retreated towards the sports field in the school. Our group felt that the matter was taking a serious turn, and we got off the bus and retreatedtowards the classroom building. The developments would prove that our decision was correct.

Angry Fish [far17@sohu], April 12, 2005, 22:46.

The preceding is the "official version" that is closest to the truth. But if one has to use the "official tone" to speak to you, one might ask: "Can you produce the evidence for your version?" It is doubtful that you can produce that, because nobody thought that this matter would turn out this way, and even the Huaxi villagers did not think that it would turn out this way either.

On other points, there was a number 51 on a medium-sized bus parked on the road. As for your persuading the people to leave in order to take down the bamboo sheds, I think that your people worked too hard. There was an elderly lady whom you put on a bus and then she wanted to ram her head against the rail to commit suicide. I wonder how you persuade her to come out?

As for the clash near the peasant houses, it did not seem right. Someone was injured by you people in front of the paper factory. The few tear gas canisters did not matter. It was less than one hundred meters from the first peasant house to the road intersection, and basically there were no crowds after that.


The anti-riot police did not appear to be ordinary police. The events that occurred afterwards were a human tragedy, but I don’t know if your people who took part reflected on it? Why did it turn out this way? Both sides trampled on each other’s human qualities, so please don’t use these saddening words.


Comrade Eyewitness, I want to clarify something with you. When you said that the forum master had bad intentions, I went back to read what had been posted. The forum master did not have anything that could be construed to be subjective speculation. Basically, the forum master reprinted what the media said about the environmental pollution! If you think that this is bad intentions, then it actually damages your credibility. I want to point this out, and if you think someone has bad intentions, you should be more specific. I think that you are basically a good comrade.

Fine, I am waiting for you to respond. Furthermore, the timing and the sequence of your events may be in some error, as I was also present at the scene. But the best way to understand this is to let the people know about what happened. We hope that more of those present can participate here, so that everyone (including the Huaxi villagers, the government officials, the police personnel and the government workers) can all understand the truth of this event.


Do you want proof? Do you want it? What is your basis? Do you dare to get it? When two policemen who wanted to protect injured government workers were beaten into a pulp, what did you do? What did you do? What did you do? Are they humans? You want to look at the photos? Oh! You want to look at them? If you are a Dongyang person, you better speak to the facts -- the people who were beaten were Dongyang folks and the people who beat them were also Dongyang folks! You don’t think this is shameful enough?

I would like to speak to you politely, but you people don’t seem to have any shame. I have nothing to say. Let me say again, the old lady sat at the seat next to the door on the medium-sized bus. And the people on the bus were the middle-aged women from the Women’s League, and the reason why they were there was to look after the elderly people who had been brought onto the bus. If it were your mother on the bus, would she let an elderly lady commit suicide? Unless your mother wanted to go to jail! Did you actually see someone get beaten up in front of the paper factory? Ha! The tear gas canisters were supposed to disperse the crowd in the front of the first peasant house! Did you know which direction the wind was blowing that morning? Ha!

I even know the name of the comrade who removed the elderly people in front of the bus, so I obviously knew from whom the anti-riot police came! Ha!

Since you don’t want to let me speak, OK!



I did not do anything. I only recorded some facts, and I am reflecting on why so many government workers were injured. But at the scene, not a single citizen --please pay attention, not a single citizen said on their behalf: Stop beating them. I was very saddened, because the government that I trusted has become "worse than the police of the Kuomintang." I heard that phrase at least three times from elder people and that is why I remembered it. Besides, I don’t have the awful habit of hating any police personnel.

11678 [110011678_2002@sohu], April 12, 2005, 23:54.

Eyewitness, you seemed to be getting emotional. I came to this forum to let people know about my thoughts and what I saw. Do you think that everyone is inhumane? Let me tell you, did you think that the injured people in there got out on their own? Damn you!!! We got them out. Have you thought about why things go to this stage?


On the last bit, I am just one person, and I can only believe what I saw. The villagers were running amok and they were emotional. You are just one person, and you can only present what you saw. But did you think about why they got so worked up? It is not enough to know the result of something, because it is necessary to figure out the reason why.

As Donyang people, it would seem too parochial to be concerned about saving face as opposed to figuring out the rights and wrongs. We are just plain folks, and we don’t want to worry about the problem of face because we are having a hard enough time staying alive. As for your tone of speech, I sensed that you must be in the police, because they usually speak like that. Why don’t I have the right to see the proof and the evidence? Please give me a reason. The constitution of the People’s Republic gave the citizens the right to know. You withhold the information because you are afraid that Dongyang will lose face, but that it is your tragedy. All rumors arise because of the lack of direct helpful information.

My anger came from the manner by which the government handled the pollution problems as well as the elderly protesters in their sit-down. As for the clash, I am sorry for both sides.

Eyewitness [4s4s4s4s123@sohu], April 13, 2005, 00:10

Ha ha ha. This is laughable! So a few police men and government workers were saved by the locals and hidden in their homes! You must be real locals. Ha ha. I forgot, even if the locals saved people, they don’t dare to admit it because some people will accuse them of being "traitors"!


Those people were beaten to a pulp without sign of life. What did their assaulters do? I think the people who were at the scene surely knew! I won’t say anything, because I am a Dongyang person too.

So, please continue chatting. Just don’t remember who you are!

11678 [110011678_2002@sohu], April 13, 2005, 00:14.

We common folks are unable to formulate a conclusion about the rights and wrongs of this case. It is true that some criminal elements took advantage of the situation, such as robbing the stuff inside the vehicles. Some are from here and some are from the outside, and I am shamed of them. The incident was caused by the pollution, and the people could not even grow any vegetables and must therefore buy from the city (that was how it is with my family). Why did the government attempt to solve this only after it came to this point? Do the officials care about the livelihood of the people?

Yahoo 0410 [Yahoo -0401@sohu], April 13, 2005, 00:43.

My name is Wang, the Wang as in "Huankantou"! The entire incident took place about 500 to 600 meters from my house. On that night, I also heard the sound of the firecrackers (the signals used by the elderly people in the bamboo sheds when they see government workers coming to remove the bamboo sheds) and I witnessed the entire incident. Afterwards, I monitored what the reactions from everyone. Of course, I also paid attention to what people on the Internet are saying. The government has the newspapers and the broadcast channels. They have the means to speak, because these are their newspapers and broadcast channels! But I want to hear the voices of the people! I have seen all sorts of posts on many web sites, big and small. Originally, I did not want to express my own thoughts, because it is a waste of time since no important official is going to have the spare time to read forum posts and then decide to take action.

But I can’t stand it and I must speak out.

It is easy to see what went on, because it is not as if this sort of thing hasn’t happened before. This was a human drama, with all sorts of people -- there are politicians, there are clowns, there are thugs, there are those who gloat, there are those who pound their chests, there are those are scared ... and these days, there are large groups of tourists (most people have never seen so many cars being smashed)! I want to say -- it is we the common folks who have suffered!

How did things come to this point? The leaders don’t have the time now to clean up the battlefield, so everybody gets to come and see it! The leaders are busy with other things! Like sending a fax to Reuters and saying that the truth is something else ... actually it was due to a "small number of people with malicious intent" ... actually ... I am not interested in what happens to these leaders and their political future is something only they care about! I want to know what we common folks should do? There are a lot and a lot of people who will be "severely sanctioned" for "opposing" (the government document actually contains these words, and you can verify it for yourself). And we have to endure the stinking water and the polluted air day and night, we have to watch the bosses


pass in front of us in their BMWs and then we receive less than a hundred dollars in compensation money each year (I received 80 yuan this New Year).

Fine, everybody must think that I am going off the track. So let me tell you what I saw on that day. Earlier on March 20, the local people heard that a chemical industrial plant was moving here. Everybody was quite angry, and a number of elderly people began to built the bamboo sheds to obstruct the principal access road to the chemical plant. Eventually, more and more people took part, so that there were more than a dozen of those sheds. By early April, the government issued a notice to ask the people to remove the sheds. Honestly, the government’s first notice was quite rational, saying a lot of nice things. But maybe the people don’t believe this sort of talk anymore, or because some city leaders refused to give up, or maybe it is both. So the government leaders could not wait anymore and they issued the second letter from the town government, including a notice from the public security bureau. The tone of that letter was scary. I called that "white terror." A few days afterwards, on April 10, a major incident accidentally but inevitably occurred.

When I got to the scene, the leader’s car had already left. At the time, the people on the road said that government vehicles rolled over and killed two elderly women; they also said that a civil government vehicle rolled over and killed one person and then they threw another injured person onto the car to be cremated alive! My first feeling was that this was extremely unlikely. When I got to about 300 meters from the bamboo sheds, I saw a topless man who was bleeding in the head running in the field being chased by a dozen peasants, one of whom was holding a stick and hitting the man. As I went further down to about 50 meters from the school, I saw a young man lying motionless in a pool of blood. He was dressed in what appeared to be a government worker uniform, and there was a pool of blood behind his head. I wanted to assist him, but the crowd around him would not let me do that.

My heartbeat rose as I went further ahead. When I got to the school, I saw that the wall was breached in two spots. Inside the schoolyard, there were many vehicles of various sizes, some of which had been smashed. The size of the crowd at the scene was so large as to be impossible to estimate. I heard that there were still some "police" trapped inside. After a few minutes, I squeezed my way towards the classrooms. There were a few people in uniform lying motionless on the ground. Someone was yelling, "Tong Rong told you to come here to die, and you came here to die!" I could not endure the angry atmosphere and I withdrew.

That was what I personally saw. No lies here. I describe these bloody scene not to let the government off. I would like to ask the city officials if they should bear some responsibility? Why did you let some unconnected people who don’t know the facts come here to do who knows what? Did you consider the safety of the people? If you asked the militia "not to fight back when hit," did you consider the safety of the militia themselves? Did you think that if you show up with 3,000 people, then the people will be intimidated? Did you not realize that there was the anger penned up over so many years? Did you feel that everything can be sacrificed for your own interests?

Perhaps a "small number of persons with malicious intent" were spreading rumors, but this is just a political struggle between you and them. Why should so many other people play along with you? Why don’t you do it properly, why don’t you do it the people’s way and why don’t you do it in a way that calms the people


instead of falling right into the trap of the "persons with malicious intent"? Sad! Disgusting! Detestable!

Yahoo 0410 [Yahoo -0401@sohu], April 13, 2005, 01:24.

To "Eyewitness" and "Real Words Are Precious":

I am a Huaxi person. I have lived here for many years. I know more about Huaxi than you do, I know more about the local people and I know even more about the government that you do.

I cannot help but start guessing at your identities. There are only several types of people here. One type would be those who are intimately connected with the incident, such as myself. Another type would be those passed by and made some posts. And then there is another type which is definitely on the other side of this incident -- such as the two of you. I think that maybe you are uniformed people who were asked by the leadership to take part in this illegal and unreasonable event, and so I can understand why you would want to complain. But you should remember that this was not the fault of the common folks, because they were forced into this. Do you want them to be just like you, being pawns on a chessboard? If you want to blame someone, you should find those who brought you over there in the first place! If you are just the usual government workers like the reporters at the Dongyang Daily, then I despise you strongly because you are worst than beasts.

The Third Eye Looks at 123 [zjdy_5678@sohu], April 13, 2005, 09:10.

Based upon I found out last night, the Dongyang municipal government mobilized three ambulances and two morgue hearses in case the workers or the common folks should need them.

This morning, an office colleague told me that her relative is a cadre and many Dongyang City department heads did not want to be used by Secretary Tong Rong and so they either turned off their mobile telephones or found some other excuse not to go. They did not want to get involved.

lijpsy [lijpsy@sohu], April 13, 14:46.

I send my respects to the comrades who were injured in this incident! Most of you were encouraged to take part without knowing the truth, and most of you behaved well -- except for a few who wanted to show off in front of the leaders! I believe that in the handling of such internal conflicts within the people, if the leaders had the courage to show up by themselves to persuade the people on the basis of legal and rational arguments, then the tragedy would not have taken place. The matter has not ended. If I were the instigator, I would have killed myself to apologize to all those who were physically and psychologically damaged, including those cadres and militia who broke down and cried afterwards as well as those students who are not able to attend classes these days.


When the people act as a group, they cannot be ignored or under-estimated! The leaders should not think that they can be mistreated, because even their tolerance has limits. The Dongyang leadership should think about whether they ought to feel guilty over this matter. Imagine that your home is in Huankantou and you have no means to redress your pollution problems, would you not feel that justice does not exist in the world?

Comrades, let me make you a suggestion! Locking down the media is not the solution. You ought to resolve the matter as quickly as possible, and you must publicly and honestly tell the public about the situation. You should tell all the media about the objective truth, you must bring all the leaders who were involved in criminal activities to justice, and you must stop operations in all those factories which exceed pollution standards. At the same time, you must also punish those people who used the opportunity to create chaos -- but not including those people who took part because they genuinely thought that they were fighting for their interests. Otherwise, the event will get more distorted as it gets relayed and you are going to look worse and worse off. You should not think that after blocking the other media, your own Dongyang Daily will help you -- after a few days, you may be the only people left reading it.

Please believe that most of the villagers are good people, and there are not too many people who took part without knowing what was going on. The anger of the people showed one thing -- there is no hatred that came about for no reason! Think about this and shouldn’t this simple fact be understood by the graduates of the communist party school?

I hope that this matter does not end with April 10. I will pray for all those who have an interest in this matter, including the leader who issued the order!

huashui050410 [huashui050410@sohu], April 13, 16:02.

Today is the third day after the Huaxi incident. Due to the information blockade, various visitors have come from all directions to see what is going on. All traffic into Huaxi has been blocked off by traffic police. Is the government getting nervous or what!? Why are all the web sites deleting the related posts? This is extremely infuriating!

http://zonaeuropa.com/20050524_1.htm

Sniffer Packets & Firewalls By Kay Hearn BA, Grad Dip Journalism ...

Documents

Transcript of Sniffer Packets & Firewalls By Kay Hearn BA, Grad Dip Journalism ...