Slapdash: Co-opting Arab Nationalism and Britain’s Wartime Commitments

The First World War

Chris Murray

Submitted to Dr. Nikolas Gardner

War Studies 543

The First World War

Royal Military College of Canada 15th April 2014

A note to the reader on spelling, For the sake of simplicity and readability I have chosen to adopt contemporary spelling and phrasing in reference to both individual and place names subject to this paper’s examination. Arabic does not easily lend itself to transliteration in English. As such the debate over spelling is both a complex and long standing one. In recent years alternative spellings have begun to be introduced that are argued as more truly representative of the original Arabic. Also current place names have altered in spelling considerably since the First World War. These spellings have led to some representations of commonly recognized names that are virtually unrecognizable to the uninitiated and can lead to confusion. In the case of this paper, the choice was made to rely on commonly recognized spelling which seems the simplest and most logical course of action. Glossary of Abbreviations HMG - His Majesty's Government AB - Arab Bureau FO - Foreign Office PID – Political Intelligence Branch of the Foreign Office IO - India Office WC - War Cabinet RN – British Royal Navy

“Acquired by subterfuge; ruled (for the most part) by proxy; abandoned in confusion.”1

- Dr. John Darwin* (on Britain’s Middle Eastern mandates)

1 John Darwin, “An Undeclared Empire: The British in the Middle East, 1918–39” The Journal of Imperial and * Dr. John Darwin is Beit University Lecturer in the History of the British Commonwealth at the University of Oxford.

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By the beginning of the 20th century the Ottoman Empire was facing rising domestic

instability and a growing Arab nationalist movement. Conditions were being exacerbated by

growing European encroachment into the region further destabilizing the Ottoman state.2 In the

years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War, His Majesty’s Government (HMG) had

accumulated a commanding body of evidence of a growing Arab resistance to Ottoman rule.3

The British were also keenly aware of the fact that this ‘nationalist awakening’ was in its

infancy, diverse and deeply fractured.4

With the outbreak of war, HMG began viewing the emerging Arab nationalist movement

as opportune for British regional interests in both an immediate military and long-term political

context.5 A massive imperial pivot to the Middle East on the part of the British Empire was

underway. The opportunity to harness, foster and guide this nationalist movement for war aims

and post-war regional concerns was considered of paramount priority.6

2 Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig, “European Wars, 1815-1914”, in Hamilton and Herwig, Decisions for War, 1914-1917 (2004), 3; Scott Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2013), 34; Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1 3 Donald M. McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I” The Historian 59, no.2 (1997): 320 4 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918. 11-21. The National Archives of the UK. “The Cabinet Papers - Records of the Cabinet Office”, CAB, London 2014. <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/default.htm>; CAB 24-143-04 “Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report No. IV” Eastern Report IV, 21 February 1917, p. 2; CAB 24-143-05 “Arabia, Hejaz. The Political Situation.” Arab Bulletin No. 41. 6 February 1917, p.56; George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement. (London: H. Hamilton, 1938), 32-3; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 28; John Baldry, “British Naval Operations Against Turkish Yaman 1914-1919” Arabica 25, no. 2 (1978): 149; McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I,” 317; Joseph Heller, “Britain and the Armenian Question, 1912-1914: A Study in Realpolitik” Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 1 (1980): 14 5 Ian F.W. Beckett, The Great War. (2nd ed.) (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 104; David French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914—1916”, War & Society 5, no. 1 (May 1987), 47-52; Joseph Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War." Middle Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (1976), 9, 12; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 152; Eitan Bar-Yosef, “The Last Crusade? British Propaganda and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-18” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 1 (2001): 91 6 James J. Schneider, Guerrilla Leader: T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. (New York: Bantam Books, 2011), 18; S.A. Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914” Middle Easter Studies 12, no. 2 (1976): 123

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This has since led to a host of recrimination against the British Empire alleging that

HMG took advantage of an Arab national awakening during the First World War by

orchestrating an uprising with empty promises that were ignored once the revolt had outlived its

value.7 Certainly the British held imperial ambition in the region, of this there can be little

doubt.8 However, British ambitions were originally far less and more flexible than they became.9

British policy in supporting Arab nationalism was also far more constant than an initial

assessment might suggest. Certainly there is a level of the left hand not knowing what the right

hand was doing or even acting against it.10 To some degree the British were caught in the

currents of war and doing their best to deal with the reality of the moment. As strange as it may

seem to suggest the world’s most extensive empire did not have a complete picture of events or

clear course of action, this is not entirely off the mark.

There also existed an underlying imperial policy consistent enough to rightly level

accusations of duplicity against Britain. Although an internal consistency did exist in British

imperial policy regarding the Arab question the massive disjointed bureaucracy is also reason

enough to suggest that the duplicity which existed was perhaps not so much conscious as much

as a systemic condition.

The British did indeed make unmistakably clear and concrete promises concerning Arab

independence that were discarded or simply ignored at war’s end.11 When Britain entered the

7 Efraim Karsh & Inari Karsh, “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt” Middle Eastern Studies 33, no. 2 (1997): 267 8 Darwin, “An Undeclared Empire,” 160 9 Brock Millman, “A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18” Journal of Contemporary History 36 no. 2 (2001): 242-3 10 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 160; V.H. Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914-1918” The Historical Journal 13, no. 2 (1970): 277; Timothy J. Paris, “British Middle East Policy-Making after the First World War: The Lawrentian and Wilsonian Schools” The Historical Journal 41, no. 3 (1998): 775-6 11 “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 46-56; His Majesty’s Government & French Third Republic. The Anglo-French Declaration, 7 November 1918; “British Treaty with Ibn Saud (Treaty of Darin) 26 December 1915,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 57-8; “The United Kingdom’s Recognition of Kuwayt as an

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war she only had the vague aim to emerge from the war with her prestige undamaged in the

east.12 By wars end this had been radically expanded. Britain had begun to express several

tangential aspirations, many of which it would eventually pursue with dogged determination.13

However, what critics who condemn British policy, as ‘Machiavellian’ fail to realize is the ways

circumstance and the momentum of the war effort also served to modify intentions.14 The

international political landscape was pockmarked with conflicting aims from Arabs, Turks,

British, French and Zionists.15

Dr. Margaret MacMillan* suggests, “The British were systematically and constantly

perfidious in their dealings with all powers and groups concerning the Middle East.”16 Although

not an incorrect analysis, this paper would and the addendum that this was however not always

consciously so. The reality of British wartime policy in the Middle East is that it was undertaken

by what has been aptly characterized as a ’hydra-headed political organism.’17 The recurring

tensions between London, Cairo and India were a hallmark of Britain’s Middle Eastern policy.18

To suggest however, that the British failed to grasp this picture of their own policy apparatus and

only realized too late the contradictions they had committed themselves to, is simply incorrect.

Independent State under British protection 3 November 1914’” J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record. (London UK: Octagon Books, 1972) 6; FO 882/9, IS/18/113, “Memorandum on British Commitments To Bin Saud” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. December 1918, p. 2-4. The National Archives of the UK. “Records Created or Inherited by the Foreign Office” FO, London 2013. <http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/SearchUI/browse/C130?v=h> 12 Millman, “A Counsel of Despair,” 242-3 13 ibid 14 Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 275; Linda J. Tarver, “In Wisdom’s House: T.E. Lawrence in the Near East” Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 3 (1978): 599-600 15 Tarver, “In Wisdom’s House,” 599-600 * Dr. Margaret MacMillan is a historian of international relations who serves as professor at the University of Oxford, where she is Warden of St Antony's College. She is also former provost of Trinity College and professor of history at the University of Toronto 16 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. (New York: Random House, 2003), 382 17 Helmut Mejcher, “British Middle East policy 1917-21: The inter-departmental level” Journal of Contemporary History, no. 8 (1973): 81 18 Mejcher, “British Middle East policy,” 81

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The tangle of HMG conflicting wartime agreements is difficult to unravel. Between the

numerous conflicting aspirations and commitments a multitude of misunderstandings rapidly

accumulated. Britain’s promises to secondary allies like the Arabs became totally conflicted and

impossible to deliver upon in short order. HMG were however well aware of this phenomenon

but felt this was hardly a cause for immediate concern.19 Wartime Britain was desperate and it

was considered unlikely HMG would find itself in a position where it would be called upon to

honour all of these arrangements.20 Most commitments were quickly issued with little concern

for details that would likely never need working out.21

The British failed to fully appreciate the nationalist forces they were co-opting in Arabia.

The British made clear commitments to post-war Arab independence in turn for immediate

wartime support.22 The nationalist movement was mistakenly viewed as a useful weapon that

could be wielded against Britain’s enemies for wartime aims and a tool that could be put to

constructing a post-war British imperial Arabia.23 Once accomplished, whether premeditated or

not HMG mistakenly assumed that Britain would simply be able to put the Arabs back in their

box.24 The British failed to appreciate that they had let the genie out of the bottle and they would

not be able to put the cork back on.25

19 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 287; MacMillan, Paris 1919, 388; Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 279; Millman, “A Counsel of Despair,” 261; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 183; James Renton, “Changing Language of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East: 1917-1918” The Historical Journal 50, no. 3 (2007): 650 20 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 287; MacMillan, Paris 1919, 388; Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 279; Millman, “A Counsel of Despair,” 261; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 183; Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 650 21 Millman, “A Counsel of Despair,” 261 22 “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 46-56; His Majesty’s Government & French Third Republic. The Anglo-French Declaration, 7 November 1918; “British Treaty with Ibn Saud (Treaty of Darin) 26 December 1915,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 57-8; “The United Kingdom’s Recognition of Kuwayt,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 6; FO 882/9, IS/18/113, “Memorandum on British Commitments To Bin Saud” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. December 1918, p. 2-4 23 Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire,” 15 24 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 287 25 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 386-7

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At the beginning of the twentieth century Arab discontent had emerged within the

declining Ottoman Empire.26 This discontent arose in response to changing Ottoman politics and

caused the revival of Arabic thought and language giving birth to the beginnings of a modern

nationalist movement.27 Although Arabs were beginning to connect with their Arabic roots in a

nationalist framework there were still deep divides in Arab society that left the bourgeoning

nationalist movement unprepared for the events the First World War.28

HMG was keenly aware from a growing sense among local diplomatic officials and

consular contacts of a rising sense of Arab nationalism emerging in the Ottoman Empire.29

Serious Arab unrest had appeared throughout the region including incidents of violence against

local Ottoman garrisons that left little doubt as to which way the wind was blowing in Arabia.30

With this awareness came increasing concern over its direction and how this movement, if

undirected could damage not only Ottoman but also British interests.31 As a result there was a

steady shift in the British Foreign Office (FO) concerning HMG’s Ottoman integrity policy.

Although their official tack would remain in support of the continued preservation of the

Ottoman Empire until their entry into the war HMG was becoming less convinced of the

feasibility of doing so.32

By 1913 the FO was facing a serious conundrum. The FO was keenly aware that it would

be ill advised to rebuff those Arab chiefs that were requesting British cooperation against the

Ottomans. Still, there was a persistent fear of the possible international and local complications

26 Charles Townshend, When God Made Hell: The British Invasion of Mesopotamia and the Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921. (London UK: Faber and Faber, 2011), 43; Martin Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity” Daedalus 122, no.3 (1993): 173-4 27 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 53–55 28 ibid, 32-3 29 Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia,” 123; McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I,” 317-20; Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire,” 15 30 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I,” 317 31 Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia,” 124-6 32 Heller, “Britain and the Armenian Question,” 3-4

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that would result from Arab revolt.33 The fear of men such as Sir Edward Grey* over an Arab

upheaval had helped to ensure Britain’s actions remained deeply cautions. Sir Louis Mallet’s*

concern of the potentially ‘far-reaching’ consequences the Arab revolt would likely create, only

served to reinforce this tack.34 The stasis HMG sought to maintain, as the Middle East swirled

into chaos, only served to produce an increasing sense of uncertainty within HMG over Middle

Eastern policy.

It was becoming increasingly clear that Ottoman entry into the war was inevitable.35 In

response Britain began to make a major shift towards finding an answer to the coming problem.

On the other side of British policy individuals like Lord Kitchener* had for some time been

advocating the view that the situation was inevitable and the Ottoman Empire was on the brink.

He believed that it was only a matter of time before an Arabs sought independence and the HMG

should do everything they could in support of it.36 Kitchener viewed the Arab Middle East as

vital to her position in Egypt and therefore the Suez Canal as well as the greater empire and

argued that some level of support must be promised to the Arab movement before the outbreak

of war.37

With the prospect of the Arab revolt more real, it began to produce a new imperial

narrative that quickly amassed a momentum all its own.38 On the eve of the outbreak of the First

World War British policy had moved to securing Arab support across the Middle East through a

33 Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia,” 124-5 * Sir Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon, served as British Foreign Secretary from 1905 to 1916. * Sir Louis du Pan Mallet served as British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire at the outbreak of the First World War. 34 Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia,” 125 35 Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire,” 23-4; * Lord Horatio Kitchener of Khartoum, 1st Earl Kitchener, British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt at the time and later British Secretary of State for War. 36 Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, 18 37 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I,” 320-1 38 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 152

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host of arrangements made with various leaders. These agreements were considered to be of the

greatest importance to the coming war.39 This would eventually lead to negotiated agreements

with most of the major peninsular chiefs including: Ibn Saud; the Imam Yahya; Sayyid al-Idrisi

of 'Asir; Ibn Sha'lan of the Ruwala; Sheikh Mubarak, the ruler of Kuwait as well as Sharif

Hussein of Mecca the Emir of Hejaz.40

Some of the earliest signs of Arab unrest had appeared in Yemen in 1869 and from 1905

onward civil unrest had intensified with violent assaults on Ottoman authority.41 The possible

impact Red Sea Arabs could have for British Royal Navy (RN) operations in the region was

cause for considerable concern with HMG. The importance of reassuring the region’s Arabs of

British intent, getting the Arabs onside with British war aims, and guarding against any threat to

British shipping had become a paramount priority.42 In response to these concerns the British

published the ‘Aden Proclamation’ with the aim of reassuring the Arabs in Yemen that HMG

had no desires on the region and declaring their commitment to the progress and welfare of the

region’s Arab population.43

The FO was inclined to agree with a growing body of opinion that, as Fitzmaurice*

described it, “'The Arabs down there are almost certain very soon to eliminate the Turks.”44 In

this view, lending a show of support to the Arabs was becoming a sound policy. At the outbreak

39 Baldry, “British Naval Operations,” 153; Jacob Goldberg, “Captain Shakespear and Ibn Saud: A Balanced Reappraisal” Middle Eastern Studies 22, no. 1 (1986): 81 40 ibid 41 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I,” 317 42 Baldry, “British Naval Operations,” 154-5 43 “British treaty with the Idrisi Sayyid of Sabia 30 April – 21 June 1915” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 24; Baldry, “British Naval Operations,” 154-5 * Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, ruler of the Nejd. 44 Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne, As quoted in Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia,” 123

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of the war letters were immediately dispatched to Ibn Saud* requesting his cooperation with

Sheikhs of Kuwait and Muhammarah in the capture of Basra. In return Ibn Saud was assured that

HMG would guarantee his protection against the Turks and would in turn recognize him as the

independent ruler of the Najd and Hasa and enter into treaty relations with him as such.45

When the Ottoman entry into the war did come, Sultan Mehmed V’s proclamation of war

was couched in religious terms and essentially represented a call to jihad.46 Britain’s chief

concern had been realized and a British response was required but was markedly reserved.47 In

Egypt, Britain’s ‘Proclamation on the State of War with the Ottoman Empire’ (6 November

1914) major emphasis was placed on stressing HMG intention to protect and abstain from

interference with Islam or the Arabian Peninsula and Support the Arab cause of freedom.48

Negotiations with Arab chiefs took on another dimension; a sense of urgency overtook

British motivations to rapidly secure their vital regional interests. The Canal and Gulf.

Agreements with Arab leaders were hastily pursued to ensure the British were not about to

become the focal point for Arab frustrations manifested through jihad. HMG made firm

assurances to both the Sheikh of Kuwait and Sheikh of Mohammerah. In the case of the 3

November 1914 assurance made to the Sheikh of Kuwait, in exchange for assistance in capturing

Basra and expelling the Ottomans, the British government agreed to recognize Kuwait as an

* Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess of Lansdowne was a British politician of considerable influence having served at one time or another as the Governor General of Canada, Viceroy of India, Secretary of State for War, and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Who from 1910-1916 served as Opposition leader in the lords and served in 1915-16 on the wartime coalition cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. 45 FO 882/9, IS/18/113, 'Memorandum on British Commitments To Bin Saud', Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. December 1918, p. 2-4; Daniel Silverfarb, “The Anglo-Najd Treaty of December 1915” Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 3 (1980): 169 46 Sultan Mehmed V of The Sublime Porte. Proclamation by Sultan Mehmed V, November 1914. 47 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 266-7; Bar-Yose, “The Last Crusade?,” 90-1 48 “British proclamation in Egypt on the state of war with the Ottoman Empire,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 7

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“independent government under British protection.”49 In the opening month of the war Britain

found itself having already made two separate and concrete commitments to Arab

independence.50

At this stage HMG was forced to consider that the post-war imperial partitioning of the

Ottoman Empire might be unavoidable. Britain was caught unprepared when confronted with

demands from the Russian Empire for post-war control of Constantinople* and the straits* in

return for wartime cooperation.51 With what would become known as the ‘Constantinople

Agreement’ HMG committed itself to a policy that would have been an unthinkable possibility

only a short time before.52

Within the same month the Treaty of London was signed settling Italy’s share in ‘The

Great Loot’53 of Ottoman lands.54 The Treaty of London committed the British to promises that

essentially would have seen the Adriatic become an Italian lake.55 These agreements were the

beginning of a major conflict and a two-track policy for the British wherein the wheels began

turning towards a post-war imperial partition of the Ottoman Empire. It would lead HMG to

imperial commitments with the Entente that would eventually run headlong into HMG’s

commitments to Arab nationalists.

In the interim between the Constantinople Agreement and the Treaty of London, in an

attempt to gain control over a rapidly escalating diplomatic calamity a committee under the 49 “The United Kingdom’s Recognition of Kuwayt,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 6 ; B.J. Slot, The Origins of Kuwait. (Leiden NL: Brill Academic Publishers, 1991), 406 50 ibid; FO 882/9, IS/18/113 “Memorandum on British Commitments To Bin Saud” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. December 1918, p. 2-4 * The Ottoman capital, modern day Istanbul * The Bosporus and Dardanelles 51 His Majesty’s Government, French Third Republic, Russian Empire. The Constantinople Agreement, 18 March 1915. Sec 1. 52 French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 48 53 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 152 54 His Majesty’s Government, French Third Republic, Russian Empire, Kingdom of Italy. Treaty of London, 26 April 1915. 55 ibid, Articles 4-7

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chairmanship of Sir Maurice De Bunsen* of the FO was established. Its aim, to formulate HMG

own post-war aims for the Middle East.56 The Committee report, delivered two months later,

recommended the preservation of an Asiatic Turkey and limited partitioning. In Arabia it was

recommended that HMG should annexed the Basra vilayet and secure her own imperial interests

in the Gulf. Beyond this the committee felt the British should commit itself to seeing that,

“Arabia and the Muslim Holy Places should remain under independent Muslim rule.”57 In

general the Committee recommended HMG make strong commitments to ensure the

independence of the Arabs and protect the autonomy of the various local Sheiks and Emirs. 58

In the days following the Treaty of London, a firm agreement was reached with the Idrisi

Sayyid of Sabia* in Yemen guaranteeing future security and independence in return for taking up

arms against the Turks.59 Britain had brought the count up to three separate treaties promising

Arab independence.60 Negotiations were also underway with Ibn Saud which would continue for

several more months.

Kitchener had been unwilling to shake his pro-Arab position and had begun laying the

groundwork for a future partnership between HMG and the Sharif of Mecca, Emir Hussein ibn

Ali as early as 1912.61 Kitchener had been involved in periodic contact with the Sharif’s second

* Sir Maurice De Bunsen was a British diplomat and member of the Privy Council who had served in several high placed roles within HMG foreign relations mechanisms including British Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon British Ambassador to Spain between 1906 and 1913 and to Austria between 1913 and 1914 when he was recalled to London due to the outbreak of the war. 56 Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 277 57 “British war aims in Ottoman Asia: Report of the De Bunsen Committee,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, Sec 3, 26-46 58 ibid, Sec 12, 26-46 * Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali al-Idrisi founder and ruled the Idrisid Emirate of Asir. 59 “British treaty with the Idrisi” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 24 60 J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record , p.6 – The United Kingdom’s Recognition Kuwayt as an Independent State under British protection 3 November 1914; FO 882/9, IS/18/113 “Memorandum on British Commitments to Bin Saud” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. December 1918, p. 2-4; “British treaty with the Idrisi” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 24 61 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I,” 320-1; Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, 18-9

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son, Abdullah.62 Abdullah had approached the British High Commissioner in Cairo to inquire as

to British attitudes concerning an Arab revolt. Although the FO had charted a careful response to

Arab overtures, maintaining HMG’s official policy of support for Ottoman integrity, British

caution did little to dissuade Hussein’s efforts.63 Despite official rebuffs the Sharif’s commitment

to the growing Arab unrest could not be deterred and Abdullah’s periodic visits to Cairo

continued in light of the belief that a shift in British policy was coming.64

While Abdullah was in Cairo courting British support, Hussein sent his third son, Faisal,

north to Syria to coordinate with Arab nationalists in Damascus.65 In secret meetings Faisal

negotiated arrangements with Arab nationalist societies for support of a Sharifian revolt against

the Ottomans.66 Their long-term goals would be articulated in the ‘Damascus Protocol’ which

defined the territorial demands of a future independent Arab state that would be established, with

British support, in Arabia in return for Arab revolt against Ottoman rule.67 Hussein presented this

offer to the British acting as the self-declared representative and leader of the Arab nationalist

movement.68

Sharif Hussein’s combination of religious legitimacy and nationalist alliances made him

an attractive force to HMG.69 The prevailing mood in Cairo was that the support of Hussein

would act as sufficient countermeasure to the Sultan’s call to jihad to prevent a religious war

62 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I,” 320-1 63 Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign,” 125; French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 48; Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 269-70 64 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 269-70 65 ibid 66 ibid, 286; Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, 17 67 Timothy J. Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution. (London: Routledge, 2003), 24 68 Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali Emir of Mecca. The Damascus Protocol, 1914. 69 Sören Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions: Iraq from the First World War to the 1958 Revolution” Revista Română de Geografie Politică 13, no.2 (2011): 159; French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 55-6

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uniting the Arabs against Britain.70 Beyond these considerations the Sharif’s dominions also

stretched the length of the Arabian Red Sea coast, that vital waterway of which Britain had

worried over.

During the course of these events in 1914 Kitchener left his post as British Agent and

Consul-General in Egypt to return to London as Secretary of State for War. This served to

further advance his views regarding ‘the Eastern question.’ That same year Lt Col. McMahon*

was appointed High Commissioner in Egypt placing the responsibility for handling HMG’s

negotiations with Sharif Hussein in his court. With Kitchener’s encouragement and the direction

of the De Bunsen Committee report Sir Reginald Wingate* and Ronald Storrs* began working

with McMahon in charting a course through negotiations to bring Hussein on side.71

The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence would progress for several months, starting in

the summer of 1915 and running into the early part of 1916. The correspondence grew steadily

discussing the Caliphate, Arab independence, and Hussein’s reign. The exchange would reach its

climax with McMahon’s letter of 24 October 1915 in which in return for Hussein’s support

McMahon promised, “Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the

Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.”72

Mere months after the De Bunsen report had mapped out a future for post-war Arabia

that envisioned a loose federation of independent states HMG had made an abrupt turn. The 70 French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 55-6 * Lieutenant Colonel Sir Arthur Henry McMahon was a British diplomat and Indian Army officer who served as the High Commissioner in Egypt from 1915 to 1917. * General Sir Francis Reginald Wingate was a British general and administrator in Egypt and the Sudan.who served as Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. From 1916 to 1919 he was also commander of military operations in the Hedjaz. Wingate was served as Sir Henry McMahon successor, High Commissioner in Egypt from 1917 to 1919. * Sir Ronald Henry Amherst Storrs was an official in the British Foreign and Colonial Office who served as Oriental Secretary in Cairo. Later he would serve as Political Officer representing the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia as Liaison officer for the Anglo-French mission in Baghdad and Britain’s the first military governor of Jerusalem. 71 French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 55-6 72 “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence 14 July 1915 – 10 March 1916,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 50-1

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British were now negotiating with Sharif Hussein as if they regarded him as the representative of

all Arabs and disregarding, or at the very least altering earlier arrangements made with

independent Arab Sheikhs.73 HMG was now committed to establishing a Hashemite kingdom in

Arabia in return for the Sharif’s material and political support.74

This was no oversight on the part of HMG and they were clearly aware of the policy

conundrum they were establishing through these agreements.75 The reality was they were

unconcerned given the uncertainty of events and the future course of the war. The entire

conversation was academic if the war was not first won.76 In the event of victory HMG’s view

was that the Arab revolt and Sharif Hussein would serve little real value beyond insulating the

British from jihad.77 Any hard military advantage of the revolt would only come with British

support and training making any Arab successes British by extension.78

The British had envisioned a very different form of ‘independence’ than that sought by

the Arabs.79 HMG had made clear commitments to ‘liberating’ the Arabs and creating an

‘independent’ Arab ‘nation.’ Despite this fact HMG continued to assume that these new Arab

states could be formed under the greater authority of HMG’s colonial empire.80 HMG was well

aware they had made a clear commitment to the Sharif of Mecca to establish a vast Arab nation

73 “The United Kingdom’s Recognition of Kuwayt,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 6; “British Treaty with Ibn Saud (Treaty of Darin) 26 December 1915,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 57-8 74 “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 46-56; “Report of the De Bunsen Committee,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 26-46; Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 161 75 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 160 76 ibid, 183; Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 287; MacMillan, Paris 1919, 388 Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 279; Millman, “A Counsel of Despair,” 261; Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 650; 77 Maxwell Orme Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu' to Aqaba” Military Affairs (1982): 194-5 78 ibid; MacMillan, Paris 1919, 388; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 266; Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 159 79 Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 161 80 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, p. 4 -21; Scholvin, Clashing Geopolitical Visions, 162; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 183

14

at wars end.81 Despite the clarity of these commitments HMG began to argue, in their own

circles, of a gap between their ‘intended meaning’ concerning commitments and how their

various Arab partners were likely interpreting these commitments.82

The British were more than aware of this ambiguity; it was an intentional internal

construct they had created out of convenience.83 They also intentionally allowed this diverging

view to persist without clarification to their Arab partners. The intent was to ‘sort things out’

after the war when the Arab leaders like Hussein would be in a position to do little but accept

whatever the British offered.84

All aspects of HMG however did not share this insight into the ambiguous nature of

agreements nor a positive view of them.85 The India Office (IO) in particular was upset over

promises to Sharif Hussein of a role in Mesopotamia when the IO was promoting a vision of a

post-war Indian colony in Mesopotamia.86 A great deal of conflict existed over policy formation

and direction. Many within HMG viewed the British to have committed themselves in concrete

terms that would be difficult to honour after the war in light of conflicting commitments and

ambitions.87 Others recognized this ambiguity but thought it disingenuous for HMG to adopt

what was viewed as a dishonourable tack of making long-term commitments for short-term gains

when it as felt they had no intention, or at least little ability, to fulfill them.88

81 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, p. 4-5 82 Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 161; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 183 83 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, p. 4-5; Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 161 84 ibid 85 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 162 86 Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 775-6; Townshend, When God Made Hell, xxii 87 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 266 88 ibid

15

After the outbreak of the war the and initial contact with Ibn Saud, much in the same way

as McMahon-Hussein, letters were exchanged between Ibn Saud and Sir Percy Cox.* These

letters became part of a yearlong negotiation between Cox and Saud to secure Saudi support. So,

as negotiations between Hussein and McMahon carried on, so too were arrangements being

finalized between HMG and Ibn Saud. The result would be the signing of the Treaty of Darin on

26 December 1915, committing HMG to Saudi rule. This served to underscore a growing

conflict between a rapidly divergent multi-track Arab policy in HMG.89

This agreement would also serve to underscore the systematic duplicity inherent in the

British system. As a result of HMG multi-track policy, a competition for primacy over Arab

policy between two branches of HMG (the FO and IO) had occurred resulting in the British

backing two sworn rivals. By making similar, if not conflicting promises, they had in essence

promised both Hussein and Ibn Saud similar if not the same lands and post-war roles, essentially

selling the future of Arabia to two separate leaders.90

1916 would prove to be a major turning point for British-Arab relations and the future of

HMG Middle Eastern policy. It had become obvious that a focal point was required to coordinate

conflicting policy aims. In December of 1915 Sir Mark Sykes* wrote General Clayton* urging

* Major-General Sir Percy Zachariah Cox was a British Indian Army officer and colonial administrator in the Middle East who served as Acting Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and Consul-General for the Persian provinces from 1904-1909 and later as British Resident until 1914 after which he was appointed Secretary to the Government of India and Chief Political Officer with the Indian Expeditionary Force. In 1918 he would be appointed Acting Minister in Tehran and went on to be the first High Commissioner under the Iraq Mandate in 1920. 89 “British Treaty with Ibn Saud (Treaty of Darin) 26 December 1915,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 57-8 90 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 165 * Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, 6th Baronet was a Conservative Member of British Parliament who served as a political and diplomatic adviser on Middle Easter affairs and played a major role both in formulating British post-war Middle Easter policy as well a committing HMG to a further net of conflicting arrangements. * Brigadier-General Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton was a British army intelligence officer and colonial administrator who at the time was serving as, then a Lieut. Colonel, Director of Military Intelligence in Cairo. When the Bureau was officially constituted, Clayton was appointed Director of the Arab Bureau and promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General. After the war Clayton went on to serve as Civil Secretary of Palestine and briefly as acting High Commissioner.

16

the establishment of an Arab Bureau (AB) tasked for said purpose.91 In short order, 7 January

1916, the AB was official formed; its intended function, to “harmonize British political activity

in the Near East.”92 The reality was such that the AB would come to assume responsibility for

formulating and complimenting HMG policy regarding Arab revolt, as well as all intelligence

flowing through the Middle East.93

The AB would enter a “three-cornered contest”94 between Simla, London and Cairo that

became a “maze of overlapping bureaucracies” 95 in the Middle East.96 The AB was, for its part,

focused on fomenting an Arab revolt while attempting to chart a carful course through the

volatile and murky regional waters of religion and nationalism.97 Beyond wartime concerns the

AB also had to contend with a growing debate over how Britain would navigate her

commitments to Arab nationalism while avoiding further entanglements and ensuring the

security of her post-war concerns. This debate covered the FO and the War Cabinet, the AB, and

IO with pro-Turk and pro-Arab cabals arguing for or against independence and imperial

annexation contributing to an incredibly complex and heated policy evolution.98

At the same time that Sir Mark Sykes was advocating a more concrete British policy for

the Middle East he was also pursuing other means of shoring up HMG post-war aims. In

November of 1915 Sykes had begun negotiations with François Georges-Picot* on terms for the

91 FO 882/4/ARB/15/4 “Letter from Sykes to Clayton (28 Dec. 1915)” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. 28 December 1915; FO 882.4/ARB/16/4 "Establishment of An Arab Bureau in Cairo" Committee of Imperial Defense Paper, 10 Jan. 1916 92 Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt,” 195 93 ibid 94 Mejcher, “British Middle East policy,” 82 95 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 220 96 ibid; Mejcher, “British Middle East policy,” 82 97 Bar-Yose, “The Last Crusade?,” 91 98 Mejcher, “British Middle East policy,” 81-2 * François Marie Denis Georges-Picot was the son of historian Georges Picot and grand-uncle of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who served as a French diplomat during the war.

17

post-war partitioning of the Middle East into British and French spheres.99 In the middle of

promising both Ibn Saud and Sharif Hussein post-war regional authority the British were also

making similar agreements with their imperial partners that were in conflict with one another.100

The Sykes-Picot agreement is described by Scott Anderson* as “one of the strangest –

and with the advantage of hindsight, most destructive – diplomatic accords ever penned.”101 It

would essentially promote the advancement of a post-war Middle East that was both totally

opposed to the fundamental tenets of Arab nationalism as well as British commitments to Arab

nationalism.102 This was in part due to Sykes and Picot’s misjudgement of the Arabs as being

‘incapable of truly governing themselves.’103 The final Sykes-Picot agreement emerged in May

of 1916 and after months of back and forth a future map of the Middle East had been created that

“bore absolutely no relation to the one envisioned by McMahon and Sharif Hussein.”104

The McMahon negotiations had been concerned with immediate military issues and were

rooted in short-term strategic interests, which were not in conflict with Arab independence. They

were unobstructed from willingly embracing the cause of Arab nationalism and were perhaps

even naïvely idealistic in their support of such a ‘noble’ cause.105 The view of Sykes-Picot was

quite different. It was the manifestation of imperialist ambitions filtered unabashedly through the

99 His Majesty’s Government, French Third Republic, Russian Empire. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 16 May 1916. Sec 2-6. 100 ibid; “British Treaty with Ibn Saud (Treaty of Darin) 26 December 1915,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 57-8; The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence 14 July 1915 – 10 March 1916,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 50-1; Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, 23 * Scott Anderson is a journalist, and a veteran war correspondent, frequent contributor to for the New York Times Magazine and author of the widely acclaimed Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East. (2013) 101 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 162 102 CAB 24-143-18 “Arabia – Hejaz, Asir and Yemen” Eastern Report XVIII, 31 May, 1917, p. 6-10; Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 162 103 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 163 104 ibid, 162 105 “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 50-1

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lens of realpolitik.106 The Sykes-Picot agreement also revealed that British interest in the Middle

East had expanded dramatically since the outset of the war.107

The Sykes-Picot agreement was viewed by many from across the different policy cadres

within HMG as a massive diplomatic miscalculation and a poorly thought-out agreement.108

Lord Curzon* would describe it as “that unfortunate agreement…which has been hanging like a

millstone around our necks ever since.”109 To many it also represented a spot of dishonour and a

betrayal of British promises to support Arab independence.110 Sykes-Picot fell almost

immediately into disrepute with HMG and served to mark a turning point after which HMG

would begin to retreat from her wartime commitments. Almost from the moment of its signing,

members of HMG were eager to exploit ways of escaping its clauses.111

It was around Sharif Hussein of Mecca that British efforts to foment an Arab revolt

against the Ottoman Empire found their focal point.112 The Sharif’s revolt was slow to begin

despite HMG’s military promoters due to a mix of Hussein’s caution and Britain’s early failures

to follow through on commitments made early in 1916 to supply the revolt with arms.113 When

the revolt did finally begin it was in earnest as a response to German and Turkish advances into

the Hejaz.114

106 Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, 23 107 Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 277 108 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 270 * George Nathaniel Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, was a vastly influential British Conservative statesman who was Viceroy of India and later as Foreign Secretary. He served in Lloyd George's War Cabinet as Leader of the House of Lords and also served on the War Policy Committee. Curzon was also included in virtually all high-level discussions concerning the fate of HMG post-war imperial aspirations. He was a significant force in Middle Eastern policy and an avid support of the Sharif of Mecca 109 1st Marquess Curzon As quoted in MacMillan, Paris 1919, 382-3 110 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 270 111 Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 775 112 Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 654 113 Donald M. McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question in the First World War” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no.2 (1993): 242 114 ibid

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On 27 June 1916 Sharif Hussein released a proclamation of independence from the

Ottoman Empire declaring Ottoman rule to be against Islam and calling for open revolt.115 The

Sharif’s proclamation was a balm for HMG’s concerns over jihad.116 The initial prospects

however, remained quite dim. The Sharifian forces were inadequately equipped, supplied, and

lacked training. It had become apparent that the revolt lacked a tactical direction and there is

question as to how much the British actually expected of the revolt in military terms.117 What

would eventual emerge however, was well beyond initial expectations and would go along way

to realizing what the pro-Arab cadre in Cairo had envisioned.118

Although initially haphazard, the adoption of hit and run tactics would prove to be

massively successful and fit well with traditional Bedouin raiding tactics.119 This would allow

the revolt to improve in scope and range broadening strategic objectives and making a very real

contribution to HMG military operations in the region.120 The capture of the port of Yenbo 27

July 1916 was a significant success allowing British supplies a port for offloading in the Hejaz.

Throughout the course of 1916 and 1917 the revolt would continue to harass Ottoman logistics,

attacking the Hejaz railway and raiding Ottoman garrisons along the line.

By 1917 the Middle East looked very different from only a year before. In January the

revolt would easily capture the port of Wejh. The British campaign in Mesopotamia had

successfully captured Baghdad on 11 March 1917. Shortly after the capture of Baghdad Lt Gen.

115 Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali Emir of Mecca. Sharif Hussein's Proclamation of Independence from Turkey, 27 June 1916. 116 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 266-7; French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 55-6 117 Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt,” 198 118 ibid; CAB 24-143-03 “Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report No. III” Eastern Report III, 14 February 1917, p. 1-2 119 CAB 24-143-05 “Arabia, Hejaz. The Political Situation.” Arab Bulletin No. 41. 6 February 1917, p. 56; Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt,” 196-8; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 464 120 CAB 24-143-03 “Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report No. III” Eastern Report III, 14 February 1917, p. 1-2; Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt,” 198

20

Sir Stanley Maude* would make the ‘Baghdad Proclamation’ emphasising that “between your

people and the dominions of my King there has been a close bond of interest” reaffirming

HMG’s commitment to Arab independence stating, “our armies do not come into your cities and

lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.”121

The revolt in the Hejaz would make further advancements that summer with the capture

of Aqaba on 6 July 1917, significantly altering the revolt.122 Aqaba was an Arab port captured

and held by the revolt, not the British. It served to protect the British flank in the Sinai and

significantly advance British lines of logistics by projecting the RN a further 160 km north into

the heart of Arabia. It had in essence elevated the revolt to an equal military partner significantly

altering the relationship. It also served to allow both British and Arab forces the ability to project

power much further north and relieve pressure on British forces in Palestine. It served to

effectively cut Ottoman forces at Medina out of the war and more importantly for the revolt, it

allowed for the possibility of operations in Syria.

On the political front, things seemed to be going well for the British in the Middle East,

all things considered. This was the calm before the coming storm. In less than a month, in

November of 1917, the duplicity of HMG system of double dealing would be laid bare with the

publication of the Balfour Declaration on 9 November 1917, which made commitments to the

Zionist movement that the British would support the establishment of a Jewish homeland in

* Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude was a British Army officer who took command of the British Tigris Corps (III Indian Army Corps) in July 1916 during the Mesopotamia campaign shortly after British failure at the Siege of Kut. He would be instrumental in re-organizing the British and Indian forces in Mesopotamia his effort would see him made commander of all Allied forces in Mesopotamia. 121 Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude on Behalf of His Majesty’s Government. The Baghdad Proclamation, 19 March 1917. 122 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question in the First World War,” 243; Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt,” 197-8

21

Palestine after the war.123 Two weeks later, as a result of the October Revolution in Russia, the

Bolsheviks would discover and publish it on 23 November 1917.124

The political fallout from the events of 1917 was significantly damaging to British

prestige in the Middle East. The British were now facing a major diplomatic challenge while still

in the midst of fighting a war, the outcome of which was still far from certain.125 The response

from HMG’s Arab allies was, as could be expected, one of indignation.126 The damaging

diplomatic crisis had caught the British on their heels and they now had to contend with a very

real Arab nationalist movement intent on seeing HMG commitments filled and their post-war

independence realized. In response to these diplomatic revelations a group of seven Syrian

notables in Cairo, members of the newly formed ‘Party of Syrian Unity,’ anonymously issued a

memorandum demanding a clear guarantee by HMG of an independent Arabia.127

McMahon would pen the British response and the resulting ‘Declaration to the Seven,’

would become the first public declaration by HMG of its commitment to Arab independence.128

Stating that “[HMG] recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arab[s]… and

support them in their struggle for freedom” the document made clear “it is the wish and desire of

[HMG] that the oppressed peoples of these areas should obtain their freedom and independence

and towards the achievement of this object [HMG] continue to labour.”129

With the end of the war approaching thoughts turned towards the coming peace and

possible post-war settlements. A growing Francophobia had also emerged within the British

123 Lord Balfour on behalf of His Majesty’s Government. The Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917. 124 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 270 125 Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 650 126 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 270; Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 283 127 Isaiah Friedman, Palestine: A Twice-Promised Land? Vol. 1: The British, the Arabs, and Zionism, 1915-1920. (New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 195-216 128 Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 50 129 His Majesty’s Government. The Declaration to the Seven, 16 June 1918.

22

hierarchy.130 There were those raising concerns regarding the French and voicing a desire to keep

the French out of imperial competition in HMG’s Middle Eastern interests. In light of the lack of

a military presence fielded by the French in the Middle East during the war it was felt as if HMG

was undeservedly handing their prizes off to the French at the risk of destabilizing the region.131

In hopes of avoiding this eventuality, there were those in HMG arguing that by utilizing

President Wilson’s* Fourteen Points132 they could renege on Middle Eastern commitments to the

French made in Sykes-Picot in good faith.133

In an effort to further erode French claims, the British were able to persuade the French

to issue the joint Anglo-French Declaration regarding the future of Syria and Mesopotamia.

Issued on 7 November 1918 the declaration clearly stated a commitment by both the French and

British governments for “the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long

oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations

deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.”134

Despite this clear commitment and the promise of, “the establishment of indigenous

130 CAB 24-143-11 “Arabia – Hejaz and Aden” Eastern Report No. XL (incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XXXYIII) 12 April 1917, p. 5; CAB 24-143-15 “Addenda- Hejaz” Eastern Report No. XV (Incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XLII) 10 May 1917, p. 8; CAB 24-143-16 “Arabia –Hejaz, The French Military Mission” Eastern Report No. XVI (Incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XLIII) 17 May 1917, p. 7; CAB 24-143-18 “Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report No. XVIII” Eastern Report XVIII, 31 May, 1917, p. 1-2; Erik Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question: The Political Intelligence Department and the Eastern Committee, 1918” Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 4 (1987): 425; Tarver, “In Wisdom’s House,” 593; MacMillan, Paris 1919, 382-3 131 CAB 24-143-18 “Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report No. XVIII” Eastern Report XVIII, 31 May, 1917, p. 1-2; Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 421; Darwin, “An Undeclared Empire,” 162; Elie Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire” The Journal of Contemporary History 3 no. 19 (1968): 22-3 * Thomas Woodrow Wilson was the 28th President of the United States, held office from 1913 to 1921. After years of attempting to keep the US out of the war and expressing a desire to act as a peace broker Wilson brought the US into the war on the side of the Entente advancing an agenda to make a war to end all wars and imposing Entente commitments to his ‘Fourteen Points’ and League of Nations in return for American intervention. 132 President Woodrow Wilson. Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918. 133 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, p. 21; Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 645; Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 779 134 His Majesty’s Government & French Third Republic. The Anglo-French Declaration, 7 November 1918.

23

Governments and administrations… as soon as they are actually established”135 the fate of the

Middle East would be held in limbo awaiting the judgment of the Paris Peace Conference.

Leading the diplomatic charge was Emir Faisal, Britain’s ‘chosen son’ of sorts. As leader

of his father’s revolt, with his successes as a military commander, and his close relation with

T.E. Lawrence,* Faisal had emerged as the de facto representative of the revolt and with it, Arab

nationalism. Wasting no time Faisal traveled to Paris as leader of the Hejaz delegation and upon

arriving released a Memorandum on 1 January 1919 outlining his vision for the future Arab

homeland.136

Framing his argument within the terms of the ‘Fourteen Points’ “point[ing] to the general

principles accepted by the Allies when the United States joined them” Faisal’s memorandum

made the case that “the aim of the Arab nationalist movements… is to unite the Arabs eventually

into one nation.”137 His memorandum also served to emphasize his father’s legitimacy as leader

of the Arab nationalist cause to act as their representative. Faisal was also careful to chart a

conciliatory course acknowledging the ‘special interests’ of the European powers to areas of the

Middle East such as with the British in the case of Yemen, the Nejd, and the Gulf.138 Faisal was

careful to acknowledge the need for independent negotiations with these separate cases. He went

further by also emphasizing that in principle there could be cooperation on the issue of

135 His Majesty’s Government & French Third Republic. The Anglo-French Declaration, 7 November 1918. * Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ was a British Army intelligence officer attached to the Arab Bureau who served as liaison Emir Faisal and played an active role in the operations of the Arab Revolt. These activities and his post war involvement in HMG Middle Eastern affairs would earn him great deal of fame and influence. He would act as a vocal critic to British imperialist policies in the region and work hard at promoting Faisal and the Hashemite cause but would eventually retreat into a life of solitude dying in 1935 at the age of 46. 136 Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Memorandum by the Emir Faisal, 1 January 1919. 137 ibid 138 ibid

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commitments made to Zionists in the Balfour declaration within the framework of an

independent Arab state.139

Faisal made a further bid to strengthen the position of the Arab cause and bring HMG on

side by alleviating concerns over other British commitments in the region. The Faisal-Weizmann

Agreement was signed 3 January 1919 under HMG’s urging, with this aim in mind.140 It was

intended to act as the basis for friendly relations between Zionists and the future Arab state in

establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine.141 It was however, to become irrelevant because its

terms had included the condition “Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in

my [Faisal’s] Memorandum”142

On 18 January 1919 the Paris Peace Conference was officially convened.* Although it

would be some time before Faisal was permitted to address the conference he would publish

another memorandum the ‘Territorial Claims of the Government of the Hedjaz’ on 29 January

1919 reinforcing his position as an independent state player at the Peace Conference. In it Faisal

again emphasized British and French commitments to an Arab independent state in keeping with

the principals framed within the ‘Fourteen Points’ and outlining the territories that would be

included with the already independent state of Hejaz.143

Faisal’s ambitions were to remain unrealized. On 30 January 1919 the conference would

announce a preliminary decision to implement a system of mandates that would run headlong

into Arab demands for independent statehood.144 Despite its disarmingly supportive tone, framed

139 Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Memorandum by the Emir Faisal, 1 January 1919. 140 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 390 141 Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein and Dr. Chaim Weizmann. The Faisal–Weizmann Agreement, 3 January 1919. Articles 1,3-4 142 ibid, Closing Provision * See Margaret McMillian Paris: 1919 for a comprehensive account of the peace conference 143 Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Territorial Claims of the Government of the Hedjaz, 29 January 1919. 144 The Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference. Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories, 29 January 1919.

25

in the principles of the ‘Fourteen Points,’ this was engineered to insure that, despite the rhetoric

of national self-determination, the regular business of empire would be maintained.145

The central point was the ambiguity present in the term ‘mandate’ itself. As Faisal

described it, “[mandate] is a word that can be interpreted as ‘colonization’ or as the lightest bond

of affectionate assistance which in no way touches independence.”146 The European powers were

relying on this fact to advance a post-war imperial agenda in the region, one that in reality,

unbeknownst to Faisal, had already decided the fate of the Middle East before the conference had

even convened.147

Faisal would meet with the Council of Ten* on 6 February 1919 to further clarify his

memorandums and Arab expectations related to the proposed sets of mandates.148 In this meeting

Faisal again reiterated the Arab views of an independent Arab government, or governments in

Arabia and the limits of his delegations claims, which were carefully crafted so as no to run into

conflict with those ambitions expressed by European powers.149 The results of this meeting were

inconsequential and would change little to nothing concerning imperial ambitions in the region.

The Arabs had made the mistake of having taken British commitments at face value,

ignoring the greater global context of the European imperial system. In the last two years of the

war the British had undertaken a massive propaganda campaign aimed at framing the conflict in

the Middle East as one in support of the cause of national self-determination.150 In order to gain

145 The Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference. Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories, 29 January 1919. Sec 4 146 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 479 147 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 381 * The Council of Ten was a committee at the Paris Peace Conference comprising two delegates each from Britain, France, the United States, Italy and Japan, which oversaw the spearheading of details surrounding major issues of negotiation. They were in effect the leaders of the conference’s negotiations. 148 The Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference and Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, 6 February 1919. Sec 1 149 ibid, Sec 1,4, 6 150 Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 645

26

support both on the home front and among the Arab population the British had worked to

transform the perceptions of the region and present themselves as supporters of the Arab

cause.151 This rhetoric had served to transform the post-war diplomatic landscape forcing the

British to adopt a less direct course to achieving their regional aims. Mandates served as a useful

tool in achieving this end but were presented and received as a strictly temporary measure on the

road to total regional independence, which undercut their long-term legitimacy.152

In the last few months of the war London had already began to pay attention to creating a

concrete plan for approaching the peace conference. The process had revealed a possibly

irreconcilable rift within HMG for post-war settlements. On one side of HMG, a Wilsonian-

style* peace was favoured, while the other viewed Britain's primary interests as lying with her

overseas empire, aimed at securing those elements of the post-war settlement.153 Both groups

however, shared uncertainty of direction concerning the post-war power structure for the

region.154

In order to formulate a strategy for the coming conference the Political Intelligence

Department (PID) of the FO, established March of 1918, was set to the task of sorting out HMG

various commitments, articulating HMG’s own ambitions and reconciling the two.155 By October

1918 the PID had been reorganized into nine subsections to accomplish this task. On 21

November the Middle East Section submitted the report 'The Peace Settlement for Turkey and

151 Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 645 152 CAB 23-08-06 “Appendix ‘Future Government on the Middle East’ – Copy of Letter from Lord R. Cecil to M. Pichon Covering a Draft Memorandum.” War Cabinet 485, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet at 10, Downing Street S.W., on Monday 14 October 1918, at 12 noon, October 1918, p. 6; Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” 24 * A peace formed on the basis of the principles espoused in President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ 153 CAB 23-08-06 “Appendix ‘Future Government on the Middle East’ – Copy of Letter from Lord R. Cecil to M. Pichon Covering a Draft Memorandum.” War Cabinet 485, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet at 10, Downing Street S.W., on Monday 14 October 1918, at 12 noon, October 1918, p. 6; Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 419 154 Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 419 155 ibid

27

the Arabian Peninsula.'156 Its recommendations would make a large deviation from the traditional

imperialist mindset. The report argued in favour of keeping France and any other imperial

competitor out of the region. It would argue for the creation of independent Arab states within

the Middle East as a means to this end, advocating it best served both the regions’, the Arabs’, as

well as HMGs’ long-term interests.157

The report outlined fourteen separate British commitments which would need to be

addressed in influencing British negotiations in the coming peace process.158 Ultimately it was

realized that these agreements were a hindrance to HMGs’ own post-war ambitions.159 HMG was

eager to find some way to escape the clauses of agreements viewed as out-dated, made under the

duress of war. The British recognized that their wartime pledges of peace without annexations

could serve to allow HMG to escape these agreements, keep imperial competitors at bay and

broker the post-war Middle Eastern deal desired.160

Perhaps the greatest challenge looming in the process was Sykes-Picot. France was

adamant that its terms be upheld and was opposed to surrendering any of its claims in the Middle

East.161 For HMG and the Eastern Committee of the PID, Sykes-Picot was a “wretched

agreement” 162 that had to be escaped from. It was clear that French views regarding the region

156 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918; Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 420 157 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918. 158 ibid 159 CAB 23-08-06 “Appendix ‘Future Government on the Middle East’ – Copy of Letter from Lord R. Cecil to M. Pichon Covering a Draft Memorandum.” War Cabinet 485, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet at 10, Downing Street S.W., on Monday 14 October 1918, at 12 noon, October 1918, p. 6; CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, p. 11; CAB 24-143-18 “Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report No. XVIII” Eastern Report XVIII, 31 May, 1917, p. 1-2 160 CAB 24-143-18 “Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report No. XVIII” Eastern Report XVIII, 31 May, 1917, p. 1-2; Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 421-2 161 Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 424 162 1st Marquess Curzon as quoted in - Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 424

28

were a direct hindrance to HMG post-war plans.163 This was only reinforced by the Eastern

Committees conclusion that an independent Syria and Hejaz along the terms that Faisal had laid

out would pose no threat to HMG’s long-term interests in the region. 164 It would in fact serve to

alleviate growing Arab resentment and strengthen HMG prestige among the Arabs as well as

block French advances into Britain’s Middle East.165

HMG negotiating team in Paris was to be a combination of new order idealists and old

world imperialists. However it was the imperialist undercurrent, a paradigm that framed all of

HMG policy that was at the heart of the matter. The British delegation led by Lloyd George* had

approached the conference with 'The Peace Settlement for Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula'

report and a clear understanding of the situation. They had also however approached the

conference under the false assumption that they were in a position to ultimately decide the fate of

the Middle East for themselves as they wished without an appreciation for possible backlash.166

HMG’s delegation failed to appreciate that the Middle East, in part because of British

wartime support, had been fundamentally altered, as “an Arab nation had entered the game of

nations, and from the outset, its members made far-reaching claims.”167 The French for their part

were unwilling to take Arab nationalism as a serious current in the region. Picot had aptly

described the French view in saying; “You cannot transform a myriad of tribes into a viable

163 CAB 23-08-06 “Appendix ‘Future Government on the Middle East’ – Copy of Letter from Lord R. Cecil to M. Pichon Covering a Draft Memorandum.” War Cabinet 485, Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet at 10, Downing Street S.W., on Monday 14 October 1918, at 12 noon, October 1918, p. 6; Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 424 164 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, p. 2; Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 424-7 165 ibid * David Lloyd George, 1st Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor was a British Liberal politician and statesman. He served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1908–1915, Prime Minister of the Wartime Coalition Government of Britain 1916–22 which included acting as leader of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 166 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 381 167 Kramer, “Arab Nationalism,” 177-8

29

whole.” 168 Both powers had failed to fully appreciate how deep an impact HMG wartime

pronouncements regarding Arab nationalism and the Anglo-French Declaration had in Arabia.169

As Margaret MacMillan described it; “the British and French who had summoned the djinn of

nationalism to their aid during the war were going to find that they could not easily send it away

again.170

By the time of President Wilson’s arrival, Lloyd George and Clemenceau* had in fact

already agreed in private as to how to divide the Middle East into their respective spheres of

control. In doing so little attention had been paid to the advice from HMG’s own policy studies,

the demands of or concerns of Arab nationalists, and in fact very little attention to the reality on

the ground at all.171

In the ensuing days and months of the peace conference a Machiavellian imperialist

realpolitik would overwhelm the negotiations. Smaller fledgling movements like that of Faisal’s

Arab nationalists would be merely speed bumps, their issues peripheral, as the imperialist

system, regardless of the good intentions of many within it, rolled ever forward. For HMG

whenever its commitments ran into conflict with French interests, as it did in Syria, the French

invariably won out. This tack was supported by the notion that Britain had to defer to the French

with whom they had to live and work with all over the world.172

There were still however those trying to avert what they saw as the looming disaster

inherent in maintaining the status quo. A great deal of criticism was emerging over decisions,

which were seen to serve only to destabilize Mesopotamia and endanger HMG’s interest in the

168 Georges-Picot as quoted in MacMillan, Paris 1919, 386-7 169 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 386-7 170 ibid * Georges Benjamin Clemenceau served as the Prime Minister of France from 1906 to 1909, and again from 1917 to 1920 and acted as leader of the French delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 171 MacMillan, Paris 1919, 381 172 Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 779

30

region. Even among those who were not enthusiasts of Hashemite* rule being adopted in

Mesopotamia realized in light of British commitments to supporting Arab autonomy, some form

of independent Arab rule would be necessary.173 Even Hashemite was preferable to British

control either direct or through mandate.174 High level individuals within HMG including Lloyd

George himself had inversely spoken openly within their own circles of simply paying lip service

to Arab nationalism and creating what would more or less be an ‘Arab façade’ to British imperial

control of the region.175

As early as 1918 Hirtzel,* was raising deep concerns over the need to adjust HMG

approach raising an alarm that “entirely new currents are flowing now and we must shape our

course to them ... the ‘Arab façade’ may have to be something more solid.’176 Hirtzel admitted

with uncommon candour that, “before the war Great Britain had a rather unenviable reputation

for giving pledges and the receding from them owing to force of circumstances.”177 This was

hardly a well-kept secret and a view widely seen as shared by HMG partners. To do any less than

completely honour HMG commitment to Arab nationalism at this critical juncture would

irrevocably damage British prestige among the Arabs and likely cause HMG to lose the whole

region in the long run.178

As negotiations at the conference ground towards their predetermined conclusions events

in the Middle East were far from static. Before the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June of

* Sharif Hussein of Mecca’s Clan 173 Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 282; Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 779 174 Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 779-87 175 FO 882-23 “Telegram –Secret, From Curzon to Clayton” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. 25 June 1919, p. 70; Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” 282 * Sir (Frederic) Arthur Hirtzel was the Secretary in the India Office’s Political Department from 1909 to 1917, after which he served as the assistant under-secretary and then the deputy under-secretary of state for Indian from 1917 to 1924. 176 Sir Arthur Hirtzel as quoted in Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 779 177 Sir Arthur Hirtzel as quoted in Townshend, When God Made Hell, 372 178 Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 779

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1919 war had already broken out in Mesopotamia. The short-lived Kuwait-Nejd war was a

warning sign of things to come.179 In light of events, growing concerns over the stability of

imposed mandates in the Middle East was becoming a larger element in top-level discussions.180

The American ‘King-Crane Commission,’ would issue its report 28 August 1919 and

remain largely forgotten, its findings not published until December of 1922.181 The report details

concerns regarding the viability of proposed partitions in the Middle East. The report argued that

the Arabs were far from prepared for total independence. The divisions, which existed within

these societies were still too raw to allow a modern state to develop without support.182

The report also cautioned that the Arabs would not accept becoming subjugated to

European domination. The commission had received, among other indications, ‘The Resolution

of the General Syrian Congress at Damascus’ 2 July 1919. This made quite clear the popular

opinion regarding a possible French mandate in Syria.183

The Paris Peace Conference was not the final word on issues concerning the post-war

Middle East. Several conferences would follow to finalize various details or adapt policy to cope

with changing politics on the ground. The London Conference of 1920 would be where the

179 His Majesty’s Government with Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait and Abdullah Said, Delegated by His Majesty Sultan Abdullah Ibn Abdur-Rahman Al Saud, Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies. The Uqair Protocol of 1922, Agreement concerning the boundary between Nejd and Kuwait, 2 December 1922. 180 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, p. 3; CAB 24-143-05 “Arabia, Hejaz. The Political Situation.” Arab Bulletin No. 41. 6 February 1917, p. 56-8; CAB 24-143-09 “ Syria. The Raw Material. [Fragmentary notes written early in 1915, but not circulated.]” Arab Bulletin No. 44, 12 March 1917, p. 113; CAB 24-143-20 “Arabia – Hejaz Intelligence” Arab Bulletin No. 51, 23 May 1917, p. 231; CAB 23-30-1 “The Iraq Treaty” Cabinet 25 (22) – Conclusions of Meeting of the Cabinet held in Mr. Chamberlain’s Room, House of Commons, S.W., on Wednesday 5 April 1922 at 4:15 p.m. p. 4-5; Goldberg, Captain Shakespear and Ibn Saud, 82; Kedourie, “The end of the Ottoman Empire,” 24; Laura Robson, “Church, State, and the Holy Land: British Protestant Approaches to Imperial Policy in Palestine, 1917 – 1948” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39 no. 3 (2001): 468 181 “Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission on Syria and Palestine 28 August 1919,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 191-200 182 Sec 1-3 of the “Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission on Syria and Palestine 28 August 1919,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 191-200 183 “The Resolution of the General Syrian Congress at Damascus 2 July 1919,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 180-2

32

details of the Treaty of Sèvres, dealing with the partition of Ottoman lands would be finalized

between Britain, France, and Italy. The treaty included the details of the Palestinian Mandate and

reaffirmed French rights in Syria.184 So although the Hejaz was recognized as independent the

European mandates severed it from the cultural and economic centres of Damascus and the

Mediterranean coast it had claimed.185

The treaty would be ratified at the San Remo conference held 19 -26 April 1920.186

Beyond confirming the decisions of the London Conference the San Remo Conference would

also reaffirm and incorporate the principles of the Balfour Declaration into Britain’s mandate for

Palestine. The conference issued the ‘San Remo Resolution’ outlining the future mandate system

of the Middle East defining Britain’s control of Iraq and French rule over Syria, essentially

closing the door on the issue of establishing truly independent Arab states.187

During the diplomatic negotiations of 1919-20 events on the ground had hardly remained

in stasis. Beyond the events of the Kuwait-Nejd war other troubles had become painfully clear.

Nowhere was the tension greater than perhaps it was in Damascus.188 It had become quite clear

to HMG through the multiple wartime pronouncements of the Sharif and his sons, that they

would not tolerate a French presence in their territories during the revolt nor after the war and

that any attempt to impose one would lead to revolt.189 This was reinforced with the events on

184 His Majesty’s Government, her Allies and The Sublime Porte. The Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920. 185 ibid; Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Memorandum by the Emir Faisal, 1 January 1919; Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Territorial Claims of the Government of the Hedjaz, 29 January 1919. 186 His Majesty’s Government, French Third Republic, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan.’ San Remo Resolution, 25 April 1920. 187 ibid 188 FO 882-23 “Memorandum to Clayton, Director of Arab Bureau, From Lt-Col. A.T. Wilson - Self-Determination in Mesopotamia ” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. 22 February 1919, p. 24-5; Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Territorial Claims of the Government of the Hedjaz, 29 January 1919; Ahmed Djemal, Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-1919 (London UK: Dalton House – Forgotten Books, 2014), 234-6 189 CAB 24-143-11 “Arabia – Hejaz and Aden” Eastern Report No. XL (incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XXXYIII) 12 April 1917, p.5; CAB 24-143-15 “Addenda- Hejaz” Eastern Report No. XV (Incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XLII) 10 May 1917, p. 2-8; CAB 24-143-19 “Arabia – Hejaz and Yemen” Eastern Report No. XIX (Incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XLVI) 7 June 1917, p. 4; Djemal, Memories of a Turkish Statesmen, 210

33

the ground during the peace negotiations, which HMG seem to have disregarded as it rolled

forward with a program of post-war settlements that were already inciting revolt before the ink

had dried.190

The wheels had been set in motion shortly after Faisal’s ‘Conference of Ten’ meeting. It

had become clear to Arab nationalists that the imperial powers were committed to exerting their

influence over the Arabs and reneging on the spirit of their wartime commitments to Arab self-

determination. Displeased at the prospect of French build up along the Syrian coast the Al-Ali

Revolt had begun in July 1919 with the expressed aim of expelling the French from the region.191

This armed rebellion would gain a loyal following and would grow and join forces with other

emerging rebellions against the French it.

In March of 1920 Faisal attempted to present Europe with a fait accompli declaring the

formation of ‘The Arab Kingdom of Syria’ with himself as king and claiming control over the

territories of greater Syria under the French mandate.192 The result was to mark the beginning of

the Franco-Syrian War. Joined by the Al-Ali Revolt, Feisal’s forces fought a French occupation

force backed by the approval of the League of Nations and HMG.193

The Franco-Syrian war would abruptly end Faisal’s Arab Kingdom of Syria by July of

the same year, 1920. A mere four months later, Damascus had fallen and Faisal had been

190 See the Kuwait-Nejd war and Al-Ali Revolt 191 Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 282–283 192 FO 882-23 “Memorandum to High Commissioner in Cairo Reginald Wingate from Lt-Col A.T. Wilson on the Future of Mesopotamia” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. 2 April 1920, p. 73; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 464; His Majesty’s Government, French Third Republic, Russian Empire. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 16 May 1916; His Majesty’s Government, her Allies and The Sublime Porte. The Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920 Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Memorandum by the Emir Faisal, 1 January 1919; Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Territorial Claims of the Government of the Hedjaz, 29 January 1919; His Majesty’s Government, French Third Republic, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan.’ San Remo Resolution, 25 April 1920; The Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference. Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories, 29 January 1919; French Third Republic. Mandat Syrie-Liban, 25 April 1920. 193 His Majesty’s Government, French Third Republic, Kingdom of Italy, Empire of Japan.’ San Remo Resolution, 25 April 1920; His Majesty’s Government, her Allies and The Sublime Porte. The Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920.

34

deposed. Although Damascus had fallen to French forces the revolt would continue until French

raids into the An-Nusayriyah Mountain strongholds of Sheikh Saleh al-Ali’s* men effectively

scattered their forces. Even then, the French forces would not finally defeat the insurgents until

June of 1921.194 Essentially the French mandate in Syria had begun with an extensive counter-

insurgency operation against local nationalist forces, aimed at eliminating a home-grown

independence movement, a movement that HMG had helped to create and done in direct conflict

to the principles of the Anglo-French Declaration.195

As to why HMG had paid so little attention to the emergence of an Arab insurgency in

French Syria only a year after the end of the ‘war to end all wars’ and the fate of their chosen

son, Faisal, the answer was simple; The British were facing their own insurgency in

Mesopotamia in response to the British mandate of Iraq.196 The Arab population was heavily

armed and already mobilized in revolt against the Ottomans. A desert people with a culture of

raiding, the Arabs had a long martial tradition and it is therefore unsurprising under these

conditions that the response to being sold short during the peace conference would be violent.197

By 1920 events in the Mesopotamia had reached crisis levels. The establishment of

Faisal’s government in Damascus had had wide reaching implications. The significant body of

Iraqi officers in the revolt were displeased at the lack of progress across the rest of the region as

* Sheikh Saleh al-Ali was a prominent Syrian Alawi leader and commander of the Al-Ali Revolt of 1919, one of the first rebellions against the French mandate of Syria before even Faisal’s Great Syrian Revolt. 194 Moosa, Extremist Shiites, 282–283 195 His Majesty’s Government & French Third Republic. The Anglo-French Declaration, 7 November 1918; Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt,” 198; Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” 23 196 FO 882-23 “Memorandum to High Commissioner in Cairo Reginald Wingate from Lt-Col A.T. Wilson on the Future of Mesopotamia” Foreign Office: Arab Bureau: Correspondence and Reports. 2 April 1920, p. 73; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 450 197 CAB 24-143-05 “Arabia, Hejaz. The Political Situation.” Arab Bulletin No. 41. 6 February 1917, p.56; Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt,” 196-8; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 464

35

well as the resistance Damascus was meeting from the HMG.198 Further adding to the issue, due

to internal divisions, HMG had been slow in moving forward with establishing firm

administration, which had only served to further destabilize the region.199

What HMG had failed to appreciate was how serious the situation on the ground had

become. By 1920 HMG was facing a serious challenge to British administration in Mesopotamia

with dangerous potential.200 Despite this danger HMG was at loggerheads. The FO and IO were

totally at odds over almost every aspect of HMG Arab policy.201

The slow progress of HMG and the general feeling of betrayal being felt across the Arab

world as the true intent of the imperial powers became apparent was the chief cause of the

Mesopotamian revolt.202 As HMG was well aware Hussein and his supporters, indeed the entire

Arab world had envisioned that their future, even within the mandated areas, would be in the

hands of an Arab government with only European support.203 Hussein had also envisioned an

Arab state that spanned the Arabian Peninsula and not a serious of weak and divided

principalities in loose federation under European authority that was being implemented.204

As Faisal had earlier stated ‘mandate’ could have wide range of interpretation and it

would seem that “colonization” and not “the lightest bond of affectionate assistance” was what

was meant by HMG and the European powers.205 In view of HMG wartime commitments these

198 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 464; French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 55-6; Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 159; Kramer, “Arab Nationalism,” 177-8; Johnson, “The Arab Bureau,” 196; Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, 28 199 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918; Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 778, 793 200 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 463; Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” 24-5 201 Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 791-2 202 ibid, 793; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 436; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 165 203 CAB 24-72-02 “Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula” Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office 21 November 1918, 6 204 ibid, 4, 11-21; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 56; Goldstein, “British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question,” 428 205 Townshend, When God Made Hell, 479

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interpretations are far from unjustified HMG was well aware of this fact. Yet as 1920 rolled on

HMG continued to support a policy of inaction and imperial authority that had witnessed revolt

across most of the Arabian Peninsula that was quickly drawing HMG into a full-scale

insurgency.206

In March of 1921 the Cairo conference was convened as a last ditch effort to stabilize the

British position in Arabia. The conference brought the various British administrations, offices,

and personalities together with the aim of finally putting to bed the interdepartmental rivalries

undermining HMG’s Middle Eastern policy. HMG had been primarily compelled to this end by

the deteriorating situation in Mesopotamia.207 Ongoing conflict between the Hashemite and

Feisal's removal from power by French forces threatened to destabilize the region and create a

massive Arab insurgency across the whole of the Arabian Peninsula.208

Like most British conferences the decisions had been pre-arranged. Faisal had met with

Winston Churchill who was then serving as HMG Colonial Secretary along with Lawrence in

London to discuss the conferences agenda and aims.209 The eventual conclusions drawn from

these meetings and the subsequent conference included HMG’s decision to give up the idea of a

Mandate in Mesopotamia. Instead, Faisal would be placed on the throne as King of a newly

formed Iraq and in turn would sign a treaty of alliance with HMG.210 Ironically, now the IO,

more concerned with instability than Hashemite motivations, had come around to advocating

206 Kedourie, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” 24-5 207 CAB 24-126-23 “Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem 12-30 March 1921” Cabinet Report of the Cairo Conference – Memorandum by the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, 1921, p. 3-4; Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 773 208 CAB 24-126-23 “Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem 12-30 March 1921” Cabinet Report of the Cairo Conference – Memorandum by the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, 1921, p. 31,40, 60, 97 209 ibid; Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 316 210 CAB 24-126-23 “Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem 12-30 March 1921” Cabinet Report of the Cairo Conference – Memorandum by the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, 1921, p. 4-7; CAB 23-30-1 “The Iraq Treaty” Cabinet 25 (22) – Conclusions of Meeting of the Cabinet held in Mr. Chamberlain’s Room, House of Commons, S.W., on Wednesday 5 April 1922 at 4:15 p.m. p. 4-5; “Treaty of Alliance: Great Britain and Iraq 10 October 1922,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 310

37

Faisal as King in Iraq.211 In response to a growing situation on the ground concerning Faisal’s

brother Abdullah in Trans-Jordan HMG created the state of Jordan. Severed from the British

Palestine mandate Abdullah would be crowned as king of this newly formed state.212

Although the Cairo Conference served to calm the immediate concerns of HMG

regarding the rioting and open revolts occurring across the region it had also failed to address a

great many unresolved issues.213 HMG had committed itself to safeguarding a patchwork of

newly formed and ultimately weak states. After the Conference HMG was still forced to contend

with unresolved issues with Sharif Hussein regarding claims to what was now the British

Palestine Mandate.214

In the meantime HMG patchwork had served to surround their forgotten partner Ibn

Saud. Left out of the ‘great settlement’ Ibn Saud would now set about utilizing his considerable

influence to take advantage of the regions volatility and the vulnerability of these new states to

undo the settlements HMG had worked so hard to establish. An ensuing debate over continued

support to Sharif Hussein became a focal point of HMG’s problems. The unresolved issues

concerning Palestine had left Hussein without a treaty of protection with HMG and Ibn Saud was

moving to invade the Hejaz.215 Eventually in an ironic twist the FO would give up on Hussein

while the IO demanded HMG continue their support. This was rooted in concerns in India of the

implications that Wahhabi rule in Mecca might have.216

211 CAB 24-126-23 “Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem 12-30 March 1921” Cabinet Report of the Cairo Conference – Memorandum by the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, 1921, p. 27; Paris, “British Middle East Policy,” 792 212 CAB 24-126-23 “Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem 12-30 March 1921” Cabinet Report of the Cairo Conference – Memorandum by the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, 1921, p. 31,40, 60, 97 213 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 316-9 214 “The Curzon-Asil Draft Treaty of Friendship: Britain and Hejaz 16 April 1923,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 318-21 215 ibid 216 Paris, British Middle East Policy, 792

38

As could be expected without HMG support Hussein was defeated by Saud in 1925 and

by 1926 Saud had been crowned King of Hejaz.217 The British were compelled to accept the new

realities of Arabia and barter a deal with Saud. On 20 May 1927 the Treaty of Jeddah was signed

between HMG and Ibn Saud.218 It would formally recognize Saud as ruler of the Nejd and Hejaz

and see HMG’s wartime ally Sharif Hussein fall from power. The implications were also to see

the rise of a fundamentalist Wahhabism in Arabia. These influences would combine with

instability in both British and French mandates, the tensions created by the rise of a Zionist

presence in Palestine to ensure the region would remain in a stasis of instability that would

continue until the outbreak of the next world war.

The root cause of the resulting instability that post-war Arabia would face was that the

Arabs and HMG had been acting on different diplomatic plains. Even when in accord these two

parties were engaged in a conflict of paradigms that at moments was both hidden and blatantly

obvious. For HMG the vast amount of knowledge available, the intelligence gathered and the

volumes of correspondence both internally and with various Arab leaders leave little doubt as to

HMG’s awareness of the situation.219 Any doubt that would remain can be easily remedied by

looking through the minutes of almost any high level meeting within HMG concerning the

Middle East and the Arab question.220

217 “Protectorate (Mecca) Agreement: ‘Asir and Hejaz and Najd and its Dependencies 21 October 1926,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 382-3 218 “Treaty (Jeddah): Britain and King Abd Al-‘Aziz of Hejaz and of Najd and its Dependencies 20 May 1927,” Hurewitz, The Middle East, 383-5 219 CAB 24-126-23 “Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem 12-30 March 1921” Cabinet Report of the Cairo Conference – Memorandum by the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, 1921, p. 3-4, 31,40, 60, 97; CAB 24-143-11 “Arabia – Hejaz and Aden” Eastern Report No. XL (incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XXXYIII) 12 April 1917, p.5; CAB 24-143-15 “Addenda- Hejaz” Eastern Report No. XV (Incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XLII) 10 May 1917, p. 2-8; CAB 24-143-19 “Arabia – Hejaz and Yemen” Eastern Report No. XIX (Incorporating Arabian Report N.S. XLVI) 7 June 1917, p. 4; Djemal, Memories of a Turkish Statesmen, 210; Townshend, When God Made Hell, 463; Kedourie, “The end of the Ottoman Empire,” 24-5 220 CAB 24-126-23 “Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem 12-30 March 1921” Cabinet Report of the Cairo Conference – Memorandum by the Secretary of Sate for the Colonies, 1921, p. 3-4, 31,40, 60,

39

HMG was keenly aware of the firm commitments being made to Arab leaders and what

would be expected of the British by the Arabs after the war. In part wartime pragmatism and the

realization that these agreements may come to nothing due to the events of war led to a

Machiavellian realpolitik.221 It was this pragmatic and perhaps rather cynical approach to

wartime alliances that allowed HMG to write these blank cheques to Arab nationalists.

The intention of this paper is not to serve as an indictment of the British imperial system.

Nor is its intention to excuse it. The nature of Britain’s view of the war was rooted in a

conflicting mix of pragmatism, romanticism, and genuine empathy, a combination of realpolitik

and imperialism with an element of chaos theory for good measure. The idea that at the height of

its power the British Empire was simply caught unaware and became victims of circumstance

caught in the currents of war, struggling to stay above water would be disingenuous.

The British Empire faced an internal conflict between long-term imperial considerations

and short-term military considerations.222 On another front the British also faced internal

disputes over the course of action to serve either of these concerns, long-term or short.223 The

situation led to several dual-track policies running simultaneously and unchecked. The reality

was the creation of a system not consciously but systemically duplicitous. Surely Britain was

aware of the web of tangled agreements it had ventured into and in not addressing this one could

argue a degree of conscious duplicity or simply excuse it as pragmatism realizing all was far

from certain even in the last few months of the war. 224

97; The Council of Ten of the Paris Peace Conference and Emir Faisal Ibn Hussein. Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, 6 February 1919. 221 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 287 222 Mejcher, “British Middle East policy,” 81; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 165, 220 223 ibid; Millman, “A Counsel of Despair,” 261 224 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 287; Millman, “A Counsel of Despair,” 261

40

On the other hand it seems unfathomable to conceive of how Britain could have avoided

this situation when confronted with the laundry list of conflicting demands from her wartime

allies. Britain’s failure was not in her commitments but in her post-war handling of the process

of disentangling these commitments. A vast Empire with experience and solid knowledge of the

realities on the spot allowed itself to be drawn in, duped, by her own out-dated imperial

paradigm. The result was a disaster for which the Arabs are still paying the final bill.

CHRIS MURRAY Royal Military College of Canada

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