SENATE-Thursday, March 4, 1982 - US Government ...

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March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE SENATE-Thursday, March 4, 1982 3275 <Legislative day of Monday, February 22, 1982> The Senate met at 10:30 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the Honorable Bos PACKWOOD, a Senator from the State of Oregon. PRAYER The Chaplain, the Reverend Rich- ard C. Halverson, LL.D., D.D., offered the following prayer: Bless · the Lord, 0 my soul; and all that is within me, bless His holy name.-Psalm 103: 1. Lord God of hosts, to Whom all hearts are open, all desires known, we invoke Thy presence in this Chamber today. As the Senate continues to ad- dress the awesome and painful duty imposed upon it by the Constitution, cover its deliberations with the light of Thy truth and the warmth of Thy love. In the loneliness of decision which each Senator must finally make, help them to listen to the still, small voice of conscience within, confident that the Spirit of God can and will enlight- en them if they seek His counsel. Strengthen them against confusion of voices from without which breed hos- tility and cynicism. Free them from distractions that obscure and militate against objectivity. Gracious Father, make us aware that You are really here and that Your wisdom really can guide to a just conclusion to this matter. Let Thy will be done. In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore <Mr. THURMOND). The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter: U.S. SENATE, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1982. To the Senate: Under the provisions of Rule I, Section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint Hon. BoB PACKWOOD, a Sen- ator from the State of Oregon, to perform the duties of the Chair. STROM THURMOND, President pro tempore. Mr. PACKWOOD thereupon as- sumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore. RECOGNITION OF THE The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- MAJORITY LEADER pore. Without objection, it is so or- The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- dered. pore. The Chair recognizes the majori- ty leader. Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair. THE JOURNAL Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of the Senate be approved to date. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am ad- vised that the distinguished Senator from California <Mr. HAYAKAWA) does not now require the time for the spe- cial order in his favor. May I inquire of the minority leader if he has any need for the 15 minutes provided by that order? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I would ap- preciate it very much if I could have that time. Mr. BAKER. Yes. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that the time allocated to the Senator from California on special order be assigned instead to the distin- guished minority leader and that he add it to the time otherwise available to him. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I am also advised that Mr. MOYNIHAN does not want the time allocated to him, so if the majority leader would make the same request and allocate his time to me that would be appreciated. Mr. BAKER. Yes. I make the same request in favor of the special order of Mr. MOYNIHAN that it be allocated to the distinguished minority leader. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. ORDER FOR ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the exe- cution of the special orders there be a brief period for the transaction of rou- tine morning business to extend not past the hour of 12:30 p.m. in which Senators may speak for not more than 5 minutes each. ORDER OF PROCEDURE ON RES- OLUTION RELATING TO SENA- TOR WILLIAMS Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, may I clarify the request I made on yester- day in respect to the allocation of time between the parties for debate on the Williams resolution? Was the request that I put yesterday in which the Senate granted that the time would be equally divided each day of debate or just for that day? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Each day. Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair. I would point out, Mr. President, that there was a disparity of time yes- terday. I do not have the numbers before me. I will consult with the Journal clerk and the Parliamentarian to ascertain how that worked out fi- nally. I have indicated to the distin- guished Senator from Hawaii, <Mr. INOUYE), that we will rebalance that time during the course of the day today. ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, yester- day I had before me a file of routine matters that I did not ask the Senate to address since we ran somewhat past the hour of 6 p.m., which was the an- nounced time for recess. I wonder if the minority leader is in position at this time to join me in con- sidering those items? Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I am. Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority leader. ORDER FOR SENATE TO RECON- VENE ON TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1982, AT 10:30 A.M. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, is there a time to convene for the Senate on Monday and Tuesday of next week? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Only on Monday at 10:30 a.m. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate, when it completes its business on Monday, stand in recess until the hour of 10:30 a.m. on Tueday next. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

Transcript of SENATE-Thursday, March 4, 1982 - US Government ...

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

SENATE-Thursday, March 4, 1982 3275

<Legislative day of Monday, February 22, 1982>

The Senate met at 10:30 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the Honorable Bos PACKWOOD, a Senator from the State of Oregon.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Rich­ard C. Halverson, LL.D., D.D., offered the following prayer:

Bless · the Lord, 0 my soul; and all that is within me, bless His holy name.-Psalm 103: 1.

Lord God of hosts, to Whom all hearts are open, all desires known, we invoke Thy presence in this Chamber today. As the Senate continues to ad­dress the awesome and painful duty imposed upon it by the Constitution, cover its deliberations with the light of Thy truth and the warmth of Thy love.

In the loneliness of decision which each Senator must finally make, help them to listen to the still, small voice of conscience within, confident that the Spirit of God can and will enlight­en them if they seek His counsel. Strengthen them against confusion of voices from without which breed hos­tility and cynicism. Free them from distractions that obscure and militate against objectivity.

Gracious Father, make us aware that You are really here and that Your wisdom really can guide to a just conclusion to this matter. Let Thy will be done. In the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore <Mr. THURMOND).

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,

Washington, D.C., March 4, 1982. To the Senate:

Under the provisions of Rule I, Section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint Hon. BoB PACKWOOD, a Sen­ator from the State of Oregon, to perform the duties of the Chair.

STROM THURMOND, President pro tempore.

Mr. PACKWOOD thereupon as­sumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

RECOGNITION OF THE The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-MAJORITY LEADER pore. Without objection, it is so or-

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- dered. pore. The Chair recognizes the majori-ty leader.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair.

THE JOURNAL Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of the Senate be approved to date.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am ad­

vised that the distinguished Senator from California <Mr. HAYAKAWA) does not now require the time for the spe­cial order in his favor. May I inquire of the minority leader if he has any need for the 15 minutes provided by that order?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I would ap­preciate it very much if I could have that time.

Mr. BAKER. Yes. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­

sent that the time allocated to the Senator from California on special order be assigned instead to the distin­guished minority leader and that he add it to the time otherwise available to him.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I am also advised that Mr. MOYNIHAN does not want the time allocated to him, so if the majority leader would make the same request and allocate his time to me that would be appreciated.

Mr. BAKER. Yes. I make the same request in favor of the special order of Mr. MOYNIHAN that it be allocated to the distinguished minority leader.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

ORDER FOR ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the exe­cution of the special orders there be a brief period for the transaction of rou­tine morning business to extend not past the hour of 12:30 p.m. in which Senators may speak for not more than 5 minutes each.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE ON RES­OLUTION RELATING TO SENA­TOR WILLIAMS

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, may I clarify the request I made on yester­day in respect to the allocation of time between the parties for debate on the Williams resolution? Was the request that I put yesterday in which the Senate granted that the time would be equally divided each day of debate or just for that day?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Each day.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair. I would point out, Mr. President,

that there was a disparity of time yes­terday. I do not have the numbers before me. I will consult with the Journal clerk and the Parliamentarian to ascertain how that worked out fi­nally. I have indicated to the distin­guished Senator from Hawaii, <Mr. INOUYE), that we will rebalance that time during the course of the day today.

ORDER OF BUSINESS Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, yester­

day I had before me a file of routine matters that I did not ask the Senate to address since we ran somewhat past the hour of 6 p.m., which was the an­nounced time for recess.

I wonder if the minority leader is in position at this time to join me in con­sidering those items?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I am. Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority

leader.

ORDER FOR SENATE TO RECON­VENE ON TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1982, AT 10:30 A.M.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, is there a time to convene for the Senate on Monday and Tuesday of next week?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Only on Monday at 10:30 a.m.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate, when it completes its business on Monday, stand in recess until the hour of 10:30 a.m. on Tueday next.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

3276 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1981 ORDER FOR THE RECOGNITION

OF SENATORS BAKER AND DENTON ON TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1982

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Tuesday, March 9, there be special orders in favor of the Senator from Tennessee <Mr. BAKER), and the Senator from Alabama <Mr. DENTON) of not to exceed 15 minutes each to follow on after the recognition of the two lead­ers under the standing order.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, there

are certain items on the Executive Cal­endar today that I am prepared to consider. May I inquire of the minori­ty leader if there are items that are marked on his calendar that we may consider by unanimous consent at this point?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Yes. On the Executive Calendar beginning with the nominations under Federal Home Loan Bank Board on page 2 and going through the remainder of page 2, page 3, page 4, and page 5 are cleared.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority leader.

Mr. President, I advise the minority leader that there is one nomination that is cleared on his side that has not yet been cleared on this side, and that is item No. 650 on page 4. I believe the reason that is not yet cleared is that we require the presence of a Senator who could not be here at this time.

There is another as well, Mr. Presi­dent, item No. 651 also on page 4 that cannot be done on this side routinely.

So I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now go into executive session for the purpose of considering the nominations beginning on page 2 under Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to include the remainder of the nominations listed on page 2, all of the nominations listed on page 3, all of the nominations listed on page 4, with the exception of Orders No. 650 and 651; and all of the nominations on page 5 of today's Executive Calender.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nomina­tions so identified be considered en bloc

The assistant legislative clerk pro­ceeded to read various nominations.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, the nomina­tions are considered and confirmed en bloc.

The nominations considered and confirmed en bloc are as follows.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD

James Jay Jackson, of Texas, to be a Member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for the remainder of the term expir­ing June 30, 1982, vice John H. Dalton, re­signed.

THE JUDICIARY

Leroy J. Contie. Jr., of Ohio, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit vice Anthony J. Celebrezze, retired.

Robert B. Krupansky of Ohio, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit vice Paul C. Weick, retired.

John R. Gibson, of Missouri, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit vice Floyd R. Gibson, retired.

Eugene F. Lynch, of California, to be United States District Judge for the North­ern District of California vice Charles B. Renfrew, resigned.

Elizabeth A. Kovachevich, of Florida, to be United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida vice George C. Young, retired.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

J. William Petro, of Ohio, to be United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio for the term of four years vice James R. Williams.

Richard L. Cox, of Florida, to be United States Marshal for the Middle District of Florida for the term of four years vice George R. Grosse, resigned.

Carlos C. Cruz, of Florida, to be United States Marshal for the Southern District of Florida for the term of four years vice Donald D. Forsht, term expired.

M. Clifton Nettles III, of Georgia, to be United States Marshal for the Southern District of Georgia for the term of four years vice James C. Murphy, Jr., term ex­pired.

Eugene G. Liss, of New Jersey, to be United States Marshal for the District of New Jersey for the term of four years vice Carl E. Hirshman, resigned.

Rudolph G. Miller, of New Mexico, to be United States Marshal for the District of New Mexico for the term of four years, vice Bennie A. Martinez, resigned.

Gene G. Abdallah, of South Dakota, to be United States Marshal for the District of South Dakota for the term of four years vice Edward P. Gribbin, term expired.

William J. Nettles, of Illinois, to be United States Marshal for the Southern District of Illinois for the term of four years vice Albert S. Hinds, resigned.

Basil S. Baker, of Texas, to be United States Marshal for the Southern District of Texas for the term of four years vice Thed­dis R. Coney, term expired.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Howard Kent Walker, of New Jersey, a Foreign Service Officer of Class two, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten­tiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Togo.

William Robert Casey, Jr., of Colorado, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo­tentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Niger.

Keith Lapham Brown, of Colorado, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten­tiary of the United States of America to the Kingdom of Lesotho.

Anthony Cecil' Eden Quainton, of Wash­ington, a Career Member of the Senior For­eign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo­tentiary of the United States of America to Nicaragua.

Howard Eugene Douglas, of Virginia, to be United States Coordinator for Refugee Af­fairs and Ambassador at Large while serving in this position.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Otto J. Reich, of Virginia, to be an Assist­ant Administrator of the Agency for Inter­national Development, vice Abelardo Lopez Valdez.

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Hugh W. Foster, of California. to be Alter­nate Executive Director of the Inter-Ameri­can Development Bank, vice Eugene Jay Finkel, resigned.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the nominations were considered and con­firmed en bloc.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified that the Senate has given its consent to these nominations.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

NOMINATION OF GENE G. ABDALLAH TO U.S. MARSHAL FOR SOUTH DAKOTA

e Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I rise in sup­port of the nomination of Gene G. Ab­dallah to be the U.S. Marshal for the district of South Dakota.

President Reagan has made a wise choice for this position with the selec­tion of Mr. Abdallah. Mr. Abadallah, a lifelong resident of Sioux Falls, S. Dak., enjoys a high reputation not only in law enforcement circles but in the community at large.

A selection panel of informed citi­zens was formed last year in South Dakota to make recommendations to the President regarding this position. After background investigation and deliberation, this panel gave strong support to Mr. Abdallah.

Mr. Abdallah is the former chief deputy sheriff of Minnehaha County, the most populous county in the State, and has received advanced edu­cation at the South Dakota Law En­forcement Officers Training School at the University of South Dakota at Vermillion. He brings to this Federal position not only a fine law enforce­ment background, but maturity and judgment. A good family man and long active in civic affairs, Mr. Abdallah is respected and liked by the people of South Dakota. He is well known for his integrity, fairness and generosity with his time for worthwhile commu­nity projects.

Mr. President, the high qualities which Mr. Abdallah brings to the posi­tion to which he has been nominated will serve that office and the people well. I am pleased that my colleagues

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3277 have speedily confirmed his confirma­tion.e

LEGISLATIVE SESSION Mr. BAKER. I ask unanimous con­

sent that the Senate now return to legislative session.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

THE CALENDAR Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, once

again, I inquire of the minority leader if there are items on today's Calendar of Legislative Business that are cleared for consideration on his calen­dar, as well.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, the first five items on page 20 have been cleared.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority leader.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, the following Calendar Orders Nos. 443, 444, 445, 446, and 447 have been cleared.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority leader.

Mr. President, those items are cleared on the calendar on this side of the aisle, as well. Therefore, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate the items so identified in the order stated by the minority leader.

NATIONAL ORCHESTRA WEEK The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­

pore. The clerk will report the first measure.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution <S.J. Res. 145> authoriz­ing and requesting the President to pro­claim "National Orchestra Week."

The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution.

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, on Feb­ruary 10, 1982, I introduced Senate Joint Resolution 145, together with 34 cosponsors. Today, I am pleased that the Senate, in just a few minutes, will take up and pass this same resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 145, establish­ing "National Orchestra Week." Our Nation's orchestras are certainly one of our most treasured cultural re­sources. Adoption of this resolution is a fitting tribute to the hours of enjoy­ment that our Nation's symphony or­chestras have provided to nearly 100 million Americans every year.

My home State of Pennsylvania is especially fortunate to have two world-class orchestras in the Philadel­phia Orchestra, under the direction of Riccardo Muti, and the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra, under the direc­tion of Andre Previn. But these two orchestras are only the best known of more than 40 orchestras statewide. Pennsylvania's orchestras are largely

responsible for my State's continuing role as a national leader in the arts.

I welcome this opportunity to ac­claim the work of American sympho­nies and their service organization, the American Symphony Orchestra League. We all should be proud of the service which these cultural institu­tions provide.

The joint resolution <S.J. Res. 145) was considered, ordered to be en­grossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agreed to. The joint resolution, with its pream­

ble, as agreed to, reads as follows: S.J. RES. 145

Whereas America's one thousand five hundred and seventy-two symphony and chamber orchestras are among our Nation's finest cultural and artistic resources, provid­ing inspiration and enjoyment to more than twenty-three million people each year throughout the country;

Whereas America's greatest professional orchestras are internationally recognized as among the finest in the world, setting the standards of excellence against which other musical endeavors are measured;

Whereas America's orchestras serve their communities as total musical resources by supporting other arts activities and cooper­ating in joint artistic ventures;

Whereas America's orchestras cultivate a national musical heritage by nurturing young talent, providing opportunities for American-trained musicians and conductors, and promoting performances of American music;

Whereas America's orchestras educate the youth of the country by providing high quality music education through youth con­certs, in-school demonstrations and training programs, and master classes;

Whereas America's orchestras reach di­verse audiences beyond the concert hall through regional and national tours, free outdoor performances, and other special events;

Whereas the success of America's orches­tras has been the result of a joint effort of skilled professionals and dedicated volun­teers working together to promote and produce music in their communities; and

Whereas America's orchestras have grown in size and artistic quality during the past ten years, with the help of direct grants from the orchestra program of the National Endowment for the Arts: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the week be­ginning June 13, 1982, is designated as "Na­tional Orchestra Week", and the President of the United States is authorized and re­quested to issue a proclamation calling upon Federal, State, and local government agen­cies, interest groups and organizations, and the people of the United States to observe that week by engaging in appropriate activi­ties and programs, thereby showing their support of America's orchestras and the arts.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was passed.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I move the motion to reconsider be forever laid on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

NATIONAL AGRICULTURE DAY The joint resolution <S.J. Res. 148)

to proclaim March 18, 1982, as "Na­tional Agriculture Day," was consid­ered, ordered to be be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agreed to. The joint resolution with its pream­

ble, as agreed to, reads as follows: S.J. RES. 148

Whereas agriculture is this Nation"s most basic industry, and its associated produc­tion, processing, and marketing segments, together provide more jobs than any other single industry; and

Whereas the productivity of American ag­riculture is a vital ingredient in our strength as a Nation, both domestically and on the world scene; and

Whereas to maintain a healthy agricul­ture it is necessary that all Americans should understand how agriculture affects their lives and well-being, and should be aware of their personal stake in an abun­dant food and fiber supply: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That March 18, 1982, is hereby proclaimed "National Agri­culture Day", and the President is author­ized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate cere­monies and activities.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was passed.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I move to lay on the table until the crack of doom the motion to re­consider.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am emboldened to suggest that it may not be safe to call up the next item, con­sidering the progressive intensity of the motions to table by the minority leader, but, notwithstanding that, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate the next calendar order.

NATIONAL DAY OF THE SEAL The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­

pore. The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read

as follows: A resolution <S. Res. 266> to declare

March 1, 1982, as "National Day of the Seal."

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 8 2 5

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on behalf of the distinguished Senator from con­necticut <Mr. WEICKER) and ask for its immediate consideration.

3278 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 198:2 The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­

pore. The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read

as follows: The Senator from Tennessee <Mr. BAKER),

on behalf of Mr. WEICKER, proposes an un­printed amendment numbered 825.

On page 2, line 1, strike "1982" and insert in lieu thereof " 1983." e Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, Senate Resolution 266, a resolution I have introduced with the cosponsor­ship of 28 of my colleagues, would de­clare March 1, 1983, as "National Day of the Seal." I urge the entire Senate to approve this important designation.

Although March 1 represents the high point in the life cycle of the Ca­nadian harp seal, probably the species most familiar to the general public, this resolution calls for the celebration of all seals.

For many years in our history seals as well as other marine mammals have been regarded primarily for their fur and meat. Indiscriminate hunting and destruction of their habitat caused some species to become endangered. Only in recent history has man become aware of the significance of seals in the balance of the marine en­vironment. In 1972 the U.S. Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act which provided the necessary pro­tection for many species of seals as well as all other marine mammals. .

Unfortunately some species were so decimated that they are still in trou­ble. The Hawaiian monk seal is a case in point. It is one of the most endan­gered of the marine mammals listed under the Endangered Species Act. Today only between 500 and 700 are estimated to remain. Its counterpart, the Caribbean monk seal, has become extinct within this century.

The purpose of this resolution is simply to foster public awareness to the Hawaiian monk seal, the Canadian harp seal, the fur seal of the Pribilof Islands and the other 30 species found worldwide and to their special place in a healthy ocean environment.

Mr. President, I would hope that all Americans join in this celebration next year.e

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut <Mr. WEICKER).

The amendment <UP No. 825) was agreed to.

The resolution, as amended, was agreed to.

The resolution, as amended, with its preamble, reads as follows:

S. RES. 266 Whereas the seal is an essential and in­

separable part of the marine ecosystem; and Whereas the seal, of which there are some

thirty-three species, is a land mammal that returned to the oceans twenty to thirty mil­lion years ago; and

Whereas the presence of the seal helps maintain the health and balance of this en­vironment; and

Whereas the presence of the seal is an in­dication of a whole and healthy ecosystem; and

Whereas the seal is a social creature with a highly evolved nervous system and physi­ology especially adapted to its marine envi­ronment; and

Whereas· the seal epitomizes the freedom and the mystique of the oceans and in many cultures is revered as a spiritual embodi­ment of the mind in the waters; and

Whereas March is the month of the year when the Harp seal renew their eternal cycle; and

Whereas the growing worldwide aware­ness of the ecological and esthetic value of the seal has led to a desire to designate a special day of recognition: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That March 1, 1982, is declared "National Day of the Seal", and the Senate urges all citizens to join in this celebration of life with appropriate activity.

The title was amended so as to read: To declare March 1, 1983, as "National

Day of the Seal." Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move

to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I move that the motion not be laid on the table. I now move to amend

·my own motion by deleting the word "not."

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BAKER. And I am over­whelmed.

RIGHT TO EMIGRATE AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­

pore. The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read

as follows: A joint resolution <S.J. Res. 154) express­

ing the sense of the Congress that the Gov­ernment of the Soviet Union should respect the rights of its citizens to practice their re­ligion and emigrate, and that these matters should be among the issues raised at the thirty-eighth meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at Geneva in February 1982.

The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution. e Mr. BOSCHWITZ. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senate Joint Resolu­tion 154, introduced by Senator PELL and myself. This resolution expresses the sense of the Congress that the Soviet Union should cease its persecu­tion of Soviet Jews.

The resolution now before the Senate addresses the issues of Jewish emigration, harassment, and assaults on Jewish study groups and reminds the Soviet Union that it has accepted obligations in these areas under the universal declaration of human rights, the Helsinki accords, other interna­tional covenants, and the Soviet Con­stitution.

Mr. President, there is no question that through its policies and proce­dures the Soviet Government fosters

the growth of anti-Semitism. In recent years, discrimination against Soviet Jews has increased and has been ac­companied by other measures de­signed, presumably, to frighten Jews into silence. The Soviet Government has intensified its campaign of harass­ment of Jews who exercise their right of religious worship and who partici­pate in Jewish study groups. Increas­ingly, Jews who are active in the dissi­dent, human rights, and emigration movements are being arrested, tried, and imprisoned on false charges.

The latest Jewish emigration figures are truly alarming. The annual emi­gration rate has dropped from a high of 51,320 in 1979 to 9,447 in 1981. In January 1982, only 290 Jews were al­lowed to · emigrate. This is the lowest monthly figure since 1970.

Mr. President, passage of Senate Joint Resolution 154 or its companion measure House Joint Resolution 373, will send a signal to the Soviet Gov­ernment that the U.S. Congress is deeply concerned about its continued persecution of its Jewish citizens. Per­haps more importantly, passage will serve to encourage Jews in the Soviet Union who are struggling to exercise basic human freedoms.e • Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senator BoscHWITZ, I introduced on March 2, a joint resolu­tion urging the President to instruct the American delegation to the cur­rent meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to call upon the Soviet Union to respect the rights of its citizens to practice their religion and to emigrate; to stop the harassments, arrests, and trials of Soviet Jews; and to stop the assaults on Jewish self-study groups; 27 Sena­tors have joined Senator BoscHWITZ and me in cosponsoring this resolu­tion. I am pleased to say that this res­olution, which is before the Senate today for consideration, has been passed by the House and unanimously approved by the Foreign Relations Committee.

As a party to the United Nations Charter and various international con­venants on human rights, and as a sig­natory of the Helsinki accords, the Soviet Union has pledged respect for human rights and fundamental free­doms and has accepted political and legal obligations in these areas. In ad­dition, the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics imposes obligations on the Soviet Government to respect and guarantee freedom of speech, of assembly, of conscience; the freedom to conduct religious worship; and the rights of Soviet citizens to education, to privacy, and to the invio­lability of their person and home. Nev­ertheless, the Soviet Union has con­sistently and fragrantly violated these obligations especially in its treatment of Soviet Jews.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3279 Through its policies and practices

the Soviet Government institutes and fosters the growth of anti-Semitism. In an effort to prevent the develop­ment of Jewish identity, Soviet au­thorities suppress most Yiddish and Hebrew cultural activities, censor liter­ature, and harass Jews who engage in religious worship. Jews have been sub­ject to an ongoing anti-Semitic/anti­Zionist propaganda campaign which, in recent years, has intensified and ex­panded.

For many years, the Soviet Govern­ment has followed the practice of har­assing, arresting, and trying Jews on capricious and trumped-up charges. In the last few years, the number of these trials has risen sharply. Most often Jews who have been active in the dissident, human rights, and Jewish emigration movements are the targets of Soviet injustice. Brave men and women such as Anatoly Shchar­ansky, Vik tor Brailovsky, and Ida Nudel, to name only a few, have risked their lives and endured unbearable suffering to force the Soviet Union to grant to its citizens, Jewish and non­Jewish alike, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Traditionally, Jews have been ex­cluded from governmental and party leadership positions and from service in the diplomatic, economic, and mili­tary bureaucracies. They have, howev­er, held prominent positions in the sci­entific and technological communities. Employment in these fields was made possible because Jews were permitted to enter Soviet universities and to pursue graduate and postgraduate de­grees. In the last decade, this situation has changed drastically. Discrimina­tion against Jews in higher education has been instituted and is increasing at an alarming rate. As a result, the number of Jews employed in scientific and technological positions is declin-ing significantly. .

Today, Jews in the Soviet Union find themselves in a catch-22 situation. The Government's anti-Semitic poli­cies and practices threaten their eco­nomic, physical, and emotional securi­ty. As discrimination continues to in­crease, more and more Soviet Jews see emigration as the only viable means of self-preservation. Yet, the chances of obtaining an exit visa are growing smaller every day.

Although the Soviet Union does not recognize the right of its citizens to emigrate, the Soviet Government has sporadically allowed Jews to leave under a policy of family reunification. The Soviet Government controls the ebb and flow of Jews to Israel and other countries in the West through a variety of administrative practices and restrictions which are placed on the application process. As more and more restrictions have been imposed in the last 2 years, Jewish emigration has de­creased dramatically.

In 1979 a record level 51,320 Jews were allowed to leave. In 1980 the number plummeted to 21,471, and in 1981, only 9,447 Jews were allowed to emigrate; 1982 appears to have brought no change in this trend. In January only 290 Jews were allowed to leave the Soviet Union. This monthly figure is the lowest since 1970. More­over, the Helsinki Commission esti­mates that the figure for February 1982 will be approximately the same. As these figures indicate, emigration is no longer a means by which Soviet Jews can escape the frightening and discriminatory policies and practices of the Soviet Government.

Mr. President, for many years I have worked to try to alleviate the plight of Soviet Jews and to force the Soviet Union to grant basic human rights and fundamental freedoms to all of its citi­zens. As a member and former cochair­man of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have participated in numerous hearings on the problems of Soviet Jewry and striven to secure the rights of op­pressed people not only in the Soviet Union but also in Eastern Europe.

Like many of my colleagues, I have cosponsored legislation such as the Jackson-Vanik amendment, indicating American disapproval of Soviet viola­tions in the area of human rights. I have also made many representations to American and Soviet officials on behalf of Soviet Jewish citizens who have been harassed and often impris­oned unjustly or denied permission to join their families in the West. I be­lieve that my efforts and those of my colleagues have served the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union.

In my view the Soviet Union is re­sponsive to the pressure of public opinion in the West. The time has come for us to bring that pressure to bear once again. The situation in which Soviet Jews find themselves today can be remedied with our help. The resolution which we are consider­ing today is not only a signal to the Soviet Union that Congress and the American people expect the Soviet Government to fulfill its obligations in the area of human rights but is also a symbol of support and encouragement for Jews and other Soviet citizens who are struggling to exercise basic human rights. I urge its adoption.e

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask the Chair lay before the Senate a mes­sage from the House on House Joint Resolution 373, a resolution dealing with the Soviet human rights.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Laid before the Senate House Joint Resolution 373, a joint resolu­tion expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of the Soviet Union should respect the rights of its citizens to practice their religion and to emigrate, and that these matters should be among the issues raised at

the 38th meeting of the United Na­tions Commission on Human Rights at Geneva in February 1982, which was read twice by title.

The joint resolution <H.J. Res. 373> was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agreed to. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move

to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was passed.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Calendar Order No. 446, the Senate companion bill which has been reported, be in­definitely postponed.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

NATIONAL GARDEN WEEK The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­

pore. The clerk will report. The assistant legislative clerk read

as follows: A joint resolution <S.J. Res. 29> to author­

ize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating the calendar week beginning with the first Sunday in June of each year as "National Garden Week."

The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution which had been reported from the Committee on the Judiciary with an amendment:

On page 2, beginning on line 5, strike "be­ginning with the first Sunday of June of each year", and insert "of June 6 through June 12, 1982".

So as to make the joint resolution read:

Whereas the gardeners of this country produce a multitude of foods for our people and enable us to export foods to other coun­tries which are in desperate need; and

Whereas our gardeners help to preserve and foster our traditional spirit of independ­ence and individual initiative; and

Whereas gardening instills in our people, both young and old, a greater appreciation for nature, in general, and for our beautiful land, in particular; and

Whereas such appreciation naturally leads to a greater respect and care for our environment; and

Whereas gardening, in addition to being most beneficial for our country, furnishes a pleasant and productive full- or part-time activity for a large number of our citizens; and

Whereas our gardens also yield flowers of great variety and breathtaking beauty; and

Whereas these flowers bring beauty into our lives and satisfy our esthetic needs: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized and requested to issue a proc­lamation-

3280 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 < 1) designating the calendar week of June

6 through June 12, 1982, as "National Garden Week"; and

<2> urging Federal, State, and local gov­ernment agencies, as well as citizens and pri­vate organizations, to observe that week with educational efforts, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities which shall in­clude the wearing of garden flowers as a symbol of our appreciation for the efforts and contributions of our gardeners.

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate today will take up and pass Senate Joint Resolu­tion 29, a joint resolution establishing "National Garden Week" on June 6-12. Garden clubs have served our Nation well through their efforts to beautify their communities, to pre­serve and restore historic sites, to landscape their home grounds, to grow fruits, vegetables, and flowers, to es­tablish educational workshops, and to conserve our environmental resources. But more importantly, national garden clubs have demonstrated the deep and abiding respect that all Americans must have for our ecosys­tem.

Thanks to the excellent work of our garden clubs, I am well aware of the therapeutic value of growing plants. Garden clubs have put this principle to use in their garden therapy projects. These projects give physical­ly, mentally, or emotionally handi­capped individuals an opportunity to get involved in garden-related activi­ties, which often contributes to their rehabilitation. This is but one of the many examples of their special brand of activism.

Mr. President, as a very amateur gardener myself, and one who benefits from and enjoys the fruits of my wife's relative and considerable exper­tise, I am proud to be associated with the National Council of State Garden Clubs, and especially happy to have been of some assistance in introducing this resolution. I hope that my col­leagues will recognize the work of these garden clubs and join with me in thanking the more than 500,000 mem­bers of garden clubs for their service and dedication. Truly, the National Council of State Garden Clubs is a group worthy of our recognition.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. The question is on agreeing to the committee amendment.

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was agree to. The title was amended so as to read:

"A joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a procla­mation designating the calendar week of June 6 through June 12, 1982, as 'National Garden Week'."

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was passed.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, will the majority leader yield?

Mr. BAKER. I yield.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 157-AWARDING OF A SPECIAL GOLD MEDAL TO HER MAJES­TY QUEEN BEATRIX Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­

dent, on behalf of Mr. MOYNIHAN, for himself and other Senators, I send to the desk a Senate joint resolution and ask that it be stated.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. The joint resolution will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution <S.J. Res. 157) to pro­vide for the awarding of a special gold medal to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix in rec­ognition of the 1982 bicentennial anniversa­ry of diplomatic and trade relations between the Netherlands and the United States.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I ask that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to its immediate consider­ation, and, without objection, the joint resolution will be considered to have been read the second time at length.

The cosponsors of the joint resolu­tion are: Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself and Mr. PRYOR, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. WIL­LIAMS, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MAT­SUNAGA, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. ARMSTRONG and Mr. GARN). e Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, with a great deal of pleasure, I rise today to introduce a resolution au­thorizing the striking of a special gold medal in honor of the bicentennial or diplomatic relations between the United States and the Netherlands. The medal would be presented to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix on April 19, when she addresses a joint session of Congress.

Two hundred years ago John Adams, who had been appointed by Congress to be the first American Minister to the Netherlands, waited patiently for recognition in the courts of The Hague. Finally, on April 19, 1782, Adams' persistence was rewarded when the Sovereign of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, the States-General, voted in favor of es­tablishing diplomatic relations with the United States. The following day, John Adams was received by the States-General and his credentials were accepted.

This concluded 2 years of often frus­trating work by Adams as he sought

formal international recognition for the young United States, and initiated what has become our longest unbro­ken friendship with any nation. Amer­ica's relationship with the Nether­lands over the last 200 years has been, and continues to be, characterized by exemplary friendship and unbounded trust and respect.

Yet the origins of this friendship lie not only in the events of 1782. The Dutch had been prominent among the earliest explorers and settlers of the New World.

Under Dutch commission, Henry ~udson sailed his ship, tl~e Half Moon, mto New York Harbor, m September of 1609 in search of the fabled North­west Passage. That quest led him up the river that now nobly bears his name as far as modern day Albany. Fi­nally abandoning the search for the Northwest Passage, he turned the Half Moon homeward to bring news of Hol­land's claim to the New World back to Amsterdam. Others soon arrived to ex­ploit Hudson's discovery and the Hudson River proved to be a passage into the heart of the richest fur coun­try south of the St. Lawrence.

The Dutch were quick to establish trading post settlements to buy furs from the Indians. Fort Orange, the precursor to modern Albany, was es­tablished in 1624 to replace an earlier flood-ravaged settlement. Two years later, Peter Minuit, Director-General of New Netherland, made the legend­ary purchase of Manhattan Island.

The colony of New Netherland was governed by a council and director­general chosen by the Dutch West India Co. The company suffered finan­cial misfortunes after a costly venture in Brazil failed, and it soon lost inter­est in its North American proprietor­ship. So when an English fleet sailed into Fort Amsterdam Harbor in Sep­tember 1664, the colony surrendered without resistance; the stamping of Peter Stuyvesant's wooden leg not withstanding.

James, Duke of York and Albany, became the new proprietor of the colony. His brother, King Charles II, gave him a grant covering the whole of the Dutch claim. Although flags changed on the flagstaffs of New Netherland, the preservation of Dutch land titles under English rule insured that the 7,000 inhabitants remained as the prosperous core of the now Eng­lish colony.

Families such as the Ten Broecks, the Van Rensselaers, the Roosevelts, and the Van Burens, were all part of a great Dutch contribution to the richly diverse American cultural heritage. Place names such as Harlem, Brook­lyn, the Bowery, Schenectady, Rensse­lear, and Catskill, today integral parts of New York life, are a small but obvi­ous part of the legacy. Immortalized by the tales of Washington Irving, the

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3281 Dutch contribution to American life far outlasted the brief 17th century rule of the directors-general. I need only mention the names of two New Yorkers, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as testimo­ny to the significance of the Dutch contribution to America.

The American flag received its first foreign salute from the Netherlands soon after independence was declared in 1776. Following the successful con­clusion of the War of Independence, John Adams, Minister Plenipotentiary to the United Provinces, negotiated the successful and mutually advanta­geous Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1782.

Moreover, the Dutch were a source of sorely needed financial assistance during a time of great American need; $12 million in loans were granted in the early years. Thus the Dutch pro­vided a strong boost not only to the morale and international prestige of the newly independent American Nation, but material assistance as well to the American Confederation.

In return for the recognition and aid that it extended, the United Provinces incurred the wrath of Great Britain, which subsequently declared war on Holland. The Dutch nevertheless re­mained true to their commitment, their principles and their new friends, even in the face of war. These same principles guided our Founding Fa­thers through the struggle for inde­pendence, and indeed were the same principles asserted by the Netherlands as it had won its own freedom from foreign domination 200 years earlier.

Today many Americans are wonder­ing, with reason, where are our allies? May I suggest that history reveals that at least one has been always at our side-and that the one is the Neth­erlands. Together, we have been part­ners in friendship and commerce for 200 years. Built upon the foundation laid by the treaty negotiated by John Adams in 1782, commerce continues to be the mainstay of our relationship. The Netherlands is one of America's largest trading partners, accounting for a full 25 percent of overseas invest­ment in the United States. Together, we are the single largest source of direct foreign investment in each other's economy.

That cooperation extends to our common defense of the principles in­delibly stamped on the birthrights of our two countries. We are both, of course, founding partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The importance the Netherlands place on our relationship will be dra­matically emphasized by the state visit of Her Majesty Queen Beatrix on the occasion of the bicentennial, April 19 through 21. The Queen will address a joint session of the Congress on the 19th, 200 years to the day that United Netherlands States-General voted to

recognize the United States. Her Maj­esty's visit will be the centerpiece of an extensive celebration being coordi­nated in the United States by the Netherlands-American Bicentennial Commission of the Netherlands-Amer­ican Amity Trust.

It is my earnest hope that the Senate will act quickly to authorize the striking of this medal as a token of the esteem in which we hold Her Maj­esty and our friendship with the Dutch nation, and as an expression of our continuing appreciation for the not inconsequential role the Nether­lands played in the securing of our in­dependence 200 years ago. The gold original will be given to the Queen and bronze duplicates will be made avail­able to the public. I urge the adoption of the resolution.e

The joint resolution <S.J. Res. 157) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the distinguished minority leader yield at this point?

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask

that the Chair lay before the Senate a message from the House of Represent­atives on House Joint Resolution 348, and I ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. The joint resolution will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution <H.J. Res. 348) to pro­vide for the awarding of a special gold medal to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix in rec­ognition of the 1982 bicentennial anniversa­ry of diplomatic and trade relations between the Netherlands and the United States.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, the joint res­olution will be considered as having been read twice by its title.

Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the joint resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolu­tion.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. The joint resolution is open to amendment. If there be no amend­ment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading of the joint reso­lution.

The joint resolution was read the third time.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

The joint resolution <H.J. Res. 348) was passed.

The preamble was agreed to. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move

to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution was passed.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask that the companion Senate resolution introduced by the distinguished Sena­tor from New York <Mr. MOYNIHAN) and others be indefinitely postponed.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR Mr. BAKER. Earlier, Mr. President,

when we considered executive nomina­tions, one nomination, calendar No. 650, was passed over because a Senator with a particular interest in that nomi­nation was not then available to par­ticipate in the consideration of that matter.

The distinguished Senator from Iowa <Mr. GRASSLEY) is present at this time. I will inquire of the minority leader if he is agreeable to returning to executive session for the purpose of considering that nomination.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, there is no objection.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority leader.

EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the Senate now return to executive session for the purpose of considering calendar No. 650, the nomination of Mary Louise Smith, of Iowa, to be a member of the Commission on Civil Rights.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

The nomination will be stated.

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS The assistant legislative clerk read

the nomination of Mary Louise Smith, of Iowa, to be a member of the Com­mission on Civil Rights.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I want to thank my Senate leader for holding up this nomination to give me the opportunity to appear on the Senate floor in support of it. I know it is a noncontroversial nomination, with no opposition. I appreciate that. But I think because of my knowing Mary Louise Smith for the last 25 years, I would be remiss in my responsibilities to the people of Iowa if I did not appear at the time the nomination was before the Senate to support her.

I wanted to be here to praise the ap­pointment. I wanted to be here to compliment the President for his nom­ination of this very qualified person to be a member of the Civil Rights Com­mission.

I know Mary Louise Smith not only as a party leader in my State and a leader of my party in the Nation as a whole, but also as a humanitarian; she

3282 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 is a civil rights advocate. She believes in fairness. She is eminently fair.

It is particularly important that we have a person with those qualities on the Civil Rights Commission.

I also know her to be a good admin­istrator as well. Many of us Republi­cans know her because of the out­standing job she did as our national chair. She brought new dimensions to that position, not only because of the fact that she was a woman, but also because of her ideas and her expertise that she brought to the job.

She is a person who I know will bring great respect to the Civil Rights Commission. That Commission does not need a person of Mary Louise Smith's dimensions to bring respect to it because it is already a highly re­spected Government Commission. But she is going to bring greater respect to it and even greater influence to it.

So it is without any hesitation at all that I commend Mary Louise Smith to this body for consideration and do it not only because of my friendship with her but because of my great re­spect for her.

With all these thoughts in mind, I ask that the Senate confirm the nomi­nation of Mary Louise Smith to the Civil Rights Commission.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, the nomina­tion is confirmed.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the nominee was confirmed.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Iowa for his re­marks. I subscribe to every word he spoke. I, too, have great admiration for the nominee who has now been confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask that the Presi­dent be immediately notified that the Senate has given its consent to this nomination.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the Senate now return to legislative session.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Without objection, it is so or­dered.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, that

completes the folder of routine mat­ters that we needed to do. I have no further need for my time under the standing order, if any remains. I thank all Senators for giving the joint leader­ship this opportunity to transact its

business early in the day, to dispose of important Legislative and Executive Calendar business.

Mr. President, we will resume consid­eration of the Williams matter with a quorum call to occur at 12:30 p.m. I hope we will have a quorum assembled quickly, or in any event no later than 1 o'clock. I will confer with the minori­ty leader, with the Senator from Hawaii, and others, on how to reestab­lish an equal amount of time for debate in the course of the day.

I have announced previously that we will not be on the Williams resolution tomorrow.

I wish to announce now that, absent circumstances which I do not foresee, the Senate will not be in session to­morrow.

I yield the floor.

RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. The Chair recognizes the Sena­tor from West Virginia.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, how much time do I have now under my control?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem­pore. Forty-five minutes under special orders and 10 minutes from the time under leader control.

THE UNITED STATES SENATE THE SENATE COMES OF AGE: 1829-1833

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, on yesterday I spoke for the 48th time on the United States Senate. The title of my speech yesterday was "The Senate Comes of Age: 1829-1833." I was unable to complete my statement on yesterday. I discussed at quite some length the Webster-Hayne debate, and I wish now to continue my statement with respect to that title-"The Senate Comes of Age: 1829-1833."

There were reports that after Hayne had made his first speech, the presi­dent had sent him a congratulatory note. Jackson was no doubt kindly dis­posed toward the argument Benton had begun by criticizing eastern cap­italists. But this was before the sena­tor from South Carolina had been led by Webster into open advocacy of the right of a State to sit in judgment upon an act of Congress. Since Web­ster's famous second reply, Old Hicko­ry had kept his own counsel, to the great frustration of both sides and to Calhoun's particular exasperation.

Benton, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, and other administration senators not from the southern branch of the Democratic party believed that for the benefit of his pro-tariff constituents Webster had over-stressed the perils of the situation. On the Senate floor, Benton came to Hayne's defense. Though the president neither ap­plauded nor criticized Benton, South-

erners took his silence as boding well. They should not have been so naive. Instead, they should have listened more closely to the speech of Senator Edward Livingston of Louisiana a few days later for clues to the president's true feelings. Livingston was an inti­mate friend of the president and was destined soon to leave the Senate for the cabinet. In his speech, Livingston sought to return the debate to its original ground but also offered a bril­liant defense of the Union against nul­lification. If the personal views of Jackson are to be found in the Senate speeches, they are in this speech by Livingston, not in those by Hayne. 25

After waiting impatiently for more than a month for a sign from the White House, the South Carolinians decided on a scheme to force the issue. Here Calhoun and Hayne put their own heads into a trap. The occasion was to be the first Democratic party Jefferson Day Dinner on April 13, 1830. The place was Washington's Indian Queen Hotel, known by the lu­ridly painted picture of Pocahontas swinging in front. Calhoun's men planned the evening and, by schedul­ing twenty-four toasts, all of which were in praise of nullification, hoped to associate that doctrine with Jeffer­son and, most importantly, the guest of honor, Andrew Jackson. They scheduled Jackson to offer the first voluntary toast after the twenty-four.

That night, light blazed from the Indian Queen's windows and was re­flected through the sparkling decant­ers of whiskey. The air was filled with the scent of turkey, partridges, and pickled oysters-and heavy with sus­pense. At each plate lay the program· listing the twenty-four speakers. Their meaning was clear. The Pennsylvania congressional delegation entered, took one look, and left.

At the White House, Jackson and Van Buren, his Secretary of State, considered what their course of action should be. The conspirators' inten­tions were clear. How to show by his toast that Jackson was familiar with their intent and to demonstrate his de­termination to preserve the Union at all hazards was the puzzle. They set­tled on a plan. "Thus armed," wrote Van Buren, "we repaired to the dinner with feelings on the part of the Chief akin to those which would have ani­mated his breast if the scene of this preliminary skirmish in defense of the Union had been the field of battle in­stead of the festive board." 2 s

Benton arrived to find the hall alive with excitement. Dinner was served. From the head and foot of the central table, Calhoun and Jackson eyed each other. As each course was served, the tension mounted. Hayne began the speeches with a flowery reiteration of his challenge to Webster. Then came the twenty-four toasts. Jackson sat im-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3283 passively, betraying nothing of his in­tentions. Finally, it was time for the volunteer toasts, and Jackson stiffly arose amid cheers. So many diners were on their feet that the diminutive Van Buren could not see and so climbed onto his chair.

Andrew Jackson looked straight into the eyes of John C. Calhoun and said, "Our Union: it must be preserved." Utter silence followed. "A proclama­tion of martial law in South Carolina and an order to arrest Calhoun where he sat," said Isaac Hill, "could not have come with more blinding, stag­gering force." Jackson raised his glass, a signal the toast was to be drunk standing. As a man, the room arose, Calhoun with the rest. Slowly, Cal­houn's hands closed around the stem of his glass. Hill reported that "his glass trembled in his hand and a little of the amber fluid trickled down the side." Calhoun drank with the rest, while Jackson continued to stare at him. For a moment more, the white­haired president stood there, and then walked away to talk with Benton. Fi­nally, all were reseated. The toastmas­ter called upon the vice president. Cal­houn arose slowly. He lifted his glass. He picked up the challenge, surren­dered nothing. Slowly but clearly he said, "The Union-next to our liberty most dear." Within five minutes, the room had cleared, men fleeing from the scene as from a battle. 2 7

From then on, the already strained relations between the president and his vice president went from bad to worse. Calhoun sagged under the strain. A visitor to the Senate gallery found the South Carolinian "more wrinkled and careworn than I had ex­pected from his reputed age. His voice is shrill and to my ear disagreeable ... His manners have in them an uneasiness; a hurried, inco­herent air." Calhoun, forty-eight years of age, was indeed uneasy. Once more Van Buren had scored over his rival in the contest to ride Old Hickory's popu­larity into the presidency. 28

Calhoun sat uncomfortably in the vice president's chair in the Senate chamber, wishing for the end of the session and release. Before relief came, with the close of the first session of the Twenty-first Congress on May 31, however, the Senate and the president locked horns once again. Despite his strong stand for the supremacy of the Union, Jackson had given ample evi­dence that on other issues he would support the exercise of national au­thority only in limited areas. One of these limited areas was that of inter­nal improvements.

The House and Senate were indulg­ing in an orgy of so-called "pork barrel" legislation that provided f eder­al aid to individual projects. The log­rolling was fast and furious on Capitol Hill. Would Senator A support Sena-tor B's bill for a highway in his dis-

trict? The trading of votes and coop­eration, either for the passage or def eat of bills would in time become a basic and complicated part of congres­sional procedure in the movement of legislation through committees and on the floors of both houses.

How reminiscent of the battle for Amtrak!

But in 1830, Jackson and his follow­ers were disgusted by the raid on the federal treasury and the mileage such efforts gave to Henry Clay and his "American System."

Jackson told Van Buren to watch Congress and bring to the White House the first vulnerable bill to meet his eye. By the end of April, Van Buren told the president that he had found the victim-a measure to au­thorize the government to subscribe $150,000 worth of stock to build a sixty-six mile turnpike from Maysville to Lexington, Kentucky, Henry Clay's state. The bill had passed the House and would soon pass the Senate. Van Buren sat down to help Jackson write his first veto message, justifying the action by noting that the road lay en­tirely within one state. Despite a great deal of bluster, Clay's supporters in the Senate could not override the veto and they had to leave for home on a crestfallen note. Jackson vetoed twelve measures during his administration­three more than all his predecessors combined. 29

As the session finally closed, Henry Clay fumed in the West, Calhoun an­grily presided over the Senate, nursing his wounds, and Webster still basked in the glory of his recent speeches. It has been a busy five months for the senators and they gladly went off for a seven month rest.

Can you imagine that-seven months.

During the second session of the Twenty-first Congress, the national spotlight shifted away from the Senate, but, with the opening of the Twenty-second Congress on December 5, 1831, the full glare focused on the senators once again.

In October 1831, Henry Clay sat in the library of Ashland, his Kentucky estate, reading a letter from Daniel Webster which went as follows:

You must be aware of the strong desire manifested in many parts of the country that you should come into the Senate. The wish is entertained here as earnestly as else­where. We are to have an interesting and ar­duous session. Everything is to be attacked. An array is preparing much more formida­ble than has ever yet assaulted what we think the leading and important public in­terests. Not only the tariff, but the Consti­tution itself, in its elemental and fundamen­tal provisions, will be assailed with talent, vigor, and union. Everything is to be debat­ed as if nothing had ever been settled. It would be an infinite gratification to me to have our aid, or rather, your lead. I know nothing so likely to be useful. Everything valuable in the government is to be fought for an we need your arm in the fight. 30

Webster's message was clear. The Opposition was gearing up for a major battle with the obstinate president whose candidacy for reelection in 1832 was almost assured. To combat the Democrats, the Opposition needed a strong leader and it turned to Clay, whose own nomination for the presi­dency was also a foregone conclusion.

Clay responded to the call to carry the fight into the enemy's camp. In the face of a ferocious Jackson press attack, Clay was elected to the Senate by a small majority of the Kentucky legislature and set off for Washington in November. He arrived, said Mrs. Smith, "borne up by the undying spirit of ambition," looking "well and animated," to be received with "the most marked deference and re­spect." 31

Henry Clay was the consummate politician. Few have been his equal. Few have ever approached his effect upon a partisan audience. Fluent, and at times capable of passages of in­spired eloquence, a master of sarcasm and ridicule, his was the oratory that moves men to action. Webster and Cal­houn spoke in abstractions-Clay spoke the language of the people. Webster and Calhoun inspired re­spect-Clay love. Calhoun once said of him:

"I don't like Clay. He is a bad man, an im­postor, a creature of wicked schemes. I won't speak to him, but, by God, I love him." 32

This was the militant figure that strode down Pennsylvania Avenue to take his place at the head of the Senate opposition when the Twenty­second Congress convened on Decem­ber 5, 1831, 151 years ago. Five days later, the National Republicans held their nominating convention in Balti­more and offered him the high office he long had sought.

As Clay surveyed his colleagues in the Senate, he must have rejoiced at his advantage. At his side was Web­ster, with all the prestige of his great name. Still presiding, though he knew his days as vice president were num­bered, was John C. Calhoun, whose break with the president was now com­plete. There also was Hayne, obviously no friend of Webster's but, out to re­venge the wounds inflicted on his mentor in the chair by the president, willing to join with the Opposition now. Also in Clay's camp were John Middleton Clayton of Delaware and Thomas Ewing of Ohio, the latter a robust partisan and able debater. And, while they were of the states' rights persuasion and hostile to the tariff and internal improvements, Clay could scarcely fail to catch the signals that the erudite Henry Tazewell and John Tyler of Virginia were sending out to make it known that they were ripe for Opposition.

3284 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 Against him, Clay could count John

Forsyth of Georgia and, of course, Benton. These two were aided by Sen­ators Felix Grundy and Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee, Isaac Hill of New Hampshire, and Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey.

Clay and his Opposition faced off against the Jackson men. The Ken­tuckian was a dominant figure in the debate that winter. An impatient lis­tener, he was wont to sit at indifferent ease, reading, or eating sticks of striped peppermint candy, a procedure varied by occasional restless wander­ings over to the snuffbox that stood on the center table. When he spoke, his telling arguments and effective gestures compelled the attention of his listeners. 3 3

Skirmishing began almost at once. But Clay was looking for an issue on which to leap. A less provocative mes­sage than that with which Jackson opened the Twenty-second Congress, however, could hardly have been penned. For lack of a better scapegoat, the Opposition seized upon the nomi­nation of Van Buren as Minister to England. At least on this issue, Clay knew that Calhoun's and Hayne's hatred of the "Red Fox of Kinder­hook" <Van Buren) would keep them in the Opposition's folds.

Van Buren had resigned as Secre­tary of State in 1831, when Jackson's entire cabinet was overhauled. In June of that year, Jackson had named him to the London mission, too late for the Senate to act upon the appointment. By January 1832, his confirmation was at the mercy of his foes, and a pettier story of party politics is scarcely found in the Senate's history. None really doubted Van Buren's ability or ques­tioned his integrity. The Calhoun fac­tion acted out of spite. Clay, Webster, and Clayton acted out of partisan spleen. Calhoun's men took the tack that Van Buren had plotted the dis­ruption in the cabinet and engineered the quarrel between the president and the vice president. Clay and Webster and their followers denounced him as a spoilsman and thundered against Van Buren's part, as Secretary of State, in the negotiations on the West India trade.

When the nomination reached the Senate, nothing was done for five weeks. The leaders of the Opposition were carefully preparing their speech­es for publication and wide distribu­tion because they did not have Xerox machines in those days. The venom behind the procrastination was finally revealed in a resolution, entrusted to an obscure member, Senator John Holmes of Maine, to recommit the nomination with instructions to inves­tigate the disruption of the cabinet and whether Van Buren had "partici­pated in any practices disreputable to the national character." This cavalier measure was withdrawn without

action but then the grander orators began. One after another, with a poor simulation of sorrowful regret over the necessity of injuring an amiable man, a former senator at that, poured forth his protest against the nomina­tion. Clay, Webster, Clayton, Ewing, Hayne and seven others recited their elaborately prepared harrangues under the approving eye of Calhoun in the chair.

Only four replies were made, the principal one by John Forsyth, the ac­complished floor leader of the admin­istration. Forsyth bitterly assailed the partisan crucifixtion and sarcastically commended the fine public spirit of the senators who voluntarily brought such distress upon themselves in the public good. Forsyth's barb hit home. Hayne later admitted that he had spoken and voted against his judgment at the behest of party alone. John Tyler noted that he finally voted for confirmation, "not that I liked the man overmuch," but because he could find no principle to justify his rejec­tion and did not care to join "the noto­riously factious opposition . . . who opposed everything favored by the Ad­ministration." 34

We should not be surprised that so few Jackson men came to Van Buren's defense. Many of them rightly saw that in his def eat could come his victo­ry. Benton, who did not participate in the Senate debate, was of this view. Benton believed that though "rejec­tion was a bitter medicine, there was health at the bottom of the draught." Freshman New York Senator William Marcy, a firm friend of Van Buren, agreed: "There would have been some difficulty in enlisting the popular feel­ings for his <Van Burea's) favor, but the blow aimed at Van Buren, Old Hickory will receive, and the two are and will be identified." 35

When the vote was finally taken for confirmation, it ended in a prear­ranged tie. In triumph, Vice President Calhoun cast the deciding vote for re­jection, ending, he was sure, his rival's career. Within ear shot of Benton, Calhoun gloated "It will kill him, sir, kill him dead; he will never kick, sir, never kick." Benton knew differently. Said he, "You have broken a Minister, and elected a vice president." Marcy wrote happily to London to inform Van Buren, jokingly pretending to be transmitting evil news. Van Buren re­turned to the United States a political martyr. In May, the Democrats chose him as Jackson's vice presidential run­ning mate. 36

One might think that the presiden­tial election would overshadow all other events in 1832. Instead, a new crisis, really a long-smoldering crisis, suddenly came to a head more quickly than anyone had expected. Ever since the tariff of 1828, the so-called "Tariff of Abominations," South Carolina, with Calhoun at the helm, aided by

Hayne, had been nursing the doctrine of nullification.

To try to conciliate the South, Jack­son had asked Congress to revise the harsh 1828 tariff. And, indeed, a new, milder tariff did pass Congress on July 14, 1832, with Southern support. Those who thought the threat had passed failed to reckon on the determi­nation of South Carolina and John C. Calhoun. In August, Calhoun wrote a public letter to South Carolina Gover­nor Hamilton defending nullification. The governor then called a state con­vention which met in Columbia in No­vember and adopted an ordinance nul­lifying the tariff and prohibiting the collection of any duties within the state beginning February 1, 1833. The legislature passed laws to enforce the ordinance. President Jackson respond­ed by alerting United States forces in South Carolina and by issuing his famous proclamation condemning nul­lification and asserting the supremacy of the federal government.

As Christmas 1832 approached, threats of war and secession were heard on every side. Charleston, South Carolina looked like a military depot. Realizing that Jackson already consid­ered him a traitor, Calhoun allowed himself to be chosen by the South Carolina legislature to fill the Senate seat of Hayne, who willingly stepped aside and was elected governor. A few days later, Calhoun resigned the vice presidency. <By then it was clear that Jackson and Van Buren had won the November elections. The electoral vote would be 219 for Jackson, 49 for Clay.)

The same as Jimmy Carter received. Calhoun addressed a hurried note to Secretary of State Edward Livingston:

Sir, having concluded to accept a seat in the United States Senate, I herewith resign the office of Vice-President of the United States.

To this extraordinary document, nei­ther the Secretary nor the administra­tion paid any attention. It was so com­pletely ignored that Calhoun finally wrote Livingston to see if he had re­ceived it. Even the Senate disdained to recognize the withdrawal of its presid­ing officer. Business continued as usual as Calhoun prepared to leave South Carolina to carry his state's battle onto the floor of the Senate. 37

Calhoun was literally taking his life into his hands when he left Charles­ton. There were rumors that Jackson had sworn to hang him. Loyal follow­ers acompanied him as far as the Vir­ginia line into Washington but even they began to drift off as the border was reached. Only a few curious spec­tators saw him enter his old boarding house. The mail that awaited him, full of drawings of skulls and coffins, did little to quite his nerves.

Crowds lined the streets the next morning, January 4, 1833, to watch him head off to the Senate. The Cap-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3285 itol was packed and curious friends and foes thronged the Senate gallery. Calhoun entered the chamber, deathly pale but calm. The chamber was just as he had left it-there was the famil­iar sound of scratching quill pens, knuckles rapping sand off the wet ink, the rustle of newspapers, tossed down as he passed. As the new senator from South Carolina sat down, several Southerners came to shake his hand, but many former friends, as they sometimes will hung back. Some delib­erately avoided his gaze. And, my, what a gaze, the piercing black eyes of Calhoun. When he strode forward to be sworn in, his colleagues watched in wonder as the Great Nullifier solemn­ly swore to "uphold, defend, and pro­tect the Constitution of the United States."

Calhoun held his peace in the Senate until Jackson's Force Bill, de­signed to enable the president to use the army and navy to enforce revenue laws, arrived in mid-January. He sprang to his feet. His words were ex­ceedingly bitter. In youth, he told the Senate, he had "cherished a deep and enthusiastic admiration of this Union." He had looked "with rapture" on the federal system, but always knew that in the last resort the body that delegated the power could regain the power. And now, for merely daring to assert the state's constitutional rights, "We are threatened to have our throats cut, and those of our wives and children." He stopped suddenly and told his already startled colleagues, "No, I go too far. I did not intend to use language so strong." An amazed correspondent for the Baltimore Patri­ot noted, "Mr. Calhoun spoke under a degree of excitement never before wit­nessed in a parliamentary body. His whole frame was agitated."3s

When another senator hastily as­sured Calhoun that the government would appeal to South Carolina's sense of justice and patriotism, Cal­houn retorted, "I am sorry that South Carolina cannot appeal to the sense of justice of the General Government." When several senators called him to order, Calhoun again "begged pardon for the warmth with which he had ex­pressed himself." But he could never take back his words. The stage was set for another memorable debate in the Senate and this time the principals would be, not Hayne, acting as a surro­gate for the silent vice president, but the farmer vice president himself up against Daniel Webster.39

That Webster should represent the administration in this dramatic con­frontation had a delicious irony for the swarthy New Englander. Almost simultaneously he was battling Jack­son on the bank issue, about which I shall speak later. Webster and Jackson had not even been on speaking terms for more than a year, but astute sena­tors were aware that Webster was

being wooed to take up the adminis­tration's part on this issue. Senator Tyler of Virginia, a Calhoun support­er, wrote home in January that, "I dined at the Palace <White House) ... a few days since and found Mr. W. there in all his glory." 4 0

The great debate began in mid-Feb­ruary 1833. Calhoun had introduced three resolutions which stated that the United States existed by virtue of a constitutional compact through which each state retained its sovereignty and could judge for itself whether or not the laws of the United States should apply in its case. The resolutions also included a specific denial that the people of the United States were or had ever been "one union." He set the stage dramatically for his opening salvo to defend his res­olutions and condemn the Force Bill. Pushing some chairs down to both ends of a long desk which stood in the front of the chamber, he enclosed himself in a sort of cage where he could pace up and down as he spoke. Close observers noted how rapidly he had aged in the past few months. His dark eyes were sunken; his short­clipped hair, brushed back from a broad forehead, was streaked with gray. To some, the gaunt figure looked "the arch traitor ... like Satan in Paradise." To others, he was a great patriot with his back against the wall, battling fiercely in defense of violated liberties.

Calhoun's speech, which consumed two days, was uncharacteristically emotional and vindictive. He attacked the president and his friends. He at­tacked Webster and New England. He claimed that the Force Bill declared war against South Carolina: "It de­crees a massacre of her citizens ... It enables him (Jackson) to subject every man in the United States . . . to mar­tial law ... and under the penalty of court-martial to compel him to imbrue his hand in his brother's blood." All the while, Webster's head was bent over a paper on which he busily took notes.

At the end of the first day, in the midst of "the tempest and whirlwind of his <Calhoun's) oratory," a voice screamed from the gallery: "Mr. Presi­dent, I am being squeezed to death!" The almost unbearable tension snapped and the Senate, except for Calhoun, rocked with laughter and ad­journed until the next day when Cal­houn took up his thread again for an­other hour before stopping.

As soon as Calhoun finished, Web­ster arose to speak. He had to pause for the cheering from the New Eng­landers in the gallery to subside. Standing in the wings were Jackson's intimates, ready to speed down the Hill to the White House with news of the confrontation. Webster's speech was essentially a replay of his part in the Hayne debate. It was late in the

evening when he concluded his mas­terful argument on the proposition that "the Constitution is not a com­pact between sovereign States." Brushing aside personalities, scarcely ref erring to any speech made during the debate, he stuck to his subject and spoke earnestly, without passion.

Long before Webster finished, the lights had been lit in the chamber where the crowd remained densely packed. With his conclusion, the gal­leries rose and cheered. Outraged, Senator George Poindexter of Missis­sippi demanded an immediate adjourn­ment. The victory was Webster's. The president was delighted. Jackson wrote to a friend that "Calhoun was in a state of dementation-his speech was a perfect failure; and Mr. Webster han­dled him like a child."

On February 24, the Force Bill came to a vote. With the beginning of the calling of the roll, Calhoun and all the enemies of the measure, with the single exception of John Tyler, arose and filed from the Senate chamber. A few moments earlier Clay had left the chamber on an unknown errand. The Force Bill passed 32 to 1-the nay was Tyler's.

Troops stood ready to march into South Carolina to wrest the federal revenues from their coffers, but all sides hoped that there was still time for an eleventh hour compromise. At the same time the Force Bill was moving through Congress, a compro­mise tariff bill was keeping pace with it. Administration supporters had in­troduced a measure for the immediate lowering of the tariff. Neither Henry Clay nor Calhoun wanted to see this bill pass for it would permit Jackson and Van Buren to take credit for set­tling-and winning-the issue. Instead Clay formulated his own compromise tariff bill and Calhoun reluctantly agreed to support it.

Clay introduced his modified tariff bill on February 13, 1833 declaring, "I have ambition, the ambition of being the humble instrument in the hands of Providence to reconcile a divided people." As the "humble instrument" sat down, Calhoun arose and stiffly announced his support. The galleries thundered with applause. By March 1, the measure had passed both Houses of Congress. The new tariff bill and the Force Bill were both signed into law by Jackson on March 2, the last day of the Twenty-second Congress.

The Nullification Crisis was finally over. South Carolina suspended the Nullification Ordinance after the new tariff passed. Both sides claimed victo­ry. What lessons had the three giants of the Senate learned from the experi­ence? Calhoun, sullen and bitter, now knew that no state standing by itself could successfully carry out the doc­trine of Nullification. The South would have to unite if it was to stand

3286 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 198:2 at all. Webster was frustrated. He had supplied the brilliant arguments, but Jackson was getting most of the credit for routing the Nullifiers. And Clay had turned the crisis to his advantage, when, after staying out of it until the very end, he had negotiated a genuine compromise and bolstered his sagging political stock. 4 1

Even while the burning issue of Nul­lification was before the Congress, the drama of another major dilemma con­tinued to grow apace. This was the issue of the Second Bank of the United States. The question of the Bank is very complicated, and, at the end of the Twenty-second Congress, it still hung fire. But since it affected the Senate and the election of 1832, I intend to touch on it here briefly before I close.

The issue between the president and his opponents in Congress was the re­newing of the Second Bank of the United States whose existing, twenty­year charter was due to expire in 1836. In his first message to Congress in De­cember 1829, Jackson had revealed his basic antagonism to the Bank and sug­gested an investigation into its deal­ings. Along with his supporters in the House and Senate, most notably Thomas Hart Benton, Jackson viewed the Bank as a national monster, estab­lished unconstitutionally and run pri­vately and in a dictatorial fashion by its president, the aristocratic Nicholas Biddle of Philadelphia. The Bank ex­isted, claimed Benton and others, for the benefit of the privileged commer­cial interests of the .Northeast to the detriment of the government and the agrarian interests of the South and West.

To many others, however, Clay and Webster among the leaders, the memory of the country's near-fiscal collapse during the War of 1812 after the demise of the First Bank had not faded. To them, the Bank was the source of the nation's stability, and, since this group still held a slim ma­jority in both houses, Congress paid little attention to Jackson's call for an investigation. Jackson, however, meant business, and, in the next annual address to Congress in 1830, he recommended that the Second Bank of the United States be replaced with a new government bank that would be a branch of the Treasury.

Thomas Hart Benton took up the president's cause in the Senate. On February 2, 1831, he tried to introduce a resolution against recharter of the Bank. Despite a fiery speech that lasted several hours, Benton was denied permission even to present his resolution. His words were not wasted, however, Pro-Jackson presses circulat­ed his speech widely and the anti-bank argument began to make an impact on the electorate. Meanwhile, Clay, fight­ing mad over the Maysville Road veto, returned to the Senate to lead the

fight for the Bank and to give Benton a run for his money. 4 2

Confident of a majority in the cur­rent Congress and wary of increased Jackson strength in the next, support­ers of the Bank decided to apply at once-four years early-for a renewal of the charter. The move led to frantic scrambling in both the House and Senate. In the House, a freshman rep­resentative and pro-Jackson man from Georgia, Augustin Clayton, recited a list of fifteen charges against the Bank. They had been written down for him by Senator Benton on a small piece of paper that Clayton kept wrapped around his finger to refresh his memory as he spoke. Benton had his own problems in the Senate. Isaac Bassett tells us:

While Mr. Benton was making some re­marks on the United States Bank bill, an in­cident occurred in the Senate Chamber. A piece of iron, part of a horseshoe, was thrown from the gallery into the body of the Chamber, passing near the head of Sen­ator Benton. The person who threw, hastily withdrew from the gallery but was followed and apprehended by Mr. Shackford, the Doorkeeper. After being detained a little while, he was released by order of the Vice President.

It sounds a good deal like the way things happen these days.

He was found to be deranged. 43

He must have been. Even crib sheets could not save the

anti-Bank forces. On June 11, 1832, the Senate voted 28 to 20 for rechart­er-on July 3, the House concurred, 107 to 86. For seven days, it looked as if the Clay forces had made a shrewd, early move. But on July 10, the House and Senate received Jackson's stinging veto of the Bank recharter.44

Clay and Benton faced off in the chamber that very hot July-no air conditioning in those days-to debate the president's veto. Benton rose to def end the president and, in the course of his harangue, charged that Clay's attack wanted courtesy and de­corum. Clay took the remarks person­ally and retorted savagely, pointedly telling Benton that when "some sena­tors" rose to speak, "the galleries are quickly emptied, with whatever else the Senate chamber may then be filled." The Kentuckian professed himself at a loss to determine which of the Missourian's opinions of Jackson one was to take for the correct one, and made caustic allusion to the fight between Jackson and the Benton brothers that had taken place years before. Certainly, Clay sneered, "I never complained of the President beating a brother of mine after he was prostrated and lying apparently life­less." Benton flung back taunt for taunt. Aspersion brought aspersion until, somewhat belatedly, the chair called for order.

Finally, the question was put on the passage of the Bank bill. By a vote of 22 for and 19 against, the Senate

failed to override the veto. It was Friday, July 13, 1832, and a black day for Henry Clay.45

Jackson viewed his overwhelming presidential election victory over Clay in the fall of 1832 as a mandate to pro­ceed against the Bank. In September 1833, he announced that the govern­ment would begin removing its depos­its from the Bank and placing them in selected state banks. Chastened but not undone. Biddle meanwhile began a campaign of restricting loans and tightening credit to create financial distress and arouse protests that would force the president to change his policy.

When the new Congress convened in December 1833, Webster, Clay, and Calhoun were at the forefront of the battle to save the Bank. Day after day, they held up important Senate busi­ness to read "distress memorials." In time, delegations of hard-pressed busi­nessmen began to show up to lobby their senators and representatives. Webster and the other opponents of the administration welcomed them­Webster even once ushering a group of thirty men onto the floor of the Senate, placing them in various spots around the chamber while he read aloud their petition.

Thus, it was clear at the opening of the Twenty-third Congress that the Bank issue would not go away. Indeed, it would continue to escalate until it resulted in the first and only Senate censure of a president. The dramatic story of the censure of Andrew Jack­son is so compelling that I would like to save it for my next historical state­ment on the Senate. The years we have just reviewed, 1828 through 1833, which included the Webster-Hayne de­bates, the rejection of Van Buren, the Nullification Crisis, and the opening salvos of the Bank war have been far busy enough.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the notes concerning these remarks.

There being no objection, the mate­rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NOTES to "the Senate Comes of Age": 1829-1833

1 Claude Bowers. The Party Battles of the Jackson Period. <Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922), p. 31.

2 Alvin Josephy. The Congress of the United States. <New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1975), p. 175.

3 lbid. 4 John Quincy Adams. Memoirs. Charles Francis

Adams, ed. <Philadelphia: Lippincott and Company, 1874-1877), Vol. IX, p. 64.

•Bowers, p. 80; Oliver Perry Chitwood. John Tyler. <New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939). .

6 Lyon Gardiner Tyler. Letters and Times of the Tylers. <Richmond: Whittet and Shepperson Com­pany, 1884), Vol. I, p. 408.

7 Bowers, pp. 80-87. sTyler, Vol. I, p. 408. •Register of Debates. 21st Congress, 1st sess., pp.

3-7. 10Bowers, p. 95.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3287 11 Register of Debates. 21st Congress, 1st sess .. pp.

3l-35. 12 Irving Bartlett. Daniel Webster. <New York: W.

W. Norton and Company, 1978), p. 116; Register of Debates. 21st Congress, 1st sess .. pp. 35-41.

1" Bowers, p. 96; Margret Coit. John C. Calhoun. <Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 210.

"Register of Debates. 21st Congress. 1st sess., pp. 41-58.

" Bowers, p. 97; Coit, p. 210; Bartlett, p. 117. '"Margaret Bayard Smith. The First Forty Years

of Washington Society. Gaillard Hunt, ed. <New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906), pp. 309-310.

111bid. '"The Letters of Arthur Machen, Arthur Machen,

Jr .. ed. <Baltimore: Privately printed, 1917>. pp. 53-54.

19 Manuscript copy of the Diary of Isaac Bassett, section 59; available in the Office of the Senate Cu­rator of Art and Antiquities.

20 Machen, p . 54. 21 Register of Debates. 21st Congress, 1st sess .. pp.

59-93; Bartlett, 117-120. 22 Marquis James. The Life of Andrew Jackson.

<New York: The Bobbs' Merrill Company, 1938), Vol. II. p. 226.

'"Bartlett, p. 120-121. 24 Ibid. 25 Bowers, p. 99; Register of Debates, pp. 247-272. •• Martin Van Buren. The Autobiography of

Martin Van Buren. John Fitzpatrick, ed. <Washing­ton, DC: American Historical Association, Annual Report of the Year 1919, 1920), p. 414.

21 lbid.; Coit, pp. 211-213; Thomas Hart Benton. Thirty Years' View. <New York: Appleton and Com­pany, 1883>. Vol. I, pp. 148-149.

••James, p. 236. 29lbid., pp. 219-220. 30 Glyndon Van Deusen. The Life of Henry Clay.

<Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), p . 245 <quoting from a letter from Webster to Clay, Octo­ber 5, 1831>; Bowers, p . 171.

3 1 Bowers, p. 172. 32 lbid. pp. 174-175. 33 Van Deusen, p. 247. 34 Bowers, pp. 177-180; Senate Journal, January

25, 1832. 35 lvor Spencer. The Victor and the Spoils. <Provi-

dence, RI: Brown University Press, 1959), pp. 62-63. 36 Ibid.; Benton, pp. 215-220. 31 Coit, p. 240. 38 Ibid., p. 246. 39 1bid. • 0 Bartlett, p . 136. • 1 Register of Debates. 22nd Congress, 2nd sess.;

Debate on the Force Bill began on January 22, 1833, and continued intermittently until February 21, 1833, when it came to a vote, pp. 174-687; Debate on Calhoun's resolutions took up the day of February 26, 1833, pp. 750-783; Debates on the Nul­lification Crisis, referred to in the Register as The Revenue Collection Bill, consumed most of the second session of the 22nd Congress, appearing intermittently from pp. 235-688; In addition, Bowers, Coit, Bartlett, and James all contain useful chapters dealing with the Nullification Crisis.

42 Register of Debates. 21st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 46-78.

43 Bassett, section 28. .. Register of Debates. 22nd Congress, 1st sess., p.

1074. 45 Ibid., pp. 1222-1295.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the leader.

HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT CHARTER '77?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the Czechoslovak Charter '77 human rights group recently celebrated its fifth anniversary.

Established in January of 1977, 242 signatories called for increased dialog with the Government over human rights and for the country to adhere to international human rights conven­tions it has signed and ratified.

As reported in the February 7 issue of the New York Times, the authori­ties' treatment of the group is respon­sible for the decline in underground documents, statements and appeals "from a high of 400 in its first year to a trickle in 1981."

In October 1979, for example, the Government brought to trial six of the group's activists, including the play­wright Vaclav Havel, and gave them long terms in prison. According to the Times.

Charter '77 signatories can expect to lose their jobs, forcing them into casual work, and their children are normally barred from going to universities.

Last month, Charter '77 announced its condemnation of martial law in Poland, and its support for the day of solidarity with the Poles held in sever­al countries on January 31.

Mr. President, how can we in the United States demonstrate our solidar­ity with the 1,200 signatories to Char­ter '77?

How can we effectively express our concern for human rights? When the United States condemns abuses of human rights, be they in Czechoslova­kia, Poland, or Ethiopia, a common re­frain by the Soviet Union is that if the United States were really serious about human rights, we would ratify the Genocide Treaty.

In 1948, the treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly by a vote of 55 to 0. This unanimous vote was due in part to the active role of the United States. We also helped in drafting the text of the convention. The inability of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Genocide Treaty, and thus declare genocide an international crime puzzles me.

Mr. President, I must say I have had a number of Senators and staff and other people approach me and say they are puzzled, too. They cannot for the life of them understand why this body does not ratify the Genocide Convention.

So I respectfully urge that my dis­tinguished colleagues in the Senate ask themselves why this treaty re­mains unratified in the world's great­est democracy.

Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the Democratic leader. I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, does the Senator from Missouri wish time?

Mr. DANFORTH. Three minutes. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield 3

minutes to the distinguished Senator from Missouri.

Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I thank the minority leader.

NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION: A QUESTION THAT NEEDS DIS­CUSSION Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President,

some months ago, a man I much re-

spect told me of a terrible thought that was on his mind. He imagined that at his death he appeared before God in judgment, and God asked him, "What did you do to prevent the nu­clear destruction of the world which brought you here?"

If that question is to be asked of those not in Government, how much more should it be asked of us who share responsibility for the future of America. Any honest answer to that question must confess the most colos­sal sin of omission since humankind has existed.

The last half of the 20th century will witness the increase in countries with nuclear capability from one to perhaps two or three dozen. One need only contemplate the number of hands through which nuclear buttons will pass during the next two decades to realize the great danger we are in.

In fact, the danger is so terrible that we try not to think about it. We would rather think about busing or abortion or school prayer or anything else than about the possibility of world destruc­tion. And so we are content to be casual about matters of life and death. We do not pursue arms limitations talks with full speed. We are lax about the availability of nuclear materiel. We fail to develop an effective deter­rent to nonsuperpower countries which might consider using the bomb.

Mr. President, I do not minimize the difficulty of putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle, but if we are con­tent to give the problem a low priority, the chances of avoiding eventual disas­ter seem remote.

America's Government and Ameri­ca's people should make this question their top priority: What can we as a country do to lessen the chances of nuclear destruction?

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Missouri yield?

Mr. DANFORTH. Yes, Mr. Presi­dent, I yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I congratulate the Senator on the statement. I think it is a very important statement. Yester­day, the Senator from Vermont <Mr. LEAHY) similarly complained about our failure to address this overwhelming problem. I am so heartened to hear the Senator from Missouri speak out as he has this morning. It is something we simply cannot evade. There is no more important responsibility we have than to provide for the survival of mankind and that is what the Senator from Missouri is talking about.

Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I very much appreciate the comments of the Senator from Wisconsin and also the generosity of the minority leader in yielding the time.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, I understand that Mr. SPECTER

has an order. I should like to accom-modate him by yielding to him at this

3288 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 198;2 time for the purpose of his executing his order on his own time.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distin­guished Senator from West Virginia for yielding to me at this time.

RECOGNITION OF SENATOR SPECTER

The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. GRASSLEY). The Senator from Pennsyl­vania is recognized.

S. 2167-THE UNFAIR FOREIGN COMPETITION ACT OF 1982

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am today introducing a bill, S. 2167, which will grant American industries broader access to the courts to prevent eco­nomic injury in antidumping cases and countervailing duty suits. This legisla­tion is necessary to provide more expe­ditious and effective relief to those companies and industries injured by foreign products being dumped or sold on the American market at less than their fair value.

As just one example, steel imports in 1981 were up 30 percent over 1980, with imports from the European Common Market increasing by 70 per­cent.

This legislation will provide for more practical and quick relief in instances involving violations of international trade laws, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade <GATT). It will not impose any addi­tional barriers to trade or initiate other protectionist measures. It will only insure that trade laws will be en­forced with greater certainty, vigor and speed.

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 provides a mechanism for the han­dling of dumping and countervailing duty complaints. However, a typical antidumping matter may take 13 to 17 months, requiring multiple decisions by two different administering agen­cies which must produce evidence: First, regarding prices in the seller's home market, second, prices in third country markets, and third, support allegations of injury to a U.S. indus­try. Under the prior law, in one in­stance involving the television indus­try, the investigation took 6 years.

In response to numerous complaints by the steel industry, the Carter ad­ministration initiated by administra­tive action a trigger price mechanism <TPM) for steel products only, which was originally intended to be more ef­ficient than the antidumping proce­dures.

In addition, there is also an anti­surge mechanism. For example, if im­ports rise over a certain percentage of domestic consumption, the U.S. indus­try is operating below a certain capac­ity and there appears to be a surge in imports, the Commerce Department will review the situation with an eye to initiating antidumping investigations.

The 1979 act, the TPM, and the anti­surge mechanism have not been suc­cessful because they have not signifi­cantly shortened the time frame for antidumping investigations. The harm is done before the investigation is com­pleted. Also, they have not been effec­tive because all relief is prospective. In addition, there have been shortcom­ings in the operation of each of these antidumping mechanisms.

For example, in a study of the Treasury's administration of TPM prior to its suspension in 1980, the GAO determined that 40 percent of foreign steel imports were coming into the country below trigger price, with 6 percent significantly below trigger price. However, in only 1 percent of all imports were antidumping investiga­tions being triggered by the Depart­ment of the Treasury. Also, since the TPM only triggered an antidumping investigation, all of the procedures set forth in the 1979 Trade Agreement Act still apply.

As a result of these shortcomings, the steel industry filed massive com­plaints in the spring of 1980, causing the Carter administration to suspend the TPM. It was subsequently rein­stated immediately prior to the elec­tion. Last month the steel industry again initiated massive complaints and the Reagan administration suspended the TPM.

These dumping complaints were filed by most of the major steel com­panies, including United States Steel, Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Jones & Laughlin, Babcock & Wilcox, Inland Steel, National Steel, and Cy­clops Corp. These complaints alleged wholesale violations of antidumping and countervailing duty laws, includ­ing instances where products were being dumped at over 60 percent below the fair or foreign market value. These complaints also alleged that Eu­ropean steel companies had received $30 billion in government grants, loans, guarantees, and other forms of subsidies in the past 6 years and will receive another $30 billion in the next 4 years.

While considerable criticism has been made of the domestic steel indus­try, it has maintained a small profit over the past 6 years while foreign producers have run up $20 billion in red ink. Without government subsi­dies, it is clear that many of these for­eign producers would not be able to dump steel on American markets.

This bill would grant industries im­mediate access to the courts so that al­legations about the dumping of for­eign products could be determined ex­peditiously. For example, just recently a Federal district court handled the extremely complex matter regarding Mobil Oil, United States Steel, and Marathon Oil in only a few weeks. This is in contrast to the up to 13 to 17

months which it requires to resolve many antidumping investigations.

This legislation would apply to all industries in the United States, not just the steel industry, who are affect­ed by the importation or sale of arti­cles at less than the fair market value. The legislation is needed to prevent U.S. unemployment and business de­cline.

Section 2 would place 15 U.S.C. 72 under the Nation's antitrust laws, thus providing plaintiffs with all of the remedies, rights of action, and so forth, provided for under those laws. Dumping is a predatory, anticompeti­tive act and plaintiffs in these cases would then have the ability to use the precedents, procedures, and immediate remedies of antitrust laws.

Section 3 substantially amends 15 u.s.c. 72.

Subsection (a) would extend the cov­erage of this legislation from import­ers and those who assist in the impor­tation of goods in the United States to include those persons who sell prod­ucts which are dumped on American markets. It utilizes terms contained in the Trade Act to reduce the vagueness in the current statute. The use of these terms is well established under the trade laws. The existing terms used in the statute, while having been previously construed in court tests, do not have as well-defined meanings.

In addition, this subsection would cover instances where products are not sold in the home country or in an­other foreign country. Using the con­structive value approach eliminates this problem.

Instead of proving that the foreign manufacturer, importer, or govern­ment intends to destroy or injure an industry of the United States, subsec­tion (a) would require that such ac­tions result in and have the reasonably foreseeable effect of injuring the American industry or preventing the establishment or modernization of the industry in the United States. This would significantly reduce the stand­ard of proof required in any court action.

Subsection (b) retains the criminal provisions in existing law and provides for imprisonment up to 1 year but in­creases the fine to as much as $1,000,000.

Subsection (c)(l) would allow any company that has been injured by reason of any violation of this section to file suit in the district court in which it resides, transacts business or has an agent. Under current law, there have been questions raised about who may file these suits and in what dis­trict court. This provision should eliminate many of these questions.

Subsection (c)(2) would set forth the relief which the court could grant in any suit. The court can issue a tempo­rary or permanent injunction or a

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3289 temporary restraining order prohibit­ing the further importation or sale of any articles.

Subsection (c)(3) retains for any pre­vailing plaintiff treble damages in the case of any injury sustained under this section, reasonable attorney fees and court costs, as well as any other equi­table relief as may be appropriate.

Subsection Cd) permits the burden of proof for actions brought under this section to shift to the defendants. The test is similar to that used in the Rob­inson-Patman Act. Under current law, the plaintiff always bears the burden of proof. Under subsection (d), the plaintiff can make a showing of viola­tion which shall constitute a prima facie case. In addition, any prelimi­nary or final determination by the ITC or the Department of Commerce that is affirmative in nature would be considered a prima facie case. A com­pany may file suit, using the record es­tablished before the ITC or Depart­ment of Commerce, when any such preliminary or final determination has been made. The burden of rebutting the prima facie case is then placed on the person charged with the violation. For both the defendant and plaintiff, the standard of proof is a preponder­ance of the evidence. The court, absent rebuttal, is authorized to issue an appropriate order including any penalty or sanction provided for in subsection (c).

Subsection (e) would allow the court to determine at any point during the proceeding to prohibit further imports into the United States. This would en­courage judges to act to bar further imports where an American company or complainant has presented a strong case.

Subsection (f) permits subpenas and other summonses to be sent into other districts where necessary and appro­priate.

Subsection (g) permits the court to find against the defendant in those in­stances where the defendant fails to comply with a final discovery order or other order or decree of the court. The court could enjoin the importation of the articles questioned until such time the defendant complies with the order or decree.

Subsection Ch) would allow the court to review in camera any confidential or privileged material in any case under this subsection.

Subsection (i) would require that any suit filed under subsection Cd) be advanced on the court docket and ex­pedited in every way possible.

Subsection (j) provides that the court rely on the definition in the Antidumping Act of 1921 and the Tariff Act of 1930 in construing the term "foreign market value." To the extent that any governmental or other subsidy is not included in the con­structed or foreign market value, it is to be added on to such value.

Subsection Ck) facilitates the serving of legal process on any person who sells products or has the product sold by another party in the United States. This should expedite the processing of actions under subsection Cc).

Subsection <D sets a statute of limi­tations of 4 years.

Section 4 states that it is the sense of Congress that this act is consistent with and in accord with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade CG A TT).

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

s. 2167 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Unfair Foreign Competition Act of 1982."

SEc. 2. Section 1 of the Clayton Act < 15 U.S.C. 12> is amended by inserting after the words "nineteen hundred and thirteen;" the words "section 801 of the Act of September 8, 1916, entitled 'An Act to raise revenue, and for other purposes' <39 Stat. 798; 15 u.s.c. 72>;".

SEc. 3. Section 801 of the Act of Septem­ber 8, 1916, entitled "An Act to raise reve­nue, and for other purposes" < 15 U.S.C. 72) is amended to read as follows:

"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to import, assist in importing, or sell, or cause another to import, assist in importing, or sell within the United States any article manufactured in a foreign country at a pur­chase price less than the foreign market value <or, in the absence of any such value, the constructed value> prevailing at the time, if the reasonably foreseeable effect of such importation or sale of such article is-

"{1) material injury to industry or labor engaged in commerce in the United States; and,

"(2) the prevention, in whole or in part, of the establishment, modernization or expan­sion of Industry in the United States.

"(b) Any person who knowingly violates or combines or conspires with any other person to violate this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not to exceed one year, or a fine not to exceed $1,000,000, or both.

"<c><l> Any person who has been injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of, or conspiracy to violate this section, may sue in the district court of the United States for the district in which the defendant resides, transacts business, is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy.

"(2) In the case of any suit filed under paragraph (1), the court shall have jurisdic­tion to decide such suit and may issue a temporary or permanent injunction or a temporary restraining order prohibiting the importation or sale of any articles which have been or will be imported or in violation of subsection <a> of this section.

"{3) Any plaintiff prevailing in a suit filed under paragraph < 1) of this subsection shall, upon a finding of injury under subsection <a>. recover threefold the damages sus­tained, any other equitable relief as may be appropriate, and the cost of the suit, includ-ing reasonable attorney fees.

"(d) The standard of proof is any action filed under subsection <c> is a preponder­ance of the evidence. Upon a prima facie showing that there has been a violation of subsection <a> or upon preliminary or final determination by the International Trade Commission or administering authority that is affirmative under sections 703, 705, 733, or 735 of the Tarriff Act of 1930 <19 U.S.C. 1671b, 1671d, 1673b and 1673d) and which shall be considered a prima facie case for purposes of this section, the burden of re­butting the prima facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this sec­tion, and unless justification shall be affirm­atively shown that such articles have not been imported or sold at less than foreign market value, the Court may issue an appro­priate order including any penalty or sanc­tion authorized by subsection <c>.

"(e) If, during the course of any proceed­ing under this section, the court determines that there is reason to believe that there is a violation of this section, it may direct that the articles concerned be excluded from entry or sale in the United States, pending completion of the suit.

"(f) Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under this Act may be pending that the ends of justice re­quire that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not. and subpoenas to that end may be served and enforced in any judicial district of the United States.

"(g) If a defendant, in any proceeding brought under subsection Cc) of this section in any court of the United States, fails to comply with any discovery order, or other order or decree of such court, the court may enjoin the further importation into the United States, sale, or distribution in inter­state commerce within the United States, by such defendant of articles which are the same as, or similar to, those articles which are alleged in such proceeding to have been sold or imported in violation of the provi­sions of subsection <a> of this section, until such time as the defendant complies with such order or decree, or may take any other action authorized by law, including entering judgment for the plaintiff.

"(h) The confidential or privileged status accorded to any documents, comments or in­formation by law shall be preserved in any action under this section. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, the court may ex­amine, in camera, the confidential or privi­leged material, may accept depositions, doc­uments or affidavits under seal, and may disclose such material under such terms and conditions as it may order.

"(i) Any suit filed under subsection <c> shall be advanced on the docket and expe­dited in every way possible.

"(j) For the purpose of construing the term 'foreign market value', the court shall apply the definition of such term contained in the Anti-dumping Act of 1921 c 19 U.S.C. 160-173) and the Tariff Act of 1930 <19 U.S.C. 1671 et. seq.). To the extent that any governmental or other subsidy provided to a manufacturer or producer is not included in the foreign market value or constructed value, then the amount of such subsidy shall be added on to the foreign market value or constructed value.

"Ck> The acceptance by any foreign manu­facturer or exporter of any right or privi­lege conferred upon him to sell his products or have his products sold by another party

3290 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 in the United States shall be deemed equiva­lent to an appointment by the foreign man­ufacturer or exporter of the Commissioner of Customs to be the true and lawful attor­ney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action or proceeding relating to the foreign manufacturer or exporter under this section.

"(!) The action brought under subsection (C) shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action oc­curred. SEc. 4. It is the sense of the Congress that the provisions of this Act are consistent with a.nd in accord with the General Agree­ment on Tariffs and Trade <GATT>.

AGENT IDENTITIES BILL Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President,

during the debate on the agent identi­ties bill, I did not have an opportunity to present my views during the time allotted. At this time, I should like to present the statement of my position in this matter, which I will amplify when the agent identities bill is before the Senate for further debate next week.

Mr. President, all Senators share a strong desire to protect the identities of U.S. intelligence agents because dis­closures harm the intelligence agen­cies and can harm the agents them­selves. All Senators want to enact a law that, consistent with constitution­al protections of fairness in criminal justice and of freedom of the press, will effectively deter systematic disclo­sures and will surely punish the disclo­sures. Disagreement arises, however, over whether requiring proof of intent to impair U.S. intelligence activities or only reason to believe impairment will occur will better assure conviction of the guilty and protection of prof es­sional journalists from the chilling effect of possible prosecution.

Senator CHAFEE, who has long cham­pioned the cause of protecting agents' identities, has proposed an amend­ment to the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1981 <S. 391) to remove the requirement of intent which was inserted by the Judiciary Committee. As a member of the Judi­ciary Committee, I know that the in­sertion was made to protect the media. Senator CHAFEE, however, believes that the intent standard "substantial­ly weakens the bill." His amendment, like the bill passed last fall by the House of Representatives, would sub­stitute a lower standard of proof de­rived from the civil law of negligence­"reason to believe."

Its sponsors believe the amendment is necessary to successful prosecution of those "in the business of naming names" and do not believe the amend­ment would threaten the press. I dis­agree.

In my opinion, as a former prosecu­tor, the reason to believe standard is inappropriate, undesirable, and unnec­essary. It may also be unconstitution­al.

In our system of justice, criminal cases have traditionally required proof of criminal intent. That practice, which has been generally followed in this country for nearly 200 years, has proven to be both realistic and fair. The practice is workable even though we cannot get inside the accused's head to examine his intentions be­cause of two well established legal doc­trines. First, the accused is deemed to intend the "natural and probable con­sequences" of his actions. Second, his intent need not be proved by direct evidence, such as his statements, but may be inf erred from his actions. Juries are instructed by the court that specific intent "may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case." Even where the accused proclaims that his intent was innocent, juries often discount such statements and inf er the requisite intent. On the basis of considerable personal experience in such cases, I know that the doctrine of inf erred intent works and works well.

Requiring intent also furnishes an essential element of the fundamental fairness that characterizes our crimi­nal proceedings. The requirement serves to protect innocent individuals from the hardship of unnecessary trial and the risk of unjust conviction. The lower standard of reason-to-believe, by contrast, imposes legal liability despite innocent intentions whenever the person should have foreseen that harm might result from his actions. In the context of agents' identities, this means that an individual motivated solely by a desire to stop illegal prac­tices who discloses the identity of the off ending agent to anyone outside of certain Government agencies could be sent to prison because he should have anticipated that his disclosure would make future recruitments or coopera­tion of agents more difficult. Indeed, such impairment might well follow from virtually any disclosure, even one for a most laudatory purpose.

Too broad a range of cases would be included by a standard that the actor would have reason to believe that identifying an intelligence agent would cause such impairment. As Sen­ator CHAFEE himself observed in the debate last Thursday, "Any reasonable person would know that by naming names you are going to impair the for­eign intelligence activities of the United States." If that is so, then the reason-to-believe standard is no stand­ard at all for it is met automatically and without regard to the purpose or circumstances of the disclosure. Ac­cordingly, the reason-to-believe stand­ard is inappropriate in a felony stat­ute.

If the criminal law should not punish a person with innocent inten­tions, then the amendment com­pounds the inherent unfairness be­cause it would apply in a first amend-

ment context. Passage of the Chafee amendment could subject a reporter or broadcaster, as well as the editors and all officers involved in reviewing the story, risk of criminal prosecution. No matter how innocent everyone's in­tentions, how necessary disclosure of the name was to the credibility or ef­fectiveness of the story or how outra­geous or illegal the conduct of the agent, criminal prosecution would be possible.

No doubt, the Justice Department would decline to prosecute such a case. But a violation certainly would have occurred.

Some Senators have argued that re­porters in such circumstances are not covered by the bill because of another provision which requires proof that the disclosure was made "in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose agents." Senator CHAFEE, for example, said in the debate, "It is not one disclosure, it is a pattern of activities." The definition given to "a pattern of activities," how­ever, is several actions with a "common purpose." Such a pattern would be found in the following hypo­thetical circumstance.

A reporter separately interviews six sources about an unidentified CIA agent allegedly involved, with agency approval, in drug trafficking overseas. In each interview, the reporter seeks clues to the person's identity. He suc­ceeds in piecing together various facts and then writes a story naming only this one agent. Since the six inter­views-a reporter's normal and lawful pursuit-all had the common purpose of gathering facts for a story about the agent, they form a pattern of ac­tivities and undeniably they were in­tended to identify and expose this agent. Thus, in fact, the amended bill would not require a series of disclo­sures over a period of time, but only one disclosure in one story that could result from activities as innocuous as news interviews.

The mere possibility of prosecution in such circumstances might have a very chilling effect on the press. After all, whether or not with good reason, members of the press may be reluctant to rely on the grace of the Justice De­partment not to prosecute them even though they would have violated the terms of the act. But the discomfort of the press is not where the potential harm ends. Chilled by the act, the press might become less vigorous, less confident and therefore less informa­tive. The public would be the loser.

Precisely to prevent such chilling, the courts closely scrutinize the consti­tutionality of any such criminal stat­ute. If S. 391 is amended, the courts might well strike it down as unconsti­tutional. In that event, my colleagues and I might find ourselves engaged in the same debate 5 years hence. We

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3291 might again be considering S. 391 as reported by the Judiciary Committee because in that form the bill is not subject to serious constitutional chal­lenge. It is the amendment that cre­ates the constitutional infirmity.

A workable bill 5 years from now is too late; our intelligence agents need and deserve such a bill right now. In fact, all parties to the debate agree on the need for immediate action on a bill that will survive legal challenge, that will reach those whose evil deeds led to the bill being proposed, and that will result in successful prosecutions of those trying to impair U.S. intelli­gence activities. I would hope they would also agree that the bill must do so without impairing freedom of the press.

In view of the risks entailed in the Chaf ee amendment, what is the over­riding need that justifies taking these risks? The administration, the Justice Department and the CIA have consist­ently indicated a strong preference for the reason to believe standard which they view as more effective. President Reagan recently wrote Senators, stat­ing-... Attorney General Smith and I firmly

believe that the <Chafee version) is far more likely to result in an effective law that could lead to successful prosecution.

In theory, they may be correct, but, with all due respect, I believe in prac­tice the amendment is unlikely to im­prove the prospects for successful prosecution for these three reasons:

First. Indictments would be less likely because of increased "graymail";

Second. Trials would be longer and more complicated and confusing, put­ting the CIA, instead of the accused, on trial as to the adequacy of its ef­forts to protect intelligence indenti­ties; and

Third. Appeals might involve greater delay and risk of reversal.

The amendment is entirely unneces­sary since the bill, as reported, will reach all those it needs to reach. Only legitimate journalists would be beyond its reach, but the CIA has always been very clear about its total lack of inter­est in prosecuting reporters. It is con­cerned with those persons who publish items like the Covert Action Informa­tion Bulletin. In my judgment such persons can be successfully prosecuted under the intent standard since their intent is apparent from the face of their publications. I have met twice with Director Casey and know that he finds the committee version of the bill acceptable.

What if their successors try to mask their intention by proclaiming their purpose to be not impeding, but im­proving U.S. intelligence activities? In the debate, Senator CHAFEE stated that such protestations would create "a loophole big enough to drive a truck through." Juries, in my experi­ence, are not so easily tricked. Rather,

they are skeptical of what the accused says and looks to what he did in as­sessing intent.

Certainly, no actual case has been cited to which could not be brought or was lost because intent could not be established while reason to believe could. Moreover, I have been advised by former Justice Department officials that in most intelligence disclosure cases what prevents prosecution is not insufficient proof of intent but rather what has become known as graymail. Graymail occurs when the defense is able to compel sufficient revelation of intelligence secrets that the cost of the prosecution is viewed as exceeding the benefits. Consequently, most such investigations are terminated without a prosecution being initiated even though ample proof exists. Sometimes the defense is entitled by law to intro­duce the sensitive information at trial. More often, however, defense attor­neys are merely entitled to receive the information as part of their pretrial preparation, known as discovery.

Unintentionally, the amendment would probably increase the scope of the pretrial discovery that the court would order. For instance, the defense could assert that in view of the appar­ent absence of harm to those agents whose identities were previously re­vealed, their client, rather than having reason to believe impairment would follow his disclosure, instead had reason to believe it would not. Thus, the defense would seek to discover all CIA documents on the 2,000 persons previously identified as intelligence agents in order to determine what effect, if any, the public revelation of identity had on their safety and pro­ductivity. In response, the CIA would deny the discovery requests even though the prosecution could not then proceed.

The so-called graymail statute en­acted by Congress does not solve this problem for it did not-and could not-restrict the scope of discovery. That depends on the elements of the offense charged and the nature of the Government's proof. All the statute did was prevent surprise use of classi­fied information at trial and expressly authorize the trial judge to admit into evidence documents from which sensi­tive information had been deleted and also to use summaries in place of the actual documents.

The bill as reported does not present any problem of discovery. Under the intent standard, CIA documents on the 2,000 agents previously identified would not be discoverable because the agents' fate is entirely relevant to the accused's intent. Even if the dangers of pretrial discovery could somehow be circumvented, the danger of undue disclosure of its secrets at trial would probably cause the CIA to demand that the Justice Department abruptly terminate the prosecution either

through a plea bargain generous enough to entice the defendant or by outright dismissal of all charges.

Senators supporting the amendment have also suggested that the reason-to­believe standard would avoid resorting to highly intrusive investigative tech­niques such as wiretapping and inquir­ing at trial into the accused's political opinions. The prediction that the intent standard would require s~h in­trusions again underestimate the so­phistication of juries. Private tele­phone conversations of the publishers of Covert Action Information Bulletin are hardly necessary. Their public statements-even perusal of the publi­cations themselves-leaves no doubt whatever about their intent. In any event, the intrusiveness of investiga­tion under either standard will depend primarily on the judgment and poli­cies of Justice Department officials.

If the bill, as reported by the Judici­ary Committee, in fact makes for better prosecutions, then why do the CIA and the Justice Department strongly prefer the Chafee version? Perhaps the appeal of the Chaf ee ver­sion is that it appears tougher. But in reality, criminal statutes derive their effectiveness from their capacity to deter future misconduct. Generally, deterrence comes not from statutes which look stern, but ones that are en­forced. Those misguided persons who seek to expose our intelligence agents are the least likely to be dissuaded merely by enactment of a new law. What would deter them would be seeing someone go to prison for naming names. In similar fashion, the morale of our agents would be raised not by enactment of a tough looking statute but by enforcement of a realis­tic statute.

Deterrence, furthermore, only con­tinues as long as convictions are sus­tained on appeal. If amended, the stat­ute not only might by invalidated but its application in particular cases might be reversed. A jury's finding on intent normally cannot be overturned by an appellate court unless the record of the trial is entirely devoid of any evidence on which the jury could have based its determination. Reason to believe, however, is a standard that permits the courts to second-guess the jury and reverse its finding if the ap­pellate judges disagree.

Supporters of the amendment take comfort from the fact that the phrase "reason to believe" appears in a hand­ful of criminal statutes, including the Espionage Act, that have been upheld by the courts. Three crucial distinc­tions have been overlooked in this regard. First, these statutes focused on surreptitious transfers of secret infor­mation, while S. 391 concerns public disclosures. Second, no appellate case has been found affirming a conviction based only on reason to believe. In

3292 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 most of the statutes the prosecution may prove either intent or reason to believe. Review of the cases suggests that the evidence proved intent. Third, the reason to believe standard is used very differently in these stat­utes than in S. 391. Typically, the de­fendant must have the normal crimi­nal intent when he passes the secret information. Reason to believe comes in on the issue of what the receiver will do with the information. If the de­fendant has reason to believe the for­eign power will use it against the United States, he is guilty. Thus, reason to believe has been used to de­scribe the defendant's state of mind as to what third parties may do, not, as in this amendment, as to what he him­self is doing.

In short, my review of the Intelli­gence Identities Protection Act has led to the firm conclusion that, as report­ed by the Judiciary Committee, it would provide: Better protection for agents' identities because it is more prosecutable; better protection of fun­damental fairness because, like compa­rable felony statutes, it requires crimi­nal intent; and better protection of freedom of the press because it re­moves the threat of possible prosecu­tion.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I

thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi­dent, how much time does the distin­guished Senator from Pennsylvania have remaining under his order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. He has 8 minutes remaining.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask unani­mous consent that I may have control of that time, also.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. With­out objection, it is so ordered.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under

the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business.

ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS UP FOR THE THIRD YEAR

Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I would like to share with my colleagues an ar­ticle which appeared in the Anti-Defa­mation League of B'nai B'rith's Febru­ary bulletin.

One would have hoped that after the disturbances of the past few years in this country the voices of hate would have been stilled. This is obvi­ously not the case. The report clearly shows that there are still those in our society who would deny to some of our

citizens that basic right which is one of the foundations of our country­freedom of religious practice.

According to the League's report, the number of anti-Semitic incidents doubled between 1980 and 1981-from 377 to 974. The report also reviews the measures which have been taken by various States to punish those who would tamper with our liberties.

Last year, here in the Senate, I in­troduced legislation which would make it a Federal crime to damage any cem­etery or a building used for religious purposes <S. 966). The League's report points up the need for legislation to enable the full resources of law en­forcement to be brought to bear on those who would violate one of our citizens' most fundamental rights.

I ask my colleagues to join with myself, and Senators SIMPSON, SAR­BANES, BOSCHWITZ, and METZENBAUM who are cosponsors of this measure in working for its early passage.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that the article from the Anti­Defamation League's bulletin be print­ed in the RECORD in full.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the ADL Bulletin, Feb. 19821 ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS UP FOR THE THIRD

YEAR

The number of reported anti-Semitic inci­dents in 1981 was more than double 1980, according to the Anti-Defamation League's annual national audit. It was the third straight year that the episodes more than doubled.

In addition to the increase in anti-Semitic vandalism against Jewish institutions and private property, such as homes and stores, and against public property <swastikas or anti-Jewish epithets scrawled on buildings, for example), the audit also revealed a sub­stantial increase in bodily assaults against Jews as Jews, and in mail or phone threats to Jews and Jewish institutions.

At the same time, there were signs that American society is reacting with growing determination against vandals motivated by bigotry and religious prejudice.

There were 974 episodes of anti-Semitic vandalism reported to ADL's 27 regional of­fices around the country. These took place in 31 states and the District of Columbia. In 1980, there were 377 reported in 28 states and the District of Columbia. In 1979, there were 120 episodes; in 1978, there were 49.

The number of assaults, mail and phone threats, and harassments of Jews and Jewish institutions reported in 1981 was 350, compared with 112 in 1980.

As in 1980, most reports of incidents of anti-Semitic vandalism in 1981 came from the states of New York (326), California 050), New Jersey <94) and Massachusetts (59)-roughly 65 percent of the total nation­wide.

The Northeast, with roughly half of the reported incidents, was once again the geo­graphic area with the greatest number of episodes.

The more serious offenses-arson, at­tempted arson, bombings and attempted bombings-numbered less than three per­cent of the total incidents reported in 1981. The other 97 percent consisted of swastika

daubings, anti-Jewish graffiti, and similar types of vandalism.

Desecrations of Jewish cemeteries in­creased from five in 1980 to 15 in 1981.

As in 1980, the overwhelming majority of those arrested in connection with the 1981 episodes of overt anti-Semitic vandalism, as­saults, threats and harassments were 20 years of age or under.

During 1981, ADL received reports that 73 individuals had been arrested in connection with 39 episodes of anti-Semitic vandalism and that 62-85 percent-were 20 or under. The remaining 11 were adults, of whom six were arrested in connection with a single episode in Nashville, TN. This involved an abortive plot, allegedly hatched by persons having Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazi affili­ations, to bomb a synagogue. In only one other episode was there evidence of activity by organized hate groups-an episode in In­diana in which one of two men arrested was affiliated with a Klan group.

POLICE, LAWMAKERS REACT

There are signs that American society is reacting to the proliferation of bias crimes. There is evidence of stepped-up activity by law enforcement authorities to combat of­fenses motivated by religious, racial and ethnic prejudice. This has been seen in the tristate area of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, scene of 44 percent of the anti­semitic incidents of vandalism reported in 1981, and in other states which have em­barked on closer monitoring.

In the last year, moreover, there have been indications of greater concern for the victims and targets of these crimes. In New York City, borough police commanders are now mandated to make personal visits to all victims and targets of offenses that are mo­tivated by bigotry.

During 1981, ADL sponsored security con­ferences in communities from coast to coa.')t, designed to bring officials of Jewish institu­tions together with law enforcement experts to discuss and plan proper security proce­dures.

Eight states enacted statutes last year aimed at dealing with the problem of reli­giously-motivated vandalism. These states­where almost two-thirds of the reported anti-Semitic episodes occurred-were: Arizo­na, California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island and Washing­ton.

Generally, the statutes can be divided into two categories. In the first group are laws providing increased criminal penalties for those found guilty of vandalizing cemeteries and houses of worship.

HOW YOUR STATE RANKED

State

I-New York .............................. .. 2-California ...... ..... .. .................... . 3-New Jersey ............................. . 4-Massachusetts ........... .. 5-Maryland . 6-Pennsylvania .. 7-Michigan .. . 8-lllinois .... . 9-Minnesota .... .... ... .... .... .

IO-Virginia .. ..... ... ........... .. !!-Florida .. ................ .. 12-Rhode Island ........ .. 13-Georgia ........... .. 14-Connecticut. ..... . 15-Missouri ..................... . 16-lndiana .. ... .. . 17-North Carolina .. 18-Nebraska ........... .... .... .. .......... .

Anti-Semitic vandalism

1981 1980

326 150 94 59 51 50 29 28 26 25 24 15 14 12 11 10 9 7

120 27 69 34 1 1

21 12 10 8 2

12 1 8 8 0 9 2

Harass­ments.

threats, and assaults-

1981

108 17 16 14 8 9

23 9

48 7 8 9 14 6 3 1 8 2

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3293

HOW YOUR STATE RANKED-Continued

Anti-Semitic vandalism Harass-

State 1981

5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 0

974

1980

377

ments, threats. and assaults-

1981

The other group of new laws requires a showing of specific criminal intent to harass, intimidate or terrorize an individual on the basis of the individual's race, religion or national origin before a conviction can be obtained. These will likely be harder to en­force and may result in fewer convictions.

Other aspects of the new statutes provide for: the creation of a state commission to study religious, racial and ethnic harass­ment <Rhode Island); the collection and analysis of data relating to incidents direct­ed against racial, religious or ethnic groups <Maryland>; civil remedies for vietims of cer­tain forms of religious vandalism <New York, Oregon and Washington), and in­creased penalties for cross burning <Mary­land).

ADL has developed a model religious van­dalism law to provide those states that do not have such legislation with a single, com­prehensive, constitutionally sound approach to this problem.

The model statute's first and second sec­tions create penalties for vandalism against houses of worship, cemeteries, schools and community centers, and also for committing certain crimes "by reason of the race, color, religion or national origin of another person.'' In both cases, the statnte leaves the severity of the penalties up to individual state legislatures, and assumes that when two or more persons agree to engage in these types of crimes, it would constitute criminal conduct under the state's general conspiracy law.

The third section of the ADL bill gives vic­tims of the crimes described in the first two sections the right to sue for damages and at­torney fees and makes parents liable for their children's actions. These forms of relief have a significant deterrent value and provide incentive for victims to bring civil suits.

CAUSE OF ANGUISH

While the 1981 audit records 974 incidents in a nation of 220 million people, the real significance of the phenomenon cannot be reduced to a ratio. Each episode of anti-Se­mitic vandalism, each assault, threat or ha­rassment against an individual or an institu­tion, causes serious anguish in the entire Jewish community and is a crime against the community.

Why does it happen? Professor Melvin Tumin, the Princeton University sociologist who was chairman of an ADL-sponsored task force of educators, law enforcement of­ficials social scientists and psychiatrists that ~et in New York shortly after ADL's 1980 audit was released, made this observa­tion: t,he anti-Semitic nature of teenage van­dalism can be attributed to "the transmis-

sion belts coming from families and other institut ions where resentment of Jews is ex­pressed." The increase may be just the "tip of an iceberg" and the overt expression of "a pervasive and deep-rooted anti-Semitism which has lain dormant" for years.

Many dangers to Jewish security, perhaps springing from these deep roots, are per­ceived in the current American milieu. A disturbingly high percentage of Americans all too readily accept anti-Semitic stereo­types about alleged Jewish control of the media or banking institutions, for example. There has been an injection of anti-Semi­tism into debates on U.S. foreign policy. A worldwide campaign of anti-Semitic propa­ganda has been conducted by the Soviet Union, various Arab regimes, and some Third World countries, exemplified in a number of United Nations resolutions, in­cluding that equating Zionism and racism. And a continuing peril confronts the State of Israel with whose destiny the fate of Jews everywhere is closely linked.

Episodes of anti-Semitic vandalism or har­assment against Jews are not, in short, the only measure of anti-Semitism in our socie­ty. But they are an indication of a disturb­ing quotient of anti-Jewish hostility just be­neath the surface of American life.

Society is beginning to respond to those manifestations of anti-Semitism which take the form of vandalism, assaults and harass­ment. Stricter laws are being enacted and law enforcement stepped up. Greater con­cern for the targets and victims of bias crimes is being shown. All are essential first steps.

In the long run, however, the deeper an­swers and the more relevant responses lie in the home, in the school, and in the church. Much more can be done in these crucial in­stitutions of American life to educate youth about the evils of anti-Semitism and other forms of religious, racial and ethnic preju­dice.

TENNESSEE AND THE NEW FEDERALISM

Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, the New Federalism proposal of the Reagan administration has engen­dered a great deal of interest in Ten­nessee and the Nation. I think that there is considerable support for the concept and the principles of the Fed­eralism proposals put forward by the administration, but there is consider­able concern about the fiscal impact of these same proposals.

And it is clear to me that we cannot have a New Federalism that works a hardship on State and local taxpayers. We cannot have a New Federalism that simply shifts the fiscal problems we are having at the Federal level to State and local governments and tell them to handle these problems with no concern for the budgetary prob­lems that may result.

Mr. President, recently State Repre­sentative John T. Bragg, the distin­guished chairman of the Tennessee House Finance, Ways and Means Com­mittee wrote an article for Tennessean on February 28 which detailed the fiscal impact of the administration's New Federalism proposals on Tennes­see. The article is a sobering one and

should be considered by my colleagues as we endeavor to put together a New Federalism proposal that will responsi­bly and constructively sort out the duties and financial responsibilities of Federal, State, and local government.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that the article by Representative Bragg be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: REAGAN PASSES THE BUCK WITHOUT PASSING

BUCKS

<By John Bragg) President Ronald Reagan has proposed

significant changes in American Federalism which will have serious adverse impact on the people of Tennessee. The announced swap-turnback program could cost Tennes­seans an accumulated $2.5 billion loss by 1991.

He proposes to take over the cost of the Medicaid program and give us the cost of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and food stamps. In addition, in 1984, Ten­nessee will be given about 45 programs cov­ered by 122 federal grants in 1981.

As this program has been proclaimed, a new "federalism trust fund" will be created that "contemplates no net financial gain or loss to the states." This is not likely. Gov. Richard Snelling, R-Vermont, and U.S. Sen. David Durenburger, R-Minn., have said so and asked the President to include a pro­gram of long-range revenue adjustment to equalize the obvious fiscal disparities among the states.

The end result of Reagan's program en­dorsed by Gov. Lamar Alexander originally. is likely to force Tennessee to pass an income tax sometime between 1987 and 1991. Now both the governors and the Na­tional Conference of State Legislatures are asking for changes in the proposals.

The numbers of Fiscal Year 1982 are murky; the calculus for Fiscal Year 1983 is even murkier. The Reagan budget calls for a decrease of over $10 billion in federal aid to state and local governments, not including food stamps and off-budget items such as student loans and farmer loans. This entire issue has been presented in a most ambigu­ous manner. We need a straight-forward answer to the question "How will we be af­fected?"

The 1983 Reagan budget proposal calls for $9.8 billion less in federal outlays to states than they are counting on this year. This represents a sizable cut for every state.

There are many different estimates of the impact on Tennessee, but based on its his­toric share of federal aid, Tennessee will lose around $180 million in fiscal year 1983. This loss will be approximately $130 million for state government and $50 million for local governments. Tennessee will have been a big loser of federal revenue for two succes­sive years before the swap/turnback and the federalism trust fund even begin to operate.

It is against the preceding backdrop that the Reagan initiative for swap and turnback must be evaluated.

In Washington last Sunday, Budget Direc­tor David Stockman told me there would be no losers or no winners, but the numbers are dangerous to the states. It is going to take a lot of doing for all to come even.

The swap would involve the absorption by the federal government of the Medicaid ex-

3294 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 penditures while giving Tennessee the cost of AFDC and food stamps.

Consider the following, based on Alexan­der's 1982-83 budget estimates:

Food Stamps: $329.7 million-federal funds.

AFDC: $59.2 million-federal funds. Medicaid: ($158.4) million-state funds. Swap Loss: $230.5 million. Tennessee would be short-changed $230.5

million if the "big swap" were in 1982-83. Tennessee is one of the states in this coun­try that finances only about 30 percent of its Medicaid program. Therefore, the feder­al government's assuming full responsibility of Medicaid would free up relatively fewer state dollars in Tennessee. States funding 50 percent of their Medicaid program will have more state dollars available for other things.

Now let's look at some of the major cate­gories of the 45 program areas involving the 122 categorical grants the President has talked about "turning back" to the states by 1984.

Federal funds in Tennessee 1982-83 budget Suggested program turnbacks: rMillionsJ

Education and training..................... $108 Low income assistance....................... 24.3 Health and social services <exclud-

ing swap items) ............................... . Transportation .................................. . Community development ................. . OSHA .................................................. .

217.6 202.6

26.6 1.6

Total .............................................. 580. 7 The funding of these "turnbacks" plus

others that will more directly affect local governments are supposed to come from a trust fund of $28 billion from 1984 to 1987. The cost of these programs this year is $40 billion. This means the programs must be cut $12 billion by 1984. In 1987, the trust fund and the excise taxes supporting them are to be phased out by 1991 at the rate of 25 percent reduction per year. The states could then levy those abandoned federal taxes or abandon the programs.

A recent White House release showed a state-by-state breakdown on the swap, turn­back and trust fund allocations. This break­down indicated that Tennessee would have to pick up $401 million in AFDC and food stamps and $567 million in turnback pro­grams for a total of $969 million <sic). Ten­nessee was estimated to save $267 million in Medicaid costs and to receive $702 million from the trust fund-an even trade for fiscal year 1984. The problem with this analysis is that the Medicaid savings are overstated by $95 million. We estimate Tennessee's share of the 1984 Medicaid program at $172 mil­lion which allows for an 8.6 percent growth over 1983. In Governor Alexander's 1983 budget he estimates Medicaid's growth at 7 percent. To reach $267 million in 1984, Med­icaid would have to grow 68.6 percent over 1983.

A recent analysis provided Tennessee by the National Governor's Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures reveals an annual $222 million shortfall for the swap/turnback combined. The Presi­dent's proposed funding for 1984-87 <the swap/turnback period) provides for neither growth nor inflation.

The $28 billion trust fund is proposed to be funded as follows:

Oil Windfall Tax ................................... . Gasoline Tax ......................................... . Tobacco Tax .......................................... . Alcohol Tax ........................................... .

Percent 59.6 7.9 9.6

21.8

Percent

Telephone Tax....................................... 1.1

Total .............................................. 100.0 It is interesting to note that Reagan's

1983 budget proposal projects these funding sources to generate more than $41 billion. Reagan chose to establish a trust fund at $13 billion less. Obviously, services will be cut in 1983 before he turns back the pro­grams in 1984. It appears Reagan would rather focus on his 1984 swap/turnback pro­posal than his 1983 budget proposal.

An implicit assumption of the proposed trust fund allocation is that there will be no growth at all in any of the programs turned back to the state. This means that even if Tennessee is successful in eliminating all growth in these programs, the real funding level will decline each year by the rate of in­flation. Assuming an average rate of 5 per­cent each year, 1984-1987, the purchasing power of $702 million would be reduced to around $600 million. Stated differently, the allocation would have to grow to around $810 million to keep up with 5 percent annual inflation. Thus, to keep the service of these programs at the fiscal year 1984 level will cost Tennessee an additional $100 million.

The second phase of the federalism trust fund runs from fiscal year 1988 through 1991. The fund will be reduced by 25 per­cent each year of $7 billion as the federal government phases out excise taxes on alco­hol, tobacco, and gasoline and the oil wind­fall profits by 1991. During this period, the states have the option of taxing these sources or other sources of revenue to con­tinue the services offered or of cutting the programs accordingly.

Based on Tennessee's 1984 "share" of the trust fund, we would lose $175.5 million in fiscal year 1988, $351.0 million in fiscal year 1989, $526.5 million in 1990, and $702 mil­lion in 1991. This assumes no growth in the programs turned back.

If Tennessee does not increase taxes and the federal government follows the Reagan "turnback scenario," all of these programs would have to be phased out in Tennessee. The types of programs that we are talking about relate to funds for roads, airports, local mass transit, water/sewer treatment, vocational rehabilitation, training, educa­tion, health and social services, and local government revenue sharing.

When we analyze these sources, it is ap­parent that on a one-to-one basis, Tennessee could substitute a state tax for the federal tax on gasoline, tobacco and alcohol. Howev­er, the state tax on these items is already high. For example, Tennessee ranks 45th among the states in beer consumption-but ranks 4th among the states in beer tax dol­lars collected. Also, suppliers will surely resist adding state taxes to replace federal taxes. <Anytime a Tennessee excise tax is out of line with bordering states there is bootlegging in that commodity.)

The principal source of revenue for the trust fund is the oil windfall profits tax. This is estimated to produce $16.7 billion of the $28 billion or nearly 60 percent. Since Tennessee is not a major oil-producing state, this source of revenue is not available to replace the reduced federal revenue. In order to maintain these programs at nomi­nal 1987 levels, and assuming the adoption of state excise taxes to replace federal taxes, the following amounts would have to be raised in Tennessee from other sources:

Millions 1988 .......................................................... $104.7 1989 ·························································· 209.4 1990 .......................................................... 314.1 1991.......................................................... 418.8

Where? The overburdened, regressive sales tax, a state property tax. a payroll tax or an income tax? There may be a choice of taxes. but it is certain there will have to be new taxes because of Reagan's swap/turn­backs. It may become a big "flop back."

The Reagan analysts make much of the fact that regional income differentials have been narrowing. For Tennessee, the reality is that our per capita income in 1981 was 80.6 percent of the national average and we ranked around 42nd among the states. The highest we have been in 150 years is about 82 percent of the national average and it doesn't look like we're going to get much closer.

Proposals for recruiting new industry for Tennessee are good as far they go, but they won't go very far if we don't have adequate water, sewer, roads, training, education and a healthy economy. In December 1981, 87 of Tennessee's 95 counties had an unemploy­ment rate above the national average. A number of our counties' unemployment rates exceeded the Great Depression level. Tennessee needs federal equalizing support, but it looks like we're not going to get it.

The bottom line for Tennessee is that Reagan is passing the buck, but Tennessee will have to come up with the bucks. In es­sence, the burden of the federal deficit and increased defense spending is being shifted disproportionately to Tennessee while human needs are being neglected.

This will come to pass unless state and local officials can change the direction of "new" federalism and make Director Stock­man's pledge come true.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, are we still in morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I sug­gest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk pro­ceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. With­out objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

SENATOR HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate, Senate Resolution 204, the resolution reported by the Ethics Committee in respect to Senator HARRISON A. WIL­LIAMS, JR., of New Jersey.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3295 The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr.

HATCH). The resolution will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution rs. Res. 204) expelling Sena­tor HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., of New Jersey, from the Senate.

The Senate continued with the con­sideration of the resolution.

QUORUM CALL Mr. STEVENS. It is our intention

that this turn into a live quorum. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names:

[Quorum No. 18 Leg.] Baker Bradley Burdick Byrd,

Harry F., Jr. East Goldwater

Grassley Hart Hatch Heinz Inouye Jackson Kennedy

McClure Pryor Specter Stevens Warner

The PRESIDING OFFICER <Mr. HATCH). A quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators.

The assistant legislative clerk re­sumed the call of the roll, and the fol­lowing Senators answered to their names: Andrews Armstrong Baucus Bentsen Biden Bumpers Cannon Chafee Chiles Cochran Cohen Cranston D'Amato Danforth Denton Dixon Dole Domenici Eagleton Exon Garn

Gorton Hayakawa Heflin Helms Hollings Huddleston Jackson Johnston Kassebaum Kasten Leahy Levin Lugar Mathias Mattingly Melcher Metzenbaurn Moynihan Murkowski Nickles Packwood

Pell Percy Pressler Proxmire Quayle Randolph Riegle Roth Rudman Sasser Schmitt Stafford Stennis Symms Tower Wallop Weicker Williams Zorinsky

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, would the distinguished manager of the reso­lution yield me 2 minutes?

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I do yield to the majority leader 2 minutes or so much time as he requires.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am ad­vised that, yesterday, the proponents of the resolution consumed 219 min­utes, the opponents 111 minutes. In view of the arrangement yesterday that the time for debate will be eo.ual­ly divided on each day and since, obvi­ously, we did not meet that yesterday, I indicated to the Senator from Hawaii that we would be glad to try to reclaim all or part of that disparity of the time for debate during the session today. I shall leave that up to the managers of the resolution and the Senator from Hawaii to decide how they do it, but I

make this suggestion: Since we shall have 5 hours for debate today, ap­proximately, I suggest that we have a rough allocation of time of 3 hours to the opponents and 2 hours to the pro­ponents. If there is a requirement for more than that, we shall change that and make it 4 hours to 1 hour, which will clearly cover the problem of equality of time.

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the Senator from Hawaii finds that satis­factory.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, the Senator from Wyoming does, also.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I shall leave it to the managers to decide how to allocate that today, but I urge that we either have equity today or try oth­erwise to recover the balance of time between sides.

Mr. WALLOP. The Senator from Wyoming certainly agrees. I also state for the record that the Senator from Hawaii was most gracious yesterday in permitting us to continue and lay out the case.

Mr. President, if I may have the ma­jority leader's attention for a moment, we had, as was plainly obvious, on the floor yesterday nearly full attendance from all Senators. I know it is still close to the lunch hour, but I am re­luctant to begin this because I know that Senator WILLIAMS wants to make his statement. I think in fairness to him, as we have from the beginning, we perhaps ought to get a rollcall and, if necessary, institute a motion that the Sergeant at Arms compel the at­tendance of absent Senators.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, it would require a quorum call to require the attendance of absent Senators. But I think, if I may inquire of the Parlia­mentarian, I can· move that the Ser­gent at Arms request the attendance of Senators without a quorum call. Am I correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the absence of a quorum, he may do so.

Mr. BAKER. Only in the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

QUORUM CALL The PRESIDING OFFICER. The

clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to

call the roll and the following Sena­tors entered the Chamber and an­swered to their names.

[Quorum No. 19 Leg.] Armstrong Baker Boren Bradley Burdick Byrd,

Harry F., Jr. Cannon Chafee Cohen Cranston Danforth DeConcint Denton Dixon

Domenici Gorton Hatch Hatfield Hayakawa Heflin Helms Humphrey Inouye Jackson Johnston Kasten Kennedy Mathias Mattingly

Melcher Moynihan Packwood Proxmire Randolph Roth Rudman Schmitt Stafford Stennis Tsongas Wallop Warner Weicker

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be instruct­ed to compel the attendance of absent Senators. I ask for the yeas and nays.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered. The VICE PRESIDENT. The ques­

tion is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Tennessee. The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the

Senator from Wyoming <Mr. SIMPSON) and the Senator from South Carolina <Mr. THURMOND) are necessarily absent.

The result was announced-yeas 96, nays 2, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 44 Leg.] YEAS-96

Abdnor Andrews Armstrong Baker Baucus Bentsen Biden Boren Boschwitz Bradley Bumpers Burdick Byrd,

Harry F., Jr. Byrd, Robert C. Cannon Chafee Chiles Cochran Cohen Cranston D'Amato Danforth DeConcini Denton Dixon Dodd Dole Domenici Duren berger Eagleton East Exon

Goldwater

Ford Garn Glenn Gorton Grassley Hart Hatch Hatfield Hawkins Hayakawa Heflin Heinz Helms Hollings Huddleston Humphrey Inouye Jackson Jepsen Johnston Kassebaum Kasten Kennedy Lax alt Leahy Levin Long Lugar Mathias Matsunaga Mattingly McClure Melcher

NAYS-2 Quayle

Metzenbaum Mitchell Moynihan Murkowski Nickles Nunn Packwood Pell Percy Pressler Proxmire Pryor Randolph Riegle Roth Rudman Sar banes Sasser Schmitt Specter Stafford Stennis Stevens Symms Tower Tsongas Wallop Warner Weicker Williams Zorinsky

Simpson NOT VOTING-2

Thurmond

So the motion was agreed to. The VICE PRESIDENT. With the

addition of Senators voting who did not answer the quorum call, a quorum is now present.

The majority leader is recognized. Mr. BAKER. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I urge once again Sen­

ators remain on the floor. I anticipate that we will have important debate im­mediately and I hope Members will not absent themselves from this Chamber except as that may be abso­lutely necessary.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, for the

information of absent Senators, before

3296 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 you arrived in the Chamber an agree­ment was reached as to the sharing of time this afternoon.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, we still do not have order in the Cham­ber.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order.

The Senate will be in order. The Senator from Wyoming. Mr. WALLOP. The agreement, with­

out going into detail, was simply an at­tempt to recapture some of the time that the committee's side used in yes­terday's debate, and it was perfectly agreeable to both Senator INOUYE and the Senator from Wyoming, and I simply ask unanimous consent that the time to establish a quorum that Senator WILLIAMS' own remarks might be heard be divided equally between the side of the Senator from Hawaii and the side of the Senator from Wyo­ming.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

It is my understanding that the Sen­ator from Hawaii wishes recognition.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Sena­tor from Hawaii is recognized.

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I yield the floor to the senior Senator from the State of New Jersey.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I thank my good friend, my distin­guished colleague, the Senator from Hawaii, for this opportunity to begin the presentation of my case personal­ly.

Mr. President, more than 23 years ago I stood proudly in this Senate Chamber. I raised my hand to take my oath, an oath I have never violated.

Mr. President, this situation is new to all of us, a resolution on expulsion. I will say things that will contradict things that others have said in other places.

I would feel better about myself if I were under an oath, waiving any con­stitutional protection I have because of my position as a Senator, speaking in the Senate Chamber-that would remove any doubt over the validity of my representation of the facts, as I know them, before the Senate today. To show that what I say here is con­sistent with all testimony I have pre­sented before the courts and before the Ethics Committee.

I would request, Mr. President, that I be placed under such an oath, remov­ing me from any constitutional protec­tion I might have as to the claim of perjury.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I yield. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, this is

not a trial in the legal sense nor the constitutional sense, nor is it an im­peachment proceeding, the only trial the Senate can conduct.

I believe there is no precedent for a Member to take an oath prior to en­gaging in debate on a resolution pend­ing before the Senate. However, Mr. President, if it is clearly understood that that oath is at Senator WILLIAMS' request, that it does not change the character of this proceeding, which is still a debate on a resolution.

It must be kept in mind that the Senator subscribed to an oath when he testified before the Ethics Commit­tee. This is not an evidentiary proceed­ing but rather a debate in the Senate of the United States-as long as this is clearly understood I have no objection to the Senator from New Jersey taking such oath.

I would suggest that the Parliamen­tarian provide an oath to the Secre­tary of the Senate who may adminis­ter it as in the case of the administer­ing of an oath in an impeachment pro­ceeding.

Might I inquire of the Senator from New Jersey whether he has any dis­agreement with the characterization of the situation the Senator from Ten­nessee has expressed?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I have none·. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I then

have no objection to the request of the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, let me propound an inquiry to the majori­ty leader.

Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, will the Senator please use his micro­phone.

Mr. MATHIAS. Would the majority leader feel that a Member of the Senate, submitting himself to an oath, would in any way alter or waive the constitutional, absolute constitutional, immunity for what he said in this Chamber?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, it would not. No oath administered to any Sen­ator beyond his initial oath as a Member can affect his status or stand­ing on this floor. No oath, in my judg­ment, can convert debate into testimo­ny. No oath can give a superior or infe­rior position to a statement of a Sena­tor, whether sworn or not, in the course of that debate.

It is the preference, however, of the Senator from New Jersey, that an oath be administered, and with that understanding, which he has acknowl­edged, I have no objection to it.

The answer to the Senator's ques­tion is the administering of an oath would not in any way change the nature and character of the debate in this Chamber and it would not extend the authority of either the executive or the judicial branches to challenge the constitutional immunity of state­ments made on this floor.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, will the majority leader further agree-I do agree with him, but would he fur­ther agree-that there is no Member of the Senate who can individually

waive or otherwise affect the constitu­tional immunity of Members of the Senate for statements made on the Senate floor?

Mr. BAKER. I do agree with that. May I inquire of the Senator from

New Jersey have I now stated any po­sition with which he disagrees?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I cannot agree or disagree. I had thought it would be possible for me to relinquish the pro­tection provided a Senator under the "Speech and Debate" clause. I wish to be subject to the laws every citizen is subject to as it relates to my participa­tion in this debate. That is what I wanted.

I discussed this with the Senator from Hawaii, and I believe I am cor­rect that that was our conclusion. May I ask the Senator from Hawaii was it not our feeling this could be accom­plished? I wanted to make it clear that I do not intend to rely on any unusual constitutional protection for what I say here.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, he does not carry any unusual protection. He carries only the protection described in the Constitution. I do not believe that the Senator, with due respect, nor the Senate could add to or detract from the constitutional status of a Member engaging in debate on this floor. I be­lieve that is beyond our power.

I have no objection to the oath, Mr. President, but I must ask the Senator if he acknowledges that it does not extend, elaborate, diminish, alter, or change his status as a Senator engag­ing in debate, and that by the adminis­tering of the oath it does not in any way modify the status of those state­ments as they may be made?

Mr. WILLIAMS. It would impress me that to take an additional oath here of this nature would be an unnec­essary action under the Senator's con­stitutional ruling and, quite frankly, I did not imagine that we would have this problem of constitutional inter­pretation.

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BAKER. Yes. Mr. INOUYE. May we submit an in­

quiry to the Presiding Officer? Mr. BAKER. I yield for that pur­

pose. Mr. INOUYE. May we have a ruling

on the understanding that was enunci­ated by the majority leader?

The VICE PRESIDENT. From the time of John C. Calhoun, the Vice President has refrained from inter­preting the Constitution for the Senate, and in this instance the Chair takes the same position, Senator.

Mr. INOUYE. I thank the Chair very much.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I have no desire to interfere in any way with the request of the Senator from New

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3297 Jersey. If he wishes to take an oath, as he has indicated, I believe the Secre­tary of the Senate is prepared with Bible in hand to administer such an oath.

I repeat it is unprecedented except in impeachment cases. This is not an impeachment case. This is not an evi­dentiary proceeding. The taking of the oath will not affect the quality of the statements made by the Senator from New Jersey. It will not extend, modify, or reduce the constitutional protection accorded to the Senator from New Jersey.

It will have no effect in that respect. But I can fully understand how the Senator from New Jersery personally feels and, for that reason, I will not lodge an objection.

I assume, Mr. President, that inas­much as the request of the Senator from New Jersey would require an of­ficial act by the Senate, it would ne­cessitate either the adoption of a motion to that effect or the granting of unanimous consent?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The major­ity leader is correct.

Mr. BAKER. I am perfectly happy, Mr. President, to withhold my objec­tion to that, and I would urge Sena­tors to do the same on the basis I have described.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield for a question?

Mr. BAKER. Yes, indeed. Mr. LUGAR. The question I have of

the majority leader is even though the taking of the oath might confer upon the testimony adopted here of our col­league a certain aura, is it not possible that in setting this precedent that hereafter the quality of the testimony any of us might present might be sus­pect if a Member were not to take an oath of that variety in order to bring it to the standard that the senior Sen­ator from New Jersey attempts to ele­vate his testimony to now? In short, although it may be a step that is un­derstandable, it seems to me the prece­dent has some possibility of setting a standard to which others might be asked to repair, and although the ma­jority leader has asserted that in no way would the veracity of Senators be more suspect in the future, it would appear that this does appear to set a precedent which sets a standard that the Senator is asserting a higher degree of truth?

Mr. BAKER. I agree with every statement expressed by the Senator with one exception, and that is that no testimony will be taken in this Cham­ber. This is not an evidentiary pro­ceeding. I would not wish the record of this debate to suggest we are now taking testimony. We are not taking testimony. We are engaging in the debate on Senate Resolution 204 which is the pending business before the Senate.

But I agree with the Senator from Indiana. I think there is a danger that in the future someone may say, "Well, if you believed that firmly in your point in that debate, why don't you take an oath and repeat that under oath?"

I think that would be inimical to the best interests of the Senate and the freedom of debate.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield?

Mr. BAKER. Yes; I yield. Mr. JACKSON. The Senator from

Washington would like to inquire whether the testimony before the Ethics Committee given by Senator WILLIAMS was under oath.

Mr. BAKER. May I yield to the dis­tinguished chairman of the committee for that answer, Mr. President?

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, in re­sponse to the Senator from Washing­ton, it was, as was all testimony that was taken.

Mr. JACKSON. The Senator from Washington would think if Senator WILLIAMS would like to be sworn, I see no precedent problem. It is, in effect, a continuation of what took place in the Ethics Committee under oath as far as he is concerned. I do not see-and I share totally the interpretation given by the majority leader-that obviously by unanimous consent or any other device, we cannot change the safe­guards that apply to all Senators on matters of debate in this body.

We are not held liable elsewhere, as the courts have held over and over again, on this floor.

But I would like to observe that it seems to me totally consistent with what has taken place in the Ethics Committee that if the Senator from New Jersey wishes to make his state­ment under oath, inasmuch as he is the principal person affected here, that that is a matter of discretion on the part of the U.S. Senate and I would certainly not object. I think it is totally in order if he so wishes to do so.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Washington. As the Senator from Washington has indicat­ed, if it is clearly understood on this record and by the Senate and by the Senator from New Jersey that we are not expanding or contracting the con­stitutional status of a statement made in debate on this floor, I am anxious to accommodate him. I hope the Sena­tor would agree to that, because we should not prolong this point.

If the point is acknowledged now by the absence of objection, and in re­sponse to this inquiry of the Senator from New Jersey, I would urge the Secretary of the Senate to prepare to administer the oath he requests.

Mr. MITCHELL. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. BAKER. Yes; I yield to the Sen­ator from Maine.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, in the colloquy with the Senator from Maryland, the majority leader stated that because the Constitution provid­ed certain rights a Senator could not waive them for himself or for the Senate. I believe that some further in­quiry should be made because it is a fundamental principle of the Ameri­can constitutional law that any citizen may waive his rights under the Consti­tution. Indeed, every day in this coun­try citizens waive their rights to trial by jury, they waive their rights to remain silent, and they waive their rights to have their own home searched without a warrant.

I am not familiar with the precise nature of this proceeding, but I think there may well be a precedent in the making here because, unless there was something peculiar with respect to this right, it is quite clear, as a general matter of constitutional law, that any citizen may waive his or her right under the Constitution.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I reply to my friend from Maine, who was a distinguished Federal jurist before he came to this Chamber, that were I practicing law before his court­indeed, I practiced law before many of his colleagues before I came to the Senate-the first suggestion I would make is that, unlike a situation where an individual may waive rights accru­ing only to himself, an individual Member of the Senate cannot waive the immunity of the "Speech and Debate" clause because this involves the Senate itself as an institution. I think that is adequate grounds for the basis that an individual Senator cannot waive the "Speech and Debate" clause.

Mr. LONG. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. BAKER. Yes. Mr. LONG. Mr. President, it seems

to me that a way to clear this matter up is to simply agree that the Senator has stipulated that he is prepared to say anything he will say here under the penalties of perjury and he is of­fering, in effect, to take an oath and say that every word he says is under oath. Why do we not leave it on that basis? The Senator is willing to say that everything he says here is under the penalty of perjury before the Ethics Committee or before any proper forum and let it go at that, be­cause that is basically what the off er is.

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is exactly it. I thank the Senator from Louisiana. What I am talking about is the protec­tion given to any Member of this body, that their words could never be ques­tioned. I am waiving my rights in this regard. I am the only one who could press that as a defense, and I make notice now that I would not press it.

3298 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 198:2 Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, there is

no possible objection to that. If the Senator is acknowledging that were he to be cited and charged for perjury be­cause of his debate in the Senate and he did not seek to assert that immuni­ty on his own behalf, no one can compel him to do so, but the Senate as an institution could assert it. It is a far different thing to establish a prece­dent in the Senate that the adminis­tering of an oath changes that consti­tutional status.

If that is the position of the Senator from New Jersey, as I understand it, based on the suggestion of the Senator from Louisiana, I think the issue is re­solved.

Mr. WILLIAMS. The majority leader and I are in agreement. I will proceed with the understanding that I consider myself to be subject to the oath I took prior to my testimony before the Ethics Committee.

Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator. I hope he understands that I did not do this in any way to impede his presen­tation, but rather because I felt the keen responsibility to see that we did not change the status of the Senate as an institution under the Constitution.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I appreciate that and thank the majority leader for his cooperation and understanding. As always, I am impressed by his knowl­edge of the Constitution and rules and precedents of this body. Quite frankly, in earlier discussions with my friend, the Senator from Hawaii, we had not anticipated this difficulty. I think it is wise that it developed this way. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, today, as I stand before you and my colleagues, I know that I am completely innocent of all crime or impropriety and, therefore, totally confident that I will be fully exonerated in the appeals process.

We all have an important responsi­bility to deliberate on the most funda­mental questions relating to the sover­eign integrity of the U.S. Senate as an independent institution of Govern­ment:

This is the first time I am to be judged by my peers on the totality of the Abscam net that was so crudely wrapped around me. In Brooklyn, N.Y. where my law case was tried, the jury was specifically denied the right to consider Government misconduct. The Ethics Committee prohibited any con­sideration of the gross misconduct of operators from the Department of Justice and the FBI.

If the Abscam operation is to be un­derstood in its totality, not only my conduct but the Government's con­duct must be considered, I submit to you, by the full U.S. Senate, so that justice might be realized.

These elements of the Department of Justice and FBI, which sought to instigate and foster criminal activity where none existed, must bear respon-

sibility for their part in this sordid affair. It is this Government miscon­duct, the illegal, unconstitutional, and ethically repugnant methods of those involved within the FBI and the Jus­tice Department who sought to impli­cate me in their criminal scheme that must be examined.

And it is in light of this executive culpability that we must consider the entire operation before we can consid­er the preposterous recommendation that I be expelled from this body-an action last taken in our history against those who committed treason during the Civil War.

No citizen should be made to be an­swerable, neither by judicial nor moral standards, for what it appears he or she may have done. Each citizen, how­ever, must be held responsible, and in every respect, for what he or she has done. So it must be with a U.S. Sena­tor.

I have not committed a crime nor have I acted improperly. It is the mis­perception which has been created, created by the techniques of this oper­ation and by the media which I must dispell.

So I rely upon you, my colleagues, to conduct a reasoned, thorough investi­gation of the reprehensible activities of the executive branch of Govern­ment during its Abscam operation. I rely upon you to perform the historic function for which this great body exists, to guide our Nation on the course of justice.

The constitutional barrier that sepa­rates the executive and legislative branches has been shattered by this attempt to create crime. It is the first time in the history of our country that this has happened.

It has happened to me. It can happen again. My fight, until most re­cently, has been a lonely fight, but in conscience I had no choice. If this tactic goes unchallenged, tomorrow, tomorrow, tomorrow, it could become an Executive method to control and intimidate this sovereign branch of Government.

I must say to you, my colleagues, that we are compelled, as hard as it is, as politically demanding as it is, to bring this issue to our judgment.

I could have made it easier for all of you by resigning-and many counseled me to do just that. However, to have done so would have led to a precedent that, carried forward, could destroy the Senate as an institution which I am pledged to uphold. To walk away from this fight, a matter of highest principle, would have been a betrayal of the trust which has been placed in me by the citizens of New Jersey in four Senate elections.

Therefore, I-and I must say at this point, my wife Jeanette-have been unwavering in our uphill struggle to­gether during this whole ordeal.

I, along with all American citizens, first learned of the previously secret Abscam operation 2 years ago. As I looked out of my house and saw a bar­ricade of media who had received leaks from the Department of Justice before I, myself, was accused of any crime, I knew then that the first principle of American justice was being turned on its head. That first principle of justice is that a man is innocent until proven guilty. I knew when I looked out at that sea of media, innocent though I was of any crime, that I would have to battle to prove my innocence. I knew that the fantasy that had been devel­oping over the prior 13 months was an attempt to get me to appear to be doing something criminal.

The abuses of certain members of the Government during the investiga­tion and since it was first revealed to me have been extensive.

Government agents, a hired crimi­nal, and co-opted individuals forged a letter on my Senate stationery. They committed major perjury, obstruction of justice, and other crimes. They took bribes and gift favors from the con­victed felon, Mel Weinberg, who bra­zenly attempted, at taxpayers' ex­pense, to bring about my demise.

They considered drugging me. On June 10, 1979, Mel Weinberg had a telephone conversation in which he was told by one of the co-opted char­acters in this affair that I was not a "doer," that I always moved "quietly/' and when Weinberg was directly told that "I do not use power for my ad­vantages," he responded on tape, "Oh, how can we make him use it?"

Mr. President, the essence of FBI and Department of Justice wrongdo­ing is the machinations of Mel Wein­berg, the hired criminal, and the errant Government operatives. Even further goes the web of Government misconduct against the Constitution and misconduct against the U.S. Senate.

Irvin Nathan, the Assistant Deputy Attorney General during the develop­ment of this Abscam scenario, ap­peared recently on nationwide televi­sion on the "20/20" show. He made a statement that I have put upon a poster so that all Members can see it and consider it. I will read it.

Mr. Nathan, and he is now no longer in the position of Assistant Deputy At­torney General, said recently:

I think that people in public office have to be concerned that the people they may be dealing with are undercover agents, and matters may ultimately be on tape and may be prosecuted in the courts. And I think that that has to have an inhibiting effect on public officials.

The rest of the chart includes an ad­ditional statement that deals with part of the law on undercover operations. You can see that Mr. Nathan said, "The court of appeals in New York has indicated a public official who is

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3299 presented with an opportunity can always say no. He can always get up and leave."

That is a statement from a court. In my case, I will develop how a clear bribe was offered to me. I not only said "No" but I repeated it several times-rejecting this illegal off er.

I do believe that the statement of Mr. Nathan suggests an attitude that we should consider most profoundly. Does it portend the wave of the future that was predicted in Orwell's "1984."? It is fraught with the greatest dan­gers, I suggest, not only to public offi­cials who are here as Members of the U.S. Congress; it is also an attitude of an approach that I find abhorrent to our free society. I leave it there for now for your thoughtful consider­ation.

Recently, Federal Judge Ruggero Al­disert of the United States Third Court of Appeals-this was on Febru­ary 12 of this year-in a dissenting opinion on Abscam had a statement that represents the deeper meaning that this state of affairs represents. Judge Aldisert's most eloquent words I would like to quote. He said:

To the Department of Justice, its oper­ation was a taste of honey. To me it ema­nates a fetid odor whose putrescence threat­ens to spoil basic concepts of fairness and justice that I hold dear. That the FBI has earned high praise for its performance in the traditional discharge of its duties should not immunize the secret police tactics em­ployed in its Abscam operation from appro­priate and vigorous condemnation.

Erwin Griswold, former Solicitor General of the United States and long­standing and eminent dean of Harvard Law School, as we all know, has also stated that, "The methods used in Abscam of surreptitiously taping inno­cent legislators raises the specter of the police state methods which we have always shunned."

I therefore appear before you not merely in my self-interest but to insure that we together preserve the integrity of the U.S. Senate as an in­stitution and the very democratic prin­ciples which are our heritage. No forum is more suited to this task than the Senate of the United States. No forum is more able. No forum is more proper. I just feel that because of the profundity of this one question-the question of separation of powers and the methods used by the executive branch-our Founding Fathers would have us here this day doing what we are doing.

I thus carry on this mission not only for myself at a personal level but as part of a constitutional imperative, as I see it, at a time when this great doc­ument is severely threatened.

The grounds upon which I was false­ly convicted in Brooklyn, N.Y., were specious and the result of artifice and continuing Government misconduct.

Exculpatory documents were with-held from the jury by the prosecutor.

One of the jurors Salvatore Ottaviano, who voted to convict me, came forward on September 16, long after the trail. He came forward with an affidavit. I shall read Mr. Ottaviano's affidavit of that date and will submit it for the record.

I would like to offer this as-I imag­ine procedurally it would be best to call it an exhibit-exhibit lA. Mr. Ot­taviano says:

On September 14, 1981, I reviewed for the first time the 2-page document captioned Exhibit 39-A, FBI internal memorandum from Section Chief W.D. Gau, who is assist­ant director in charge, to Francis M. Mullen, Jr., November 1979. Had I been previously aware of this document during the trial supra and deliberations relating thereto, I would have voted not guilty on all counts and would under no circumstance have ever changed my vote from not guilty.

Mr. President, after that and most recently again, on "20/20," the nation­al television program, the jury fore­man at my trial affirmed what Mr. Ot­taviano said.

Mr. President, when those who are responsible for preventing crime and protecting our citizenry instead manu­facture and engineer crime out of nothing, they develop a personal vested interest in seeing to it that their scripts proceed as planned. The power vested in each of us as Senators of the United States is a sacred bond between ourselves and the electorate we represeent. If it were not I but one of our constituents who had been the victim of such wrongdoing, I am confi­dent we would be unanimously en­gaged in a full committee investigation of the renegade individuals who, in this whole situation, even took in Wil­liam Webster and Benjamin Civiletti. They took them in, these master con people. They were taken in with these schemes that I describe as evil schemes.

I stand before you today strong in my resolve, innocent of any wrongdo­ing, and confident that you shall find me so. I also stand before you and ask that, for the first time in this entire affair, we now proceed to deliberate on the reality of my conduct and not the staged appearance and fostered mis­perceptors. In the process, it is essen­tial that we bring into focus the wrongdoing committed by FBI and De­partment of Justice operatives against the legislative branch of Government. Future generations of free Americans will grant us their blessing for pro­ceeding with responsibility, reason, and judicious deliberation.

My colleagues, I know that I am asking of all of you a great deal by bringing this matter here. It is an ordeal and it is a hard and weighty de­cision. I know it is the sort of decision that we would not have wanted to decide in our term as U.S. Senators. But I just want to impress upon you that my partner and I-my wife and I-have been through some ordeal, I

can tell you, for now better than 2 years. Our neighborhood, up in Georgetown, was taken over on the night of February 2, 1980, by the gath­ering of media that was equal to a Presidential inauguration. They had, through planned leaks and the plant­ing of material, been advised-before I was advised-of Abscam. Since that date, I know that you are aware of how the media has followed Abscam, the whole Abscam operation. It was a modern-day hue and cry as in old Eng­land, long ago, the hue and cry went out. When someone saw someone com­mitting a crime, he issued a hue and cry and it was the citizens· responsibil­ity to join the chase and get the crimi­nal.

When the press and all of the media got on this Abscam business, it was like a hue and cry. All other media fol­lowed and, believe me, all who read that first wave of publicity from Feb­ruary of 1980 into the month of March and then continuing, the public was part of the hue and cry, because they were reading what was provided by those who had created the whole scene.

My situation was buried right in the middle of Abscam, the only Senator, though my situation was entirely dif­ferent from those who were of the other body who were brought into this thing.

But I still read in the newspapers today things that were originally put into print after Abscam first came to public attention that were false-not true. They still keep appearing in newspaper accounts of my situation as described by those who first started the hue and cry, those who had re­ceived the leaks. And I still read in the paper, "WILLIAMS had a hidden inter­est," "WILLIAMS accepted a cash bribe," WILLIAMS this, WILLIAMS that-things that are not true.

The rest of my presentation will de­velop the record that shows the truth of the situation. Because I feel so deeply for the wrong that was created here to a Senator and to the institu­tion, to our institution, I have put you to a demanding task, a real ordeal.

Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I cannot-I feel for you-but I can not apologize because if I were not here bringing this operation to your atten­tion at this time, the rest of my life, I would condemn myself. I say to you, try to put yourself in my situation. Would you want to go through your life forever, thinking every day, "Why didn't I make the fight in conscience for the principles that I believe?" I think if you could just imagine your­self in my situation, knowing that you were framed into looking like you were doing wrong-what would you do? Would you not have to live and pro­ceed in conscience on the principles

3300 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 198:2 that are truly so profound in this case?

Mr. President, I should like to move now to the grist of our mill, upon which you will base your decision, the totality of the facts; and I hope I will present them to you in an efficient way and an understandable way.

Members of the Senate, the evidence against me as presented by the Senate Ethics Committee report on page 3, exists exclusively of evidence used by the Government at my trial. I know that much of the trial procedure was tainted, and tainted in many ways.

Contrary to what you were told yes­terday, there was no independent in­vestigation by the Senate Ethics Com­mittee here; and I submit to you that a careful viewing of the evidence that was shown does reveal that I did noth­ing wrong.

Moreover, the Government's own documents show that the Government itself, upon viewing that evidence, knew I did nothing wrong. The charges against me, both at trial and before this body, assume the following quid pro quo: I sought something of value in exchange for promising to use my office to obtain Government con­tracts or to introduce legislation. These charges also assume that I would hide my interest or not report any income from those hidden inter­ests.

Careful viewing of the Government's own evidence shows these charges to be false. The Government's own docu­ment show the Government knew these charges to be false.

I also should like to bring to your at­tention, first, that the Government in­vestigated me for over a year without any reason to believe at the outset that I had done anything wrong or would do so, and they continued, de­spite my refusal to do so. The Govern­ment knew that I did not improperly use my office, but they pressed my friends to get me to use my office im­properly.

The Government manufactured evi­dence, co-opted targets, and destroyed evidence in their efforts to make me appear guilty of wrongdoing.

The Government committed the crimes of perjury, obstruction of jus­tice, conspiracy to commit perjury, bribery, impersonation of a foreign dignitary, and fraud.

In addition, the Government violat­ed its own guidelines and regulations.

The Government engaged in a bad­faith prosecution by trying me in the press, engaging in ex parte contacts with the trial judge, with forum shop­ping, withholding exculpatory evi­dence; and the prosecutor in my case stood to make $60,000 from a book contract contingent on my conviction.

Before I go into detail, into the evi­dence that I did nothing wrong, or into the evidence of the Government's misconduct, I should like again to

bring to your attention the Govern­ment's own opinion of my conduct.

First, after over 10 months of pursu­ing me, from January to November of 1979, the Government itself had con­cluded that I had done nothing wrong. This is in the memorandum of Novem­ber 22, 1979, from FBI Section Chief W. D. Gow, to Assistant Director in Charge Francis Mullen. This was first developed by the Senator from Hawaii yesterday. I should like now to include this in the record of our proceedings as another exhibit, which would be ex­hibit 1, and I will read in part from this exhibit.

It was stated yesterday-its signifi­cance is important enough to state it again today-that this represents the report of a conference which was held on November 19, 1979, relative to the immediate investigative direction of the Abscam cases. It recites the group of people from the various of fices of enforcement in New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, and Washington gath­ered together with representatives from the Bureau in Washington at this meeting.

I will not read them all, but I can say that all of the principals from Government involved in my part of Abscam were included in this meeting. The prosecutor, Mr. Thomas Puccio, was there; the supervisor of the FBI activity, Mr. Good, was there; and other agents from New York, assistant U.S. attorneys from New Jersey, Plaza and Weir, were there, and others, as I have indicated, from Philadelphia and Washington.

The exhibit describes all the cases that were before them. When it came to my situation, I will read the conclu­sion as put into the memorandum from all these people gathered in the meeting, reported by Mr. Good and Mr. Mullen:

Relative to the matter concerning U.S. Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, the following was decided: "It will be neces­sary to recontact U.S. Senator Williams in attempt to obtain an overt action on his part regarding his sponsoring of some type of legislation; i.e., tax cover for titanium mine; environmental standards for titanium mine and/or import quotas for titanium."

2. It was also suggested that attempts should be made to elicit from U.S. Senator Williams whether or not he wanted his shares hidden, through discussions concern· ing reporting of personal taxes and officials acts that he promised to provide.

guistic work on these tapes and was able to time the tapes in his process has timed my taping time as 3 hours and 19 minutes. I was thinking of that yesterday when the distinguished Sen­ator from Alabama was speaking; it was less time than the Senator used to describe the actions of the committee.

But that was only part of the actions of the Government in taping. Other­wise, there are truly hundreds of hours of recordings, a lot of that in­volving me, but that 10 months from this memorandum I again suggest to you represented waste, wasted effort, and wasted expense on their part. I had done nothing wrong. That memo­randum indicates that clearly. They say I had to be recontacted to get me to do something, that I had not done at that point. Nevertheless, the pur­suit continued and they pressed on.

The operators from the Government pressed on with me and they did it with what had been developed as an asylum scenario. I call them the rene­gade FBI agents where, at the direc­tion of the prosecutor, Mr. Puccio, they were going to off er me money in exchange for what the FBI hoped would be my promise to introduce leg­islation on behalf of their sheik.

What I did do, and this to the panic of the FBI and the prosecuting attor­ney, Mr. Puccio, who was monitoring the meeting in the next room, was to flatly refuse an offer of money. The meeting had been set up following the November memo-on January 15; Mr. Puccio was in the back monitoring, and when the off er was made of money and I flatly refused the money they did not give up. Mr. Nathan said,"All you have to do is say no." I most clearly said no, but they tried­they did not give up with that no, I can assure you. They then came at me in another way, and they tried to un­successfully link a promise of legisla­tion, which I never gave, a promise to introduce immigration legislation. I never made that promise. But they tried to get me to promise and then to link that to the financing of the mining venture that was one of the underlying features of this case.

What was the Government's reac­tion to this last attempt to ensnare me in crime?

I would like to introduce at this point exhibit No. 2. It is the words of Robert C. Stewart. Mr. Stewart was chief of the Newark strike force.

If the above information is obtained, pros­ecutors at the meeting felt that they could prove that Senator Williams was in viola­tion of Title 18, Section 201 USC and Con-spiracy to Defraud the Government. This is a 21/2-page memorandum

h . "d th from Mr. Stewart, and I am offering it T is, Mr. Presi ent, suggests at d t •t b d · t d h"b" after 10 months of pursuit, the Gov- an sugges i . e esigna e as e~ i it ernment knew they had no case No. 2, ~r. President, and would hke t.o against me, despite hours of wasted• have this sent to the clerk to read if tape recordings. that procedure would be acceptable.

At this point, the hours to those of The VICE .PRESIDENT. The ~ena-you who went to the viewing of the tor has the right to ask for material to tapes probably appeared to be intermi- be read by the clerk. nable. A professor who has done lin- The clerk will read it.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3301 Mr. WILLIAMS. Thank you, Mr.

President. The assistant legislative clerk read

as follows: Exhibit 52, excerpt from memorandum of

Robert C. Stewart, Newark strike force, Jan­uary 29, 1980, pages 7 through 10.

But, the primary concern, and one which the operational prosecutors in Newark pin­pointed at the very outset of their involve­ment in the matter, has been with the very essence of this investigation. There is reason for concern < 1> when two public offi­cials are brought before a TV camera to take a bribe, but both decline; <2> when so many people could have believed for eight months that "W"-

Mr. WILLIAMS. "W"-where it says "W"Iam"W."

The assistant legislative clerk con­tinued to read the exhibit as follows: "W" had a hidden interest in the business venture when the facts now appear to be to the contrary; and (3) Page one of my Memo­randum of 9-12-79 pointed out that there was no running log on this matter, a lack of 302's covering important predicate events, a substantial lag-time in the availability of transcripts and inaccessibility to the Under­cover Operatives-all of which resulted in a "dearth of formal legal analysis on the vari­ous issues which were apparent in the sever­al initial transactions" and all of which made "systematic case review, essential for proper prosecutorial decision-making", im­possible.

Secondly, I stressed to you that, even in the very few transactions to which the Newark prosecutors have been allowed to become privy, the Informant continues to suggest the criminal scheme, rather than al­lowing the particular suspect to initiate his scheme.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the clerk withhold?

The Chair has made an error. It does take either unanimous consent or a motion for material to be read by the clerk. The Chair apologizes to the Senate.

Is there objection? Without objection, the clerk will

continue. The assistant legislative clerk re­

sumed and concluded reading as fol­lows: This problem-which Mr. Plaza discussed with the Informant as early as August 9-was noted as late as the December transac­tions in New Jersey, despite Mr. Weir's spe­cific admonitions to the Informant on this point. <See: my Memorandum of 1-8-80, p. 3. > I addressed this very problem both orally during our meeting of 9-13-79, and in my Memorandum of 10-31-79 <at page 4)­stressing that the substantive difficulties "are apt to reoccur unless corrective meas­ures are taken". The fact that the Inform­ant persisted in his proclivity as late as De­cember certainly does nothing to allay ap­prehensions about the overall conduct of this investigation.

Finally, I stressed to you my concern about the propriety of the asylum scenario, which has come to be the principal motif of this investigation since the August 21 meet­ing with Suspect "M" of Pennsylvania. First of all, there appears to be confusion over how this scenario developed originally. The Informant said that the agents along with Mr. Puccio devised it. But, as late as Janu-

ary 9, the Undercover Agent and the Case Agent told Mr. Weir that Intermediary "E" had suggested it in response to a statement by the Undercover Operatives that there might come a time when the Investor would need asylum. Mr. Weir told the agents that the 302's in our possession did not reflect this, and they said they would look into the matter.

A second point with regard to the asylum scenario, as I discussed at pages 3 and 4 of the Memorandum of 1-8-80, is the funda­mental difference between this investigation and a conventional "sting" operation. In the latter, the defendant has no equity. He ap­pears before the jury on tape discussing the sale of a stolen TV set or some such contra­band item. His conduct is malun in se, and no one could possibly criticize the Govern­ment for successfully detecting his criminal­ity. In this investigation, however, the cir­cumstances are fundamentally different: Basically, you have a public official who is minding his own business and presumably discharging his public responsibilities in a correct manner. An intermediary then as­serts that the official is corrupt and will take a bribe. Usually, there is little or no evidence that the official knows anything about the intermediary's representations. There may be little, if any, extrinsic infor­mation which would suggest that the par­ticular official is corrupt. On the contrary, most of the officials begin the conversation with disclaimers of criminal intent and offers to handle the problem in a perfectly correct and lawful manner. The Undercover Operatives then press, and they dangle large sums of money in front of the offi­cial-initially with promises that he will never be required to deliver the quid pro quo because the payment is only insurance against a remote contingency. The official relents and accepts the payment-in some cases offering to perform further criminal acts, in others without providing additional evidence of predisposition or criminal intent. In several cases the payment was re­fused.

All of this is very different in kind and quality from a conventional sting operation.

This project was launched on a very sound investigative predicate: The original inter­mediary <"E"> stated unequivocally that he himself was corrupt, and that he was able to collaborate with others of a similar ilk for purposes of corrupting the processes of gov­ernment. "E" requested an opportunity to introduce his associates, and he promised that they would formulate specific criminal proposals which they would submit to the Undercover Operatives for consideration. This theme was represented to us to be the principal motif of this project throughout the period prior to Mr. Del Tufo's Letter of 7-13-79; and, Mr. Del Tufo and I understood it to be the principal scenario intended as late as my Memorandum of 9-24-79, describ­ing the proposed New Jersey Phase. There­after, however, it became increasingly ap­parent to Mr. Del Tufo and myself that the orientation of this project was undergoing a dramatic metamorphosis. The asylum sce­nario, first used in late August, gradually came to the fore and now predominates. In­termediary "E" has been unavailable since November: and the original-and, I think, perfectly correct-scenario has gone by the board. Thus, as I reiterated to you Wednes­day <l-23-80>. my concerns about the sub­stantive aspects of this matter are simply that, even if the due process argument is not able to defeat a particular prosecution, it may tarnish the Government and cause

serious difficulties for law enforcement. In view of this possibility, I have thought it ap­propriate to keep you advised of these con­cerns.

Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from New Jersey yield to the Senator from Ohio?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. METZENBAUM. I merely wanted to ask that copies of that be made available to Members of the Senate.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me, it is in the ex­hibits. It is on page 983 of the open hearings before the Ethics Committee, volume II, if you will look at it.

Mr. METZENBAUM. I would like to point out that although it is in the ex­hibits, I have been looking for those books in my office. They tell me they have never been received, and other Senators tell me the same thing. I am not making any objection to that, but I would like to have a copy of this par­ticular exhibit.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Senator will receive a copy.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I apologize to the clerk. This copy was not as clean as I would like. It was hard to read, and I appreciate that. This is a copy, obviously, and there was just one point I would like to come back to. It is difficult to restate, but I think a word was missed, and I would like to read one paragraph again in the Stewart memo we just heard:

There is reason for concern < 1 > when two public officials are brought before a TV camera to take a bribe, but both decline; <2> when so many people could have believed for eight months that "W" had a hidden in­terest in the business venture when the facts now appear to be to the contrary;

Mr. President, I see that after more than a year of pursuit, after a year of paying this hired crimi:lal hundreds of thousands of dollars, tax-free dollars, by the way, and after a year of wasted tape recordings, the Government knew I had done nothing wrong.

To understand this Orwellian night­mare, as well as the effect that this ordeal has had on myself, my wife, and my family, and to try to find out how this could happen, I would now like to give some background of my re­lationship with two individuals who were central to a prospective mining operation in Piney River, Va.

The two individuals to whom I was close and had been close to for many years were Sandy Williams and Alex Feinberg.

I met each of them the same year in different situations, the year was 1958, and I was running for my first term.

Alex Feinberg was a candidate for Congress in the district that embraced the area of Camden, N.J., and I met

3302 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 him-we were colleagues on the trail in 1958, and developed a very close friendship out of that political associa­tion.

He was a distinguished and is a dis­tinguished and respected member of the bar, and a citizen of Haddonfield, a suburb of Camden, N.J.

I met Sandy Williams one August afternoon when I was campaigning at a plant gate of the Bendix Co., in northern New Jersey. Alex is from Camden, which we consider southern New Jersey.

After I finished my . greetings to the working people coming out of Bendix that afternoon, a fellow came up to me and introduced himself. It was Sandy Williams. He said:

I am publisher of the Morning Call, a daily newspaper in Paterson, and I wonder if we could go across the street, have a cup of coffee. I would like to talk to you.

That we did. I mention a little detail here, very interesting. His introduc­tion of himself to me was memorable, the sort of thing you would not forget if you are in public life. He said:

I listened to you, I watched you, I heard what you said to those guys coming out of the plant. I know some­thing about how you look at things. I want to tell you that my paper, I, sup­ported Senator Joe McCarthy, I sup­ported Senator Robert Taft, and I am going to support you.

That is the sort of thing that you re­member because Senator McCarthy and Senator Taft came from a differ­ent political spectrum.

So I knew I would be remembering Sandy. We did not get to be very close friends back then. He did support me in that election. But over the years I did get to know him.

I became very close to Alex Fein­berg, who developed to be my eyes, ears, and even representative at vari­ous political matters in south Jersey when I could not be down there.

Both I considered, as they evolved, to be close friendships. They were.

It was a more casual thing with Sandy Williams. I saw him infrequent­ly. After he had sold his paper he, with great enthusiasm, used to get into business projects. Each one had his full enthusiasm, but each had the similar final result, nothing ever hap­pened, nothing ever came to fruition.

With a chemist they developed a new cola, Congo Cola. I do not believe you have ever seen it on the stands.

He developed with a man in New York a magazine. It had a very short life.

There were many things, but his en­thusiasm was not matched by the re­ality of any real prospect of success.

Then came garbage recycling, and again in concert with a chemist, they developed their process, and finding some area to reprocess garbage, they

discovered a necessary ingredient, phosphoric acid. This was the begin­ning for me of all of the factual mat­ters that we are here now discussing in terms of my situation.

Sandy talked to me one day about the need to get domestic phosphorous for phosphoric acid. And I know noth­ing about phosphoric acid or phospho­rous, but I suggested to him that I am sure the Department of the Interior, in their geodetic surveys, will tell you where there is domestic phosphorous. And he did follow my advice and he did get from the Department of the Interior a book that discribed a source of phosphorous in the State of Virgin­ia, Piney River, Va. And he went down there. And in finding the phosphorous he found that the mine included not only phosphorous, but also included ti­tanium and iron. He found the site where this mine had been operational and where the American Cyanamid Co. had a processing plant. He also dis­covered that the American Cyanamid Co., because of environmental prob­lems that developed with their proc­ess, had closed their plant and the mine was not operational.

I will try to abbreviate it. He worked on bringing the mine back into oper­ation. I was not familiar with all of this until I had to be later on in recon­structing all of this, but I learned that he had gotten some financial support from a foundation to buy the plant­site, part of the ore, and he developed options on other acreage near the plantsite. And over the years 1975, 1976, 1978, he would call me occasion­ally and tell me what he was doing. He was trying to keep his options alive. He lost ownership of what had been bought. The people who had put up the money then owned it, he did not. But in that 3-year-plus period he worked and he worked hard to develop customers for the products that would come out of the mine when, and if, he ever got it operational. He got paint companies, he got fertilizer companies, he got the Lynchburg iron foundry to indicate their interest through letters of intention.

I did not have anything to do with that. At one point, he did wonder if I knew an investment banker that might be able to look at his situation because he needed capital. Because it was in Virginia and because he claimed there was some kind of prospect here, I did not personally know how much of a prospect, for bringing in that mine, I thought of former Secretary of Treasury Fowler, who was then a sig­nificant partner in Goldman Sachs. I called Joe Fowler, a friend, and won­dered if he would see Sandy Williams or his firm would. They did and spent some time, gave him some ideas. For one reason or another, it did not fit their kind of financing, and that did not come to pass.

When I found that out, I called Joe Fowler and said, "Thank you. " I would suggest to you who are in public life, this represents what we do for many, try to help constituents and friends. If it works, fine; if it does not, "Thanks for the effort. "

And I would like to include from my trial a transcript that describes just what I am saying here. It is the tran­script of testimony of Mr. Joe Fowler, who was being examined by my attor­ney. And I will say, that it includes something that is of interest to an­other aspect of this case. He was asked-and I off er this as an exhibit, which would be 2A for our record.

Mr. Fowler was asked "When he spoke to you"-he is talking about me-"When he spoke to you-"-in other words when I spoke to him­"and the others who called-was there ever discussion of Government con­tracts?"

Answer: No, no discussion of government con­

tracts, only when the government came into it in outlining the various areas of how money might be raised, as to what was then more or less a dead venture which needed capital in order to be revived. In that con­text, I think one of my colleagues men­tioned the fact that maybe the Small Busi­ness Administration would-an application would be filed and Mr. Henry Williams indi­cated he wouldn't be interested in approach­ing the Small Business Administration.

Question: " Is that a Federal agency?''

Answer: "Yes." I would include that in our hearing

record, Mr. President, as exhibit 2A. I think it would suffice to say again

that I had not had any part of those years of developing anything with Sandy Williams and Alex, who was a less active part, than that particular suggestion and call to the investment banker from Goldman Sach's to re­quest that he see him.

I have only one thing to add. One Friday, in the fall of 1977, we were out of session. Sandy Williams was going to drive down from Paterson. He stopped in Washington and wondered if I would like to drive down to Piney River. I did. We used my car. We went down, and I did see the Piney River plant, formerly occupied by American Cyanamid, and the mine area. And I was impressed with two things: The re­ports that he had on the ore body and what was there. To a layman who knows nothing about ore, it seemed impressive. The plant was massive. But I was also impressed with the fact of its having not been in production for 3 or 4 years, it looked to me as though it would be a major job to get that plant back into production.

This all began when I went to a public gathering in Camden. The public gathering was of publicly spirit­ed people in public office, community spirit, from Philadelphia, from Dela-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3303 ware, and New Jersey. We gathered in the council chamber of the city hall in Camden. The purpose of that gather­ing was to show the full community spirit for having the carrier Saratoga come to the Philadelphia Navy Yard for its rehab operation. The fight was led here by the Senator from Dela­ware. We knew that our work, people in our State, in the Philadelphia Yard, would do an excellent job. I think the Senator from Delaware would agree. It did happen. That was the reason I was there. That is all.

After that was over, I debated with myself whether to go up to the mayor of Camden on a political stop to see how things were going. In that area of our State, there are always factions in the Democratic Party, always strug­gles. I am never fully abreast of exact­ly what the situation is. I went up to check it with Angelo Errichetti. I was in his office maybe 5 minutes, 10 min­utes at the most.

While I was there, he said, "By the way, there are some people who are in­terested in doing some investing in Camden, particularly down on the wa­terfront."

I do not know how many of you know Camden, but it is in a depressed state, and particularly waterfront.

He said, "These people come in here and say they have a lot of money to invest." One individual represented a group from Boston. He said the indi­vidual was an investment adviser to the Kennedy Foundation. "The other group of people who are interested," and he said they came together, "are representatives of Middle Eastern money, and they are interested in in­vesting in Camden, N .J."

He said, "You know, if you have anyone who needs investment financ­ing maybe these people would be in­terested." I said, "One thing. I know Alex Feinberg is involved in a venture. He might be interested. Is it all right for me to call Alex?"

Obviously, the mayor of Camden would know Alex Feinberg, a lawyer in Camden, N.J. He said, "Sure." That was the end of the conversation.

Later I called Alex Feinberg and Alex Feinberg called Errichetti and out of that came the meetings. That was January 3, 1979. I had no phone calls, I am sure, between January 3 and into March. I do know that they saw each other, that there were meet­ings with, and then I heard that the Middle Eastern people in March were giving a reception for Errichetti on a boat in Florida. Alex, my south Jersey political adviser and friend, asked me if I would go down to that reception for Errichetti. That was the only way he described what it was.

Reluctantly, I finally agreed to go down. It was on Friday, March 1979. I went down on Thursday night, not being too excited about the whole prospect of the reception for Erri-

89-059 o-85-20 (Pt. 3)

chetti. I did arrange for Alex and myself to play golf that day at the PGA course outside of Palm Beach. I trusted that somehow I would have something that I enjoyed on that day in Florida.

I went down Thursday night. We played golf Friday. We went over to the boat and there I was surprised. It was described as a luxury yacht. To me we were going down to a luxury yacht reception put on by the Middle Eastern people for Errichetti. It was really a pretty well old rundown former luxury yacht but in bad repair. The people gathered there were non­descript, not exactly what you would expect, given the promotion of this thing. I was there a little less than an hour, I would say. At that point I met the person who was described as the sheik from the United Arab Emirates. There was a greeting, a picture was taken, "hello," and a gracious intro­duction for just moments, mostly a one-sided discussion with the sheik who had an interpreter, and that was that. That was March 23, 1979.

I will stop here. That is the back­ground that got me into this because out of that came the scenarios that will unfold here later.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The vari­ous exhibits will be printed in the RECORD.

The exhibits ordered to be printed in the RECORD are as follows:

EXHIBIT 1 FBI INTERNAL MEMORANDUM FROM SECTION

CHIEF W. D. GOW TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE FRANCIS M. MULLEN, JR., NOVEMBER 27, 1979

Purpose.-To provide results of a confer­ence which was held on 11/19/79, relative to the immediate investigative direction of cap­tioned project.

Recommendations.-None. For informa­tion.

Details.-On 11/19/79, a conference was held at the Federal Strike Force, Eastern District of New York <EDNY), Brooklyn, New York, between Thomas Puccio, Chief, Federal Strike Force, EDNY; John Jacobs, Strike Force Attorney EDNY; AUSA Edward Plaza, United States Attorney's Office, Newark, New Jersey; AUSA Robert Weir, United States Attorney's Office, Newark, New Jersey; Robert Stewart, Chief, Federal Strike Force, Newark, New Jersey; AUSA Robert Herbst, United States Attor­ney's Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; SAC Edwin J. Sharp, Brooklyn/Queens MRA; SSRA John Good, Hauppauge Resi­dent Agency; SA Jack Caughlin, Hauppauge Resident Agency; SA Walter Drissler, Haup­pauge Resident Agency; ASAC Robert Wright, Newark, New Jersey; Supervisor Joseph Vidovich, Newark, New Jersey; SA Martin Houlihan, Newark, New Jersey; and Supervisor Michael D. Wilson, FBIHQ. The p·urpose of the meeting was to insure that all previous bribe situations were complete relative to prosecution and did not necessi­tate any further investigative action.

Concerning the meetings with Angelo Er­richetti, Mayor of Camden, New Jersey, and New Jersey State Senator; Kenneth McDon­ald, New Jersey Casino Control Commission Vice Chairman; U.S. Congressmen Michael

Ozzie Myers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Raymond F. Lederer, Philadelphia, Pennsyl­vania, and Frank Thompson, Jr. , Trenton, New Jersey; the following was discussed:

1. It was recommended that no further action would be instituted against U.S. Con­gressmen Myers, Lederer or Thompson. It was felt by the prosecutors that a case against each could be proved in a court of law for violation of Title 18. Section 201 USC (Bribery of a Public Official>.

2. It was recommended that no further action would be instituted against Mayor Errichetti or New Jersey Casino Control Commission Vice Chairman McDonald. Each prosecutor at this meeting felt that re­contact with these individuals could ad­versely affect this matter and indicated a provable case could be made against each for conspiracy in violation of the Hobbs Act Statute.

Relative to the matter concerning U.S. Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, the following was decided:

1. It will be necessary to recontact U.S. Senator Williams in attempt to obtain an overt action on his part regarding his spon­soring of some type of legislation; ie, tax cover for titanium mine; environmental standards for titanium mine and/or import quotas for titanium mine.

2. It was also suggested that attempts should be made to elicit from U.S. Senator Williams whether or not he wanted his shares hidden, through discussions concern­ing reporting of personal taxes and official acts that he promised to provide.

If the above information is obtained, pros­ecutors at the meeting felt that they could prove that Senator Williams was in viola­tion of Title 18, Section 201 USC and Con­spiracy to Defraud the Government.

Relative to the matter concerning U.S. Congressman John M. Murphy, Staten Island, New York, it was felt that he should be recontacted and an attempt should be made to elicit from him that through his position he can guarantee political asylum for the Arab principal of Abscam.

EXHIBIT lA [Affidavit]

I, Salvatore Ottavino, of 569 Rockaway Street, Staten Island, New York, hereby state under oath, after first being duly sworn, the following under penalty of perju­ry and based upon my personal knowledge:

1. I was a juror in the trial of United States of America v. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., et al., United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Docket No. 80-CR-00575.

2. That on September 14, 1981, I reviewed for the first time, the two page document captioned "Exhibit 39-A F.B.I. Internal Memorandum From Section Chief W. D. Gow to Assistant Director in Charge Francis M. Mullen, Jr., November 27, 1979" <incor­porated herein by reference and appended hereto> hearing my signature and date thereof on each page thereof, and that I have reviewed the same document this date, September 16, 1981.

3. Had I been previously aware of this doc­ument during the trial, supra, and delibera­tions relating thereto I would have voted "not guilty" on all counts and would under no circumstance have ever changed my vote from "not guilty".

3304 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 FBI INTERNAL MEMORANDUM FROM SECTION

CHIEF W. D. GOW TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE FRANCIS M. MULLEN, JR. NOVEMBER 27, 1979

Purpose.-To provide results of a confer­ence which was held on 11/19/79, relative to the immediate investigative direction of cap­tioned project.

Recommendations.-None. For informa­tion.

Details.-On 11/19/79, a conference was held at the Federal Strike Force, Eastern District of New York <EDNY>, Brooklyn, New York, between Thomas Puccio, Chief, Federal Strike Force, EDNY: John Jacobs, Strike Force Attorney, EDNY; AUSA Edward Plaza, United States Attorney's Office, Newark, New Jersey; AUSA Robert Weir, United States Attorney's Office, Newark, New Jersey; Robert Stewart, Chief, Federal Strike Force, Newark, New Jersey; AUSA Robert Herbst, United States Attor­ney's Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; SAC Edwin J. Sharp, Brooklyn/Queens MRA; SSRA John Good, Hauppauge Resi­dent Agency; SA Jack Caughlin, Hauppage Resident Agency; SA Walter Drissler, Haup­pauge Resident Agency; ASAC Robert Wright, Newark, New Jersey; Supervisor Joseph Vidovich, Newark, New Jersey; SA Martin Houlihan, Newark, New Jersey; and Supervisor Michael D. Wilson, FBIHQ. The purpose of the meeting was to insure that all previous bribe situations were complete relative to prosecution and did not necessi­tate any further investigative action.

Concerning the meetings with Angelo Er­richetti, Mayor of Camden, New Jersey, and New Jersey State Senator Kenneth McDon­ald, New Jersey Casino Control Commission Vice Chairman; U.S. Congressmen Michael Ozzie Myers, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Raymond F. Lederer, Philadelphia, Pennsyl­vania, and Frank Thompson, Jr., Trenton, New Jersey; the following was discussed:

1. It was recommended that no further action would be instituted against U.S. Con­gressmen Myers, Lederer or Thompson. It was felt by the prosecutors that a case against each could be proved in a court of law for violation of Title 18, Section 201 USC <Bribery of a Public Official).

2. It was recommended that no further action would be instituted against Mayor Errichetti or New Jersey Casino Control Commission Vice Chairman McDonald. Each prosecutor at this meeting felt that re­contact with these individuals could ad­versely affect this matter and indicated a provable case could be made against each for conspiracy in violation of the Hobbs Act Statute.

Relative to the matter concerning U.S. Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, the following was decided:

1. It will be necessary to recontact U.S. Senator Williams in attempt to obtain an overt action on his part regarding his spon­soring of some type of legislation; i.e., tita­nium mine and/or import quotas for titani­um mine.

2. It was also suggested that attempts should be made to elicit from U.S. Senator Williams whether or not he wanted his shares hidden, through discussions concern­ing reporting of personal taxes and official acts that he promised to provide.

If the above information is obtained, pros­ecutors at the meeting felt that they could prove that Senator Williams was in viola­tion of Title 18, Section 201 USC and Con­spiracy to Defraud the Government.

Relative to the matter concerning U.S. Congressman John M. Murphy, Staten

Island, New York. it was felt that he should be recontacted and an attempt should be made to elicit from him that through his position he can guarantee political asylum for the Arab principal of Abscam.

EXHIBIT 2 <Exhibit 52: EXCERPT FROM MEMO­

RANDUM OF ROBERT C. STEWART NEWARK STRIKE FORCE JANUARY 29, 1980,p. 7-10)

But, the primary concern, and one which the operational prosecutors in Newark pin­pointed at the very outset of their involve­ment in the matter, has been with the very essence of this investigation. There is reason for concern < 1> when two public offi­cials are brought before a TV camera to take a bribe, but both decline; <2> when so many people could have believed for eight months that "W" had a hidden interest in the business venture when the facts now appear to be to the contrary; and (3)

Page one of my Memorandum of 9-12-79 pointed out that there was no running log on this matter, a lack of 302's covering im­portant predicate events, a substantial lag­time in the availability of transcripts and in­accessibility to the Undercover Operatives­all of which resulted in a "death of formal legal analysis on the various issues which were apparent in the several initial transac­tions" and all of which made "systematic case review, essential for proper prosecuto­rial decision-making", impossible.

Secondly, I stressed to you that, even in the very few transactions to which the Newark prosecutors have been allowed to become privy, the Informant continues to suggest the criminal scheme, rather than al­lowing the particular suspect to initiate his scheme. This problem-which Mr. Plaza dis­cussed with the Informant as early as August 9-was noted as late as the Decem­ber transactions in New Jersey, despite Mr. Weir's specific admonitions to the Inform­ant on this point. <See: my Memorandum of 1-8-80, p. 3.) I addressed this very problem both orally during our meeting of 9-13-79, and in my Memorandum of 10-31-79 <at page 4)-stressing that the substantive diffi­culties "are apt to reoccur unless corrective measures are taken". The fact that the In­formant persisted in his proclivity as late as December certainly does nothing to allay apprehensions about the overall conduct of this investigation.

Finally, I stressed to you my concern about the propriety of the asylum scenario, which has come to be the principal motif of this investigation since the August 21 meet­ing with Suspect "M" of Pennsylvania. First of all, there appears to be confusion over how this scenario developed originally. The Informant said that the agents along with Mr. Puccio devised it. But, as late as Janu­ary 9, the Undercover Agent and the Case Agent told Mr. Weir that Intermediary "E" had suggested it in response to a statement by the Undercover Operatives that there might come a time when the Investor would need asylum. Mr. Weir told the agents that the 302's in our possession did not reflect this, and they said they would look into the matter.

A second point with regard to the asylum scenario, as I discussed at pages 3 and 4 of the Memorandum of 1-8-80, is the funda­mental difference between this investigation and a conventional "sting" operation. In the latter, the defendant has no equity. He ap­pears before the jury on tape discussing the sale of a stolen TV set or some such contra­band item. His conduct is malum in se, and

no one could possibly criticize the Govern­ment for successfully detecting his criminal­ity. In this investigation, however, the cir­cumstances are fundamentally different: Basically, you have a public official who is minding his own business and presumably discharging his public responsibilities in a correct manner. An intermediary then as­serts that the official is corrupt and will take a bribe. Usually, there is little or no evidence that the official knows anything about the intermediary's representations. There may be little, if any, extrinsic infor­mation which would suggest that the par­ticular official is corrupt. On the contary, most of the officials begin the conversation with disclaimers of criminal intent and offers to handle the problem in a perfectly correct and lawful manner. The Undercover Operatives then press. and they dangle large sums of money in front of the offi­cial-initially with promises that he will never be required to deliver the guid pro quo because the payment is only insurance against a remote contingency. The official relents and accepts the payment-in some cases offering to perform further criminal acts, in others without providing additional evidence of predisposition or criminal intent. In several cases the payment was re­fused.

All of this is very different in kind and quality from a conventional sting operation.

This project was launched on a very sound investigative predicate: The original inter­mediary ("E") stated unequivocally that he himself was corrupt, and that he was able to collaborate with others of a similar ilk for purposes of corrupting the processes of gov­ernment. "E" requested an opportunity to introduce his associates, and he promised that they would formulate specific criminal proposals which they would submit to the Undercover Operatives for consideration. This theme was represented to us to be the principal motif of this project throughout the period prior to Mr. Del Tufo's letter of 7-13-79; and, Mr. Del Tufo and I understood it to be the principal scenario intended as late as my Memorandum of 9-24-79, describ­ing the proposed New Jersey Phase. There­after, however, it became increasingly ap­parent to Mr. Del Tufo and myself that the orientation of this project was undergoing a dramatic metamorphosis. The asylum sce­nario, first used in late August, gradually came to the fore and now predominates. In­termediary "E" has been unavailable since November; and the original-and, I think, perfectly correct-scenario has gone by the board. Thus, as I reiterated to you Wednes­day <1-23-80), my concerns about the sub­stantive aspects of this matter are simply that, even if the due process argument is not able to defeat a particular prosecution, it may tarnish the Government and cause serious difficulties for law enforcement. In view of this possibility, I have thought it ap­propriate to keep you advised of these con­cerns.

EXHIBIT 2A Direct examination by Mr. Koelzer, con-

tinued: Q. That was it? A. That was it. Q. Now, did Senator Williams at any time

discuss with your or anyone-with you-any personal interest he had in this?

A.No. Q. Did he say to you that this was impor­

tant to him or that he really wanted you to

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3305 do this or make this loan, or words to that effect or substance?

A. No. Q. Did he put any pressure on you? A. None whatsoever. Q. Did he ask you, when he called you to

thank you for seeing these friends of his did he ask you to reconsider? '

A.No. Q. Did he say in any way, shape or form

he could get government assistant for this project--

A. No--Q. -so that this could get government

contracts? A.No. Q. When he spoke to you-and the others

who called-was there ever discussion of government contracts?

A. No, no discussion of government con­tracts, only when the government came into it in outlining the various areas of how money might be raised, as to what was then more or less a dead venture which needed capital in order to be revived. In that con­text, I think one of my colleagues men­tioned the fact that maybe the Small Busi­ness Administration would-an application would be filed and Mr. Henry Williams indi­cated he wouldn't be interested in approach­ing the Small Business Administration.

Q. Is that a federal agency? A. Yes. Mr. KOELZER. Thank you, Mr. Fowler. Mr. BATCHELDER. No questions, sir. The COURT. Mr. Puccio, any cross? Mr. Pucc10. A few questions. The COURT. All right. Cross-examination by Mr. Puccio: Q. Mr. Fowler, your lawyer asked me to

establish that you are not here as a volun­teer, but were subpoenaed by the defense; is that correct, sir?

A. That's correct. • ;-1!" KOELZER. Excuse me, your honor. I

Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield to me for a brief moment?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I am happy to yield.

Mr. BAKER. At some point, I intend to ask the Senate to stand in recess briefly. Of course, I would be willing to do that at whatever time seemed most convenient to the Senator from New Jersey. If he is prepared, we can do it now, it is 3 o'clock, or we can do it later.

Mr. WILLIAMS. This would be fine for me.

RECESS UNTIL 3:10 P.M. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until the hour of 3:10 p.m.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 2:55 p.m. recessed until 3:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassem­bled when called to order by the Pre­siding Officer <Mr. GARN).

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, while we are waiting-I am about to suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time to be charged to both sides-I say to the Senate, and for the record, that every office has had no fewer than 18 volumes delivered to it, the first 9 of which were boxed, and all of which have been delivered subsequently.

So, before worrying on, I suggest that Senators check with their offices

as to where those volumes may be. If it is not possible to find them, or one volume, we still have some.

However, the printing bill t)lat the committee has acquired in the course of this investigation and presentation is rather enormous. So I ask Senators to see if the volumes may be in their offices before asking us to obtain more. We can obtain more.

QUORUM CALL With that, Mr. President, I suggest

the absence of a quorum, and I ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. With­. out objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll

and the following Senators answered to their names:

Armstrong Baker Biden Boren Boschwitz Cannon Cranston Danforth Dixon Dodd Ford Garn Grassley Hart

[Quorum No. 20 Leg.] Hawkins Heflin Helms Hollings Humphrey Inouye Jackson Long Mathias Matsunaga Mattingly McClure Melcher Mitchell

Moynihan Percy Proxmire Quayle Riegle Roth Schmitt Specter Stennis Stevens Symrns Wallop Weicker Williams

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be instruct­ed to compel the attendance of absent Senators, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The

question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Tennessee to in­struct the Sergeant at Arms to compel the attendance of absent Senators. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the

Senator from Arizona <Mr. GOLD­WATER), the Senator from Kansas <Mrs. KASSEBAUM), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. SIMPSON), and the Sen­ator from South Carolina <Mr. THUR­MOND) are necessarily absent.

Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Texas <Mr. BENTSEN) and the Senator from Missouri <Mr. EAGLETON) are necessarily absent.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Have all Senators in the Chamber been record­ed?

The result was announced-yeas 92, nays 2, as follows:

Abdnor Andrews

[Rollcall Vote No. 45 Leg.] YEAS-92

Armstrong Baker

Baucus Biden

Boren Boschwitz Bradley Bumpers Burdick Byrd.

Harry F .. Jr. Byrd. Robert C. Cannon Chafee Chiles Cochran Cohen Cranston D 'Amato Danforth DeConcini Denton Dixon Dodd Dole Domenici Duren berger East Exon Ford Garn Glenn Gorton

Proxmire

Grassley Hart Hatch Hatfield Hawkins Hayakawa Heflin Heinz Helms Hollings Huddleston Humphrey Inouye Jackson Jepsen Johnston Kasten Kennedy Lax alt Leahy Levin Long Lugar Mathias Matsunaga Mattingly McClure Melcher Metzenbaurn

NAYS-2 Quayle

Mitchell Moynihan Murkowski Nickles Nunn Packwood Pell Percy Pressler Pryor Randolph Riegle Roth Rudman Sar banes Sasser Schmitt Specter Stafford Stennis SteYens Symms Tower Tsongas Wallop Warner Weick er Williams Zorinsky

NOT VOTING-6 Bentsen Eagleton

Goldwater Kassebaum

Simpson Thurmond

So the motion was agreed to. The VICE PRESIDENT. With the

addition of Senators voting who did ~ot answer the quorum call, a quorum is now present.

The majority leader is recognized. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I do not

want to sound harsh or arbitrary, but we entered into a unanimous-consent agreement for a 15-minute recess. We have now been 50 minutes getting some semblance of a quorum to return to the floor and remain on the floor. We have wasted almost an hour.

I still think that we need a break about midafternoon. But I urge Sena­tors, when we do have that break, to come back. Otherwise, we are going to be a very long time, indeed, on this matter.

So I urge Senators to stay in their seats and when we have breaks-and by the way, there will be no more thi~ afternoon DaughterJ-that we come back promptly. There may not be any more ever. [Laughter.]

We will go out at 6 o'clock today, be­cause I made that commitment. But if we have this problem in the future if it becomes a permanent problem, then the only recourse is to extend the time in the afternoon, and I would not wish to do that.

Mr. WALLOP addressed the Chair. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Sena­

tor from Wyoming is recognized. Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I

thank the majority leader and add my encouragement to what he has just said.

You have heard this described by both sides n.s a historic and unprece­dented event in the floor preceedings of the Senate. We owe it to Senator

3306 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 WILLIAMS and we owe to the Senate to be present during these deliberations.

I do not wish to sound preachy, but your committee has sat through it all, Senator WILLIAMS has sat through it all, and it is just an obligation in the custodian role of the reputation of the Senate that we be here and participate in these proceedings.

One last thing. I would like to say again, because, as we previously recon­vened at the appointed time after the recess there were not enough Senators on the floor, but those exhibits which Senator WILLIAMS has offered are con­tained in the material which has been delivered to your office. Each Sena­tor's office has had these books deliv­ered to it. If your staff has them stashed some place, please ask them to try to find them. We have a few left, but the Senate's printing bill is enor­mous on these, as you can well imag­ine. There are some 18 volumes, and each of our offices has had those de­livered there. The memorandums in­troduced to date by Senator WILLIAMS as exhibits are contained in those vol­umes. I just wish to bring that out. We will cooperate as best we can in provid­ing you with extra copies, but please search first at home.

Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Who yields time?

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I indicated previously that I had not received the 5 volumes. I now find that I have, and I wish to make that clear. I appreciate the Senator's concern as he expressed it.

Mr. WALLOP. I thank the Senator from Ohio. I yield the floor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Sena­tor from New Jersey is recognized.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, con­tinuing with the factual background of this matter. In December of 1978 through January of 1980, the Govern­ment ran a covert operation called Abscam against a number of Congress­men and Senators. According to public statements of Director Webster, Abscam was the most carefully moni­tored and supervised investigation in the history of the FBI and that he, personally, as well as Benjamin Civi­letti, were involved in the direction and control of the Abscam investiga­tion. These representatives and repre­sentations were made during hearings conducted by the House Judiciary Committee. For the RECORD, I would offer them as exhibit No. 3.

EXHIBIT 3 MEMORANDUM

To: Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights.

From: Michael Tucevich, Assistant Counsel. Re FBI Undercover Review.

The attached memorandum is a summary of all representations made to the Subcom-

mittee by the Department of Justice and FBI officials during the course of our previ­ous undercover operations hearings. The quotations are arranged by subject to facili­tate their use should any of these issues arise once again in future hearings.

A. Safeguards Concerning Undercover Op-erations.-

1. General: Ca) William H. Webster, Director, FBI: In summary, we must use the undercover

technique with discretion and care. Wheth­er it be the undercover technique or an­other technique, in every investigative ven­ture, there are potential risks.

As I have indicated, we have developed policies and procedures designed to mini­mize these risks. This is not to claim investi­gative perfection, but whenever mistakes or miscalculations or misunderstandings do occur, you may be sure that the lessons learned will be incorporated in our future planning of operations. [March 4, 1980 p. 150)

Cb) Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice:

"It is only if the agent goes there and does a lot of fancy talking, somebody will be re­sponsible for it, if they go and do a lot of fancy talking and inducing." [March 4, 1980 p. 164)

2. Quality Controls on Informants: Ca) Donald W. Moore, Jr., Assistant Direc­

tor, FBI: "We have taken self-imposed restrictions

to insure the quality of the informant cover­age in this particular program, so we don't just proliferate people and say they're an informer. We trust our informants are of quality ... " [March 8, 1979 p. 61

"The purpose [of the informant program] is to get quality informants." [March 8, 1979 p. 13)

Cb) William H. Webster, Director, FBI: In addition to this approval review proc­

ess, special care is taken to ensure that our Agents are sensitive to the limitations and requirements of undercover work. Before an operation is undertaken, FBI supervisors, the Special Agents in Charge in the field, and program managers at FBI Headquarters carefully screen all undercover Agents to be certain that they are suited for their par­ticular missions. We also provide special training for those selected, with emphasis on instruction in legal areas, including the issue of entrapment.

We take precautions to minimize potential problems. With adequate training, the Agents involved are alert to sensitive issue areas. We want them to recognize when lines are about to be crossed, and to know that when in doubt they must seek the advice of their supervisors.

Once the review committee approves a project, the Bureau monitors it, both at Headquarters and in the field. When elec­tronic surveillance or closed circuit video­tapes are used, we can examine the proprie­ty of our Agents' conduct, and the quality of the investigation as it progresses. And, of course, the results of the surveillance and the tapes provide an opportunity for the courts to evaluate the Agents' actions should they subsequently be challenged. [March 4, 1980 p. 1451

In addition to this approval review proc­ess, special care is taken to insure that our agents are sensitive to the limitations and requirements of undercover work. Before an operation is undertaken, FBI supervisors, the Special Agents in Charge in the field, and program managers at FBI Headquarters

carefully screen all undercover agents to be certain that they are suited for their par­ticular missions.

We also provide special training for those selected, with emphasis on instruction in legal areas, including the issue of entrap­ment.

We take precautions to minimize potential problems. With adequate training, the agents involved are alert to sensitive issue areas. We want them to recognize when lines are about to be crossed, and to know that when in doubt. they must seek the advice of their supervisors. [March 4. 1980 p. 149)

3. Effect of Guidelines: <a> Paul R. Michel, Associate Deputy At­

torney General, Office of the Deputy Attor­ney General:

The field offices have been operating for the entire period of extensive undercover work, which I guess is between 2 and 3 years without formalized guidelines.

That is not to say that they have been op­erating without carefully structured proce­dures. Because the procedures have been rather well structured and followed closely. What the guidelines basically did was to build on those procedures and to formalize them and if I can misuse a word, codify them into guidelines. [February 26, 1981 p. 81)

The guidelines on undercover operations like those on other topics, were drafted on the basis of certain underlying principles. Three of the most important of these are as follows. First, guidelines should not be a catalog of "do's" and "don'ts." Rather, they should focus on establishing or formalizing sound procedures to assure that critical judgments are made at appropriate levels of authority and are recorded and therefore, susceptible to subsequent review within the Bureau, by the department, and by the Con­gress.

Second, the guidelines must be clear enough to be readily understood and fol­lowed by all agents and must contain stand­ards which are realistic enough so as not to interfere with effective and appropriate in­vestigative activities.

Third, the guidelines should not merely meet the minimum requirements of consti­tutional and statutory law, but should also reflect sound law enforcement policy. I might say that these three principles, in my view, were precisely the same principles that formed the basis, a theoretical basis, for example, for the guidelines on domestic security investigations, which were issued in 1976. [February 26, 1981 p. 821

"So, I think, No. 1, that the guidelines are taken seriously, and they are followed, and we have proof of that.

"No. 2, there are sanctions. The real sanc­tion that's involved here is you can get fired. And FBI Directors have not hesitated to fire people who committed substantial wrongdoing." [February 26, 1981 p. 1021

4. "Reasonable Indication" Requirement: Ca) Paul R. Michel, Associate Deputy At­

torney General, Office of the Deputy Attor­ney General:

That's not to say that undercover oper­ations ought to offer opportunities for crim­inality in the complete absence of reasons to suspect that the activity is going on and that the people who will present themselves or were presented and produced at the loca­tion in fact are involved in that kind of criminal business. We used in a charter, as you will recall, . . . the concept and the phrase "reasonable indication."

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3307 And that same notion is adopted in the

guidelines and is mentioned. As I indicated earlier. we either have to have a reasonable basis for suspecting, a reasonable indication, that the individual in question is corrupt as a labor racketeer, or whatever the operation involves, or he has to identify himself by coming in, with no active role on our part. [February 26, 1981 p. 841

5. "Witting" versus "Unwitting" Middle­men:

<a> Paul R. Michel, Associate Deputy At­torney General, Office of the Deputy Attor­ney General:

We often have a man who starts out as a suspect. Let's say an informant has come and told us that Mr. X, who is a police cap­tain in some metropolitan city, is collecting bribe payoffs from gambling operators. Sup­pose then that the word goes out that a new gambling operation is being established. And the next thing that happens is, this police captain comes in. He indicates that his superior officer, Inspector Y, also shares in these bribes.

Well, at that point, the captain has shift­ed from being merely a subject, because of the informant allegation, to being an inter­mediary. But he is going to bring in the higher ranking officer. And of course, we're even more interested in trying to successful­ly prosecute that individual that the cap­tain.

So he becomes a middleman. And he is not a witting middleman. Obviously, he has no idea that this gambling operation is phony and it's a setup in order to detect police cor­ruption.

There are, of course, middlemen who are witting. They are referred to in FBI termi­nology as cooperating individuals. They present special problems because of obvious difficulties of total control by the Govern­ment. But it's important to recognize, I think, that in most situations the middle­man is not being manipulated by the Gov­ernment. The middleman himself doesn't even know that it's an undercover oper­ation.

Now, in the case where the middleman is a cooperating individual, is fully knowledgea­ble, there is a risk that he will misrepresent the statements or activities of a suspect, that he will produce at our warehouse, or whatever the location might be, individuals who in fact are innocent. There is, there­fore, the risk that an innocent individual may be offered the criminal opportunity. There are two reasons why this risk, even aside from guidelines protection, is not very great. The first is, if a cooperating individ­ual, a middleman, brings in an innocent person, we quickly discover that he's either exaggerating or he doesn't know what he's talking about, so we no longer put so much faith in what he says. It corrects itself rather fast.

It is quite true, in the meantime, one or two individuals who are completely innocent might be drawn into the operation to the extent of having the offer made. But as, I think it was the second circuit, recently ob­served, that is not necessarily disastrous, be­cause the honest man simply rejects the offer and departs.

It is a risk; it is undersirable. It is not a big risk, and the guidelines minimize it by, for example, stressing that the underlying criminal nature of the offer has to be made very clear and communicated directly to the suspect. No offers are made through third parties. They're face to face, and they're clear terms.

And I might say that with regard to the clarity of the criminal nature, we frequently

have had circumstances in actual operations where extensive script writing, in effect. was done by teams of lawyers from both the de­partment and the FBI. So that the under­cover agent who actually makes the offer­we don't let the middleman make the offer; the undercover agent makes the offer-does so in terms that are unmistakably clear that this is a crime that's being offered. [Febru­ary 26, 1981 p. 85]

Mr. EDWARDS. Often, these middlemen are conmen or people with long criminal rec­ords, and sometimes they are in the pay of the Bureau or of the Department of Justice. Is that correct, also?

Mr. MICHEL. That's correct. There are both types. The first type is the far more common.

Mr. EDWARDS. Is there no auditing done? How do you control these people floating around? ...

How do you stop them from approaching one person after another and then ap­proaching the same person again, and entic­ing the same innocent person again and again and again . . . ?

Mr. MICHEL. Let me take it separately. With regard to the unwitting conman, there is no way we can stop them. And we didn't start them. He was already out there doing that.

Mr. EDWARDS. No, but you're paying him money to continue.

Mr. MICHEL. No, no, not the unwitting conman. He thinks that he's working with criminals and at both ends, and so, he's just operating in his normal fashion.

And we didn't put him into that business, and we're not in a position to put him out of that business, so that it just isn't a question of how can the Government let him do that? The Government ordinarily has little capacity to stop him from doing that.

Now, in the case of the witting interme­diary, who is being paid, in some instances, by the FBI, certainly is receiving direction from the FBI, that's quite a different cir­cumstance. In that case, there's a lot that we can do and do to minimize as much as possible, the risk of innocent people being drawn into this web, if you will.

One of the things we do is that we require, to the extent possible, that his contacts with people that he says are corrupt, or are racketeers, or whatever the nature of the enterprise is, we require him to develop the best possible evidence.

For example, if there are telephone con­versations between the unwitting conman and the suspect, those conversations may be recorded with consent of the cooperating in­dividual. So that we aren't dependent on his word that the suspect showed an interest in committing a crime. The words of the sus­pect himself or herself are available to us. So that eliminates the risk that the middle­man is lying in that kind of circumstance. Now, it is not always practical to have tape recordings done. But that's done where it can be done.

Another device we use is that the witting middleman is questioned closely after each material meeting or contact with a suspect. And he reports or produces information de­tailing precisely what was allegedly said.

Sometimes, the specifics in these reports can be corroborated through independent investigations, so that would serve on a check that the conman is conning us and lying about someone being interested in committing a crime. [February 26, 1981 p. 95] ... Ctlhe key point perhaps is this: We

need to be very sure that our cooperating

individuals are not themselves making any offers. If we can limit their role to being a middleman in the sense of a broker who brings together two parties. then we can get past the fact that the middleman may be lying or exaggerating or distorting or he's got it in for somebody and he's just trying to get the fellow in trouble for some person­al vindictive reasons.

So we need to put very heavy emphasis on limiting the role of the middleman and by being sure that all the operative conversa­tions are ones that are taking place between the suspect and undercover FBI agents. and not just between the middleman and the suspect. I don't think that there's anything more that we can do. [February 26, 1981 p. 109]

6. The Review process <Monitoring): (a) Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice:

As a matter of sound administrative policy, the Department observes consider­ably more restraints than the bare legal re­quirements in establishing, monitoring and executing its undercover operations. In the elaborate review process which Judge Web­ster has described, the Bureau and the Criminal Division strive to insure that each undercover operation is carried out in a manner which is fair, unambiguous, produc­tive of successful prosecutions, and which minimizes the impact on or even the in­volvement with innocent persons. [March 4, 1980 p. 138]

The other intuition underlying the "creat­ing crime" argument is the strong sense that law enforcement activity, including un­dercover operations, should avoid harming or burdening third parties. Certainly any undercover activity which posed a direct threat to the safety or well-being of third parties would be exceedingly troubling. We are sensitive to this concern and are ex­tremely careful to monitor our operations to prevent third party harm. We commonly close the operation if there appears to be any significant chance of violent activity or severe uncoverable financial loss to individ­uals. [March 4, 1980 p. 140]

(b) William H. Webster, Director, FBI: These operations, however, often raise

sensitive issues which I recognize must be addressed. Therefore, the FBI has adopted specific undercover policies, and an exten­sive oversight machinery to insure that each undercover operation is carefully planned and conducted.

When an undercover project is proposed by a squad in one of our field offices, our field office managers, the field legal advisor, and the Strike Force or United States Attor­ney in that region review it and send their reports to Headquarters. We consider the project's goals, the worthiness of its objec­tives, it costs, whether the tactics proposed might involve entrapment or present other legal problems, and the general propriety of proposed project tactics. [March 4, 1980 p. 144]

Once the review committee approves a project, the Bureau monitors it, both at headquarters and in the field. When elec­tronic surveillance or closed circuit video­tapes are used, we can examine the proprie­ty of our agents' conduct, and the quality of the investigation as it progresses.

And, of course, the results of the surveil­lance and the tapes provide an opportunity for the courts to evaluate the agent's ac­tions, should they subsequently be chal­lenged. [March 4, 1980 p. 1491

So we had two things in place there:

3308 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 One, don't bring us anybody who isn't pre­

pared to be up front with us; and two, if he comes, then it was our purpose and plan to make sure before any money was passed to that person, that he understood the crimi­nal nature of the situation and that whole process was monitored by U.S. attorneys watching the process and in a position to cut it off if at any time our agent exceeded the bounds we had set for them. [March 4, 1980 p. 170]

<Question by Chairman Rodino:> It seems to me that you have responsible

people in the FBI, your agents, who I think are responsible enough and expert enough in undercover activities to be able to review what that informant has or has not said about such-and-such a person may be in his pocket, or words to that effect, as you have said. Do you engage in this kind of further review so that the informant who has made this kind of statement to you, so that what he has had to say is really carefully weighed? Can you recite that in the cases that you have conducted, this is what you have actually done?

Mr. WEBSTER. If I understand the chair­man's question, I can certainly say yes, at various levels, the reliability in the sense of whether the statement made has a basis sufficient that we would have an obligation to investigate further is assessed.

Now we have for cross-checking available to us within certain time constraints-de­pending on how fast the situation is break­ing-we do the best we can. We up the level of approval consistent with the individuals involved, and the sensitivities involved.

For example, in a number of these in­stances in Abscam, by both I and the Assist­ant Attorney General, we were aware of and approved the proposals based on the infor­mation furnished to us. Those of us who live in a world of decency, at least among our friends and associates, sometimes find it hard to assume that anyone who engages in crime can tell the truth. But when he is tell­ing the information to someone who he thinks is in league with him, that is some­times the way by which we get our very best information consistently, in all types; not just public corruption cases.

But in other instances, we have some of the most important ones now that are going through the process, organized crime fig­ures dealing with our undercover agents, and telling us things that are true and turn out to be true.

So there has to be some investigative judgment call. What Mr. Heymann pointed out, and what I pointed out, is the nature of the controls that we have on entrapping in­nocent people. I can't guarantee that in an Operation Lobster, or even a sting oper­ation, some innocent person isn't going to walk in the door thinking that this is for him or have some misapprehension about it. [March 4, 1980 pp. 170-171]

7. Protecting Third Parties <Avoidance of Ambiguity>:

<a> Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice:

Such precautions involve a careful evalua­tion of anything we are told by intermediar­ies about the possible interest of other per­sons in a criminal transaction, and an at­tempt to check such claims to the extent practicable. Most important, however, is the second major safeguard followed in every undercover operation, of making clear and unambiguous to all concerned the illegal nature of any opportunity used as a decoy. This provides the strongest possible protec-

tion against any unwitting involvement by individuals brought in by intermediaries or who are encountered directly. We attempt to structure our undercover decoy transac­tions by requiring overt participation on the part of all individuals. If a middleman offers to provide police protection for an undercov­er numbers parlor, we would seek a face-to­face encounter with the allegedly corrupt policeman at which the illegal nature of the quid-pro-quo would be made utterly clear. This precaution not only elicits the strong­est possible evidence of the knowledge and involvement of principal offenders who usu­ally insulate themselves through middle­men, but also provides an important protec­tion against any attempt by a middleman to use the name of an innocent person and against any inadvertent involvement by per­sons located on the outskirts of an under­cover operation. By making clear and unam­biguous the corrupt nature of any offer we make, the chance of unwitting or gullible in­volvement by innocent individuals is strong­ly guarded against. [March 4, 1980 pp. 139-140]

The other intuition underlying the "creat­ing crime" argument is the strong sense that law enforcement activity, including un­dercover operations, should avoid harming or burdening third parties. Certainly any undercover activity which posed a direct threat to the safety or well-being of third parties would be exceedingly troubling. We are sensitive to this concern and are ex­tremely careful to monitor our operations to prevent third party harm. We commonly close the operation if there appears to be any significant chance of violent activity or severe uncoverable financial loss to individ­uals. [March 4, 1980 p. 140]

But the concern underlying the "prior crime" argument is again an important one, and is similar to the "creating crime" argu­ment. We don't wish law enforcement activi­ty of any sort to turn law-abiding people into new criminals. The attraction of a "prior crime" population to a bogus proper­ty fence seems consistent with this precept. But the concern is also met by our safe­guard policies of keeping all decoy opportu­nities proportionate to those that exist in the real world and by making sure that the illegal nature of the opportunity is clear and unambiguous. These safeguards assure that the only individuals who take part in decoy transactions are individuals likely to have engaged in similar conduct on other occasions.

The same ethical intuition probably moves those commentators who have argued that a factual predicate of probable cause concerning an individual's involve­ment in criminal activity should precede any use of undercover techniques. For the reasons explained above concerning the dif­ficulties in detecting and identifying the parties to consensual crimes, we do not be­lieve that a probable cause standard as to individual involvement is remotely practica­ble-not to mention that probable cause is the articulated standard for arrest and in­dictment rather than the beginning of an investigation. But the intuition underlying the "probable cause' argument-that the government should not make new criminals out of law-abiding persons nor test people at will with temptations not otherwise occur­ring in their lives-is again met by our safe­guards of having all decoy opportunities and attractions approximate to those existing in the real world and of making clear and un­ambiguous of all participants in a decoy transaction the corrupt and illegal charac­ter of the activity. [March 4, 1980 p. 141J

<b> William H. Webster, Director, FBI: We are also aware of the problems inher­

ent in operations where our undercover Agents are investigating subjects who are influence peddlers or middlemen claiming to know others already willing to engage in criminal activity. Since these middlemen do not know they are dealing with the FBI, or that they are the subjects of investigation, it is difficult for us to monitor their activi­ties, and, of course, they are not under our control. We must, therefore, carefully evalu­ate any information they provide to us as to the willingness of a third party to engage in a crime before we proceed further and assure that if such a third party does meet with us he is aware of the criminal nature of the meeting. [March 4, 1980 p. 146]

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, I believe that the gen­tlemen from Massachusetts put his finger on the problem I don't think we have re­solved yet, and that is the problem of these free-floating purveyors, Middlemen, or whatever they might be, often of dubious reputation, sometimes hoodlums who, while not working for the FBI, are certainly work­ing with the FBI, because they are the ones who bring out the leads. They are the ones who finger people. How do you control them? What devices do you have for audit­ing their activities? In our private conversa­tions, we made it very clear, the chairman and I, that a number of innocent people have been damaged very severely by these operators, by these middlemen.

Mr. WEBSTER. What we do try to do is identify the con men who are misleading us in the attempt to rip off whatever cover our undercover agent is functioning under, and to deal out those operatives, if they are not in fact engaging in illegal activity.

In the Abscam case, again without trying to get into facts, there were influence ped­dlers-and there was a chain of them one led to another, there were others who intro­duced them. They were told consistently not to bring anyone to the undercover agent, unless that person was prepared up front to make promises which would in a legal sense violate their trust.

We don't express it, obviously, to the mid­dlemen in that sense, but unless they were prepared to make these statements and as­surances up front, and to take the money personally, so that there could be no oppor­tunity for the middlemen, or at least mini­mized opportunity for the middlemen to mislead the public official as to the purpose of that visit.

Now, in at least one, and maybe two, cases, that's exactly what happened. But step two, which we instituted to control the oper­ation, was that in our handling of the situa­tion, it was made clear to the individuals that it was a criminal activity, or at least an activity which that person could not in good conscience participate in, and he walked out, and that's exactly what we intended. [March 4, 1980 pp. 168-169]

I gave you the ground rules that we apply to try to minimize that. We haven't the in­terest or the facilities to keep screening out people banging on the door, because we haven't taken the precaution to keep them away. We can't obviously inform the influ­ence peddler that we are the FBI and we don't want him to bring any innocent people-I don't mean to be facetious about that, but we have to carry out the cover, and the two ground rules are don't bring us anybody that isn't going to be up front with us, and then we take the second ground rule, which is to be sure that that's the case.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3309 Chairman RODINO. That's why I would

like to be convinced that under your guide­lines you are able to say that you now have reasonable grounds to believe, based on the fact that you have actually scrutinized data, not only what the purveyor has said, but what other information you may have-I would like to be convinced that it isn't just the purveyor and some rumors-that the FBI doesn't go forward and then engage in this kind of operation, which when ulti­mately disclosed and leaked, damages the reputation of innocent persons.

Mr. WEBSTER. No one would like to con­vince you more that I, Mr. Chairman. In the course of these proceedings, I do want to emphasize that in investigations particular­ly where we are trying to reach beyond the streets and go out and reach the areas that all of you have been telling us to go in, that we are not sitting as a grand jury. We don't have to have probable cause, but we do have to have a reasonable suspicion and move on it. [March 4, 1980 p. 1711

<c> Paul R. Michel, Associate Deputy At­torney General, Office of the Deputy Attor­ney General:

Now, I would stress, Mr. Chairman, that the guidelines do not unduly hamper actual operations. And they do contain realistic but meaningful standards .. . .

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the guide­lines essentially provide that we can make such an offer only under t hese circum­stances. One, a middleman, who may be a witting person cooperating with us, or may be unwitting, implicates and produces the suspect at our location. Or two, the suspect, having heard of our operation, brings him­self in. In addition, once the suspect is there, any offer made to him must be clear­ly criminal in nature, must be one in which the incentive-for example, the size of a bribe-is not disproportionate to the service sought or the normal expectations for that type of criminality.

Now, some outside observers have suggest­ed that the Government should be required to have probable cause of similar past crimes by a particular individual before it offers him an opportunity for crime. Our view is that this suggestion is impractical. [February 26, 1981 p. 831

So those are the principal protections that prevent an innocent person from ever get­ting to the stage of being at one of our loca­tions.

And then, as I mentioned earlier, the second line of defense, the second safety net, is our strong emphasis on making it ab­solutely clear that we're talking about crimes and make sure that the contact is di­rectly between the agent and the suspect, and no one is speaking for the suspect. He's speaking for himself.

And in that way, if there was anything that slipped through and an innocent person gets in there, then when he's face to face across the table with the undercover agent, who makes it clear that they're talk­ing about outright criminality, well, then he leaves. [February 26, 1981 p. 961

8. Frequency of Review Under Guidelines: <a> Paul R. Michel, Associate Deputy At­

torney General, Office of the Deputy Attor­ney General:

Now, with regard to how that all works, I would like to make this observation. The guidelines emphasize the approval process, because that is what we thought deserved the most emphasis. That is what is going to bring the judgment of supervisors and out­siders to the field office involved to bear on this.

And as you know, the guidelines provide for the operation to be recertified by the committee and the appropriate senior FBI officials under any one of three tests. No. 1, at a minimum, every 6 months, no matter what else. No. 2, anytime the nature of the operation changes; if it changes every month, then there 's a whole new review every month. And No. 3, any time the oper­ation spends more than a trigger sum, which is $20,000.

The practical effect of those three trig­gers of renewed scrutiny by the committee is that in the largest and most sensitive op­erations, the reviews aren't every 6 months; they're much more frequent than that. In addition to formal reviews by the commit­tee, however, there are reviews which some­times are week-to-week, or even day-to-day in the most sensitive cases.

There are innumerable examples, for in­stance, where the Director of the FBI him­self, personally reviewed whether a particu­lar circumstance, as to a particular suspect, warranted the making of an offer of a crimi­nal opportunity.

So, the control of these operations, and minimizing the risks of untoward events oc­curring, rest as much on this ongoing super­vision at all levels of the chain of command in the FBI, as they do on the committee proposal certification process. [February 26, 1981, pp. 86-87]

Mr. EDWARDS. I might also point out that at a hearing just about a year ago, March 1980, the Director of the FBI Webster and the Assistrant Attorney General Heyman testified that there was total control of the undercover operations at that time, that all the decisions made in connection with the undercover operations that this subcommit­tee was inquiring into had been supervised by the Bureau and Department of Justice on a daily basis.

Yet your testimony today points out, and rightly so, that that was not quite the fact. You have stage 1, stage 2, stage 3. You were in stage 1 at that time. Is that correct? And some problems did arise?

Mr. MICHEL. No, Mr. Chairman. The testi­mony of Director Webster and Mr. Heyman on March 4 of 1980, was describing circum­stances in the immediately preceding months. And those months are in the period I categorized as period number 2.

The procedures were in place. The Under­cover Operations Review Committee was functioning. So that in terms of what the current situation was, in late 1979 and early 1980, all the controls were in place at that time.

They had not been in place back in the period 1977, 1978, and perhaps into parts of 1979.

Mr. EDWARDS. In other words, Operation Front-Load was in stage l?

Mr. MICHEL. That's correct. Mr. EDWARDS. What you're saying is

Abscam was in stage 2? Mr. MICHEL. Most of Abscam was in stage

2. I believe the very beginnings of it were in stage 1. [February 26, 1981 p. 941

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, an operation can go on for 6 months?

Ms. CooPER. Without approval. Mr. EDWARDS. Without approval again.

How do you know what's going on in an op­eration in 6 months? Under the Domestic Security Guidelines there is a review after 30 days, as I recall.

Mr. MICHEL. There is a little point of con­fusion on that, Mr. Chairman. The review by the Attorney General or his designee of ongoing domestic security investigations occurs annually.

Mr. EDWARDS. But an investigation has to stop after 30 days if something further hasn't developed.

Mr. MICHEL. Where you have a prelimi­nary investigations. And they then come under that annual review.

I think the answer to your question, though, is that undercover operations are under continuous review and not just within the field office. As Director Webster indicat­ed, the most sensitive ones resulted in his being briefed on a very frequent basis about specific details of a particular operation.

And needless to say, at only slightly lower levels of the FBI there is continuous scruti­ny of what's going on in those undercover operations.

So there are parallel tracks. There's the committee review track, which focuses on events like initiations of the operation, and a major change where it switches to a dif­ferent compass course. But the other track is the regular chain of command supervision within the FBI, and that's a very lively, fast track.

I think from my own experience that the FBI officials at headquarters keep an ex­ceedingly close watch on undercover oper­ations. The more sensitive they are, the closer the watch.

So if we sit back and say, hell, they only look at this every 6 months, that really isn't the case at all. They look at it every week, sometimes every day. And they should.

The guideline's references to 6 months really was simply to have some automatic provision. Remember I said there were three triggers? If the purpose changes, the scope changes, then you have a review im­mediately, no matter if it's only been ap­proved for 30 days or 50 days or whatever.

Second, if you're spending a significant amount of money, automatically you have a review. So the 6-month provision was just to have some automatic device, so that at a minimum, the operation would get a com­plete new look at 6 months. But they are under very close scrutiny on an ongoing basis, really on a daily basis.

And it's a shame, in a way, that the guide­lines don't refer to that, because it's easy to forget on just reading the text of the guide­line how close and frequent the review is. [February 26, 1981 pp. 110-1111

9. Crimes and Ethical Violations by Informants:

<a> Paul R. Michel, Associate Deputy At­torney General, Office of the Deputy Attor­ney General:

Mr. EDWARDS. Now, guidelines also permit the Director to approve operations that will involve the commission of crimes by the agent or informant.

Is there any limit to what kind of a crime might be authorized? Does it go as far as robbery, murder, or anything like that?

Mr. MICHEL. Of course not. And the point of reference would be to the informant guidelines.

You'll recall that the informant guidelines provide that informants are to be told they may not engage in violence.

So, the general rule is a prohibition on vi­olence. And the exceptions are limited: [February 26, 1981 p. 104]

Mr. EDWARDS. "Now, would these guide­lines immunize the agent who has commit­ted the crime from prosecution by a State or Federal Court?"

Mr. MICHEL. "No, they couldn't as a matter of law and they certainly weren't in­tended to. " [February 26, 1981 p. 1041

Ms. COOPER. Let me ask you about section H, which has to do with undercover employ-

3310 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 ees posing as attorneys, physicians, clergy­men or members of the media. With the ap­proval of the higher ups, it seems that it is possible that those impersonations can be used to develop a confidential relationship, one that is ordinarily privileged under law.

Do the guidelines sanction an agent violat­ing his own ethical and professional respon­sibilities? For example, if the agent is an at­torney himself, posing as someone else's at­torney and thereby getting into a confiden­tial relationship with the subject?

Mr. MICHEL. I guess the question is wheth­er the guidelines overrule the cannons of ethics. The answer is "no." [February 26, 1981p.112)

10. Public Officials-Investigations of: (a) Philip B. Heymann, Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice:

The safeguards and techniques which are employed in our undercover operations gen­erally are and shall be utilized in investiga­tions aimed at public corruption. After the careful internal review procedures are satis­fied, we will initiate an undercover investi­gation only where we have a well-founded reason to believe that there is a pattern of criminality. There are only two ways in which any public official will become the subject of an undercover investigation: if he is the object of reliable, specific criminal al­legations for which an undercover operation is an appropriate method of investigation; or if, by a process of self-selection, he volun­tarily enters an operation. Just as we do not know which individuals will enter our un­dercover warehouse with a truckload of stolen merchandise, who we do not always know or even suspect which municipal building inspector will show up in our un­dercover bar to solicit a corrupt payment in return for a license. As in all undercover op­erations, any decoy transaction in a public integrity case should be structured so that its corrupt character is as clear and unambi­guous as possible and should be modeled and proportioned as closely as feasible on the pattern of criminality we understand to exist in the community. We must be fully satisfied that the public official is soliciting and willing to accept an illegal payment in return for dispensing a political favor. If it appears that the individual lacks such intent and has entered the operation on an innocent misunderstanding, perhaps gener­ated by the misrepresentations of a deceit­ful non-governmental middleman, we would not pursue the individual as a target of the investigation. [March 4, 198() p. 1431

Mr. SEIBERLING. May I ask you, are there any such operations where the FBI first put the stolen goods in the hands of the individ­ual who came in later?

Mr. HEYMANN. No. No operation that I know of, including this one.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Yet that's what the FBI did in this case, apparently, in trying to get individuals to accept bribes.

Mr. HEYMANN. There is a major difference, Mr. Seiberling, and that is we have no agent going out and making contact, and I am going to drift off in the general, because I don't want to talk about the Abscam investi­gation. I know of no case where an agent has gone out and tried to persuade a politi­cal figure to take a bribe, which would be the equivalent of trying to persuade him to take stolen goods. [March 4, 1980 p. 1631

11. FBI Internal Audit <Completion by March 1, 1979)

(a) William H. Webster, Director, FBI: Congressman DRINAN. I know, Judge Web­

ster, that you are as wary as we are of the

whole question of informants. I commend the chairman for his perseverance on this topic over some 4 to 6 years. But I wonder if you would elaborate, Judge Webster, on some of the things that you said before the Senate Judiciary the other day, that you in­dicated that you were going to have an in­ternal study on this whole question.

Would you supply us with some details or some things in which this subcommittee could be of help to you?

Mr. WEBSTER. Yes, I would be happy to do that, Congressman Drinan. I have sent out instructions to the field that we will shortly be commencing a full-scale review of our in­formant files, all of those which were active, I believe, as of Febraury 28, in order to insure that there be no modification in the files.

As a result of my instructions, Mr. Col­well, the Chief of our Planning and Inspec­tion Division, has conferred with Mr. Ols of the General Accounting Office with respect to the profile of our inspection. I directed that every file, not just random auditing, but every file, be reviewed. There are some 2,800 of them. We have already started that review in the Washington Field Office as an immediate prototype to iron out any bugs that might develop in that audit.

I have given this a top priority status. Ev­erything else in our planning and inspection program, with one exception, has been put behind this one. I would hope that we would complete the audit within approximately 30 days, by May 1.

In connection with that audit, I have di­rected that the areas of compliance to be reviewed include, but not limited to, the fol­lowing: Development of informants, oper­ation of informants, travel by informants, reporting information obtained from informants, informant files and indexes, payments to informants, use of informants, instructions to informants, and violations of instructions or laws. [March 27, 1979 pp. 102-03)

B. Investigation of Misconduct by FBI Employees:

1. Responsibility of OPR: (a) Lee Colwell, Assistant Director, Plan­

ning and Inspection Division, FBI "The Office of Professional Responsibility

<OPR) is responsible for supervising, investi­gating, or monitoring the investigation of al­legations of criminality, serious misconduct and moral turpitude concerning employees of the FBI. Our OPR works closely with the Department of Justice OPR, and keeps that office fully informed concerning all matters handled." [March 15, 1979 pp. 28-291

Mr. VOLKMER. "Are the Office of Profes­sional Responsibility people permanent?"

Mr. COLWELL. "They are permanent to the extent that we require them to serve ap­proximately three years or more in that ca­pacity. [March 15, 1979 p. 351

Mr. COLWELL. "In 1979, as of February 28, fiscal year 1979, [The Office of Professional Responsibility] had 161 cases we addressed."

Mr. VOLKMER. "And those are being taken care of by five professional people plus one staff?" ...

Mr. COLWELL. "We do not personally, or through respresentatives of that office, handle each allegation of misconduct against our employees. We delegate that au­thority on a case-by-case basis to the special agent in charge of a field office or another Assistant Director at FBI Headquarters if it concerns one of their employees. The way we arrive at that decision is the seriousness of the offense, whether or not there is a possibility of that official being involved in

the allegation or later becoming involved in the allegation. And we supervise that inves­tigation." [March 15, 1979 p. 361

Mr. HYDE. "In other words, you have in­creased the qualifications of the internal audit staff?"

Mr. COLWELL. ··Yes, we have ... Mr. HYDE. ··And what about the independ­

ence of the internal audit staff? Has that been increased?"

Mr. COLWELL. "Well, we believe that we are independent."

Mr. HYDE. "No need to increase it, in other words?"

Mr. COLWELL. "Well, there is always room for improvement in anything that you do, but we believe that we are independent, that we do provide an objective, unbiased view to the Director. We report to him. We are not responsible to any other person in the FBI. As long as our selection process is good, I think we do have independence and can produce a good product for the Direc­tor." [March 15, 1979 p. 371

Mr. COLWELL. "Any time we receive an al­legation which involves misconduct or im­propriety which is serious on the part of an FBI employee, yes, we either conduct the in­vestigation directly or supervise that investi­gation." [March 15, 1979 p. 451

2. Access of Department of Justice During Audits of FBI Operations:

(a) Lee Colwell, Assistant Director, Plan­ning and Inspection Division, FBI:

Mr. EDWARDS. Now, the Department of Justice tells us, I think, that when the De­partment is involved in internal audit of FBI programs, the Department itself has very limited access to FBI internal reports, such as field office inspections, Office of Planning and Evaluation studies, and time accounting reports, which I believe you call TURK.

What access do you give to the Depart­ment of Justice when they are conducting audits and inspections of the FBI's oper­ations?

Mr. COLWELL. We give them access except where a situation exists involving confiden­tiality. If we have been requested or we have assured someone of confidentiality, then the files are not made available. It de­pends on the particular area. If it involves foreign counterintelligence, there would have to be clearances of the people who are conducting the audit. [March 15, 1979, p. 45)

3. Immediate Investigation: (a) William H. Webster, Director, FBI: "We look into any allegations of mistreat­

ment of people under investigation, any abuse of power. And I mean to say that we do it immediately, there is no delay or back­log in these investigations. [March 21, 1919 p. 109)

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, with respect to my situation, the Govern­ment tried three separate scenarios to ensnare me. The first scenario was a stock-for-loan transaction. Under this scenario, the Government's agents, Weinberg and Amoroso, were to pose as representatives of a wealthy Arab shiek.

They were to arrange financing for certain individuals to purchase land in Virginia upon which existed a titani­um mine and a production plant. The deal also involved a paint pigmenta­tion plant in Georgia. The individuals interested in the loan were Sandy Wil-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3311 Iiams-who is no relation to me­George Katz, Alex Feinberg and Angelo Errichetti. The Government agents were introduced to Sandy Wil­liams and George Katz. Katz owned options to purchase land in Virginia. Feinberg was an attorney. And Angelo Errichetti, as I indicated, was mayor of Camden and a State Senator. Erri­chetti mentioned the potential financ­ing opportunity to me, and I informed Alex Feinberg who then contacted Er­richetti. Errichetti then arranged this whole thing and they met the Govern­ment agents. The Government agents, as the record will show, told these in­dividuals, Sandy Williams, Katz, Fein­berg and Errichetti, that the investors were not interested unless I was in­volved.

In the summer of 1979, Weinberg and agent Amoroso, Sandy Williams, Katz, Feinberg and Errichetti, set up three shell corporations, two in Virgin­ia and one in Georgia, to obtain fi­nancing for the land, mine and plant. These operatives tried to create the appearance that I was given an 18-per­cent interest in these three shell cor­porations. They contrived an alleged quid pro quo, that I was to get Gov­ernment contracts for the output of the mine. Both plants could only be used to produce paint pigmentation, the users for which were paint produc­ers, like the Glidden Co. Most of the mine product could be used only to supply the plants for production, the production plants in Virginia and Georgia, or others like it.

The agents contrived in my absence and without my knowledge, to hide an interest in this business venture, al­though when I found this out I clearly stated that I would disclose any inter­est that might develop.

This can be seen in a portion of the transcript, of May 31, 1979. I will offer it as a part of the factual background as an exhibit and read just the part that deals with this particular issue.

I am speaking and I say, "I've got a­my situation is this. I've got to uh I am under a law that makes me disclose an interest when I have an interest. But up until now there's been no de­fined interest. In what? An idea basi­cally. Because there's no corporate stock."

And then Alex Feinberg said, "But when and if you do--".

I came in with the reply, "When that happens, then that's part of my law."

I off er that to explain when I say "that's part of my law," that is part of our law, the law or requirements that are directed toward disclosure. When I say "my law," it is the law and regula­tions that attach to a U.S. Senator.

The exhibit follows: EXHIBIT 4

Date: May 31, 1979. Place: Hotel Pierre <Dining Room), New

York, New York.

Participants: Harrison A. Williams <HW>. Sandy Williams <SW>. George Katz <GK>. Alexander Feinberg <AF>. Mel Weinberg <MW), Tony De Vito <TD>. Inaudible <IA>

• • • AF: I've got to do some manipulation here

on account of our-­SW: Alex'll--AF: -situation. <IA> a lot of--HW: I've got a-my situation is this. I've

got to uh I'm under a law that makes me disclose an interest when I have an interest. But up until now there 's been no defined in­terest. In what? An idea basically. Because there's no corporate stock.

AF: But when and if you do--HW: When that happens then that's a

part of my law <IA>. AF: Well that's what you and I have to

discuss, what we have to examine. We're going to do that.

HW: But there's no sense doing anything before if there's was no reason for me to do it by on this May 15th-

AF: No, no. No, no. HW: -because it's just for--AF: We'll work that out. There will be

nobody with more then. Mr. WILLIAMS. In the late summer

or early fall of 1979, the Government agents implemented the second sce­nario, the stock for sale transaction. Under this scenario, a second group of Arabs would essentially buy out the first group of Arabs, and everyone in the shell corporation would share in the profits in accordance with their proportionate shares.

The Government agents pressed me to promise Government contracts for the new Arabs, which I had never agreed to do-and not disclose my in­terest or pay taxes. I clearly stated again that I would live with my law and honor my law, I would pay taxes and I would use a legal blind trust for any interest that I might have.

Forced with my refusal to do what the agents wanted, Weinberg, FBI agent Amoroso, and Errichetti con­spired to forge a letter on my Senate stationery stating that I would do what I had previously refused to do.

I off er that at this point in the RECORD as exhibit 5. With the forged letter I will include the memorandum of one of the agents.

The exhibit follows: EXHIBIT 5

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND

HUMAN RESOURCES, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1979.

To whom it may concern: In light of the fact that I am, at present, a

stockholder in, and advisor to, the corpora­tion which is involved in the mining and processing of titanium dioxide, I would be pleased to serve in the same capacity in the new corporation, which new corporation is purchasing the existing operation.

Sincerely, HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION-DATE OF TRANSCRIPTION SEPTEMBER 25, 1979

Upon instant date, a meeting was held at the Hyatt House, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Room 1232 at approximately 6:15 PM.

Present during the meeting were Angelo Er­richetti, Mayor of Camden, New Jersey, his secretary Danny <Last name Unknown> <LNU> and undercover agents Anthony Amoroso, Jr and Bruce Brady. At this time, Errichetti furnished a forged letter to An­thony Amoroso, using the letterhead of the United States Senate with the forged signa­ture of Senator Harrison A. Williams. Jr. Errichetti admitted during conversation that he had a printer make up the letter­head and that his secretary typed the letter and forged Senator Williams' signature. Er­richetti also stated that in this regard. his printer could do any type of forgery neces­sary to accommodate the "new" Arab inves­tors to believe that Senator Williams would serve in the same capacity as he had in the old titanium mine venture.

EXCERPT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF TAPED MEET­ING BETWEEN MELVIN WEINBERG AND ANGELO ERRICHETTI

MW. The other problem we're going to have in our deal which I didn't even bring up last night, I explained to you before, these other guy Arabs may want a letter. I didn't dare bring, I told you about this, re­member you said you'd sign it? From Pete stating that he be with them. How the Ce.d.l are we going to work around that?

AE. I have a letter from Pete, sent to me . .. I'll ink out <IA> ... I'll be able to type anything you want to copy. His name will be on the bottom ... <IA> ... everything out: I'll ink it out.

MW. How the Ce.d.l can you do that? AE. What? The letter. MW. Yeah. AE. Senator Pete Williams who, I got ten

thousand Ce.d.l letters for him. Right? ... <IA> . .. I'll experiment, make it all out.

MW. I don't think that's going to fly. AE. What? MW. You're crazy. AE. No, all I'll leave in there is his signa­

ture. MW. Do you think if you told Pete, to give

you a letter, and that, and you will hand de­liver it, let them read it and then you would burn it will he would trust you?

AE. Let's see if ... my thing first would work.

MW. Alright. AE .... <IA> ... secretary? MW. That's my only, I told you this

before, that's my only problem I got. AE. Can I tell you something? MW. And I'm trying to get around it. AE. Can I tell you something? She can ink

out the body of the letter . . . <IA> . .. okay? There we are. We type in what we're going to type.

MW. Alright, try it. If not we'll try it with the other way; because I think Pete will trust you.

AE. If worst comes to worst, I got to get a letter from him. Is that what you're telling me?

MW. Yeah. AE. Alright. We'll try it our way first.

CE.d.l him .... MW. Just say: to whom it may concern

that I agree to do all my power to . . . AE. I'll address the Ce.d.). MW. Huh? AE. If I can do I'll address it to the Ce.d.l

whoever it is. MW. Alright. AE. Make it to the Ce.d.l Arab's name,

Ce.d.l him. Dear then boom. MW. Well you don't, but that may be my

only stumbling block.

3312 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 AE. Because when she comes back from

... <IA> ... in the [e.d.] bathroom and say Dan I got a letter for you, one of our letters with Pete Williams on it ... <IA> ... block out so you can't see it and type in .. .

AE. On that letter that MW. Yeah

*

AE. That has to be typed up. MW.Right AE. Now before I ... before I ... up MW.Right AE. Which I don't want to. In drafting it

up very simply it's one where he is going to uh be a part of the new organization

MW.Right AE. That correct MW. Correct AE. And uh will serve in the capacity he's

serving tod ... in this present corporation in the in the future corporation that will be acquired

MW.Right AE. Okay MW. Right AE. I got it all in the letters are beautiful

piece of, beautiful letterhead MW. Yeah <laughs) AE. Better than better this his <laughs) MW. How about the signature though AE. No problem MW. No problem AE. It was the one that was on the other

one MW.Oh AE. It was lifted off of that one MW. Oh beautiful AE. It's his, it's his MW. No kiddin AE. Yeah MW. Beautiful AE. Okay, so I'll bring it with me when I

come out in about an hour MW. Okay AE. Alright MW. Righto AE. See ya MW. Bye-bye DA. What do you want? A pen? AE. Naw. Pen's over here. He needs some

paper. MW.Right. AE. OK. There's number one, in regards

to the letterhead signature on it. MW. No problem. AE. Got to compose what you want on

that letter. MW. I'll leave it up to you. AE. (IA) tell me what you want. Name?

Put the name on it. MW. We'll make him sign. That's all. AE. OK. MW. We'll leave up to our chief, the book­

keeper. AE. OK. The letter has to state signed by

PETE OK to whom it may concern that uh my continued interest and involvement in uh the corporation ... what's our corpora­tion's name?

MW. I don't know what the hell it is. You got the stock right?

AE. Yeh. I got to put it in a sentence that doesn't kill me. It says this, very honestly: that PETE WILLIAMS will will be most happy to be retained under a new corpora­tion that's gonna be formed when the pur­chase uh of the American Cyanamid in Georgia will be most happy to be retained on with the new corporation.

MW. Well she knows what to say. AE. She don't know what to say. I gotta

tell her. DA. Yeh. OK. Yeh <IA>. AE. We'll discuss it.

DA. Um hum. right. No problem here. Unidentified Voice. It's just <IA> not uh AE. Well, Melvin, how's Melvin? MW. They're killing me here. Killing me

<IA> TDV. Getting my clock cleaned as they

say. Uh, I check Unidentified Voice. [e.d.J TDV. I don't even wanna see, you can

have it. Yeah, I knew that, I knew that was coming. Oh yeah.

DA. <IA> AE. Try again. AE. <IA> DA. <IA> BB. I was lucky. AE. <IA> Unidentified Voice. <IA> Fifty dollars

here. Yeah. MW. What happened to the station? AE. <IA> remember <IA) AE. <IA> see what you did you cover the

body of the letter. You black bank out the body of the the you bank out the

DA.CIA) AE. Hey, look I. If the Senator wants to

spring down if he wants to change letter <IA> that's the original letterhead.

TDV. Original letter, hey. I think you missed your calling.

DA. He has many callings <laughter). TDV. I think you missed your calling in

life. AE. I asked you the day before <IA> seek

and you shall find. Whatever you need you gotta ask and you get it.

Mr. WILLIAMS. This memorandum on this activity in connection with the forged letter is November 26, 1979. It is short.

Upon instant date, a meeting was held at the Hyatt House, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Room 1232 at approximately 6:15 PM. Present during the meeting were Angelo Er­richetti, Mayor of Camden, New Jersey, his secretary Danny <Last Name Unknown> <LNU) and undercover agents Anthony Amoroso, Jr and Bruce Brady. At this time, Errichetti furnished a forged letter to An­thony Amoroso, using the letterhead of the United States Senate with the forged signa­ture of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. Er­richetti admitted during conversation that he had a printer make up the letterhead and that his secretary typed the letter and forged Senator Williams' signature. Erri­chetti also stated that in this regard, his printer could do any type of forgery neces­sary to accommodate the "new" Arab inves­tors to believe that Senator Williams would serve in the same capacity as he had in the old titanium mine venture.

I am including with this exhibit, Mr. President, the transcript of a conversa­tion with Weinberg and Errichetti that describe their conversations about the forged letter. I would like to read just part, if I may.

If I could have license to change a very profane word where it appears to a less profane word--

Mr. WALLOP. If the Senator will yield, I have no objection to doing that, but I wonder if the Senator will identify the transcript he is reading from.

Mr. WILLIAMS. This is from Sep­tember 12, 1979. I think reference can be made to it in the book:

ANGELO ERRICHETTI. Now before I-before I "foul"-

And that is reducing the degree of offense in that word-up.

MEL WEINBERG. Right. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. Which I don't want

to. In drafting it up very simply it's one where he is going to uh be a part of the new organization.

MEL WEINBERG. Right. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. That correct. MEL WEINBERG. Correct. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. And uh will serve in

the capacity he's serving tod-in this present corporation in the future corpora­tion that will be acquired.

MEL WEINBERG. Right. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. OK. MEL WEINBERG. Right. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. I got it all in the let­

ters are beautiful piece of, beautiful letter­head.

MEL WEINBERG. Yeah. [Laughs.] ANGELO ERRICHETTI. Better than better

than his. [Laughs.] MEL WEINBERG. How about the signature

though. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. No problem. MEL WEINBERG. No problem. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. It was the one that

was on the other one. MEL WEINBERG. Oh. ANGELO ERRICHETTI. It was lifted off of

that one. Oh, beautiful. ERRICHETTI. It's his, it's his. WEINBERG. No kiddin. ERRICHETTI. Yes. WEINBERG. Beautiful. I am skipping some parts here to

just highlight pertinent parts. The whole matter will be in the RECORD.

ERRICHETTI. OK. The letter has to state signed by Pete OK to whom it may concern that uh my continued interest and involve­ment in uh the corporation ... what's our corporation's name?

WEINBERG. I don't know what the hell it is. You got the stock right?

ERRICHETTI. Yeh. I got to put it in a sen­tence that doesn't kill me. It says this, very honestly: that PETE WILLIAMS will will be most happy to be retained under a new cor­poration that's gonna be formed when the purchase uh of the American Cyanamid in Georgia will be most happy to be retained on with the new corporation.

Then Tony DeVito comes in later to say-one of the agents-"! don't even wanna see, you can have it. Yeah, I knew that, I knew that was coming. Oh, yeah."

DeVito again later. "Original letter, hey. I think you missed your calling."

The other person there, DA, says "He has many callings." [Laughter.]

Tony DeVito. "I think you missed your calling in life."

Angelo Errichetti. "I asked you the day before, seek and you shall find. Whatever you need, you gotta ask and you get it."

Mr. President, this is a summary of the high points of their discussion about a letter forged on U.S. Senate stationery of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. This was in the Government's exhibit file in connec­tion with my case. That is where we have taken it from. This is a copy, the

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3313 original is probably with the court. This is a true copy of my letterhead from the Commttee on Labor and Human Resources when I was chair­man of that committee with all of my distinguished colleagues.

This is not a committee matter, true. I would say that that forged letter

came on September 12. On September 11, the day before, there was a meet­ing. It is one of the meetings that I went to and it was at that meeting the effort was made to get me to agree to do certain things. One of the things that I did not do is described in the forged letter, indicating by forgery that I would do what I had indicated I would not do when I was questioned directly.

In January of 1980, a third scenario was devised. The scenario-the sheik, who was FBI Agent Richard Farhart, pressed for immigration legislation in exchange for cash. Unfortunately for the Government, I turned the cash down in no uncertain terms.

The meeting with the sheik-Agent Farhart-was immediately interrupted by Agent Amoroso on the instructions of Agent Good and Prosecutor Puccio, who were personally monitoring the meeting in an adjoining room. Just as I was saying that I do not accept any­thing of value when I work in my offi­cial capacity, that is when the inter­ruption was made.

I mentioned before when, by saying no, I said, "My public" and I got the word "public" out and maybe one other word, in came Agent Amoroso to interrupt. I never did finish explaining what we all know we must do when anybody offers money in connection with anything in our public life. It is an instinctive no, no, no.

According to his own testimony, in­structions were given to Agent Farhart to link the legislation with the closing of the stock-for-sale scenario. Follow­ing the refusal of money and at the beginning of my explanation, I was in­terrupted.

Mr. President, I should say at this point that it was not much before this time in our Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs that we had been through the development of legislation dealing with bribes to for­eign officials. I can say now-and I hope to get back to this later; this person said "Money" and I said, "No." Then there was an interruption; he left the room. It came to my mind that this was a man from an Arab coun­try-he is the one thing that I felt was real in the operation. I was taken in by what he said he was.

It just seemed to me that we had heard all kinds of testimony, during consideration of the foreign corrupt practices bill when it was before our committee. We heard a great deal of testimony from businessmen going to other lands-a great number who trav­eled to Middle Eastern lands-that the

offering of money is the way of doing business. If they wanted to get busi­ness, they felt obliged to be part of the custom of paying what we know to be bribes.

This man presenting himself as a sheik-which is an official of high rank-wants an immigration matter to be considered and offers money. I fig­ured he obviously thinks that here, we practice what had been described to us in our committee as normal practice over there. I started to explain this, was interrupted, and never did get back to have an opportunity to ex­plain that.

In February, Mr. President, 1980, Abscam became overt beginning with the detailed coverage of the covert op­erations appearing as the headlines story in the New York Times. The New York Times was the principal re­cipient of the most detailed informa­tion regarding Abscam before any of this went public.

While Abscam was still within Gov­ernment as a known operation, there was a planting of significant internal material from the Justice Department with the New York Times. That amounted to the announcement made to the world February 2 and February 3 of 1980. This information reached the world at large on the night of Feb­ruary 2 through one of the networks and a newspaper, N ewsday. That will be dicussed later, also.

Mr. President, now I would like to talk to the subject of the tapes. I know that most Members have viewed these tapes. I would like to say that I know that perhaps three-quarters of the Senate is aware that the Senate Ethics Committee has shown 7 of the 58 tapes used in evidence at my trial. I was filmed on 6 of the tapes shown by the committee and present at only 7 of the 58 tapes.

It has been said that the tapes speak for themselves. I tell you that such is not, in fact, the case. In the view of Robert C. Stewart, then chief of the Newark strike force, the tapes did not support conclusions of criminality.

The memorandum of Robert C. Stewart, dated January 8, 1980, which I will present in exhibit-it will be No. 6-is a memorandum that is not in any of the published materials. Because of this, and because it is just over 2 pages long, its significance here can be judged by the Members.

The immediate concern is whether an ade­quate factual predicate exists for future in­vestigative action as to New Jersey Suspects "D" and "S" on Wednesday as proposed. The factual recitation as to Suspect "W" in the Memorandum of Messrs. Plaza and Braniff <transmitted by Mr. Del Tufo on December 19) formalizes the issue about possible governmental overreaching, which I emphasized to you during our meeting of September 13, 1979. Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir brought this concern directly to the atten­tion of the Brooklyn Strike Force in July and, at the first opportunity, to the Under·

cover Operatives as early as August 9, 1979 <see p. 4 of my Memorandum of October 31, 1979).

Then there is a reference: "See page 4 of my memorandum of October 31, 1979."

Subsequent events reflect that the Brook­lyn prosecutors, the case agent and the In­formant represented this "intrusion" by the Newark prosecutors. In fact, Mr. Plaza was told that his advice ·•jeopardized" the inves­tigation. Notwithstanding those events, the Informant persists in formulating the crimi­nal scheme rather than simply allowing the suspects to do this. Indeed, as late as the December meetings in New Jersey, the In­formant persisted in suggesting the nature of the criminal undertaking rather than al­lowing the suspects to relate what they pro­posed, as Mr. Weir had expressly instructed the Informant to do.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I believe it is at page 877 in the document.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, it is in volume II. It is in the respondent's ex­hibit 1, and it is not there in its entire­ty. They retract some of the material that was in there, and later, at an ap­propriate time, we will say what was retracted.

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MELCHER. I hate to interrupt the train of thought of the Senator and the thoughts of the other Sena­tors, but I want to return, if I may, for just a moment, to the forged letter.

It was known to be forged by three FBI agents; and there is a report-I guess they call it a 302 report-which goes in the file and describes that two of the agents knew it to be forged.

Was the point of the forged letter to be given to influence another FBI agent who was in costume as a sheik?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I cannot answer that. All I know is that the agents and Errichetti were very pleased with the product. The product was made avail­able to us in the exhibit file of the Government.

Mr. MELCHER. I suggest that per­haps the forged letter was to show, in a convincing way, not to the sheik, who was an FBI agent, as the other three FBI agents are who know it is forged-but it was to convince some­body else that the Senator was willing to participate as broadly as the letter would indicate.

It goes to the point, Mr. President, of how credible the evidence is. \Vas this evidence that was to be credible evidence to be presented to a court and found not to be credible later and therefore was not presented as credi­ble evidence?

I thank the Senator for yielding. Mr. WILLIAMS. I thank the Sena­

tor from Montana. Mr. LONG. Mr. President, since the

matter has been raised, I am curious to know if the Senator knows just who

3314 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 was intended to be deceived by the for­gery. This forgery, apparently, was participated in by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I find it strange that my Government would partici­pate in a forgery. Who was the target for the forgery? Who was the FBI planning to deceive with the forgery?

Mr. WILLIAMS. Again, I cannot attest to what was on their mind on September 12. All I know is that on September 11 they wanted me to say certain things that I did not say; and on the following day, a forgery was created which intended to prove that I had done those things which I said I would not do. What their purpose was, who they were going to impress-obvi­ously, I would think they sought to impress someone with what they had forged.

Mr. LONG. I would have to assume that if some second group of Arabs were to appear on the scene, they would not be genuine Arabs; they would be FBI Arabs. Why would the FBI have to forge a document to de­ceive another FBI agent?

Mr. WILLIAMS. The fantasy goes on and on. It just has to amaze you that our people are spending time doing this sort of thing and finding great pleasure in doing it.

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I yield. Mr. MELCHER. I thank the Senator

for yielding. I do not believe that the Federal

Bureau of Investigation form was and is in the file, signed by Agent Bruce Brady, and with the date of transcrip­tion of September 26, 1979. It has been mentioned by the Senator.

I merely ask the committee, if the Senator will permit me, and if the committee will yield-has it been con­sidered by the committee? Will the chairman yield? Will the chairman of the committee yield?

Mr. WALLOP. I beg the Senator's pardon. I did not hear the question.

Mr. MELCHER. Senator WILLIAMS has mentioned the Federal Bureau of Investigation form signed by agent-I do not know whether is a signature. It is typed in-Bruce Brady. The date of transcription is September 26, 1979. I refer to the forged signature of Sena­tor WILLIAMS on this document we are discussing.

Mr. WALLOP. I do not think the Senator has.

Mr. MELCHER. I am asking the chairman whether the committee has--

Mr. WALLOP. I cannot answer. I will be happy to answer the Senator later.

The only point I was going to raise is that Mayor Errichetti was not an FBI man. Mayor Errichetti was conspiring to defraud a second group of Arabs.

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Federal

Bureau of Investigation document dated at the top September 26, 1979, of Bruce Brady, be made part of the RECORD at this point-at the point we are dealing with the forged letter.

Mr. RIEGLE. What does it say? Mr. MELCHER. I will read it into

the RECORD. Upon instant date, a meeting was held at

the Hyatt House, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Room 1232 at approximately 6:15 pm. Present during the meeting were Angelo Er­richetti, Mayor of Camden, New Jersey, his secretary Danny (Last Name Unknown> CLNU> and undercover agents Anthony Amoroso, Jr., and Bruce Brady. At this time, Errichetti furnished a forged letter to An­thony Amoroso, using the letterhead of the United States Senate with the forged signa­ture of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. Errichetti admitted during conversation that he had a printer make up the letter­head and that his secretary typed the letter and forged Senator Williams' signature. Er­richetti also stated that in this regard, his printer could do any type of forgery neces­sary to accommodate the "new" Arab inves­tors to believe that Senator Williams would serve in the same capacity as he had in the old titanium mine venture.

Mr. President, I submit it at this point because I think it goes along with the rest of the discussion by Sen­ator WILLIAMS of the forged document and merely to demonstrate that the FBI agents who were working on this case to prove something wrong with Senator WILLIAMS' action not only in­volved one or two, but at least three were involved, and that it was included in the Justice Department file and cer­tainly is available to Justice Depart­ment superiors of these agents.

Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I think I can join these matters. I wish to do whatever the Senator wishes to do. If he wishes me to do it when he finishes I will do it then.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Perhaps it would be best. I have not finished this.

Mr. HELFIN. All right. Mr. WILLIAMS. The Senator from

Wyoming raised the subject; it war­rants response.

I will try to make my response brief, and then we can finish this exhibit.

Errichetti was not an agent or an employee of the Federal Government. That is certainly accurate. What his role was at this point <mid-September of 1979), is not clear.

New evidence, evidence new to me and which has been available, some since December, some in January, sug­gests that Errichetti had clearly been co-opted by Weinberg and together they divided bribe money that was in­tended for another target.

So the relationship between Wein­berger and Errichetti and the oper­ations that arose out of that relation­ship is unclear; but it has been sug­gested, and evidence corroborates, that they were conspirators working in their own self-interest; and even though one was working for the Gov-

ernment, the other was not, they were certainly using this operation for their separate and, they thought, secret ends.

There is much more to this, I am sure, than I know. Errichetti has been a defendant in cases and it has been suggested that because of this and other things, he has not been available as a witness.

So, I cannot say any more. What I did say is a matter not of public record, but of public statement. Much surfaced in conversations that were held with Marie Weinberg in Decem­ber and January and was included as part of an affidavit that she made before her most untimely and ques­tionable death.

It also is a matter that has been a subject of testimony in another case in another proceeding.

Now back to this Stewart memoran­dum that I did not complete and if I may just finish it:

In the present investigation, the circum­stances are fundamentally different because there is nothing inherently illegal about either the nature of the meeting place or the general topic of conversation. Indeed, absent specific facts to the contrary, there is an initial presumption of legality because of the positions which the suspects occupy and because of the ostensibly legitimate nature of the things under discussion­whether those things be the operation of a business, economic development in a par­ticular area, or the protection of the human rights and indeed the very life of a foreign national who is touted as nothing more than a legitimate entrepreneur. Hence, the decision for further investigative action cannot be controlled by the criteria which govern such decisions in a conventional "sting" operation, but must depend instead upon the demonstrable existence of special facts which infect the particular transaction with illegality.

Two instances may serve to illustrate this point: In his conversation with me on March 27, 1979, Mr. Puccio indicated that Suspect "W" of New Jersey had a hidden interest in the particular business venture. It was the hidden nature of this interest which was malum prohibitum, and it was that fact which justified further investigation. How­ever, during the meeting of April 4, 1979 in Brooklyn, at the outset of Newark's involve­ment in this matter, Mr. Puccio related that the investigative predicated as to Suspect "W" were Cl> the assertions of Intermediary "E" ...

Errichetti--that "W" was corrupt and that "W" 's

friend, "F", ... That is Feinberg-... was "W" 's bagman, and (2) the asser­

tions of the Informant that "F" was "W"'s bagman. Mr. Puccio observed that "W" was a "big question". Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir began to review the available materials; and, in late April, they advised me that many 302's appeared to be missing, that there were no reports, that a number of telephone calls which had been made by the Inform­ant had not been recorded, that it was ex­tremely difficult to reconstruct the facts, and that there appeared to be a lack of con­trols over the investigation in general.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3315 These difficulties prompted a meeting in Brooklyn on May 11, 1979. During this, Mr. Puccio reiterated to Mr. Del Tufo and myself ...

To Stewart--. . . that "W" had a hidden interest in the

venture; and, during a conversation on June 5, 1979, Mr. Puccio told me that "W" had acknowledged his hidden ownership during a meeting the preceding Thursday.

May 31, 1979. Many months later, when we finally ob­

tained the tapes, the situation proved to be quite different: The whole idea of hidden ownership appears to have sprung from a statement by "F" ...

Feinberg--... on March 8th to the effect that "W"

would have a piece of the venture, though he could not show it.

And the memo says: That was a prediction by "F", not a state­

ment of existing fact. During the March 23rd conversation, "W" himself said only that he was interested in the venture and would authorize the Undercover Agent to say that he was interested. "W" did not say that he had an interest, hidden or other­wise-only that he was interested. Then, during the May 31st conversation, "W" said only that when the venture materialized, he would then have to disclose his interest-an interest which would come into being at that time. All of this is a far cry from having a "hidden interest". To be sure, there were the assertions of Intermediary "E" that "W" was corrupt, but the basis of these conclusory assertions was never elicit­ed.

I submit the entire document known as Exhibit 6 for the RECORD.

EXHIBIT 6 EXCERPT OF MEMORANDUM OF ROBERT C. STEW­

ART, NEWARK STRIKE FORCE JANUARY 8, 1980, PP. 3-5 The immediate concern is whether an ade­

quate factual predicate exists for future in­vestigative action as to New Jersey Suspects "D" and "S" on Wednesday as proposed. The factual recitation as to Suspect "W" in the Memorandum of Messrs. Plaza and Braniff <transmitted by Mr. Del Tufo on December 19) formalizes the issue about possible governmental overreaching, which I emphasized to you during our meeting of September 13, 1979. Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir brought this concern directly to the atten­tion of the Brooklyn Strike Force in July and, at the first opportunity, to the Under­cover Operatives as early as August 9, 1979 <see p. 4 of my Memorandum of October 31, 1979). Subsequent events reflect that the Brooklyn prosecutors, the case agent and the Informant resented this "intrusion" by the Newark prosecutors. In fact, Mr. Plaza was told that his advice "jeopardized" the investigation. Notwithstanding those events, the Informant persists in formulating the criminal scheme rather than simply allow­ing the suspects to do this. Indeed, as late as the December meetings in New Jersey, the Informant persisted in suggesting the nature of the criminal undertaking rather than allowing the suspects to relate what they proposed, as Mr. Weir had expressly instructed the Informant to do. Given this proclivity on the part of the Informant, pru­dence dictates that the genesis of each pro­posed meeting be scrutinized carefully in ad­vance to ensure that there is a sound legal basis for further investigative action. With

respect to the meetings proposed for the week of January 7th, that predicate review cannot be done by anyone in Newark with­out access to the recent tapes.

It appears to me that the substantive problem with respect to this investigation is that it is being conducted in the manner of a conventional "sting" operation-that is, the predominant modality is to videotape anyone willing to meet with the Undercover Operatives in order to determine what, if anything, they have to say which might be incriminating. The problem with this ap­proach is the fundamental difference be­tween the subject matter of a conventional "sting" operation and that of the present operation. In the former, the subject matter under discussion <such as a stolen television set in the hands of a junkie thief) is contra­band per se and any discussion about it is ipso facto incriminating. The suspect's mere presence in an ostensible "fencing" location with an item which is being offered for sale at a fraction of its face value provides more than an adequate basis for further investi­gative action-namely, recording the sus­pect's conversations about the contraband item. In the present investigation, the cir­cumstances are fundamentally different be­cause there is nothing inherently illegal about either the nature of the meeting place or the general topic of conversation. Indeed, absent specific facts to the contrary, there is an initial presumption of legality because of the positions which the suspects occupy and because of the ostensibly legiti­mate nature of the things under discus­sion-whether those things be the operation of a business, economic development in a particular area, or the protection of the human rights and indeed the very life of a foreign national who is touted as nothing more than a legitimate entrepreneur. Hence, the decision for further investigative action cannot be controlled by the criteria which govern such decisions in a conven­tional "sting" operation, but most depend instead upon the demonstrable existence of special facts which infect the particular transaction with illegality.

Two instances may serve to illustrate this point: In his conversation with me on March 27, 1979, Mr. Puccio indicated that Suspect "W" of New Jersey had a hidden interest in the particular business venture. It was the hidden nature of this interest which was malum prohibitum, and it was that fact which justified further investigation. How­ever, during the meeting of April 4, 1979 in Brooklyn, at the outset of Newark's involve­ment in this matter, Mr. Puccio related that the investigative predicates as to Suspect "W" were < 1) the assertions of Intermediary "E" that "W" was corrupt and that "W's" friend, "F", was "W's" bagman, and <2> the assertions of the Informant that "F" was "W's" bagman. Mr. Puccio observed that "W" was a "big question." Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir began to review the available ma­terials; and, in late April, they advised me that many 302's appeared to be missing, that there were no reports, that a number of telephone calls which had been made by the Informant had not been recorded, that it was extremely difficult to reconstruct the facts, and that there appeared to be a lack of controls over the investigation in general. These difficulties prompted a meeting in Brooklyn on May 11, 1979. During this, Mr. Puccio reiterated to Mr. Del Tufo and myself that "W" had a hidden interest in the venture; and, during a conversation on June 5, 1979, Mr. Puccio told me that " W" had acknowledged his hidden ownership

during a meeting the preceding Thursday <5-31-79). Many months later, when we fi­nally obtained the tapes, the situation proved to be quite different: The whole idea of hidden owership appears to have sprung from a statement by ··F" on March 8th to the effect that "W" would have a piece of the venture, though he could not show it. That was a prediction by "F". not a state­ment of existing fact. During the March 23rd conversation, ··w" himself said only that he was interested in the venture and would authorize the Undercover Agent to say that he was interested. ··w" did not say that he had an interest, hidden or other­wise-only that be was interested. Then, during the May 31st conversation, ··w" said only that when the venture materialized, he would then have to disclose his interest-an interest which would come into being at that time. All of this is a far cry from having a "hidden interest". To be sure, there were the assertions of Intermediary "E" that "W" was corrupt, but the basis of these conclusory assertions was never elicit­ed.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I would like to share with the Members of the Senate a statement from Dr. Roger Shuy, a professor of linguistics at Georgetown University who special­izes in, the analysis of video and audio recordings, and who has been used as an expert witness in a number of trials on the issue involving audio and video recordings.

I would like to introduce Dr. Shuy's statement as an exhibit, which would be exhibit 7, and I ask that this letter by Dr. Shuy, after being entered in the RECORD be read in full by the clerk at this time.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me? Will the Senator from New Jersey give us some idea how long the letter is?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I can if I may have one moment.

Dr. Shuy has been permitted to be present on the floor, and I will ask him. It is a 30-minute reading by the clerk, and I appreciate that that is a long time. But, if I may just say, I dis­cussed the statement of Mr. Nathan and his attitude about the future in terms of the conversations of public officials that might well be recorded.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I have no objection to that. I was simply trying to find out how long it might take. I knew the clerk had a very lengthy document at the desk, and I was trying to judge how long to pro­ceed this afternoon. That question was a preface to my next question, and that is, can the Senator from New Jersey give me some idea of how long his presentation today will take so that I can make some plans on what time to ask the Senate to recess?

Mr. WILLIAMS. We have this pres­entation, and I believe that what I hope to clarify today can be done so by 6 o'clock.

Mr. BAKER. I have no desire what­ever to suggest that the Senator should shorten his presentation. I

3316 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 know he understands this is solely for the purpose of planning the schedule of the Senate.

I would suggest then that we plan to recess when the Senator from New Jersey completes his presentation today or if that runs much past the hour of 6 then we would assure that he would have the floor to complete that presentation on Monday.

The leadership would then plan to recess at approximately 6 o'clock today.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I appreciate-and I take another opportunity to express my appreciation for-the full consider­ation given my position by the majori­ty leader.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob­jection to the clerk's reading the letter? If not, the clerk will read Sena­tor WILLIAMS' exhibit.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I will say that charts are described in the letter; these charts were prepared by Dr. Shuy. As it is read, these charts will be visible in the back of the Chamber. In addition, these charts are available on each Senator's desk.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will read.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

EXHIBIT 7 DEAR SENATORS: I have devoted over 25

years of my life to the science of linguistic analysis. My field of specialization has been that of the tape recorded language of people of all ages. I have written and edited 22 books in the field of linguistics and have published about 100 articles in professional journals on this subject.

Spoken language is one of our most impor­tant tools. We all use it in almost every walk of life and in almost everything we do and yet, as we use it we are generally unaware of how we do it. We tend to take for granted the structure, the patterns, the regularity of our conversation. This is peculiar because all conversations have structure which con­tributes strongly to the meaning we convey. By this I mean that it is not just the mean­ings of words which communicate. There are many other things in our speech which provide important clues to our intentions.

In conversation, it is also common for people to be confused. Two people may think they are talking about the same thing whereas, in reality, they may have quite dif­ferent frames of reference.

When recorded language is considered of great importance in making a decision of some sort, such as in the issue before you today, a full understanding of the structure of the language actually used and recorded is essential. Too much is at stake for those who must make that decision to not have all the information which these tapes reveal. When there is a dispute over what was promised, what was actually said or done, what was meant by the language used, how the language used was understood by the other participants or what the roles of the speakers were in conversation, this dispute becomes a linguistic dispute. When the evi­dence is recorded, as it was in the case before you, the issue becomes one for which the science of linguistics is appropriate. The analysis of language evidence, which most people are untrained to carry out and which

is, therefore, unavailable to such people, be­comes critically important.

For the past 3 years, I have been analyz­ing such recorded language for the benefit of juries in their determination of the true facts in various court cases. The litigation I've been involved in relates to such areas as school desegregation, contract disputes, social and welfare services, criminal cases, and housing discrimination. I have partici­pated in litigation in six of our Federal courts, in the form of expert witness testi­mony, affidavits and consultation. I have testified in four Federal cases so far in an effort to help the jury to discover and to un­derstand the linguistic clues which are found in the language used right on those tapes. In each of these cases, I have spent many days in scientific analysis of the tapes, identifying and charting these clues and presenting my findings to the juries.

In the case of Senator Harrison A. Wil­liams, Jr., I have spent 30 days listening, analyzing, describing the language structure of these tapes and writing up my conclu­sions. I refer you, at this point, to my paper, "Linguist Analysis of the Recorded Conver­sation and Transcripts Used as Evidence in the Case of USA v. Harrison A. Williams, Jr. et al." <October 5, 1981), which by now you should have in your possession. This paper outlines the methodology I used and warns about certain dangers that exist, certain dif­ficulties that the untrained listener has, when he or she attempts to process video or audio tape recorded evidence. It warns about a predisposition of guilt simply be­cause the Government has decided to target an individual for taping. It warns about the danger of the listener being so swamped or inundated with masses of recorded data be­tween many speeches over long periods of time that the listener succumbs to the prin­ciple of contamination in which one speaker is falsely attributed with the words, atti­tudes or intentions which are clearly attrib­utable to a different speaker. It argues that the task of understanding the real meaning of the intentions and actions of the speech­es on a tape must be seen in context, not wrenched from context. It warns against using written transcripts as the only guide to the spoken conversation, since written language is unable to symbolize the pauses, interruptions, nonverbal communication, timing, and other nuances of meaning which we all process in our face-to-face daily communication.

Next, that paper provides a detailed scien­tific analysis of the topics introduced by each speaker and the responses to these topics. It also traces the crucial referencing used by the speakers and provides what lin­guists call a contrastive analysis, comparing, for example, what was said when Senator Williams was present to what was said when he was not present. I urge you to consider this paper seriously and I apologize for its occasional technicalities and its 112 page length.

Here today, I would like to present the conclusions of my extensive analysis. But, in order to fully understand how I came to these conclusions, I would like to provide you with what my experience in this, and other cases involving surreptitiously record­ed conversation, has revealed. To begin with, in all conversations the speakers have agendas, or goals. They also have conversa­tional strategies to accomplish these goals. One of the first steps in determining the agendas of the speakers is to examine what topics they introduce in the conversation. The topics which a speaker introduces, or brings up, are, in fact, his agenda.

In the case of the Government agents, the topics introduced have known underlying reasons. The general purpose of Govern­ment-sponsored surreptitious recording is to capture the commission of an illegal act on camera, to retell past illegal acts or to prom­ise future illegal acts. Otherwise there would be no case and you could not be dis­cussing this issue today.

The major agendas of the Government agents, in the case of Senator Williams are:

1. To get Senator Williams to agree to use his influence or position to secure Govern­ment contracts for the proposed mining venture.

2. To get Senator Williams to agree to hide his interest in the proposed mining venture.

3. To get Senator Williams to accept a bribe for sponsoring legislation on behalf of the presumed Arab sheik.

4. To link Senator Williams' promise of legislation for the presumed sheik to secur­ing a loan for the sheik for the proposed mining venture.

AGENDAS/TOPICS My analysis shows that all of these agen­

das put forth by the Government agents re­sulted in failure.

If the agents had agendas, it is also the case that Senator Williams had agendas. Topic analysis of all of his topics on all of the tapes reveals a very interesting pattern. The topics a person introduces in a conver­sation are the most important clue to his in­tentions.

Chart 1 displays this pattern:

CHART 1

HW All ~~:~~ Reports Small Reports others lion facts talk opinions

June 28 audio . 10 ............................

June 28 video ........ 20 2 . .

Aug. 5 audio ........ 21 2 . 3 ......

Sept. 11 video ........ 24 65 17

Oct 7 video ... 10 44 6 Jan. 15

video .. ...... 10 14 3..

Totals ... 57 174 36 11

First, notice that the chart refers to the six tapes in which he participated. The dates of these tapes identify them. The column marked HW ·identifies the number of topics Senator WILLIAMS introduced. The second column identifies the number of topics introduced by the other people in those conversations. The four columns to the right further break down the types of topics that Senator WILLIAMS introduced. There are four such types of topics. Re­questing information, reporting facts, small talk, and reporting opinions.

All six of Senator WILLIAMS' topics in the June 28 coaching session were requests for information.

In the June 28 meeting with the sheik, the Senator introduces only two topics, both reporting facts. One was a description of the mine (pp. 107-109>; the other was a continu­ation of that description (pp, 116-117>.

In the August 5 tape, the Senator brings up only 5 of the 26 topics; two are requests for information, three are small talk <"sorry I'm late," "how are things?" and "meet my wife.")

In the September 11 meeting, 17 of the Senator's 24 topics were requests for infor-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3317 mat ion. He introduced two topics in which he reported facts. (" I've never been down there to the plant," and " the only one you talk to down there is Bosacki" ). He int ro­duces two small talk topics <"Cab driver" and travel plans" ) and he reports four opin­ions such as "the plant didn't look like it was ready to work" and " I think the smart way for me to go is to pay the taxes."

In the October 7 tape, the Senator's 10 topics include 6 requests for information, 3 small talk topics and 1 reporting of a fact.

Date

June 28 audio .................................. . June 28 video

In the last tape, January 15, the Senator's 10 topics include 5 requests for information, 3 small talk topics and 2 reporting facts ("What this legislation does" and "my inter­est is with the mining development").

It is extremely unusual, in normal conver­sation, to report so few facts and opinions. Senator WILLIAMS' role is clearly marked by this analysis as an "outsider" to the infor­mation shared by others.

Of his topics, 60 percent are requests for information, a highly disproportionate per­centage for one speaker in any conversation.

CHART 2-SENATOR WILLIAMS' RESPONSES

He is clearly trying to find out what is going on.

It is equally important for you to observe that, especially under the circumstances for which you are meeting, the topics which on the tapes clearly indicate that Senator WIL­LIAMS did not introduce such as money or stocks.

RESPONSES TO THE TOPICS OF OTHERS Another important clue to the intentions

of a speaker in a conversation can be found in the responses which he makes to the topics introduced by the others.

I understand Changes subject

Answers with full response

Responds positively

Responds negatively No response I hear you what you're Defers topic

saying

13 13

Aug. 5 audio .. Sept. 11 video Oct. 7 video ..

·:::::::::::::::::::::::::::············:: :::::::::: ::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·· ············ ····g·· 8

···5 2 2

·····2s--· ·············T ·

I

T ... 2 2

Jan. 15 video.

Total. .......... .

Percentages . .......... ..................... .. . ............................ .

Again, the dates of the conversations iden­tify each tape. The eight columns are marked to indicate the types of responses made by the Senator: No response at all is the first column, followed by what linguists call the lax-token responses such as uh-huh, yeah, or OK. Such responses do not indicate agreement. They are used in conversation because a person who is talking requires feedback. To provide such feedback, people nod their heads, say uh-huh, etc., not out of agreement but, rather, to signify, "I hear you" or "I understand what you're saying." This is a very important thing to keep in mind when you listen to conversation. These second and third columns do not sig­nify agreement. The responses here are lax­tokens. The fourth column indicates that the Senator's response is to change the sub­ject. The fifth column signifies that his re­sponse was to defer the topic to some unde­termined future point. The sixth, seventh, and eighth columns are full responses <such as who, what, where, etc.) and truly positive or negative responses.

Senator WILLIAMS' responses strongly sup­port the identification of his role as an "out­sider" to these conversations. Over two­thirds of his responses fall into the first three columns: No response or lax-tokens in­dicating " I hear you" or " I understand what you're saying." From the standpoint of normal conversation, this is a very dispro­portionate amount of passive responses.

Adding to the picture of his "outsider" and passive role are the responses of chang­ing the subject and deferring the topic, re­sponses which divert the subject to other things. Totalling these all together we get 88 percent of Senator WILLIAMS' responses which indicate no active involvement in the topics being discussed. This is an amazingly disproportionate amount for any conversa­tion.

Now let us look at Senator WILLIAMS' re­sponses which make up the remaining 12 percent full, positive and negative re­sponses.

On August 5, two full responses were that he spoke with Affleck and that he likes to know how things are coming along. His four positive responses were agreement that he had spoken to the chairman of the board, that somebody is working on it, and that he

.................... ...... 2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·

······························· 30 24 30 19 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__:~~~-=-~~___:_

24 18 24 15

agrees that he should be kept apprised of this thing.

In the September 11 tape, the Senator's two positive responses are to Weinberg's statement that they are not going any fur­ther until they get his OK and to Devito's question about the Government's feeling about titanium.

In the October 7 tape, Senator WILLIAMS' full responses are that a blind trust is the way for his purposes, that he talks titanium to anybody and that titanium is still prime. His positive responses were that some plans had been approved, and that somebody had already gotten a license. His negative re­sponse was that he does not know McDon­ald.

In the January 15 tape, Senator WIL­LIAMS' single full response is a lenghty de­scription of how the legislation is normally done. His two negative responses were that he had not contacted people and, of course, his quadruple negative response to the sheik's offer of money.

From this analysis of the responses made by Senator WILLIAMS to the topics intro­duced by others, you should see two very clear patterns.

1. Senator WILLIAMS is an "outsider" to the information shared by others. His major role is to discover what is going on.

2. His substantive <full, positive and nega­tive responses) are totally innocuous in terms of the reason for this meeting today.

At this point I would like to call your at­tention back again to the four major agen­das of the Government agents in their con­versations with Senator WILLIAMS. I will try to preserve a chronological approach but I must warn that the agent's agendas often carry across two or more tapes. For this reason, I have identified the dates of the tapes in my examples.

The first Government agenda was to get Senator WILLIAMS to agree to use his influ­ence or position to secure Government Con­tracts for the proposed mine. I call your at­tention now to chart 3, "Government Con­tracts: Lack of Mutual Understanding", which contains five examples.

CHART 3-GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: LACK OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

<1 June 28> H.W. When we came to you with this and

the mine plant we also came with another element and that is the opportunity to buy a processing plant .. . when we've got it to­gether we move. We move with our govern­ment and we catch up, go ahead we have what we need, which we don't have now. We've got thirty thousand tons we could produce a year. Therefore, with what we got of this value, knowing the need of our coun­try, being in a position to go ah well you know right to the top on this one.

<2 June 28) A.E. says H.W. will utilize him in contracts

with the government, blows H.W.'s horn and asks how long he 's been in Washington now? Twenty years?

H.W. More than that ... <3 June 28)

T.D. Well then .. . with you being in that position and contracts the like would not be a problem.

< 4 September 11) T.D. let me ask you a question, have you

talked to anybody within the government as to what their feeling is about titanium?

H.W. As a matter of fact ... the situation on titanium can be described as desperate.

<5 October 7) T.D. you had opportunity to discuss with

anybody in er you know on-the govern­ment?

H.W. I talk titanium with anybody .. . like Bethlehem Steel . . .

The first example is from the June 28 meeting with the Sheik. At this point, Sena­tor WILLIAMS had just changed the subject away from DeVito's extolling of the Sena­tor's power and position to the nature of the mine. He says "Could I back up and just de­scribe . .. what we have here." For a page and a half, the Senator describes the uniqueness of the ore body at the mine. Now look at example 1:

" l. HW: When we came to you with this and the mine plant we also came with an­other element and that is the opportunity to buy a processing plant ... What we got

3318 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 there in our ground ... When we've got it together, we move. We move with our Gov­ernment and we catch up, we go ahead, we have what we need, which we don't have now ... We've got thirty thousand tons we could produce a year. Therefore, with what we got of this value, knowing the need of our country, being in a position to go ah, well, you know, right to the top on this one."

From the Senate Ethics Committee report, it appears that "to go ... right to the top on this one" is some sort of evidence that the Senator will use his influence to get Government contracts. The context in which this expression is used, however, makes it utterly clear that "Going right to the top" can mean only that if the sheik provides the loan, the venture will succeed. To go right to the top does not, in this con­text, refer to the top of the Government. It means become successful in the business at hand, as the context clearly indicates. The agent's attempts, therefore, fail.

The second example of the attempt to get the Senator to agree to secure Government contracts also occurs in the June 28 conver­sation.

"2. AE: Says HW will utilize him in con­tracts with the Government, blows HW's horn and asks HW how long 'he's been in Washington now, 20 years?'

"HW: More than that ... " After saying the words, "Government con­

tracts," Errichetti produces a 19-line state­ment in which he blows the Senator's horn and, at the end, asks the Senator how long he's been in Washington, "twenty years?" The recency principle in linguistics dictates that when a person is presented with more than one proposition, he responds to the last, or most recent one despite whatever has been said before. Senator WILLIAMS does exactly this and elaborates on his serv­ice in the House and Senate. By this time, the meaning of Errichetti's brief mention of "Contracts with the Government" had been lost and they were on to a different topic.

There has been no connection of Govern­ment contracts in the Senator's response. By changing the direction of his conversa­tion, Errichetti had so successfully camou­flaged his statement about Government contracts that he got no response to it. By the time he posed his question to the Sena­tor, that topic had become ancient history. The attempt, therefore, fails.

The third example, from the June 28 con­versation, also cited by the Senate Ethics Committee report, should not have been cited at all since the word used is contracts, not government contracts.

"3. TD. Well then ... with you being in that position and contracts and, uh, the like would not be a problem."

This statement cannot be assumed to mean government contracts because govern­ment is not mentioned. The Senator re­sponds "no problem," indicating clearly that contracts would not be a problem. To read anything else into this statement is to infer­ence a connection of what might have been meant, not what was actually said and re­corded. The attempt fails.

The fourth example of the effort to get Senator Williams to get government con­tracts is the September 11 tape, when DeVito asks:

"4. TD. Senator, let me ask you a ques­tion, have, have, uh you talked to anybody with uh within the government as to what their feeling is about titanium?

"HW. As a matter of fact ... the stitua­tion on on titanium can be described as des­perate."

Rather than focusing on "anybody in gov­ernment," Senator Williams focuses on the titanium and changes the topic to the des­perate shortage of it. The Senator's re­sponse should not be confused with pump­ing government officials for contracts. Al­though contracts may have been what DeVito wanted to hear, he phrased his ques­tion in such a way that any answer could easily focus on titanium, not on persons in Government.

The Senator says that he talks about tita­nium with people. The attempt therefore, fails.

The fifth example of the attempt to get Senator Williams to agree to solicit Govern­ment contracts occurs on the October 7 tape.

"5. TD. Have you had an opportunity to discuss, er, titanium with anybody in er you know in ... the Government?

"HW. I talk titanium with everybody ... like Bethlehem Steel. . . . "

Having not received the desired response here, DeVito recycles his use of the word Government two more times immediately following. Senator Williams' responses con­tain no evidence that he had talked about Government contracts. The attempt, there­fore, fails again.

The strategies used by the Government agents to attempt to secure Senator Wil­liams' agreement to use his office to get Government contracts, then are as follows: wrench from context <example 1), camou­flage with a series of questions after the critical word is used <example 2), be vague or ambiguous in what you ask <examples 3 and 4) and recycle the question three times <example 5).

All other mentionings of the issue of Gov­ernment contracts in the Senate Ethics Committee report distort reality by wrench­ing from context or by implying that the topic was about Government contracts when the recorded evidence clearly indi­cates that it is not.

A detailed analysis of these destortions is available in my paper, "Factual Errors and Misrepresentation in the Report of the Select Committee on Ethics, U.S. Senate In­vestigation of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr.," available through Senator Williams' office.

In summary of this point, the Govern­ment agents' strategies for trying to get Senator Williams to use his influence and office to secure Government contracts ut­terly fail.

The second Government agent agenda in these tapes is to get Senator Williams to hide his interest in the mining venture. The Senate Ethics Committee report claims that he did. The recorded conversation, however, makes it very clear that it is the Govern­ment agents who attempt to criminalize his words by using hidden while in sharp con­trast, Senator Williams used the words blind trust. Chart 4 illustrates examples of this effort from three tapes: August 5, Septem­ber 11, and October 7.

CHART 4-BLIND TRUST VS. "HIDDEN INTEREST"

1August5: M.W. Keep it secret, protect you, 100%

protection. T.D. You protected, your position protect-

ed, everybody protected. 2 September 11: H.W. Right, pay the taxes. 3 October 7: M.W. Sandy spoke about you going to de­

clare 17 million dollars profit or something. H.W. No ... I'm going to find a way to

protect myself with some other kind of dee-

laration. I'm going to have to go public with something or other.

T.D .... Everything was going to be hidden ... .

T.D. Everybody can declare ... you can't.

H.W. Well this is where the lawyer comes in Alex ... We can blind trust me you know ... .

4 October 7: T.D .... You were going to declare it but

in some other way. H.W. Now if it's a blind trust ... that's

the way for my purposes. T.D .... I said when the Senator said he

wanted to declare ... he was trying to pro­tect himself . . . by coming up with some gimmick.

H.W. Well there we have it under the trust ... so I've done what I had to do.

In the August 5 tape, for example, the only references to secrecy were made by Weinberg and DeVito. Example 1 displays these expressions:

"1. MW. Keep it secret, protect you, 100 percent protection.

"TD. You protected, your position pro­tected, everybody protected."

In example 2, September 11, we see Sena­tor Williams saying that he will pay the taxes:

"2. HW. Right, pay the taxes." In the October 7 tape, Senator Williams

responds to the overture of Weinberg and DeVito by stating forthrightly and ethically that he will "declare" and "go public" and use a legal "blind trust" should this business venture ever become a reality <example 3).

"3. MW. Sandy spoke about you going to declare 17 million dollars profit or some­thing.

"HW. No ... I'm going to find a way to protect myself some kind of declaration. I'm going to have to go public with something or other.

"TD. Everybody can declare . . . you can't .... . "HW. Wel~. this is where the lawyer comes mAlex ....

I call your attention to the contrast be­tween the words used by Senator Williams <declaration, go public, and blind trust) with those used by the agents <hidden).

We can blind trust me you know ... Again, on October 7 <example 4) DeVito

attempts to criminalize Senator Williams' earlier declared intentions to use a legal blind trust with words such as "some other way" and "some gimmick". To this, Senator Williams responds, again, with his clear in­dication to use a legal blind trust.

"4. TD .... You were gonna declare it, but in some other way.

"HW .... now if it's a blind trust ... that's the way for my purposes.

"TD: ... I said when the Senator said he wanted to declare ... He was trying to pro­tect himself . . . by coming up with some gimmick.

"HW. Well there we have it under the trust ... so I've done what I had to do."

The Government agent's strategy of trying to convert legal language into covert or illegal words produces an effect of con­tamination. The Senate Ethics Committee report falls into this trap, overlooking what was actually said by Senator Williams in favor of an interpretation which highlights what Weinberg and DeVito said, even though these word were denied and rejected by the Senator. The Government agent's strategy of attempting to criminalize the

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3319 language, leading to listener contamination, clearly fails.

The third Government agent agenda, to get Senator Williams to accept a bribe for sponsoring legislation on behalf of the pre­sumed Arab sheik also fails to accomplish their agenda. In this, the government agents would have to accomplish two things.

"l. Get Senator Williams to agree to spon­sor the legislation.

"2. Get Senator Williams to accept a bribe."

It is abundantly clear from the recorded conversation that Senator Williams rejected the bribery offer <chart 5). On January 15 the following is said <see example 1 >:

"1. RF. I, I, will for, for your help, er, as­sistance and assistance-I would like to give you, er, you know, some money for, for per­manent ...

"HW.No. "HW. No, No, No." There can be no question about Senator

Williams' rejection of this strategy. But did he ever agree to sponsor the legislation? The statements Senator Williams makes about the difficulty related to such legisla­tion are revealing <chart 6).

CHART 5-BRIBERY OFFER 1. Money: R.F. I, I will for, for your help, er, assist­

ance and assistance-I would like to give you, er, you know, some money for, for per­manent--

H.W.No. R.F. Residence. H.W. No. No. No. 2. Attempt to link legislation with loan: R.F. Uh as long as possible for sure, as­

sured me uh regard er permanent residence. Er business for titanium mine will be sucess­fully concluded. End of, end of er month.

H.W. Yes? R.F. Can I? H.W. You can be. R.F. I be-­H.W. Youcan-­R.F. Be sure. H.W. You can leave with my assurance

that I will do those things that will, will bring you on for the consideration of perma­nency. Quite frankly, I can't issue that ... I can't personally. Er, it, it is a law.

CHART 6-LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL PREREQUISITES

SENATOR WILLIAMS' STATEMENTS: JANUARY 15

It's not easy. There have to be good reasons. Meet some criteria. Harder now than 5 years ago. It has been restricted. Best results when a person of good charac­

ter. If that person were made to return to his

country he would face great personal hard­ship.

The situation has to be fully understood. Criteria. It's an exceptional situation. After full knowledge of your situation. It's processed through a committee. Then also in the other body. Quite frankly I can't issue that. I cannot personally. It goes through the whole dignified proc­

ess of passing a law. The Senator says, "It's not easy, there

have to be good reasons, meet some criteria, harder now than 5 years ago, it has been re­stricted, best results when a person of good character, if that person were made to return to his country he could face great personal hardship, the situation has to be

fully understood, criteria, it's an exceptional situation, it is processed through a commit­tee, then also in the other body, quite frank­ly I can't issue that, I cannot personally, it goes through the whole dignified process of passage a law."

Throughout this tape, Senator WILLIAMS requests information that is necessary to even consider such legislation. He says that he does not know the sheik well enough. He asks for the names of potential supporters or sponsors. To this the Senator receives little or no information and he finally con­cludes:

"I will do those things that will bring you or for the consideration of permanency. Quite frankly, I can't issue that ... I cannot personally. Uh, it is a law. And it has to be, goes through the whole dignified process of passage a law."

Does Senator WILLIAMS promise to spon­sor the legislation? Clearly not. He offers to help get together the necessary information for the sheik to even be considered. He needs to know a great deal more before any­thing like sponsorship could even be consid­ered.

The Government agent strategies used to try to accomplish this agenda item again are to be as ambiguous as possible in order to obtain self-incrimination by the Senator. The vehicle for this was the inarticulate, broken English of the agent. Once again, however, the strategy fails since not one aspect of the agenda is accomplished.

The fourth Government agent agenda, the attempt to get Senator WILLIAMS to link sponsoring the legislation for the presumed sheik to securing a loan for the proposed mining venture, also fails. I have already pointed out that the recorded evidence does not show that the Senator even agreed to sponsor the legislation.

This did not deter the agents, however, for after the second telephone interruption <a popular strategy of the agents which occurs at crucial, peak moments in their tapes), such an effort was made. <Chart 5, example 2):

"2. R.F. Oh, as long as possible for sure, assured me uh regard er permanent resi­dence. Er business for titanium mine will be successfully concluded. End of er month.

"H.W. Yes? "R.F. Can I? "H.W. You can be-­"R.F. I be--"H.W. You can-­"R.F. Be sure "H.W. You can leave with my assurance

that I will do those things that will, will bring you on for the consideration of per­manency. Quite frankly, I can't issue that ... I cannot personally. Er, it, it is a law ... "

Two questions must be asked here. < 1) Did Farhart, with his broken English, link the titanium venture with the legislation? <2> What did Senator WILLIAMS agree to? You should keep clearly in mind that the written representation, as garbled as it is, is not nearly as garbled as the words on the tapes themselves. The spoken version is the one which Senator WILLIAMS had to decipher on the spot. It contained long, unnatural pauses, unpredictable sequences of words, deleted prepositions and deleted articles. Senator WILLIAMS' "yes" is not agreement. It is uttered with rising intonation and sig­nifies "Keep talking, I hear you." But even if one were to take it as agreement, it is im­possible to know exactly with what it might have agreed. Even Farhart is not sure for he then asks the question, "Can I?" which he

omitted from his previous garbled question. At this point Senator WILLIAMS begins his twice interrupted explanation that he will do the things necessary for the consider­ation of permanency-a promise of no more than to help gather the information neces­sary for the sheik to apply.

If there was any link made by Farhart to link legislation to the titanium venture, there is no indication of this in Senator WILLIAMS' words. He denies his authority to carry out the legislation and to be alone re­sponsible for it. He outlines the legal proc­ess and does not offer hope that it can be done. And he does not even mention the mine in this regard. The agent's strategies of vagueness through garbled English, stra­tegic telephone interruptions which block exculpatory explanations and verbal inter­ruption, all fail.

The major agendas of the Government agents were to get Senator WILLIAMS to agree to these four things. In the process, they used several strategies, some of which have already been mentioned. The strategy of blocking exculpatory statements with telephone interruptions or other verbal interruptions is one strategy. The obvious goal of such taping is to get Senator WIL­LIAMS or any other designated target to either commit an illegal act on camera, to retell past illegal acts. or to promise future illegal acts. It is clear from the taped evi­dence that Senator WILLIAMS did none of these.

It is consistent with the goal of taping such acts that efforts on the part of desig­nated targets to make exculpatory state­ments would be blocked.

Another strategy used by the agents, al­ready mentioned, is the use of criminalizing language. The Senator's use of blind trust is translated, by the agents, as hidden and secret.

Coaching is another strategy used by the agents. The case of Senator WILLIAMS is un­usual in that a recording was made of the actual coaching session. In the June 28 audio tape, Weinberg gives 28 directives that Senator WILLIAMS was to make in the following meeting with the sheik. Chart 7 displays these directives with the results next to them. On the left side of this chart are Weinberg's directives used, in the re­hearsal tape. On the right side, in three col­umns, is the performance itself. The three columns indicate whether it was Errichetti, Devito or Senator WILLIAMS who brought up the topic coached, or rehearsed, by Weinberg.

CHART 7-JUNE 28 AUDIO

Weinberg's rehearsal directions Errichetti

Performance by-

De Vito Williams

~~i~if~e ~n![i: ::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: ~ ::::::::::::::::::: ~ ::::::::::::::::::: Who you know ... ......................... . X .... . Chairman of whatever ....................... X .. ..... .................... .. How important... ................................ X ............................. . Without you there is no deal. ........... X ........ ..... . ....•. You put this together ............................................... X .................. .

~o!v gi:~~~r .. ~.~~.'.~.~~.~.::::::::::::::: :: ~ ::: ................ ·:c:::::::::::::::: Influence for contracts ...... X ......... .. ........ X .................. . Important ........................... ................ X .......... ....... .. X ................. . How important you are ..................... X ................ ... X Who you are ...................................... X ................ X Without me, no deal.. ........................ X ........... ........ X .. I'm the man ................................................................. . Open doors ............................................................... X Use influence ..................... .. ...... ........ X ................... X .................. . I guarantee this ................................. X ............... .. .. ..... .. ............... . We'll produce.............. .. .. ... ... X ............... .. Blow your own horn ... .. .................. .. . X ................... X .................. . Who you control ....................................................... X ................. .. I can move this .................... .. .................................. X .................. .

3320 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1981 CHART 7-JUNE 28 AUDIO-Continued

Weinberg's rehearsal directions Performance by-

Errichetti DeVito

~~ra~~1~e t~saci X ........... ... .. .. ..... .. ............ . ... X ........ .. .. .... .. X .... ..

You 're loss ....... . ~~~enfrn~~r .... .. .. .. .. ................... ·x-........ .. Come on strong .. ... . . ..................... X .. .

. X ........ .

. X .. X ..

.. x ...

Williams

You should notice from this chart that it is Errichetti and Devito who initiate these directives and not Senator Williams. The difference between initiating or introducing a topic is crucial to keep in mind. This is not to deny that Senator Williams mentioned that the Vice President used to be on his committee or that Secretary Vance was a neighbor. But these and three other state­ments of who he know were made in re­sponse to questions asked Senator Williams by Devito and Errichetti. This difference is very important. What Senator Williams does not say is as important as what he does say. One last point should be observed about Weinberg's coaching. About half way down his list of directives, Weinberg changes from saying what to say to using exact words, or scripting, the similarity of these tapes to making a movie is more than coincidental. Even the lines were to be re­hearsed.

Another important strategy used by the Government in this case is to isolate Sena­tor Williams from the information which the others share. If the other participants are co-opted in advance, the peer pressure on the "outsider" is very great. The insider­outsider motif in these tapes is most evident in the topics introduced by the Senator.

In this case, the Government strategy in isolating the target from the knowledge held by others is reasonably successful. Many meetings were held in which Senator Williams was not present. When he was present he often had to pry the information out.

The last agent strategy I would like to mention is what I call camouflaging. By this I mean that the agents make something im­portant seem unimportant. The September 11 meeting is a classic example. The meet­ing was introduced as "unofficial" and "hy­pothetical". In contrast to the July 11 meet­ing, in which Senator Williams was not present, the September 11 meeting con­tained no business meeting language or pro­cedures.

The "insiders" meeting had taken place on July 11, in the Senator's absence. The baloney meeting was not about to happen. The significance of the camouflage strategy is that Weinberg and Devito evidence one major agenda or goal in this meeting: To get the Senator's OK on the resale scheme. If the meeting were to be announced and car­ried out as "unofficial" and "hypothetical," it would seem less threatening, especially to an "outsider" to the plans devised outside of Senator Williams' presence. Weinberg and Devito try ten times to get the Senator's OK and they fail each time. He gives no positive response to their requests. The very fact that his OK is sought ten times is, in fact, evidence that they had not gotten it each previous time. It should be noted that one of the efforts to secure his OK came in the form of a vote <even though the meet­ing had been declared unofficial>.

The tape transcript records Senator Wil­liams with an aye after his initials but there is not audible "H.W: aye" on this tape. The

camera quality is so poor that it is not possi­ble to see lip movement.

The strategy of camouflaging the real agenda with the label of "unofficial," then trying for the commitment fails again. It is difficult to tell what anyone might do in a situation in which it has been declared that this is not an official meeting, where two threads of conversation get hopelessly mixed up, where all the participants argue over what the Senator said, where Weinberg takes both sides of the same issue, where Errichetti revamps history by asking for an official vote and declares that he heard a motion which was never made and a vote is recorded in the transcript by speakers when such detailed recording of ayes has not been possible to record even in the official July 11 meeting.

Even if Senator Williams did vote aye <which my trained ear cannot detect from the sound track), what could it have meant under such conditions? Only one thing is clear: That the nine efforts made to this point to get Senator Williams' ''OK" were frustrating enough that an "OK" had to be manufactured in whatever way they could get it.

Further evidence that they did not get the Senator's "OK" at this time can be seen by the tenth effort, by Weinberg:

M.W. We're not going any further till we get your OK. But no sooner has Errichetti made this statement about Senator Wil­liams' motion when Weinberg asks the Sen­ator if he wants anything to eat:

M.W. Want anything Pete? H.W.No. Then Errichetti tries to continue his

motion and Weinberg continues: M.W. Sure? As a strategy for distraction, this sudden

introduction of an offer of food is effective. On top of all the other confusion and cam­ouflage in this conversation, Weinberg does not even permit discussion of the motion to be aired.

Using my expertise an as analyst of lan­guage discourse, I studied all of the tapes used as evidence before you and came to the following major conclusions:

< 1 > Senator Williams did no agree to use his influence or position to secure Govern­ment contracts for the proposed mining ven­ture.

<2> Senator Williams did not agree to hide his interest in the proposed mining venture.

(3) Senator Williams did not accept a bribe for sponsoring legislation on behalf of the presumed Arab sheik.

< 4 > Senator Williams did not link the sponsoring of legislation on behalf of the presumed sheik to securing a loan from the sheik for the proposed business venture.

Despite all of the strategies used by the Government agents to accomplish these aims, the recorded evidence makes it abun­dantly clear that they fail.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you all for your attention. I have not pointed out all the facts which my linguistic analy­sis of these tapes have revealed. For the sake of time, I have focused on what are the major, substantive issues in this case.

In all humility I take this opportunity to remind you that the careful and accurate analysis of evidence of this type, hours of tape recorded data and hundreds of pages of transcripts, is not something that can be done casually or passively. Language is a complex phenomenon. The paradox of it all is that we know how to use it but very few know how we actually do this. This is the work of linguists. We specialized in how people use language to get things done.

Years of training in phonetics, grammar, semantics, and discourse structure attune our ears to hear, record and analyze the thousands of signals which we all use when we talk. An analogy might be in order here. We have all seen an X-ray. When we see it we can easily say, "That surely is an X-ray." But when a physician looks at an X-ray, he sees things in it that the medical layman never sees. It is not that his vision is better than ours. It is how he sees.

Sincerely, ROGER W. SHUY, Ph.D.,

Professor of linguistics, Georgetown University and senior linguist, Center for Applied Linguistics.

I, Dr. Roger W. Shuy, hereby depose and state under oath that I have read the fore­going and it is true and correct to my best knowledge and belief.

ROGER W. SHUY. Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I ap­

preciate the attention the Members of the Senate gave to that reading, and thank the clerk for the superb manner in which he read.

The next topic area that I want to introduce--

Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from New Jersey yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from California.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, I have read this analysis by Professor Shuy, who is described as a professor of linguistics, who has studied phonet­ics, grammar, semantics, and discourse structure for many years; and he has taken the analysis of language to a mi­crolevel to which I have never taken it in my own linguistic studies.

I am rather impressed with the way in which he analyzes how a question is stated and how the response is given and how the response is given in a dif­ferent language from that in which the question is stated.

So that this author says that what these people-who are distinguished by such initials as "MW" and so on­ask is frequently frustrated by HW not replying precisely to the question being asked or agreeing to the propos­al being made.

I have found this particular docu­ment of very special interest in trying to evaluate what has been going on. It seems to me very clear that these agents, in talking to Senator WIL­LIAMS, were trying to get him to say something which, somehow or other, Senator WILLIAMS fails to say. As the professor says at the end, Senator WILLIAMS did not agree to use his in­fluence or position to secure Govern­ment contracts; Senator WILLIAMS did not agree to hide his interest in the proposed mining venture; Senator WILLIAMS did not accept a bribe for sponsoring legislation; Senator WIL­LIAMS did not link the sponsoring of legislation on behalf of the presumed sheik to securing a loan from the sheik for the proposed business venture.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3321 So far as the contents of the analysis

of this document are concerned, it seems to me that this professor of lin­guistics is correct.

I do not presume at this point to go into the remainder of it, but I must say that I have been impressed by this witness. I have not been following lin­guistics very carefully since I came to the United States, I must say, so I have not heard about Professor Shuy and his work. I am impressed with his very detailed microanalysis of linguis­tic interaction.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I am very grateful for the thought of the distinguished Senator from California, who, we all know, is a professor of semantics.

Is that "micro" or "macro"? May I ask that question?

I thought, without talking to the Senator from California about this, that the analysis of a linguist would be of particular interest to him as the Senator from California has a back­ground as an acknowledged leader in the profession of micro or macro se­mantics. Obviously, I am not very versed in either.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. I grew up in a generation that did not use words such as "micro" and "macro." We spoke English. [Laughter.]

If you insist upon using these words, I would say that my kind of semantics was macro, in the sense that if you want to use the terms we used at the time when I was beginning my work­it was a form of propaganda analysis.

What we did was to analyze whole speeches, whole advertising cam­paigns. If we got to the microlevel, we would examine, let us say, Nazi propa­ganda or advertisements, slogans for soaps and detergents, and see how they played with words.

However, we did not try to study, for example, what goes on here as to the evasions. When A says to B, "Would you like to buy this car?" and B says, "No; I have always been interested in Oldsmobiles," he is really not answer­ing the question.

There also are ways of evading an answer and not committing oneself; whereas, the question is direct enough.

Insofar as Professor Shuy does make this kind of analysis of the way in which a response does not correspond to the question, that particular kind of analysis-shall I call it microanaly­sis?-is not something I have done as a student of language. That is why this particular document fascinated me very much.

It is a whole new way of looking at things. But I am reminded that Prof. Carl Rodgers of the psychology de­partment at that time of the Universi­ty of Chicago, and later on he moved to La Jolla and started his own insti­tute in psychology, in studying the transcripts of psychotherapy sessions between a psychologist and his pa­tients which were taped and then

when studied that kind of interaction they must have gone into microanaly­sis of question and response, argument and counterargument, very often not adjusting to each other at all and so on, but since I never became a psy­chotherapist I never got into that kind of microanalysis myself. All I am saying is this particular document I found very fascinating.

I thank the Chair. Mr. WILLIAMS. I thank the Sena­

tor. May I inquire of the Senator from

California whether there is in this world of nnderstanding communica­tion whicJ:'l i would suggest is unnatu­ral because for some it has a purpose that is not clear to others in the con­versation, an explanation for the hidden camera and the hidden taping which creates an unnatural situation. Not only the linguist has an interest in analysis which achieves understanding and defines meaning and intent. What really went on in that kind of conver­sation? The semanticist perhaps, and I gather the psychologist as well might answer my question. Is there a role, in the Senator's opinion, for the psychol­ogist to understand the true projec­tion of what happened in a conversa­tion where one side knows that it is being taped and the other side does not? Where one side has a certain agenda that the other side is not aware of?

Mr. HAYAKAWA. I have not stud­ied enough of these direct personal interactions which, as I say, my former colleague, Dr. Carl Rodgers would study on the basis of taping psy­chological therapy sessions. I never got into that area. So I really cannot answer the Senator's question, but I can say this much: that the farther Dr. Rodgers went into psychotherapy the more he found it necessary to have not only a tape of the therapy session but he wanted movies of it so he could see the facial expressions of the people involved and to watch how they reacted to each other so that if someone was evading a question or trying to hide his true emotions, et cetera, even if you could not detect it in the language itself you sometimes detect it in the face.

But the movies we have that we saw were so poor-I mean you did not have good lighting as you have in profes­sional movies-that I did not see very much of people's expressions and peo­ple's faces in the movies that were se­cretly made of your interviews with other people.

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is the most important insight that the Senator from California just developed. That observation, and I know that there has been much criticism from people of this profession of taping in this Abscam because of the very poor ar­rangements the lighting, and the pic­ture does not really represent what is

happening because the pictures, and that is one of the reasons, because the pictures are so bad.

Mr. HAYAKAWA. I am sure that must be the case.

I must say I am not enough of an expert in these matters to be able to judge, but I thought that the pictures I saw that were shown to me as pho­tography were lousy. That was not great for semantics either. They do not reveal too much.

Mr. WILLIAMS. In Dr. Shuy's paper there was a suggestion that a vote had been taken at one of the meetings he studied. It was a video taped meeting. And if you heard any of the audios or saw any of the videos, you know that I have a voice that does come through quite clearly when I speak. It is per­haps unfortunate; but, at any rate, whenever I said anything it was re­corded on those tapes. He did not hear an "aye." The vote was taken. It may have been official or unofficial. I do not know. But there was a suggestion that a vote was taken, and he did not hear any "aye" from me; but he made the observation in his paper that the video taping was so poor there was no way to se. whether my lips even moved. And so this brings me to an­other request.

I have not, I will confess, read some material that was presented in the Ju­diciary Committee of the House of Representatives regarding this world of taping-secret taping-and analysis from various standpoints.

There was a psychologist, Dr. Albert Levitt, a clinical psychologist who de­livered a paper there. A copy was sent over to me this morning, and I think it might be useful to have it in the RECORD at this point together with an­other linguist's statement that was given to me for the RECORD.

So if they would be included in the RECORD at this point as part of Dr. Shuy's report it will be appreciated.

Mr. President, there is another sub­stantial document that was given to me and, obviously, I have not read it. It is a psychological monograph of general applied studies of individuals and their conformity of a minority when opposed by a unanimous majori­ty.

I think that we will not include that in the RECORD. But if anyone has an interest in this the study has been done by Solomon Ash of Swarthmore College on that subject.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The mate­rial which has been submitted will be printed in the RECORD.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, that last document is voluminous, and it would not be proper for me to put it in the RECORD at this point until I have reviewed it.

The VICE PRESIDENT. I had refer­ence to the material that has been submitted as part of exhibit 7.

3322 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is right. EXHIBIT 7

ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS

WITNESS LIST, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JU­DICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CON­STITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Hearing: FBI Undercover Operations. Date: Tuesday, March 2, 1982. Time: 9:30 a.m. Room: 2141 Rayburn HOB. Dr. Roger Shuy, Senior Linguist, Center

for Applied Linguistics, Professor of Lin­guistics, Georgetown University.

Dr Albert Levitt, Consulting Psychologist, Tem~le University, Unit of Law and Psychi­atry, Senior Psychologist to Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.

Mary Gallagher, J.D., Ph.D., Attorney and Linguist.

OPENING STATEMENT OF DON EDWARDS

Good morning. Today's hearing repre­sents a continuation of our ongoing over­sight of FBI undercover operations and guidelines.

Previous witnesses who have appeared before this subcommittee have suggested that there has been a subtle change in the approach of the FBI to law enforcement. Traditionally, the Federal Bureau of Inves­tigation has operated as a "reactive" <or after the fact) investigative agency. In other words, a crime is committed, then report.ed to the FBI, and thereafter the Bure~u m­vestigates the offense and gathers evidence to support the eventual arrest and prosecu­tion of the perpetrator(s). However, we have been told that there has been a shift of sorts in law enforcement strategy towards a "proactive" <or before the fact) investigative posture. We have received repeated assur­ances from Justice Department and FBI of­ficials that elaborate safeguards exist to insure that such tactics do not ensnare inno­cent victims not involved in criminal activi­ty.

This morning's hearing will focus on the increased use of audio and videotaping of suspects in the course of undercover investi­gations. The thrust of the argument in sup­port being that enhanced supervision of ac­tivities in the field is possible by FBI and Department of Justice officials. Als~: t:t;iat eventually a jury can "see and hear with their own eyes and ears the conduct and willingness of a suspect to engage in illegal activities. However, experts in the field of linguistics have cautioned that this "seeing is believing" idea may be, in fact, misleading and capable of manipulation.

We look forward to our witnesses this morning sharing with us their expertise in the area.

Our first witness is Professor Roger Shuy.

STATEMENT OF ROGER W. SHUY, PH. D. To the Honorable Members of the House

Judiciary Committee: I am a professor of linguistics at Georgetown University where I also am Head of the Sociolingusitics Pro­gram. In addition, I am Senior Linguist at the Center for Applied Linguistics. I have authored and edited twenty-two books a!ld over a hundred articles in the field of lm­guistics. I have served as the President .of the American Association of Applied Lm­guistics, as chairman of the Ethics c:ommit­tee of the Linguistic Society of America, and as chairman of the scientific commissions of the International Association of Applied Linguistics. ·

In recent years I have been called ypo~ to serve as an expert in lawsuits and llt1gat10n

relating to the language issues involved. in criminal cases, contract disputes, housmg discrimination, school desegregation 8:n~ social and welfare services. I have part1c1-pated in litigation in five Federal court dis­tricts.

Over the past 15 to 20 years I have tape­recorded some 1,500 hours of conversation and spent roughly 10,000 hours analyzing and listening to tape recorded conversations from approximately 2,000 informants. At Georgetown University, I teach a graduate seminar in linguistic interviewing and an­other in the relationship of linguistics to the field of law.

In most of the litigation in which I have been asked to be expert witness or consult­ant, the major source of evidence was in the form of surreptitious audio or video tapes made by the FBI. It is about my experience in analyzing these recordings that I wish to speak today.

WHAT IS LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS?

Since the field of linguistics is not widely known or understood by the public, it is first necessary to explain why this science is relevant to such a topic. All fields of human activity are conducted in language. Doctors and patients use it as do clerks and custom­ers teachers and students, lawyers and cli­ents and, in short, it is used in every imagi­nable communication. Linguists study such communication for its structure and for how the speakers express their intentions-what it is they want to say. This is called dis­course analysis. Linguists also make a number of other kinds of analyses such as phonological, grammatical and syntactical, all of which have an important bearing on the language used in everyday conversation.

In analyzing conversation, linguists study more than the way people talk about a par­ticular subject. They analyze all types of conversation about different subjects to identify what conversations have in common. In other words, linguists analyze how people talk not just what they talk about. Linguistics is not restricted to the study of the English language, but really embraces how all languages operate and what all languages have in common. Of course, we are not only interested in wh~t people have in common but also what is unique about individual speakers in a con­versation.

What I have called the structure of con­versation, which linguists refer to as dis­course is not always accessible to the un­trained listener or to someone who is merely reading a transcript. What a linguist can see in a conversation is similar to what a doctor can see in an x-ray. All of us can recognize what an x-ray is but that is not the same thing as understanding what the x-ray re­veals about the structure of the body. We may all know what a conversation is as we hear it or read it, but not everyone can follow all the nuances of its structure. The science of linguistics is no different from the physical sciences. We know what water looks like but our sciences have taught us that it is a combination of hydrogen and oxygen. We use that knowledge of what is invisible to the naked eye, we rely upon our scientific understanding of what water is, to enable us to do things with that substance that we would otherwise not know how to do.

WHY IS LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS NECESSARY?

It has been averred by prosecutors in cases which involve recorded evi?enc.e ~h~t the "tapes speak for themselves.'. This is m one sense true but, in another, qmte danger-

ous. The problems that juries have with ~vi­dence of this kind are great. The followmg are illustrations of problems for which lin­guistics can be helpful: 1. To prevent contamination

Those who listen to recordings of people talking tend to overgeneralize many thi~gs. For example if one listens to a conversation between two people, one of whom is swear­ing and the other of whom is not, the gener­al impression that the third party listener gets is that both are swearing. This is what I refer to as the contamination principle. In the tapes involved in the Abscam case of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr .. for exam­ple, it is clear that the swearing is being done overall by the government agents and by other participants, not by Senator Wil­liams. By the same token, the government operatives use the words hidden interest. Senator Williams uses the words blind trust. In a very few instances, the government agents use the words government contracts. Senator Williams does not. The words used by the government operatives about Sena­tor Williams in the first meeting with the presumed Arab sheik contrast sharply with what Senator Williams actually says about himself. Despite these clear contrasts in who said what, the court and even the U.S. Senate Ethics Committee became victims of contamination and overgeneralized mean­ings which were not there. The principle of contamination is especially dangerous and unfair. Careful analysis of who said what in the actual recorded evidence is carried out by linguists to diffuse and dispell this con­tamination. 2. To avoid swamping

Another problem involving tape recorded data as evidence in court cases is that the jury becomes innundated with data. Cases involving many tapes between many people taking place over long periods of time lead to a tremendous overload of information. Listeners are required to keep straight the various participants, what they said and what their roles are. The most difficult task of all is to separate the words and actions of one defendant from those of non-defend­ants and other defendants. This task is made much more difficult when the govern­ment agents act as provocateurs, making their roles ambiguous as well.

An important role of the linguist in assist­ing listeners when masses of recorded lan­guage data are in evidence is to trace the actual topics introduced, responses to the topics of another speaker, specific refer­ences to people, things or events through­out the many tapes and transcripts present­ed. The listeners should not confuse the re­sponses of another party with those of the defendant and, especially, they should not confuse what the defendant is reported to have said or done by another party with what he or she actually said or did.

The simple observation that "the tapes speak for themselves," then, runs several great risks. One risk is that listeners are not consciously aware of the structures of con­versation which, if recognized, will enable them to find the contextual or discourse meaning of a given speaker. They are aware of word meanings but words, outside of a context, are very slippery. Secondly .. listen­ers, when innundated or swamped with lan­guage data find it difficult to separate the words of one speaker at one time from the words of other speakers or from the re~re­sentation by other speakers of the first speaker. The principle of contamination is very active at such times.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3323 INTENTIONS

In a criminal case, the most essential factor in determinin1; innocence or guilt re­sides in the actions carried out along with the meaning of what is said. Actions are clearer by far than the meanings of what is said. But since tape recordings are the evi­dence for decision making in courts, it is necessary to address the question of mean­ing, along with its corollary question of in­tention. Intentions are usually hidden deep within a person's mind, but there are clues to intentionality which are marked in lan­guage use.

In order for an indictment to be brought or a conviction to be made from the evi­dence which surreptitious tape recorded data provides, these clues to intentions found in a speaker's language must be iden­tified. Since a person's intentions are his agenda, or goal, it is important to be able to identify the agendas of the speakers in such conversations if we are to understand the full meaning of the tapes.

It is clear, for example, that the agent's agendas are to capture, on tape, any illegal activity which the targets may espouse. Such activity may be an action agenda, such as the presentation or acceptance of a bribe on tape or camera. It may also be a retelling of past illegal activities, or it may be the promise or intent to commit a future illegal act.

The agendas of the target must also be carefully analyzed because what really mat­ters most is < 1) what the agendas of the speakers are-what they choose to talk about-and (2) how each speaker responds to the agendas or topics of the others. Lin­guistic analysis of such conversations identi­fies and makes clear what these agendas are. The method of such analysis begins with what linguists call topic analysis. This unit of analysis can be seen across all the conversations in which a given speaker ap­pears as well as in a specific, individual con­versation. By listening to the tapes and noting when topics are introduced and re­introduced, the listener can obtain a clear picture of what a speaker's agenda is. That is, we can determine what he or she really wanted to talk about, regardless of what the other speakers' agendas were. Nothing gives a clearer indication of a person's intentions than the topics or agendas he introduces in a conversation or across many conversa­tions.

The first tool, then, is the discovery of agendas. This is done by identifying the topics raised, by noting when and how fre­quently the topics are recycled and the structure of the sequencing of the recycled topics, the frequency of topic recycling and the way the recycled topics are sequenced, that is, how they are spaced in the conversa­tion, also give clues to the intentions of the speakers.

STRATEGIES

Strong clues to the intentions of speakers can be found in the topics they introduce and the responses they give to the topics of other speakers. But there is still more. All speakers have strategies for advancing their own agendas and, conversely, for blocking the agendas of others, especially those agen­das with which they are not comfortable. It is in this area of conversational strategies, especially strategies which block the agen­das of the other speaker, where recent FBI practice causes concern. The seven FBI strategies which I will describe and illus­trate are:

1. Securing the appearance of agreement strategy.

2. Coaching strategy. 3. Camouflaging strategy. 4. Criminalizing strategy. 5. Blocking exculpatory statements strate-

gy. 6. Insider-outsider strategy. 7. Culture/language difference strategy. All of these strategies go beyond such

normal, everyday conversational strategies of repeating one's point, interrupting, turn­taking or question asking. These seven strat­egies are manipulative in ways which appear to exceed the limits set by Judge William H. Webster in his statement of March 4, 1980: We also provide special training for those selected, with emphasis on instruction in legal areas, including the issue of entrap­ment. Cp. 145> 1. Securing the appearance of agreement

In all conversation there is a requirement of feedback. When one person talks, the other person is obliged to say something which indicates that he is attending. With­out such feedback, we as speakers will soon stop talking on the topic and ask if the other person understands us, is listening, etc. The most commonly used signals for such feedback are what linguists call lax­tokens. The positive lax-tokens usually take the form of uh-huh, alright, yeah or ok, but there are also occasions when the intona­tion of other words, such as right, indicate that these words are also lax-tokens in qual­ity. Since the function of the lax-token is to provide feedback to the speaker, its mean­ing, though positive, cannot be taken as agreement. Evidence that the meaning is not agreement can be found in conversa­tions such as the following:

SPEAKER A. I really liked the movie. SPEAKER B. Uh-huh. It is absurd to consider Speaker B's re­

sponse as agreement, since he has no reason or right to agree with what Speaker A liked.

Some lax-tokens are even more lax than uh-huh. When a speaker reponds uh or um, the weakness or laxness departs even far­ther from a positive meaning.

Conversations taped by the FBI contain hundreds and hundreds of examples of such speaker responses. Even though they do not signify agreement, prosecutors, courts and juries often confuse them as positive agree­ment. To some this may not be considered a problem for which the FBI should be con­cerned. I disagree. Whether or not the ulti­mate effect of a lax-token non-agreement response is misperceived by juries as agree­ment, the actual agreement has not been ac­curately captured on tape. If an indictment is made on the basis of a presumed agree­ment when, in fact, the response meant " I hear you, keep talking," a false indictment has been made.

The point of this argument is simple. In matters involving guilt or innocence, the FBI should be certain that the target's re­sponse is a full token "I agree," "That's right," "I'm with you," or "You have my agreement," "It's a deal," or even yes fol­lowed by another positive market such as "Yes, of course" or "Yes, that's right." To be completely unambiguous in what the target means, a true positive response must be obtained.

Coaching The Abscam case of Senator Williams con­

tains a classic example of FBI coaching of the target to say what the agents want him to say. On June 28, 1979, the convicted criminal hired by the FBI, Mel Weinberg, gives the Senator 28 directives about what he should say, in his meeting with the pre-

sumed Arab sheik immediately following. Using simple contrastive analysis, I have charted the 28 directives in the coaching tape and then noted who actually intro­duced those topics in the follow-up meeting. <Figure 1.)

<Figure 1-Senator Williams)

Weinberg's coaching topics Topics introduced in following meeting

by-

Errichetti De Vito Williams

~g:"i~ i~n~~~ . ~'.~ : : .. .. ...... ::::::: ~ :: ... .. .... .... .. ~ Who you know ...... ...... ...... . . .. ...... .... .. . .......... .... . ..... X .. . Chairman of whatever .............. ....... X ............... ......................... . How important ............................ ..... X Without you there is no deal ...... ..... X ..................................... .. You put this together .............. . ... X ................. .. Get government contracts ....... X ...... .. ..................... . How important.. ............... .. ............. X .................. X ................ .. Influence for contracts ......... .. .. .. ..... X. . .............. X .................. . Important.................................. .. ..... X. .... . ........ X ................. .. How important you are ....... ....... X ...... ............ X.. ............... .. Who you are.......... . .............. X ..... .. . X .................. . Without me. no deal............. . ... X ........ X ...... ..... ....... . I'm the man 1 .... .................. . .............. .. ...... ............... ..

Open doors .... . ....... ...... . ...... . . . X .............. .. Use influence ........ ........................... X . ................ X ................. ..

~~~fr~~~~~~~ ::::::::::::::::::::: : ::: :: : :: : :: - ~-::::::::::::::::::: ·:c :::::::::::::::: Blow your own horn .......................... X ................... X .................. . Who you control ......... .. ..................................... X ................. .. I can move this ........................................................ X ................. ..

~r~i~t~et~~L::::::::::::::::::::: :: : ::: ~ ::::::::::::::::::: y :::::::::::::::::: You're boss.... ............ .. ........................... X ................. .. I'm the power............. .. ........................... X .. .. Throw names .............. .. .... X ......... .. ...... . Come on strong ......... . ...... X .. ........ ......... X

1 Not brought up by anyone.

It is clear from this chart that when Weinberg's directives were introduced, that is when the coaching was actually brought into practice, it was agent Tony DeVito and Angelo Errichetti, and not Senator Wil­liams, who did so. Those who are familiar with that tape should be aware of the fact that topic introduction is the key to inten­tions or conversational agendas. It is true that Senator Williams did say, on that tape, that the Vice President used to work on his committee and that Secretary Vance was a neighbor of his in New Jersey, but these statements were not topic initiations. They were made in response to questions asked him about officials that he knew. Responses are quite different from initiations. If asked a question, a person has the obligation to answer but this answer is not a strong indi­cation ·of intention or agenda. Senator Wil­liams does not initiate topics about how im­portant he is or who he knows. He does not specify, as coached, that without him there is no deal or that he is the man that opens doors. He does not say who he controls, what he moves or that he's the boss. He does not sell like mad or blow his own horn. Senator Williams' statements can be consid­ered nothing short of a failure at self pro­motion.

It is very important to separate the re­sponses of Senator Williams from those of Errichetti and DeVito in situations where contamination is likely. The casual listener to tapes like these tends to gain general im­pressions without being able to separate ex­actly how these general impressions are formed. Is there horn blowing during the June 28 meeting with the sheik? There cer­tainly is. As Figure 1 clearly indicates, how­ever, the horn-blowing is done by DeVito and Errichetti, not by Senator Williams and the government strategy clearly fails.

One last point should be made about the coaching. Not only were concepts suggested, as Figure 1 indicates, but actual scripting

3324 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 was used by Weinberg. By scripting I refer to when Weinberg and Errichetti change their you references to actual modeling sen­tences, as follows:

MW: Without me there is no government contracts.

MW: Without me there is no deal. MW: I'm the man. MW: Use my influence. MW: I guarantee this. AE: And we'll produce. AE: I can move this. AE: I can move that. AE: I guarantee this. AE: I can do that. This change from suggestion of what Sen­

ator Williams should say to the sheik to the actual sentences he should use becomes what in the field of education is called di­rected teaching; putting words in the mouth of students whether or not they want to say them.

The dangers of FBI coaching are clearly obvious. The agents urge the Senator to do one thing, even to the extent of putting the exact scripted words before him and they urge him not to say what he was there to say.

Coaching is the equivalent of a leading question; question probing in any area of ac­tivity grows more dangerous as it predeter­mines the results. In police investigation, for example, the fact value of the answer to what linguists call a tag question, is mini­mal. Figure 2 illustrates a continuum of fact value dependant on the type of question asked. <Figure 2 not reproduced.)

By coaching the target to say what the agent wants him to say, the FBI gets low fact value, if any at all.

An argument could be made, in the Wil­liams case, that the coaching was done by Weinberg, not by a trained FBI agent. This argument does not hold water on several grounds. Most convincing of all, however, is the statement by regular agent Amoroso <alias DeVito> on February 12, 1979, in which we hear the agent coaching Weinberg on how to coach, in effect telling him what to say.

AA: I think you gotta set it right out for him and give him real strong assurances that, hey, this guy can do this and this, can do that, and this guy can do that, you know, once you lay it out for him and he's kind of a hard guy to deal with times because, you know, and uh you Just gotta lead him which way you want.

Weinberg will later become the coach of Senator Williams.

3. Camouflaging A second FBI strategy is that of camou­

flaging. By this I mean making something important or visible seem unimportant or invisible. The structure of the September 11 tape of the Williams case is a classic exam­ple. This conversation was declared an unof­ficial meeting when Senator Williams ar­rived, the words "unofficial" and "hypothet­ical" were used over and over again to de­scribe the meeting. All the other partici­pants had met during the previous two months and shared a great deal of informa­tion that the Senator did not have.

The significance of the camouflage strate­gy is that agents Weinberg and DeVito had one major goal in this meeting: to get the Senator's ok for the resale scheme. They were careful to declare this conversation un­official. As such, it could seem more specula­tive, tentative and less threatening, especial­ly to an "outsider" to their plans. It is also clear that if the group wished to get a vote on any issue, it would be best to introduce

this vote at a point in which high-level con­fusion was taking place. Agents Weinberg and DeVito try ten times in this tape to get Senator Williams' ok to the newly proposed idea of reselling the still unofficial corpora­tion as· soon as they get the loan. That the strategy fails is evidenced both by the fact that Senator Williams gives no positive re­sponse to the request and by the fact that they keep bringing it up.

The camouflage strategy also works to turn an unimportant or nonincriminating act into one which is incriminating. In the Texas Brilab case, for example, the convict­ed criminal, Joe Hauser, hired by the FBI to capture illegal acts on tape, worked with an unwitting friend of the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Bill Clay­ton, and together they offered Mr. Clayton a campaign contribution for the upcoming election. After presenting it, however, they redefined the meaning of the contribution, implying that it was a bribe for reopening the state insurance contract bidding. The strategy failed when Mr. Clayton said "I don't want to do anything illegal and nei­ther do you." At this point, Mr. Clayton said that he would report the campaign contri­bution, following the perfectly legal proce­dure, to which agent Hauser said several times that he didn't have to report it.

The camouflage strategy is a common one in FBI taping. It clearly violates the state­ment by Philip B. Heymann, Assistant At­torney General, when he said:

"In the elaborate review process which Judge Webster has described, the Bureau and the Criminal Division strive to insure that each undercover operation is carried out in a manner which is fair, unambiguous, productive of successful prosecutions, and which minimizes the impact on or even the involvement with innocent persons." <March 4, 1980, p. 138)

The camouflage strategy is not unambig­uous. In contrast, it thrives on deliberate, created ambiguity and confusion.

3. Criminalizin~ By criminalizing I mean the translation of

perfectly legal terms and concepts used by the designated target into terms and con­cepts which are illegal or covert. One of the charges against Senator Williams, for exam­ple, is that he hid his interest in the pro­posed mining business. The recorded conver­sation, however, makes it very clear that the government agents' agenda to get him to adopt their covert terms and concepts failed completely. Figure 3 illustrates the contrast between the terms used by Senator Wil­liams <a legal blind trust, go public, declare> and the words used by agents DeVito and Weinberg <hidden, hide, secret, gimmick and some other way). Figure 3-Senator Williams: Blind Trust v.

Hidden Interest August 5

MW: Keep it secret, protect you, 100% protection.

TD: You protected, your position protect­ed, everybody protected. September 11

HW: Right, pay the taxes. October 7

MW: Sandy spoke about you going to de­clare 17 million dollars profit or something.

HW: No ... I'm going to find a way to protect myself with some kind of declara­tion. I'm going to have to go public with something or other.

TD: . . . everything was going to be hidden.

TD: Everybody can declare .. you can't.

HW: Well this is where the lawyer comes in Alex ... we can blind trust me you know. October 7

TD: . . . you were gonna declare it, but some other way.

HW: ... now if it's a blind trust ... that's the way for my purposes.

TD: . . . I said when the Senator said he wanted to declare ... he was trying to pro­tect himself . . . by coming up with some gimmick.

HW: Well there we have it under the trust ... so I've done what I had to do.

It is one thing to suggest illegal actions but quite a different matter to attempt to convert legal intentions into illegal ones. The contamination effect had been pro­duced, however, and both the court and the Senate Ethics Committee were somehow able to overlook what was actually said in favor of an interpretation which ignores Senator Williams' statements and high­lights those of agents Weinberg and DeVito, even though these were denied and rejected by the Senator.

In reality, the government agents' agenda of trying to get Senator Williams to hide his interest in the proposed venture fails. but the contamination nonetheless remains.

At issue here is a matter even larger than the FBI strategy. In court cases involving tape recorded evidence, the contamination effect on later listeners of the illegal words or concepts of the agents can be devastat­ing. It might be argued that, from the letter of the law, the FBI is not overstepping its ground by appearing to be criminal to the target. But when the ultimate effect of this appearance leads to misreadings or misun­derstandings in the ultimate interpretation by jurors and even by the U.S. Senate Ethics Committee, this strategy must be se­riously questioned. When the targeted person is focusing on the content of what is being said and not on the manner in which it is said, there is great opportunity for mis­leading him. Even when careful scientific analysis of the speech indicates that con­cept and words were not adopted by the target, the damage has been done.

4. The Blocked Exculpatory Statement It cannot be denied that the major agenda

of the FBI agent in recorded conversations is to capture any illegal acts or words on tape. That is the announced purpose of such activity in the first place. In their effort to do this, however, the agency faces the severe temptation of blocking state­ments which start to clarify the target's po­sition or reveal his or her rejection or denial of the suggested illegal act. The usual con­versational strategy for doing this is inter­ruption. We all do it for various reasons and because of this, it may seem innocuous and unimportant. It is not the act of interrupt­ing which is dangerous here; it is the timing of the interruption. In the tape recorded evidence used in the Abscam cases of Con­gressman Richard Kelly and Senator Harri­son Williams, for example, the blocked ex­culpatory statement strategy is worthy of examination. Congressman Kelly was inter­rupted over and over again as he verbally re­jeced the offer of money nine times. <This, in itself, poses an important question to the FBI: How many times must a target reject the offer before the pursuit is called off?> Both in the Kelly and the Williams cases, however, still another blocked exculpatory statement approach is used: the telephone. The pattern of telephone interruption in these cases, as well as in the taping of Sena­tor Larry Pressler, is for the interruption to

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3325 come at points which are activity peaks, ones in which a strategy has failed and it appears that a change in strategy is called for. In the case of Senator Williams, in his January 15, 1980, tape, the first telephone interruption blocks his effort to explain to the sheik why he was rejecting his offer of money. The Senator says no four times and then the telephone interrupts. The second telephone interruption comes a few minutes later, after the Senator was trying to re-es­tablish the reason he had agreed to meet the sheik in the first place: to represent the potential mining business' concerns. After the interruption, the sheik changes his agenda from offering money <which had failed) to an attempt to link his proposed loan to the mining business with securing the Senator's offer to sponsor legislation which would bring him into the country.

The critical point here is that the Senator had clearly not offered to sponsor the legis­lation. Figure 4 illustrates the terms which the Senator used to indicate that he would only help the sheik get information togeth­er toward that end.

(Figure 4-Senator Williams, January 15) Legislative and legal prerequisites

It's not easy. There have to be good reasons. Meet some criteria. Harder now than 5 years ago. It has been restricted. Best results when a person of good charac­

ter. If that person were made to return to his

country, he could face a great personal hardship.

The situation has to be fully understood. Criteria. It's an exceptional situation. After full knowledge of your situation. It is processed through a committee. Then also in the other body. Quite frankly I can't issue that. I cannot personally. It goes through the whole dignified proc­

ess of passing a law. Furthermore, the effort of the sheik,

using broken English, to make that link was virtually incomprehensible. The strategy failed for both of these reasons. Yet both the court and the U.S. Senate Ethics Com-

Date

mittee failed to see that the strategy had failed. The point, again, is that cases involv­ing surreptitious tape recorded evidence have the capacity for contamination so great that the true facts are misperceived by later listeners such as juries or the U.S. Senate Ethics Committee. One could say that this is an issue for the courts to worry about and not the FBl's concern. As a person who has seen the blocked exculpato­ry statement strategy work to indict persons later found to be innocent people, I main­tain that it is the FBl's concern. The blocked exculpatory statement strategy, whether by the telephone or by verbal face­to-face interruption, is as much a violation of our rights as is a policeman's failure to read a person his legal rights. When our lan­guage rights are blocked, our democracy is stymied.

5. The "Insider-Outsider" Strategy Another government agent strategy is to

isolate the designated target from much of the information that the others share. If some of the other targets have been, or appear to have been already coopted, the strategy leans heavily on peer pressure to go along with what the others seem to want. Topic analysis and response analysis, two linguistic discourse tools, can clearly point out how much of an outsider the targets are in their conversations. In the case of Sena­tor Williams, for example, there were many meetings between the government agents and targets other than the Senator. The topics discussed and the way they were dis­cussed were substantially different when the Senator was not present from when he was. His role in the conversations in which he did participate clearly displays that of an "outsider" who is trying to determine what was going on. Figure 5 displays the topics in­troduced by the Senator in all six of the meetings he attended.

<Figure 5-Senator Williams' Topics)

Total topics introduced

Types of HW topics

HW

June 28 audio....... 6 June 28 video .. ......... 2 Aug. 5 audio............. 5 SePt. 11 video .......... 24 Oct. 7 video.............. JO Jan. 15 video............ IO

All others

R S Reports equest Reports mall opin-info. facts talk ions

JO 6 ....... .................... .

~~ ........... T .... 2 ..... ····T:::::::::::::: 65 11 .... T 2 4 44 6 I 3 14 5 2 3

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Total ................ 57 174 36 11

Note especially that he brought up fewer than one-fourth of all the topics discussed when he was present. This in itself evi­dences a rather minor role in the conversa­tions. Even more revealing, however, is the breakdown of the types of topics he did in­troduce. Sixty percent of Senator Williams' topics are requests for information. When a speaker spends almost two-thirds of his time trying to find out things that the others al­ready know, he is clearly an "outsider" to the conversation. Ten percent of his topics are small talk <about his family or other topics not germaine to the major topics). Senator Williams, in fact, never introduced any of the topics for which he was presum­ably being recorded, including stocks and money.

An analysis of Senator Williams' re­sponses to the topics introduced by others also supports his "outsider" role in these conversations. Figure 6 displays these re­sponses <See page 21). He does not respond at all to 24 percent of all the topics intro­duced to him. He uses responses which lin­guists call lax-tokens (uh-huh, yeah, ok, etc.), which actually mean "I hear you," "keep talking," 42 percent of the time. He defers 15 percent of the topics and changes the subject five percent of the time. This leaves only 17 percent of his responses which are affirmative, negative or full-word responses. This is not the role of a dynamic conversation leader. It is, instead, the pas­sive role of an "outsider," a person trying to find out things that others know but which he does not.

<Figure 6-Senator Williams' Responses)

No response I hear you I understand

what you say

Change subject

Defer topic Answers full Positive . response response

Negative response

June 28 au010......................................................................................................................................................................... 13 13 2 ..................................................................................................................... . June 28 video ········································································································································································-··············································· 2 2 5 ................................................................ ..... . August 5 auOIO . . . . .... •• .. •.. . . .. . 5 25 ................................................ 2 4 ..................... . r:::ir ~~::::::::::: :::::::: ::::::::::: ::::::: ::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: :::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::: : :: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·················1 ~ 3 4 ........................ 2 ..................... . January 15 video ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 2 ····················(..

1 i I .................... ~. . ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Total......... .. ................................................................ .. ............................................................................................. 30 24 30 19 . 6 8 3 Percentage.............................................................................................................................................................................. 24 44 15 12

The "insider-outsider" strategy is used commonly in FBI recorded conversations. It was used widely in the Brilab cases to insure that the target was kept ignorant of things that other co-opted participants already knew. The significance of the strategy is ob­vious. When the target is an "outsider," the already co-opted "insiders" can help the agents convince the target to perform the desired act. The peer pressure of friends and acquaintances is great. The desire not to appear ignorant or beligerant to an event which the others may have agreed to tends to cause the targets to "go along" with something about which they may know very little. The danger, of course, is that the

target, even though unwilling to do or say the act, will be trapped into agreeing to do it anyway, not because he is predisposed to do so or because he intends to do so, but for purely social reasons or from the false as­sumption that his "insider" friends have done the proper investigating and thinking about an issue about which he is still ill-in­formed. For any of these reasons, the target may be captured on tape making a promise or agreeing to something which he does not fully understand even though his intention is not to do so if he only had sufficient in­formation.

It would seem only reasonable that it is not the purpose of law enforcement to cap-

ture people on tape agreeing to things they would not agree to if they had proper infor­mation. Philip B. Heymann has stated, in fact, that such procedure is not condoned by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice:

"Most important, however, is the second major safeguard followed in every undercov­er operation, of making clear and unambig­uous to all concerned the illegal nature of any opportunity used as a decoy." <March 4, 1980, P. 139-40)

It would appear that the agency's use of the "insider-outsider" strategy is evidence that such a safeguard is not always prac­ticed.

3326 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 6. The Culture/Language Difference

Strategy Another government strategy is to use as

agents people who are presumably from a different culture and a different language background. Since their words are inexplicit and their sentences garbled, the other person has to inference a great deal. The conditions of politeness are heightened and the designated target is forced to tolerate great strangeness in behavior. That is, when standard English speakers converse with non-standard English speakers, the latter are given certain accommodations. Since they often tend to use incomplete sentences and street language rather than the more explicit and appropriate expressions, the standard English speaker in such conversa­tion tends to rely more on inferencing to make sense of the non-standard English speaker's syntax, semantics and lack of ex­plicit referencing. The same is true, of course, for a limited English speaker, as rep­resented in the case of Senator Williams by the presumed Arab sheik. It is only courte­ous and polite for a standard or native Eng­lish speaker to tolerate great imprecision and error in such people's use of English. It is also common for the native English speaker to infer a great deal more about the intentions of the non-native speaker, to finish his sentences for him and to lower any expectations of the normal conventions of conversation. One must also note the cross-cultural implications of such conversa­tions. If it is known or suspected that the customs of the speaker from another coun­try are at variance with the ethics or other conventions of America, the native treats this variance with politeness and dignity rather than with scorn or malice. Such vari­ance is the "Arab way," as Mel Weinberg pointed out in the tape of June 28, 1979.

In several cases in which surreptitious tape recordings have been used, the agents produced a non-standard or vernacular Black English. In others, the agent spoke a kind of non-standard street language. In such cases, the effect on the designated tar­gets was to force them to inference meaning that was unclear from sentences which were in a dialect different from their own and frequently inexplicit and incomplete. Agents using such language are expected not to know the appropriate terms and, therefore, when they use words like deal for transaction, or buy a pardon for obtain a pardon, the temptation of the target is to excuse such usage as the best the speaker could do, even if inappropriate. Just as a physician seldom corrects the vocabulary of an inarticulate or limited English speaking patient, so elected officials may not choose <out of politeness> to correct the street lan­guage vocabulary of undercover agents who are posing as non-standard English speak­ers.

When critical decisions about the guilt or innocence of designated targets hinge on garbled syntax of the proposition made by the agent, the practice of using the culture/ language difference strategy must be seri­ously questioned. In the Williams Abscam case, for example, it is claimed that the agent got Senator Williams to link getting a loan for the business venture which he rep­resented to promising to sponsor legislation for the sheik's permanent residence in the United States. The actual language used to presumably make this "link" is displayed in Figure 7.

<Figure 7-Senator Williams, January 15) RF: Uh as long as possible for sure as­

sured me er regard, er permanent residence.

Er business for titanium mine will be suc­cessfully concluded. End of, end of er month.

HW:Yes. RF: Can I? HW: You can be-­RF: I be. HW: You can-­RF: Be sure. The two questions here are: ( 1) Did the

sheik, with his broken English, link the tita­nium venture with the legislation? (2) What did Senator Williams agree to?

Although the written text of what agent Richard Farhart says in his first conversa­tional turn above might give the appearance of linking pennanent residence Cin the first sentence) with business for titanium mine <in the second sentence), the spoken ver­sion-the one which Senator Williams had to decipher on the spot-is not that clear. There are long, unnatural pauses between words, unpredictable sequences of words ("for sure assured me"), deleted preposi­tions <with, for, by), deleted articles <the twice). Senator Williams' first response to this utterance was Yes. On the surface, this might seem to be agreement. Two things argue against this interpretation. One is that his intonation is not appropriate for an assertion of agreement. It is, rather, that of a conversational, "Keep talking," "go on" response. Even if one were to disagree with this analysis, on the basis of the oral presen­tation of Farhart in this utterance, it would be quite difficult to know what it is that any agreement marker might have agreed to. Even Farhart is not sure for he then asks the question "Can I?" which he had omitted from the question he had previously ut­tered. At this point, Senator Williams begins his twice interrupted response which explains that he will do those things which will bring the sheik on for the consideration of permanency. This can hardly be consid­ered a promise to provide the legislation. It is, instead, a promise to help gather the in­formation necessary for the sheik to be con­sidered. It is also noteworthy that the Sena­tor makes no mention of the titanium mine venture in his response. If a link between his promise to help gather the information for ultimate consideration for legislation and the titanium venture was to have been made, the Senator's response gives no evi­dence of it. In fact he denies his authority to carry out the legislation or be responsible for it alone. He outlines the legal process and does not even off er hope that it will be done. No commitment is made by the Sena­tor.

This government agent's strategy obvious­ly fails, as is evidenced clearly in the actual video-taped conversation. But, again, the damage was done. Neither the court nor the Senate Ethics Committee was able to dis­cern the failure of this strategy, largely be­cause they lack the experience necessary to deal with language analysis. Again, one might say that this is a problem for the courts, not for the FBI. I do not agree that it is the court's problem alone. In the way the taping was done, even though later analysis of the event shows no link to have been made, the FBI shares the responsibil­ity with the court. The culture/language difference strategy puts the target at the disadvantage not only of trying to decipher the meaning of the unusual language used but also at the even greater disadvantage of hoping that later listeners, such as juries, will also be able to understand that mean­ing. Later listeners, as has already been noted, have even more disadvantages to un-

derstanding since they were not a part of the event itself or the contexts leading up to the event. They are further subject to the other general pressures previously dis­cussed, including contamination and being swamped with hours of tape recorded data to assimilate and process in the tenseness of a court room setting. This strategy of cul­ture/language differences can lead, as it did in Senator Williams' case, to an inaccurate and unfair perception of the event, even though the objective data which are imme­diately available clearly should lead to a to­tally different perception.

CONCLUSIONS It may be true as Paul R. Michel, Associ­

ate Deputy Attorney General, has observed that " ... the honest man simply rejects the offer and departs." <February 26, 1981, p. 85) For the man who is unlucky enough to be indicted for a lax-token agreement rather than a true agreement, Mr. Michel's statement may not be so true. If the offer had been camouflaged into looking like something quite different and the man is in­dicted, the statement may not hold water. If the man has been coached or scripted to say something other than he intended and is then indicted, the truth of the statement is in question. If the man's honest intentions are criminalized through contamination of the agent's language and he is then indict­ed, the statement is not true. If the man at­tempts to utter exculpatory statements that are blocked by the agents and then the man is indicted, Mr. Michel's statement has no truth in it. If the man is isolated from the information which others have and suc­cumbs to group pressure to go along with the others and gets indicted for it, the truth of the statement is questionable. If the man is confused by the garbled language of a non-native speaking agent and doe~ not catch the subtleties of the garbled speech and is indicted as a result, the truth o{ Mr. Michel's observation is nil. An honest ·man certainly can reject the d,ffer and depart as long as the offer is clear, the option is open, the conversational strategies are fair and the deck is not stacked. The seven strategies outlined here are all found in current FBI surreptitious tape recorded conversations. They are not unique to the cases cited. But they certainly do bring indictments.

CURRICULUM VITAE 1981 <Roger W. Shuy, Linguistics Department,

Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057)

I. PERSONAL A.B.: Wheaton College (Illinois) 1952,

English. M.A.: Kent State University, 1954, Eng­

lish. Ph.D.: Case Western Reserve University,

1962 English and Linguistics. II. PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS

1956-58: High School English Teacher, Akron, Ohio.

1957: Special Instructor, Akron University. 1958-64: Assistant Professor of English

and Linguistics, Wheaton College. 1964-67: Associate Professor of English

and Linguistics, Michigan State University. 1967-71: Director, Sociolinguistics Pro­

gram Center for Applied Linguistics, Wash­ington, D.C.

1969: Special Consultant, H.E.W., Plan­ning and Evaluation.

1970: Director, Sociolinguistics Program and Professor of Linguistics, Georgetown University.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3327 1974-80: Associate Director, Center for

Applied Linguistics. 1980- : Senior Linguist, Center for Ap­

plied Linguistics. III. GRANTS, AWARDS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Study and travel grants Graduate Assistant, 1957, Case Western

Reserve University. ACLA Fellow, summer 1957, University of

Michigan. University of Chicago research fellow,

summer 1963. · U.S. Air Force research fellow, summer

1964, Indiana University. ACLS travel grant to the Third Interna­

tional Conference on Applied Linguistics, Copenhagen, August 1972.

Fulbright-Hays Award, Australia-Ameri­can Foundation Fellow, summer 1972, Con­sultant to UNESCO English Curriculum De­velopment Project in Australia.

Ford Foundation Travel grant to speak at the Council of Europe Conference on Mi­grant Worker Children, Ghent, 1976 Austra­lian National government award to speak at the National Committee in English Teach­ing Conference, Canberra, 1977.

Swedish Government, invited plenary lec­turer, Association Internationale Linguisti­que Applique, Lund, Sweden, 1981.

B. Professional responsibilities 1. Professional Committees

Chairman, NCTE Clearinghouse Commit­tee on Social Dialects, 1967-70.

Presidente, Comision de Llnguistica y Dia­lectologia Angloamericanas Inter-American Program for Linguistics and Language Teaching, 1968-72.

Member, International Reading Associa­tion's Commission on Teacher Education, 1969-72.

Member, International Reading Associa­tion's Commission on the Reading Process, 1969-72.

Member, Linguistics Society of America, Program Committee, 1971-73.

Member, Linguistic Society of America, Technical Committee on Language and Cog­nitive Development, 1970-73.

Chairman, International Reading Associa­tion, Linguistics and Reading Committee, 1973-75.

Chairman, Linguistic Society of America, Committee in Linguistics and the Public In­terest, 1974-76.

President, Lectological Association, 1972-75.

Member, Social Science Research Council, Committee on Sociolinguistics, 1972-76.

Membership Secretary, Executive Com­mittee, National Conference for Research in English, 1976-79.

Presidente, Comision de Linguistica Ang­loamericana, Inter-American Program for Linguistics and Language Teaching, 1976-77.

Member, Committee on Language Acquisi­tion of Young Children, National Council of Teachers of English, 1977-79.

Member, Executive Committee, National Council of Teachers of English, 1977-81.

Member, Executive Committee, AILA <As­sociation Internationale de Linguistique Ap­plique, 1978-81.

President, American Association of Ap­plied Linguistics, 1978-80.

2. Professional Advisory Boards Member, Advisory Committee, The Aus­

tralasia Foundation for Education, 1976-80. Member National Advisory Board, ERIC

Clearninghouse on Languages and Linguis­tics, 1974-80.

Member, Bilingual Education Task Force of Teacher Corps, 1975-76.

Member, Advisory Board, NSF Linguistics Program, 1976-78.

Member, Scientific Advisory Board, Center for the Study of Reading, 1977.

Member, Board of Directors, Institute for the Study of Social Interaction, 1980-81.

3. Professional Evaluation Panels Evaluation Panel, Linguistics Department,

SUNY Buffalo, 1972. Member, Evaluation Panel, Early Child­

hood Education, National Institute of Edu­cation, 1972.

Member, USOE Bureau of Educational and Profesr' ·mal Development, Leadership Training Insdtute, 1970-75.

Member, Joint Consultant Review Panel, Northwest Regional Educational Laborato­ry, 1971-72.

Evaluator of proposals: NIE, NIMH, USOE, Canada Council, NSF, British SSRC, Carnegie Corporation of N. Y., NEH, Ford Foundation, 1967-.

Evaluation Panel, Center for the Study of Reading <NIE>, 1978-.

Evaluation Panel, Linguistics Department, SUNY-Buffalo, 1978.

Evaluator, SUNY Albany, 1980. 4. Visiting Faculty Positions

Visiting Faculty, LSA Summer Linguistic Institute, State 'U'niversity of New York at Buffalo, 1971.

Visiting Faculty, International Reading Association, Inter-disciplinary Seminar, Uni­versity of California at Santa Cruz, 1972.

Visiting Faculty, LSA Summer Linguistic Institute, University of Michigan, 197 4.

Visiting Faculty Faculty, University of Lim.burg, and Co-Chairman, European Ap­plied Linguistic Institute, Belgium, Summer 1974.

Visiting Faculty, LSA Summer Institute, State University of New York at Oswego, 1976.

Visiting Faculty, Seattle Pacific Universi­ty, summer 1978.

Visiting Faculty, University of Jyvaskyla, Finland, summer 1979.

5. University Committee Responsibilities Chairman, NDEA Title VI Graduate Fel­

lowship Committee, 1965-67, Michigan State University.

Chairman, Fulbright-Hays Graduate Fel­lowship Committee, 1965-67, Michigan State University.

Member, Graduate Committee, Michigan State University, 1965-67.

Member, Board of Graduate Studies, Georgetown University, 1972-73.

Member, Graduate Committee, School of Languages and Linguistics, Georgetown Uni­versity, 1970-74, 1977-78.

Member, Admissions and Fellowship Com­mittee, Linguistics Department, George­town University, 1970-78.

Member, MAT Admissions Program, Georgetown University, 1981-.

C. Grants Director, NDEA Title XI Institute for Ap­

plied Linguistics <USOE>. summer 1965. Michigan State University.

Director, Detroit Dialect Study <USOE>. 1966-67, Michigan State University.

Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York grant to the Center for Applied Lin­guistics, Urban Dialect Study, 1967-70.

Director, National Institute of Mental Health grant to the Center for Applied Lin­guistics, Psycholinguistic Attitude Study, 1968-69.

Director, USOE grant to the Center for Applied Linguistics, Sociolinguistics Theory, Materials and Programs, 1969-70.

Director, USOE grant to the Center for Applied Linguistics, Influence of Two Over­lappng Systems on the English or Harlem Puerto Ricans, 1970-71.

Director, National Science Foundation grant to Georgetown University to establish a doctoral program in Sociolinguistics, 1970-73.

Director, Teacher Education Program in Social Dialects, Norfolk Virginia, 1972.

Director, Carnegie Corporation of New York research grant to the Center for Ap­plied Linguistics to study the acquisition of children's use of language functions, 1975-77.

Director, NIE Grant to the Center for Ap­plied Linguistics to build a research agenda in bilingual education, 1975.

Director, Ford Foundation grant to CAL to develop Puerto Rican community aware­ness of bilingual education in New York, 1975-77.

Co-director, Carnegie Corporation of New York grant to CAL to study cross-discipli­nary contributions to bilingual education, 1975-77.

Co-director, NIE grant to the Center for Applied Linguistics to study Inferencing in Reading, 1978-80.

Director, Planning Grant, Ford Founda­tion, Determining conditions that affect learning of English by Hispanics, Summer 1980.

Co-director, NIE grant to CAL on Func­tional Language in Vernacular Setting, 1980- .

D. Editorial boards and advising Linguistics Advisor, Ginn and Company,

1967- . General Editor, Urban Language Series,

Center for Applied Linguistics, 1967-74. Editorial Board, American Speech, 1968-

77. Editorial Board, Language in Society,

1973-80. Editorial Board, International Journal of

the Sociology of Language, 1973- . Editorial Board, Discourse Processes,

1975-. Editorial Board, Reading Abstracts, 1975-. Editorial Board, Language Problems and

Language Planning, 1977-. General Editor, Sociolinguistic Series,

Newbury House Publishers, 1974-1980. Linguistics Advisor, Xerox Intermediate

Dictionary, 1973. General Editor, Literacy Series: Center

for Applied Linguistics, 1977-. Editorial Consultant, Journal of Educa­

tional Psychology, 1977. Editorial Consultant, American Journal of

Sociology, 1977. Editorial Board, Studies in Language,

1979-. Editorial Consultant, University Park

Press, University of Texas Press, Temple University Press, University of Pennsylvania Press.

Editorial Consultant, Applied Psycholin­guistics, 1980-81.

E. Membership in learned societies Linguistic Society of America American Dialect Society National Council of Teachers of English International Reading Association American Educational Research Associa-

tion American Anthropological Association Teachers of English to Speakers of Other

Languages Australian Association of Teachers of

English

3328 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 National Conference on Research in Eng­

lish Associacion de Linguistas Y Filologos de la

America Latina Association Internationale pour le Recher­

che et la Diffusion des Methodes Audio-Vi­suelles et Structuro-Globales <AIMA V>

American Association of Applied Linguis­tics

IV. PUBLICATIONS: BOOKS

A. Regional and social dialects The Northern-Midland dialect boundary

in Illinois. 1962. University of Alabama Press. <American Dialect Society Publica­tion #38).

Social dialects and language learning. Editor. 1965. Champaign: National Council of Teachers of English.

Discovering American Dialects. 1967. Champaign: National Council of Teachers of English.

Linguistic correlates of social stratifica­tions in Detroit speech. 1967. Final Report, USOE. Project 6-1347. (ERIC Document ED-022187).

Field techniques in an urban language study. Co-author. 1968. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Dialects in Culture. Co-editor. University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1979.

B. Sociolinguistics Sociolinguistics: a cross-disciplinary per­

spective. Compiler. 1971 Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Sociolinguistics in cross-cultural analysis. Co-editor. 1972. Washington, D.C.: George­town University Press.

Sociolinguistics: current trends and pros­pects. Editor. 1973. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Language Planning: current issues and re­search. Co-editor. 1973. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Language Attitudes: current trends and prospects. Co-editor. 1973. Georgetown Uni­versity Press.

Some new directions in linguistics. Editor. 1973. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Uni­versity Press.

New ways of analyzing variation in Eng­lish. Co-editor. 1973. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Toward tomorrow's linguistics. Co-editor. 1974. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Uni­versity Press.

Studies in Language Variation. Co-editor. 1977. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Uni­versity Press.

Varieties of American English. Co-editor. 1979. Washington, D.C.: International Com­munication Agency.

Language Use and the Uses of Language, Co-editor. 1980. Washington, D.C.: George­town University Press.

C. Education and linguistics Teaching Black children to read. Co­

editor. 1969. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Innovative education: a Federal concern. 1970. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. <mimeograph, 101 pages).

Sociolinguistic theory, materials and training programs: three related studies. Co­Author USOE. Final Report OEC-3-9-180357-0400<010 ).

Language differences: do they interfere? Co-editor. 1973. Newark, Delaware: Interna­tional Reading Association.

Ginn Individualized Spelling Program. Co­author. 1975. Boston, Massachusetts: Ginn and Company.

Linguistic theory: what can it say about reading? Editor. 1977. Newark, Delaware: International Reading Association.

V. PUBLICATIONS: ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS

A. Regional and social dialects Tireworker terms. American Speech, De­

cember 1964: 268-277. Sauce: dialect meth­odology. American Speech XLI: 74-75. <Feb­ruary 1966).

An automatic retrieval program for the Linguistic Atlas of the United States and Canada. In Paul Garvin and Bernard Spolsky <eds.), Computation in linguistics: a case book. 1966. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Dialectology and usage. Baltimore Bulle­tin of Education XLIII: 2-4, 40-51 < 1966-67).

A selective bibliography of social dialects. The Linguistic Reporter, June 1968: 1-3.

Dialectology. In Ronald Wardaugh and H. Douglas Brown <eds.) A Survey of Applied Liguistics. 1977. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Mr. Georgia dialect is Just as Good as Your Boston Accent, Georgetown Magazine <January 1979), 2-4.

B. Scociolinguistics and linguistics Subjective judgments in sociolinguistic

analysis. In J. Alatis <ed.) 20th Annual Georgetown Round Table. 1969. Washing­ton, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Sociolinguistic research at the Center for Applied Linguistics: the correlation of lan­guage and sex. In Giornate Internazionali di sociolinguistica. Rome: Palazzo Baldas­sini. 1969: 847-857.

The sociolinguists and urban language problems. In Frederick Williams <ed.) Lan­guage and poverty. 1970: 335-350. Chicago: Markham.

Sociolinguistic strategies for studying urban speech. In Maurice Imhoff <ed.) Viewpoints, Bulletin of the School of Edu­cation. Indiana University 47:2:1-25.

Some problems in studying negro-white speech differences. In Rodolpho Jacobson <ed.) The English Record, Special Anthology Issue. 1971.

Contemporary emphases in sociolinguis­tics. In R. O'Brien <ed.) 22nd Annual Georgetown Round Table. 971. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Language and success: who are the judges? In Words and Ways: Language of Teacher Trainers. 1971. Minneapolis: Uni­versity of Minnesota.

The Sociolinguistics Program at George­town University. In William K. Riley and David M. Smith <eds.) Languages and lin­guistics working papers number 5. 1972. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Sociolinguistics and teacher attitudes in southern school system. In David M. Smith and Roger W. Shuy <eds.) Sociolinguistics in Cross-Cultural Analysis. 1972. Washing­ton, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Sociolinguistics as a way of knowing things. In J. Griffith and L. E. Miner <eds.), The second and Third Lincolnland Confer­ences on Dialectology. 1972: 333-347. Univer­sity, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Language problems of disadvantaged chil­dren: a sociolinguistic perspective. In J. Irwin and M. Marge <eds.), Principles of Childhood Language Disabilities. 1972. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts.

Social dialect and employability: some pit­falls of good intentions. Studies in Linguis­tics. 1972: 145-156. University: University of Alabama press.

Language and success. Idiom VII. 6:5-13. <Melbourne, Australia).

Stereotyped attitudes of selected English dialect communities. In R. Shuy and R. Fa.sold <eds.), Language Attitudes: Current Trends and Prospects. 1973. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Lan­guage and the paradoxical flight from elit­ism. Semiotica VII 4:352-364.

Some useful myths in social dialectology, Florida FL Reporter, XI <Spring/Fall, 1973) pp. 17-20, 55.

Sex as a factor in sociolinguistic Research. In W. W. Gage <ed.), Language in its Social Setting. Anthropology Society of Washing­ton, 1974 (pp. 74-83).

Communications problems in the cross­cultural medical interview, Papers of the Second Annual Conferences on Psychoso­matic Obstetrics and Gynecology, Ced. Paul D. Mozley), Key Biscayne, Florida, 1974.

Reciente investigaciones in sociolinguis­tica in El Simposio de San Juan, University of Puerto Rico, 1974, pp. 111-123.

The patient's right to clear communica­tion in the medical interview. ITL, Leuven, Belgium, 1977, pp. 1-26.

Breaking into and out of linguistics, in Linguistics: Teaching and Interdisciplinary Relations Ced. F. P. Dinneen, S. J.) George­town University Press. 1975. 0430164).

The medical interview: problems in com­munication, Primary Care <September, 1976), pp. 375-386.

Quantitative language data: a case for and some warnings against, Anthropology and Education Quarterly, VII, 2 <May, 1977) 78-82.

Implications of recent sociolinguistic re­search for the problems of migrant worker children in M. deGreve and E. Rosseel <eds.) Problemes Linguistiques des En/ants de Tra­vailleurs Migrants. Bruxelles: AIMA V (1977) pp. 187-209.

Sociolinguistics, in R. Shuy <ed.) Linguis­tic Theory: What Can It Say About Reading? Newark, Delaware: IRA, 1977, pp. 80-94.

Linguistic considerations in the simplifica­tion/ clarification of insurance policy lan­guage <co-author), Discourse Processes I, 305-321 (1978).

The consumer and insurance policy lan­guage in Proceedings of Consumers and Life Insurance: An Exchange of Views. U.S. Office of Consumer Affairs, May 15-16, 1978, pp. 19-34.

Some problems in preparing dialect data for processing, Germanistische Linquistik, 3-4/77, Marburg/Lahn, 1979 pp. 145-158.

Toward the description of areal norms of syntax: some methodological suggestions, Germanistiche Linguistik, 3-4/77, Mar­burg/Lahn, 1977. pp. 367-390.

Multilingualism as a goal of educational policy, Linguistics in the Seventies: Direc­tions and Prospects, ed. Braj Kachru, Urbana, Ill.: Dept. of Linguistics, 1978, <pp. 107-123).

Bilingualism and Language Variety, in J. E. Alatis <ed.), International Dimensions in Bilingual Education. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1978.

The role of research at the Center for Ap­plied Linguistics, Linguistic Reporter, Vol. 21, No. 7 <April, 1979), pp. 6-7.

Language policy in medicine: some emerg­ing issues, in J. E. Alatis and G. R. Tucker <eds.), Language in Public Life. Washing­ton, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1979.

Some recent applications of sociolinguistic theory and research in K. Sajavara <ed.), Papers from Finnish Summer Schools of Linguistics, Jyvaskyla, Finland: University of Jyvaskyla, No. 8, 1980, pp. 31-63.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3329 Code-switching in Lady Chatterly's Lover,

York Papers in Linguistics, No. 9, pp. 223-240, 1981.

Variability and the public image of lan­guage, TESOL Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 <September, 1981), pp. 315-326.

C. Education and linguistics Starting a reading program for speakers

of sub-group dialects. Highlights. 1966: 51-58. Newark: International Reading Associa­tion.

Linguistics principles applied to the teach­ing of reading. Reading and Inquiry X: 242-244 <1965>. International Reading Associa­tion.

In what dialect will they read? In New Di­rections in Reading. <Bantam, 1967).

Detroit speech: careless, awkward and in­consistent or systematic, graceful and regu­lar? In A. L. Davis Ced.), On the Dialects of Children. National Conference on the Teaching of English, 1968.

Some language and cultural differences in a theory of reading. In K. Goodman and J. Fleming <eds.> Psycholinguistics and Read­ing. 1969. Newark: International Reading Association.

A linguistic background for developing reading materials for black children. In Teaching Black Children to Read. 1969. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Lin­guistics.

Locating the Switching Devices of Oral Language. In J. Walden Ced.), Oral Lan­guage and Reading. 1969: 89-99, Cham­paign: National Conference on the Teaching of English.

Some considerations for developing read­ing materials for ghetto children. Journal of Reading Behavior II, Spring 1969.

Bonnie and Clyde tactices in English teaching. Florida FL Reporter, July 1969

The relevance of sociolinguistics for lan­guage teaching. TESOL Quartely March 1969: 13-22.

Social dialect research and interdiscipli­nary conflict. The Reading Specialist VII. 3:41-44.

Some relationships of linguistics to read­ing process. Teachers' Manual, Reading 360. 1969: 8-15. Boston: Ginn and Company.

Teacher training and urban language problems. In R. Fasold and R. Shuy <eds.), Teaching Standard English in the Inner City. 1970. Washington, D.C.: Center for Ap­plied Linguistics.

Terminological interference in the study of the social aspects of language. In Sanford Newell Ced.), Dimensions: Language 70, Pro­ceedings of the Sixth Southern Conference on Language Teaching, 1970: 71-82. Spar­tanburg, S.C.: Converse College.

Language variation and literacy. In J. Allen Figure! Ced.), Reading Goals for the Disadvantaged. 1970. Newark: International Reading Association.

Social dialects: teaching versus learning. Florida FL Reporter, 1:1-2 28-33, 55.

Performance contracts and reading: the great oversimplification. Journal of Read­ing. 15.8: 604-612.

Speech differences and teaching strate­gies: how different is enough? In R. Hodges and E. H. Rudort <eds.), Language and Learning to Read: What Teachers Should Know about Language. 1972. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Nonstandard dialect problems: an over­view. In J. Laffey and R. Shuy <eds.), Lan­guage Differences: Do They Interfere? 1973. Newark: International Reading Association.

Some things that reading teachers need to know about language. In Howard Klein Ced.), The Quest for Competency in Teaching

Reading. 1972: 141-150. Newark: Interna­tional Reading Association.

Current theory and knowledge for the teaching of English. English in Australia 22:25-45.

Whatever happened to the ways kids talk? In Martha King, R. Emans and P. Cianciolo <eds.), A Forum for Focus. 1972. Champaign: National Conference on the Teaching of English.

Current theory and knowledge for the teaching of English. In The Teaching of English: Australian UNESCO Seminar. Can­berra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 1973: 36-44.

The study of vernacular Black English as a factor in educational change, Research in the Teachings of English, VII, 3 <Winter, 1973) pp. 297-311.

Sociolinguistics strategies for teachers in a southern school system. Proceedings of the Third International Con.Jerence on Applied Linguistics, Vol. II. Ced. A. Verdoodt>, Hei­delberg: Julius Groos Verlag, 1974 (pp. 155-171).

Interdisciplinary perspectives on change in teacher education. In H. Sartain and P. Stanton <eds.), Modular Preparation for Teaching Reading, Newark, Delaware: Inter­national Reading Association, 1974, pp. 271-292.

Pragmatics: still another contribution of linguistics to reading. In S. Smiley and J. Towner, Language and Reading, The Sixth Western Symposium on Leaming, 1975, pp. 36-48.

Problems in assessing language ability in bilingual education programs. Bilingual education <ed. Hernan La Fontaine et al) Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Co., 1978. Cp. 376-381).

The literacy crisis: what can be done about it? Quest <Department of Education: Queesland) 24 <April, 1978) 43-54.

On the relevance of recent developments in sociolinguistics to the study of language learning and early education, in 0. Garnica and M. King <eds.), Language, Children and Society. Pergamon Press, 1978.

What children's functional language can tell us about reading, or, How Joanna got herself invited to dinner, in R. Beach and P. D. Pearson (eds.), Perspectives on Literacy, College of Education. University of Minne­sota, 1978,pp. 78-96.

Toward a cross-disciplinary view, in Bilin­gual Education: Current Perspectives, Syn­thesis, Arlington, Virginia: Center for Ap­plied Linguistics, 1978, pp. 82-88.

Toward future study of the effect of school setting on learning, In Perspectives on the Instructional Dimensions Study. Washington: National Institute of Educa­tion, 1978, pp. 40-48.

The child as communicator, in Language Arts <September 1979) pp. 616-618.

On the relevance of recent developments in sociolinguistics to the study of language learning and education, in Gyorgy Sqepe <ed.) Studies in Mother Tongue Education, AILA Bulletin, no. 21, Pisa, 1978, pp. 77-105.

Language development in the field of writ­ing, in Jillian Maling-Keepes and Bruce Keepes (eds.) Language in Education. Can­berra, Australia: Curriculum Development Centre, 1979, pp. 269-278.

The mismatch of child language to school language: implications for beginning read­ing instruction in Theory and Practice of Early Reading Ced. Lauren Resnick and Phyllis Weaver), Hillsdale, N. J.: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, 1979.

Three kinds of bias in standardized test­ing, in Carlos Yorio, Kyle Perkins and Jae-

quelyn Schachter, <eds.) On TESOL '79: The Learner in Focus, Washington, D. C.: TESOL, 1979.

Vernacular Black English: Setting the issues in time, in Marcia Farr Whiteman Ced.) Reactions to Ann Arbor: Vernacular Black English and Education. Arlington, Va: Center for Applied Linguistics 1980.

Reading and dialect differences, in Dia­lects and Educational Equity Series, Center for Applied Linguistics, 1979.

Balanced decoding and comprehension in a good reading program, Ginn Occasional Papers, Number 5, 1980.

What do they do at school any day: Study­ing functional language, in Children's Oral Communication Skills Ced. Patrick Dickson> New York: Academic Press, 1981.

Closing remarks, in Moving Between Prac­tice and Research in Writing ed. Ann Humes. Los Alamitos, Cal.: SWRL Educa­tional Research and Development, 1981.

The rediscovery of language in education, Educational Leadership, March, 1981.

Learning to talk like teachers, Language Arts, Vol. 58, Number 2 <February, 1981>. <reprinted in Education Digest. May 1981 ).

What do the researchers know? Language Arts, Vol. 58, Number 3 <March, 1981>.

A holistic view of language, Research in the Teaching of English, XV, 2 <May, 1981) 101-111.

Four misconceptions about clarity and simplicity, Language Arts, Vol. 58, Number 5 <May, 1981).

VI. PUBLICATIONS: MEDIA

A. Films 1. "Varieties of American English: Region­

al Dialects" 40 minutes, co-author and per­former, U.S. International Communication Agency, 1977.

2. "Varieties of American English: Social Dialects" 45 minutes, co-author and per­former, U.S. International Communication Agency, 1978.

3. "Varieties of American English: Stylis­tic Differences" 40 minutes, co-author and performer, U.S. International Communica­tion Agency, 1978.

B. Video tapes 1. "Living Language," author and per­

former, series of twelve, thirty minute pro­grams on linguistics for secondary school teachers, WETA, Washington, D.C., 1967.

2. "American Dialects," 30 minute inter­view, U.S. International Communication Agency, 1976.

3. "Language in Education," Sydney <Aus­tralia> Educational Television, 1978.

ROGER W. SHUY: WORK INVOLVING LAW COURT CASES

I. PAST WORK

Affidavits <language assessment>: Aspira v. NY City Board of Education, Southern Dis­trict of New York: 58 FDR 62, 1973; 65 FDR 541 1975; 394 F. Supp. 1161, 1975; 423 F. Supp. 647, 1976.

Assisted USHEW <Dept. of Justice> by de­veloping the master plan for implementing the Supreme Court decision Lau v. Nichols <Superintendent of San Francisco Unified School District), 1974.

Affidavit <language assessment>: HEW Ad­ministrative Proceedings: HEW v. Chicago Board of Education, District 299, and the Il­linois Office of Education Docket S-120 HUD 77-1, 1976.

Assisted USHEW <OCR) on language and content of instruments used to satisfy plain­tiffs in consent agreement <re: language in­ter! erence to social and welfare services):

3330 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 Mendoza et al v. Lavine et al <Commissioner of Social Services for NY City> 74 Civ 4994, 412 F. Supp. 1105, 1976.

Assisted Eisha Lopez de Vega et al v. Arthur W. Thomas et al <Philadelphia Public School District>-bilingual education Civil action 75-14-Consent Decree for plaintiff, Puerto Rican Legal Education and Defense Fund, 1977.

Affidavit (language assessment>: Cintron v. Brentwood, L. I. Unified School District, 455 F. Supp. 57, Eastern District of New York, 1978.

Assisted Federal Court and Ann Arbor Public Schools in implementing orders to determine whether or not the schools violat­ed Sec. 1703<F> of title XX of US Code: Var­ious Plaintiff Children v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, Civil action 7-71861, Detroit, 1979.

Expert witness on tape recording of FBI recorded conversation presumed to be solici­tation of murder: State of Texas v. T. Cullen Davis, 1979.

Affidavit on equal opportunity housing for minorities relating to identification of race of persons talking on the telephone: Paul Allen Coles et al v. Havens Realty Corp. et al, U.S. District Court, Richmond, Va., Civil Action 79-0024-R, 1980.

Affidavit relating to language of names in patent infringement: Alixandre Furs Inc. v. Alexandros Furs, Ltd. et al, Civil Action No. 80 Civ. 6092, Southern District of New York, 1980.

Expert witness on FBI tape recording of language, presumed to be an extortion effort: US v. John Poli and John McNown, Nevada Federal District Court, 1981.

Consultation with attorneys in prepara­tion for possible expert witness:

State of Florida v. Jerry Townsend, 79-14698, 79-15569, working with Dade County Public Defender, case pending.

State of Texas v. Billy Clayton, Don Ray and R. Wood (also referred to as Texas Brilab), 1980.

Cibro v. Sohio, contract dispute, 1980. State of Louisiana v. Charles Roemer et

al, (also referred to as Louisiana Brilab), 1980.

US v. State of Texas et al <bilingual educa­tion>. Civil Action 5218, for plaintiff-interve­nors Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, 1980.

Expert witness on case involving presumed extortion effort: US v. John McNown, Nevada Federal District Court, 1981.

Expert witness on case involving presumed bribery: US v. J. Stipe and Red Ivy, Oklaho­ma Federal District Court, 1981.

Affidavit on equal opportunity case: Gray Panthers v. Richard C. Schweiker, Secre­tary of DHHS, 1980.

Expert witness in U.S. v. Don Tyner (ex­tortion), Western District of Oklahoma Fed­eral Court, 1982.

Consultation <case dismissed by judge before my testimony was given>: U.S. v. Donald L. Crow <extortion>, Kansas Federal District Court, 1982.

II. CURRENT WORK

Preparation for possible expert witness on linguistic aspects of two cases involving slander <in Washington, D.C. and in Nevada>, of one contract dispute <in Flori­da), of three racketeering and bribery cases <in New Jersey), and one bribery appeals case which also involves working with the client <a U.S. Senator> to prevent his expul­sion from office.

STATEMENT OF ALBERT LEVITT

ABSCAM

To the Honorable Members of the House Ju­diciary Committee:

Gentlemen: I have been a consulting psy­chologist for Temple University Unit of Law and Psychiatry and Senior Psychologist to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadel­phia.

In my capacity as friend of the court I ex­amine individuals accused and convicted of various crimes. I have examined well over 10,000 individuals. I am licensed and listed in the National Register of Mental Health Providers.

Moreover, I have been the consultant to the U.S. Attorney's Office in Philadelphia since 1973 and have been the consultant to District Attorney's offices in Delaware County, Chester County and Bucks County, Pennsylvania.

I have been doing group therapy for 14 years. I have also worked for the defense in criminal cases, but about 80 percent of my time has been working with the prosecution in adversary cases.

I have worked with the F.B.I. on several occasions in conjunction with my associa­tion with the U.S. Attorney's Office.

My association with the F.B.I. has been nothing but positive and I hold the organi­zation in high esteem.

I was called into the Abscam case by attor­neys representing City Councilman Harry Jannotti to help give them a psychological overview of the case.

While reviewing the F.B.I.'s procedures it occurred to me that the seating arrange­ment and situation was similar to the famous ASCH <Solomon Asch) experiment of the group influencing one targeted person.

I do not believe the F.B.I. set the stage with knowledge of the experiment, and I do believe the F.B.I. was operating with the best of intentions.

Nevertheless, what the F.B.I. did was stage a situation where the "target" had considerable group pressure on him to con­form to the arrangements that were sug­gested to him.

CThe ASCH Experiment, briefly ex­plained, revealed that a group pre-pro­grammed to respond a particular way could influence an individual to acquiesce to the group norm even when the individual's per­ceptions of concrete stimuli is different than his opinion.

A pre-programmed group is told how to respond to long and short lines placed on a wall. The group is told to say the short lines are longer and the long lines are shorter.

An individual is brought in and seated in such a way that he hears many opinions before he can verbalize his own perceptions. Essentially, he sees something different than what the group is saying, and he has to decide whether to go along with the group or go along with his own perceptions.

The experiment shows that a majority yielded to the group pressure and went against their perceptions and judgments without other inducements or enticements. According to the ASCH Experiment-a pause to allow the targeted individual to re­flect on the situation may produce a differ­ent reaction because once an individual ac­quiesced, yielded or took a particular posi­tion at the beginning of the session he usu­ally did not vary his behavior.

ASCH suggests that contrary forces or ideas provided the "target" might also alter the "target's" thinking.

If the F.B.I. is to continue in this type of operation these two psychological aids

should be offered to give the target a chance to w~rd off the influence and pres­sure.

Individuals who are more passive and less articulate can be more easily influenced by more aggressive and more articulate individ­uals.

The F.B.I. should not overmatch their tar­gets verbally or psychologically.

I do not mean to judge the action of the defendants-but to try to explain how the F.B.I. contributed to the aberrant behavior that occurred.

Rehearsed, goal directed, monitored and coached the F.B.I. set up a situation that lured, cajoled and seduced these Abscam de­fendants into aberrant actions.

At the time the world knew of the large profits, through the sale of oil that accrued to the Arabs-OPEC meetings were widely publicized. The Arabs-a strange and exotic people who act in ways different from the West. Their dress, their social and religious ways are different, and out of this igno­rance, myths and erroneous assumptions prevail.

The F.B.I. set themselves up to represent these Arabs, and in their dealings perpet­uated and excelerated these myths.

It was relatively easy then to create allur­ing business propositions and insist on spe­cial provisions, some of which were illegal, to secure their business.

In the Jannotti case-the target, Jannotti, was invited to an exclusive suite in an exclu­sive hotel. The surroundings were unfamil­iar to Mr. Jannotti who is by and large a plain man with plain taste with limited verbal skills.

He is seated in a small group faced by a very bright, adaptive, highly verbal, F.B.I. agent who claims to be the representative of a rich sheik. The "target" Mr. Jannotti is flanked by a prominent lawyer and another F.B.I. agent. Mr. Jannotti has no one to con­sult.

Behind the wall-a cameraman and a U.S. Attorney is monitoring the procedures and coaching by way of a telephone call when­ever the situation strays form the legal pre­dicament they want to create for the "target.''

The F.B.1.-agent of the sheik-weaves a tale of riches for the city-a 345 million dollar hotel, and an additional 10 million dollar restaurant complex which will pro­vide possibly 3,500 jobs and untold revenue. It is a completely legitimate project. The others in the room add whatever support then can verbally and non-verbally.

They create an atmosphere that is com­pletely positive-there is no reason to dis­agree. But they now say the sheik, "must know that he has friends", and to prove it to the sheik the target must accept an offer of friendship in the form of a sum of money. "It is the way Arabs do business", the target is told.

The target does not know how Arabs do business. He believes the myth that money to oil rich Arabs is of little importance since they have so much of it.

Still the target makes no statement about money-he merely acquieces-passively agrees to a proposal that is offered, and pas­sively conforms to what is offered. The target is psychologically out maneuvered.

Physically he is outmanned and verbally out talked. The agent did not go to Jannot­ti"s office where Jannotti would be in famil­iar surroundings. They did not give him an opportunity to aggressively make an illegal demand for money, they did not give him a chance to think over the proposition or

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3331 allow him to leave-think over the proposi­tion-come back and accept the offer.

The target accepted a proposal and ac­cepted a binder to the proposal in the form of money so as not to lose this great plum for the city.

There was no effort to extort-no deal made to sell his office by the target. There is no hint that Mr. Jannotti would reject the business proposal even if no binder to the offer was tendered.

The group pressure is clear-three pres­suring and pressing for a glamorous propos­al and the target passively accepting.

The ASCH Experiment demonstrates this could happen to many people. In fact, this experiment demonstrated that many-a ma­jority of people could be influenced under similar circumstances.

But let us look at the actual situation and review the actual verbal output of the sheik's agent and the target-Jannotti.

Clearly Jannotti has little to say and what he has to say is almost always in the form of acquiescence. He states he would not accept an illegal or immoral business.

Then why seduce him to commit an un­ethical action? Why force him to make a "here and now" decision to save business for the city.

He apparently did not have presence of mind to ask for a delay or the verbal skills to take command of the situation-many would respond the same way-and herein lies the problem.

It is possible for the F.B.I. to create a situ­ation and have less adequate, unsophisticat­ed, verbally inept individuals submit or ac­quiesce to their proposals-and by doing so expose themselves to criminal prosecution.

Beside the ASCH Experiment other ex­periments on influencing others have been popularized such as brain washing, the band wagon effect, and the big lie are well known.

What is not known is how quickly and easily a person can be influenced by group pressure. We see it in religious proselytizers.

We see ourselves talked into buying an item we don't want, we see it in many as­pects of life-but when we see a politician talked into accepting a legitimate business for the city a great hue and cry is evoked, and we disregard the psychological influ­ence in the case and disregard the powerful forces that led up to the offense.

Police agencies are historically "after the fact" organizations. When a crime has oc­curred or where a crime may be occurring the policing organization such as the F.B.I. is motivated.

The F .B.I., by creating a crime situation, is out of character <and in the Jannotti case since it had nothing at all to do with inter­state or national problems was out of its ju­risdiction>.

Psychologically, the effect on Abscam is to distrust the F.B.I.-to distrust the mo­tives of the F.B.I. and to distrust their pro­cedures.

In Abscam, the F.B.I. made a change from an "after the fact" to a "before the fact" op­eration.

If it is to maintain this position then guidelines must be established so the un­suspecting public can be protected from a "now predatory" organization.

There is one other troubling aspect of Abscam that must be addressed-and it seems to me, to be, perhaps, the most perti­nent point from a psychological perspective.

Abdul Enterprises, the sheik, the agents of the sheik do not exist-they are fantasies of the F.B.I.'s imagination.

Psycholgists in treatment attempt to sepa­rate reality from fantasy and make their cli-

ents deal more with reality and avoid fanta­sy.

A person dealing with fantasy has a tenu­ous grasp on reality.

Now the Abscam trial, is based on a fanta­sy-a completely unreal situation. Yet the courts argue about Abdul Enterprises being involved in interstate commerce-as if Abdul Enterprises were real. Everyone is proceeding as if the fantasy is real.

The presumption borders on absurdity. The court would laugh at the police charg­ing a man who they claimed raped "Alice in Wonderland" because "Alice in Wonder­land" is a fantasy and you cannot rape a fantasy-nor can you do business with a fan­tasy-nor can a fantasy interfere with inter­state commerce, nor can a fantasy build a hotel complex-but a fantay now can lead you into legal difficulty.

The F.B.I. is not representing anything or anyone real-there is no nefarious operation ongoing-it is all fantasy-something that an enterprising graduate student might dream up as an experiment to prove men are greedy or prove that men can be influ­enced.

The rock bottom basis upon which Abscam is based is a fantasy-to act, then, as if it is real borders on the absurd.

SUMMARY

Psychologically, the "target" was placed in a group situation that was pointed toward influencing the target.

The "target" was placed in a double bind, i.e., accept the enticing offer to the city and the personal money binding the deal or lose the offer to the city-lose the jobs and the revenue the business would bring in.

The "target" was overwhelmed verbally in the situation and was influenced by the rich surroundings, the myths of the exotic rich Arabs and he was unfamiliar with their business practices.

The F.B.I. changes from an "after the fact" organization to a "before the fact" or "promoting a fact" organization. Guidelines should be established realizing that many can be influenced under similar circum­stances. The courts prosecute on the basis that a fantasy is real. From a psychological­ly sane point of view the law in these cases is questionable.

Respectfully submitted. ALBERT LEvITT,

Psychologist.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF MARY GALLAGHER

To the Honorable Members of the House Ju­diciary Committee:

Gentlemen: Under current law, no war­rant is required for government agents to install a hidden video camera in almost any room in the United States. No consent of any party is required for videotaping. Nor is a warrant required in most states where a government agent or informer either wears a recording device or otherwise permits a conversation in which he takes part to be recorded. As Abscam demonstrates, the FBI and other agencies have now turned from investigating crime already committed to providing incentives for crime, whether by offering money, as in Abscam, or by offering drugs for sale, or by offering other induce­ments. On the basis of my experience, I con­clude that videotaping is the almost neces­sary accompaniment of government-induced crime. The F.B.I, cannot rationally use after-the-fact investigation to prove a crime in which agents or informers in fact took part. The proof is tainted, because the gov­ernment agents are obviously interested

parties. Videotaping therefore provides the logical contemporaneous proof that the crime occurred.

Under these circumstances, videotape is not a tool of investigation, as there is no prior crime to investigate, but is rather the presentation of the crime, itself. Not sur­prisingly. therefore, agents on these tapes have manipulated their targets emotionally and linguistically, have manipulated sce­nery, have produced luxurious settings or four language, as needed, in order to stage the crime to be proved. Together with the peculiar psychological effects of videotape <as opposed to movies, for example) such contrived evidence is almost universally damming. The defendants shown in such settings are almost universally convicted.

I believe that the abuses of languages pointed to in my article in Legal Times, "Linguists Could Provide Insights into Abscam Tapes," a copy of which is attached will arise wherever government agents must stage new crimes rather than investigating old ones. I have seen it not only in the Abscam transcripts, but in a drug conspira­cy case in which I recently served as an at­torney-consultant. The agent on video-tape must be constantly vigilent to make sure that the target says enough to constitute the elements of the crime. He must also pre­vent the target from saying words that will provide him with a defense to the crime. The same is true not only in Abscam, but wherever the government is inducing a crime, and using videotape for proof.

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF MARY GALLAGHER

Mary Gallagher is a Washington, D.C., lit­igator, advisor to businesses in international development, education, television, comput­ers and other industries, and attorney-con­sultant on cases involving complex linguistic data, including audiotape and videotape evi­dence. She is one of five attorneys in the United States who also hold the Ph.D. in linguistics. She is a graduate of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy and a member of the Association of Trial Lawyers of Amer­ica, a member of the Criminal Law Commit­tee of the D.C. Bar Association, and a member of the Litigation Section and of the Forums on Entertainment, Construction and Communications of the American Bar Association. Miss Gallagher is the author of "Linguists Could Provide Insights into Abscam Tapes," which appeared in Legal Times of Washington on August 31, 1981, and which has aroused wider interest in the use of linguistic analysis in the Abscam cases and other civil and criminal cases in­volving audiotape and videotape evidence. She is a 1982 Nominee of the Center for Ad­vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University.

Miss Gallagher holds the Juris Doctor degree from Harvard Law School, where she was recognized as an outstanding oralist in the Ames Competition. She has been a Guest of the Research Laboratory of Elec­tronics at M.I.T., and she holds the Ph.D. in linguistics from the University of Illinois. She holds the Bachelor of Arts degree in philosophy from Barnard College, Columbia University, where she was awarded the Montague Prize for promise of future dis­tinction in philosophy. She has been an N.D.E.A. Fellow, and a University Fellow of the University of Illinois. She is the author of numerous articles, and the co-author of two books, on linguistic and educational topics, as well as articles on business law and litigation. She is a former faculty member of Queens College, and the Gradu-

3332 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 ate Center, City University of New York. In 1971 she was awarded a Fulbright Senior Lectureship at the University of Tampere, Finland, which she declined in order to enter Harvard Law School. She is a guest judge in the advanced appellate advocacy competition <Leahy Competition> of the Georgetown University Law Center, and has been a guest judge in the Ames Competition of Harvard Law School, and a member of the adjunct faculty of New England School of Law. Miss Gallagher is a member of the National Governing Board of the Ripon So­ciety, and has served on the Board of Visi­tors and Governors <Trustees) of St. John's College, Annapolis, Maryland, and Santa Fe, New Mexico, and on its Executive Commit­tee.

LINGUISTS COULD PROVIDE INSIGHTS INTO ABSCAM TAPES

<By Mary Gallagher> <Mary Gallagher is a litigator in Washing­

ton, D.C. She is one of two persons in the United States who holds both a law degree and a Ph.D. in linguistics.)

As a lawyer who is also trained as a lin­guist, I am concerned about the evidence that went to the jury in the Abscam cases. Those cases in which the defendants were convicted are now before the trial judge again, on post-trial motion, or are on appeal. They will certainly come in due course before the Supreme Court. I have the great­est respect for the attorneys who represent­ed the defendants in the Abscam cases. I re­spectfully suggest, however, that linguistic analysis of the taped conversations in those cases might raise new issues of due process. Indeed, it might raise new issues of scienter and mens rea, and of simple innocence or guilt.

The facts of the Abscam are by now well known. Agents of the Federal Bureau of In­vestigation, aided by a convicted swindler named Mel Weinberg and others, ranged up and down the East Coast acting the parts of rich Arab sheiks and their men, eager to pay American officials for help with various in­vestment projects. If the officials were con­gressmen and senators, the Arabs offered to pay for legislative help with immigration problems.

Although there have been a few acquit­tals, 17 persons, including seven members or former members of Congress, have been convicted on one or more of the charges brought. These include bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 201<c), accepting a gratuity, 18 U.S.C. § 20l<g), aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2, and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371.

The prosecution depended on videotapes and audiotapes for the proof of its cases. On each videotape, it was argued, the defendant could be seen and heard accepting a bribe or agreeing to accept a bribe or both. Without those tapes, and the transcripts made from them, the government's cases would have been wholly different.

None of the defendants called a linguist as a technical witness. It may be indicative of the potential usefulness of a linguistic de­fense, however, that the only congressional defendant to be acquitted on even one charge, John Murphy, made several argu­ments of a linguistic type to the jury. One must assume, however, that the defendants will present to the courts of appeals legal arguments based largely on theories of en­trapment and due process.

CONVERSATIONS WITH A DIFFERENCE

Technical linguistic analysis of the taped evidence would have been advisable, first

and principally, because these conversations were not normal conversations. The fact that the government videotaped or audio­taped and had an agenda for the critical ses­sions makes these conversations different from normal conversations in specific, meas­urable ways. These differences distort the perception of these conversations by un­trained persons unaided by expert analysis.

As a linguist I know that it is relatively easy for one party not only to impose his own agenda on the conversation, but to produce almost any impression on a tran­script of the conversation. Few of us speak with one eye on what a resulting transcript might look like. Nor have we come so far from the civilized view that gentlemen do not eavesdrop that we must take the inva­sion of privacy for granted in daily life.

People merely hearing tapes of artificial conversations, however, apply normal stand­ards of interpretation to those tapes. The simplest and the most common false impres­sion that a speaker with an agenda can convey is that everyone in a conversation agrees with the other speakers, when in fact there is no agreement at all. Simply to bring up a topic a number of times can produce the impression on a transcript that every­one agrees about that topic. Linguists call this contamination.

Let me illustrate contamination with a type of example not found in the Abscam tapes, to my knowledge. Suppose that there are two participants in the conversation, one with an agenda, the other without. If the speaker with the agenda vigorously at­tacks and slanders an absent third party, and the other party remains silent, the venom of the agenda will contaminate the entire conversation: someone overhearing the conversation or reading the transcript, but subjecting it to no analysis, may very well conclude that the two speakers agree about the defects of the one who is absent. In fact, the silent participant may be silent not out of agreement, but out of politeness, boredom, torpor, or good judgment.

EXPERT FOR THE DEFENSE

One of my fellow linguists. Dr. Roger W. Shuy of Georgetown University and the Center for Applied Linguistics, has analyzed government tapes and transcripts in numer­ous criminal cases, including the Texas Brilab cases. Dr. Shuy has kindly provided me with his unpublished research papers on the role of a linguist as an expert in a crimi­nal case. The following summary is taken from those papers, in which he describes the types of technical analyses be has used. <Dr. Shuy has changed the names of the parties.)

Topic-comment analysis. Dr. Shuy points out that in normal conversations partici­pants are not only expected, but indeed re­quired, to introduce approximately equal numbers of topics. Conversations instigated by government agents rarely have that characteristic. In normal conversations, moreover, one does not keep bringing up the same topic over and over again if the listen­er does not respond to it.

Again, since these government agents have definite agendas of what they must ac­complish in each conversation, principally getting the other party to say that he will commit a crime, these conversations differ from normal conversations. The govern­ment agents must often bring up the same topic over and over again, trying to get the other party to respond.

In one case, the government alleged that the defendant had tried to persuade an in­former, Foster, to murder not only the de-

fendant's wife but the judge in their divorce case. The government equipped Foster with a body microphone and sent him off to get the defendant to commit himself on tape to plans for the putative crime.

The defense, using Dr. Shuy's analysis of the resulting tapes, argued at trial that if the defendant were the instigator of a crimi­nal plot, it was odd that of the 22 topics on a 20-minute tape, it was Foster who brought up 18 of the topics. Only Foster, further­more, brought up the topic of "doing Gwen­dolyn and the judge." Moreover, he brought it up over and over again. The argument for the defense was persuasive.

Response analysis. When the speaker who has an agenda for the conversation domi­nates and controls the conversation, it is particularly important to analyze the re­sponses of the defendant. It is easy to con­fuse vague or ambiguous responses or place­markers ("uh-uh") with something totally different-resolution of the topic. This is particularly true where the entire conversa­tion is dominated-and contaminated-by the sole topic that the government agent keeps bringing up over and over again, namely, the commission of a crime.

Referencing analysis. Dr. Shuy's "Arthur Jones" case illustrates his use of still a third tool. An FBI agent disguised as a foreigner, Herb Colier, introduced almost all of the topics at the crucial videotaped meeting. To Colier's apparent chagrin, whenever he mentioned his offer to pay Jones money, Jones responded off-topic. Of the 23 intro­ductions of topics in the tape, according to Dr. Shuy's analysis, 11 are Colier's introduc­tion and repeated reintroduction of the money topic. Despite Jones's obviously wish­ing not to deal with the money topic, how­ever, and despite his constantly changing the subject-saying, even, that he wanted nothing to do with the money-Arthur Jones took $25,000 in his hands, and the vid­eotape plainly shows his doing so. Dr. Shuy, however, has analyzed the references of pro­nouns throughout the conversation, and he argues cogently that although Jones in fact did touch the money, he believed that he was taking it for someone else, namely, his friend Earl Walker, and not accepting it for himself. ·

DOUBTS ABOUT ABSCAM

I have other doubts about Abscam. I wonder about the effect of videotape evi­dence supporting the prosecution's case, when there are no videotapes of the events the defense might find useful. Jury mem­bers, after all, are largely persons who long ago gave up listening to conversation in favor of watching television. I have serious political doubts about Abscam-doubts that are not wholly assuaged by the present FBI guidelines designed to guard against entrap­ment. If no demonstrated predisposition to crime is required to bring an innocent person within the scope of such an investi­gation, why not subject your political en­emies to overwhelming temptation, with the cameras and tape recorders grinding all the while? Consider the fact that guilty or not, former Rep. Richard Kelly was offered money nine times before he touched it. Keep at it and you, too, can bring your en­emies to ruin. This is the lesson of Abscam.

My doubts as a lawyer and linguist, how­ever, concern the distortions produced in conversations when one speaker has a defi­nite, irrepressible agenda. These govern­ment-instigated conversations are less like conversations than like high-pressure inter­views or sales sessions. Linguistic analysis of

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3333 the evidence could cast light on questions of criminal guilt or innocence and produce re­sults in the interest of justice.

ABSCAM FOOTNOTE: WHAT You SAY, How You SAY IT, ARE VERY CRUCIAL

A Washington lawyer with a Ph.D. in lin­guistics thinks a close examination of con­versation patterns on the Abscam tapes could bolster acquittal arguments of some defendants appealing their convictions.

"What is important about the tapes is that these are not normal conversations," says Mary Gallagher, a lawyer whose back­ground in linguistics made her curious about the conversations between undercover government agents and some of the politi­cians ensnared in the Abscam caper.

" As a linguist, I know it is relatively easy for one party • • • to produce almost any impression on a transcript of the conversa­tion," argued Gallagher in a recent Legal Times article.

Gallagher says the article led to calls from several lawyers working on appeals for Abscam defendants, including an inquiry from one of the lawyers representing Sen. Harrison Williams of New Jersey. Williams is scheduled next month to make a major effort to convince the Senate ethics commit­tee that, despite his Abscam conviction, he should not be expelled.

In the Abscam cases, Gallagher suggests a linguist work from original tapes <some of the transcripts have gaps and errors in tran­scription> and highlight distortions in the conversations brought on by the govern­ment's zeal to coax incriminating state­ments from politicians.

Gallagher says while some of those con­victed in Abscam seemed amenable to ac­cepting a bribe, others, including Williams, repeatedly turned down illegal suggestions and may have been convicted simply "for keeping bad company." Gallagher says un­sophisticated juries listening to tapes filled with references to corrupt practices tend unconsciously to tie the defendant into the scheme-even if the defendant seems reluc­tant to participate.

"People sidestep in many, many ways, es­pecially politicians," says Gallagher. "They make a sympathetic utterance without agreeing to any thing-that's a political speech pattern."

Mr. HAYAKAWA. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from New Jersey will yield for just a minute, I wish to make it clear that I am not commenting on the whole case or the whole testimony. My remarks are lim­ited to this particular document of a linguistic analysis by Dr. Shuy. I am still reserving judgment on all the other information that is contained in these many, many volumes of testimo­ny.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point?

Mr. WILLIAMS. I am happy to yield.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, could I ask two questions? One, was this infor­mation that Dr. Shuy gave in this statement available at the trial in New York and, two, if not, would it be available as other evidence?

Mr. WILLIAMS. It is a worthy ques­tion. I did not know of Dr. Shuy at the time of the trial. There was a report to my attorney of Dr. Shuy's work and

my attorney, knowing where we were working in the Brooklyn courthouse, made an evaluation for our trial strat­egy. It was not, in his judgment, wise to include this approach in that trial.

It was available and known but not used. Later on, when we came before the Senate committee, then I de­scribed something that was new to me at that time, and it was a linguistic analysis, and when it came to me it was one of the elements that I pre­sented to the Ethics Committee to see if we could have a hearing that would include that, among some other things, as I recall it. But the hearing was not continued or opened or what­ever. This is the first it has come before the Senate on the subject matter before the Senate.

Mr. LONG. Would it be correct to say that this type of testimony would have been relevant or admissible at the trial and, if so, of course, the Gov­ernment, I assume, would have had the right to present similar expert tes­timony to contend for an opposite con­clusion?

Mr. WILLIAMS. The answer is, yes. Several jurisdictions question this pro­fessional analysis in various ways.

I know Dr. Shuy's work has been used in Oklahoma, Texas, and many other places. Dr. Shuy's work has also been presented in courtrooms, includ­ing some criminal cases.

The next subject I would like to in­troduce at this time is directed to new evidence, Mr. President. But before I continue I should like to advise the Senate that many of the documents to which I will be referring have only re­cently been obtained under the Free­dom of Information Act or from other counsel in other cases. Some of the documents to which I shall refer were not available to me at my trial.

Judge Penn in the Jenrette case be­lieved these documents to be exculpa­tory.

Last, I shall be referring to docu­ments in motions to reopen the Kelly and Jenrette cases before Judges Bryant and Penn here in the District, as well as in motions to reopen my own case before Judge Pratt.

These documents are based upon the charges of Marie Weinberg, late wife of Melvin Weinberg, who died under mysterious circumstances only 1 week after she made some of these charges on national network television in the program "20/20" that has been men­tioned before.

This is a listing of the materials that I describe as new evidence: a Nathan memorandum of September 1981; the affidavit I have referred to of Otta­vianio of September 16, 1981; some tes­timony of Mr. Edward Plaza of Decem­ber 1981; a Plaza letter of December 1981; grand jury proceeding-and I would say these are dates of receipt of these matters that came to my atten­tion-of December 1981; an Amoroso

transcript also in December; McLaugh­lin transcript in December; and then from-I have indicated these motions to reopen cases, motions made in Jan­uary of 1982, this year-Marie Wein­berg's affidavit, transcripts of conver­sations with Marie Weinberg, and also grand jury and related trial tran­scripts.

In addition, a 302 involving a man, Mr. DiLorenzo-1 mentioned earlier there was evidence that Weinberg and Errichetti might have been involved in dividing money that was supposedly directed at the bribing of an individ­ual. This came in January of this year. A Katz transcript which came to my attention in January of this year; and the FOIA document on value, that re­views the question of the value of the stock that I received, came to me through FOIA in December of this year; and just recently affidavits of FBI agents received this month.

These I have just listed, all of these are matters of newly discovered evi­dence that will be brought up later for my analysis here, and I hope on Monday, when we reconvene.

The next topic that I would like to discuss is under the heading, a phrase that I have been obliged to use count­less times in the past 2 years, "I did nothing wrong." Under a subheading, the first subtopic is "The stock was worthless."

I will tell you, my colleagues, the stock I received was worthless. The Government knew it and so did I.

I offer first the following Govern­ment document which shows the Gov­ernment knew the stock was worth­less. I obtained this document under the Freedom of Information Act in December of 1981, and will have it in­cluded, if I may, as exhibit 8.

It is a redacted copy of a review by the Civil Division of the Department of Justice. Their review was of many, many cases. I am certain of this be­cause of the extent of the redaction.

Their review was to see what suits would be brought to recover money. I would like to indicate those parts that were not redacted. They involve me. But I will read it as it comes to me­the part that was not redacted.

"Authority is hereby granted to"­that was not redacted, but who it was granted to is redacted.

". . . close this matter without suit as to HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR. Ap­prove." There is a checkmark before "approve." It is signed by Stuart E. Schiffer, acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division.

Then there is the memorandum for Mr. Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attor­ney General, the man I just men­tioned, which reads:

Re: HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr., summary. We also seek to close without civil suit the matters involving Senator HARRISON WIL­LIAMS because there is no evidence that Sen-

3334 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 ator WILLIAMS received anything more than worthless stock certificates.

Let me point out another memoran­dum for Mr. Stuart Schiffer. This is in a redacted form.

Re: (5) HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr., Com­bined Request For Authority To File Suit And To Close. Recommendation: those in­volved with Harrison Williams where the Government suffered no monetary loss. We recommend closing as to Williams.

Finally: "This page withheld-out­side scope." Another "This page with­held-outside scope."

Then "(5) HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr., Alexander Feinberg, George Katz and Angelo J. Errichetti. A nine-count indictment charged WILLIAMS with violations of" and it recites the indict­ments.

Then it says: On August 5, 1979, in New York, WIL­

LIAMS took possession of stock certificates in a valueless corporation. No cash was paid to WILLIAMS or the other defendants. There is one factual difference with respect to WIL­LIAMS.

Then something is redacted. Similarly, because WILLIAMS took nothing

of value <only stock in a fictitious corpora­tion), and because we are unaware of any other losses that the Government suffered as a result of his actions, the Government can claim no damages. Consequently, we also recommend that no civil action be insti­tuted against him and that this matter be closed as to them. For the above reasons, we recommend that: (5) this matter be closed without suit as to HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr. ..

It was signed Jane A. Restani, Direc­tor, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice.

I submit the document for the RECORD.

EXHIBIT 8 MEMORANDUM FOR FILE RE: HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., D.J. FILE NOS. 186-52-77

Authority is hereby granted to: • • • • •

Close this matter without suit as to Harri­son A. Williams, Jr.

<x> Approve. STUART E. ScHIFFER,

Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division.

Dated: July 9, 1981.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STUART E. SCHIFFER, · ACTING ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CIVIL DIVISION Re: <5> Harrison A. Williams, Jr.

SUMMARY • • • • •

We also seek to close without civil suit the matters involving Senator Harrison Wil­liams because there is no evidence that Sen­ator Williams received anything more than worthless stock certificates.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STUART E. SCHIFFER, ACTING ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CIVIL DIVISION Re: Harrison A. Williams, Jr .... COMBINED REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY TO FILE

SUIT AND TO CLOSE Time limit: ...

Opposing counsel: . . . Nature of claims: ... Amount of claims: . . . Action of the Criminal Division: ... Recommendation: ... those involved

with Harrison Williams where the Govern­ment suffered no monetary loss. We recom­mend closing as to Williams . . .

INTRODUCTION • • •

[This page withheld-Outside scope.] [This page withheld-Outside scope.] (5) Harrison A. Williams, Jr. [Alexander

Feinberg, George Katz and Angelo J. Erri­chetti.l A nine count indictment charged Williams with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201<c> <bribery), 201<g) <acceptance of gratuity), 203<a> <unlawful compensation to Members of Congress). Feinberg and de­fendants George Katz and Angelo J. Erri­chetti were charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 <aiding and abetting). All defend­ants were charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 <conspiracy) and 1952 <inter­state travel to commit unlawful acts>. The case against Katz and Errichetti was sev­ered. The trial of Williams and Feinberg re­sulted in jury verdicts of guilty on all counts.

On August 5, 1979, in New York, Williams took possession of stock certificates in a val­ueless corporation. No cash was paid to Wil­liams or the other defendants.

DISCUSSION • • • • •

There is one factual difference with re­spect to Williams .... Similarly, because Williams took nothing of value <only stock in a fictitious corporation), and because we are unaware of any other losses that the Government suffered as a result of his ac­tions, the Government can claim no dam­ages. Consequently, we also recommend that no civil action be instituted against him and that this matter be closed as to them.

• • • • •

CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we recommend

that: • • • • •

<Five> this matter be closed without suit as to Harrison A. Williams, Jr.,

JANE A. RESTANI, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch,

Civil Division. The one phrase that struck me-be­

cause we are unaware of any other losses that the Government suffered as a result of his actions-was that there was no suit against me to get anything back. The Government suf­fered no losses as a result of my ac­tions.

As I read it, it just hit me, Mr. Presi­dent, the terrible national loss that has come here as the result of this Government's escapade, whatever you call it, this fantasy of wrongdoing, a monumental amount of resources were put into this search for criminality in Congress, coming here with no predi­cate, as they say, no probable cause, coming to people-I am not the only one they came to with no prior record, any way, of wrongdoing, criminal wrongdoing, absolutely not.

When it comes to Government losses, believe me, the taxpayers of

this country are paying some kind of bill for Abscam to get a guy like me who has never done anything wrong.

As I told my dear friend, a man I am not politically that close to, the major­ity leader, but I have the highest re­spect for him, when he asked me a question that I appreciated him asking and I hope that he will not be off end­ed if I recite this. He asked me a ques­tion that he should have asked, as the leader of this Senate, one day when we were just conferring and there were just the two of us. And as he said it, I smiled. I have not practiced law for 30 years, but it was a lawyer's question, and he is an opposing lawyer, really.

He said, "Pete, are we going to have to try this case?" And I smiled a bit, I think, because it was good to hear that kind of old lawyer question. As a de­fense lawyer in civil cases long ago, I used to say it a lot. "Are we going to have to try this case?"

And my reaction, I think the Sena­tor will recall, I said, as I recall it, "Howard, yes, we are going to have to try this case." I do not know if at that time I recognized the difficulty, the hardship, and the ordeal I am putting all the Members to. But I said, "Howard, if I had as much as touched that money and had thought that I might even think of taking that money, I wouldn't be here fighting this case."

Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield? Mr. WILLIAMS. I am happy to

yield. Mr. BAKER. I remember that con­

versation vividly. And I recall the an­guish that obviously beset the Senator from New Jersey when I put the ques­tion. I am glad to hear him say today that he understands the feeling of ne­cessity that I had in having to put the question in the first instance.

As I recall, there was one other part of that conversation, as well. And that was, "Then, as the Senate debates this issue, we are going to resolve every close issue for Pete Williams. We are going to see that you get a fair shot at making your case."

And I hope that we have done that. I think the Senator from New Jersey has acquitted himself well and the Senate has acquitted itself well.

I will take just this brief time to say that I commend my colleagues for staying on the floor as diligently as they have in the course of this debate, and I commend all parties for their participation so far.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I would like to ob­serve to our beloved majority leader that there were many things about the procedure and how this matter would be developed that my lawyers and I suggested and were not agreed upon; for example, the possibility, per­haps, of allowing witnesses either in the Chamber or in a caucus room

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3335 hearing. I have not had what I consid­er to be a full opportunity.

But, believe me, I know the majority leader did everything possible to give me the opportunities that I needed to make the case that I felt and do feel compelled to make, even to the point of being very generous, considering my physical condition when I had to re­cover from surgery. In anticipation of hours on my feet, my doctor informed me, and then he said to the majority leader, that a certain amount of time was needed and it was granted immedi­ately.

The majority leader mentioned 6 o'clock. This is a breaking place for me if it is for the majority leader.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I think it

. is a good breaking point. It is 12 min­utes to 6. I am prepared now to ask the Senate to recess over until Monday.

Mr. CRANSTON. Will the majority leader withhold just a moment?

Mr. BAKER. Yes. Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I

gather that the Senator from Califor­nia has something to announce.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I rise to speak only briefly today. Last night I spoke briefly about my conclu­sions regarding Senate Resolution 204 as reported by the Ethics Committee and my intention to proposed two courses of action with respect thereto.

First, next week, I will propose a substitute amendment to the pending measure that would censure, rather than expel, Senator WILLIAMS for be­havior bringing the Senate into disre­pute.

Second, I will be introducing next week, with the cosponsorship of the distinguished majority whip <Mr. STE­VENS), an original Senate resolution to provide for a full Senate investigation of executive branch misconduct re­garding the Abscam undercover oper­ation and related executive branch in­vestigations and other activities tar­geted against Members of the Con­gress. The investigation would be de­signed to determine the extent to which these activities constitute a danger to the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances inherent in our Constitution and to produce recommendations regarding what protections may be necessary to preserve the independence and integri­ty of the Congress.

I will be advocating the adoption of this resolution, as soon as possible, after disposition of the Williams matter.

INTRODUCTION

Last night, I had printed in the CON­GRESSIONAL RECORD 20 exhibits, cover­ing 78 pages, that I believe point up the need for the kind of in-depth Senate investigation Senator STEVENS and I will be proposing. These exhibits are . also critical, in my opinion, to 89--059 ()-85-21 (Pt. 3)

gaining a full understanding of the extent of Government misconduct in this case and the extent to which the Government itself was the victim of con man Mel Weinberg's own scam.

I urge all Senators and their aides to review these exhibits and the analysis of them that I have made and am making as part of my remarks today.

What I wish to do now is to summa­rize my conclusions for my colleagues.

It is my conclusion that there has been the grossest misconduct by the Government of the United States in the investigation and subsequent pros­ecution of Senator WILLIAMS. I believe that this misconduct far exceeded just the Government's failure to show there was a valid basis for pursuing Senator WILLIAMS-and it certainly has failed to show that. This miscon­duct is fully developed in the analysis I am about to make and I invite the close attention of my colleagues to it now and over the weekend.

I believe that this analysis shows that Abscam was an undercover oper­ation totally out of control because the chief operative, Mel Weinberg, was totally out of control. Out of control in implicating Government targets. And out of control in terms of his rela­tionship to those in the Government supposed to be supervising him. Wein­berg manipulated, conned, compro­mised, defrauded, and ultimately made fools of the Governinent and its agents.

But that jury verdict is not all there is to this matter. Serious allegations have been made that there has been the grossest misconduct by the Gov­ernment of the United States in the investigation and subsequent prosecu­tion of Senator WILLIAMS. These alle­gations, and evidence to support them, unfold daily. Yesterday I introduced for printing in the RECORD, a great deal of this material, which appears beginning at page 2998.

The Ethics Committee argues that explusion is warranted regardless of the outcome of the criminal proceed­ings. That is a technically correct view of the Senate's authority and power. But would expulsion really be pro­posed if Senator WILLIAMS had been acquitted? I believe it is clear that it is the criminal case that is driving the Senate forward.

As was pointed out so forcefully and eloquently· yesterday by the able Sena­tor from Hawaii <Mr. INOUYE), there is no precedent, even in recent history, for the Senate to expel a Senator for the type of conduct comparable to the conduct charged against Senator WIL­LIAMS. All cases where expulsion has actually occurred have involved trea­sonous acts.

And there is no instance in which this body has expelled a Senator whose criminal conviction was still in the appellate process. In fact, the Senate in this century has permitted

. three convicted Senators to continue to sit until their appeals have been ex­hausted.

What is more, as this became more and more clear throughout the oper­ation, officials of the Justice Depart­ment, in effect, ignored the warnings I am told by ~minent attorneys for from its own prosecutors that the op- · whom I have high regard that argu­eration was out of hand. ments and evidence being mustered

As the following analysis demon- against the Government may very well strates, what emerges in Abscam is a l~ad to an overtu~i~g of the ju~y ~er­trail of executive branch delay, stall- diet as well as a d1sm1ssal of the md1ct­ing, withholding, and finally coverup ment on due process grounds. of Government misconduct. A reversal of Senator WILLIAMS' con-

DEcisroN viction would, in my judgment, in no I have followed very carefully the way excuse his conduct nor exonerate

deliberations on this matter. I have him from censure for conduct improp­studied the video tapes and have re- er by a U.S. Senator. But the possibili­viewed the evidence for and against ty of reversal on appeal, and numerous Senator WILLIAMS. I have discussed unanswered questions about this case, this matter with fellow Senators and do mitigate the penalty which I think with others whose views I hold in high the Senate can fairly impose-at this regard. time-to redress the wrong Senator

I have reached a decision that it WILLIAMS has done. would be wrong, that it would be a RECENT PRECEDENTS

miscarriage of justice, to proceed at Senators have been condemned, cen-this time to vote the ultimate sanction sured, and denounced-but not ex-against Senator WILLIAMS. pelled-for conduct that many would

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS consider worse than that of which Mr. President, the case of Senator Senator WILLIAMS is accused. These

WILLIAMS is an extremely troubling cases involved Senators personally en-one. riching themselves by large amounts

STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS OF PENDING of money through improper use of the CRIMINAL PROCEEDING Office of U.S. Senator. Senator WIL-

We are, in effect, being impelled to LIAMs-whatever may have been his in­an expulsion of a fell ow Senator be- tentions-was not enriched by his un­cause of his conviction by a jury of fortunate escapades. Indeed, he em­having committed several crimes in- phatically rejected a direct and clearly volving abuse of his Senate office. criminal bribery attempt.

3336 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 EXECUTIVE BRANCH INVASION OF SENATE

INDEPENDENCE To rely on the jury verdict in this

case, obtained as it was-I will under­take to show-by a marauding execu­tive branch thoughtless of constitu­tional separation of powers between the great executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government, is to abrogate to the executive our re­sponsibility under article I, section 5, clause 2, of the Constitution to decide the qualifications of our Members and punish those who go astray. We should not, in the name of self disci­pline, in effect permit the executive branch to decide who may sit in Con­gress.

Moreover, I am sure all Senators share my deep concern about an un­dercover operation directed against the Senate by executive branch pros­ecutors who unblinkingly asserted in an October 2, 1981, Government brief on this matter that "undercover oper­atives do not need probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion to com­mence an investigation."

Mind you, the so-called "undercover operative" in question here is not the clean-cut, high-minded agent of "This Is Your FBI" fame. Not at all. The op­erative here is one of the sleaziest crooks and con artists ever caught and convicted of a Federal felony: He was then turned loose, with the blessing and protection of the Government, to pursue and ensnare Members of the Congress at a time when the Govern­ment had no basis to suspect them of criminal wrongdoing or propensities.

In the words of former dean and So­licitor General Erwin Griswold in the Williams' "due process" brief in sup­port of a dismissal of. the indictment and a new trial, tolerance of the un­ethical law enforcement standards and practices involved in Abscam "trans­forms a system designed to promote the general welfare into a system that fosters disobedience in order to punish. Such a system serves no legiti­mate law enforcement interest, and has no place in a democratic society".

Such an operation when directed against the coequal legislative branch of Government by the executive branch poses a very real threat to the separation of powers and checks and balances that the Constitution estab­lishes to protect our system of govern­ment and the freedom of all Ameri­cans.

Executive branch action-such as through the manipulation that oc­curred in the 1960's and 1970's of FBI and IRS resources-to develop inf or­mation which could be used to at­tempt to compromise Members of the Congress could impair the constitu­tionally established independence and integrity of the Congress itself.

Unchecked abuse of executive branch investigative and prosecutorial power could escalate into despotism

and the ultimate subservience of the Congress to the executive branch in derogation of the Constitution.

It takes little imagination in light of the events of the last decade or so to conjure up a scenario whereby an ex­ecutive branch, believing the tactics employed in Abscam were appropriate or at least tolerated, might target a Member of Congress because of the Member's antiadministration views and actions. Toleration by us of the Government's actions under the previ­ous administration in this case would, in my view, invite its repetition under circumstances that could produce a disastrous blow to our constitutional form of Government.

I am not suggesting that individual Senators themselves deserve any spe­cial protection from Government un­dercover operations; but rather that the Constitution requires that the in­stitution of the Senate be protected from such invasions and that the Sen­ate's independence can be preserved only by requiring the executive branch, and ultimately, the Congress to consider the implications for the separation of powers when the execu­tive targets its resources against a Member of the Congress. INVESTIGATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH ABUSE OF

POWER It is vital to the reputation and dig­

nity of the Senate that we act immedi­ately to investigate the conduct of the Abscam operation which, by unleash­ing without cause a manufactured criminal scheme to ensnare whomever came within its web, could if repeated threaten the very independence and integrity of the U.S. Senate.

That is why I will be introducing next week, with the cosponsorship of the distinguished majority whip <Mr. STEVENS), a resolution directing a Senate investigation of the conduct of the Government in its Abscam oper­ations and related activities directed against Members of Congress. I intend to ask for consideration of this resolu­tion at the earliest possible time after we dispose of Senate Resolution 204.

SENATOR WILLIAMS' CONDUCT WARRANTS CENSURE

Notwithstanding the grossly improp­er action of the Government, Senator WILLIAMS did in my opinion act in a manner unbecoming a Senator, injur­ing the reputation of the Senate, and generally not adhering to the high standards which must be expected of a U.S. Senator.

Because of such action, I am pre­pared at this point to vote to censure Senator WILLIAMS in strong condem­natory language. I will be proposing a substitute amendment for the pending Senate Resolution 204 to accomplish that censure. The basic text of that amendment appears at page 2998 of yesterday's RECORD, although I note that I may be making minor adjust-

ments in the format of the language before I submit it.

If we proceed with censure, the Senate would not be foreclosed from later expelling Senator WILLIAMS after the appellate courts have disposed of his appeal or at any time prior to the end of this term.

On the other hand, if we vote pre­maturely to impose what amounts to political capital punishment on Sena­tor WILLIAMS by revoking his right to sit in the Senate, we have no future option if his conviction is overturned or if future investigations produce evi­dence which tends to exculpate his ac­tions. We have no power to re-seat a Senator once expelled.

It is essential to the historic dignity of the Senate and its respect for fair play that any final judgment of expul­sion await both the exhaustion of Sen­ator WILLIAMS' appeals and a thor­ough investigation of the full set of circumstances surrounding the allega­tions and evidence regarding Govern­ment misconduct.

Although I believe that the criminal proceedings should be concluded before we can properly proceed with expulsion, I believe it is also the case that we are not bound by the results of that process or the findings of fact in that process. It is the duty of the Senate to look carefully at all the evi­dence and to determine for ourselves what really happened-what hap­pened with respect to Senator WIL­LIAMS and what happened with respect to the Government's entire course of dealing in the Abscam matter.

WAS A CRIME COMMITTED? Let us look carefully at the relation­

ship between Senator WILLIAMS' con­duct and the Government's conduct. Dean Griswold, in his fine reply brief for Senator WILLIAMS, concludes as follows:

The court seems to assume that Senator WILLIAMS committed a crime and that he should therefore be punished. But does this not beg the question? One of the issues in this case is whether, in all of the circum­stances, Senator WILLIAMS did commit a crime. It is easy to say, "Well, that is obvi­ous, at least in light of the jury verdict." · But is that really so?

Let us explore this central question of the Griswold brief: "Was there a crime?"

As Dean Griswold put it: The Government knew of no particular

crime or threat of crime which it was seek­ing to uncover or track down. The only ob­jective of the operation was to see if the Government could create a crime which would be committed at the Government's instigation.

And, I would add, a crime, if one oc­curred, every element of which was the product of the Government's arti­fice.

The manufacture of a crime to be committed totally as a result of the Government's instigation may be justi-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3337 fiable if the Government has a sound basis for suspecting the target is guilty of criminal activity which should be prevented and merely provides the target with an opportunity to engage in criminality.

In fact, the law sets standards for determining when it is permissible for the Government to proceed to uncover criminal behavior by this means. These standards apply to efforts to protect any person-be he a U.S. Sena­tor or the man on the street-from being lured into a criminal enterprise.

PREDISPOSITION

An essential requirement to legiti­mize such an undercover operation is that there must be a predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit a crime. The rule used by the Govern­ment to determine Senator WILLIAMS' predisposition in this case is set out in the Viviano case. That rule requires that there must be:

< 1 > an existing course of criminal conduct similar to the crime for which the defend­ant is charged, <2> an already formed design on the part of the accused to commit the crime for which he is charged, and (3) a will­ingness to commit the crime for which he is charged as evidenced by the accused's ready response to the inducement.

The prosecution relied on Senator WILLIAMS' alleged involvement in the Biocel Corp. matter and the Ritz Casino project. But the Ritz matter could not have been used by the Gov­ernment to determine predisposition since it did not come to the Govern­ment's attention until October 1979, long after Senator WILLIAMS had become a target of a persistent Abscam operation.

And the Government did not learn of the Biocel matter until it began to prepare for trial.

Yet, testimony about allegations re­garding these matters was presented to the jury in order to demonstrate that the Senator had engaged in a course of criminal conduct similar to the accusations arising out of Abscam.

Worse yet, this was done by the Gov­ernment prosecutor even though he had in his possession the January 24, 1977, report of a New Jersey State in­vestigation exonerating Senator WIL­LIAMS of any wrongdoing in the Biocel matter. This action by the prosecutor seems to me highly improper and prej­udicial.

The other hard evidence of an exist­ing course of similar criminal conduct consists of the March 24, 1979, · "bagman" statement made by Angelo Errichetti concerning Alexander Fein­berg. But there is good reason to sus­pect that this and similar remarks about Senator WILLIAMS were manu­factured by the Government's under­cover con man, Mel Weinberg.

Some 900 tapes were made during the Abscam operation. Many never have been transcribed. Many were missing-many disappearing while in Weinberg's custody. Many have gaps.

Custody and control of most of these tapes were entrusted to Mel Weinberg. The decision as to what to tape and what not to was entrusted to him. When the tapes were heard and tran­scribed by the FBI was controlled by Weinberg in terms of when he chose to send them in. The October 2, 1981, letter from former Federal Prosecutor Edward Plaza, which I had printed in yesterday's RECORD at page 2999 as exhibit 1~ substantiates all of this.

Thus, it was very difficult as Abscam unfolded for supervisors and Justice Department lawyers to understand the chain of events, the relevancy of events, and the interconnection of events. Even upon careful study now in chronological sequence, uncovering the truth is still very difficult. Howev­er, with the guidance of an experi­enced former prosecutor like Mr. Plaza, who is very well informed about all aspects of Abscam, it becomes pos­sible to weave disparate threads to­gether into a fabric. What emerges when that is done is a criminal con­spiracy woven out of whole cloth inso­far as Senator WILLIAMS is concerned.

Let me illustrate: Tapes of March 1 and March 5 involving an Edward Ellis, a New Jersey owner of the Garden State Raceway property-not himself involved in the titanium mine-demonstrates exactly how Mel Weinberg created the words and ac­tions the Government wanted in order to produce criminal prosecutions. These tapes were printed in yester­day's RECORD at pages 3018 and 3019 as exhibits 3 and 4.

On the March 5, 1979, tape, Mr. Ellis on five separate occasions in a relative­ly short meeting with undercover FBI Agent Amoroso describes Alexander Feinberg as WILLIAMS' bagman (p. 11, 15, and 19).

A reference to Senator WILLIAMS having a bagman apparently was con­sidered by the Government very im­portant to showing some predisposi­tion toward criminality on Senator WILLIAMS' part. I note that yesterday the Senator from Alabama <Mr. HEFLIN) made specific mention of such a reference by Errichetti on March 24.

That being the case, why has not the Government relied on the repeat­ed Ellis references to Senator WIL­LIAMS having a bagman, references that came 19 days before Errichetti's?

The reason, Mr. President, I believe is because of the way that Ellis' state­ment was manufactured by the Gov­ernment. That fabrication process is revealed by another tape, not pub­lished by the Ethics Committee, of a March l, 1979, telephone call between Ellis and Mel Weinberg. Weinberg pro­poses and Ellis agrees to meet one-half hour before the March 5 meeting to "go over it" (pp. 11 and 16). Signifi­cantly, in this conversation, Ellis de­scribes Feinberg, not as a bagman, but

as WILLIAMS' man, WILLIAMS' boy, and best man at his wedding (p. 14).

In a phone call Weinberg received after this one, he tells Ellis' partner, William Hyman, that there would be no problem getting the loan "if Ellis does what I tell him • • • when I spoke to you down in Florida" and as­sures Hyman that he's going "to meet • • • him at 9:30 in the morning, a half hour before, I'm going to go over it with him again" (p. 17).

Ellis also was apparently coached by Errichetti who stated 4 days later, on a March 8 tape of a meeting with Weinberg, Amoroso, and Feinberg, that he had told Ellis to make the bagman statement (p. 9). Excerpts from this tape appear at page 3022 of yesterday's RECORD.

From these conversations, I think it is inescapable that the references by Ellis to possible criminality involving Senator WILLIAMS were a product en­tirely of Weinberg's contrivance and coaching.

There emerges from all of the tapes and other evidence available a strong reason to believe that Mel Weinberg instructed Errichetti and perhaps others to whom he already had given or promised money to make incrimi­nating statements about Senator WIL­LIAMS in front of a duped FBI under­cover agent McCarthy-the directing agent first in charge and who posed as the Sheik's top representative-in order to convince the FBI that there were grounds to conclude that Senator WILLIAMS was predisposed to take a bribe. It is clear that Errichetti had re­ceived a large sum of cash from Wein­berg prior to making on March 24 his bagman reference about Alex Fein­berg.

So I ask my colleagues, how can Er­richetti's bagman statement of March 24 be relied upon as a legitimate basis for reaching any judgment about Sen­ator WILLIAMS in terms of predisposi­tion.

Rather, as it turned out, the Govern­ment already had strong evidence from the same expert that Senator WILLIAMS was not susceptible to brib­ery-as events would later prove to be absolutely correct.

This exculpatory evidence appears in a portion of the March 8 tape not printed by the Ethics Committee. In that meeting, Mel Weinberg repeated­ly goads Errichetti to get WILLIAMS to take a $10,000 or more bribe and Erri­chetti keeps responding "no [expletive deleted] way", "forget WILLIAMS", "U.S. Senator, forget it" (pp. 21, 22, and 23).

If there is one thing you would think Errichetti would be credible about, it would be who would not accept a bribe. But that was not enough for the Government.

Let me discuss yet another example of Weinberg super manipulation and

3338 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 fabrication: In the same March 5 tape, Edward Ellis, after coaching by Wein­berg, indicates to undercover FBI man McCarthy that he can corrupt Senator WILLIAMS and that he has already bribed him-he "cost me a hundred thousand bucks" (pp. 10 and 15). Later, in the March 8 tape both Fein­berg and Errichetti, talking about how Ellis had oversold the WILLIAMS con­nection, indicate Ellis had probably never even met Senator WILLIAMS (pp. 20 and 51).

As is confirmed by much other evi­dence, this was Weinberg's standard method of operation. As he told nu­merous Government prosecutors, "we would have no cases" if he did not put words in people's mouths.

Weinberg's scam depended upon convincing members of various busi­ness ventures, including the titanium mining venture, that the Arabs wanted to deal with persons who could get public officials involved in promoting their business interests in any manner possible, legally permissible or not. He stressed repeatedly that if the public official had a financial stake in the venture, according to his scenario, the Arabs liked it even better. Especially if the public official gave the appearance of corruptibility.

In sum, Weinberg would advise that what the Arabs need to be told before they would make a loan is that the businessmen have politicians available in case they or the Sheik ever need to call on them for help and paying them off in advance is the way they like to assure that. This is indeed the case. This line is a major theme of Wein­berg's March 1 telephone conversation with Hyman (p. 17) and Weinberg's July 16, 1979, taped conversation with George Katz, the principal investor in the titanium mine venture (pp. 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 22).

Getting Angelo Errichetti to make these kinds of false representations was no problem. He already was total­ly corrupt. He willingly forged a letter from Senator WILLIAMS at Weinberg's instigation and duplicated and forged certificates of deposit-for almost a half million dollars-on blanks Wein­berg had supplied him. He was more than eager to play his role in this sham.

Moreover, there is reason to believe that a contact memorandum to the Di­rector of the FBI regarding the Wein­berg-contrived bagman and $100,000 bribe statements by Ellis may have formed part of the basis for the Gov­ernment's decision to go after Senator WILLIAMS. If this is true-and a reli­able source involved with the Abscam prosecution has stated that it is-this alone demonstrates that the prosecu­torial integrity of the executive branch has been gravely compromised, the victim of anothe_r Mel Weinberg scam.

It is such new evidence and allega­tions, new interpretations and inter­connecting of seemingly unrelated events, questions about the untran­scribed tapes and undocumented meet­ings in Abscam, and the untold story of the entire operation that convince me that the Senate does not know all it should before it proceeds to vote to expel Senator WILLIAMS.

Evidence deliberately kept back from the jury has already come to light which, had it been presented, might well have altered the verdict. Indeed, one juror-Salvatore Otta­viano-swore under oath on Septem­ber 16, 1981, that had he been aware of the Justice Department's November 29, 1979, memorandum about a No­vember 11 Justice Department meet­ing and the concern in the Depart­ment at that time that the case against Senator WILLIAMS was weak, he would have never voted to convict.

But it is only that jury verdict that now holds in place manufactured facts and inferences which even the pros­ecution, we now know, doubted would hold firm.

Without the jury's unwitting en­dorsement of the Government's post facto justification for proceeding to target Senator WILLIAMS, the Govern­ment has no criminal case against the Senator.

To mask its embarrassment, the prosecution argued, as I pointed out earlier, "It is permissible for Govern­ment undercover agents to initiate criminal activity even when there is no reason to believe that the defendant is engaged in wrongdoing. Undercover operatives do not need probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, to com­mence an investigation."

The cases cited by the Government to support this theory are in no way comparable to the kinG. of extensive, prolonged, persistently persuasive and all-consuming operation that was di­rected against Senator WILLIAMS and others.

STATE OF MIND RE COMMITTING A CRIME The second test for predisposition is:

Was a design to commit the crime al­ready formed in Senator WILLIAMS' mind?

The facts show that prior to the Government's intervention there was no plan. It was invented by the Gov­ernment and put in place by its opera­tive, Mel Weinberg.

If guesswork and rumor supported by manufactured corroboration are to be the standard for due process, then no one is free from the danger of being targeted by the Department of Justice.

I do not have to invent a case of the Government's apparent willingness to target a U.S. Senator for a bribe offer without any reasonable basis for sus­pecting that Senator. As Senator INOUYE described yesterday, that hap­pened with respect to Senator STROM

THURMOND as a result of an allegation by former Representative John Jen­rette. In his trial, the following ex­change took place between his coun­sel, Kenneth M. Robinson, and former Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Philip Heymann:

Mr. ROBINSON. After you learned that Mr. Jenrette had made an allegation about a Senator on a video tape, can you tell us why the offer was not made when you had three weeks before the shutdown of Abscam?

Mr. HEYMANN. The first time I think I learned of Mr. Jenrette's statement about Senator THURMOND was when U.S. Attorney Ruff called me up and said: "I want to go ahead and offer in some way • • *" I don't remember how "* • • an opportunity for Senator THURMOND to come and take money, because we found this in the record and we think that we ought to follow this through."

And I said "Go ahead." That is the first time I ever heard of it, so for me the timing was within 15 minutes of the time the phone rang I said "yes."

Mr. ROBINSON. So, you don't know what Mr. Ruff and others did about proceeding against Senator THURMOND?

Mr. HEYMANN. I don't know, exactly what they did, but they did proceed and Senator THURMOND, I think did not respond. I don't know exactly what happened.

What we have here is a decision made at the highest levels of the Jus­tice Department to proceed against one of the most esteemed Members of the U.S. Senate soley because he was mentioned by a man the Government knew at that very time was himself corrupt and unreliable. The bribe to Jenrette had been paid the month before, and yet the prosecutors appar­ently made no effort whatsoever to substantiate his statement that the senior Senator from South Carolina had any predisposition to commit a crime.

Nevertheless, this very same Assist­ant Attorney General Heymann testi­fied to the House Judiciary Committee on March 4, 1980, after the existence of the Abscam operation became public knowledge, that "where we are met by the representatives of an initi­ating agent of uncertain reliability, we seek to take every precaution against involvement of the innocent."

Abscam was a wholesale fishing ex­pedition with the executive branch using a large net to try to trap Mem­bers of Congress. It could have mount­ed into a massive assault upon the Constitution. Any Senator, no matter how unblemished his or her record, could have been targeted.

Due process requires strict observ­ance of rules to protect all citizens from entrapment-from deliberate de­signs to overcome the will of someone resisting temptation and criminality.

That is why the Senate must not ignore those standards in making a de­cision in the matter of Senator WIL­LIAMS.

No one is immune from rumor and innuendo. Someone is almost always

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3339 available to circulate gossip or fabri­cate changes against any elected offi­cial.

People can always be found who will say anything.

Hence, if the FBI agent in charge is gullible, compromised, or simply care­less, and hence fails to supervise his undercover operator, as the evidence indicates beyond any doubt happened in Abscam, an individual in any walk of life could be made the target of a sophisticated, persistent scam. This conclusion is buttressed by Assistant Attorney General Heymann's testimo­ny to the House Judiciary Committee on March 4, 1980, about how "special training" is provided for all undercov­er FBI agents, "with emphasis on in­struction in legal areas, including en­trapment." He said nothing of provid­ing any training to an undercover op­erative like Mel Weinberg, however.

READY RESPONSE WITHOUT PERSUASION

The third standard regarding predis­position asks: Did Senator WILLIAMS make a ready response to criminal in­ducement? Judge Learned Hand, one of our great Federal appellate judges, articulated the standard as "ready and willing without persuasion" to commit a crime.

Senator WILLIAMS, it is clear from all the tapes and transcripts, was a tough man to persuade.

Throughout the first half of 1979, Weinberg kept pouring on the pres­sure, urging long-time friends and as­sociates of WILLIAMS to get "Pete" to go along because there would be no loan and no successful business ven­ture without him. All to no avail. Weinberg and Errichetti finally had to engage in the infamous coaching ses­sions in June 1979. That is when they contended that all Senator WILLIAMS needed to do to help his friends was a little play acting; that he would never really have to do anything to get any contracts because the venture could make it on its own since there was a ready market in the private sector for paint pigments.

Absence of persuasion is supposed to be crucial for a finding of predisposi­tion. Yet Senator WILLIAMS was pushed, pulled, tugged, and insinuated up to the threshold. And if he crossed that threshold, why was it that the Government as late as November 1979 did not think it had an acceptable case-long after Senator WILLIAMS had his June meeting with the sheik and had received the bogus stock cer­tificates?

If the Government thought it did not have a clear case after those 9 months of persistent efforts, that should have been the end of the crimi­nal proceeding. But, for reasons that I expect will come out eventually, the Government was driven to make a case against a U.S. Senator, and to get such a case before a jury to complement the

cases it was building against Members of the House.

On the basis of the foregoing analy­sis of the three elements of predisposi­tion, I believe it is clear that the Gov­ernment not only failed to satisfy all three but failed to satisfy even one of the elements of the predisposition it needed to prove against Senator WIL­LIAMS. The threat to individual liberty posed by this kind of unrelenting, un­controlled Government action to create criminal activity is enormous. A U.S. Senator thrown into the criminal justice system as a result of such ac­tivities may have the resources avail­able to defend against the Govern­ment's misconduct. To the individual private citizen who may not have these resources available, the threat is far greater in terms of the conse­quences of prosecutional abuse.

EXTENT OF GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT: THE DOUBLE SCAM

What is now clear, I believe, from the record, is that there is far more here than just a failure of the Govern­ment to show there was a valid basis for pursuing Senator WILLIAMS, far more than was ever presented to the Ethics Committee before it reached its recommendation or to the trial judge at the tie of the due process hearing.

We can see now from the affidavit of Marie Weinberg, the tragically and re­cently deceased wife of Mel Weinberg, that Abscam was actually a double scam. The con man was not only out of control in implicating Government targets. He was also out of control in terms of his relationship to those in the Government supposed to be super­vising him. Weinberg manipulated, conned, compromised, defrauded, and ultimately made fools of the Govern­ment and its agents.

Why should we believe Marie Wein­berg's accusations?

Well, for one thing she was consist­ent. She related the same events during hours of taped telephone calls with a Jack Anderson investigative re­porter and during 4 hours of video taped discussions with the ABC televi­sion network. We now know that rele­vant aspects of her affidavit were con­firmed in a statement to the FBI­which I printed in the RECORD yester­day as part of exhibit 7 at page 3028-by Errlchetti's nephew, Joseph DiLorenzo, regarding a meeting on April 1, 1979, between Errichetti and Weinberg. According to the December 17, 1980, Plaza memorandum attached to his letter to Judge Penn, DiLorenzo also told this to Plaza and another Justice Department lawyer.

At such an April 1 meeting, there is good reason to believe that Weinberg and Errichetti split up $75,000 of the $100,000 FBI bribe money intended for but apparently never received by Ken­neth McDonald of the Atlantic City Casino Control Commission. The letter containing this information

about the nephew was not made avail­able to defense attorneys until Decem­ber 2, 1981, 2 months after it was writ­ten by former first principal assistant U.S. attorney in New Jersey Edward Plaza.

Both Plaza and Errichetti's nephew are supported in this version of events by Errichetti saying to Weinberg at the April 8 meeting that "MacDonald isn't getting a [expletive deleted] quarter. No way. I may buy him a cigar, a three dollar cigar, but that's it, but there ain't no [expletive deleted] way I'm gonna offer, give him the money" (page 27).

Finally, this theory is also supported in a most unlikely way by a tape of a telephone call that Weinberg made to Errichetti on April 1, 1979, the day that the Errichetti-Weinberg meeting allegedly occurred. I printed this tape in the RECORD yesterday as exhibit 6 at page Sl506. This tape is another ex­ample of how relevant tapes have often been overlooked. On this tape, Weinberg and Errichetti discuss the attempted payment of the $100,000 bribe to McDonald 2 days earlier and go out of their way to make it clear that $75,000 of the money was finally taken by McDonald. Of course, no ref­erence is made to any meeting that day at the Holiday Inn.

There are two very unusual things about this tape. First, the tape begins with Weinberg stating "April 1, 2:30 p.m., Sunday, I am returning the mayor's call." He then places the call and charges it to his office phone. Two-thirty was approximately the time that Errichetti's nephew told the grand jury that Weinberg and Erri­chetti had met that day. After the nephew's grand jury testimony, the FBI agents apparently found this tape and by virtue of the lead-in, disbe­lieved the nephew's testimony. Howev­er, I have learned that Justice Depart­ment attorneys, skeptical as to the time when the call actually occurred that date, had telephone company toll records checked. They showed, I am advised, that the call actually was made at 5:30 p.m.

The second strange thing about that call is that neither Weinberg nor Erri­chetti used any profanity throughout a 7-page transcript. A cursory review of any other tape involving the two will quickly reveal how unique is that occurrence. Errichetti, particularly, is almost incapable of letting more than a sentence go without embellishing it with major profanity.

Parenthetically, I wish to explain to my colleagues that, in the material ap­pearing at page 3028 in yesterday's RECORD, two "Christ's" were deleted from the transcript of the April 1 tele­phone tape. This was done by the Gov­ernment Printing Office at my request to remove any profanity from any ma-

3340 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 terial in case we had missed any in our editing.

The most plausible explanation for all this and the reason that the Gov­ernment has never been able to find the $75,000 is that Weinberg and Erri­chetti ripped it off and that this phone call was a play act that Wein­berg conned Errichetti into joining in order to give Weinberg something to use to convince his "bosses" that the target had actually taken the bribe.

Interestingly, Jack Anderson's Janu­ary 18, 1982, column which is printed in yesterday's RECORD as part of exhib­it 20 at page 3076 asserts that Erri­chetti has indicated to Anderson through an intermediary that he gave $75,000 to Weinberg at that meeting and would so swear under oath if he was given limited "use" immunity. Weinberg denied under oath to a grand jury that he had had any such meeting with Errichetti that day or that he got money from Errichetti then or at any other time.

Which convicted felon, liar, and con man is one to believe? Hard to choose on the face of it-except that the evi­dence from Errichetti's nephew, from Marie Weinberg, from the March 8 tape, and from the April 1 tape itself also strongly suggests that Weinberg pulled off the ultimate-a quintuple scam-scamming Errichetti, McDon­ald, and the U.S. Government for whom he was supposed to be scam­ming each of the others and scamming Errichetti a second time in the scam to cover their scam.

Also, we learned only last week that FBI affidavits filed on February 23 before Judge Pratt fully corroborate Marie Weinberg's allegations that nu­merous personal effects from her home were turned over to FBI agents by her husband when the Weinbergs moved to Florida in the summer of 1979, including an organ, men's suits and sportscoats, women's fur coats, and large furniture items. Three FBI agents admitted under oath that they paid Mel Weinberg over $7,500 for var­ious items of personal property.

Besides attesting to Marie's reliabil­ity, these affidavits show incredible in­sensitivity on the part of the FBI and the Justice Department. Chief Pros­ecutor Puccio now defends these ac­tions by the FBI and suggests that the extent to which the agents-including the chief FBI undercover operative who succeeded Agent McCarthy, An­thony Amoroso-had been compro­mised by engaging in personal finan­cial transactions with Weinberg is ir­relevant to Senator WILLIAMS' case.

Despite Mr. Puccio's assertions in Judge Pratt's court that there was nothing improper about these transac­tions, they clearly violate the Depart­ment of Justice's Standards of Con­duct regulations, in part 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, govern-

ing the behavior of all Justice Depart­ment employees.

These regulations provide generally, in section 45. 735-2, that Department of Justice employees shall "conduct themselves in a manner that creates and maintains respect for the Depart­ment of Justice and the U.S. Govern­ment", and avoid any action "which might result in, or create the appear­ance of using public office for private gain", "giving preferential treatment to any person", or "losing complete in­dependence or impartiality".

I think that there can be little doubt that the agents' activity, at a mini­mum, created the appearance of pro­hibited conduct.

More specifically, the regulations provide, in section 45.735-14, that a Department of Justice employee "shall not solicit or accept for himself or another person, directly or indirect­ly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertain­ment, loan, or any other thing of mon­etary value from a person who • • • conducts operations or activities that are regulated by the Department• • • Corl has interests that may be substan­tially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the employee's of­ficial duty." The agents' conduct falls afoul of both these standards.

First, the agents were responsible for overseeing and regulating Mel Weinberg's operations and activities. Second, as the record amply illus­trates, Weinberg clearly had an inter­est that was "substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance" of the agents' official duty. I do not see how there can be any doubt that the agents, by entering into financial transactions with Mel Weinberg, vio­lated these regulatory prohibitions against such conduct.

So the executive branch is urging the courts to take a head-in-the-sand approach and ignore conflicts of inter­est and the appearance of such con­flicts on the part of the agents who were supposed to be in charge of the man who in fact was running them.

As I said, all of this abundantly cor­roborates what Marie Weinberg has to tell us about Mel's efforts to rip off Abscam for far more than the $133,000 in compensation that the Justice De­partment admits it paid to him direct­ly.

Moreover, ample evidence exists to confirm Marie's allegations of Wein­berg's having extorted from Abscam targets expensive gifts to be passed to the sheik and in fact kept by Wein­berg, facts she asserts Good, Amoroso, and other FBI agents were well aware of. We're talking about three $1,000 gold watches, a $1,200 stereo, a $900 Betamax, at least three $300 Sony TV's, and a $900 microwave oven. This does not include bribe moneys he probably absconded with. Except for the watches, Mel Weinberg denied

under oath in another Abscam case that he was given such booty.

I ask: Is there not ample reason to believe Marie Weinberg? Has her credibility not been clearly estab­lished?

She was never convicted of swindling anyone.

Her husband, on the other hand, is a self-admitted liar whose credibility Judge Pratt has discounted and, ac­cording to evidence outlined in the Edward Plaza October 2, 1981, letter, and described in Jack Anderson's recent letter to the Senate leadership that was sent to each Senator, printed in yesterday's RECORD at page S1479 as exhibit 1, who perjured himself on nu­merous occasions in Abscam judicial proceedings.

I ask each Senator to read the Marie Weinberg affidavit and tape, the Plaza letter, and the FBI affidavits recently presented to Judge Pratt, all of which I will submit for printing in the RECORD.

I wish this narration of misconduct could stop here-that Weinberg and some FBI agents were the only ones implicated in possible governmental wrongdoing, but the scandal goes higher.

The Government's chief Abscam prosecutor, Mr. Puccio, characterized Mel Weinberg, in the memorandum he just filed on February 23 in Judge Pratt's court, as follows:

Weinberg's character was never an issue at trial. He was conceded to be a con man, a charlatan whose credibility could be estab­lished only by corrobative evidence.

FURTHER IMPROPER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ACTION

How can we overlook the testimony of Chief Abscam Prosecutor Thomas Puccio reluctantly admitting to having discussed with a journalist a book about Abscam while the investigations and case preparations were in progress? This testimony and the book contract appear at page S. 1511 as ex­hibit 11 in yesterday's RECORD. Is it credible that the $60,000 advance available to Mr. Puccio, under a book contract negotiated by that journalist which Puccio admits he was aware of throughout his prosecution had no effect on his conduct? That it did not influence his decision as to which cases would go to indictment? That it did not influence his decision as to whether allegations of Government misconduct would be investigated?

The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administra­tion of Criminal Justice state:

Standard 3-1.2 Conflicts of Interest: A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality of a conflict of interest with respect to official duties.

Standard 3-1.3 Public Statements: <a> The prosecutor should not exploit the office by means of personal publicity connected with a case before trial, during trial, or thereaf­ter.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3341 Is there any question that Mr. Puc­

cio's undisclosed contingent financial interest in this venture was improper?

The disclosure of this situation alone casts severe doubt on the integ­rity of the basic conduct of the Justice Department vis-a-vis Senator WIL­LIAMS and on the fairness of his trial. All parties were apparently unaware of this obvious conflict, including the jury, judge, and defense attorneys until it was brought out in the Erri­chetti due process hearing after the Williams trial was over.

And how can we ignore the allega­tions by Mr. Plaza that former Deputy Attorney General Irwin Nathan testi­fied incorrectly, incompletely, or false­ly in numerous respects about the Government's action in the Abscam cases? Mr. Plaza also makes allega­tions that erroneous testimony was given by FBI special agent, John Good.

Mr. Plaza cites numerous internal Justice Department memoranda in support of his various contentions. In­asmuch as the Department of Justice has generally refused to provide these memoranda to the defendants in the criminal cases or to the House Judici­ary Committee's subcommittee with FBI oversight jurisdiction, how can we do other than to assume the veracity of Mr. Plaza's statements.

What do we know about Mr. Plaza's credibility? I have been advised by counsel for the House Judiciary Com­mittee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, which has FBI oversight jurisdiction, that its investi­gation of Mr. Plaza's allegations has indicated, through independent cor­roboration, that his credibility is of the highest order.

Finally, a recent piece of Govern­ment dishonor has emerged. Two weeks ago in filing answers to Senator WILLIAMS' and Mr. Jenrette's motions to reopen the due process hearings, the Government took conflicting posi­tions. In its memorandum before Judge Bryant in opposition to the motion in the Jenrette case, the Gov­ernment staunchly denied Marie Weinberg's allegations regarding the transfer of personal property from Mel Weinberg to the FBI agents. But before Judge Pratt in the Williams case, the Government the very next day filed the FBI affidavits confirming her account.

Because the Government's action here is so distressing I want to quote directly from the memorandum before Judge Bryant. The Justice Depart­ment memorandum makes the follow­ing absolutely incredible statements about what it stresses on several occa­sions is the:

also gave books to a female FBI agent ... (page 2, f.n. 1):

We have studied the allegations contained in the defendant Weisz' motion. While it is unclear whether, and to what extent, any of them can be proven, particularly in view of Mrs. Weinberg's death on January 28, we would suggest to that Court that none of these allegations, even if all of them are as­sumed to be true <which we steadfastly deny> bears in any meaningful way on the due process question before this Court. <Page 3.>

[Defendant's] pleadings fail to allege acts or omissions which, even if they are true which we dispute ... <Page 18.>

While his allegations and they are only al· legations ... <Page 18.>

I must say that I am truly shocked by this latest revelation of Govern­ment duplicity. Is this a case of forum shopping to find where best to bury incriminating evidence of Government misconduct?

Another instance of the extreme lengths to which the Government would go to manipulate the Abscam prosecutions and to ignore the separa­tion of powers took place in the cham­bers of Judge Curtis Meanor of the U.S. District Court for New Jersey on March 5, 1981, relating to investiga­tion of the McDonald-Errichetti case.

In the judge's chambers were Reed Weingartner, representing the Depart­ment of Justice, and William Robert­son, the U.S. attorney for new Jersey District. They met with the judge to discuss the grand jury's formal protest of a request of the Justice Department from Washington to withdraw the Government presentation to the New Jersey grand jury and to transfer the proceedings to a grand jury sitting in Brooklyn, N.Y.

After some discussion took place, Judge Meanor pointedly asked Mr. Weingartner of the Department of Justice whether the Government was seeking to move the Abscam prosecu­tions out of New Jersey entirely in order to avoid a third circuit decision, U.S. against Twigg, a decision control­ling the Federal court in New Jersey which would have greatly strength­ened any due process arguments of de­fendants in various Abscam proceed­ings.

The judge first began by asking what was the authority of the Depart­ment to make such a request, and I quote:

Mr. WEINGARTNER. The authority, the only authority I have is that the executive branch has given-

THE COURT. I don't care about the execu­tive branch. The grand jury is an arm of this court. It's an autonomous, independent constitutionally recognized body. And I may be ignorant but I know of no way that the U.S. Attorney or the Department of Justice attorneys can force a grand jury to discon­tinue an investigation it wants to perpet­uate.

Alleged behavior of Mr. Weinberg and cer· • • • • • tain FBI agents (page 1), including claims: THE COURT. And it's obvious to me-call a that ... Weinberg gave furniture and spade a shovel-they want this thing away clothing to Agents Good and Amoroso and from your office because the Department

wants to control it .... They have control in Brooklyn. They apparently have lost con­trol in Newark.

• • • • • Mr. ROBERTSON. Judge, let's be specific.

There's a feeling that-and you correct me if I'm wrong-that, for example, maybe Mr. Melvin Weinberg would not like to be in the District of New Jersey given the fact that Mr. Plaza and Mr. Weir have questioned some of the tactics used.

THE COURT. I would assume we would all agree were an indictment returned by this grand jury involving the ABSCAM cases it would be inappropriate for Mr. Weir and Mr. Plaza to participate in the prosecution?

Mr. ROBERTSON. That's correct, Judge ....

• • • • • THE COURT .... To me it sounds more and

more like an effort to get all Abscam pros­ecutions out of New Jersey, to get them out from under either the U.S. Attorney's Office here or the Judiciary in New Jersey, or the Judiciary in the Third Circuit. . . . The leading Court of Appeals case that would harm the government's position as to the propriety of the Abscam conduct, as I have read it in the papers, comes out of the Third Circuit.

Mr. WEINGARTNER. U.S. v. Twigg is the case you refer to?

THE COURT. Yes. Mr. WEINGARTNER. I think this is the

point. I have not been instructed to say this violent dispute is the reason we are leaving this District. I was instructed to say there are a lot of valid reasons. The government chose to exercise its discretion.

THE COURT .... Grand juries and courts do not exist for the convenience of the pros­ecution. I do not exist as a lackey of the De­partment of Justice, although I sometimes think that the Department of Justice would like to have it be that way. So when you go in and talk to that grand jury you stick to my principles. . . . ABSCAM'. MAY REACH WATERGATE PROPORTIONS

AS A THREAT TO OUR BASIC DEMOCRATIC IN­STITUTIONS As I noted earlier, what emerges in

Abscam is a trail of executive branch delay, stalling, witholding, and finally coverup of Government misconduct.

In my opinion, when the full meas­ure of Government misconduct is dis­covered, the Abscam scandal will rival if not exceed Watergate in terms of the extent and breadth of Govern­ment misconduct and the resultant threat it poses to the survival of our basic democratic system of govern­ment.

In characterizing the pervasive nature of the misconduct of the execu­tive branch throughout, I want to stress again that this is not a partisan concern. The Justice Department's ac­tions in connection with the undercov­er operation and indictment all oc­curred under a prior administration as did the failure to investigate adequate­ly the initial allegations of impropri­ety in the operation. The actions with regard to the trial itself occurred very early on in the present administration, although the recent actions I have just outlined are the responsibility of

3342 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 the present leadership of the Justice prosecution of Senator WILLIAMS as to Department. convince the Senate that the conduct

EVALUATING SENATOR WILLIAMS' CONDUCT IN in which he did engage does not war-CONTEXT rant expulsion from this body.

It will be asked and Senators are coNcLusioN asking: "Why is all this relevant to It is my contention, and I will what punishment the Senate should expand on this further next week, impose on Senator WILLIAMS?" that Senator WILLIAMS' conduct, while

In the opinion of the Ethics Committee, t t' 1 · t th' · Mel Weinberg's credibility and actions are no warran mg expu s1on a Is time, not central to the case before the Senate does justify his censure. against Senator WILLIAMS. Senator WILLIAMS faced what in my

The committee believes that, because we opinion was a cruel and unreasonable can find reprehensible behavior and words test. Conceding the interpretation of by Senator WILLIAMS on a relatively few events most favorable to him. I con­minutes of tape out of the hundreds of elude that his conduct fell short of hours of tapes, his expulsion is justified. what must be the high standard for

I have great respect for the Senators on every Senator here. that committee. I know they have labored exhaustively over this matter, devoting Even though a private citizen might enormous amounts of time to the proceed- be exonerated in court because of due ings and deliberations. Their devotion to the process considerations in a case like Senate in tackling this "thankless" task is a this-and that may well be the ulti­credit to each of them. mate result of the judicial process for

I cannot, however, accept the Ethics Com- Senator WILLIAMS-that does not mittee's thesis that the Senate should judge mean a Senator should escape appro­this case with blinders ori. And I submit priate punishment by the Senate for a that this approach is critical to sustaining violation of its ethical standards which the expulsion recommendation.

What I mean by a "blinders" approach is clearly must be higher than those by that we are asked to look only directly which society judges the conduct of its ahead-to look only at the specific words citizens in terms of the criminal law. and one action-submit it is only one action Thus, even though I find substantial of Senator WILLIAMS-and not look to the mitigation for Senator WILLIAMS' ac­right or to the left or behind. tions here, I also find his conduct

I believe that approach is wrong. To me, Senator WILLIAMS' ultimate actions and wanting when measured against the words are equivocal. To understand them conduct which must be expected of fully and to evaluate them fairly, 1 submit those who hold a high public trust. that one must look at the entire process-all I reach this conclusion even though that preceded and followed and surrounded I believe that he was improperly led those ambiguous words and one action. into the improper conduct by the ex-

The analysis I have presented today will, I ecutive branch. I do not believe that hope, help each of us to do that-look at the Senator WILLIAMS should escape ap­whole picture.

This includes the extent to which the propriate punishment by the Senate Government itself was being deluded by because of due process violations by Weinberg and the extent to which adverse the Government. statements by others about Senator WIL- For conduct that is undisputed on LIAMS were manufactured by Weinberg and the record, I am prepared now to cen­relied on by the Government. sure Senator WILLIAMS, but not to

This includes what might be found when expel him. gaps in tape transcriptions are filled in, if I note again that I will speak further possible, and what can be learned of un-taped and undocumented conversations. next week on my censure substitute

This includes what Weinberg persuaded amendment and the Senate investiga­Senator WILLIAMS' friends they had to do to tion resolution I will be introducing get him involved because without his in- with Senator STEVENS. Let me also volvement there would be no loan. repeat my urging that Senators review

This includes the truth about pros- the 20 exhibits that were printed in ecutor Puccio's book deal and whether yesterday's RECORD. Weinberg believed that any of his fn that regard, Mr. President, I wish compensation depended on convic- to express my appreciation to all of tions. the dedicated individuals at the Gov-

This includes the extent to which ernment Printing Office who worked the U.S. Government was itself so long and hard last night to print scammed and compromised by the con the 20 exhibits. They did a magnifi­man who was masterminding the cent job under truly onerous condi­entire undercover operation. tions, and I am most grateful for their

Finally, this includes the extent to efforts. which the full scope of the Govern- I thank my colleagues for their at-ment's improper conduct-from the tention. chief Abscam perpetrator, Mel Wein- Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I yield berg, the field FBI agents, and their to the Senator from New York. supervisor in the field, through the Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I field office supervisor, to the Justice believe we can assume that there are Department's strike force and the re- those who believe that the conduct of sponsible at Justice Department head- the Department of Justice in the quarters-has so thoroughly infected Abscam operation is relevant to the and polluted the investigation and resolution before us, there are those

who think it is not, and there are those who are undecided.

It seems to me an elemental duty to Senator WILLIAMS to report to the Senate that I have the transcripts of two meetings involving Mr. MELVIN WEINBERG, Mr. William Rosenberg, Mr. Bruce Brady, a special agent of the FBI, and also Mr. Tony DeVito, a special agent of the FBI which were referred to yesterday by the distin­guished Senator from Hawaii.

In this transcript, Mr. Rosenberg, who was a convicted felon, who has subsequently been found guilty in one of the Abscam cases, represented him­self as having been in contact with Senator Javits, with me, with Con­gressman LENT, of New York. It would be of some interest to the body to know he also represented himself as being in contact with the late Senator Robert Kerr, of Oklahoma. [Laugh­ter.]

He was instructed by Weinberg and DeVito to offer money and bring in a person.

I would say that Senator Javits is no longer in the Chamber.

It could be pointed out that Mr. Charles B. Renfrew, the Deputy Attor­ney General on January 27, 1981, wrote to me and wrote to Senator Javits that Mr. Rosenberg had con­fessed to lying with respect to the rep­resentations that he had made, that they were not true, and he had left the matter right there.

There may be Senators who wish to read these transcripts, and they will certainly be available. I wanted it to be known that I do have the transcripts. They are dated September 10, 1979, at the JFK Hilton, and October 21, 1979, also at the Hilton.

Mr. STENNIS. Will the Senator yield to me for just 1 moment?

Mr. BAKER. I yield. Mr. STENNIS. The Senator men­

tioned Senator Kerr's name. It is known to us here, but some may not recall. Senator Kerr passed away some 15 years ago.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. Mr. STENNIS. I thought I should

mention that at this point in the RECORD.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. He was at that time dead almost 17 years, to be clear. [Laughter.]

Mr. LONG. Will the Senator yield? Mr. MOYNIHAN. The majority

leader has the floor. Mr. LONG. Will the Senator yield? Mr. BAKER. I yield. Mr. LONG. When the proposal was

made that the FBI bribe Senator Kerr, was the person making or receiv­ing the proposition knowledgeable that Senator Kerr was in his grave at the time?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. The man who rep­resented himself to Mr. Weinberg, whether he knew that or not, I cannot

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3343

say. He represented that Senator Kerr was retired.

Mr. LONG. Might we assume that that might be some great feat, if the FBI actually succeeded in bribing someone in his grave?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I think the distin­guished Senator from California does not want to go beyond his knowledge in these matters, and neither do I. [Laughter.]

The VICE PRESIDENT. The major­ity leader.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, at 6 o'clock, a few minutes from now, ac­cording to the Parliamentarian, the committee will have utilized 58 min­utes and Senator WILLIAMS, 243 min­utes. That may not be exactly accu­rate, depending on how we ha~e clocked the time that has been used m the last 10 minutes or so. The point I make is that we have failed miserably in trying to allocate time equally on each day. But by force of events it has sort of evened out in these 2 days.

If the committee is agreeable, and if Senator INOUYE, the minority leader, and Senator WILLIAMS are agreeable, I would propose that we just start fresh on Monday and divide the time equal­ly when, presumably, the opening statements so-called, will be out of the way and w~ will be down to the time when there will be a need for perhaps a little more equity and control, or at least a little more precision, in the al­location of time. Is that satisfactory to the chairman?

Mr. WALLOP. By all means it is sat­isfactory to the committee.

Mr. BAKER. Is that satisfactory to the Senator from Hawaii?

Mr. INOUYE. Yes. Mr. BAKER. On Monday we will

begin fresh.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Saunders, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

<The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate pro­ceedings.)

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVALS A message from the President of the

United States announced that he had approved and signed the following joint resolutions:

On February 26, 1982: S.J. Res. 134. Joint resolution to designate

1982 as the "National Year of Disabled Per­sons."

On March 1, 1982: S.J. Res. 122. Joint resolution to authorize

and request the President to designate the week of February 28, 1982, through March 6, 1982, as "National Construction Industry Week."

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE At 10:36 p.m., a message from the

House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House agrees to the amendments of the Senate to the following bill:

H.R. 4625. An act to authorize the Secre­tary of the Army to return to the Federal Republic of Germany certain works of art seized by the U.S. Army at the end of World War II.

The message also announced that the House agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the dis­agreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill <S. 1503) to authorize the Presi­dent to allocate supplies of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and refined petrole­um products during a severe petrole­um supply shortage, and for other purposes.

The message further announced that the House has passed the follow­ing bill and joint resolutions, in which it requests the . concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 4977. An act to direct the President to name the next Nimitz class nuclear-pow­ered aircraft carrier as the U.S.S. Hyman G. Rickover;

H.J. Res. 348. Joint resolution to provide for the awarding of a special gold medal to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix in recognition of the 1982 bicentennial anniversary of dip­lomatic and trade relations between the Netherlands and the United States; and

H.J. Res. 373. Joint resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the govern­ment of the Soviet Union should respect the rights of its citizens to practice their reli­gion and to emigrate, and that these mat­ters should be among the issues raised at the 38th meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights at Geneva in February 1982.

The message also announced that the House has agreed to the following concurrent resolution, in which it re­quests the concurrence of the Senate:

H. Con. Res. 226. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should press for uncondition­al discussions among the major political fac­tions in El Salvador in order to guarantee a safe and stable environment for free and open democratic elections. ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker has signed the fol­lowing enrolled bill and joint resolu­tions:

H.R. 4625. An act to authorize the Secre­tary of the Army to return to the Federal Republic of Germany certain works of art

seized by the U.S. Army at the end of World War II;

S.J. Res. 91. Joint resolution to designate July 1982 as "National Peach Month"; and

S.J. Res. 105. Joint resolution to designate October 1982 as "National P.T.A. Member­ship Month."

The enrolled bill and joint resolu­tions were subsequently signed by the President pro tempore <Mr. THUR­MOND).

At :;:45 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Berry, announced that the House has passed the following joint resolu­tion, without amendment:

S.J. Res. 142. Joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a procla­mation designating March 21, 1982, as Af­ghanistan Day, a day to commemorate the struggle of the people of Afghanistan against the occupation of their country by Soviet forces.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED The following bill was read the first

and second times by unanimous con­sent, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

H.R. 4977. An act to direct the President to name the next Nimitz-class nuclear-pow­ered aircraft carrier as the U.S.S. Hyman G. Rickover.

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION REFERRED

The following concurrent resolution was read, and referred to the Commit­tee on Foreign Relations:

H. Con. Res. 226. A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should press for uncondition­al discussions among the major political fac­tors in El Salvador in order to guarantee a safe and stable environment for free and open democratic elections.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTIONS PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate report­ed that on today, March 4, 1982, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled joint resolutions:

S.J. Res. 91. A joint resolution to desig­nate July 1982 as "National Peach Month"; and

S.J. Res. 105. A joint resolution to desig­nate October 1982 as "National P.T.A. Mem­bership Month."

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were ref erred as in­dicated:

EC-2833. A communication from the Di­rector of the Defense Security Assistance Agency transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on a foreign military sale to Korea; to the Committee on Armed Services.

3344 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 EC-2834. A communication from the Gen­

eral Counsel of the Federal Emergency Management Agency transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to extend the national flood insurance program; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-2835. A communication from the Gen­eral Counsel of the Federal Emergency Management Agency transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize appropria­tions for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 for the conduct of flood studies under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968; to the Commit­tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-2836. A communication from the Ad­ministrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration transmitting, pursu­ant to law, notice of proposed revisions of NASA's space transportation upper stages program and related changes in the Galileo mission to Jupiter and the International Solar Polar Mission; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

EC-2837. A communication from the Sec­retary of the Interior transmitting, pursu­ant to law, the 1981 annual report on the anthracite mine water control and mine sealing and filling program; to the Commit­tee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-2838. A communication from the Under Secretary of the Interior transmit­ting, pursuant to law, a report on activities of the Geological Survey during calendar year 1981; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-2839. A communication from the As­sistant Secretary of the Air Force for Man­power, Reserve Affairs, and Installations transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide an extension of certain special tax treatment provisions for members of the armed forces listed as missing in action; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2840. A communication from the Sec­retary of Labor transmitting a draft of pro­posed legislation to limit eligibility for un­employment compensation for ex-service members; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2842. A communication from the Di­rector of the Office of Personnel Manage­ment transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on experimental alternative work schedules for Federal employees; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2843. A communication from the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regula­tory Commission transmitting the annual report of the Commission for 1981 under the Freedom of Information Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2844. A communication from the Post­master General of the United States trans­mitting, pursuant to law, the report of the Service for 1981 under the Freedom of In­formation Act; to the Committee on the Ju­diciary.

EC-2845. A communication from the Public Information Specialist of the Occu­pational Safety and Health Review Commis­sion transmitting, pursuant to law, the Com­mission's 1981 report under the Freedom of Information Act; to the committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2846. A communication from the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities transmitting, pursuant to law, the 1981 report of the Endowment under the Freedom of Information Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2847. A communication from the Free­dom of Information Officer of the Office of the Federal Inspector of the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the Inspector

for 1981 under the Freedom of Information Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2848. A communication from the Chairman of the National Credit Union Ad­ministration transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of the Administration for 1981 under the Freedom of Information Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2849. A communication from the Di· rector of the Selective Service System trans­mitting, pursuant to law, the System's semi­annual report for April 1 through Septem­ber 31, 1981; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EC-2850. A communication from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting, pursuant to law, a report enti­tled "Federal Review of Intrastate Branch­ing Applications can be Reduced"; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-2851. A communication from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting, pursuant to law, a report enti­tled "Despite Recent Improvements, Bank Supervision Could be More Effective and Less Burdensome"; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-2852. A communication from the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission transmitting a draft of pro­posed legislation to permit payment of relo­cation expenses to Washington, D.C. for participants in the Commission's fellows programs by their former private employ­ers; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

EC-2853. A communication from the Sec­retary of Energy transmitting, pursuant to law, notice of intention to submit by May 1 the Department's report on the size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; to the Com­mittee on Energy and Natural Resources.

EC-2854. A communication from the Ad­ministrator of the Energy Information Ad­ministration transmitting, pursuant to law, volumes 1 and 3 of the Administration's 1981 Annual Report to Congress; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Re­sources.

EC-2855. A communication from the Ad· ministrator of the Environmental Protec­tion Agency transmitting, pursuant to law, the fiscal year 1981 report on the testing of chemicals, manufacturing and processing notices, regulation of chemicals, relation­ship to other federal laws, penalties and state programs; to the Committee on Envi­ronment and Public Works.

EC-2856. A communication from the Deputy Director of the Office of Manage­ment and Budget transmitting, pursuant to law, an integrated proposal for the Uniform Federal Procurement System recommend­ing certain procurement reforms; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2857. A communication from the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commis­sion transmitting, pursuant to law, the Commission's 1981 report under the Gov­ernment in the Sunshine Act; to the Com­mittee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2858. A communication from the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation transmitting the fifth annual report of the Corporation under the Gov­ernment in the Sunshine Act; to the Com­mittee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2859. A communication from the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commis­sion, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Commission on activi­ties under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1981; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2860. A communication from the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trad­ing Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Commission on activities under the Freedom of Informa­tion Act for calendar year 1981; to the Com­mittee on the Judiciary.

EC-2861. A communication from the Sec­retary of Health and Human Services, trans­mitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Department on activities under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1981; to the Committee on the Judici­ary.

EC-2862. A communication from the Acting Administrator of the Panama Canal Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Commission on ac­tivities under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1981; to the Commit­tee on the Judiciary.

EC-2863. A communication from the As· sistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the Department on ac­tivities under the Freedom of Information Act for calendar year 1981; to the Commit­tee on the Judiciary.

EC-2864. A communication from the Sec­retary of Health and Human Services trans­mitting, pursuant to law, the fifth annual report on Evaluation of Multipurpose Ar­thritis Centers; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2865. A communication from the Sec­retary of Health and Human Resources transmitting, pursuant to law, the fourth annual report on Evaluation of Diabetes Re­search and Training Centers; to the Com­mittee on Labor and Human Resources.

EC-2866. A communication from the Sec­retary of Health and Human Services trans­mitting, pursuant to law, the 1981 Director's Report and Annual Plan for fiscal years 1983-87 for the National Cancer Program; to the Committee on Labor and Human Re­sources.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS The following petitions and memori­

als were laid before the Senate and were ref erred or ordered to lie on the table as indicated:

POM-708. A resolution adopted by the Legislature of the Virgin Islands; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.

"RESOLUTION No. 1056 "Whereas Farmers Home Administration

<FmHA> home loans are administered through a federal program not subject to the legislative Jurisdiction of the United States Virgin Islands; and

"Whereas FmHA is by far the most signif­icant non-bank direct home loan source in the United States Virgin Islands, serving to supplement the amount of credit and cap­ital directly available from commercial lend­ers; and

"Whereas after careful study, it has been determined that the average purchase price of a home in the United States Virgin Is­lands is approximately $90,000, while the average purchase price of a home in the continental United States is approximately $72,000, or 14.6% less than in the United States Virgin Islands; and

"Whereas the present FmHA program in the United States Virgin Islands supports only a $45,000 loan maximum and a $54,000 home purchase maximum assuming a 20%

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3345 downpayment, the equivalent of $36,000 less than the average price of a home in the United States Virgin Islands; and

"Whereas the average worker in the United States Virgin Islands earns approxi­mately 13.8% less than his average counter­part in the continental United States; and

"Whereas the cost of living in the United States Virgin Islands is approximately 30% higher than the level found in Washington, D.C., primarily because of expensive sea freight costs; and

"Whereas despite these facts, FmHA pro­motes home building only in the lower household income price ranges while local banks and other non-public financing sources focus upon homebuyers with sub­stantially more purchasing power; and

"Whereas the victims or those caught in the gap between low and high buying power groups are not adequately served due to the lack of available financing; and

"Whereas for the purposes of home loans, FmHA attempts to maintain a posture of "lender of last resort" with respect to com­mercial lending sources, making loans to qualified applicants who can find no other sources of financing available on terms or conditions they can meet: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Legislature of the Virgin Islands:

"SECTION 1. The United States Congress is respectfully petitioned to direct that the FmHA declare the United States Virgin Is­lands a "high income area" and raised the FmHA maximum income levels from the present $15,600 to $23,400 as it is in Alaska for direct home loans, and from $11,200 to $16,800 for subsidy loans also as it is in Alaska. The Congress is further petitioned to raise the loan maximum level applicable to the United States Virgin Islands from the present $45,000 to the higher level of $54,000 currently applicable to Alask~. Hawaii and Guam.

"Sec. 2. A copy of this Resolution shall im­mediately upon its passage be forwarded to the Vice President of the United States ·as Presiding Officer of the Senate, the Speaker of the United States House of Representa­tives, the Chairman of the Senate Commit­tee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, the Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, and the United States Virgin Islands Delegate to the House of Represent­atives, Washington, D.C."

POM-709. A petition from a citizen of Bal­timore, Md., favoring a prohibition to forbid the use of American tax dollars directly or indirectly by the U.N. to finance or support SW APO; to the Committee on Appropria­tions.

POM-710. A resolution adopted by the El­dorado County, Calif., Board of Supervisors, favoring legislation to provide ex-spouses of military personnel an equitable share of military retirement benefits; to the Commit­tee on Armed Services.

POM-711. A resolution adopted by the Ex­ecutive Committee of the American Legion, Department of Puerto Rico, relating to the proposed reduction of Coast Guard activity in Puerto Rico; to the Committee on Com­merce, Science, and Transportation.

POM-712. A resolution adopted by the Wisconsin State Senate; to the Cominittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

"1981 SENATE RESOLUTION 17 "Whereas, the interstate system of high­

ways is a vital part of this nations modern transportation system; and

"Whereas, the maintenance and good repair of the interstate system is important

to the economy of this state and the nation generally and to the users of the interstate system specifically; and

"Whereas, the current methods of financ­ing the maintenance and repair of the inter­state system will not provide sufficient funds for the necessary maintenance and repair; and

"Whereas, increasing the gasoline tax, ve­hicle registration fees, general taxes or a state's indebtedness for the purpose of maintenance and repair of the interstate system would create an inequitable burden on all persons for the benefit of the users of the interstate system; and

"Whereas, instituting a system of tolls on the interstate system will provide the funds necessary for maintenance and repair and will provide such funds in an equitable manner by assessing the users of the inter­state system for the necessary maintenance and repair; now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the senate, That the legisla­ture of the state of Wisconsin requests that the members of the congressional delega­tion of this state prepare, introduce and support legislation which will authorize this state and any other state that so chooses to institute a system of tolls for the use of the national interstate system of highways within the individual state's boundaries; and, be it further

"Resolved, That duly attested copies of this resolution be transmitted to each member of the congressional delegation from this state, the secretary of the U.S. senate and the chief clerk of the U.S. house of representatives."

POM-713. A resolution adopted by the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Centennial Com­mission urging Congress to provide for a speedy restoration of Franklin Roosevelt's House at Hyde Park, N.Y.; to the Cominit­tee on Energy and Natural Resources.

POM-714. A joint resolution adopted by the California Legislature; to the Cominit­tee on Finance.

"JOINT RESOLUTION No. 41 "Whereas, Surveys on sales tax tables

published by the Internal Revenue Service are conducted only once every 10 years; and

"Whereas, these sales tax tables do not re­flect the sales tax paid by Californians; now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of California, jointly, That the Legislature of the State of California re­spectfully memorializes Congress to require the Internal Revenue Service to revise the optional sales tax tables for California on an annual basis; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Chief Clerk of the As­sembly transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

POM-715. A petition from citizens of New York, favoring the restoration of recently eliminated student benefits under the Social Security Act; to the Committee on Finance.

POM-716. A concurrent resolution adopt­ed by the Legislature of the State of Indi­ana, to the Committee on Finance.

"CONCURRENT RESOLUTION "Whereas, The existing income tax laws

and the printed forms for collection of the United States Internal Revenue Service and the Indiana Department of Revenue are un-

necessarily complex, complicated and con­fusing making it difficult, if not sometimes impossible, for taxpayers to understand and file as they are required to pay tribute de­manded by the State and the National Gov­ernments; and

"Whereas, Many, if not most individual taxpayers, are required to seek professional assistance in the preparation of their feder­al and state income tax returns; and

"Whereas, Governments created of, by and for the people should not in extracting the tribute from its citizens for its mainte­nance and the funding of its projects, place an additional monetary burden upon its citi­zenry in order to secure the involuntary support they demand: Therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate of the General As­sembly of the State of Indiana, the House of Representatives concurring:

"SECTION 1. That the Congress of the United States and the Internal Revenue Service are requested to simplify federal income tax laws and the forms used in its collection so that the citizenry will not re­quire the assistance of a professional to pay the tribute demanded.

"SEc. 2. That the Governor of the State of Indiana and the Indiana Department of Revenue are requested to simplify Indiana income tax laws and forms used in its collec­tion so that Hoosier citizens will not require the assistance of a professional to pay the tribute demanded.

"SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Senate is directed to transmit copies of this resolu­tion to the leadership of Congress of the United States, the Indiana Congressional delegation, the Internal Revenue Service, the Governor of the State of Indiana, and the Indiana Department of Revenue."

POM-717. A resolution adopted by the Public Affairs Luncheon Club of Dallas, rel­ative to South Africa; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

POM-718. A resolution adopted by the House of Representatives of the State of Il­linois to the Committee on Foreign Rela­tions.

"HOUSE RESOLUTION No. 614 "Whereas, Since the Paris Peace Accords

were signed eight years ago, some 2,500 Americans remain unaccounted for in Southeast Asia; and

"Whereas, Various live sighting reports, currently being investigated, indicate Amer­icans are still held captive in Vietnam, Cam­bodia, and Loas; and

"Whereas, The United States must insist that the governments of Vietnam, Cambo­dia, and Laos live up to their legal and hu­manitarian responsibilities by giving a full and complete account of these missing American servicemen; and

"Whereas, Such accounting is not Just a humane gesture, but an obligation and re­sponsibility due every serviceman, past, present, and future; and

"Whereas, The Congress of the United States should demand that the governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, furnish the government of the United States with a complete accounting of the hundreds of prisoners of war never repatriated; there­fore, be it

"Resolved, by the House of Representa­tives of the Eighty-Second General Assembly of the State of nlinois. That we hereby urge the Congress of the United States to demand that the governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos promptly account to the government of the United States for all

3346 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 Americans missing in Indochina, to immedi­ately release all soldiers held capitive and return any American remains which are in their possession, or which may be subse­quently discovered; and, be it further

"Resolved, That suitable copies of this preamble and resolution be forwarded to the President of the United States Senate, the Honorable George Bush, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Hon­orable Thomas P. O'Neill, and to each member of the Illinois Congressional Dele­gation."

POM-719. A resolution adopted by the Federation of Citizens Associations of the District of Columbia, relative to the welfare and safety of the citizens of the District of Columbia; to the Committee on Governmen­tal Affairs.

POM-720. A resolution adopted by the Mexican American Democrats of Texas, rel­ative to the shifting of certain welfare pro­grams to the States; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

POM-721. A resolution adopted by the House of Representatives of the State of Kansas; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

"HOUSE RESOLUTION No. 6117 "Whereas, Teachers, through education of

the young, provide both the foundation of modern civilization and the means for en­hancing the lives of all members of society; and

"Whereas, The personal inspiration and enrichment which students receive from their teachers extend far beyond the few years spent in the classroom to exert a valu­able lifelong influence on the young people of this nation, and through them, on all of our citizens; and

"Whereas, Teachers richly deserve indi­vidual recognition, honor and encourage­ment for their dedication and excellence in the pursuit of their profession; and such recognition, honor and encouragement should be bestowed each year on a nation­wide basis; and

"Whereas, Students, parents, school ad­ministrators and all other citizens of the United States should be encouraged to per­sonally communicate by word and deed to their present and former teachers, the spe­cial appreciation and recognition that teach­ers so richly deserve: Now, therefore,

"Be it resolved by the House of Represent­atives of the State of Kansas: That the Con­gress of the United States is hereby request­ed to enact the necessary legislation to de­clare and establish the first Friday in March of each year to be the day upon which each teacher in the schools of our nation is to be given special recognition and honor, and to provide for such day to be known as Teach­er Day USA; and

"Be it further resolved: That the Chief Clerk of the House of Representatives is hereby directed to transmit enrolled copies of this resolution to the President of the United States; the President of the United States Senate; the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives; to each member of the delegation to Congress from the state of Kansas; to Laurence L. Stanton, Dr. Steven A. McKee and Frank B. Toalson, all in care of Kansas Teachers Hall of Fame, 500 W. Wyatt Earp, Dodge City, Kansas 67801; and to Glenn E. Burnette, 1630 Knollwood, Topeka, Kansas 66611."

POM-722. A petition from a citizen of Keego Harbor, Mich., relative to payment of debts to States in gold and silver; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

POM-723. A resolution adopted by the House of Representatives of the State of Michigan; to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

"HOUSE RESOLUTION No. 387 "Whereas, Recent federal budget cuts are

having devastating effects on the services offered to Michigan's many unemployed in­dividuals, including the closing of various Michigan Employment Security Commis­sion offices throughout the state and a sub­stantial reduction in the Work Incentive Program <WIN>. They are also resulting in the immediate layoff of more than 750 Michigan Employment Security Commis­sion employees, over and above the 1,000 employees which the Michigan Employment Security Commission layed off in Septem­ber of 1981; and

"Whereas, While these cuts will undoubt­edly affect millions of unemployed individ­uals throughout our nation, they will be es­pecially devastating to the State of Michi­gan, which is reeling under the country's highest unemployment rate. It will also hinder unemployed individuals in locating available jobs for which they are eligible; and

"Whereas, The State of Michigan has been on a determined course over the past couple of years to keep its economy on an even keel and to reduce Michigan's stagger­ing unemployment rate. These federal budget cuts constitute a major setback to this effort and are not good public policy; now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representa­tives, That the members of this legislative body memorialize the President and the Congress of the United States to reconsider the recent budget cuts which are so particu­larly devastating to unemployed individuals; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, the Presi­dent of the United States Senate, and to the members of the Michigan Congressional Delegation."

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES The following reports of committees

were submitted: By Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on

the Judiciary, with amendments and an amendment to the title:

S. 1554. A bill to amend the Bail Reform Act of 1966 to permit consideration of danger to the community in setting pretrial release conditions, to eliminate surety bond, to permit pretrial detention of certain of­fenders, and for other purposes <Rept. No. 97-317).

By Mr. MATHIAS, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, without amendment:

S. Res. 333. An original resolution author­izing expenditures by committees of the Senate <Rept. No. 97-318>.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following executive reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. TOWER, from the Committee on Armed Services:

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, from the Committee on Armed Services, I report favorably the following nomi-

nations: in the Marine Corps there are 10 permanent promotions to the grade of brigadier general Oist begins with Louis H. Buehl HD. I ask that these names be placed on the Executive Cal­endar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. With­out objection, it is so ordered.

By Mr. ROTH, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs:

John R. McKean, of California, to be a Governor of the U.S. Postal Service for the remainder of the term expiring December 8, 1986;

John W. Crutcher, of Virginia, to be a Commissioner of the Postal Rate Commis­sion for the term expiring October 16, 1986; and

Henry R. Folsom, of Delaware, to be a Commissioner of the Postal Rate Commis­sion for the remainder of the term expiring October 14, 1982.

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolu­tions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous con­sent, and ref erred as indicated:

By Mr. SPECTER: S. 2167. A bill to amend the Unfair Com­

petition Act of 1979 and Clayton Act to pro­vide for further relief in the event of unfair foreign competition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BRADLEY: S. 2168. A bill to amend section 235 of the

National Housing Act; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. PRYOR: S. 2169. A bill making a rescission of cer­

tain funds for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982; to the Committee on the Budget and the Committee on Appropriations, jointly, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975; to be reported by the Appropriations Com­mittee pursuant to the provisions of S. Res. 45 of the 94th Congress.

By Mr.DODD: S. 2170. A bill to amend chapter 6 of title

5, United States Code, with respect to the requirements for the preparation of regula­tory analysis; to the Committee on the Judi­ciary.

By Mr. DODD <for himself and Mr. CRANSTON):

S. 2171. A bill to stimulate the develop­ment and rehabilitation of affordable multi­family rental housing; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. GOLDWATER <for himself and Mr. KASTEN):

S. 2172. A bill to amend the Communica­tions Act of 1934; to the Committee on Com­merce, Science, and Transportation.

By Mr. CHILES <for himself and Mr. HOLLINGS):

S. 2173. A bill to enable the shrimp indus­try to establish, finance, and carry out a co­ordinated program of research, quality en­hancement, and producer and consumer education in order to improve, expand, maintain, and develop markets for shrimp; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

By Mr. KASTEN: S.J. Res. 156. A joint resolution to desig­

nate April 9, 1982, as "POW-MIA Com-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3347 memoration Day; to the Committee on Judi­ciary.

By Mr. MOYNIHAN <for himself, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. INOUYE, MR. WILLIAMS, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. D 'AMATo, Mr. LEvIN, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. QUAYLE, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MATSU­NAGA, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. ARMSTRONG, and Mr. GARN):

S .J. Res. 157. Joint resolution to provide for the awarding of a special gold medal to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix in recognition of the 1982 bicentennial anniversary of dip­lomatic and trade relations between the Netherlands and the United States; indefi­nitely postponed.

By Mr. SYMMS: S.J. Res. 158. Joint resolution expressing

the policy of the Government of the United States of America with respect to the Gov­ernment of Cuba, to the Committee on For­eign Relations.

By Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. LoNG, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MOYNI­HAN, Mr. ZoRINSKY, Mr. LEvIN, Mrs. HAWKINS, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. HAYAKA­WA, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. SASSER, Mr. TsoNGAS, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. BUR­DICK, and Mr. PERCY>:

S.J. Res. 159. A joint resolution entitled the "White House Conference on Productiv­ity Act" ; to the Committee on Governmen­tal Affairs.

SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS

The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred <or acted upon), as indicated:

By Mr. KENNEDY <for himself and Mr. HEINZ):

S . Res. 332. A resolution to assure Israel's security and to oppose advanced arms sales to Jordan; to the Committee on Foreign Re­lations.

By Mr. MATHIAS, from the Commit­tee on Rules and Administration:

S. Res. 333. An original resolution author­izing expenditures by committees of the Senate; placed on the calendar.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. SPECTER: S. 2167. A bill to amend the Unfair

Competition Act of 1979 and Clayton Act to provide for further relief in the event of unfair foreign competition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

<The remarks of Mr. SPECTER on this legislation appear earlier in today's RECORD.)

By Mr. BRADLEY: S. 2168. A bill to amend section 235

of the National Housing Act; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

BRAM HOLLOW CONDOMINIUM Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, the

bill which I am introducing is neces­sary to halt an imminent threat to an important housing project in Jersey City, N.J. The St. Patrick's Church

Bram Hollow Condominium project may grind to a halt because of a recent decision by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to place a March 31, 1982, deadline for firm commitments on section 235 mortgage subsidy projects.

The Bram Hollow project is unable to meet the March 31 deadline because the sponsors appropriately operated under the assumption that the dead­line would be the end of the fiscal year until a change in the law, effective this January sped up the deadline. Recognizing that this was a problem for municipal projects, Congress passed, and the President approved, an extension of the deadline for those projects.

St. Patrick's proposes to build, on its own land, moderate income housing for 36 families in Jersey City. After much planning, the church began its search for a developer in spring 1981. In July, an application was submitted to HUD for a formal reservation. In August 1981, HUD gave St. Patrick's a reservation. From August to December of last year St. Patrick's completed the steps necessary to meet additional HUD requirements. Since New Jersey law requires approval by the State at­torney general before the offering of a prospectus this additional delay has prevented advertising or accepting de­posits on the condos. In January 1982 St. Patrick's applied to the attorney general for approval. In late January they were permitted to accept prelimi­nary reservations and nonbinding res­ervations. St. Patrick's is now awaiting final approval of their prospectus which is expected by mid-March which will permit the acceptance of binding contracts of sale. After ap­proval the 10 persons who have sub­mitted nonbinding reservations will have 15 days within which to submit contracts of sale or receive refunds. After submission of a contract applica­tion for a mortgage is submitted for an FHA loan, processing takes 8 weeks. Afterward HUD approval takes about one week. Then a firm commitment is issued.

As is quite apparent from these facts, it is impossible for St. Patrick's Church to meet a March 31 deadline­not because they have procrastinated, but because the process of Federal, State, and local governmental approv­als is slow.

The bill I am introducing today would amend section 235 to return this deadline to the end of fiscal year 1982, not only for housing which is devel­oped on land owned on September 30, 1982 by a municipal sponsor, but for such projects sponsored by a charita­ble organization. This would insure that money appropriated to provide home ownership opportunities for moderate income families will be used for that purpose. Groups such as St. Patrick's Church have acted in good

faith and developed proposals for badly needed housing units. The cur­rent housing market only intensifies the need for these projects. We ought to at least permit approved projects to use funds which have already been ap­propriated for this purpose.

The question is simply whether we will permit a last minute change in the rules to shelve the months of planning and to dash the hopes of those fami­lies in Jersey City who are counting on this project.

By Mr. PRYOR: S. 2169. A bill making a rescission of

certain funds for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending Sep­tember 30, 1982; to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on the Budget, jointly, pursuant to the order of January 30, 1975.

M-9 ARMORED COMBAT EARTHMOVER Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, the Fed­

eral budget is under severe con­straints. The cost of defense, when added to the so-called uncontrollable costs of major entitlement programs, is rising faster than revenues can be found. Every department, including defense, is going to feel the squeeze of reduced resources.

In this context, it is alarming to note that the costs of defense are joining the ranks of the uncontrollable. As a result of major modernization efforts occurring simultaneously in all serv­ices and the accompanying huge in­creases in procurement accounts, we are undermining our budgetary flexi­bility in the out-years. We find that it is often impossible to make real reduc­tions in outlays because we are obligat­ed by the decisions of previous years. And we almost invariably find that our obligations are more expensive than we thought they would be. And when we find that what we have bought does not work as well as we had expected, it only increases our sense of frustration and disappoint­ment.

I am, therefore, pleased to introduce a bill that will cut some $40 million in outlays for a program that is an all too typical disappointment, the M-9 ar­mored combat earthmover, or ACE. This vehicle is essentially a high-speed bulldozer designed to go into battle with the M-1 tank. It was originally supposed to cost some $200,000; but now the price tag has risen to more than $1 million apiece, and we plan to buy between 600 and 1,400 of them.

The ACE is not a weapon system. It does not destroy Warsaw Pact tanks. It does not terrorize Soviet infantry. It digs holes. The program is likely to have procurement costs of around $1 billion, at a time when the search for economies in the Defense Department might mean the usual cuts from cru­cial operations and maintenance ac­counts.

3348 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 The Army tells us that we need the

ACE because the M-1 cannot dig itself in, unlike the old-fashioned, obsolete tanks it is replacing. The idea is that the ACE will give the M-1 increased survivability. We were never told that the M-1, with its low silhouette and great speed, would be anything less than the most survivable tank in histo­ry. But the Army tells us that we must have a bulldozer that can roar into battle at 40 miles per hour or we will endanger our wonderful tanks.

What I fear most is that this is typi­cal of the way we develop our doctrine, the way we identify what the armed services need and absolutely cannot do without. Complexity leads to greater complexity. We have a fast tank, so we have to have a hot-rod bulldozer, no matter the cost.

To add insult to injury, the Defense Department awarded the contract for the first $40 million and 36 bulldozers on a sole-source basis. Of course now it seems that we might get no more than 25 bulldozers for that first $40 million. And the Defense Department has identified the program as a likely can­didate for multiyear procurement.

Luckily, it is not too late for us to save $40 million now, before we throw it down a deep hole, and a lot more later on. I understand that the origi­nal $40 million is as yet unobligated, and I propose that we rescind those funds before they are wasted.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill and two recent newspaper articles on this subject be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the mate­rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That of the funds appropriated under the head "Other Procurement, Army" for fiscal year 1982 in Public Law 97-114, $40,400,000 appropriated for the M-9 Armored Combat Earthmover are rescinded.

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 3, 19821 RECALL THE Ml's ACE? Now IT'S GOT A

PROBLEM <By Walter Pincus>

You remember ACE, that plucky little bulldozer the Army decided to buy some time ago to help solve a problem with its new Ml tank?

Well, it seems that ACE has a problem, too.

In just three months its price has gone up almost 50 percent, from $1.1 million per dozer last December to an estimated $1.6 million last week. And even at that price, the Army is not certain that the sole-source contractor, Pacific Car and Foundry Co. of Renton, Wash., will be able to build it, Army sources say.

ACE stands for Armored Combat Earth­mover. The Army decided it needed the ACE to help the speedy Ml tank dig in when the Ml arrived wherever it wanted to be in battle. While the Ml is fast, its trans­mission is too delicate for clearing away bat­tlefield debris or for simple, soft-earth

moving. And while the Army's current bull­dozer, the D7, is an unsurpassed digger, it is much too slow to keep up with the Ml.

The new price increase is not the first for ACE. When the new bulldozer was first pro­posed in fiscal 1978, its cost was put at $200,000 each. Congress would not buy it. The next year the price had risen to $660,000. Again, Congress said no.

When the Army came back a third time last year, the cost per unit was put at about $1.1 million-$40.4 million for the first 36 machines. This time, Congress voted aye.

But no sooner had it done so than the Army began a design review, which was completed last week. That inquiry found, according to Army sources, that the ACE needed a new, more expensive cooling system and additional armor on the top to bring it up to the performance level it was described as having already attained. In ad­dition, some parts have now risen in price.

Last week, the Army said its initial re­sponse to this would be to buy fewer vehi­cles. An Army official said that the fiscal 1982 money would be enough to buy only "25, or maybe even less." But, he added, the additional cost would eventually help bring the price down for future ACEs.

And then Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger indicated in testimony before a House Appropriations subcommittee that the Army might even stop buying them al­together. After calling the ACE a "useful enough gadget," he said, "We are not going to purchase any more."

A spokesman in Weinberger's office, how­ever, said the secretary meant to say only that there is no money for ACEs in the fiscal 1983 budget before Congress. As to the Army's future plans to buy more ACEs, the spokesman said that that "is what the service wants today ... Whether the secre­tary will approve it next year is an open­ended question."

The Army, meanwhile, has shifted ground on the Ml-ACE combination in two other ways. First is the basic question of whether the Ml is too delicate to be fitted with a blade and do the simple scraping and soft­dirt moving that the older M60 tank still in service can.

When official testimony to this effect was first noted in a Washington Post report Feb. 9, Maj. Gen. James P. Maloney, director of Army weapons systems, wrote this newspa­per that "our older tanks have such a blade, and so will the Ml."

That contradicted what Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer told Congress last year, which was that to put a blade on the Ml, "You would have to use a different engine, different transmission."

Now, an Army spokesman has contradict­ed Maloney. The spokesman said last week that the Army plans only to "look at a device in August" that the Israelis have that could be attached to the Ml and serve as a blade.

The second problem has to do with how many ACEs the Army wants. Last year it said 1,300, but in a statement last week, the Army raised this to 1,400 to meet not only needs of the mobile regular forces but also the Rapid Deployment Force. In addition to all its other attributes, the Army says the ACE is the only bulldozer built that can be airdropped.

TANKS THAT NEED A BUTLER <By Mary McGrory>

While he was roaring through the Sieg­fried Line in the lead tank, in the fall of 1944, Gen. George S. Patton Jr is said to

have sent back a message to GenComZone in Paris: "Have just p - - - ed in Rhine. For God's sake send gasoline."

You'll get no such message from any Patton of tomorrow. He'll be trying to cope with the Army's new Ml, a $2.5-million baby which goes into battle with a butler and a nanny close behind.

The Ml, if it were a child, would be Little Lord Fauntleroy. If it were a dog-and some people think it is-it would be a thorough­bred greyhound, fleetfooted but high­strung. It is so finely bred that it cannot dig a hole, which, if it were to fire its guns at the enemy from a stationary position, it would probably want. That was all that coarse, old-fashioned, unchaperoned tanks ever had to do.

Why not put a hole-digging capability on the Ml, so you wouldn't need the ACE, the Armored Combat Earthmover, to accompa­ny it to the front like a stage mother? Hear a general explain to a congressional commit­tee:

"It would mean radical changes. It is not just adding a blade. There are a lot of other things you would have to do."

The ACE only costs $1.1 million, for heav­en's sake. And how in the world is the Pen­tagon going to spend the $258 billion that Ronald Reagan is sending it if it's going to nickel-and-dime itself to death looking for practical solutions to expensive mistakes?

The Ml, for all its beauty and speed, has another slight defect which requires an­other vehicle in its supporting cast. It gets very low mileage on its gasoline.

The cost of sending fuel trucks with tank battalions would be a mere $63 million more. Patton would not have to send salty wires back to headquarters for more gaso­line. He would have the fast-lunch van for his tanks right with him, providing, of course that the tank, the earthmover and the fuel truck could manage to stay togeth­er in the heat of battle.

This of course, raises the question of com­mand structure. Who would be in charge? The bulldozer-excuse me, Armored Combat Earthmover-would presumably have to race ahead to scout out a berth for the tank. I am assuming they will have an elaborate radio-communications system among the three vehicles, but that may be just the be­ginning of the problem.

What if he hears on his earphones orders from the tank to dig in at a certain coordi­nate on the map? The ACE finds the spot, radios back that it is solid rock and, besides, the view is rotten. The fuel truck comes in. It is running out of gas. Does it give its re­maining drops to the tank or the ACE?

They might have to wire the commander­in-chief for a decision on that one. Getting that message encoded and back and forth to 1600 Pennsylvanie Ave. could mean the loss of valuable digging time.

Gen. Erwin Rommel used solo tanks with great effectiveness in the desert of North Africa in World War II. How will the cling­ing-vine Ml perform in the sand? In the desert it is plainly visible from above. Ap­parently, the ACE could dig it a grave deep enough to provide overnight cover. But what about the ACE, which, weighing in at 34,000 pounds, is somewhat noticeable? After burying the Ml, what would it do with itself until dawn?

Would it have to be dismantled and reas­sembled in the morning? But hark! It is, its fans say, "air-droppable," which means it could be flown back to Saudi Arabia and catch an early return flight in the morning.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3349 But we still have the fuel truck. Could it

hitch a ride on the ACE and be dropped off in Saudi Arabia for the night? Would they drop the vehicles with the people in them, or do the personnel parachute? This could start a jurisdictional war with the Air Force, but when you are talking about a Rapid De­ployment Force, you have to take risks.

But anyone who has ever driven a party of more than three on a long journey knows where the real rub comes. Deciding when and where to put up for the night can produce acrimonious stalemate.

Someone wants to keep going until dark. Someone says it's better to quit early and get a decent hotel. In the sands of the Per­sian Gulf, this would be no problem. But in Germany-and aren't we going to stop the Reds at the Oder?-some fuel truck jockey is going to insist that the best Wiener schnitzel on the continent is only a village away, and the ACE operator says the local beer is better right where they are. The tank commander will have to be more diplo­mat than warrior.

Our only hope is that the Soviets also have an Ml, that they are even now patting it on the turret, telling it not to be afraid in the dark, that it will never be alone, that the butler and the nanny will take care of it, even when, assuming both sides solve their logistical problems, the guns are going off.

I think if Gen. Patton had ever met an Ml, he would have slapped it in the face.

By Mr.DODD: S. 2170. A bill to amend chapter 6 of

title 5, United States Code, with re­spect to the requirements for the preparation of regulatory analysis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT

e Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am pro­posing today legislation to remove a loophole in the Regulatory Flexibility Act that I do not believe the Congress ever intended to leave open.

My bill would make clear that the Regulatory Flexibility Act is intended to apply to all rules published for public notice and comment that may have a substantial impact on small business or other small institutions. Under the current language of the act, several Federal agencies have claimed that their rules are exempt from the analyses required under the Regula­tory Flexibility Act. Certain exemp­tions are certainly valid. The Congress clearly did not intend that the Regula­tory Flexibility Act apply to rules not published for public comment. But where public comment is solicited, and where these proposed rules could have a significant impact on small business, I believe it was intended that the Reg­ulatory Flexibility Act be brought to bear. Rules published for public com­ment by the Department of Defense and the Internal Revenue Service are of particular importance to small busi­ness, yet both have been reticent in complying with the act.

I will attempt, in the remainder of my statement, to demonstrate the im­plications of and weaknesses in the ar­guments for exemption put forward by the DOD and the IRS. I believe in the

process, the need for congressional clarification by way of amending the act and the need for close congression­al oversight of the act will become clear.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act, passed by the 96th Congress, requires that agencies, in developing rules that would have a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis to determine what that impact might be under alternative ways of implementing the rule. Agen­cies are encouraged to adopt the least onerous approach or exclude small business from coverage completely. The findings and purposes section of the act are straightforward and unam­biguous in expressing the congression­al rationale and objectives and I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that section be printed in the RECORD fol­lowing my statement.

Mr. Frank Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy at the Small Business Ad­ministration, succinctly summarized the Regulatory Flexibility Act's intent in testimony last October 7, before a House Small Business Subcommittee when he stated:

The Regulatory Flexibility Act imposes a requirement of regulatory analysis, and the expectation is that Federal agencies' sensi­tivity to the needs and problems of small en­tities will increase, and different regulatory decisions will result.

He went on to say: The instrument of regulatory analysis is

basically a self-help mechanism for the Fed­eral regulator. Making him think first before acting, making the rulemaking proc­ess itself more open to those who are most directly affected by that process, and making sure that regulations more fre­quently reflect rather than dictate economic realities."

Mr. Swain's predecessor as Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Mr. Milton Stewart, characterized the act as:

An effort by what is perhaps the largest institution in the world to limit its own neg­ative regulatory impact on "small business". It is a conscious and laudable, if overdue, effort at self-control, at forbearance in the exercise of power.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the "Message From the Chief Coun­sel," printed in the Small Business Ad­ministration's Guide to the Regula­tory Flexibility Act, from which this latter quote was taken, be printed in the RECORD following my statement.

The loophole being used by some agencies to avoid this selfhelp mecha­nism, to avoid forbearance in the exer­cise of power, lies largely in a techni­cal misinterpretation of the act.

Specifically, the act requires that when an agency publishes a general notice of proposed rulemaking "pursu­ant to section 553(b) of the <Adminis­trative Procedure Act>. or any other law," it must undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis unless the agency certifies in advance that the proposed

rule would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses or other small enti­ties.

My proposal would strike the lan­guage "pursuant to section 553(b) of this title, or any other law," in the def­inition of "rule," and similar language in two other sections of the act, so as to make the act read:

Whenever an agency publishes general notice of proposed rulemaking for any pro­posed rule, the agency shall prepare and make available for public comment . . . a regulatory flexibility analysis.

The change would not make the Regulatory Flexibility Act an inde­pendent authority or mandate for any Federal agency to publishing for public notice and comment any rule which it would not otherwise publish. It simply would require that when the rulemaking process is opened up to the public, its impact on the little guys, as well as the big ones be as­sessed. It would require that the rule writers attempt to increase their sensi­tivity to the needs and problems of small entities. It would require that rule writers to think first before acting.

I do not think that is too much to ask, but apparently the officials of some Federal agencies and depart­ments do.

The most notable examples that have come to my attention are the De­partment of Defense and the Internal Revenue Service. Both of these agen­cies have claimed a near blanket ex­emption from the requirements of the Regulatory Flexability Act on the grounds that they are not "required by section 553(b) of the <Administra­tive Procedure Act), or any other law" to publish notice of proposed rulemak­ing for public comment. I should point out that both of these agencies regu­larly publish notice for comment of their own volition. I commend them for their action, and hope they will continue this practice.

I ask unanimous consent that copies of correspondence between the SBA's chief counsel for advocacy and the Office of General Counsel of the De­partment of Defense concerning the applicability of the Regulatory Flexi­bility Act be inserted in the RECORD. This correspondence makes it clear that the DOD considers itself com­pletely exempt from the Regulatory Flexibility Act as a consequence of the language addressed by my proposed amendment.

The Internal Revenue Service made its position clear when it published, on October 8, 1981, its notice of proposed rulemaking concerning pooling of in­dustrial development bonds, a matter of tremendous importance to small business. The proposal stated:

Although this document is a notice of pro­posed rulemaking which solicits public com-

3350 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 ment, the Internal Revenue Service has con­cluded that the regulations proposed herein are interpretive and that the notice and public procedure requirements of 5 U.S.C. 553 do not apply. Accordingly, these pro­posed regulations do not constitute regula­tions subject to the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

These items illustrate the technical arguments on which the DOD and the IRS base their claims of exemption from the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Both agencies publish rules for public notice and comment, but they assert that unlike other agencies, it is not necessary for them to comply with this particular step in the rulemaking process.

The technicality upon which the DOD and the IRS base their exemp­tion contains sufficient ambiguity to leave open the question of congres­sional intent of the applicability of the Regulatory Flexibility Act to the pro­posed rules. This ambiguity, and its implications, were addressed by Mr. Swain in his October 1981, testimony before Representative ANDY IRELAND'S Subcommittee on Export Opportuni­ties and Special Small Business Prob­lems. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Swain's testimony concerning the Department of Defense and the Inter­nal Revenue Service be printed in the RECORD following my statement.

I also ask unanimous consent that a copy of a recent article published in nation's Business, "A Fairer Shake for Small Business," be printed in the RECORD.

Representative IRELAND, the chief sponsor of the Regulatory Flexibility Act in the House of Representatives, should be complimented for his prompt and conscientious oversight, within the House Small Business Com­mittee, of the implementation of this landmark legislation. I would also like to commend Representative JOHN LA­FALCE, chairman of the House Small Business Committee's General Over­sight Subcommittee, for specifically addressing the issue of the application of the Regulatory Flexibility Act to Department of Defense procurement during hearings on small business and the Federal procurement system in June of 1981. Prompt and frequent oversight of major legislation such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act is es­sential. Such vigorous hearings will insure effective implementation, and uncover gaps the act may fail to ad­dress because of technical deficiencies in the legislation, or problems created as a result of administrative misinter­pretations. This is particularly impor­tant in the case of laws affecting agen­cies' administrative procedures which affect practically every activity of the Federal Government.

Setting aside for the moment techni­cal interpretations of the law, the most disturbing element of the posi­tions taken by the DOD and the IRS is the arrogance reflected in their atti-

tudes. The legislative history of the Regulatory Flexibility Act makes it abundantly clear that technical com­pliance with the law would achieve little of substance without a change in attitude. In fact, the Senate's own record of August 6, 1980, the day the act passed this body, states explicitly that the goals of the act, "can be met largely through attentiveness by rule­makers to the unique problems of smaller institutions." The DOD's and the IRS' virtually absolute refusal to comply with the act reflects, more than anything else, an arrogance and insensitivity toward small business and other small institutions that is a clear violation of the spirit of the law even if it is not a technical violation.

The Department of Defense provid­ed perhaps the clearest example of this arrogance on October 2, 1981, in its response to Mr. Swain's inquiry concerning the application of the Reg­ulatory Flexibility Act to a rule pub­lished on September 11, 1981, by DOD for public notice and comment. I would like to quote briefly from DOD's response and ask that copies of Mr. Swain's letter and DOD's reply be printed in the RECORD. ... Concerning the proposed Department

of Defense instruction of "education of handicapped children in the DOD depend­ent schools".

Under 5 U.S.C. sections 603 and 604, agen­cies are required to prepare initial and final regulatory flexibility analyses of specified types of rulemakings conducted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. section 553. Section 553, however, does not apply to rules involving "a military ... function of the United States".

As I am sure you will readily agree, the overseas dependent schools, which are main­tained primarily to serve the children of members of the Armed Forces stationed abroad, are an integral part of the military mission of this Department. Thus, regula­tions governing the overseas schools are exempt from the requirements of section 553.

The proposed instruction, therefore, was not subject to the procedural requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act on that basis alone.

While the claim of exemption of this proposed rule from section 553 of the APA under the military function ex­emption of title 5, is debatable, the im­portant point is that the DOD did publish this rule for public comment and it was a rule that could have a sig­nificant impact on a substantial number of small institutions, namely the schools that educate military de­pendents overseas. An assessment of that impact during the rulemaking process, as called for by the Regula­tory Flexibility Act, would clearly not have jeopardized any aspect of mili­tary security and may well have led to a rule that enhanced the ability of these schools in meeting the educa­tional needs of military dependents.

Again, my amendment would not re­quire the DOD to publish for public comment any rule it does not elect to

otherwise publish. It would require, where appropriate, that the Depart­ment specifically assess the impact of its rules on small business and other small entities such as schools. Those rules of chief significance to small business, of course, are DOD's pro­curement rules which affect billions of dollars of Government contracts annu­ally.

It has been argued by some that the Department of Defense might cease publishing rules for public notice and comment if, by publishing, it will have to comply with the Regulatory Flexi­bility Act. The argument has been put forward that if my proposal is adopt­ed, and the voluntary publication of proposed procurement rules by the DOD is ended, the result will be even less opportunity for small business to participate in Defense Department procurement.

In response, I remind my colleagues that Public Law 93-440, as amended by Public Law 96-83, <which is the ena­bling legislation for the Office of Fed­eral Procurement Policy < OFPP> ), re­quires the development of procure­ment rules Governmentwide that in­clude "establishing criteria and proce­dures for an effective and timely method of soliciting the viewpoints of interested parties." The Department of Defense is not exempt from this law and the rules for implementing Public Law 96-83 are currently being devel­oped. Publication of proposed rules governing procurement by the DOD will not be strictly voluntary when this law is fully implemented.

In further response to this argu­ment, I would suggest that the entire matter of the military function ex­emption under section 553 of the AP A might well merit reexamination by the Congress. This exemption and its use are certainly matters on which the Congress, not the Department of De­fense, should have the final word. I would urge the Committee on the Ju­diciary to include an examination of this exemption in any oversight hear­ings on the rulemaking process.

Finally, Mr. President, the question of whether or not a different attitude or different perspective can be effect­ed in a Federal agency and whether or not such an attitudinal factor can make any real difference in Federal regulations does not have to be an­swered hypothetically. Mr. Swain's testimony in October illustrates that change in attitude and the difference it can make in the case of several agencies with which his office has worked during the first year under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Perhaps the best example of the dif­ference that can be made by a sensitiv­ity to the unique characteristics of small business is provided by the Envi­ronmental Protection Agency. The EPA began exploring alternative ways

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3351 to implement regulations to reduce the burdens on small business long before the Regulatory Flexibility Act was enacted. In fact, the EPA provided many of the models for regulatory flexibility analyses that were studied by the Congress during the develop­ment of the act. It is not surprising that Mr. Swain's October testimony concerning the Environmental Protec­tion Agency and the Regulatory Flexi­bility Act gives that agency the high­est marks of all Federal agencies in its compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the law. I ask that Mr. Swain's comments on the EPA be pritned in the RECORD. These com­ments stand in stark contrast to those concerning the Department of De­fense and the Internal Revenue Serv­ice.

I believe my proposed amendment will move us a step closer to making that contrast less dramatic and I urge the Senate to support its provisions.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that the bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the mate­rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

s. 2170 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Ca) section 601 C2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out "pursuant to sec­tion 553 Cb) of this title, or any other law".

Cb) Section 603 Ca) of such title is amended by striking out "is required by section 553 of this title, or any other law, to publish" and inserting in lieu thereof "publishes".

Cc) Section 604 Ca) of such title is amended by striking out "under section 553 of this title, after being required by that section or any other law to publish" and inserting in lieu thereof a comma and "after publish­ing".

FINDINGS AND PURPOSES

SEC. 2. Ca) The Congress finds and declares that-

< 1) when adopting regulations to protect the health, safety and economic welfare of the Nation, Federal agencies should seek to achieve statutory goals as effectively and ef­ficiently as possible without imposing un­necessary burdens on the public;

(2) laws and regulations designed for ap­plication to large scale entities have been applied uniformly to small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental juris­dictions even though the problems that gave rise to government action may not have been caused by those smaller entities;

(3) uniform Federal regulatory and re­porting requirements have in numerous in­stances imposed unnecessary and dispropor­tionately burdensome demands including legal, accounting and consulting costs upon small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions with limit­ed resources;

(4) the failure to recognize differences in the scale and resources of regulated entities has in numerous instances adversely affect­ed competition in the marketplace, discour­aged innovation and restricted improve­ments in productivity;

(5) unnecessary regulations create entry barriers in many industries and discourage potential entrepreneurs from introducing beneficial products and processes;

<6> the practice of treating all regulated businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions as equivalent may lead to inef­ficient use of regulatory agency resources, enforcement problems, and, in some cases, to actions inconsistent with the legislative intent of health, safety, environmental and economic welfare legislation;

(7) alternative regulatory approaches which do not conflict with the stated objec­tives of applicable statutes may be available which minimize the significant economic impact of rules on small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental juris­dictions;

(8) the process by which Federal regula­tions are developed and adopted should be reformed to require agencies to solicit the ideas and comments of small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions to examine the impact of pro­posed and existing rules on such entities, and to review the continued need for exist­ing rules.

Cb) It is the purpose of this Act to estab­lish as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of appli­cable statutes, to fit regulatory and infor­mational requirements to the scale of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given serious consideration.

MESSAGE FROM THE CHIEF COUNSEL

This pamphlet is an introduction to a new law-the Regulatory Flexibility Act CRFA>. Its major features are outlined for laymen; they may check what is said against the brief text of the law which is printed in full.

Several reasons are suggested for using the term "landmark" to describe the impor­tance of the new statute as a law. But there is an even "larger-than-law" sense in which the RF A is a "landmark" for those con­cerned with diversity, competition, balance, and individual opportunity in our econo­my-as well as our political liberty. This law is a prime example of a big institution-our Federal Government-imposing a new disci­pline on itself. It is an effort by what is per­haps the largest institution in the world to limit its own negative regulatory impact on "small entities." It is a conscious and lauda­ble, if over-due, effort at self-control, at for­bearance in the exercise of power.

In that sense, the RF A is an important and promising precedent in two directions. The same direct effort to limit the negative effect of Federal "uniform action" on large and small entities needs to be extended beyond regulation. And, indeed, in the fields of taxation, procurement, capital and credit, science, and technology support-in all these areas we are intensifying the quest for multi-tiered policies to replace the spurious equality of treating large and small entities in the same way.

To understand what is meant by "spurious equality" just think of a single regulation's impact on two competing businesses of very different sizes. Larger Company, Inc. has assets of $5,000,000 and sales of $10,000,000. Smaller Company, Inc. has assets of $500,000 and sales of $1,000,000. Now each must comply with the same Federal regula-

tions; that looks and sounds fair. But assume the cost of compliance is $10,000-the same indirect tax is being imposed on both. Obviously, the Federal Government is intervening in the marketplace with a burden that will be heavier for the small business to bear. Larger Company, Inc. has 10 times the sales and assets over which to spread the cost of regulation.

While it looks and sounds fair, it is a spu­rious equality of treatment. The Federal Government is actually intervening in the marketplace on the side of the larger busi­ness, giving it a new non-market competitive edge. Now multiply the one regulation by 100 to reflect many regulations. The cumu­lative impact becomes a major obstruction to small entities and a built-in synthetic bias and pressure towards bigness. Obviously, we want no needless and indefensible regula­tion of anyone. by government. But where regulation is necessary, the RFA brings the welcome relief of genuine fairness-regula­tion must be tailored to the size and ability of the regulated to bear the burden-as well as the other legitimate goals of proper regu­lation.

What is happening in government, more­over, needs to be made a model for the giant institutions of the private sector. They too, in ways appropriate to their roles, must con­tribute to the survival and expansion of "small entities." Multinational businesses, major unions, universities-all can profit from this example of self-discipline and for­bearance.

The RF A culminates a long period of effort by the organized small business com­munity, capped by the January 1980 White House Conference on Small Business. Small business leaders know only too well that even the best intended laws may be made dead letters by the way they are adminis­tered. Whether this happens to the RFA will depend first on the way hundreds of government managers and their lawyers view the changes sought by the RFA. They can support the quickest, most thoroughgo­ing changes in the direction spelled out in the new Act. Or they can dig in and fight to limit and delay its force in many subtle ways at which they can be so expert.

The Office of Advocacy will, of course, do its best to perform its monitoring mission under the Act. To succeed it will need the vigilant, thoughtful, and active participa­tion of many private citizens. A task force on regulatory flexibility is being established to help with the tasks of education and im­plementation. It will ultimately include economists, local officials, and small busi­ness people as well as lawyers.

Even good causes are soured by excessive zeal. It is important for us now to avoid cre­ating new problems as we try to solve the old ones.

We need and solicit the advice and assist­ance of all those interested-but especially the groups and leaders who represent those whom the RFA is intended to help. We also need the awareness by small entities that responsible behavior is necessary and re­quired by all of us if regulatory flexibility is to work. This law is a good and useful tool which will help correct abuses of long-stand­ing.

MILTON D. STEWART, Chief Counsel, Office of Advocacy.

3352 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 SBA: THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY AcT­

BETTER FEDERAL TREATMENT FOR SMALL EN­TITIES

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Washington, D.C., December 5, 1980.

DEAR AGENCY OFFICIAL: The Office of Ad­vocacy is pleased to send you a copy of our pamphlet which describes major elements of the recently passed Regulatory Flexibil­ity Act <RFA), Public Law 96-354. The RFA amends the Administrative Procedure Act <AP A>. adding a new chapter VI, providing for special considerations of small entities in rulemaking and becomes effective on Janu­ary 1, 1981.

This Act affects every agency in the Fed­eral Government-all executive and inde­pendent agencies which propose rules, pur­suant to notice to the public.

The Act designates the Chief Counsel for Advocacy to monitor government-wide per­formance of agencies in regulating "small entities" of all three kinds. The Act requires special treatment in the regulation of small business, small cities and counties, and small voluntary associations, among others.

I request that you designate a Regulatory Flexibility Officer to monitor activities under the Act in your agency and to serve in a liaison capacity with the Office of Advoca­cy. The officer you designate will hopefully have a solid background in administrative law and also have a firm grasp of your agen­cy's substantive policies. It is important that you designate such an officer immediately and notify us of your action as soon as possi­ble.

I believe it would be mutually beneficial to discuss the RFA and the concept it em­braces, as well as its technical provisions, prior to its effective date. I would like to invite you to such a meeting to be posted by the Office of Advocacy on Wednesday, De­cember 17, 9:30 a.m. in room 214 in the Small Business Administration building at 1441 L Street, N.W. It is also important that your agency es­

tablish an inventory with the trade associa­tions and small entity organizations affect­ed by your regulations in the past. It would be desirable for you to contact them and advise them on how your agency will pro­vide for their participation in rulemaking as required by the Act.

You may also find it appropriate and ben­eficial to brief the President-elect's Transi­tion Team assigned to your agency on the urgency and significance of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The Act is reprinted in the enclosed pam­phlet; I look forward to establishing a mean­ingful relationship with your agency regard­ing implementation of the Act.

Sincerely,

Enclosure.

MILTON D. STEWART, Chief Counsel for Advocacy.

Honorable Bob Bergland, Secretary of Ag­riculture, Room 200-A, 14th Street and In­dependence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250.Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Room 5854, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Room 3E880, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Hans M. Mark, Secretary of the Air Force, Room 4E87, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20330. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., Sec­retary of the Army, Room 3E718, The Pen­tagon, Washington, D.C. 20310. Mr. Secre­tary.

Honorable Edward Hidalgo, Secretary of the Navy, Room 4E686, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20350. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Robert H. Barrow, Comman­dant General, United States Marine Corps, Arlington Annex, Columbia Pike and Ar­lington Ridge Road, Arlington, Virginia 20380. Commandant General Barrow.

Honorable Shirley M. Hufstedler, Secre­tary of Department of Education, 400 Mary­land Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20202. Ms. Secretary.

Honorable Charles W. Duncan, Jr., Secre­tary of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585. Mr. Secre­tary.

Honorable Patricia Roberts Harris, Secre­tary of Health and Human Services, 200 In­dependence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20201. Ms. Secretary.

Honorable Moon Landrieu, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 451 Sev­enth Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20401. Mr. SecretQ.ry.

Honorable Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior, C Street between 18th and 19th, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20240. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Benjamin R. Civiletti, Attorney General, Department of Justice, Tenth Street, and Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530. Mr. Attorney Gen­eral.

Honorable Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20210. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Edward Muskie, Secretary of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable Neil Goldschmidt, Secretary of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Mr. Secretary.

Honorable G. William Miller, Secretary of the Treasury, 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Secretary.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,

Washington, D.C., February 25, 1981. Mr. MILTON D. STEWART, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business

Administration, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. STEWART: This is in response to

your letters requesting that the Department of Defense designate a Regulatory Flexibil­ity Officer to assist in implementing the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Public Law 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 <1980). This legislation, an amendment to the Administrative Proce­dure Act, requires that agencies consider al­ternative approaches in rulemaking that would tailor a regulation to the size of the business, organization, or government juris­diction, which is subject to the regulation. The Department of Defense does not engage in any of the rulemaking activities that the Regulatory Flexibility Act was in­tended to cover. Accordingly, there is no need for the Department of Defense to ap­point a Regulatory Flexibility Officer.

Sincerely, DENNIS H. TROSCH,

Assistant General Counsel (Logistics).

MARCH 20, 1981. DENNIS H. TROSCH, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, Logistics, De­

partment of Defense, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. TRoscH: I am writing in re­

sponse to your letter of February 26, 1981, concerning the applicability of the Regula­tory Flexibility Act, P.L. 96-354 to the De­partment of Defense.

In your letter you stated that it is unnec­essary for DOD to appoint a regulatory flexibility officer since "the Department of Defense does not engage in any rulemaking activities that the Regulatory Flexibility Act was intended to cover." We are unable to understand what you mean by this state­ment. The language and legislative history of the Act indicate that it is of broad appli­cability.

Furthermore, under 5 U.S.C. section 612, I am required to" ... monitor agency compli­ance . . . and . . . report . . . thereon to the President and to the Committees on the Ju­diciary of the Senate and House of Repre­sentatives, the Select Committee on Small Business of the Senate, and the Committee on Small Business of the House of Repre­sentatives." In order to assist me in accom­plishing this task, I would appreciate your providing me a more detailed rationale.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Paul J. Seidman, my Assistant Chief Counsel for Procurement. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely, A. J. PRENDARGAST,

Acting Chief Counsel, for Advocacy.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1981.

Mr. MARSHALL PARKER, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small

Business Administration, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PARKER: This is in reply to your letter requesting that I elaborate on the views of the Department of Defense regard­ing the Regulatory Flexibility Act. As I stated in my earlier letter, we have conclud­ed that the Department of Defense does not issue any regulations that are subject to the Act.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act estab­lished, as a principle governing the issuance of regulations, that agencies will attempt to tailor regulatory and informational require­ments to the size of the business or other organization which is subject to regulation. This Act does not, however, apply to all reg­ulations. The Act was designed to minimize the economic impact of rules issued by the regulatory agencies; accordingly, the Act ap­plies only to those rules defined as follows: "CTlhe term 'rule' means any rule for which the agency publishes a general notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to section 553<b> of this title," or any other law ... " Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 <1980) <to be codified in 5 U.S.C. 601(2)). Section 553 of title 5 exempts military and foreign affairs functions of the United States and exempts matters related to agency management, personnel, public property, loans, grants, benefits, or con­tracts. The Department of Defense does not perform a regulatory function, and the reg­ulations of the Department of Defense come within these exemptions. There is no other law that requires the Department of De­fense to publish a notice of proposed rule­making. Thus, by its terms, the Regulatory Flexibility Act does not apply,

Our reading of the Act is consistent with the intent of this statute that regulatory agencies should seek to avoid unnecessary economic burdens on the public when adopting regulations to protect the health, safety, and economic welfare of the nation. Unlike rules of general applicability issued by the regulatory agencies, the Department of Defense principally deals with the public through its contracting. Our regulations es-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3353 tablished the procedures and the terms and conditions under which the Department of Defense contracts. Contractors are compen­sated in the contract price for complying with these terms.

Congress has enacted statutes pertaining to our contracting activities that in many respects parallel the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Through the Small Business Act, the Congress made known its favor for small business, and the Department of Defense has implemented an extensive small busi­ness program. Under the Small Business Act, Moreover, the Office of Federal pro­curement Policy <OFPP> is required to con­duct analyses of the impact on small busi­ness regulating from revised procurement regulations. The policies adopted by OFPP apply to the contracting of the Department of Defense.

In summary, our conclusion that the regu­lations issued by the Department of De­fense are not of the type contemplated by the Regulatory Flexibility Act does not mean that we do not recognize the needs of small business. Although our regulations are not subject to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, we will continue to accommodate the needs of small business through our small business program.

Sincerely, DENNIS H. TROSCH,

Assistant General Counsel (Logistics).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE The Department of Defense <DOD> poses

a special problem because it is not entirely clear whether the Regulatory Flexibility Act <RFA> applies to its regulations. Be­cause of the specific exemption for regula­tions pertaining to military functions in § 553<a><l> of the Administrative Procedure Act <APA), which the RFA amends, it has consistently been the position of the DOD that the RFA does not apply to that agency. Because of the military function exception, almost all DOD regulatory functions are not subject to APA notice and comment rule­making.

Thus, the passage of the RFA has had no impact on DOD's proposed regulations. Except for the U.S. Army Corps of Engi­neers <ACE>. DOD has totally ignored the RFA. The Assistant General Counsel for Lo­gistics in DOD has written that "the DOD does not issue any regulations subject to the Act" <referring to the RFA). With the ex­ception of an official in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, no regulatory flexibility officers have been appointed in the DOD. Nor has DOD shown the slightest interest in special training or sought any informa­tion about the RFA or about the Act's un­derlying concept of regulatory tiering.

From January l, 1981, the effective date of RFA, to October 1, 1981, the DOD has published seventeen notices of proposed rulemaking in the FEDERAL REGISTER. Of all these proposed rules, there were no initial regulatory flexibility analyses <IRFAs> and only four certifications of no substantial impact on a number of small entities. Two of these certifications were improperly done. Significantly, however, on May 29, 1981, the DOD published a semi-annual agenda of regulations, pursuant to Execu­tive Order 12291. As expected, in the agen­da's summary, the DOD states that since the agenda was voluntarily published con­sistent with the Executive Order, the RFA did not apply. I would like to point out that within DOD's agenda was a section pub­lished by the ACE. The ACE stated that pursuant to the RFA, it was publishing "for

public information a list of regulations per­taining to the civil functions of the Depart­ment."

The ACE issued three of the aforemen­tioned seventeen DOD notices of proposed rulemaking. ACE certified all three as having no substantial impact on a number of small entities, though one contained minor technical shortcomings. All three of these regulations had to do with the desig­nation of danger zones off the coast of Hawaii and California. To the credit of ACE, it is the only division within the DOD which has appointed a regulatory flexibility officer.

Because of the broad-ranging use of the military function exception to the AP A, the DOD appears to have decided that outside of the civilian public works function of the ACE, every regulation proposed by DOD pertains to its military functions, and all regulations therefore are exempt from the provisions of the AP A and the RFA.

The Office of Advocacy finds this attitude on the part of DOD profoundly disturbing, because by using this broad-brush approach, the DOD has included a whole class of sig­nificant regulations which would have a definite substantial impact on a number of small entities. By this we refer to DOD's procurement regulations and to the impact of those regulations on small business and other small entity contractors for DOD pro­curement.

DOD argues that because of § 553<a><2> of the AP A, its procurement regulations, aside from being military functions, are exempt from notice and comment rulemaking, and accordingly, from the RFA. We believe this is too narrow a reading of DOD's responsi­bilities. RFA does apply to procurement reg­ulations because § 603(a) of the RFA states IRFAs must be conducted "whenever an agency is required by § 553 of this title <Title 5 U.S.C.> or any other law <emphasis added), to publish general notice of pro­posed rulemaking for any proposed rule .... " The "other law" regarding pro­curement regulations is P.L. 93-400 and its amendment P.L. 96-83, which is the ena­bling legislation of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy <OFPP>. This statute specifically states that the functions of the OFPP Administrator <who has overall lead­ership in developing and implementing pro­curement policies) include "establishing cri­teria and procedures for an effective and timely method of soliciting the viewPoints of interested parties in the development of procurement policies, regulations, proce­dures, and forms." All procurement regula­tions are subject to this type of notice and comment rulemaking, and DOD's procure­ment regulations are not exempted from this requirement.

This is obviously a complicated area, and this Subcommittee might well wish to pursue the issue of procurement and the Regulatory Flexibility Act in separate hear­ings.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE In the important subject of tax policy and

procedure, the Internal Revenue Service <IRS> has purported to comply with the letter of the Regulatory Flexibility Act <RFA). But the IRS has certainly not em­braced the spirit of the law. The provisions of the Act apply to "rules" of "agencies" for which the agency publishes a general notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to Section 553Cb) of the Administrative Procedure Act <APA>. However, interpretative rules, gener­al statements of policy, and rules of agency

procedures, organization or practice are spe­cifically exempted from the requirements of APA Section 553(b). Thus, the APA applies to so-called legislative rules.

Generally, a legislative rule is promulgat­ed by an agency pursuant to a specific grant of legislative power by the Congress. Inter­pretative rules do not rest on any specific statutory delegation of authority. Instead, they are promulgated under the authority of delegated interpretative power to assist in the implementation of a statute by an agency.

In the tax area, the Treasury Department has taken the position that the great bulk of IRS regulations are interpretative. It should be noted that IRS usually follows the routine requirements of the APA even with respect to interpretative rules. Never­theless, in the context of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Internal Revenue Serv­ice has utilized the distinction between in­terpretative and legislative regulations and the exemption of the former from the provi­sions of the AP A to minimize efforts under the RFA, in the tax area.

In those instances where Congress has specifically delegated authority to the Treasury Department/Internal Revenue Service in certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code to write detailed rules, the IRS has considered regulations issued pur­suant to such provisions to be legislative and has fully complied with the require­ments of the RF A applicable to such regula­tions. Examples are regulations issued in the LIFO inventory area and those promul­gated pursuant to the Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980. However, where regulations have been issued, without such specific stat­utory delegation of authority, the Treasury Department has claimed exemption from the RFA on grounds that such rules are in­terpretative, and therefore, not subject to the Act.

Since the majority of tax regulations issued by the Treasury Department/Inter­nal Revenue Service are described as inter­pretative, this position arguably enables the bulk of tax regulations to escape the scruti­ny of the substantive requirements of the RFA despite what the Office of Advocacy considers to be their potential substantial impact on small business. We recognize that IRS's narrow position in this regard enables them to argue that they have to meet only the technical requirements of the law. How­ever, apart from my reservations we have regarding the "interpretative" nature of the bulk of tax regulations, the Office of Advo­cacy believes this position, even if assumed to be based on solid legal grounds, effective­ly circumvents the spirit or intent of the RF A in the tax area and provides the basis for a continuation of the status quo. In view of the importance of taxes to small busi­nesses, we find this situation unacceptable and recommend this area as a suitable sub­ject for legislative investigation and action.

A FAIRER SHAKE FOR SMALL BUSINESS <By Michael Thoryn>

Says an irreverent Capitol Hill staffer, "Regflex goes after crazy regulations and Equal Access aims at crazy enforcement." His quip sums up the intent of two laws hailed as "milestones" and "significant wins for small business" when they were passed in the fall of 1980.

The Equal Access to Justice Act, which took effect in October, is intended to tear a hole in the deep pockets of litigation-happy federal agencies. Small business people can

3354 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 now recover their legal fees from the agency budget when they challenge a tax or regula­tory ruling and win. Supporters say the act restores balance between citizens and gov­ernment when a disagreement arises.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act, which took effect a year ago, requires the federal government to tailor regulations to the abil­ity of small firms to comply. It is slowly taking hold: Federal agencies and depart­ments, with some reluctance, are revising or dropping burdensome rules.

"It's really good to see something work," says Rep. Andy Ireland CD-Fla.), who la­bored for three years to move the Regflex legislation through Congress. Ireland, chair­man of the Small Business Subcommittee on Export Opportunities and Special Small Business Problems, plans regular oversight hearings to make sure the intent of Regflex isn't scuttled.

Government agencies are now required to give public notice of impending major rules so small business can comment; to weigh the effect of proposed rules on small business; to explain the need for and objective of each proposed rule; and to review all exist­ing rules within 10 years with an eye toward eliminating those that aren't needed.

Regflex sits well with Robert E. Carr, president of Seacor, a marine engineering firm in Cherry Hill, N.J. A delegate to the 1980 White House Conference on Small Business, Carr observes: "Regulatory agen­cies have ·made a living out of beating up on the small guy, who had no defenders."

Ireland says Regflex's impact is difficult to measure because of the difficulty of sepa­rating it from the impact of two other deregulatory efforts-the Reagan adminis­tration Executive Order 12291, which di­rects the Office of Management and Budget to monitor regulations for cost effective­ness, and Vice President George Bush's Task Force on Regulatory Relief.

Monitoring Regflex compliance at federal agencies is a top priority of the Small Busi­ness Administration, says Administrator Mi­chael Cardenas. Frank Swain, SBA's chief counsel for advocacy, whose office the act charges with making sure that Regflex works, likes much of what he surveys. "The act is well on its way to becoming the land­mark legislation many believed it to be," Swain says.

It may also be a path to redemption for the often criticized SBA. The agency's loan and management assistance programs help relatively few of the estimated 10 million small businesses. Regflex gives SBA a chance to work for-and thus protect-its entire constituency.

Does small business need protection? Small banks must struggle with the same forms given to giant rivals. A 1980 Depart­ment of Energy regulatory analysis pro­posed an energy efficiency rule for appli­ances that would have put 80 percent of ap­pliance manufacturers out of business; the rule was withdrawn after protests from business groups.

Regflex does not lengthen the regulatory process dramatically, but it does add a few more steps. The required analysis is "basi­cally a self-help mechanism for the federal regulator, making him think before acting," Swain says.

Among the new considerations: Regula­tors must estimate the number and kind of small firms a regulation will affect and make a detailed evaluation of the reporting, record-keeping and compliance require­ments they anticipate.

As you might expect, agencies aren't en­thusiastic about Regflex. Most haven't had to consider small business needs before.

"Bureaucrats are making a stab at it," says Jere W. Glover, a top official in SBA's advocacy office during the Carter adminis­tration. "However, I sense an undercurrent of 'Oh my, what am I going to do?' "

Voices rose at Regflex oversight hearings last October when Commissioner Bevis Longstreth of the Securities and Exchange Commission said Regflex was a burden-to the SEC.

"The Regflex act has added little of value to our processes while at the same time im­posing internal burdens," Longstreth said. Why, he asked, does the agency have to spend extra staff time on regulatory analy­sis and review?

"We're not here to discuss the inconven­ience to your staff," snapped Rep. Ireland. "You are complaining about your workload. We're concerned about the day-to-day work­load of small businesses."

While the SEC, which has simplified stock issue requirements and reporting rules for small business, wishes compliance were easier, the Department of Defense and the Internal Revenue Service don't want to comply, period.

IRS says it only interprets laws and doesn't write regulations-and therefore it can generally ignore Regflex.

"That interpretation Cof the actl is unac­ceptable," says the SBA's Swain.

The Department of Defense argues that military functions are exempt from the Ad­ministrative Procedure Act, which Regflex amends. New legislation may be needed to snare the two holdouts.

Other agencies are already complying: The Interstate Commerce Commission has

eliminated the requirement that small motor carriers file annual reports with the commission.

The Labor Department is planning to eliminate a piece of Davis-Bacon Act paper work-a weekly report on each worker. Davis-Bacon requires contractors to pay pre­vailing wages-usually the highest union wage in the area-on federally funded con­struction projects.

The Department of Transportation is holding public hearings in the evening to enable small business people to attend.

For Regflex to build on its success-and not be just another regulatory procedure­constant monitoring is needed by both SBA's advocacy office and small business groups. The advocacy office, which has about 25 professionals working on Regflex, aids the writers of agency regulations, tracks their progress and reviews their ef­forts when regulations appear in the Feder­al Register. But the real check on abuses, Ireland insists, "is the small business person and his trade association. If silly rules start creeping back in, I'll hear about it."

Federal agencies may not be prepared for Equal Access. "I get the impression agencies will not give Equal Access nearly sufficient thought until some agency gets banged," says Raymond S. Wittig, minority counsel for the House Small Business Committee, adding that eventually there will be "plenty of government losses."

Wittig points out that government attor­neys lose about 25 percent of their cases. His best guess for the first small business victory: the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. "Equal Access applies to ex­isting cases, and about 90 percent of cases that come to the OSHA Review Commission are overturned," Wittig says.

To be eligible to recover fees and related costs-the top rate is $75 an hour-business­es must have bad a net worth of less than $5 million or fewer that 500 employes when the action was filed. Individuals' net worth at the beginning of proceedings cannot exceed $1 million.

Equal Access has five key provisions: It is irrelevant whether it is the govern­

ment or the taxpayer who initiates litiga­tion.

It is not necessary to prove bad faith by the agency.

The agency must show that its actions were "substantially justified."

It is not necessary to prevail on all issues to receive an award.

There is no dollar limit on awards. Unfortunately, says Steven F. Holub, na­

tional director of tax services as the La­venthol & Horwath accounting firm, the act "has a gaping hole in terms of protecting taxpayer rights." It does not apply to the U.S. Tax Court, which is where litigants often try to get their cases heard, since they may dispute their taxes with IRS without first having to pay the tax allegedly due.

Holub adds, "Equal Access is going to help the small business executive only if he wins. Companies have to weigh the hazard of liti­gation-they might lose."

Glover, the former official of SBA's advo­cacy office and now a Washington attorney, points out that if the government agency loses, the money would come out of the agency's budget. Therefore, he says, "the government might think twice about the cost of litigation and change the kind of issues it contests. That is the cure the law envisions."

To Rep. Ireland, Regflex and Equal Access represent "a big stick for attitude change-the bureaucracy must consider small business needs."

It's an important change for millions of small business people.

SEPTEMBER 28, 1981. Dr. DIANE L. GOLTZ, Department of Defense Dependents School,

Alexandria, Va. DEAR DR. GOLTZ. On January 1, 1981, an

important new law, the Regulatory Flexibil­ity Act <P.L. 96-354), C5 U.S.C. § 601 et. seq.] which amends the Administrative Procedure Act, took effect. I wish to call your atten­tion to this law because it imposes certain resposibilities on your agency with regard to your proposed rule regarding Education of Handicapped Children in the Department of Defense <DOD> Dependents Schools, which appeared in the Federal Register on Sep­tember 11, 1981, page 45368.

Under P.L. 96-354, I have a statutory obli­gation to review Federal regulations and to monitor compliance with the law. The notice of proposed rulemaking appearing in the Register gave no indication whether or not you had complied with the require­ments of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Since it is a new law, you may be unaware of the requirements of this legislation. The Regulatory Flexibility Act <P.L. 96-354) es­tablishes as a "principle of regulatory issu­ance that agencies shall endeavor, consist­ent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and in­formational requirements to the scale of the business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3355 their actions to assure that such proposals are given serious considerations."

To achieve this goal, Public Law 96-354 re­quires that you prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis C5 U.S.C. § 6031 for each rule for which your Agency publishes a gen­eral notice of proposed rulemaking after January 1, 1981, with certain exceptions. However, an agency may not be required to prepare an analysis with respect to a par­ticular rule if it certifies that the rule will not exert, if promulgated, a significant eco­nomic impact on a substantial number of small entities. A copy of the certification must be sent to the Chief Counsel for Advo­cacy for comment (5 U.S.C. § 605].

I recommend that members of your staff review your responsibilities under P.L. 96-354 with regard to this particular rule. In addition to the requirements outlined above, there are other responsibilities of which you should be aware and for that reason I am enclosing an explanatory book­let prepared by the Office of the Chief Counsel which includes a copy of the Act.

I look forward to receiving the results of your determination. Dorothy Nakama of my staff is the Regulatory Flexibility contact person for your agency, and is available to assist you in this process. Her number is <202) 653-8212.

Sincerely, FRANK S. SWAIN,

Chief Counsel for Advocacy.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,

Washington, D.C., October 2, 1981. Mr. FRANKS. SWAIN, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business

Administration, 1441 L Street NW., Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SWAIN: I have received a copy of your September 28, 1981 letter to Dr. Diane L. Goltz of the Department of Defense De­pendents Schools <DoDDS> concerning the proposed Department of Defense Instruc­tion on "Education of Handicapped Chil­dren in the DoD Dependents Schools." The proposed Instruction was published in the Federal Register for public notice and com­ment on September 11, 1981 <46 Fed. Reg. 45368). You have written to Dr. Goltz con­cerning the applicability of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq. <1981 Supp.), to the proposed Instruction. This letter responds on Dr. Goltz's behalf.

Under 5 U.S.C. §§ 603 and 604, agencies are required to prepare initial and final reg­ulatory flexibility analyses of specified types of rulemakings conducted pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553. Section 553, however, does not apply to rules involving "a military . . . function of the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)( 1 ). As I am sure you will readily agree, the overseas dependents schools, which are maintained primarily to serve the children of members of the armed forces stationed abroad, are an integral part of the military mission of this Department. Thus, regulations governing the overseas schools are exempt from the requirements of sec­tion 553. The proposed Instruction on spe­cial education and related services provided by DoDDS, therefore, was not published for public notice and comment pursuant to sec­tion 553, but in accordance with a Depart­mental directive that encourages voluntary solicitation of public comments on DoD reg­ulations of broad public interest. The pro­posed Instruction, therefore, was not sub­ject to the procedural requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act on that basis alone.

Moreover, 5 U.S.C. § 605<b> excuses an agency upon proper certification from pre­paring regulatory flexibility analyses for proposed or final rules that will not "have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." 5 U.S.C. § 605<b>. As its name implies, DoDDS only operates facilities abroad. Although it may occasion­ally pay the tuition of individual students in schools within the United States, such placements are exceedingly rare.

In sum, the proposed DoD Instruction falls outside the scope of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. As a result, the preparation of regulatory flexibility analyses for the proposed Instruction is unnecessary. Ques­tions concerning this matter may be direct­ed to Paul Koffsky of my staff, who can be reached on 695-3657.

Sincerely, ROBERT L. GILLIAT,

Assistant General Counsel, Manpower and Health Affairs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY In the first nine months of this year, the

Environmental Protection Agency <EPA> has already acquired substantial experience with implementing the RFA. EPA has issued 100 certifications over this period and omitted certification in only five instances. All of the omissions occurred in the first four months <three in January) and were apparently oversights by the agency. EPA has agreed to issue final certifications with the final rules at the time of promulgation to remedy these omissions.

The vast majority of the certifications concern routine matters <e.g. state air pollu­tion plans, pesticide tolerances) and contain adequate explanations. In several instances, the agency has certified regulations on the basis of a beneficial impact, rather than an insignificant impact. We have been in­formed that EPA wishes to discuss this issue with us in the near future. They are pres­ently undecided on whether a regulatory flexibility analysis may be required for posi­tive benefits.

EPA has issued only one IRFA in this period <effluent guideline for porcelain enameling plants>. As with most of its past regulatory analyses, it was very comprehen­sive and professional. In contrast, EPA has specifically acknowledged that it has failed to prepare IRF As for two hazardous waste regulations <which won't be ready for months). EPA is under a court ordered deadline to issue these regulations and could not complete the detailed analyses re­quired by these regulations. We cannot fault EPA for the lengthy delay.

As for the agenda, EPA combined the agency requirements of the RFA and Execu­tive Order 12291, thereby combining "major regulations" with regulations having an impact on small entities. It was published on April 27, 1981, in compliance with the Act. The agenda offers brief but adequate descriptions of all rules which EPA expects to act upon. EPA used a conservative ap­proach to RFA compliance by including reg­ulations where it could not yet determine whether there would be a significant small entity impact.

EPA's periodic review plan was published on July 16, 1981 <due on July 1, 1981). It provides the criteria that EPA will utilize in choosing regulations for review and invites public suggestions for regulations to review. EPA also initiated review of three regula­tory programs which were described in the plan. The plan provides that EPA announce with each agenda the regulations it has tar-

geted for review. In the subsequent agenda, EPA will report its decision on each regula­tion listed, whether to revise, rescind or con­tinue the rule unchanged. This plan seems to be adequate for compliance with the RFA. However, a more satisfactory plan would have already indicated at least a ten­tative plan for reviewing rules for the next few years.

In establishing its good track record in im­plementing regulatory flexibility, EPA is benefiting from its extensive experience over the years of exploring regulatory alter­natives. EPA is well known for its innovative approaches to rulemaking, and for its de­tailed economic analyses. The agency ap­pears to be sensitive to the needs of small businesses. It is also very accustomed to im­plementing regulatory reform, as reflected by EPA's excellent implementing guidelines under Executive Order 12044, the predeces­sor to Executive Order 12291. Therefore, EPA appears to have little difficulty imple­menting the few mechancial changes posed by the RFA.

The ease of compliance with RFA is likely the result of EPA's adoption of the RFA­type procedures in advance of the RFA's passage. For example, an excellent model IRFA is provided by numerous large EPA analyses of the economic impact of pro­posed air or water pollution regulations. The FRA requires little that EPA did not voluntarily provide before RFA. The only major change for EPA is the required certi­fication statement which was previously un­necessary. EPA had some initial trouble tracking all its regulations for this require­ment, but his problem has apparently been resolved.•

By Mr. DODD (for himself and Mr. CRANSTON):

S. 2171. A bill to stimulate the devel­opment and rehabilitation of afford­able multifamily rental housing; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

RENTAL HOUSING PRODUCTION AND REHABILITATION ACT OF 1982

• Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am in­troducing legislation today to author­ize the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to provide assist­ance to State and local governments to finance the rehabilitation and develop­ment of affordable multifamily rental housing. I believe that this program, in conjunction with either existing or modified program resources focused on the problem of housing affordabil­ity, represents an efficient and cost-ef­fective means of continuing this Na­tion's commitment to addressing the housing needs of its citizens who are not being served by the private sector.

During the previous session, I intro­duced a more limited proposal to es­tablish a demonstration housing devel­opment loan program. Although hear­ings were not held on that bill, I have received much support as well as sev­eral suggestions for modifications to this earlier proposal. Based on this input, I am revising and expanding this initiative and intend to pursue this proposal actively during consider­ation of this year's housing legislation. I am pleased that this measure is

3356 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 being introduced today by the able Chairman of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Mr. ST GERMAIN, the chairman of the Housing and Community Development Subcommittee, Mr. GONZALEZ, and other members of the committee, in­cluding the cosponsor of the proposal I offered last session, the gentleman from New York, Mr. SCHUMER.

This program is intended to serve as a replacement for the section 8 reha­bilitation and construction programs. This housing strategy not only will provide greater fiscal control, but will allow us to better target our assistance to individuals and areas most in need. Given the continuing, severe housing crisis facing this Nation and the signif­icant budget reductions made in these activities during the previous session, I believe that alternatives must be con­sidered expeditiously. I do not believe that we can reduce these resources further without calling into question this Nation's commitment to afford­able housing and a decent living envi­ronment for its citizens. Although this bill is being introduced in the House in the context of an omnibus housing ini­tiative being offered by the committee majority, it is my intention to pursue and refine this initiative with both majority and minority members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous­ing, and Urban Affairs. I believe that we can come up with a balanced hous­ing package which is both fiscally re­sponsible and yet responds to the vari­ous dimensions of a national problem of increasing proportions.

Any housing policy which places sole reliance on income support measures will not represent a comprehensive ap­proach to current needs and, in fact, will prove counterproductive in supply constrained areas.

Mr. President, this action is essential if we are to begin to reverse the condi­tions contributing to a national hous­ing shortage reaching crisis dimen­sions. This crisis is especially severe with respect to the availability of rental housing. Today, Americans who want to rent housing cannot find decent, affordable housing opportuni­ties. The vacancy rate for rental hous­ing shows no signs of improving from the recent record low levels.

Demographic trends, as well as the continuing prohibitive costs of home­ownership, will increase the already high demand for rental housing. As the baby boom generation comes of age, and individuals choose to live in smaller households, more and more people will need rental housing.

In my State of Connecticut, the pro­duction of multifamily housing units fell by 30.8 percent from 1978 to 1981. Last year, only 9,000 total housing starts were recorded for the entire State against a projected annual demand of 25,000 units. In the housing plan released last year by the Con-

necticut Department of Housing, it was estimated that 175,000 households were either living in substandard hous­ing or paying excessive portions of their income for rent. The rental va­cancy rate in the State is below 2 per­cent and lower than that in most major cities. In Stamford, for example, the vacancy rate is zero and, with the exception of several federally spon­sored projects, virtually no rental units were constructed over the past decade despite unprecendented demand.

The supply of rental housing has been exacerbated further by the loss of existing units as the inventory ages and is not replaced. Anthony Downs, in the "Future of Rental Housing in America," estimated that the gap be­tween rental needs and production in the decade of the 1980's will range from 1.1 to 4.6 million units. The study, "Housing Needs in the Eight­ies," published by ICF Inc., predicts a shortage of 3.5 million rental units over the course of the decade.

The crisis in the rental housing in­dustry is real, and the outlook is not encouraging. A 1979 GAO report states that the rental housing market could be likened to "an endangered species." Dangerously low vacancy rates aggravate already inflationary rents, thereby threatening the ability of moderate- and low-income Ameri­cans to afford decent housing.

The legislation I am proposing em­bodies certain important principles for the future of Federal housing policy. This initiative overcomes the budget­ary criticism of the section 8 program. The Congress will regain annual con­trol over these activities and will not incur the long-term obligations inher­ent in the current programs. Re­sources will be delivered more effi­ciently as a result of the separation of affordability and availability concerns. In addition, State and local officials will become an equal partner in the development process. This will insure better coordination and leverage of re­sources as well as highlight the impor­tance of local support in the planning and location of housing developments so as to spur neighborhood develop­ment and mitigate displacement. Most importantly, this proposal reaffirms the premise that the Government has an obligation to respond to the hous­ing needs of all our citizens who are not being served or provided with decent, affordable housing opportuni­ties by the private sector. This will be accomplished at the lowest possible cost in a manner which anticipates maximum participation by other gov­ernmental entities and the private sector.

Mr. President, the purpose of this bill is to increase the Nation's stock of affordable rental and cooperative housing. State and local governments would make application for assistance

to encourage the construction or reha­bilitation of multifamily developments in areas found to be experiencing severe shortages of decent rental hous­ing opportunities, as determined by objectively measurable indices. In con­junction with the private sector, these governmental entities would have broad flexibility in designing the type of program assistance necessary to re­spond to prevailing local housing market conditions. For example, the assistance could be utilized as a capital grant or loan, annual interest reduc­tion payments or other comparable means to reduce project debt service and thereby create affordable, market­able housing. In accordance with local­ly identified needs, funds could be di­rected for either new construction, substantial rehabilitation or moderate rehabilitation.

The amount of assistance would be the least amount required to provide modestly designed housing in an area for families or individuals without other reasonable and affordable alter­natives in the private market. In addi­tion, the amount of assistance would be sufficient to provide affordable rents in at least 20 percent of the units in any assisted development to f ami­lies with incomes below 80 percent of area median income. A project selec­tion priority is established for propos­als which exceed this later require­ment in terms of either the percentage or length of commitment to our lower income citizens.

The bill contains other selection cri­teria designed to assure that only fea­sible proposals which maximize the necessary Federal assistance will be se­lected, including the degree to which such assistance will be eventually repaid to the Federal Government. Al­though this is a highly targeted pro­gram, the Secretary of HUD is direct­ed to make resources available in dif­ferent geographic regions and in non­metropolitan as well as urban areas.

If any conditions of this assistance are breached or the owner sells or con­verts the development during the term of assistance, the amount of Federal contribution must be repaid in full with accumulated interest. While the Secretary will continue to regulate rent levels as is the case in current as­sisted housing programs, a new f ea­ture has been added to expedite con­sideration of rent requests from pri­vate owners.

In conclusion, this proposal attempts to overcome the criticisms of current programs and incorporates, both in terms of philosophy and program design, many elements of other pend­ing initiatives, such as housing block grants and the administration's recent request for a rental rehabilitation grant program. In conjunction with other ongoing and emergency initia­tives, it is my hope that we can reaf-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3357 firm a national housing policy during this session which is a comprehensive response to the shelter needs con­fronting the American people.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that the bill be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

s. 2171 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the

"Rental Housing Production and Rehabili­tation Act of 1982".

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND AUTHORITY SEC. 2. <a> The purpose of this Act is to in­

crease the Nation's stock of rental and coop­erative housing and to reduce the housing costs of the residents of such housing by en­couraging the construction and rehabilita­tion of multifamily rental housing projects and cooperative housing projects for fami­lies and individuals without other reasona­ble and affordable housing alternatives in the private market.

Cb> The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (hereafter referred to as the "Secretary") shall, to the extend approved in appropriation Acts, provide financial as­sistance to carry out the purpose of this Act with respect to multifamily rental housing and multifamily cooperative housing if such cooperative housing is owned by limited div­idend corporations, private nonprofit corpo­rations or other nonprofit corporations or limited dividend entities eligible under sec­tion 221Cd)(3) or <e> of the National Housing Act.

<c> Such assistance shall be made available by the Secretary to States, units of local government, or designated agencies of States or units of local government which apply for such assistance in a form and manner prescribed by the Secretary and which are selected for such assistance on the basis of the eligibility and selection cri­teria and other conditions set forth in this Act.

Cd) States, units of local government, or agencies thereof which receive such assist­ance shall utilize it to stimulate the con­struction or rehabilitation of rental or coop­erative housing projects described in subsec­tion Cb> by providing-

<1> capital grants; <2> loans; <3> interest reduction payments; <4> grants to finance the purchase of land;

or <5> other comparable assistance, which

the Secretary deems appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act, designed to reduce project debt service cost.

AREA ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA SEc. 3. To be eligible for assistance under

this Act, a project must be located in an area which is experiencing a severe shortage of decent rental housing opportunities for families and individuals without other rea­sonable and affordable housing alternatives in the private market. The Secretary shall issue regulations, consistent with the pre­ceding sentence, which set forth minimum standards for determining areas eligible for assistance. Such standards shall take into account the extent and change in the level of poverty, housing overcrowding, the

amount and duration of rental housing va­cancies, the amount of substandard rental housing, the extent of rental housing pro­duction lag, and such other objectively measurable conditions specified by the Sec­retary which are consistent with the first sentence of this section.

PROJECT SELECTION CRITERIA SEc. 4. <a> In selecting projects for assist­

ance under this Act from among the eligible projects, the Secretary shall make such se­lection on the basis of the extent-

< 1 > to which the project or projects de­scribed in the application reduce the severe shortage of decent rental housing opportu­nities in the area for families and individ­uals without other reasonable and afford­able housing alternatives in the private market;

<2> of non-Federal public and private fi­nancial or other contributions which reduce the cost of the project or projects;

<3> to which the project or projects con­tribute to neighborhood development and mitigate displacement;

<4> to which, and the manner in which, some or all of the assistance provided under this Act will be recaptured by the Federal Government;

<5> to which the applicant has established a satisfactory performance in meeting as­sisted housing needs; and

<6> to which the assistance requested from the Secretary will provide the maximum number of units for the least cost, taking into consideration cost differences among different areas and differences among the types of projects and tenants being served.

<b> In selecting among such projects, the Secretary shall give a priority based on the extent to which the requirement of section 7 <a> <2> is exceeded.

ALLOCATION OF ASSISTANCE SEc. 5. In providing assistance under this

Act, the Secretary shall seek to assure a rea­sonable distribution among eligible areas in different geographic regions, between met­ropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas, and between States and units of local govern­ment or their designated agencies, based on the Secretary's determination of the prior and current capacities of those entities to develop and implement housing initiatives. In addition, the Secretary shall make a rea­sonable distribution of assistance among newly constructed, substantially rehabilitat­ed, and moderately rehabilitated projects on the basis of local housing needs and prevail­ing local housing market conditions identi­fied in the application for assistance.

AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE SEC. 6. The amount of assistance provided

under this Act with respect to a project shall be the least amount which the Secre­tary determines is necessary to provide, through the construction or rehabilitation of such project, decent rental or cooperative housing of modest design which is afford­able for families and individuals without other reasonable and affordable housing al­ternatives in the private market, including an amount necessary to make rents for units described in section 7<a><2> affordable for persons and families whose income does not exceed 80 per centum of the median income of the area.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF ASSISTANCE SEC. 7. Ca> Assistance under this Act may

be provided with respect to a project only if-

(1) the owner has entered into such agree­ments with the Secretary as may be neces-

sary to assure compliance with the require­ments of this section, to assure financial feasibility of the project, and to carry out the other provisions of this Act:

<2> the owner agrees that. during the 15-year period beginning on the date on which 50 per centum of the units in the project are occupied <or in the case of a moderately re­habilitated project, are completed), at least 20 per centum of the units the construction or rehabilitation of which is provided for under the application shall be occupied, or available for occupancy by, persons and families whose income does not exceed 80 per centum of the area median income;

(3) the owner agrees-<A> to pass on to the tenants any reduc­

tion in the debt service payments resulting from the assistance provided under this Act:

<B> not to discriminate against prospective tenants on the basis of their receipt of or eligibility for housing assistance under any Federal housing assistance program; and

<C> not to convert the units to condomini­um ownership <or in the case of a coopera­tive, to condominium ownership or any form of cooperative ownership not eligible for as­sistance under this Act>; during the 15-year period beginning on the date on which the units in the project are available for occupancy <or in the case of a moderately rehabilitated project, are com­pleted>;

< 4 > any mortgage secured by the proper­ty-

<A> has a principal amount which is not more than the amount which could be in­sured for the project under section 207 of the National Housing Act; and

CB> bears a rate of interest and contains such other terms and conditions as the Sec­retary determines are reasonable;

(5) the project is newly constructed or substantially or moderately rehabilitated, contains five or more dwelling units, and is used predominantly for residential pur­poses; and

(6) the State or unit of local government which receives the assistance certifies to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the assist­ance will be made available in conformity with Public Law 88-352 and Public Law 90-284.

Cb)(l> The Secretary shall provide that if the owner or his or her successors in inter­est fail to carry out the agreements de­scribed in paragraphs (1), <2>, and <3> of sub­section <a> during the applicable period, the owner of his or her successors in interest shall make a payment to the Secretary in an amount which equals the total amount of assistance provided under this Act with re­spect to such project, plus interest thereon <without compounding), for each year and any fraction thereof the loan was outstand­ing, at a rate determined by the Secretary taking into account the average yield on outstanding marketable long-term obliga­tions of the United States during the month preceding the date on which the assistance was made available.

<2> Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any assistance provided under this Act shall constitute a debt, payable in the case of any event described in paragraph < 1 >. secured by the security instruments given by the mortgagor to the Secretary.

<c><l> A mortgage on a project assisted under this Act may be insured under title II of the National Housing Act.

<2> Section 817 of the Housing and Com­munity Development Act of 1974 is amend­ed-

3358 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 <A> by striking out "and" after "1966,";

and <B> by inserting after "and 1970" the fol­

lowing: ", and the Rental Housing Produc­tion and Rehabilitation Act of 1982".

(d)(l) Rents charged for units described in subsection <a><2> in any such project shall be approved by the Secretary. In approving such rents, the Secretary shall provide that tenants of such units are charged not more than 30 percent of their adjusted income for rent, including utilities, and shall require that not less than 30 days prior written notice of any increase in rents be provided to such tenants.

(2) Any schedule of rents submitted by an owner to the Secretary for approval shall be deemed to be approved unless the Secretary informs the owner, within 60 days after re­ceiving such schedule, that such schedule is disapproved.

LABOR STANDARDS

SEc. 8. Any contract for assistance pursu­ant to this Act shall contain a provision re­quiring that not less than the wages prevail­ing in the locality, as determined or adopted <subsequent to a determination under appli­cable State or local law> by the Secretary, shall be paid to all architects, technical en­gineers, draftsmen, and technicians em­ployed in the development, and all mainte­nance laborers and mechanics employed in the operation, of the housing project in­volved; and shall also contain a provision that not less than the wages prevailing in the locality, as predetermined by the Secre­tary of Labor pursuant to the Davis-Bacon Act <49 Stat. 1011), shall be paid to all labor­ers and mechanics employed in the develop­ment of the project involved, and the Secre­tary shall require certification as to compli­ance with the provisions of this section prior to making any payment under such contract.

AUTHORIZATION

SEC. 9. There is authorized to be appropri­ated for assistance under this Act not to exceed the sum of $1,300,000,000 for fiscal year 1983.e

By Mr. GOLDWATER (for him­self and Mr. KASTEN):

S. 2172. A bill to amend the Commu­nications Act of 1934; to the Commit­tee on Commerce, Science, and Trans­portation.

CABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1982

e Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the bill I introduce today, the Cable Telecommunications Act of 1982, rep­resents the culmination of a process that began in 1979 when I introduced legislation that contained similar pro­visions. Extensive hearings were held on that bill but no action was taken in the 96th Congress.

Last year, the Commerce Committee considered a number of communica­tions bills that were passed by the Senate. Among those was S. 898, which contained several cable televi­sion provisions. However, no hearings had been held on those particular sec­tions in S. 898. Therefore, during the floor debates on that bill, I objected to these provisions because of the com­mitments I had made that there would be no cable legislation without hear­ings. I also made it clear that I was not

objecting to the substance of the cable provisions in S. 898. My amendment to delete those provisions was successful, and they were stricken from the bill.

Mr. President, this bill is the first time that a comprehensive bill has been introduced on cable television. There will be ample opportunity for public comment on its provisions, as I have steadfastly promised in the past. The subcommittee has tentatively scheduled 4 days of hearings on this bill next month: April 27, 28, 29, and 30, 1982.

Mr. President, I invite my colleagues to join in cosponsoring this bill.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that this bill and a summary de­scribing it be printed in its entirety in the RECORD, following my remarks.

There being no objection, the mate­rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

s. 2172 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) this Act may be cited as the "Cable Tele­communications Act of 1982".

(b) The Communications Act of 1934 is amended by inserting immediately after title V the following new title:

"TITLE VI-CABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT

''FINDINGS

"SEC. 601. The Congress hereby finds that-

"( 1) cable systems are engaged in inter­state commerce through the origination, transmission, distribution, and dissemina­tion of broadband telecommunications serv­ices;

"(2) the expansion and development of cable telecommunications is of primary con­cern to the Federal Government;

"(3) it is necessary and appropriate for the Federal Government to establish and main­tain a national policy for cable telecom­munications to assure the evolution of cable as a medium in its own right; and

"(4) a national and uniform policy for cable is needed to prevent the emergence of conflicting regulation and to allow the growth and development of cable as a medium which will be responsive to and serve the needs and interests of the public.

"PURPOSES

"SEc. 602. The purposes of this Act are to-

"O> create a jurisdictional framework which apportions the authority to regulate cable systems between the Federal Govern­ment and each of the several States of the United States; and

"(2) allow cable systems to compete in the marketplace with other providers of tele­communications services to the public.

"STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY

"SEC. 603. The provisions of this title shall apply as follows:

"(1) The Commission shall have jurisdic­tion and exercise authority with respect to cable systems solely as specified in this title. Commission jurisdiction under this title is exclusive and no other Federal or State in­strumentality or agency or any political sub­division thereof shall make or establish rules or policies regarding the matters dealt with in this title.

"(2) Any cable system shall be subject to the provisions of this title and such orders, rules, or regulations as may be adopted pur­suant thereto and any Federal rule, regula­tion, order, or standard applicable to cable systems shall, to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this title, be null and void.

"(3) A State, instrumentality, agency, board, commission, or authority or any po­litical subdivision thereof may adopt or con­tinue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard affecting cable systems, unless such law, rule, or regulation, or order or standard is inconsistent with the exclu­sive grants of authority under this title and is not forbidden to any governmental au­thority under this title.

"DEFINITIONS

"SEC. 604. For purposes of this title, the term-

"(1) 'basic service', 'basic cable service', or 'basic subscriber service' means the retrans­mission of broadcast signals and any other service as determined by a cable operator;

"(2) 'broadband telecommunications' means any receipt or transmission of elec­tromagnetic signals over one or more co­axial cables or other closed transmission medium;

"(3) 'broadcasting' means telecommunica­tions by radio intended to be received by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations;

"(4) 'cable channel' or 'channel' means that portion of the electromagnetic frequen­cy spectrum used in a cable system for the propagation of a radio, television, or other electromagnetic signal;

"(5) 'cable operator' or 'cable system oper­ator' means any person or persons, or an agent or employee thereof, that operates a cable system, or that directly or indirectly owns a significant interest in any cable system, or that otherwise controls or is re­sponsible for, through any arrangement, the management and operation of such a cable system;

"(6) 'cable service' means the retransmis­sion of any television or radio broadcast signal, or program origination, for distribu­tion by cable or any other closed transmis­sion medium to multiple subscribers;

"(7) 'cable subscriber' means any person who receives radio, television, or other elec­tromagnetic signals distributed or dissemi­nated by a cable operator or a channel pro­gramer over a cable system;

"(8) 'cable system' means a facility or com­bination of facilities under the ownership or control of any person or persons, which con­sists of a primary control center used to re­ceive and retransmit, or to originate broad­band telecommunications services over one or more coaxial cables, or other closed transmission media, from the primary con­trol center to a point of reception at the premises of a cable subscriber, but such term does not include a facility or combina­tion of facilities that serves only to retrans­mit the television signals of television broadcast stations located within the market in which such facility is located, nor shall a common carrier subject to the provi­sions of title II of this Act be deemed to be a cable system solely by reason of receiving or transporting broadband telecommunications services in the ordinary course of its busi­ness as a common carrier;

"(9) 'channel programer' means any person or persons that lease, rent, or are otherwise authorized to use the facilities of a cable system for the origination of pro-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3359 graming over a cable channel, and such term shall include a cable system operator to the extent that such operator, or person or persons under common ownership or con­trol with such operator, is engaged in pro­gram origination;

"(10) 'closed transmission medium' or 'closed transmission media' means media having the capacity to transmit simulta­neously electromagnetic signals over a common transmission path such as coaxial cable, optical fiber, wire, waveguide, or other such signal conductor or device;

"(11) 'origination' or 'program origination' means the use of a cable channel by a chan­nel programer to create and distribute pro­grams such as news, public affairs, enter­tainment, sports, educational, information­al, and religious, but such term does not in­clude carriage of radio or television broad­cast signals by a cable operator;

"(12) 'person' means an individual, part­nership, association, joint stock company, trust, corporation, or any governmental au­thority;

"(13) 'radio or television signal' means a signal or any radio or television broadcast station, domestic or foreign, operating on a channel regularly assigned to its communi­ty, which is receivable by the general public without charge;

"(14) 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or among points spec­ified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information, by means of electromagnetic transmission, with or with­out benefit of any closed transmission medium, including all instrumentalities, fa­cilities, apparatus, and services <including the collection, storage, forwarding, switch­ing, and delivery of such information) essen­tial to such transmission;

"(15) 'telecommunications carrier' or 'car­rier' means any person, including any gov­ernment or quasi-government entity, which offers any telecommunications service or fa­cilities used by any person to provide tele­communications services, except that a person engaged in broadcasting, or in pro­viding any cable service, shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a car­rier;

"(16) 'telecommunications service' means the offering for hire of telecommunications facilities, or of telecommunications by means of such facilities; and

"(17) 'United States' means the several States and territories, the District of Colum­bia, and the possessions of the United States.

"OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF CABLE SYSTEMS

"SEC. 605. <a> Except in the case of the antitrust laws of the United States and to the extent otherwise provided in subsections Cb), Cc), and Cd> of this section, no executive agency of the United States, including the Commission, and no State or political subdi­vision or agency thereof, including a cable franchising authority, shall have the au­thority to prohibit, or otherwise regulate, the ownership of cable systems by any person.

"(b)(l) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection <a> of this section, for the pur­pose of ensuring fair and equitable treat­ment of United States cable enterprises seeking access to markets in a foreign coun­try, the Commission shall have authority to conduct inquiries and establish policies, rules, regulations, and requirements applica­ble to foreign persons from that country seeking access to domestic markets in the United States in connection with the con-

struction, ownership, and operation of cable enterprises with a view to assuring that such United States cable enterprises are permitted access to such foreign markets upon terms and conditions which are recip­rocal with the terms and conditions under which such foreign persons have access to domestic markets in the United States.

"(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'foreign persons' includes any individ­ual who is not a citizen of the United States, any subsidiary <although established under the laws of the United States or any State thereof) of a corporation or other business entity which was established under the laws of a foreign country, any corporation or other business entity established under the laws of a foreign country, or any corpora­tion or other business entity established under the laws of the United States or any State thereof, if 25 percent or more of the capital stock or equivalent ownership is owned or controlled by an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or by a corporation or other business entity estab­lished under the laws of a foreign country, or any subsidiary of a corporation or other business entity established under the laws of a foreign country.

"(3) The Commission shall adopt such rules, regulations, policies, requirements, and procedures, and may impose such re­strictions as it determines to be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this subsection.

"(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection <a> of this section, a State or any political subdivision or agency thereof may not own or acquire an ownership interest in any cable system, unless such State, subdivi­sion, or agency acquires such ownership or interest at not less than fair market value and not by condition of franchise unless the franchise provides for purchase at fair market value. In any case in which any such State, subdivision, or agency has or acquires any such ownership or interest in accord­ance with this subsection, such State, subdi­vision, or agency shall, in no case, own or control, directly or indirectly, any of the programing on such cable system except as provided in section 606<a><l>.

"(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection <a> of this section, no telecom­munications carrier shall engage in the pro­vision of cable services in the same operat­ing area, unless the Commission, in any par­ticular case, shall otherwise permit and then only upon a sufficient showing that such provision by a carrier will provide sig­nificant additional media diversity and com­petition. In any particular case, the Com­mission shall require conditions which foster the purposes and policy of this Act.

"(e)(l) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection <d> of this section, telecommuni­cations carriers serving rural areas with low population density, as defined by the Com­mission, may provide cable services in such areas.

"(2) The Commission shall prescribe regu­lations necessary to carry out the provisions of this section within the 180-day period fol­lowing the date of its enactment.

"DEDICATION OF CHANNEL CAPACITY

"SEc. 606. <a> The Commission shall re­quire cable systems having twenty or more television broadcast channels 020 MHz or more of bandwidth> for immediate or poten­tial use to dedicate or set aside-

" Cl) 10 percent of such channels for use by public, educational, and governmental channel programers; and

"<2> 10 percent of such channels for use by leased channel programer.

"Cb) (1) The obligation to provide access imposed under paragraph (2) of subsection <a> of this section <relating to leased chan­nels) shall cease upon determination by the Commission that there are reasonably avail­able alternatives for persons desiring to pro­vide programing service to the public in a particular geographic area or market.

" (2) IN determining whether there are reasonably available alternatives in the rele­vant area or market, the Commission shall consider-

" CA> the number and size of other provid­ers of service;

"CB> the extent to which service is avail­able from other providers;

"CC> the ability of such other providers to make such service readily available at com­parable rates, terms, and conditions; and

"CD> other indicators of the extent of the competition.

"(c) The channels referred to in para­graphs Cl) and <2> of subsection <a> of this section shall be made available on a first­come, first-served, nondiscriminatory basis.

"(d) Until such time as there is demand for each channel full time for its designated use, public, educational, governmental, and leased channel programing may be com­bined on one or more channels. To the extent time is available therefor, such dedi­cated channels may be used for other serv­ices.

"RATE REGULATION

"SEc. 607. <a> Each State or political sub­division or agency thereof, or cable franchis­ing authority, is authorized to establish, fix, or otherwise restrict the rates, on a nondis­criminatory basis, charged for the use or sale of cable channel capacity or time on such channels referred to in paragraph < 1 > of subsection <a> of section 606.

"Cb> Each State or political subdivision or agency thereof, or cable franchising author­ity, is authorized to establish, fix, or other­wise restrict the rates, on a nondiscrimina­tory basis, charged for basic services.

"(c) No executive agency of the United States, including the Commission, and no State or political subdivision or agency thereof, or cable franchising authority, shall have authority to establish, fix, or oth­erwise restrict the rates charged channel programers by cable system operators for the use of channels described in paragraph <2> of subsection <a> of section 606.

"CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY

"SEc. 608. Nothing in this title shall be deemed to affect the criminal or civil liabil­ity of channel programers pursuant to the law of libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of privacy, false or misleading ad­vertising, or other similar laws, except that the cable operator shall not incur such li­ability for any program carried on any public, educational, governmental, or leased channel referred to in paragraphs (1) and <2> of subsection <a> of section 606, or for any program originated by a channel pro­gramer having no ownership affiliation with the cable system operator.

"CARRIAGE OF BROADCAST SIGNALS

"SEC. 609. The Commission may establish the terms and conditions respecting the car­riage of radio and television broadcast sig­nals by cable system operators.

"FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, EQUAL TIME, AND REASONABLE ACCESS

"SEc. 610. No executive agency of the United States, including the Commission,

3360 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 and no State or political subdivision or agency thereof, or cable franchising author­ity, shall require a cable operator to comply with the provisions of sections 312<a><7> and 315 of this Act.

"FRANCHISE FEES "SEC. 611. (a) The Commission shall estab­

lish reasonable ceilings for the fees to be paid to States, or any political subdivision thereof, by operators of cable systems re­ceiving franchises from such State or politi­cal subdivision thereof and, periodically upon its own motion or upon petition, may review the appropriateness of such ceilings and make adjustments therein.

"Cb> The Commission shall prescribe pro­cedures necessary to carry out the provi­sions of this section within the 180-day period following the date of its enactment.

"PROTECTION OF SUBSCRIBER PRIVACY "SEC. 612. <a> No person shall intercept or

receive broadband telecommunications unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable system operator, channel programer, or originator of broadband telecommunica­tions or as may otherwise be specifically au­thorized by law.

"(b) In order to safeguard the right to pri­vacy and security of broadband telecom­munications, such broadband telecommuni­cations shall be deemed to be a 'wire com­munication' within the meaning of section 25100) of title 18 of the United States Code.

"(C) In the event that there may be any difference between the provisions of this section and chapter 119 of title 18 of the United States Code, or any regulations pro­mulgated thereunder, it is the intent of the Congress that such chapter 119 shall be controlling.

"(d) No cable operator, channel program­er, or originator of broadband telecommuni­cations, shall disclose personally identifiable information with respect to a cable subscrib­er, or personally identifiable information with respect to the broadband services pro­vided to or received by a particular cable subscriber by way of a cable system, except upon the prior written consent of the sub­scriber, or pursuant to a lawful court order authorizing such disclosure.

"(e) If a court shall authorize or order dis­closure, the cable subscriber shall be noti­fied of such order by the cable operator, or other person to whom such order may be di­rected, within a reasonable time before the disclosure is made. For the purposes of this paragraph, a reasonable period of time shall not be less than fourteen calendar days.

"(f) Any cable subscriber whose privacy is violated in contravention of this subsection, shall be entitled to recover civil damages as authorized and in the manner set forth in section 2520 of title 18 of the United States Code. This remedy shall be in addition to any other remedy available to such sub­scriber.

"TECHNICAL STANDARDS "SEC. 613. The Commission shall ensure

that cable system operators conform to technical standards necessary to promote the compatibility and interoperability of cable systems, the compatibility of the re­ceivers and other terminal equipment con­nected to such systems by cable subscribers, and to prevent harmful interference to radio and television communications. No person shall manufacture, import, sell, offer for sale or lease, ship, or use devices which fail to comply with such regulations pro­mulgated by the Commission.

"RECORDS "SEc. 614. The Commission shall require

the maintenance of such records by cable operators and the submission of such re­ports to the Commission as may be neces­sary and relevant to the performance of its duties and responsibilities as provided under this title or under any rule, regulation, or order adopted pursuant thereto.

"EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY "SEC. 615. The Commission shall ensure

and promote equal employment opportunity by cable system operators.

"SPORTS "SEc. 616. <a> No cable system shall re­

transmit into any area within 50 miles of the home stadium of a club which is a member of a professional sports league the broadcast or any part thereof of any game involving that home club or a member club of that league unless it obtains the consent of that home club or its designee.

"Cb) Nothing in this section shall prevent a cable system from retransmitting the pro­graming of any broadcast station into an area which is located wholly within that sta­tion's 'local service area'. as defined in sec­tion lll(f) of title 17, United States Code.".

SIGNAL PIRACY SEc. 2. Section 705 of the Communications

Act of 1934 <as redesignated by section 3 of this Act> is amended < 1) by designating the existing text thereof as subsection <a>. and <2> by adding at the end thereof the follow­ing:

"(b)(l) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action under this section may grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain violations of subsection (a).

"(2) Any person who violates the provi­sions of subsection <a> shall be liable to any person aggrieved by such violation, for dam­ages as provided by subsection <c>.

"(3) Any civil action under this section may be commenced in any United States district court of competent jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controver­sy, or in any other court of competent juris­diction.

"<c><l><A> Damages awarded under subsec­tion <b><2> shall be computed in accordance with subparagraph <B> or subparagraph <C>.

"CB> The party aggrieved is entitled to re­cover the actual damages suffered by him as a result of the violation, any profits of the person committing the violation that are at­tributable to the violation and are not taken in account in computing the actual dam­ages. In establishing such profits, the party aggrieved is required to present proof only of the gross revenue of the person commit­ting the violation, and such person is re­quired to prove his deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to fac­tors other than the violation.

"CC> The party aggrieved may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits under subparagraph <B>, an award of statutory damages for all violations involved in the action, in a sum of not less than $250, or more than $10,000, as the court considers just.

"(2) In a case where the party aggrieved sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds that the violation of subsection <a> was committed willfully and for pur­poses of commercial advantage or private fi­nancial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of damages, whether actual or statutory under paragraph < 1 ), by an amount of not more than $50,000. In a

case where the person committing a viola­tion sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such person was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted a violation of subsection <a>. the court in its discretion may reduce the award of damages to a sum of not less than $100.

"(d)(l) Any person who violates subsec­tion <a> willfully shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.

"(2) Any person who violates subsection <a> willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, for the first such offense, and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both, for any subse­quent offense.

"(e)(l) No criminal proceeding shall be maintained under the provisions of this sec­tion unless it is commenced not later than three years after the cause of action arises.

"(2) No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this section unless it is commenced not later than three years after the claim accrues.''.

REDESIGNATION SEc. 3. The existing title VI of the Com­

munications Act of 1934 is redesignated as title VII, and sections 601 through 609 are redesignated as sections 701 through 709, re­spectively.

SUMMARY: CABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1982

SECTION 601-FINDINGS 1. Need for a national policy.

SECTION 602-PURPOSES 1. Establish jurisdiction. 2. Allow competition.

SECTION 603-STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY 1. The FCC has exclusive jurisdiction. 2. States can regulate if not inconsistent

with FCC authority. SECTION 604-DEFINITIONS

SECTION 605-0WNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF CABLE SYSTEMS

1. Generally, no ownership restrictions. 2. Foreign ownership of cable prohibited if

no reciprocal rights granted to U.S. compa­nies.

3. Municipal ownership allowed if ac­quired at fair market value and if no control over programining.

4. Telephone companies prohibited from providing cable in their same operating areas except in rural areas.

SECTION 606-DEDICATION OF CHANNEL CAPACITY

1. Cable systems with 20 or more channels must set aside:

<a> 10% for public, educational, and gov­ernmental use; and

<b> 10% for leased channel use. 2. The leased channel access obligation

ceases when the FCC determines that there are reasonably available alternatives for programmers.

SECTION 607-RATE REGULATION 1. States may regulate rates for public

access channels. 2. States may regulate rates for basic serv­

ice. 3. No entity may regulate the rates for

leased access channels.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3361 SECTION 608-CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY

1. No liability by cable operator for pro­grams on public or leased channels. SECTION 609-CARRIAGE OF BROADCAST SIGNALS

1. The FCC may require carriage of broad­cast signals. SECTION 610-FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, EQUAL TIME,

AND REASONABLE ACCESS

1. No government entity may require a cable operator to comply with the Fairness Doctrine, equal time, or reasonable access requirements.

SECTION 611-FRANCHISE FEES

1. The FCC shall establish reasonable ceil­ings for franchise fees paid by cable opera­tors.

SECTION 612-PROTECTION OF SUBSCRIBER PRIVACY

1. No unauthorized interception of cable. 2. No cable operator shall disclose person­

al information about a subscriber without permission.

SECTION 613-TECHNICAL STANDARDS

1. The FCC shall ensure that cable opera­tors conform to technical standards.

SECTION 614-RECORDS

1. The FCC shall require operators to keep records.

SECTION 615-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

1. The FCC shall ensure equal employ­ment opportunity by cable operators.

SECTION 616-SPORTS

1. Cable systems must blackout carriage of a professional game within 50 miles of the home club's stadium.

SECTION 2-SIGNAL PIRACY

1. Contains protections for programmers against signal piracy .e

By Mr. CHILES <for himself and Mr. HOLLINGS):

S. 2173. A bill to enable the shrimp industry to establish, finance, and carry out a coordinated program of re­search, quality enhancement, and pro­ducer and consumer education in order to improve, expand, maintain, and develop markets for shrimp; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

SHRIMP RESEARCH, QUALITY AND CONSUMER INFORMATION ACT OF 1982

e Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, today it's my pleasure to join with Senator HOLLINGS, to introduce the Shrimp Re­search, Quality and Consumer Inf or­mation Act of 1982. This bill would enable the shrimp industry to estab­lish, finance, and implement a coordi­nated program of research, quality en­hancement, and producer and con­sumer education in order to improve and develop shrimp markets. There is widespread support for this legislation in the industry and a general feeling that it will give the industry a chance to establish the kind of programs that have benefited the egg, cotton, and peanut industries.

This legislation, similar to the ena­bling legislation for the Egg Board, would authorize the Secretary of Com­merce to issue an order designating both a warm water and cold water

shrimp industry in the United States. It would also authorize the Secretary to identify shrimp harvesters and shrimp marketers in each industry and to conduct a referendum among the harvesters and marketers to determine whether they desire the establishment of a council for their respective re­gions. If a majority of both harvesters and marketers approve the ref eren­dum, then the Secretary will appoint members of both councils. The ap­pointments will come from nomina­tions received from the harvesters and marketers. Once both shrimp councils are established, they will formulate and implement educational, research, and quality enhancement programs designed to assist the shrimp indus­tries.

An appealing element of this propos­al is that the cost of the program is borne by the industry. There would be no Government funds for promotion or research programs. Once the coun­cils are in place, shrimp marketers will pay an assessment based on the number of pounds of shrimp they pur­chase. Although the collection is man­datory, actual assessment is voluntary since marketers have the right to re­ceive a refund of the assessment from the councils. Also included in the legis­lation are provisions for dissolution of the councils if enough industry mem­bers so desire.

It is no secret that the last few years have been difficult for the shrimp in­dustry. High fuel prices particularly have taken their toll. Consequently, it's more important now than ever for the industry to have a mechanism to help solidify and expand its markets. While a sizable body of knowledge exists regarding shrimp production and processing, a great deal remains unknown about the consumption and marketing of shrimp and shrimp prod­ucts. This legislation will give the shrimp industry the opportunity to initiate programs that will help fill these informational and research voids. It will also give the industry a chance to work together in solving some of its pressing problems and to help insure that it remains one of the major components of our national fisheries sector·•

By Mr. KASTEN: S.J. Res. 156. Joint resolution to des­

ignate April 9, 1982, as "POW-MIA Commemoration Day"; to the Com­mittee on the Judiciary.

POW-MIA COMMEMORATION DAY

e Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, today, I am introducing legislation to declare April 9, 1982 as "POW-MIA Com­memoration Day." The ultimate sacri­fice one can make is to put his life on the line for his country. This bill com­memorates our American POW's and MIA's and the sacrifices made by their families.

POW's and MIA's are some of Amer­ica's most deserving heroes. Their cap-

tivity in World War I, World War II, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts was marked by physical abuse, mental tor­ture, and living day-in and day-out at the mercy of their captors. During these conflicts, over 140,000 Americans were prisoners of war and over 17,000 died.

Mr. President, we must never forget those who are still listed as "missing in action." Since World War I, almost 92,000 Americans have been listed as MIA's; in World War I, there were 3,300; in World War II, there were 78,000; during the Korean conflict, there were 8,000 MIA's, and from the Vietnam conflict, there are still 2,500 Americans considered as missing in action.

I believe it is important that we re­member Americans from all past wars and conflicts during this special day. The date of April 9 signifies the fall of the Peninsula of Bataan and repre­sents the point in time when the larg­est single group of Americans were taken hostage by enemy forces. Our prisoners of war, our missing in action, and their families deserve this special day of recognition.

Mr. President, the joint resolution which I have proposed today pays spe­cial tribute to our POW's and MIA's who served America to protect the freedom of this Nation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that the text of the joint resolu­tion be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 156 Whereas thousands of American soldiers

have been captured by the enemy and held as prisoners of war or have been declared missing in action in wars involving the United States;

Whereas many American prisoners of war were subjected to cruel and inhumane treat­ment by their captors in violation of inter­national law and suffered physical and mental anguish;

Whereas many Americans died and most of those who survived continued to suffer as a result of such treatment;

Whereas it remains uncertain whether those Americans missing in action are dead or alive and such uncertainty causes hard­ship and suffering for their families;

Whereas the sacrifices of American pris­oners of war, Americans missing in action, and their families are deserving of national recognition;

Whereas on April 9, 1942, the largest group of American soldiers ever taken pris­oner by an enemy of the United States were captured in the Phillipines; and

Whereas the recognition of this date will coincide with the 40th anniversary of the fall of the Peninsula of Bataan: Now, there­fore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That April 9, 1982, is designated as "POW-MIA Commemoration Day", and the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon all government

3362 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 agencies and the people of the United States to observe the day with appropriate ceremonies, programs, and activities.e

By Mr. SYMMS: S.J. Res. 158. Joint resolution ex­

pressing the policy of the Government of the United States of America with respect to the Government of Cuba· to the Committee on Foreign Relation~.

U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO CUBA

.Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, today I wish to introduce a joint resolution en­titled "A joint resolution expressing the policy of the Government of the United States of America with respect to the Government of Cuba." The joint resolution reads as follows: A joint resolution expressing the policy of

the Government of the United States of America with respect to the Government of Cuba That it is the policy of the Government of

the United States to continue in its rela­tions with the Government of Cuba the policy set forth in the Joint Resolution enti­tled "A Joint Resolution Expressing the De­termination of the United States with Re­spect to the Situation In Cuba,"

Mr. President, that resolution passed the Senate on September 20, 1962, and the House of Representatives on Sep­tember 26, 1962. It was signed into law by President Kennedy on October 3 1962. ' It stated as follows, Mr. President: Whereas President James Monroe, an­

nouncing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, de­clared that the United States would consid­er any attempt on the part of European powers "To extend their system to any por­tion of this Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties under­takes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by arti­cle 51 of the Charter of the United Na­tions", and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Or­ganization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ide­ology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extra­continental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and

Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba, its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined:

<a> to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from ex­tending, by force or the threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

Cb> to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capabil­ity endangering the security of the United States; and

<c> to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent for that resolution to be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the resolu­tion was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S.J. RES. 158 Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­

resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the policy of the Government of the United States to continue in its relations with the Govern­ment of Cuba the policy set forth in the Joint Resolution entitled "A Joint Resolu­tion Expressing the Determination of the United States with Respect to the Situation In Cuba," passed by the Senate on Septem­ber 20, 1962 and by the House of Represent­~tives on September 26, 1962, and signed mto law by the President on October 3, 1962 <76 Stat. 697), as follows:

Whereas President James Monroe an­nouncing the Monroe Doctrine in 182J de­clared that the United States would co~id­er any attempt on the part of European powers "To extend their system to any por­tion of this Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties under­takes to assist in meeting the attack in the excercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by arti­cle 51 of the Charter of the United Sta­tions", and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Or­ganization of American States of Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "The present Government of Cuba has indentified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ide­ology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine and accepts military assistance from extra: continental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba, its political, economic, and military sphere of influence; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined-

<a> to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from ex­tending, by force or the threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

<b> to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capabil­ity endangering the security of the United States; and

<c> to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, there are several important aspects of this

joint resolution. First and, I think, the most important part is that it reaf­firms the law of the land on American policy toward Cuba as embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 230 or Public Law 87-733 <76 Stat. 697>. This bill can be found in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 87th Congress, 2d session, volume 108, No. 170, September 20, 1962, pages 18892-18951, and No. 174, September 26, 1962, pages 19702-19753. That joint resolution passed the Senate on September 20, 1962, by an almost unanimous vote of 86 to 1 and it passed the House of Represent~tives on September 26, 1962, by an over­whelming vote of 384 to 7.

So I think, Mr. President, it would do us all good to note that the estab­lished law of the land is what we are talking about in this resolution.

Second, this proposed joint resolu­t~on reaffirms the Monroe Doctrine, first announced in 1823, and the Rio Treaty of 1947.

Third, this proposed joint resolution has several policy thrusts. It expresses the determination of the United States to prevent, by force if neces­sary, the Soviet-backed Communist reg~e of Cuba from engaging in ag­gressive or subversive activities in any part of the Western Hemisphere. It also expresses American determina­tion to prevent the Soviets from estab­lishing a military base in Cuba. Final­ly, it states American support for the freedom and self-determination of the Cuban people.

Mr. President, this proposed reaffir­mation of the 1962 Cuba resolution is fully consistent with President Rea­gan's Caribbean policy expressed on February 24, 1982. It is my intention and the intention of my colleague' Representative JACK KEMP, of Ne~ York who is sponsoring this joint reso­lution in the other body, to fully sup­port the President's Caribbean policy. The President's speech had three main elements relating to U.S. policy toward Cuba. First, President Reagan proclaimed that security in the Carib­bean region is vital to U.S. national in­terests. The President said:

The Caribbean region is a vital strategic and commercial artery for the United States. Nearly half of our trade, two-thirds of our imported oil, and over half of our im­ported strategic minerals pass through the Pan8J!la Canal or the Gulf of Mexico. Make no mistake, the well-being and security of our neighbors in this region are in our own vital interest.

Second, President Reagan described the nature of the threat from Soviet­backed Cuba. He said:

Cuba and its Soviet backers ... <have> trained, armed, and directed extremists in guerrilla warfare and economic sabotage as part of a campaign to exploit troubles in Central America and the Caribbean. Their goal is to establish Cuban-style Marxist-Len­inist dictatorships. Last year, Cuba received 66,000 tons of war supplies from the Soviet

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3363 Union, more than in any year since the 1962 missile crisis.

Of course, President Reagan was not ruling out potential American use of force in the Caribbean or against Cuba. He was merely stating that at present we may not be planning to use force.

Mr. President, I hope that this reaf­firmation of American determination to resist Soviet and Cuban aggression and military threats in the Caribbean will receive unanimous support from colleagues. As John F. Kennedy accu­rately predicted during his 1960 Presi­dential campaign-I quote President Kennedy. at that time Senator Kenne­dy, who was running for President in 1960:

Soviet missile power will be the shield behind which they will slowly but surely ad­vance-through Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect, nonvert aggres­sion, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies. The periphery of the free world will slowly be nibbled away.

Mr. President, that is the end of the quote by candidate John F. Kennedy when he was running for President in 1960. How prophetic that turned out to be, Mr. President.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following articles relating to the present situa­tion in Cuba. Mr. President, a state­ment and news release from Repre­sentative KEMP dated February 1, 1982, in which Representative KEMP accused the Soviet Union of violating the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agree­ment prohibiting the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba and called for comprehensive hearings into Soviet and Cuban activities in the Car­ibbean and the administration's plan of action to counter that threat.

<Mr. SPECTER assumed the chair:> There being no objection, the article

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: KEMP CALLS FOR HEARINGS ON SOVIET/CUBAN

THREAT TO WESTERN HEMISPHERE At hearings today before the House For­

eign Operations Subcommittee, ranking Re­publican Member Jack Kemp <R-N.Y.) ac­cused the Soviet Union of violating the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement prohibit­ing the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and called for comprehensive hearings into Soviet and Cuban activities in the Caribbean, the threat posed to the secu­rity of the nations of the region, and the Administration's plan of action to counter that threat. The text of Congressman Kemp's statement follows:

"As I understand it, the narrow purpose of this hearing today is to consider a forthcom­ing notice from the Department of State of the President's intention to provide $55 mil­lion in aerial support equipment to compen­sate for the severe losses inflicted by guer­rillas in last Wednesday's attack on the air­base outside of San Salvador.

"This attack has seriously impaired trans­portation within the country. If we fail to assist the Government of El Salvador to

repair its vital lines of transport, we will concede to the terrorists a major victory. Encouraged by this success, they would most certainly escalate the incidence of vio­lence, with the objective of disrupting the elections scheduled for March 28.

"In short, if there are ever to be free elec­tions in El Salvador, it behooves the United States to help support the people and gov­ernment of El Salvador against the gueril­las' attacks.

"And that brings me to a crucial distinc­tion that we must face squarely. What we are seeing in El Salvador is more an invasion than a civil war. And by no means is that in­vasion limited to El Salvador.

"I believe that the threat to the peace and security of our allies in the Western Hemi­sphere is growing to dangerous proportions.

"Cuban military advisors and Soviet arms and materiel have been pouring into Nicara­gua for the purpose of destabilizing neigh­boring countries. The latest escalation in this dangerous arms supply effort is the an­ticipated receipt of Russian MiG-23 attack jets in Nicaragua, dramatically increasing Nicaragua's threat to its neighbors.

"Nicaragua now hosts some 5,000 civilian and 1,500 military advisors supplied by Cuba. Moreover, Cuban advisors are be­lieved to be serving in key posts throughout the government. And there are significant numbers of advisors present from East Ger­many, Bulgaria, North Korea, and the Soviet Union.

"Air bases in Nicaragua and Cuba are under Soviet supervision. Soon to be added is an airbase now under construction in Gre­nada. On December 19, 1981 Grenada's Min­ister of National Mobilization declared that the new airbase and housing facilities in his country were at the disposal of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

"Yasser Arafat has publicly boasted of the presence of PLO operatives in Nicaragua.

"All of this has been made possible by the Soviet Union's control over Cuba, and the use of Cuba as a staging ground for the export of aggression in this hemisphere.

"In 1962, President Kennedy reached an agreement with Premier Khrushchev which provided three things. First, the Soviet Union would withdraw all offensive weap­ons from Cuba, and assure that no new of­fensive weapons would be introduced into Cuba. Those offensive weapons included medium range ballistic missiles and light­weight bombers. Second, in exchange for that withdrawal and forebearance, the United States agreed not to invade Cuba. Fi­nally, and central to the agreement, was the tacit understanding that Cuba would not engage in disruptive activity in this hemi­sphere. This final understanding was em­braced in Senate Joint Resolution 230, which read in part "That the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere."

From public records we know that today, on the docks of Havana, there are crates containing perhaps a squadron of MiG-23 attack aircraft. These flogger Jets are the latest in the Soviet military supply of Cuba, which has continued unabated since 1962.

If anyone would doubt the offensive nature of these aircraft, consider that the newest versions have a range in excess of 1,600 km, and carry loads of bombs, rockets and guided munitions up to 3,500kg payload. Moreover, these ground attack aircraft are nuclear capable.

But apart from the specifications of the MiGs, the essential point is this: The Soviet Union has a military infrastructure in place and growing in Cuba, from which offensive actions may be launched. This includes:

Soviet brigade (2,600-3,000 men> located near Havana;

Major Soviet intelligence collection facili­ty which monitors U.S. communications;

$3 billion annual aid program, or v. of Cuba's GNP;

$2.5 billion in arms deliveries since 1960; Three times more Soviet military equip­

ment sent to Cuba in 1981 than in the previ­ous year, and more than in any year since 1962;

Soviet deliveries to Cuba transshipped to Nicaragua and elsewhere; ultimately used against target governments such as in El Salvador.

The Soviet Union's record of an extensive military buildup in Cuba, and its systematic expansion of Cuba's potential to serve as a base for aggressive actions, leads to one con­clusion: the Soviet Union has violated its 1962 pledge not to emplace offensive sys­tems in Cuba.

Moreover, Cuba's activities throughout the Caribbean, promoting violence and in­stability and seeking to overthrow existing governments, is a gross violation of the un­derstanding reached in 1962 that this hemi­sphere would be a zone of peace, free from Soviet sponsored disruption.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it would be extremely shortsighted for us to attempt to evaluate the President's military assistance program in El Salvador without looking at that program in the context of the security situation in the entire Caribbe­an region.

Accordingly, I would like to request that we schedule hearings in the near future, with ample advance notice to all members of the subcommittee and to the Administra­tion, to examine the question of Soviet in­fluence in the Caribbean, of Cuban activi­ties throughout the region, and of the impli­cations for our security and the peace and security of our neighbors in Latin America.

Mr. SYMMS. I also have the mes­sage of October 26, 1962, from Chair­man Khrushchev of the Soviet Union to President Kennedy. It is very clear if one reads this statement and the other correspondence between Khru­shchev and Kennedy in October 1962 that the Soviets are in violation of the agreements that were reached by President Kennedy and Mr. Khru­shchev in 1962. The U.S.S.R. should certainly now be made aware in my opinion, of the affirmation by Con­gress of U.S. policy toward Cuba that passed Congress and was signed into law by the President in the fall of 1962. I ask unanimous consent that the following unclassified excerpts from the Kennedy-Khrushchev corre­spondence be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the state­ment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE, OCTOBER 26, 1962 Therefore, Mr. President, let us show good

sense. I assure you that the ships bound for Cuba are carrying no armaments at all. The armaments needed for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not mean to say that there have been no shipments of armaments

3364 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already obtained the neces­sary weapons for defense.

Let us normalize relations. We have re­ceived an appeal from U Thant, Acting Sec­retary General of the U.N., containing his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals are to the effect that our side not ship any armaments to Cuba for a certain period of time while negotiations are being conducted-and we are prepared to enter into such negotiations-and the other side not undertake any piratical action against vessels navigating on the high seas. I consid­er these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has evolved that would give nations a chance to breathe easily.

If the President and Government of the United States would give their assurances that the United States would itself not take part in an attack upon Cuba and would re­strain others from such action; if you recall your Navy-this would immediately change everything. I do not speak for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba would, probably, announce a demobili­zation and would call upon the people to commence peaceful work. Then the ques­tion of armaments would also be obviated, because when there is no threat, armaments are only a burden for any people. This would also change the approach to the ques­tion of destroying not only the armaments which you call offensive, but of every other kind of armament.

Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will de­clare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated.

KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE October 27, 1962 I therefore make this proposal: We are

willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are will­ing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfill­ment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives en­joyed the confidence of the Security Coun­cil, as well as yours and mine-both the United States and the Soviet Union-and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do- not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of Ctol the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Se­curity Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to re­spect the inviolability of the borders and

sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridge­head for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate com­mitting aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neigh­boring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridge­head for such an invasion, and will also re­strain those who might contemplate com­mitting aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighbor­ing states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a cer­tain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay-say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidential use of them to the detriment of the United States is ex­cluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our repre­sentatives to New York, to the United Na­tions, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the correspond­ing instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

KENNEDY MESSAGE, OCTOBER 27, 1962 DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have read your

letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be ren­dered inoperable, under effective United Na­tional arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York in­structions that will permit them to work out this weekend-in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your repre­sentative-an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals-which seem generally ac­ceptable as I understand them-are as fol­lows:

< 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appro­priate United Nations observation and su­pervision; and undertake, with suitable safe­guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

(2) We, on our part, would agree-upon the establishment of adequate arrange­ments through the United Nations to

ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments-<a> to remove prompt­ly the quarantine measures now in effect and <b> to give assurances against an inva­sion of Cuba. I am confident that other na­tions of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise. If you will give your representative similar

instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these ar­rangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more gen­eral arrangement regarding "other arma­ments", as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concern­ing Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world se­curity, would surely lead to an intensifica­tion of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26th.

KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE, OCTOBER 28, 1962 I regard with respect and trust the state­

ment you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that no attack would be made on Cuba and that no invasion would take place-not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other coun­tries of the Western Hemisphere, as your same message pointed out. In view of this, the motives which prompted us to give aid of this nature to Cuba no longer prevail. Hence, we have instructed our officers <these means, as I have already reported to you, are in the hands of Soviet officers> to take the necessary measures to stop the construction of the facilities indicated, and to dismantle and return them to the Soviet Union. As I have already informed you in my letter of October 27, we are prepared to come to an agreement with you to enable representatives of the U.N. to verify the dis­mantling of these means.

In this way, on the basis of the assurances you have made and of our orders to disman­tle, there appear to exist all the necessary conditions for the elimination of the con­flict which has arisen.

KENNEDY MESSAGE, OCTOBER 28, 1962 I consider my letter to you of October

twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly car­ried out.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article from the Foreign Service Journal of July 1979 by Barton Bernstein entitled "Kennedy and Ending the Missile Crisis: Bombers, Inspection and the No Invasion Pledge" be printed in the RECORD.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3365 There being no objection, the article

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: KENNEDY AND ENDING THE MISSILE CRISIS:

BOMBERS, INSPECTION, AND THE No INVA­SION Pl.EDGE

<By Barton J. Bernstein> On Sunday morning, October 28, 1962,

Americans awakened to discover that the Cuban missile crisis seemed over: The Sovi­ets had agreed to remove their missiles, and the United States would both withdraw its quarantine and promise not to invade Cuba. Sticky issues soon emerged: Premier Fidel Castro refused to allow on-site inspection, a brief quarrel developed over removal of the Soviet bombers, the United States pushed for Soviet withdrawal of their 15,000-20,000 troops, and the administration refused to give a firm, public "no invasion" pledge.

In private negotiations, the two powers speedily agreed on inspection at sea to es­tablish withdrawal of the missiles. But for about three weeks, until November 20th, American and Soviet negotiators vigorously disputed other issues. On at least two occa­sions, American advisers flirted with bomb­ing the Soviet bombers <IL-28s> in Cuba if the Soviets did not promise to remove them speedily. And through much of this period, the president worried about what action he should take if the Soviets or Cubans shot down an American plane conducting surveil­lance of Cuba. Finally, on the 20th, the So­viets promised to withdraw their bombers, and the United States accepted aerial in­spection of them at sea. In the next few weeks, the two powers vigorously negotiated but never agreed on two remaining prob­lems-the "no invasion" pledge and contin­ued American surveillance of Cuba. By early January, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that they could not agree on these problems.

These two months of negotiations raise important, neglected questions: Why did President John F. Kennedy insist upon re­moval of the bombers, which had been a marginal issue during the missile crisis? Why did the Soviets concede on this matter? How close did Kennedy come to taking military action against the bombers? What were the roles of domestic and inter­national-political influences on his decision? Did the administration insist upon on-site inspection in order to avoid a firm "no-inva­sion" pledge?

FACING PROBLEMS

When Premier Nikita Khrushchev public­ly capitulated on October 28th, the presi­dent knew that he still had to confront two sets of problems-negotiating a settlement with the Soviets, and rebutting domestic critics who wanted to overthrow Castro and heap greater humiliation on the Soviet Union. How, they asked, could the president settle for so little when more was within his grasp? America's conventional and nuclear superiority, they argued, could achieve more victories.

On the 28th, Theodore Sorensen, the president's counsel and trusted adviser, sketched the administration's future re­sponse to these charges: The United States had used moderate force and diplomacy to compel the Soviets to retreat, but greater goals and additional threats would have es­tranged allies and might have provoked the Soviets to retaliate elsewhere. They might have grabbed Berlin and "blameCdl ... us." Put simply, rejoice in an important but shrewdly limited American victory but don't take risks that could provoke retaliation.

The administration was not guaranteeing that Castro would remain in power, Soren­sen stressed, but "only repeat[ingl assur­ances not to invade" and thus restoring the status quo. "CThel effect on Castro of having Cthel rug pulled out from under could be profound." The defeat might topple him from power. Other advisers pointed out that the widespread cut-off trade with Cuba and CIA pressures on his regime and economy could drive him from power.

At the morning meeting of the executive committee of the National Security <ExComm> on the 28th, Kennedy stressed, in the words of the minutes, that "many se­rious problems will be encountered in the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba." He wanted to secure the removal of the 42 IL-28 bombers "by making a private ap­proach to Khrushchev, Cbutl said we should not get 'hung up' on the bombers .... " He proposed a deft solution to accomplish his goal-including the bombers "in the Soviet definition of 'defensive weapons'" and of "weapons we call offensive." Since the Sovi­ets had agreed publicly on the 28th "to dis­mantle the arms which [Kennedy] de­scribed as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union," Kennedy was acting within the framework of their infor­mal public agreement.

When General Maxwell Taylor, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed the im­portance of returning to the status quo ante, Kennedy agreed that the goal was de­sirable but he was also uneasy. He seemed to fear that the bombers were not clearly covered by the Soviet message, and, accord­ing to the minutes, "he did not want to get into a position where we would appear to be going back on part of the deal. The IL-28 bombers were less important than the stra­tegic missiles. Admittedly, we would face the problem of Soviet armaments in Cuba if the Russians continued to build up their de­fense capacity there."

As Kennedy knew, he would find it politi­cally difficult to accede to the Soviet bomb­ers in Cuba, for, like the missiles, they were capable of offensive use and could bomb the United States. But, on the other hand, the bombers did not raise the same sense of peril domestically or internationally. They were slower and more familiar than missiles, so for psychological and military reasons they were not generaly alarming. Yet, to reduce political objections at home, he would find it desirable to remove the bomb­ers. And, unlike the missiles, the bombers could be operated by Cubans, and thus might be very dangerous if they fell into Castro's control and he was as unpredictable as many Americans feared.

Kennedy was seeking to achieve a settle­ment with the Soviets and to avoid creating unnecessary problems. For example, he briefly halted aerial surveillance of Cuba, and hoped that the United Nations would take over this task. For personal, political, and military reasons, he believed that he needed almost daily evidence on soviet activ­ity at the missile sites and air fields; he did not want to be caught unprepared. But he also did not want to provoke an incident Ca downed American plane> and then have to confront the painful problem of whether to retaliate militarily. And to expand its room for manuevering, the administration tried to block Cuban emigres from broadcasting in­flammatory statements. In the laconic words of the minutes, the USIA director "was authorized to discuss with the FCC some way of dealing with this problem

Cemigres buying radio time for angry com­ments] without appearing to be asking for radio censorship."

On Monday, the 29th, John J. McCloy, Kennedy's special representative, and Adlai Stevenson, ambassador to the UN, began ne­gotiations in New York with the Soviets to settle the crisis. They promptly agreed to a modification of the quarantine-in trou­bling cases, the International Red Cross, an not the United States, would inspect cargoes from the Soviet Union to Cuba to assure that offensive weapons were not being shipped. There was quick agreement that the missiles would be dismantled and sent back to the Soviet Union, but there were fears that Castro would bar on-site inspec­tion. They suspected that he would insist upon terms that the United States would reject-the return of Guantanamo, termina­tion of subversive activities against Cuba, and a halt to both aerial surveillance ("vio­lation of Cuban air space"> and the trade embargo. Since Kennedy still hoped to topple Castro and defined Castro's relation­ship with the Soviet Union as "non-negotia­ble," the administration would not yield to his terms. How, then, would verification be conducted? McCloy indicated that termina­tion of the quarantine rested on guaranteed verification of dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles, and he implied that on-site inspection was essential.

When UN Secretary General U Thant conferred with Castro, he learned that the Cuban leader would not permit inspection. It was a violation of Cuba's sovereignty, Castro argued, unless America also allowed inspection. His demands for a quid pro quo included inspection of possible emigre camps in the southern United States. Tem­porarily thwarted by Castro, on November 1st, Kennedy sought to increase the pres­sure on both the Cubans and the Soviets. He authorized low-level flights over some medium-range missile sites, where there was evidence of dismantling, and over airbases with IL-28s. "The major reason for overfly­ing the IL-28s," according to the minutes, "is to make clear that we consider these planes 'offensive weapons' to be removed by the Russians and, therefore, we must know whether they are being dismantled." If an American plane was shot down, "the presi­dent decided that no retaliation would take place today." <emphasis added> Then what? The evidence suggests no clear answer. The president did not want to attack the anti­aircraft weapons, for the could mean killing Soviets, and provoke more hostile responses. But he did want to maintain aerial surveil­lance and could not long tolerate attacks on the spy planes. His credibility would be im­paired, and domestic critics would skewer him.

Kennedy and his associates did not know, or even suspect, some very unsettling infor­mation: that the Cubans, not the Soviets, had shot down the American U-2 on Satur­day, October 27th. A few years after the crisis, American intelligence cracked a key code and then discovered that Cuban troops had briefly seized the surface-to-air <SAM> site and fired the deadly missile.

Had Kennedy realized this by the 29th, what would he have done? Halted surveil­lance lest the Cubans capture another SAM? Attacked the SAM sites and risked killing thousands of Soviets? Most likely, Kennedy would have tried to work out a speedy deal with the Soviets to gain the dis­mantling of the SAMs. The Soviets, anxious to avoid another clash with the United States or another reason to justify an Amer-

3366 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 ican attack on Cuba, would probably have conceded.

STRUGGLING WITH THE SOVIETS

The Soviets were deftly trying to block the aerial surveillance in order to assuage the embittered Castro and probably to fore­stall another Cuban effort to seize a SAM site. The Cubans warned UN officials that they could shoot down the planes, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Ku­zetzov informed McCloy that all the anti­aircraft equipment, including SAMs, was in Cuban control. American intelligence con­tended that the Soviets were bluffing, and the CIA concluded that "the SAM sites are under exclusive Soviet control."

To try to calm Castro and possibly to secure on-site inspection, Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba. The CIA forecast that the soviets were sincerely seeking a way out of the crisis, and thus they "might exert pressure on Castro" and offer him more financial aid, while trying to wring from Kennedy a pledge to halt Cuban exile attacks in addition to his promising not to invade Cuba. Roger Hilsman, the State Department's director of research and intelligence, offered a more cynical interpre­tation: The Soviets were exploiting Castro's opposition to inspection for their own pur­poses. They would dismantle the missiles, he forecast on the first, but not remove them from Cuba until they could wring more concessions. Like the CIA, Hilsman be­lieved the Soviets would ask for stronger guarantees for Castro.

Through this tense period, as the ExComm minutes make clear, Kennedy was maintaining close control over negotiations with the Soviets, the handling of press re­leases, and the conduct of aerial surveil­lance. Often meeting twice daily with the ExComm, he determined the number and focus of the surveillance flights, and even which pictures of sites and weapons would be distributed within the government and to the press. Fearing leaks and wanting to quiet fears in America, he circulated pic­tures showing the dismantling of the missile sites but not those of the assembled bomb­ers.

He kept insisting privately that the bomb­ers had to be removed and that the quaran­tine would continue until their withdrawal. Because Castro was blocking inspection in Cuba, Kennedy agreed that the United Na­tions or the Red Cross would inspect the ships removing the missiles. He "instructed Cthel USIA . . . to emphasize Castro's ob­struction to UN inspection and to measures necessary to restore peace to the Caribbean rather than to depict Castro as a Soviet puppet." By focusing attention on Castro, Kennedy presumably hoped to minimize the continuing Soviet-American disputes over removal of the bombers and when the quar­antine would end.

By the third, after only five days of nego­tiations, Kennedy was becoming more uneasy. The crisis might heat up again, he feared. Undoubtedly, he recalled the warn­ing, a few days before, from former Secre­tary of State Dean Acheson, who reminded Kennedy of the two years of wrangling over the Korean armistice, after a settlement seemed imminent. The president warned Stevenson and McCloy of Soviet perfidy: "CThisl is a course in which bargains are fudged, secrecy prevents verification, agree­ments are reinterpreted, and by one means or another the Soviet government seeks to sustain and advance the very policy which it has apparently undertaken to give up." The assembling of the bombers continued, and

he had some sketchy evidence that the Sovi­ets might be establishing a submarine base in Cuba. "In blunt summary," Kennedy told his negotiators, "we want no offensive weap­ons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28."

He was not prepared to admit what he had implied on the 28th-that the bombers might not be clearly included and thus that the United States should not "get hung up" on their removal. Nor did he acknowledge that he was adding a new requirement-no Soviet submarine base. What would he do if the Soviets publicly admitted that they were establishing such a base? Since he had justified the quarantine primarily on the grounds that the Soviets had clandestinely sought to alter the balance of power, and he had even tried to distinguish American mis­siles in Turkey from Soviet missiles in Cuba on the basis of open vs. clandestine deploy­ment, how could he justify opposing an openly acknowledged submarine base? Most Americans would not be troubled by the problem of justification, but the administra­tion might need international support if it chose actions reaching beyond words-a continued quarantine, attacks on Soviet subs, and destruction of the base. Undoubt­edly, Kennedy would have also argued, as he did in distinguishing the missiles in Turkey from those in Cuba, that American weapons were "defensive" and Soviet weap­ons "offensive". But such claims, rooted in self-righteousness, would not have won much international support.

Fearing that negotiations were stalemat­ed, Kennedy cabled Khrushchev on the sixth to stress that the bombers must be re­moved and that anti-aircraft weapons, even in the hands of Cubans, must not interfere with American surveillance. He emphasized that "we attach the greatest importance to the personal assurance you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba." <Though much of their correspond­ence remains classified, Khrushchev had probably implied that he would not create such bases, and Kennedy was converting the implication into a firm promise.) American relations with Cuba could not improve, Ken­nedy stated, until the Soviets withdrew their troops and offensive weapons. It was a temperate but firm message, which avoided threats but stressed that the solution of these problems was essential to the restora­tion of confidence and the broader negotia­tions <on a test ban and disarmament> that Khrushchev wanted.

By November 8th, with the issue of the bombers still unresolved, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, a Republican, foresaw two alternatives, as Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson noted: "Hit planes or strengthen the quarantine." The scattered declassified materials make clear that the president was not about to launch an attack but was considering a stronger quarantine, which would bar petroleum products. He was also resisting the arguments of some ad­visers, including his negotiators, to let Khrushchev "wiggle off the hook" and leave the bombers in Cuba. That was unac­ceptable for reasons of domestic politics and probably of pride.

At the same time, Kennedy was trying to reduce domestic fears about Soviet weapons in Cuba and thus to deflate the political pressures on the administration. It was not a time for candor, he apparently concluded. So the administration did admit publicly that the procedures for verifying the with­drawal of the missiles had led to confusion.

One Soviet ship that was supposed to "have carried two missiles had none and another had one more than Cthel number forwarded by the Soviets," an administration member complained privately. The United States "observed Conly] 38 of 42 missiles [that thel Soviets had reported," he noted.

Even after the Soviet shipment of the mis­siles from Cuba on the ninth and the widely publicized pictures of their removal, rumors continued that the Soviets were hiding addi­tional missiles in Cuba. To kill these rumors, Kennedy directed CIA director John McCone to have the agency check on every emigre report on missiles in Cuba, to ask for the source of information, and to refute the charge in the press if the "refu­gee is unable to give any significant substan­tiating information."

On the 13th, the ExComm again discussed strategy for forcing the Soviets to remove the bombers: a private message to Khru­shchev threatening a stiffer quarantine, and OAS and UN action dramatizing the "in­completeness of Soviet compliance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding" and also exhorting Cuba to cooperate. Apprais­ing this strategy, U. Alexis Johnson, the deputy under secretary of state, acknowl­edged that "it would be difficult to mobilize opinion in the UN to exert pressure on the USSR to get the IL-28s out of Cuba since Communist arguments regarding their obso­lete character, limited range, and the appar­ent disequilibrium between such weapons and our own, would make an impact on a good many countries. [Many] members of the UN will adopt the view that the Soviets have acted in good faith and have fulfilled, to the degree possible, their part of the bar­gain."

WINNING REMOVAL OF THE BOMBERS

During the next three days, the two powers failed to break the stalemate but they did narrow their differences. The Sovi­ets said they would withdraw their bombers, but first they wanted certain United States acts-termination of the blockade and an­nouncement of the "no invasion" pledge. "Our view," explained McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security, "is that the first step must be a Soviet order to remove Cthe bombers] in 30 days," and then the United States would lift the blockade. He implied that a pledge required on-site in­spection, and Castro has barred such inspec­tion. In addition, Bundy stressed, the Sovi­ets had refused to promise that they would not reintroduce offensive weapons in Cuba. "We may soon find ourselves back in a posi­tion of increasing tension," the administra­tion warned the Soviets.

The Joint Chiefs, as General Maxwell Taylor told Kennedy, were delighted that he was insisting on removal of the bombers. But they hoped that the Soviets would reject Kennedy's offer to lift the blockade in return for Khrushchev's promise to remove the bombers soon. The chiefs wanted to use the quarantine to secure more concessions-withdraw! of Soviet tech­nicians and soldiers, and acceptance of on­site inspection. They left unclear how the Soviets could force Castro to allow inspec­tion, and perhaps they would not have been unhappy if the Soviets failed to meet their terms. They proposed an expanded quaran­tine to include petroleum products. "If the expanded quarantine did not succeed in ob­taining withdrawal of the IL-28s, we should be prepared to take them out by air attack," the chiefs concluded.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3367 The Soviets continued to insist that the

bombers would be withdrawn as part of a final solution, in which the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba, support covert activities against Castro, or conduct air surveillance. To put pressure on the So­viets, McCloy informed them on November 18th that Kennedy was scheduling a press conference on the 20th, at 6 p.m., and that the Soviets had to promise before then to withdraw the bombers. There is no evidence that McCloy communicated a direct threat, but the early evening press conference scheduled at such an unusual time, was probably designed to remind the Soviets of Kennedy's early evening speech of October 22nd, when he had surprised the Soviets by declaring a quarantine.

To put additional pressure on the Soviets and to prepare the way for military action, the State Department notified OAS and NATO allies that the Soviets had not agreed to withdraw the bombers and that Castro was threatening to attack American surveil­lance planes. "Situation is fluid and may take one of several courses [including] the reestablishment of the quarantine and its extension to [petroleum products]," the State Department warned. In a special mes­sage to Harold Macmillan, Konrad Adenau­er, and Charles de Gaulle, Kennedy stated, "we have to face the fact that a second backdown for Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concen­trating any action we take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Sovi­ets say the IL-28s are still under their con­trol, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least part of our pressure against direct Soviet inter­ests."

As Under Secretary Johnson had pointed out earlier, many nations would not support American demands for withdrawal of the planes. Even an expansion of the quaran­tine would seem extreme. Military action would provoke fear and antagonism among most allies. Even though the chiefs and pos­sibly Secretary Dillon were ready to move beyond an expanded quarantine to bomb the planes, Kennedy and others were far more cautious. They hoped to succeed through hard bargaining and minor threats. If such threats had failed, would the presi­dent have done more? Perhaps he would have warned the Soviets that America might increase activities against Castro, but it is unlikely that Kennedy would have bombed the planes. Such action would have frightened allies, outraged neutrals, and un­nerved many Americans.

The Soviets, as they had indicated in ear­lier negotiations, were not hoping to keep the bombers in Cuba. Perhaps they, too, feared that Castro might seize these weap­ons and thus provoke a crisis that would drag the Soviets into another confrontation with America. Or possibly dominant forces in the Kremlin had simply concluded that Kennedy would not accede to the mainte­nance of Soviet bombers in Cuba. For about ten days, Soviet negotiators had tried to wring concessions from the United States in return for withdrawal of the bombers. But the administration had refused to offer more than the termination of the quaran­tine. That would not be sufficient to as­suage Castro or to puncture the charges of the Chinese, who accused the Soviets of cowardly retreating and abandoning Cuba. Possibly the announcement of the evening press conference, with the implication of such drastic American action, alarmed the

89--059 0-85-22 (Pt. 3)

Soviets. They did not want to deal with an­other dramatic crisis after having been hu­miliated.

On Tuesday, the 20th, the Soviets capitu­lated. A few hours before the press confer­ence, Kennedy received a message <still clas­sified) from Khrushchev that he had or­dered withdrawal of the bombers in thirty days and that he would also remove some of the Soviet troops. At his evening press con­ference, the president announced the Soviet promises, implied that aerial surveillance of Cuba would continue, and avoided giving a no-invasion pledge. <In an earlier draft, pre­pared by Sorensen, the refusal of the pledge had been explicit: "In the absence of neces­sary safeguards, there is no occasion for formal assurances on the subject of inva­sion.") Having been thwarted by Castro, Kennedy probably feared that a pledge, in the absence of guaranteed inspection, would have enraged many Americans. And since he was reluctant to tie his hands permanently, he was undoubtedly quite pleased that he could avoid granting such a promise. He had not initially stipulated a condition <on-site inspection> in order to avoid the pledge, but evidence had accumulated by mid-November that his condition would have that conse­quence. He clung to it when he knew that an embittered and outraged Castro was not prepared to yield.

Bundy suggested that the President might meet some of the Soviet needs by issuing a vague statement, like his announcment of the 20th, which "the Soviets can readily in­terpret as promised assurances against inva­sion." He noted that Khrushchev had so construed the earlier statement. "You should emphasize," Bundy counseled Ken­nedy, "that there is in fact no present danger of invasion of Cuba, but that we cannot be put in position of giving blanket guarantees to a man who has refused to co­operate with UN to fulfill [Soviet-Ameri­can] understanding of October 27 and 28."

Kennedy followed Bundy's strategy, and the Soviets had to settle reluctantly for a presidential statement reaffirming that "there will be peace in the Caribbean ... if Cuba is not used for the export of aggres­sive Communist purposes." America had no "intent to launch a military invasion of the island," the president said. Publicly, Khru­shchev treated Kennedy's statement as a firm pledge and told the Supreme Soviet that he would take "appropriate action" if America broke its promise. Despite Soviet objections, Kennedy would not renounce America's right to conduct aerial surveil­lance of Cuba to guard against reintroduc­tion of offensive weapons. Because the Sovi­ets were unhappy about these positions, the two great powers were unable to achieve a complete settlement. As a result, in early January, after weeks of haggling, they joint­ly informed the UN that some issues re­mained unresolved.

CONCLUSIONS

Three weeks of difficult negotiations, fol­lowed by a few weeks of less anxious negoti­ations, had ended the crisis. The Soviets had gained a very weak, carefully hedged, "no invasion" pledge. And the administration did not feel barred from continuing covert activities to overthrow the Castro govern­ment. The American government had gained removal of all offensive weapons and some Soviet soldiers, and a Soviet promise not to reintroduce the weapons. Cuba, while asserting her sovereignty by resisting in­spection, had been both an impediment and a pawn in the negotiations.

Kennedy had carefully guided the negoti­ations to settle the crisis. Rejecting the counsel of those who would have liked an attack on Cuba, he had bargained shrewdly and avoided direct threats. While delighted by his dramatic victory in forcing the Sovi­ets to remove their "offensive" missiles, he had sought to avoid a public crisis over the bombers. That effort had required that he manage the news by blocking the emigre groups and by concealing troubling evidence that the government had not observed the removal of all 42 missiles from Cuba.

By January, when the two great powers submitted their report to the UN, the rumors in America about missiles in Cuba were dying out. In fact, the faith in the president and his ability to protect Ameri­can interests in dealing with the Soviets was so great t·hat he was soon able to secure American approval of a limited test-ban treaty.

Mr. SYMMS. In addition, I also have a Rowland Evans and Robert Novak article from the Washington Post of February 3, 1982, entitled "The Bears In Cuba." It deals with the subject of the Soviet TU-95 Bear, heavy, inter­continental bombers that have been brought into Cuba and are now sup­porting Castro's air force. As Evans and Novak point out, the SALT II Treaty, in a Common Understanding, defines all variants of the Soviet TU-95 Bear as "heavy bombers." The Soviet IL-28 Beagle Medium bombers were required to be removed from Cuba because they were offensive weapons. A heavy bomber should be even more clearly classed as an offen­sive weapon. As Evans and Novak sug­gest, the United States is still unilater­ally complying with the unratified SALT II treaty, and hence the United States apparently still accepts the Common Understanding defining all TU-95 variants as heavy bombers. As Evans and Novak imply, the United States may therefore have to choose between honoring an inconvenient def­inition in the SALT II treaty, or accus­ing the Soviets of violating the Kenne­dy-Khrushchev and McCloy-Kuznet­sov agreements. One solution to the problem could be to amend the SALT II treaty, or to renounce it.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 3, 19821 THE BEARS IN CUBA

<By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak> An early warning signal has been flashed

to President Reagan that defense-oriented senators, many of them solid Reaganites, will break their self-imposed silence and demand decisive U.S. action against the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, using a politi­cal backdrop that could embarrass the presi­dent.

That backdrop is the drama of President John F. Kennedy's spectacular success in backing down the Soviet Union in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. What gives piquancy to the demand for action is the new disclosure that Cuban airfields now operate as a base for the Soviet TU95 heavy bomber called

3368 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 the Bear-far superior to the IL28 that Kennedy insisted be withdrawn.

Despite the rising demand for action by an administration that has been talking tough on Cuba and the Caribbean for a full year, but carrying a small stick, the consen­sus within Reagan's national security bu­reaucracy was described to us this way: "We all agree the Soviets are developing a fan­tastic strategic opportunity." But as for the U.S. counteraction, well, let's see what hap­pens.

Twenty years ago, when the United States still held an unequivocal military margin over the Soviets, Kennedy extended the missile crisis beyond mere Soviet agreement to pull out the medium-range missiles sur­reptitiously unloaded on Cuban wharfs. He insisted, also, on the withdrawal of the Cuban-based IL28s.

Congressional agitation has been rising for months over U.S. intelligence reports that Soviet weapons have been piling up in Fidel Castro's Cuba. But the latest intelli­gence added a new dimension: Cuban-based TU95s, the aircraft classified in the SALT II treaty as the primary Soviet heavy bomber, have been engaged in reconnaissance flights against U.S. naval vessels along the Atlantic Coast for the first time. The Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee that oversees Latin America and the Caribbean has asked State Department officials to give it details and documents of the 1962 agreements <that re­solved the missile crisis) between John J. McCloy, representing the United States, and Vasily Kuznetsov, then a high-ranking offi­cial in the Soviet Foreign Office.

The subcommittee, headed by Sen. Jesse Helms, means business, but the State De­partment is exhibiting signs of wariness. Senate insiders say the administration does not want to reveal the fine print of the writ­ten and oral undertakings by the Soviets in the so-called "McCloy-Kuznetsov agree­ments." A closed-door session scheduled for this week was postponed for at least an­other week.

Rising Senate agitation is based on the suspicion, now nearing conviction, that the McCloy-Kuznetsov agreements have been tom to shreds by Moscow. The essence of those agreements was an embargo on "of­fensive" weapons in Cuba that could be used either against the United States or in Cuban political manipulations against Central America or elsewhere in the Caribbean.

Assuming the accuracy of American intel­ligence, the presence of Soviet Bear bomb­ers on any one of nine different airfields equipped to handle them amounts to a quantum Jump in proliferation of more am­biguous Soviet weapons. Crates recently un­loaded from Soviet vessels are acknowledged to contain MiG23s, a late-model Soviet fighter that has been present in Cuba for many months. Some specialists, however, believe they may contain the bomber ver­sion of the MiG23, known as the MiG27, which would also appear to be a clear viola­tion of the 1962 agreement.

Administration officials correctly fear that the coming Senate probe points to far more difficulties for the president than merely identifying Castro's most recent Soviet acquisitions. The true target is the president's curious lassitude in adopting a consistent policy to deal with Cuba's central role in spreading Marxist revolution or civil war throughout Central America.

What the senators are after is candid, public recitation of the extent and signifi­cance of the Soviet arms shipments, their use by Cuba and what the Reagan adminis-

tration is going to do about it. It may be a lot more than they get.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I also request that the National Security Record of the Heritage Foundation published last summer entitled "Re­moving the Soviet Influence From Cuba" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMOVING SOVIET INFLUENCE FROM CUBA

The necessity of formulating a new strate­gy toward Cuba has been underscored by the Reagan Administration's emphasis on the central role played by the Caribbean region in American security. This strategy must effectively counter Fidel Castro's ex­panding position as the principal supporter of radical groups in the area, and also thwart Soviet exploitation of Cuba as a mili­tary surrogate in the Third World. Castro has been free to pursue his ambition of spearheading revolution in Africa and Latin America with minimal opposition from the United States. Both the passive policy of economically isolating Cuba and the active promotion of the normalization of relations have proved inadequate in checking Cuba's active involvement in Soviet expansionism. More direct and positive policies must be de­veloped to challenge Cuban militarism and adventurism, and ultimately to remove Soviet influence from Cuba.

IMPACT OF COMMUNISM

Although Castro came to power promising redistribution of national wealth to the lower classes, his actions have impoverished the entire country. He destroyed a flourish­ing economy based on free enterprise, and alienated the technical and managerial sec­tors, who comprise a large portion of the refugees over the past two decades. Many who were not able to escape are dead or in prison. Primary support for the regime had come from both wealthy classes opposed to corruption and political restraints under Ba­tista, and the rural poor, who initially re­ceived some marginal benefits from Castro's rule. But rather than further open the po­litical process in Cuba, Castro completely closed it, and all segments of society have suffered reductions in living standards. The urban population, especially in Havana, has opposed Castro since his rise to power. Cuba today is an economic disaster.

Because of the combination of Castro's emphasis on the international role of Cuba and the failure of the Communist system to provide incentives for production, the econ­omy has actually retrogressed. The annual Soviet subsidy of more than three billion dollars in non-military aid does not even maintain normal levels of subsistence. As early as 1965 the per capita ration of food had dropped to far below the actual con­sumption before the Castro regime took power. Official statistics have not been re­leased since then, although in 1979 at a De­cember meeting of the National People's As­sembly Castro stated "the year 1979 was one of the worst years" in terms of agricultural production and food supplies. In 1957 Cuba's per capita Gross National Product ranked fourth in the Americas, but after a decade of "revolutionary development" it had dropped to eleventh, and has since fallen further.

By 1970 Fidel Castro had abandoned all hope of establishing an independent econo­my and accepted the Soviet Union as a per­manent protector and provider. The price of

Soviet aid is the use of Cubans around the world in support of Soviet political and mili­tary designs. As a result most aspects of Cuban life have become subordinated to the military, especially as a result of mandatory military training and the emphasis on armed conflict as the major defense of the revolution, as illustrated in Chart 1 below. As this often leads to duty in an African ad­venture, avoidance of the draft has become more and more of a problem in Cuba. Taken together with the other social and economic factors, this lucidly explains the flight of over a million Cubans since 1959-over 10 percent of the population.

CHART I-SOLDIER TO CIVILIAN RATIO

GNP- 1976 Soldier/ Active duty Population (millions of civilian U.S.dollars) ratio' military

Cuba ......................... 9,720,000 8,120 79 189,000 Chile .................. ........ 10.742,000 10,980 145 88,000 Peru .......................... 16,832,000 12,610 276 95,000 Brazil ........................ 113,859,000 125,570 421 281.000 Guatemala ................. 6,531,000 4,070 553 15,000 Mexico ... ....... .. ......... 65,487,000 67,640 722 107,000

1 Number of civilians per soldier.

This extraordinary mass exodus graphi­cally contrasts the nature of the tyranny in Cuba from that of any other country in Latin America. Despite varying degrees of dictatorial rule in the hemisphere, only Cuba has established a totalitarian regime which rigidly regulates or supervises all as­pects of society. As the annual State De­partment survey on human rights reports:

"Cuba is a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist state. Under the 1976 constitution, the gov­ernment may restrict any right or freedom when exercised in opposition to the state. All political, economic, social, and cultural activities are under the close control of the communist party."

This report notes that repression has in­creased since a new penal code went into effect on November l, 1979, which lists a wide range of "crimes" which threaten the "security of the state." This was followed by general unrest and the occupation of the Peruvian Embassy by over ten thousand dis­contented Cubans. Eventually the govern­ment encouraged 125,000 people to flee the country.

A SOVIET SUBCONTRACTOR

Soviet use of Cuba as a proxy has sparked heated debate as to what extent Castro ini­tiates Cuba's foreign policy and military moves. Economic dependence and Soviet control of Cuba's security forces preclude any Cuban action not in accord with Rus­sian designs. Regardless of Castro's personal objectives or the interests of the Cuban people, his forces are serving the interests of the Soviet Union. In order for Castro to justify the enormous cost of these overseas adventures and Cuba's subservience to Soviet interests, the cause of "international­ism" and "revolutionary solidarity" ·is con­tinually cited. Castro has often stated that only after the final defeat of capitalism will Cuba achieve complete independence, ra­tionalizing the global involvement of Cuban troops as being in the national interest. The degree of this involvement is staggering for a country of Cuba's size and population. Some examples from the past decade in­clude:

Syria: During the October 1973 Yorn Kippur War, five hundred "tanquistas" <ar­mored corps troops) were airlifted to Syria to operate Soviet-supplied tanks. This par-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3369 ticipation, in view of Cuba's total lack of ties to the area, was presumably under Soviet orders, and certainly made possible by Soviet transport.

Angola: After the Portuguese withdrawal in November 1975, Soviet military equip­ment and Cuban troops began to arrive in large numbers. At the height of the inter­vention 20,000 Cuban troops and hundreds of East German security advisors and Soviet technicians sustained the MPLA. This suc­cess in Angola bolstered Castro's personal prestige and at the same time reestablished his position as a major leader of the nona­ligned movement. Over 10,000 Cuban troops continue to protect the MPLA against popu­lar nationalist movements in Angola.

Zaire: Cuban forces trained and armed the so-called Congolese African Liberation Front, which invaded Zaire in 1977 and 1978. Cuban officers led the former Katan­gan gendarmes at least as far as the Zaire border. Only the rapid assistance provided to Zaire by Morocco and France prevented an eastward expansion of Soviet influence in southern Africa.

Ethiopia: Cuban advisors appeared in Ethiopia soon after a Marxist coup d'etat overthrew the government of Haile Selassie, while all eastern-bloc aid was withdrawn from the Eritrean and ethnic Somali inde­pendence movements, although aid had been supplied for years. When in spite of this the insurgencies threatened to end Ethiopian rule in Eritrea and the Ogaden, a massive Soviet airlift of material and an es­timated 16,000 Cuban troops reversed the situation. By March 1978 the last field oppo­sition to the Cuban and Ethiopian forces had been defeated.

Nicaragua: Cuba played a vital role in training and supporting the guerrilla move­ment in this country and throughout Latin America. Indeed, as the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas Enders points out, in most cases Castro ac­tually created a central leadership for these movements:

"That is where Cuba came in: One by one-first Nicaragua, then El Salvador, then Guatemala, now Colombia-Cuba brought the leaders of the different factions togeth­er. Often Castro personally worked out their differences in long negotiating ses­sions. He forged unified directorates, coun­seled the formation of broader fronts, to manipulate legitimate opposition groups and unleashed a global propaganda cam­paign.''

Castro continues to exercise considerable influence over events in Nicaragua. There are two to three thousand Cubans currently in the country, including over 800 security advisors and troops, exercising far more in­fluence than the 48 American military advi­sors in El Salvador.

Colombia: After the capture of a number of terrorist M-19 leaders in June 1981, Co­lombian intelligence learned that they were trained and supplied with Soviet arms by Cuba. The Colombian government hopes that this revelation will discredit the M-19 leadership and bolster the government's am­nesty offer. Colombia has broken diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Guatemala: In the midst of growing vio­lence, American intelligence reports growing Cuban involvement in training and equip­ping guerrilla groups operating against the government forces. Equipment traced to Cuba and Nicaragua has been captured-un­confirmed sources report Guatemalan cap­ture of a Cuban soldier.

Chart 2: Advanced Soviet Weaponry in Cuba In Cuban Service: 2 W and F Class Submarines: 6000-9000

miles range. 6 Kronstadt Patrol Craft: 3500 miles

range. 10 Osa Fast Attack Craft: 450 miles range. 12 P-6 Torpedo Boats: 400 miles range. 12 P-4 Torpedo Boats: 400 miles range. 80 MiG-21 Close Support Aircraft: 683

miles range. 10 MiG-23 Interceptors: 600 miles range. 48 MiG-23 and 27 Fighter-bombers: 600-

1500 miles range. Soviet Forces Frequently in Cuba: Tu-95 "Bear-D'': 7800 miles range. Golf Ballistic Missile Submarines: 9000

miles range. Echo Cruise Missile Submarines: Nuclear

powered. Kresta II Guided Missile Cruiser: 9000

miles range. In each case Cuba's role has been contrary

to the interests of regional peace and stabili­ty, and also detrimental to the national se­curity interests of the United States. The presence of Soviet military forces in Cuba; a submarine base at Cienfuegos; Soviet pilots flying advanced tactical bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons; and the famous Soviet brigade, which is configured in the same manner as other Soviet units guarding nuclear munition dumps in Eastern Europe, continue to have potentially adverse conse­quences for American security.

AMERICAN POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF CUBA

No nation so firmly entrenched in the Soviet orbit for as long as Cuba has ever ex­tricated itself from Moscow's grip. The de­fection of Cuba from the Soviet camp would have a great dual impact: < 1 > the Soviet Union would have to focus its attention on its other satellites to prevent their following suit, turning it away from overseas expan­sion; and <2> the removal of Cuba as a base for Communists expansion in the Western hemisphere would weaken radical revolu­tionary movements that threaten Latin America's movement toward development and democracy.

Enormous discontent exists in Cuba, as was demonstrated by the Mariel exodus. The people of Cuba may now be very recep­tive to a change of government that would improve their quality of life. But the possi­bility that Cuba can expel Castro's Soviet patrons by popular uprising is unlikely at the present. Castro remains an extraordi­narily effective dictator, well able to manip­ulate the Cuban population, and his large Soviet directed internal security apparatus is fully capable of repressing dissent.

The Carter Administration initially advo­cated normalization of relations with Cuba. In its view, Castroism would be moderated by the demands for increased personal free­dom made by Cubans after trade, travel, and freer contact with the exile community in America opened their horizons. In 1977 interest sections were established in Wash­ington and Havana, but Carter intentions to upgrade them to embassies were halted by the escalation of Cuban activities overseas. Advocates of this policy fail to explain why Castro would be interested in promoting a process that would result in a weakening of internal control, or why the Soviet Union would grant its approval. In fact, Cuba has directly or indirectly spurned U.S. efforts to improve relations.

Diametrically opposed to this view is the advocacy of direct U.S. intervention. In re­sponse to new Cuban operations overseas the United States could take direct military

action against Cuba, ranging from a block­ade to invasion. Although this is probably the most effective option for removing Soviet influence from Cuba available to the United States, such an option raises numer­ous concerns for reasons which include:

Misperception of the Soviet role in Cuba. Many American leaders continue to perceive Castro as being essentially independent of the Soviet Union in his foreign policy initia­tives. Therefore they continue to hope that in spite of past failures it will be possible to reach an accommodation with Castro.

Fear of Latin American reaction. The image of America as an imperialist power re­mains an integral element of leftist politics in Latin America. Many Latin Americans admire Castro, in spite of disagreements with his policies, for continually humiliat­ing the United States for a generation. How­ever, most of these Latin Americans have always opposed American policy uncritical­ly. Other groups, including the leaders of many of the most important Latin Ameri­can nations, would either overtly or quietly support actions to remove Castro from power.

Fear of Soviet reaction. There is a very real possibility that the Soviet Union would react to the loss of Cuba by striking else­where in the world. Before the signing of the Four Power Treaty in 1971 the Soviet Union had repeatedly threatened to seize West Berlin if the United States intervened in Cuba. Such a reaction could still take place against Berlin or in the Middle East, exploiting the concentration of American troops close to home. Because of this, many Americans have suggested the toppling of the Castro regime in response to a Soviet in­vasion of Poland, when the Soviet Union would be too preoccupied to react.

Fear of unacceptably high losses. An action by the American military could well be costly in terms of both men and materiel. In light of Castro's continual harping of the threat from America and the failure of the United States to explain through radio broadcast its opposition to the Communist regime, the intervention could possibly rally the Cuban people to Fidel for a time. Castro commands an army of 190,000 regular troops and a militia of nearly half a million. An application of American force must be decisive in the early part of a conflict to avoid a prolonged involvement.

Fear of direct conflict with the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union has five thou­sand troops in Cuba, the disposition of these Russian forces would be an important con­sideration in the event of direct interven­tion. There status would have to be deter­mined and if possible, arrangments made for their return to the USSR. In any movement that toppled the Castro regime the Soviets should be allowed to evacuate their forces as the United States did at the fall of South Vietnam: safely, but with humiliation.

NEW POLICY GUIDELINES

Unless as a result of Soviet or Cuban prov­ocation a consensus is reached to intervene directly, the Reagan Administration will be confined to indirect means of opposing Soviet influence in Cuba. At present the question of which means are appropriate is under review. Several steps have already been taken which indicate an increased re­solve to deal with the Cuban problem. These include a Caribbean economic plan, increased military and economic aid to El Salvador, and a cut-off of aid to Nicaragua. But these steps are essentially counter-

3370 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 measures to Cuban efforts to destabilize Caribbean nations.

More active measures can be taken to con­tain Cuban military operations and at the same time arouse the discontent of the Cuban people with their arduous life under Communism and loss of sovereignty to the Soviet Union. These include:

Increased materiel and financial assist­ance to governments and movements direct­ly resisting the Cubans, including Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, and the Angolan UNIT A movement, and the various nation­alist movements in Ethiopia.

Direct action against Cuban forces over­seas through covert or overt actions. This could involve sabotage, air support for free­dom fighters, and direct interdiction of Cuban resupply and relief forces by means of a naval quarantine.

Support of desertion of Cuban troops from their overseas military units and de­struction of their morale by the use of radio and other propaganda mechanisms.

Direct action by the State Department to once again discourage Americans from visit­ing Cuba, possibly prohibiting such travel completely without State Department ap­proval.

Active diplomatic efforts to encourage those countries currently maintaining close ties with Cuba to downgrade their relations.

Persistent efforts to convince the Organi­zation of American States and the United Nations to seek sanctions against Cuba for its support of global terrorism and for vio­lating the basic human rights of its people.

Cooperation from our allies and the other Latin American nations to boycott the Cuban economy, so that the Soviet Union must expend even greater efforts to main­tain the Communist regime. Revenue from tourism and trade should be curtailed to the greatest degree possible.

Direct radio broadcasts to Cuba, independ­ent of the Voice of America, should be in­creased to 24-hour service. The format of these broadcasts should differ strongly from Voice of America, stressing instead internal news and the losses involved in the African adventures.

Similarly, Cuban nationals in the United States should also be encouraged to broad­cast from their own stations and not be har­assed by U.S. FCC officials as in the past.

The American people should be educated as to the extent of Soviet control of Cuba, and the threat this poses to the United States.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the United States should pursue a cautious policy of isolating Castro's regime, fomenting discontent on his island, and re­acting vigorously to any attempt he makes to intervene in the affairs of other nations. Such a policy would nullify the immediate impact of Havana on world events, and pos­sibly set into motion forces in Cuba that will lead to the demise of the Castro regime.

But the determining fact in formulating a policy to remove Soviet influence from Cuba must be the extent to which the United States feels Cuba poses a threat to itself and its neighbors, and the price it is willing to pay to remove this threat. If the Ameri­can people believe that Soviet influence ninety miles from their shores is unaccept­able, and that the growing role of Cuba as a nursery for infant revolutions is a threat far too great to tolerate, then the United States will bring the necessary pressure to bear on Castro to end his oppressive rule and return Cuba to its place as a peaceful member of the Caribbean community.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I think what this means is that we in Con­gress and the United States as a nation, whether governed by Republi­cans or Democrats have a vested inter­est in our security and what is going on with our neighbors to the south. I would say there are many of my con­stituents, and, I am sure, of the distin­guished Presiding Officer's constitu­ents who talk with us about immigra­tion and illegal immigrants coming into this country. I only say that if we fail at this point to restrain the Soviet­Cuban aggression, and fail to do what­ever is necessary to defeat it, we have not seen anything yet in terms of an immigration problem in this country because, once the revolution starts in Mexico, it will not have to be success­ful. If revolution just starts with our neighbors to the south, in Mexico, we shall have immigration problems across that 2,100-mile border that one has not imagined up to this time.

There is a 2,100-mile border virtually unguarded and untended between our­selves and our friends in Mexico to the south. All it will take is for the United States to stand idly by and allow the Marxist-Lenin revolutions to be suc­cessful in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala. Then it will start in the oilfield regions in Mexico. If it ever starts, people will start fleeing from Mexico into the United States.

I believe it may come to pass in a very short time that we shall have an immigration problem that will be really unimaginable.

I often hear, Mr. President, and I would say in the last 10 days, I spent a good share of that time in my home State, Idaho, talking with people, having town meetings and so forth. I heard everyone saying we cannot have another Vietnam. I tell them they are quite right, we cannot suffer another def eat as we did in Vietnam. Because the Communist victory in Vietnam was a gross violation of human rights. It is very interesting to me to hear the hue and cry one hears from particular quarters, especially from part of the great national news media, about al­leged human rights violations in El Salvador by the beseiged government. Very rarely do we hear anything about the Communist human rights viola­tions in Southeast Asia today, where 2 million Cambodians were murdered or where North Vietnamese troops are il­legally using mycotoxins on the people in Laos and Cambodia, where hun­dreds of thousands of innocent, free­dom loving people are trying to escape South Vietnam in leaky boats.

I implore this body to accept this joint resolution in view of the fact that we cannot afford another def eat like Vietnam, not in our own back yard, because to accept what hap­pened in Vietnam in the Americas will surely mean the ultimate def eat of the

United States. I think that is a very se­rious problem. I hope that my col­leagues will accept this joint resolu­tion because it merely reaffirms what the law of the land is, as it was passed in 1962. I think that it only points out the fact that we have probably not successfully followed that policy of re­sisting Soviet-Cuba aggression that passed Congress in the 1960's, during the sixties or the seventies. It never is too early to start doing what is right. I implore my colleagues to join me in passage of this resolution.

I yield back the floor, Mr. President. If there are no other Senators on the floor who wish time, I suggest the ab­sence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

By Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. LONG, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. ZORINSKY, Mr. LEVIN, Mrs. HAWKINS, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. HA­YAKAWA, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. SASSER, Mr. TSONGAS, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. BUR­DICK, and Mr. PERCY):

S.J. Res. 159. Joint resolution enti­tled the "White House Conference on Productivity Act"; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON PRODUCTIVITY ACT

•Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, today I am introducing, on behalf of Senator LoNG and myself, a bill calling on the President to convene a White House Conference on Productivity.

America today is in the midst of a productivity crisis. We have seen our productivity growth rates decline with the passage of time and have wit­nessed a loss of markets and sales op­portunities throughout the world to countries whose efficiency surpasses ours. Loss of markets means loss of jobs and a declining standard of living for all Americans.

During the 1950's and the first half of the 1960's, U.S. productivity growth averaged more than 3 percent per year; by 1965, however, it had begun to decline. From the midsixties until 1973, growth was only 2.3 percent per year, and after 1973, 2.3 percent dropped to 1 percent. In 1978, 1979, and 1980, we actually saw a decline in productivity; and the United States, once a world leader in innovation, effi­ciency and economies of scale, began losing precious ground to tough for­eign competitors.

While the figures for 1981 were, on the whole, better than those in 1980, the fourth quarter showed a 6.5-per­cent drop in output per hour of all

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3371 persons. That was the biggest drop, on an annual basis, since World War II.

Productivity declines affect each and every one of us. The Department of Commerce and the American Produc­tivity Center estimate that if we had maintained our earlier growth rates, the average American household would have $5,500 more in real income this year. Moreover, without corre­sponding productivity improvements, wage increases merely fuel inflation, leaving us with higher prices and illu­sory profits.

Internationally, our productivity doldrums seriously impair our ability to compete in world markets. From 1973 to 1979, U.S. output per hour in­creased less than 1.5 percent per year. In Japan, by contrast, output in­creased nearly 7 percent per year. West Germany topped 5 percent and Belgium 6 percent. Productivity slow­downs at home are thus being met by productivity leaps abroad.

Such comparisons are more than academic exercises. It is no coinci­dence that, as our productivity growth rates have declined, our share of world markets has followed suit. While our share of the world market for manu­factured goods was nearly 20 percent in 1960, we were supplying less than 13 percent of that market by 1980. Much of this market share has been seized by more productive firms in Japan and the newly industrializing countries around the rim of Asia.

As members of a global system U.S. producers must compete with foreign producers everywhere; and as unit costs of production overseas decline relative to U.S. costs, foreign goods become cheaper and we lose markets and job opportunities.

These competitive problems affect our Nation's basic industries. U.S. pro­ducers of carbon steel, for example, unable to keep pace with productivity improvements in Japan, have seen that country gobble up an increasing share of the U.S. market. Even my own State of Delaware has suffered from international pressure. Dela­ware's Chrysler and General Motors auto and truck producers have watched Japanese auto manufacturers walk away with as much as 30 percent of the U.S. market in a given month.

This experience is being repeated throughout our economy, in consumer electronics, motorcycles, machine tools, apparel, and a host of other products.

We must turn this situation around and regain our international competi­tiveness. We must develop a strategy for economic growth that will boost the standard of living for all Ameri­cans and increase job stability for U.S. workers. And I am convinced that, over the long term, the solution to our domestic and international dilemma lies in greatly improved productivity.

To sell abroad and compete at home, we must become more productive.

Productivity improvements, howev­er, will require some basic changes in our thinking. We must give up our crisis mentality approach to issues and begin to emphasize long-term stability.

Business, government and labor all 'have a stake in improving our produc­tivity performance and in developing long-term guidelines that will enable us to become more efficient. These groups, working together, can contrib­ute to a cooperative strategy for growth. As in the case in Japan, we must all work as partners, exchanging ideas to enhance individual welfare and planning for a strong United States in the 1990's.

As a key step in this cooperative process, the President should convene a White House Conference on Produc­tivity. Such a conference-preceded by a statewide and regional meetings among business, labor, academia, gov­ernment at all levels and consumers­would provide a forum for airing views on such diverse topics as robotics, gov­ernment organization, quality of work­life, capital formation, regulatory policy, export prospects and technolo­gy sharing.

This conference could focus national attention on the individual benefits that accrue from productivity im­provements. It could study the meas­ures and policies that have been suc­cessful in countries like Japan to learn how we might become more efficient. And it could study educational systems around the world to learn how stu­dents are taught to become formidable competitors in the world marketplace.

What I envision is a grassroots cam­paign to spread the word on the value of productivity improvements to each and every American citizen. I do not envision a one-shot deal-just another Federal conference where ideas and recommendations are thrashed out, only to be filed and forgotten due to lack of interest or followup action.

Rather, this White House confer­ence would be an important contribu­tion to our Nation's economic recov­ery-first as a statement by the Chief Executive on the priority he places on improved productivity, and, second, as a forum for developing innovative so­lutions to get our productivity back on track.

The United States can again be the world's productivity leader, but to do so requires the cooperation and active participation of every American. A White House Conference on Produc­tivity could get that ball rolling.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that this legislation be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as fallows:

S.J. RES. 159 Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep­

resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this joint reso­lution may be cited as the "White House Conference on Productivity Act".

TITLE I-FINDINGS SEC. 101. The Congress finds that-< 1 > The United States' traditional annual

productivity improvement rate of approxi­mately 3 percent has fallen drastically in recent years to a negative one-half of one percent;

<2> if our traditional productivity improve­ment rate had been maintained, the average household would have received nearly $5,500 in additional real income each year:

<3> the decline in productivity has inflated the cost of goods and services produced in the United States relative to the goods and services of nations with higher productivity rates:

<4> improved productivity will enhance our international competitiveness, which will expand foreign market opportunities and jobs;

<5> productivity improvement can be re­stored in the United States through the ap­plication of policies and management tech­niques which have brought substantial pro­ductivity gains on a broad scale in other countries and in some businesses within the United States;

<6> when adequate protections are provid­ed, productivity improvement techniques can bring great benefits to labor as well as management; and

<7> the United States must act immediate­ly to reverse our productivity decline and to restore our annual productivity improve­ment.

SEC. 102. For purposes of this joint resolu­tion-

(1) the term "conference" means the White House Conference on Productivity;

<2> the term "Director" means the Direc­tor of the Office of Management and Budget;

<3> the term "productivity" means output per paid employee hour of all employees in the private sector;

<4> the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Is­lands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Is­lands, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

TITLE II-THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON PRODUCTIVITY

SEC. 201. The President shall call a White House Conference on Productivity not later than one year after the date of enactment of this title in order to develop recommen­dations to stimulate the Nation's productivi­ty improvement rate.

SEc. 202. For the purpose of ascertaining facts and developing recommendations con­cerning the improvement of productivity, the Conference shall bring to_gether individ­uals who are experts in the field of produc­tivity, employees, and representatives of businesses, associations, labor organizations, academic institutions, and Federal, State, and local government.

SEC. 203. The Conference shall consider the following policy options with regard to their role in improving national productivi­ty:

< 1 > reorganization of the Federal Govern­ment so that it can best promote productivi­ty improvement in the private and public sectors;

3372 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 <2> bringing to the attention of American

businesses, labor organizations, and govern­ment officials the benefits which result from implementing productivity improve­ment techniques;

< 3) improving the general training and skill level of American labor;

< 4) redirecting Government efforts to inform American businesses of foreign tech­nological developments;

(5) encouraging Government agencies to share with industry new discoveries and processes that improve productivity;

<6> establishing annual Presidential awards of recognition for those businesses and industries which accomplish outstand­ing improvement in productivity and estab­lishing similar awards at the State and dis­trict levels;

<7> revising the tax laws to encourage companies to take actions to improve pro­ductivity;

(8) reviewing the effect of the antitrust laws on efforts to improve productivity;

(9) reviewing the patent laws to determine if changes are needed to encourage more productive use of American patents;

<10> improving the accuracy and reliability of data gathered by the Bureau of the Census and other Government statistical collection centers which measure American productivity; and

< 11) revising Federal civil service laws to improve the productivity of Government workers and encouraging similar action at State and local levels.

SEC. 204. A final report of the Conference on Productivity shall be submitted to the President not later than one hundred and twenty days following the date on which the Conference is called and the findings and recommendations included therein shall be immediately made available to the public. The President shall, within one hundred and twenty days after submission of such final report, transmit to the Congress his recommendations for the administrative action and legislation necessary to imple­ment recommendations contained in such report with which he concurs.

TITLE III-ADMINISTRATION SEc. 301. In administering this joint reso­

lution, the Director shall-< 1> request the cooperation and assistance

of the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and the Treasury and such other Federal departments and agencies as may be appro­priate in carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution;

<2> render all reasonable assistance, in­cluding financial assistance, to groups and organizations which are conducting district, State, or regional productivity conferences in preparation for the Conference;

(3) prepare and make available back­ground materials for the use of delegates to the Conference which are deemed neces­sary, and prepare and distribute any report of the Conference as may be necessary and appropriate;

<4> engage such additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing ap­pointments in the competitive service, and without regard to chapter 51 and subchap­ter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates; and

<5> enter into contracts only to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, with organizations with particular expertise in productivity to conduct preparatory and follow-up work for the Conference.

SEc. 302. There is authorized to be appro­priated up to $1,500,000 to carry out the provisions of this Joint Resolution. The Di­rector shall attempt to raise all or part of the Conference's operating funds from groups participating in the Conference, in­cluding private industry, labor organiza­tions, State and local governments, and pri­vate organizations and foundations.e

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS s. 671

At the request of Mr. PELL, the Sen­ator from South Dakota <Mr. PRES­SLER>, and the Senator from Ohio <Mr. METZENBAUM> were added as cospon­sors of S. 671, a bill to amend section 402 of title 23, United States Code, re­lating to establishment by each State of comprehensive alcohol-traffic safety programs as part of its highway safety program.

s. 1018

At the request of Mr. CHAFEE, the Senator from Colorado <Mr. ARM­STRONG> was added as a cosponsor of S. 1018, a bill to protect and conserve fish and wildlife resources, and for other purposes.

s. 1693

At the request of Mr. KASTEN, the Senator from South Carolina <Mr. HOLLINGS>, the Senator from South Carolina <Mr. THURMOND>, the Senator from Minnesota <Mr. DURENBERGER)' and the Senator from Maine <Mr. MITCHELL> were added as cosponsors of S. 1693, a bill to provide for the is­suance of a special stamp to com­memorate the 200th aniversary of the presence of the bald eagle on the offi­cial seal of the United States of Amer­ica.

s. 1852

At the request of Mr. JEPSEN, the Senator from Iowa <Mr. GRASSLEY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1852, a bill to amend the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 to provide for the exten­sion of credit for agricultural commod­ities.

s. 1987

At the request of Mr. CRANSTON, the Senator from Florida <Mr. CHILES), the Senator from New York <Mr. MOY­NIHAN), and the Senator from Michi­gan <Mr. RIEGLE) were added as co­sponsors of S. 1987, a bill to amend the Social Security Act to provide general revenue funding for successful pro­grams providing rehabilitation services to individuals in receipt of disability benefits under title II or XVI of such act.

s. 2012

At the request of Mr. PROXMIRE, the Senator from Indiana <Mr. LUGAR) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2012, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to limit the deduction of living expenses by Members of Congress and to eliminate the provision which allows such deduction without sub­stantiation of such expense.

s. 2036

At the request of Mr. QUAYLE, the Senator from Pennsylvania <Mr. HEINZ), the Senator from Mississippi <Mr. COCHRAN), the Senator from Mon­tana <Mr. MELCHER), and the Senator from Utah <Mr. HATCH) were added as cosponsors of S. 2036, a bill to provide for a job training program, and for other purposes.

s. 2051

At the request of Mr. DANFORTH, the Senator from South Dakota <Mr. PRESSLER) was added as a cosponsor of S. 2051, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny the de­duction for amounts paid or incurred for certain advertisements carried by certain foreign broadcasting undertak­ings.

s. 2155

At the request of Mr. KASTEN, the Senator from Iowa <Mr. GRASSLEY), and the Senator from Wisconsin <Mr. PROXMIRE) were added as cosponsors of S. 2155, a bill to require a foreign country be declared to be in default before payments are made by the U.S. Government for loans owed by such country or credits which have been ex­tended to such country which have been guaranteed or assured by agen­cies of the U.S. Government.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 138

At the request of Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, the Senator from Louisiana <Mr. JOHNSTON) was added as a cospon­sor of Senate Joint Resolution 138, a joint resolution to authorize and re­quest the President to designate the week of April 18, 1982, through April 24, 1982, as "National Coin Week."

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 154

At the request of Mr. PELL, the Sen­ator from Colorado <Mr. HART), and the Senator from Ohio <Mr. GLENN) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 154, a joint resolu­tion expressing the sense of Congress that the Government of the Soviet Union should respect the rights of its citizens to practice their religion and to emigrate, and that these matters should be among the issues raised at the 38th meeting of the United Na­tions Commission on Human Rights at Geneva in February 1982.

At the request of Mr. BOSCHWITZ, the Senator from Delaware <Mr. ROTH) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 154, supra.

SENATE RESOLUTION 299

At the request of Mr. WEICKER, the Senator from Virginia <Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), the Senator from Ken­tucky <Mr. FORD), the Senator from Iowa <Mr. GRASSLEY), the Senator from Kansas <Mrs. KASSEBAUM), the Senator from Pennsylvania <Mr. SPEC­TER), the Senator from South Carolina <Mr. HOLLINGS), and the Senator from Montana <Mr. BAucus> were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 299, a

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3373 resolution to designate May 4, 1982, as "International Franchise Day."

SENATE RESOLUTION 332-AS­SURING ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND OPPOSING ADVANCED ARMS SALES TO JORDAN Mr. KENNEDY (for himself and Mr.

HEINZ) submitted the following resolu­tion, which was referred to the Com­mittee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 332 Whereas Israel is a stable, democratic and

reliable ally of the United States; Whereas the security of Israel is in the

national interest of the United States; Whereas Jordan has opposed the Camp

David peace process and joined forces with Iraq, whose government is committed to the destruction of Israel;

Whereas Jordan is intending to purchase additional advanced weapons from the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the sale of U.S. advanced fighter aircraft and mobile antiaircraft missiles to Jordan would jeopardize the security of Israel.

Resolved, it is the sense of the Senate of the United States of America that:

1. The United States should not sell ad­vanced fighter aircraft, mobile antiaircraft missiles, or any other advanced weapons to Jordan because they threaten the security of Israel.

2. The United States should ensure that Israel retains its qualitative military edge in the Middle East.

SALE OF ADVANCED ARMS TO JORDAN

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I send to the desk a resolution, and ask for its appropriate referral. I also ask unanimous consent that a letter from Senator HEINZ and myself to the Presi­dent of the United States on this issue be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE, Washington, D.C., March 4, 1982.

THE PRESIDENT, The White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There are continuing reports that the Administration plans to recommend the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft, mobile HA WK ground-to-air missiles or any other advanced weapons to Jordan. These reports are of deep concern, and we believe that such sales would jeopardize the securi­ty of Israel. We have introduced a Senate Resolution opposing such sales and reaf­firming our nation's commitment to ensure that Israel's military forces continue to maintain a qualitative advantage in the Middle East.

Such a sale to Jordan would jeopardize the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Jordan has opposed the Camp David peace process and has joined forces with Iraq, whose government is committed to the de­struction of Israel. This sale would violate clear restrictions imposed in 1975 as well as your own long-standing personal pledge to retain Israel's qualitative military edge in the Middle East.

It is wrong for Jordan to ask the United States to violate these commitments. We reject the implicit threat that Jordan may purchase additional arms from the Soviet

Union if the United States does not supply them. Instead of succumbing to this pres­sure, the Administration should pursue an active diplomatic strategy for enduring peace and security in the Middle East.

We hope that you and your Administra­tion will make clear that the United States does not intend to pursue these arms sales with Jordan, either now or in the future. Our national interest in a secure Israel and a stable peace in the Middle East clearly outweighs any purported justification for such sales.

Sincerely, EDWARD M. KENNEDY. JOHN HEINZ.

SENATE RESOLUTION 333-RESO­LUTION AUTHORIZING EX­PENDITURES BY COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE Mr. MATHIAS, from the Committee

on Rules and Administration, reported the following original resolution; which was placed on the calendar:

S. RES. 333 Resolved, That this resolution may be

cited as the "Omnibus Committee Funding Resolution of 1982".

AGGREGATE AUTHORIZATION

SEC. 2. In carrying out the powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, and under the appropriate au­thorizing resolutions of the Senate, there is authorized in the aggregate $41,936,869, in accordance with the provisions of this reso­lution, for all Standing Committees of the Senate, the Special Committee on Aging, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Select Committee on Indian Affairs.

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

SEc. 3. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its dis­cretion <1> to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and <3> with prior con­sent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reim­bursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

Cb> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $1,309,000, of which amount not to exceed $2,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

<c> The committee shall report its findings together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

Cd) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 4. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations is author­ized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion Cl> to make ex­penditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and <3> with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

Cb> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $3,780,310, of which <1> not to exceed $5,000 may be ex­pended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended), and <2> not to exceed $5,000 may be expended for the training of the professional staff of such committee <under procedures specified by section 202(j) of such Act>.

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

Cd) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

SEc. 5. <a> in carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services is author­ized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion <1> to make ex­penditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and (3) with prior consent of the Government de­partment or agency concerned and the Com­mittee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of per­sonnel of any such department or agency.

Cb> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $1,607,807, of which amount not to exceed $25,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended>.

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

Cd> Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

3374 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN

AFFAIRS

Sec. 6. (a) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its dis­cretion < 1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reim­burable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

<b> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $1,563,411, of which amount (1) not to exceed $1,000 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organi­zations thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended), and (2) not to exceed $1,000 may be expended for the training of the professional staff of such committee <under procedures specified by section 202(j) of such Act).

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(d) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

SEC. 7. (a) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on the Budget is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make expendi­tures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and <3> with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

(b) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $2,645,961, of which amount not to exceed $50,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individuals consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

(c) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(d) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the

disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

SEc. 8. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation is authorized from March l, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its dis­cretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reim­bursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

<b> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $3,161,746, of which amount (1) not to exceed $20,000 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organi­zations thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended>, and (2) not to exceed $8,000 may be expended for the training of the professional staff of such committee <under procedures specified by section 202(j) of such Act>.

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(d) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

SEc. 9. (a) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re­sources is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contin­gent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ per­sonnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency con­cerned and the Committee on Rules and Ad­ministration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such de­partment or agency.

(b) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $2,102,840, of which amount not to exceed $10,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

(c) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than Fedruary 28,1983.

Cd> Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent

fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that voucher shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

SEC. 10. (a) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Environment and Public Works is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion < 1) to make expenditures from the contin­gent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ per­sonnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency con­cerned and the Committee on Rules and Ad­ministration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such de­partment or agency.

<b> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $2,213,000, of which amount (1) not to exceed $30,000 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organi­zations thereof <as authorized by section 202><i> of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended), and (2) not to exceed $3,000 may be expended for the training of the professional staff of such committee <under procedures specified by section 202(j) of such Act).

(c) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(d) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

SEC. 11. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Finance is authorized from March l, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make expendi­tures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

Cb> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $2,118,200, of which amount not to exceed $30,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices· of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202<D of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3375 Cd> Expenses of the committee under this

section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

SEC. 12. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Relations is au­thorized from March 1, 1982, through Feb­ruary 23, 1983, in its discretion <1> to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

Cb) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $2,404,912, of which amount not to exceed $18,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

Cc> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

Cd> Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITl'EE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

SEC. 13. Ca> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Governmental Affairs is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion <I> to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Gov­ernment department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Adminis­tration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such depart­ment or agency.

Cb) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $4,432,426, of which amount C 1) not to exceed $68, 725 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organi­zations thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended), and (2) not to exceed $1,500 may be expended for the training of the professional staff of such committee <under procedures specified by section 202Cj > of such Act>.

<c><I> The committee, or any duly author­ized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to study or investigate-

<A> the efficiency and economy of oper­ations of all branches of the Government

including the possible existence of fraud, misfeasance, malfeasance, collusion, mis­management, incompetence, corruption, or unethical practices, waste, extravagance, conflicts of interest, and the improper ex­penditure of Government funds in transac­tions, contracts, and activities of the Gov­ernment or of Government officials and em­ployees and any and all such improper prac­tices between Government personnel and corporations, individuals, companies, or per­sons affiliated therewith, doing business with the Government; and the compliance or noncompliance of such corporations, companies, or individuals or other entities with the rules, regulations, and laws govern­ing the various governmental agencies and its relationships with the public;

CB> the extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in the field of labor-manage­ment relations or in groups or organizations of employees or employers, to the detriment of interests of the public, employers, or em­ployees, and to determine whether any changes are required in the laws of the United States in order to protect such inter­ests against the occurrence of such practices or activities;

CC> syndicated or organized crime which may operate in or otherwise utilize the fa­cilities of interstate or international com­merce in furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the law of the United States or of the State in which the transactions occur, and, if so, the manner and extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or corporations, or other en­tities by whom such utilization is being made, what facilities, devices, methods, techniques, and technicalities are being used or employed, and whether or not orga­nized crime utilizes such interstate facilities or otherwise operates in interstate com­merce for the development of corrupting in­fluences in violation of the law of the United States or the laws of any State, and further, to study and investigate the manner in which and the extent to which persons engaged in organized criminal ac­tivities have infiltrated into lawful business enterprise; and to study the adequacy of Federal laws to prevent the operations of organized crime in interstate or internation­al commerce; and to determine whether any changes are required in the laws of the United States in order to protect the public against the occurrences of such practices or activities;

<D> all other aspects of crime and lawless­ness within the United States which have an impact upon or affect the national health, welfare, and safety; including but not limited to investment fraud schemes, commodity and security fraud, computer fraud and the use of offshore banking facili­ties to carry out criminal objectives;

<E> riots, violent disturbances of the peace, vandalism, civil and criminal disor­der, insurrection, the commission of crimes in connection therewith, the immediate and longstanding causes, the extent and effects of such occurrences and crimes, and meas­ures necessary for their immediate and long-range prevention and for the preserva­tion of law and order and to insure domestic tranquillity within the United States;

CF> the efficiency and economy of oper­ations of all branches and functions of the Government with particular reference to-

(i) the effectiveness of present national se­curity methods, staffing, and processes as tested against the requirements imposed by the rapidly mounting complexity of nation­al security problems;

(ii) the capacity of present national securi­ty staffing, methods, and processes to make full use of the Nation's resources of knowl­edge, talents;

(iii) the adequacy of present intergovern­mental relationships between the United States and international organizations prin­cipally concerned with national security of which the United States is a member; and

<iv> legislative and other proposals to im­prove these methods, processes, and rela­tionships;

CG> the efficiency, economy, and effective­ness of all agencies and departments of the Government involved in the control and management of energy shortages including, but not limited to, their performance with respect to-

m the collection and dissemination of ac­curate statistics on fuel demand and supply;

<ii> the implementation of effective energy conservation measures;

<iii> the pricing of energy in all forms; <iv> coordination of energy programs with

State and local government; <v> control of exports of scarce fuels; <vi> the management of tax, import, pric­

ing, and other policies affecting energy sup­plies;

<vii> maintenance of the independent sector of the petroleum industry as a strong competitive force;

<viii> the allocation of fuels in short supply by public and private entities;

Cix) the management of energy supplies owned or controlled by the Government;

<x> relations with other oil producing and consuming countries;

<xi> the monitoring of compliance by gov­ernments, corporations, or individuals with the laws and regulations governing the allo­cation, conservation, or pricing of energy supplies; and

CxiD research into the discovery and devel­opment of alternative energy supplies; and

<H> the efficiency and economy of all branches and functions of government with particular reference to the operations and management of Federal regulatory policies and programs: Provided, That, in carrying out the duties herein set forth, the inquiries of this com­mittee or any subcommittee thereof shall not be deemed limited to the records, func­tions, and operations of any particular branch of the Government; but may extend to the records and activities of any persons, corporation, or other entity.

<2> Nothing contained in this subsection shall affect or impair the exercise of any other standing committee of the Senate of any power, or the discharge by such com­mittee of any duty, conferred or imposed upon it by the Standing Rules of the Senate or by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended.

(3) For the purpose of this subsection, the committee, or any duly authorized subcom­mittee thereof, or its chairman, or any other member of the committee or subcom­mittee designated by the chairman, from March l, 1982, through February 28, 1983, is authorized, in its, his, or their discretion CA> to require by subpena or otherwise the at­tendance of witnesses and production of cor­respondence, books, papers, and documents, <B> to holding hearings, CC> to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recess, and adjournment periods of the Senate, <D> to administer oaths, and <E> to take testimony, either orally or by sworn statement, or, in the case of staff members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-

3376 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 gations specifically authorized by the chair­man, by deposition.

(4) All subpenas, contempt proceedings, and related legal processes of the committee and its subcommittees authorized under S. Res. 361 of the Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, and S. Res. 57 of the Ninety­seventh Congress, first session, including the subpena enforcement and contempt pro­ceeding against William Cammisano, are au­thorized to continue.

(d) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(e) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

SEc. 14. (a) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary is author­ized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make ex­penditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

(b) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $4,398,223, of which amount (1) not to exceed $80,000 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organi­zations thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended), and <2> not to exceed $2,000 may be expended for the training of the professional staff of such committee <under procedures specified by section 202(j) of such Act>.

(C) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation or other action as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest prac­ticable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(d) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

SEC. 15. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Labor and Human Re­sources is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion < 1) to make expenditures from the contin­gent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ per­sonnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the

Government department or agency con­cerned and the Committee on Rules and Ad­ministration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such de­partment or agency.

(b) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $4,046,000, of which amount not to exceed $45,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

<d> Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 16. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Rules and Administration is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion ( 1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Gov­ernment department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Adminis­tration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such depart­ment or agency.

(b) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $1,243,833, of which amount not to exceed $15,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(d) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

SEC. 17. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Small Business is author­ized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make ex­penditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of

personnel of any such department or agency.

(b) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $897 ,000.

<c> The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

<d> Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

SEc. 18. <a> In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as au­thorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Veterans' Affairs is au­thorized from March 1, 1982, through Feb­ruary 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and <3> with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

<b> The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $784,438.

(c) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

(d) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

SEc. 19. <a> In carrying out the duties and functions imposed by section 104 of S. Res. 4, Ninety-fifth Congress, agreed to February 4, 1977, and in exercising the authority con­ferred on it by such section, the Special Committee on Aging is authorized from March l, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, <2> to employ personnel, and <3> with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reim­bursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

(b) The expenses of the special committee under this section shall not exceed $901,946, of which amount (1) not to exceed $35,000 may be expended for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or or­ganizations thereof <as authorized by sec­tion 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended), and <2> not to exceed $1,000 may be expended for the training of the professional staff of such committee <under procedures specified by section 202(j) of such Act>.

<c> The special committee shall report its findings, together with such recommenda­tions for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3377 Cd) Expenses of the special committee

under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouch­ers approved by the chairman of the com­mittee, except that vouchers shall not be re­quired for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SEc. 20. (a) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under S. Res. 400, ap­proved May 19, 1976, in accordance with its jurisdiction under section 3Ca) of such reso­lution, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as authorized by section 5 of such resolution, the Select Committee on Intelligence is au­thorized from March 1, 1982, through Feb­ruary 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency.

Cb) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $1,728,106, of which amount not to exceed $10,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

Cc) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as it deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

Cd) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS

SEc. 21. Ca) In carrying out the duties and functions imposed on it by section 105 of S. Res. 4, Ninety-fifth Congress, agreed to Feb­ruary 4 <legislative day, February 1), 1977, as amended, and in exercising the authority conferred on it by such section, the Select Committee on Indian Affairs is authorized from March 1, 1982, through February 28, 1983, in its discretion (1) to make expendi­tures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of any such department or agency.

Cb) The expenses of the committee under this section shall not exceed $597,710, of which amount not to exceed $20,000 may be expended for the procurement of the serv­ices of individual consultants, or organiza­tions thereof <as authorized by section 202<D of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended).

Cc) The committee shall report its find­ings, together with such recommendations for legislation as its deems advisable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but not later than February 28, 1983.

Cd) Expenses of the committee under this section shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries paid at annual rate.

REPEALER

SEc. 22. Senate Resolution 289 of the Ninety-seventh Congress, agreed to Febru­ary 8, 1982, is repealed.

OMNIBUS COMMITTEE FUNDING RESOLUTION

e Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, today I am reporting an original reso­lution funding committees of the Senate for the committee fiscal year which begins on March 1, 1982. This action reflects the unanimous decision of the Committee on Rules and Ad­ministration to recommend to the Senate that there be no aggregate in­crease over last year in overall spend­ing by Senate committees.

As you know, last year we achieved a remarkable overall reduction of 10 percent in costs for running the com­mittees. We must continue to protect these savings. We have thus consoli­dated the individual committee resolu­tions into a single resolution. Conse­quently, you will find all committee budgets, section by section, in this res­olution. In addition, an accompanying comparative chart shows committee budget experience since our reductions in spending at the beginning of 1981.

The committee's rationale for indi­vidual increases or decreases is self-evi­dent from the chart. Briefly, the committee looked at increases and de­creases in individual committee spend­ing over the past several years; realis­tic estimates for administrative ex­penses in committee budget submis­sions; unexpended balances in the pre­vious committee fiscal year; and com­mittee plans for oversight and legisla­tive review activities in the coming year.

Finally, I would call your attention to the first clause in this resolution. This clause is an adaptation of a budget control technique successfully used in our consideration of concur­rent resolutions on the budget; it sets aggregate Senate committee funding at the same level as last year: $41,936,869. I would ask that any of my distinguished colleagues who wish to propose amendments to the Rules Committee recommendations also pro­pose conforming amendments which will preserve our goal of no increase this year in aggregate committee spending.e

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED FOR PRINTING

COPYRIGHTED WORKS ON VIDEO RECORDERS

AMENDMENT NO. 1333

<Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.)

Mr. MATHIAS <for himself, Mr. BAKER, Mr. ROBERT c. BYRD, Mr. CRAN­STON, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. BAUCUS, and Mr. HART) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them to the bill <S. 1758) to amend title 17 of

the United States Code to exempt the private noncommercial recording of copyrighted works on video recorders from copyright infringement.

NOTICES OF HEARINGS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND MINERAL

RESOURCES

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the infor­mation of the Senate and the public that the oversight hearing to review the capacity, distribution and status of the strategic petroleum reserve, previ­ously scheduled for Monday, March 8, at 2 p.m., has been postponed until Tuesday, March 16, beginning at 10 a.m. in room 3110 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

For further information regarding this hearing you may wish to contact Mr. Roger Sindelar of the subcommit­tee staff at 224-4236.

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I an­nounce that the Senate Agriculture Committee will hold a hearing March 12 on the relationship of the export lending activities of the Commodity Credit Corporation to the problems of overdue payments to the U.S. Govern­ment and private banks by Poland and other Soviet bloc nations.

Invited witnesses include representa­tives of the U.S. Department of Agri­culture and other Federal agencies, as well as producer, exporting, and finan­cial sectors of the economy.

The hearings will begin at 10 a.m. in room 324 Russell Building. Anyone de­siring further information should con­tact the Agriculture Committee staff at 224-2035.

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Small Business Committee will hold a full committee hearing to con­sider the nomination of James C. Sanders to be the Small Business Ad­ministration Administrator. The hear­ing will be held in room 424 of the Russell Senate Office Building, March 9, at 9:30 a.m.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

THE RECOGNITION OF ANGOLA e Mr. TSONGAS. Mr. President, almost 3 years ago to the day, March 8, I spoke in this Chamber about an important foreign policy question-the recognition of Angola. That was 1979 and President Carter was convinced that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola was a barrier to normal rela­tions between our Government and theirs.

I argued in my statement and have ever since that the regime in Angola

3378 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 was restless and discontented with its Soviet and Cuban sponsors, that the MPLA government was reaching out to multinational corporations, many of them American, and would do much more if the American diplomatic con­text was less, shall we say, frigid.

I have no reason to alter those views today. I still think recognition makes sense, not because it would be moral or principled to do so, but for the simple reason that it would serve U.S. nation­al interests. Trade, investment, diplo­macy, and what the administration might call the "strategic" competition all points to a single course-the recog­nition of Angola.

One of the curious dimensions of this issue has been the position of the business community. When officials from both the Carter and Reagan ad­ministrations have lectured congres­sional committees on the Marxist com­plexion of the Angolan Government, they were usually followed by wit­nesses from the private sector, arguing that Angola is a fairly good place to do business.

Now, the press reports another testi­monial from the "supply" side. David Rockefeller, described as the "epitome of capitalism" by the Washington Post, said it would be "to the advan­tage" of the United States and Angola to establish normal diplomatic rela­tions.

I believe that the Post article makes for interesting reading and I ask that it be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows: [From the Washington Post, Mar. 3, 19821

DAVID ROCKEFELLER CITES "ADVANTAGE" To UNITED STATES OF NORMAL TIES WITH ANGOLA

<By Jay Ross) Salisbury, ZIMBABWE, March 2.-David

Rockefeller, whose name is the epitome of capitalism, said today he does not think that African Marxism is a threat to the United States or to American business inter­ests on the continent.

Nearing the end of a 10-nation tour of Africa, the retired chairman of Chase Man­hattan Bank told reporters it would be "to the advantage" of the United States and Marxist Angola to create normal relations. He had two days of talks with Angolan gov­ernment leaders before coming here yester­day.

Rockefeller said the presence of thou­sands of Cuban troops and Soviet advisers had no "direct bearing on American busi­ness operations in Angola. Clearly, it has not interfered with our own banking rela­tions."

The United States, the only major West­ern nation that does not recognize the An­golan government of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has linked normal rela­tions with the withdrawal of 15,000 to 20,000 Cuban troops in the country. Last year, the Reagan administration failed in its attempt to repeal the Clark amendment, which prohibits U.S. covert or overt actions to aid Angolan political factions.

Rockefeller, whose bank has helped fi­nance purchases of airliners and oil equip­ment for Angola, said that "the question of

Cuban troops is an issue that needs to be in­cluded" in bilateral talks, but he declined to comment further.

On the question of Marxism, he told a press conference at the conclusion of his two-day visit here, "The more I've seen of countries which are allegedly Marxist in Africa, the more I have a feeling it is more labels and trappings than reality."

The primary interest of these countries' leaders, he said, "is to improve the lot of their people and strengthen the economies of the countries."

"They are willing to accept help from any source to achieve it," he continued. "In some cases, those governments did not re­ceive support from Western countries, and therefore they accepted it from where they could get it."

Dealing with socialist or Marxist countries "really does not cause us any problem at all,'' Rockefeller, now chairman of the bank's international advisory committee, said. "We do business with at least 125 coun­tries in the world, governments ranging over the whole political spectrum." He noted that Chase Manhattan was the first Ameri­can bank in Moscow and Peking.

"I don't think an international bank such as ours ought to try to set itself up as a judge of what kind of government a country wishes to have. We have found we can deal with just about any kind of government, provided they are orderly and responsible."

He also pointed out to a reporter who questioned relations between capitalist bankers and socialist governments that there are wide varieties within both eco­nomic systems and many similarities.

Rockefeller said he was optimistic that U.S.-led negotiations to bring about inde­pendence in South African-controlled Na­mibia, Angola's southern neighbor, would succeed. Such a move, he said, could end South African attacks on Angola, which plays host to Namibian guerrillas, cause a withdrawal of the Cuban troops and bring stability to the Luanda government.

A Western businessman who recently vis­ited Angola said stability there could lead to "geometric growth" in Western investment in the country because of its great economic potential in oil, minerals, agricultural poten­tial and water power.

The businessman, apparently not at all concerned about Angola's professed Marxist economy, added, "Angola is the only coun­try in southern Africa with the ability to pay" because it has $2 billion a year in oil revenue.

Angola supplies oil to the United States, almost all of it pumped by American compa­nies, led by Gulf, which has invested more than $400 million in the country.

On other matters, Rockefeller said: "Some very attractive investment oppor­

tunities" exist in Zimbabwe and the coun­try's economy has done remarkably well in two years of independence.

His bank opposes South Africa's system of racial separation, but he is against economic sanctions to pressure for change because they would not work. Defending Chase Manhattan's loans to the private sector there, he added, "We don't feel our activi­ties in South Africa are inconsistent with our sense of social responsibility."

Rockefeller leaves Wednesday for Zambia and concludes his tour in Morocco. He has also visited Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon.e

U.S. POPULATION e Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I wish to report that according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau approxima­tions, the total population of the United States on March 1, 1982, was 230, 773, 787. This represents an in­crease of 139,693 since February 1, 1982. Since this time last year, our population has grown by an additional 2,177,215.

In 1 short month we have added enough people to our population to more than fill the entire city of Savan­nah, Ga. Over the past year, our popu­lation has increased enough to fill the city of Pittsburgh, Pa., more than five times.e

FRANK MANKIEWICZ

• Mr. HART. Mr. President, I would like to share with my colleagues an ar­ticle from today's New York Times about a remarkable and truly talented individual, Mr. Frank Mankiewicz, president of National Public Radio.

As the article explains, Frank Man­kiewicz's whole life has been one of public service. The contributions he has made in both domestic and foreign policy matters are unique and impres­sive. Now Frank is in the midst of an­other important struggle, insuring the survival of National Public Radio, and making it a strong and independent educational and informational force in our lives.

I ask that the article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The article follows: FRANK MANKIEWICZ'$ NEW CAUSE: SAVING

NATIONAL PuBLIC RADIO <By David Shribman>

WASHINGTON, March 3-Frank Man­kiewicz, the president of National Public Radio, is sitting in a Washington coffee shop, toying with his two poached eggs and doing what few people in this city do better. He is telling stories.

At first it sounds like the standard Man­kiewicz repertoire, one of the capital's long­est-running performances: stories about Peru and his days there with the Peace Corps, stories about his travels with Senator Robert F. Kennedy and the Presidential campaign that ended in death in a Los An­geles hotel, stories about being press secre­tary to George McGovern and about the 49 states the former South Dakota Senator lost in the 1972 Presidential race.

But Mr. Mankiewicz has added something new. Lately he can't stop talking about radio.

There's the satellite hookup that N.P.R. has arranged to carry more programs and produce better sound quality. There's the progress of "Morning Edition,'' the two­hour news and feature show that has drawn more than a million new listeners. There's the private sponsor plan that N.P.R., in its quest for new sources of financing, inaugu­rated this week. And more.

Nearly breathless, Mr. Mankiewicz pauses suddenly and blurts out: "I love this job."

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3379 ASKING FOR MONEY

For the better part of the past five years, he has headed National Public Radio, work­ing to shave away its reputation for too much elitist programing and trying to sculpt an identity separate from that of its video cousin, the Public Broadcasting System. Now, as the Reagan Administration pares its budget, Mr. Mankiewicz faces yet an­other struggle, insuring the survival of N.P.R. itself and working to make it inde­pendent of the uncertainties of Federal fi­nancing by 1986.

"We expect to be around," he says. "We're going out to the private sector asking for the money. The President says the private sector will give it. And we're going to earn the money, too, with our satellite oper­ations. We have no guilt about that."

With the current emphasis on Capitol Hill on the impact of budget cuts on the poor and on education grants, National Public Radio may lose as much as $3 million in Federal financing next year, a serious matter for an organization whose 1982 budget is $14.5 million. To offset such a loss, N.P.R. has raised more than $1 million in donations over the past four months.

It is somewhat characteristic of Mr. Man­kiewicz that he did not take the characteris­tic route to leadership in the radio industry. Before he went to N.P.R., his radio experi­ence consisted almost entirely of a short and rather undistinguished stint with United States Armed Forces Radio in West Germany, where he did the usual mix for his G.I. listeners: a little sportscasting in the daytime, an introduction to the Bremen Philharmonic at night. He did not come away from the experience with any great commitment to the airwaves.

Today, however, Mr. Mankiewicz is totally committed. He is, in fact, something of a radio evangelist, peddling the religion of radio. In the Mankiewicz traveling salvation show-and that, with the Administration's budget cuts, is truly what it is-the pitch goes something like this:

"Radio is live. People know that when they listen to the radio that a live voice is going to be there. It's a link to the world. It's flesh and blood. Television is not. You can watch TV for three hours and not know for sure that anyone's alive."

Moreover, Mr. Mankiewicz considers him­self a journalist and has made it clear that he believes news is where N.P.R. can make its mark and, not incidentally, where it can compete most effectively with public televi­sion.

"If you watched public television all day,'' he says, "you'd know how to make a terrific quiche, you'd know how to strip the veneer off your furniture, you'd know a lot about Edwardian England. Pinchas Zukerman and Isaac Stern and the other one, Itzhak Perl­man, would be like neighbors. But you wouldn't know if there were a war on in El Salvador."

The son of the late Herman J. Man­kiewicz, the screenwriter who wrote "Citizen Kane" and "Pride of the Yankees," Mr. Mankiewicz often came home to find the Marx Brothers, James Thurber, E.B. White and Edmund Wilson seated around the family dinner table. But it was his father who drew him into politics and the world of issues and news.

THE KENNEDY INFLUENCE

"If I hadn't known what he did for a living, I would have thought my father was a columnist," he says now.

Although Mr. Mankiewicz, who is 57 years old, has written a syndicated column, run

<unsuccessfully) for Congress, been the Peace Corps' regional director for Latin America, written four books, argued cases for the United Steelworkers of America and practiced law, he likely will be remembered mostly as the man who, as Robert Kenne­dy's press secretary, issued the periodic medical bulletins on the condition of the fa­tally wounded Presidential candidate.

"If I were to leave N.P.R. and become Chief Justice of the United States, win a Nobel Prize for literature and two or three Academy Awards, my obituary will still say: 'Former Kennedy Aide Dies,"' Mr. Man­kiewicz says, "They'd be right. That in many ways was the shaping influence in my adult life."

Even so, he has developed a style that is, as a colleague puts it, all his own. It is, in a word, informal, based on conversation rather than memo. "I like to keep up with things," he says. "I prefer one-on-one deal­ings."

Then, as if to reassure a skeptical listener, Mr. Mankiewicz goes on: "We do the things other companies do. We interact. Sometimes we interface." He pauses, winks and adds, "Behind closed doors, of course.''•

THE DEXTER UNITED METHODIST CHURCH

e Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, ours is a land of change, of movement, of flux. There is, of course, much of virtue as­sociated with the constant level of ac­tivity which characterizes our time. But there is also, I would suggest, a strength that comes from stability and a power that comes from permanence.

In that context, I rise to pay tribute to the Dexter United Methodist Church of Dexter, Mich. They are in the midst of a yearlong celebration of their 150th anniversary. For that ex­traordinary period of time, they have sought to bring the joy of fellowship to its members and a sense of service to its community.

Since 1841 this church has stood in the same spot. After a fire destroyed the original structure in 1925, the members of the church decided to re­build the sanctuary on the same spot. And from that spot, in their current building, the 461 members of the Dexter United Methodist Church join in worship.

In celebration of this anniversary, the church has created a memorial logo: A tree representing the strength of the church; roots symbolizing the strength of its traditions; branches and leaves suggesting renewal and re­birth; and a continuous circle suggest­ing the continuity of past, present, and future action.

Mr. President, this institution, now looking forward to its 200 years of op­eration, knows well the value of tradi­tion. I am sure my colleagues will join with me in extending congratulations and expressing admiration for the work of the Dexter United Methodist Church.e

STATE OF BLACK AMERICA e Mr. HART. Mr. President, the Na­tional Urban League recently released its annual report on the "State of Black America". Their findings and recommendations merit the attention and study of every Senator.

In releasing the report which has been issued every year since 1976, the Urban League's new president John Jacob said:

Never in that time has the state of Black America been more vulnerable. Never in that time have black people so strongly felt themselves under siege. Never in that time have black economic and civil rights gains been under such powerful attack. Never in that time have so many black people been so alienated from their government.

The reasons for Mr. Jacob's deep concern are outlined in the eight major documents that make up the report, which is available from the Na­tional Urban League. I ask that Mr. Jacob's entire statement be printed in the RECORD at this point. It is an elo­quent analysis which I urge all my col­leagues to review.

The statement follows: REMARKS BY JOHN E. JACOB

Today the National Urban League releases its seventh annual State of Black America report.

Never in that time has the State of Black America been more vulnerable. Never in that time have black people so strongly felt themselves under siege. Never in that time have black economic and civil rights gains been under such powerful attack. Never in that time have so many black people been so alienated from their government.

This is an unhealthy and dangerous situa­tion. It is something the government must act to dispel. It is a situation created by this Administration's actions, and only this Ad­ministration can reverse it.

In 1981, the black community was hit by economic and political disasters of the first magnitude. For black Americans, 1981 was a year of economic Depression, savage cuts in survival programs for the poor, and the be­trayal of basic civil rights protections.

Let me briefly summarize some of those elements. Black unemployment is at record levels-sixteen percent by the understated official statistics that don't include discour­aged workers or involuntary part-timers. Teenage black unemployment went through the roof in 1981. We are in the seventh post­war national recession, so those numbers will get worse. After each recession, black jobless rates stay higher than they were.

This time around the social safety net is in shreds. Cuts in federal social programs did not just trim the fat, they slashed deep into bone. And those cuts were concentrated in programs in which blacks were a third to a half of all beneficiaries.

We must be very clear about what hap­pened in 1981: the rich got tax cuts, the Pentagon got a blank check; but poor people lost jobs, training opportunities, food assist­ance, health care, and much else.

We didn't go through some sort of ab­stract budget adjustment process. We went through a series of earthquakes that left disproportionate numbers of black people with fewer resources and drove them deeper into poverty. Especially in the context of those economic disasters, the attack on civil

3380 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 rights is downright immoral. This nation did not go through a long, painful process of de­segregating society only to have it resegre­gated in the 1980s.

In 1981, an Administration from which blacks and minorities are virtually absent, took a number of negative steps on civil rights. From its backtracking on desegregat­ing schools to its de-emphasis of civil rights enforcement to its attacks on affirmative action, the Administration created a feeling among many blacks that they were forgot­ten people.

Perhaps the most blatant of those anti­civil rights policies was the unconscionable decision to reward racism by granting tax­exempt status to schools that discriminate. The President's later statement that he would ask Congress to pass a law authoriz­ing the IRS to refuse exempt status to such schools does not change the issue. The IRS had the authority. The courts said it had the authority. The Administration's claim that this is simply a procedural issue about legal authority does not hold water. Its ac­tions provided aid and comfort to the racists in our midst.

Taken together. these and other steps can only be interpreted as attempts to dismantle the process of desegregating America. They raise the grim prospects of a return to a past that denied basic human rights and tol­erated racial discrimination. They account for the bitter feelings of alienation and iso­lation, not only among many black Ameri­cans, but among all who don't want the clock turned back to a meaner, nastier period.

What about 1982? Past experience indi­cates black workers will not recapture their losses in a general economic recovery. The Administration, faced with enormous defi­cits, will try to cut what remains of impor­tant programs that help poor people. At­tempts to bury affirmative action and civil rights enforcement are likely to accelerate.

But there is also greater hope in 1982 that these calamities can be prevented. The steamroller of the Administration's radical approach to national problems has stalled. A year's experience has shown that supply side economics is indeed what David Stock­man said it was, nothing more than old-fa­sioned "trickle down." The fight against in­flation used the old, discredited tools of the past-tight money and high unemployment. The promised economic growth turned to deep recession. The New Federalism just dumped problems on to the states; problems they know they can't handle.

So I sense a new realism today. especially among Congressmen who recognize the po­litical risks involved in policies that put their constituents out of work, increase pressures on local governments in their dis­tricts, and outrage the moral sensibilities of Americans who believe in fairness.

Two key tests of that new realism are now shaping up. The first is the framing of the 1983 Budget. We call on Congressional lead­ers of both parties to inform the Adminis­tration that further cuts in poor people's programs are unacceptable. The budget def­icit caused by the Administration's tax cuts and defense spending increases can be closed by scaling down the defense budget and by closing tax loopholes for special in­terests.

A second key test is the Senate battle over extension of the Voting Rights Act. We call on the President to abandon his opposition to the House Bill. The Senate should swiftly pass this vital protection of the right to vote, a right denied many black people until 1965.

We also call on the President to order his Justice Department to call a cease-fire in its war on affirmative action. To equate affirm­ative action with restrictive quotas is noth­ing less than a Big Lie. As practiced by both the public and private sectors and consist­ently endorsed by the courts, affirmative action is nothing less than fair play-remov­ing race and gender as obstacles to hiring and promoting qualified people. As the Na­tional Urban League says in our new nation­al advertising program, "everybody deserves a chance to make it on their own."

1982 offers major challenges to all Ameri­cans. To all who are concerned with the ter­rible pressures placed on poor people it is a time to take off the gloves and come out swinging against further attempts to weaken the weak. We must build coalitions to protect the interests of the forgotten and neglected.

To the Administration and to political leaders of both parties, 1982 offers the chal­lenge of replacing failed policies and noting the increased political risk attached to stay­ing on the road of recession.

The private sector in 1982 is challenged to make our system work for all Americans, and to reaffirm support for affirmative action and social responsibility.

And black Americans in 1982 are chal­lenged to marshall community and political strengths. While we build external coali­tions we must also mobilize black communi­ties to deal with their problems at the neighborhood level. That's a job not only for civil rights and social service agencies, but for every community organization and every individual.

1982 then, will be a year of challenge and struggle; a year in which black people must channel their alienation and bitterness to positive efforts for change. It is a year in which all Americans must strive to recap­ture the faltering ideals of equal opportuni­ty and equal rights. It is a year in which a nation concerned with the loss of rights in Poland must also become concerned with the threat to civil rights here at home.

THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-MENT CRISIS IN AMERICA

•Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, on March 9, 1982, the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes, of which Sena­tor PERCY is the chairman and I am the ranking minority member, will hold a hearing on "Research and De­velopment: The Role of the Public and Private Sectors."

This hearing occurs at a time when it is increasingly important that public policymakers listen more carefully to what the scientific and technical com­munity is saying about our competi­tive position with regard to R. & D. and industrial innovation.

We are witnessing today a wholesale retreat in the Federal role in civilian research and development in the United States. This retreat manifests itself in the shrinking amount of re­search support available to our univer­sities, our private nonprofit research laboratories, and our national multi­program laboratories.

It is as if we had decided that in­quiry into the unknown is irrelevant to the removal of hunger, disease, and

poverty from the world. Indeed just the opposite is true. Research has given us knowledge, knowledge has given us technology, and technology has revolutionized and is continuing to revolutionize the world. Consider that within a single lifetime, agriculture, the original basis of civilization, has lost its dominance in nation after nation. Today, in a dozen major coun­tries, agriculture employs fewer than 15 percent of the economically active population. In the United States the figure is below 6 percent and is still shrinking, while agricultural produc­tivity expands.

THE BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGY

The symbols of technology are no longer just images of smoky steel plants or the clanking noises of an automobile assembly line. Rather the symbols of technology today include the relative silence and clean sur­roundings of the advanced technologi­cal processes involving space technolo­gy, electronics, and gene-splicing.

This ongoing technological revolu­tion is not a historical anomaly. Just as our first human ancestors were driven to satisfy their curiosity about what lay beyond that next hill or valley, just as Columbus, Vespucci, and Cabot were driven to venture beyond the horizon, mankind is driven by an insatiable curiosity to explore the unknown. Our job must be to nur­ture the inquisitive and inventive mind, not to stifle it. When we do nur­ture it the results may not be predict­able, but the benefits can be incalcula­ble.

Let us look at what has happened in the field of transportation over the past 100 years. First, recall that it took the human race millions of years to get to the point where man could travel at a speed of 100 miles per hour. That was in the 1880's. It took less than 60 years thereafter to quadruple the limit so that by 1938 airborne man was cracking the 400 mph line; in an­other 20 years the limit was doubled again; by the 1960's rocket planes ap­proached speeds of 4,000 mph; and men in space capsules were circling the Earth at 18,000 mph. And even those who had the vision to be able to imagine such machines could not fore­see all the benefits that would arise from their development. The spinoffs from the American space program, which includes the development of the field of microelectronics and the cre­ation of powerful, portable, and low­cost computers, have led to a revolu­tion in communications that will change the way we live and work from now on.

We are living today at a time of aus­terity. We are looking toward rigorous cost accounting in the justification of the expenditure of public moneys and that is not bad. But research is not amenable to the rigors of cost account-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3381 ing. We may start off looking for one thing and find another. Sir Alexander Fleming, through an accidental discov­ery in 1929 that green mold slowed the growth and reproduction of bacteria, began the research that ended with the discovery c;>f penicillin and the de­velopment of antibiotics. And Michael Faraday's experiments, that ended with the principle of the discovery of electromagnetism and the dynamo, set the stage for the development of new industries that all electrical engineers in particular, are familiar with. There is, in fact, a story about a famous ex­change between Benjamin Disraeli and Michael Faraday regarding the in­vention of the dynamo. After Disraeli had inspected this earliest of genera­tors he pointedly asked Faraday, "What good is this?" To which Fara­day replied, "What good is a baby, Mr. Disraeli?" The point of that story is that one cannot judge the potential of a new discovery or of a new idea any more than one can judge the potential of a baby.

Our prosperity, our national securi­ty, our industrial strength have come about because we were willing to invest in research into the unknown and that willingness has paid hand­some dividends. Let me cite a few ex­amples.

In 1843 the U.S. Congress actively supported the development of the first practical application of electic energy with a grant of $30,000 to Samuel F. B. Morse to construct a telegraph line from Baltimore to Washington. Within 20 years no developed area in the United States was without tele­graphic service and submarine cables were in regular operation under the Atlantic Ocean. In some sense, that was the beginning of the communica­tions revolution that we are experienc­ing today.

In 1956 John Bardeen, William Shockley, and Walter Brattain shared the Nobel Prize for physics for their invention of the transistor. Subse­quent Government policies on military procurement had a major effect on the development of the semiconductor industry thereafter, an industry which has become a mainstay of the U.S. economy.

In 1964 Charles Townes became a co­winner of the Nobel Prize for his re­search on the maser and laser. Today laser technology is used in a variety of activites ranging from brain surgery to optical scanners in supermarkets.

Norman Borlaug won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 for his work on the development of high-yield grains. That research was not only used in this country, but was exported abroad where it provided the basis for the Green Revolution that fed a hungry world.

The list could go on and on, but the point is obvious. Research, and the technology we develop to exploit the

fruits of that research, has made America the wealthiest, most power­ful, and most productive Nation on Earth. R. & D. supported by both Government and private sources has transformed the United States into the dominant technological force in the world. It is the key to our produc­tivity and to our ability to compete successfully in a highly competitive world market. Let us, therefore, exam­ine what has been happening with re­spect to productivity in the United States and investment in R. & D.

U.S. SLIPPAGE

Between 1961 and 1978 the annual productivity gain in manufacturing averaged 3 percent in the United States. This should be compared to an average gain of 9 percent in Japan, and 5 percent in Germany. Moreover, total U.S. private sector productivity has actually declined in recent years. That decline in productivity has cost us 2 million jobs since 1970. That fact makes me extremely concerned, espe­cially with unemployment hovering at the 9-percent mark in this country today, but we cannot sit around wring­ing our hands. The Japanese are pres­ently outproducing us in a number of areas.

We are being challenged as we never have been before. But let me tell you something. I welcome the challenge because given the proper tools, Ameri­cans can still outwork, outproduce, outinnovate, and outcompete anyone on the face of this planet. But if we are going to do it, we are going to have to turn around some worrisome trends that are occurring in the United States today-trends that indicate lag­ging capital investment, shortsighted management, lagging human re­sources, and most important of all, slippage in our commitment to main­tain and extend the amount of re­search and development necessary to stay ahead in the technological race.

In capital investment we were first in the world in 1963. By 1975 we had slipped to sixth place on a per capita basis. Europeans are increasing their per capita investment in industrial plant and equipment at a rate which is double ours and the Japanese are doing so at a rate which is five times ours. We need to encourage savings and we are not going to do it by voodoo economics.

We have to educate our corporate managers to look beyond the planning horizon of 3 or 4 years. The economist Edwin Mansfield has shown that there is a direct relation between the amount of long-term basic research carried out by an industry or firm and its rate of productivity increase, all other things being constant. The short-term, bottom line mentality must be refocused toward the future. Short-term advantages can evaporate almost overnight and can have a dev-

a.stating impact on our national securi­ty.

Let me give you an example. A recent Rand report discusses the diffi­culties the Soviets had until the early 1970's in trying to develop equipment for grinding precision miniature ball bearings which are important in cur­rent missile guidance systems. Within less than a decade, the Soviets are now claiming to have developed high preci­sion machine tools capable of turning out miniature ball bearings with toler­ances of two ten-thousands of 1 milli­meter. These are closer tolerances, they claim, than Western equipment allows.

The conclusion is obvious. If we sit back and try to rest on the technologi­cal laurels we have, we will find the leaves of our laurels plucked away one by one. Unfortunately, when one sees what we have been doing with respect to human resources and investments in R. & D. over the past 10 or 15 years, it appears that we have, indeed, been sitting down on the job. And, I might add that if the Reagan administra­tion's philosophy and budget continue to be accepted, we will go rapidly from a position of sitting down to a position of lying prostrate before the world.

Over the past 15 years the propor­tion of America's GNP invested in re­search and development has steadily declined-dropping more than 20 per­cent since 1965. During that same period and by that same measure, the Soviet Union's R. & D. investment has climbed by 21 percent, Japan's has risen by 27 percent, and West Germa­ny's by 41 percent. Over the 12-year period, 1968-1980, investment in indus­try in basic research as a fraction of net sales declined by 32 percent.

Similarly, investment by the Federal Government in basic research as a fraction of the Federal budget de­clined 27 percent over the same period. Overall, R. & D. spending by the Fed­eral Government as a fraction of the Federal budget decreased 36 percent. There are other worrisome indicators as well. At a time when domestic U.S. patents have decreased by almost 25 percent, U.S. patents of foreign origin have increased by more than 70 per­cent. Thus, the foreign origin share of total U.S. patents increased from 20 percent in 1966 to 36 percent in 1977. On top of this, we must remember that much of the R. & D. in the United States supported by Govern­ment is for defense purposes. If we look only at civilian R. & D., then we see that as a percent of GNP, civilian R. & D. in the United States rose only 10 percent during the past 14 years; in West Germany it rose 30 percent, and in Japan it rose 25 percent. Is it any wonder therefore, that during the same period manfacturing productivi­ty rose 30 percent in the United

3382 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 States, 85 percent in Germany, and 290 percent in Japan?

With statistics like these, with the knowledge that 40 to 60 percent of all technological advances occur as a result of doing basic research, and with studies showing that advances in knowledge constitute the single most important source of productivity gain in economic expansion, does it make sense to have a hands-off national policy on R. & D.? Does it make sense to have a policy that removes the prime source of investment in basic re­search, the Federal Government, from a good part of the game, in the hope that private industry will take up the slack? I submit that to even ask the question is to already give the answer, and the answer is a resounding "no."

In addition to the huge underinvest­ment in R. & D., that has been occur­ring in the United States over the past 15 years, we are failing to produce the technical people that we need to sus­tain needed increases in productivity and to make advances in knowledge that will be the basis for our economic prosperity and national security in the coming decades.

For example, last year American col­leges and universities granted 58,000 degrees in engineering. By contrast, Japan, with roughly half our popula­tion, graduated 7 4,000, and the Soviet Union graduated about 300,000 engi­neers. In the field of computer science there is an estimated demand for 54,000 graduates at the bachelor's level, but we are only supplying 13,000 graduates. The estimated demand at the master's level is for 34,000 people, we are only graduating 3,400, and at the doctoral level the estimated demand is 1,300, whereas last year we only graduated 330.

The intense demand for technically trained people has resulted in high salaries that are luring faculty and graduate students away from even our best universities. The result is unfilled faculty positions in our Nation's engi­neering colleges, and a dramatic drop in the number of scien~e and engineer­ing students who are going on for ad­vanced degrees. In 1979 for example, a full 46 percent of U.S. doctoral degrees in engineering went to foreign stu­dents-two-thirds of whom were study­ing here on temporary visas.

To complete this dismal picture, there is mounting evidence that the research labs and instrumentation in American universities are rapidly be­coming obsolete. According to an ASEE assessment, the engineering teaching equipment found in most uni­versity labs is 20 to 30 years old and equipment to teach new growth tech­nologies is almost nonexistent. Few colleges and universities can afford ex­pensive computer-aided design or com­puter-aided manufacturing teaching equipment. Yet, without such modern equipment efficiency of output is sac-

rificed, promising areas of research are foreclosed, and the ability of our uni­versities to attract and retain top-qual­ity professors and graduate students is further diminished.

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE

In the face of the international chal­lenge that I have outlined, and in the face of the clear indication that an ex­panded national R. & D. effort is needed to shore up our productivity, strengthen our national defense, and halt the scientific braindrain, what has been the response of the Reagan administration? Let us examine four specific areas: Energy, space, science education, and the national labs.

ENERGY

For over 3 years I worked, and jaw­boned, and cajoled the Carter adminis­tration to increase its funding in energy R. & D. in the areas of solar and renewables and conservation. My goal was to have this R. & D. funded at a level which would represent at least 1 percent of the cost of our annual oil import bill which was projected to be about $80 billion in fiscal year 1982. We finally got this amount and a bit more in the fiscal year 1982 budget request submitted in January 1981-about $777 million in solar and renewable energy R. & D. and $336 million for energy conserva­tion R. & D. And then what hap­pened?

At a time when the Pentagon was asking for billions more for defense-a goodly portion of which was justified on the grounds of maintaining our access to foreign oil supplies, the new administration cut $487 million or 62 percent from solar and renewable R. & D. and $248 million or 74 percent from energy conservation R. & D. for fiscal year 1982. That was in the re­vised fiscal year 1981 budget submis­sion by President Reagan, presented to the Congress on March 15, 1981.

On September 15, 1981, another re­vised budget submission came along calling for additional cuts of 12 per­cent across the board. In trying to save some of these programs, Congress de­f erred funding for some programs from 1981 to 1982. Thus, for fiscal year 1982 the amount of money avail­able for R. & D. in solar and other re­newables is $374 million, while R. & D. funds for conservation for fiscal year 1982 amount to $144 million. DOE's own Energy Research and Advi­sory Board <ERAB> disagreed with these cuts. In their report of Novem­ber 1981 they stated that:

. . . R&D funding for energy conservation and end-use technology is underfunded, par­ticularly when compared with funding levels for supply technologies. A balance . . . should be achieved by increases in funds al­located to buildings and community systems and industrial conservation.

So, what is the Reagan administra­tion's response to the ERAB report's recommendations? In fiscal year 1983

the Reagan administration is request­ing a total of only $18 million for energy conservation R. & D., which is a cut of 87.5 percent from fiscal year 1982, and a cut of 95 percent from the original Carter fiscal year 1982 figure. All this at a time when the Japanese Government has doubled its invest­ment in conservation, France's invest­ment has increased 221 percent, and Germany's commitment increased 66 percent to a level of $1 billion. In the case of solar and renewables R. & D. the Reagan figure for fiscal year 1983 is $83 million. That represents a cut of 78 percent from the amount available in fiscal year 1982 and represents nearly a 90-percent cut from the origi­nal Carter fiscal year 1982 figures.

The impact of these cuts is incalcu­lable. The programs that are being zeroed out include the industrial energy conservation program, the transportation energy conservation program, which includes the all-elec­tric and hybrid vehicle research and development, the buildings and com­munity systems conservation research program, which includes the energy efficient buildings research program at the Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratory, and the energy storage program, which includes long-term, high-risk battery R. & D. that could make elec­tric vehicles and utility load-leveling devices possible, as well as eliminate some of the practical difficulties that arise from the use of solar and renew­able energy technologies because of their intermittency.

These budget cuts may be pennywise in this year's budget, but they are ab­solutely pound stupid for the long­term interests of this Nation. Cutting basic research funding of this type is almost guaranteed to prolong the de­pendency of the free world on the Ara­bian Gulf, and the mammoth outflow of money that goes with it.

The energy efficient buildings re­search program at the Lawrence­Berkeley Laboratory has a 1,000-to-1 potential return on investment. It has been costing the Nation less than $10 million annually, but has been produc­ing technology and knowledge which have the potential of saving consum­ers and business more than $10 billion annually. None of this research is likely to be taken over by the private sector. For less than $1 million, this program produced an innovation in high-frequency ballasts for fluorescent lamps that advanced the adoption of these ballasts by 5 to 10 years and saved the U.S. ballast industry from severe foreign competition. The elec­trical savings are about 35 percent. The importance of that figure be­comes obvious when I tell you that the electricity used to run fluorescent lamps in 1981 is estimated to be ap­proximately the output of 40 base-load powerplants and costs businesses

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3383 nearly $10 billion. So every 10-percent gain in efficiency saves a billion dol­lars a year and the equivalent output of four powerplants.

The industrial energy conservation program also has major achievements to its credit. It produced innovations in coil coating, textile foam finishing, crop residue grain dryers, granulated fertilizer production, efficient slot forge furnaces, high temperature recu­perators, and cogeneration. The poten­tial energy savings coming out of this program were of the order of many tens of millions of barrels of oil equiv­alent per year, and of course, these are savings that would occur every year once the innovation is in place. All this for an investment which last year amounted to less than $50 million. Once again, there is no evidence that the projects that were being worked on under this program would be taken over by private industry.

In the case of the energy storage program, the decision by the Reagan administration to zero this program out is particularly egregious in my view. We are presently in the middle of a technological race to develop a suitable battery capable of being used in electric vehicles or in utility load­leveling markets. A number of labora­tories in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States have entered this competition, the result of which is a worldwide renaissance in battery tech­nologies. About 10 advanced battery systems are being developed for this application and many technical ad­vances have been made.

The Department of Transportation estimates that 92 percent of the non­commercial driving in the United States is done within 20 miles of our homes. General Motors and Ford have said that they intend to market elec­tric vehicles as soon as battery tech­nology permits. However, the techni­cal barriers are numerous and diffi­cult. There are cost barriers making for narrow profit margins. There are technical risks. The potential savings by the year 2000 could amount to over 400 million barrels of oil equivalent per year, not to mention the possibili­ty that powerplants which are cur­rently being planned might not have to be built, thereby freeing up a huge amount of investment capital for other purposes.

Does the administration really, seri­ously believe that the private sector will take up the slack in all these sci­entific areas that are being abandoned with such dispatch?

Here's what DOE's Energy Research and Advisory Board said about the new policy:

ERAB is concerned that some energy R&D of great potential significance for the achievement of the nation's energy goals will fall between Federal and industry re­sponsibilities.

The new policy recognizes that private in­dustry cannot be expected to do basic

energy research or projects of a long-term, higher risk character, but there are other circumstances in which it would be unrealis­tic to expect timely and effective assump­tion by industry of R&D responsibilities ab­dicated by the government, however worthy the projects involved, and despite the provi­sion of new generous tax incentives.

Thus, I ask again. Should our future be determined only by the private sec­tor's response to the level of market prices for commodities like oil? I submit this is risky at best, and may be downright dangerous for the future welfare of our country. We need look no further than to an unusually candid interview given to a pro-govern­ment Saudi newspaper in Jidda by Sheik Ahmad Yamani. In the inter­view, he stated that Saudi Arabia has opposed recent petroleum price in­creases because increases in 1979 and 1980, "caused a great rush toward in­vestment in energy technologies, with the aim of reducing consumption and developing alternative energy sources. . . . This has resulted in a drop in OPEC's share of the market from 31 million barrels per day in 1979, to less than 24 million barrels a day this year". Yamini goes on to say that such Western actions could fur­ther reduce OPEC's leverage in the future which would mean "the end of the organization". He finally adds that keeping prices low enough "to curb in­vestment in alternative sources", will insure continued Western dependence and Saudi Arabia "will be assured of obtaining income sufficient to meet its financial requirements for the next 20 or 30 years." Well, its all in that state­ment. If we refuse to be farsighted enough to provide investment in alter­native sources and in conservation in order to keep up our technological base and prepare us to switch to alter­native fuels in the future, we will be forever condemned to be at the mercy of the OPEC oil producers who are honest enough to state that they intend to keep the price low enough so that any strategy for obtaining alter­natives through market forces will fail.

SPACE

If you think that what the Reagan administration is doing to energy R. & D. is ridiculous, wait till you examine their decisions on the space program. The fiscal year 1983 budget for space shows sharp reductions for the plane­tary program. The Galileo program is now the only remaining U.S. planetary program in development. The Venus orbiting imaging radar mission which was postponed by the Reagan adminis­tration last year, is canceled this year and the fiscal year 1982 operating plan deletes the $10 million provided by Congress for this project. They are even cutting the research and analysis line items for planetary programs. The argument has been made that the United States can forego planetary ex­ploration for the next decade because

we still have a great deal of data from past spacecraft to analyze, but now the funding is being cut for this data analysis function. In addition, some of the older space probes which continue to return data from their locations in space may be turned off because of in­sufficient funds for continued tracking and data acquisition. This action would affect Pioneer-10 which is now the farthest manmade object from Earth. Funds have also been cut for technology transfer and technology utilization programs, as well as for the construction and launching of a satel­lite to test new advances in communi­cation. Last, but of extreme impor­tance to our economy, aeronautics re­search and technology has been cut by more than one-third from NASA's original request to OMB-this for a program which helped us to achieve and maintain our technological lead in commercial aircraft around the world and which the Department of Defense still says is important to our national security. And I say "of extreme impor­tance to our economy" because sales abroad of U.S. aircraft are second only to agriculture in our balance-of-pay­ments tally sheets. Is this the time to cut back on aeronautics research, at a time when the Europeans are chal­lenging us with the development of the airbus, when the Japanese and even the Brazilians are thinking of launching major forays into the inter­national aircraft market? I submit once again the answer is "no."

And, more generally, what about all of the technological spinoffs from the space program that have helped to raise our standard of living and that have kept us ahead in the internation­al race for technological supremacy? I am talking about satellite communica­tions technology, the microelectronics industry, and hundreds of new con­sumer items based upon new materials for packaging and clothing. Is turning off this type of activity what we should be doing at a time of increasing international competitiveness? Is this what you would call leadership, fore­sight, and orientation toward the future? Not in my book.

SCIENCE EDUCATION

The administration claims that it is interested in the future. That it is in­terested in supporting long-term, high­risk, potentially high payoff R. & D. activities which the private sector will not support. They like to point to the increase in the budget of the National Science Foundation, which is up by 7. 7 percent for fiscal year 1983 over fiscal year 1982 if you do not take inflation into account. What the administration prefers to ignore is the zeroing out of NSF's request for funds to upgrade university laboratories and, in addi­tion, the 70-percent reduction that they forced on NSF in the science edu­cation budget. Now is not that a won-

3384 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 derful way of insuring that we will get the amount of engineers and hard sci­entists that we are going to need in the future? I wonder if the administra­tion is considering population and de­mographics. The birth rate has gone down and college-age populations are going to be decreasing for a number of years into the future. Besides that, only 6 percent of U.S. college gradu­ates are engineers or hard scientists, as opposed to over 35 percent in West Germany, or 20 percent in Japan. We are right to be concerned as to wheth­er we will be able to meet the demand for technical people in the future. We are also right to be concerned about whether we will continue to have the kind of social and political climate in the United States that is supportive of the work of technical people. All of this requires better scientific and tech­nological literacy within our popula­tion. But for the sake of saving a few million dollars at the National Science Foundation the administration is will­ing to give up on attempts to create more scientifically and technologically minded young people. That says a great deal about the administration's attitude toward the technical manpow­er of tomorrow.

THE NATIONAL LABS

What about the technical manpower of today? Here is what is happening at our national laboratories. At Argonne, which is deeply involved in energy and environmental research, 600 positions already have been cut. The laborato­ry's Director says 600 additional em­ployees may have to be laid off. At Brookhaven National Laboratory, 270 of 3,600 employees have been laid off and officials say further cuts may eliminate 25 percent of the work force within the year. At the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, which I talked about earlier, the staff was trimmed by 200 people after the March budget projections, about 12 percent of the staff. The laboratory's Deputy Direc­tor has been quoted as saying that an additional 200 to 300 people may be let go in a worst-case situation. At the NASA Lewis Laboratory in Cleveland, a center which employs 2,700 persons, and which some years ago employed 5,500, more than 200 full-time equiva­lent slots are scheduled for the ax in 1983. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Pasadena may end up having so little to do because of the cutbacks in the planetary program at NASA that its best people will inevitably start drifting away.

The administration seems not to re­alize that it takes 8 to 9 years to produce a Ph. D. scientist, and years and years and years to assemble a top­notch research team and carry a proj­ect to fruition. When funding disap­pears even for a year, so do the people, they cannot just sit and wait, highly competent teams breakup, teams that are valuable national resources-and

you cannot necessarily bring them back without additional years of build­up later on.

As Dr. John McCarthy, head of the NASA-Lewis Laboratory put it:

It is time that this country came to its senses and supported the vital research and technology necessary for national economic health. Cyclical, inadequate funding is the road to disaster.

He is absolutely right. This Nation is what it is because we have from our founding days put more effort into pushing back the frontiers of knowl­edge, of learning the new and putting it to work, than any nation in history.

WHY GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF RESEARCH IS NECESSARY

The mood in this administration, and in many places outside it, that Government should leave well enough alone, even in the R. & D. area. In answer to that let me quote what President Harry Truman said to a joint session of the Congress on Sep­tember 6, 1945, only 3 weeks after VJ Day:

Progress in scientific research and devel­opment is an indispensible condition to the future welfare and security of the nation. No nation can maintain a position of leader­ship in the world of today, unless it develops to the full its scientific and technological re­sources. No government adequately meets its responsibilities unless it generously and intelligently supports the work of science in university, industry, and in its own laborato­ries.

We must remember that much in­dustrial R. & D. is devoted simply to meeting the requirements of Govern­ment regulation, rather than to the kinds of risk-taking research that promises true technological break­throughs. Basic research by definition will rarely result in an immediately salable end product, so it is not attrac­tive to most businesses. But, it is the new information that comes together that makes later commerically usable products possible.

Let me be clear. In no way am I sug­gesting that the Government should seek either to compete with, or sup­plant the business community's re­search and development efforts. Both efforts should be complementary and, wherever possible, symbiotic.

I have spent a lot of time giving my views on what is wrong with our present situation in the area of science and technology, research and develop­ment.

Now I want to say a few words about what, specifically we ought to be doing about it.

First. Increase financial support for scientific and technological research. We should restore funding for re­search programs that have potentially high payoffs and which the private sector will not pick up. Government funding for basic research should be stable and predictable, and should be given on a multiyear basis for selected fields of particular importance to the

health of our economy or national se­curity. Such stability of funding should be available to our best univer­sities, nonprofit research institutions, and Government laboratories. In addi­tion we must upgrade the equipment in our university laboratories. Finally, we should remove artificial impedi­ments to increased support that have hampered the ability of the Depart­ment of Defense to support basic re­search along a sufficiently wide spec­trum.

Second. Alleviate shortages of tech­nical personnel with advanced train­ing, including faculty at our schools of engineering. Our brightest students should be given incentives to go on to postgraduate training, and our scien­tists must receive adequate compensa­tion commensurate with their abilities and contributions. Incentives for in­dustry-endowed university chairs and/ or the use of industrial laboratory equipment for graduate training and research should be explored.

Third. Provide incentives for better university-industry cooperation in areas of both basic and applied re­search. Industry must recognize some responsibilities to support the training of the next generation of scientists that will be of use to it, and the uni­versities should recognize that raising the health of our technology is part of the key toward increasing the econom­ic benefits that mean more support for university activities. At the same time, we must insure that increased univer­sity-industy cooperation does not lead to a significant loss of university inde­pendence to play its traditional role of pursuing knowledge for its own sake.

Fourth. Improve and expand science and mathematics education at our pri­mary and secondary schools. We can build the society of the future only if our population is scientifically and technologically literate. A first step in this direction is to restore the science education program at the National Science Foundation. In addition, we must explore ways of increasing the supply and training of science and math teachers at the precollege level.

Fifth. Improve the climate for re­search, development, and technologi­cal innovation within the private sector. We should seek to implement additional incentives for R. & D. wher­ever necessary and effective. In this regard, a reexamination of our patent policy would be valuable. We should also reexamine our antitrust laws to see if we have unnecessarily restricted cooperative R. & D. ventures within industry.

Sixth. Develop a coherent national science and technology policy, and raise the visibility and the voice of the science and technology community in the making of such policy. Decisions about support for research on energy, space, and health should not be made

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3385 only by lawyers and accountants. If the Office of Science and Technology Policy cannot be sufficiently effective in this role then we should start think­ing seriously about creating a Cabinet­level Department of Science and Tech­nology as a focal point for Federal nondefense research activities. Such a Department could probably include the present Department of Energy's energy research and development, NASA, the multiprogram national labs, NSF, NOAA, NBS, possibly the major Federal statistical agencies, and possibly a national engineering foun­dation to do for applied research what NSF has done for basic research.

It is my intention to introduce legis­lation to deal with some of the above issues in the near future.

Another point: From all the above concerns, and through all the genera­tions since our founding days, has come the matrix of new ideas that has provided the new industries, the new businesses, and products and services to trade not only domestically, but in international commerce.

That has meant jobs, employment, Americans at work in fields the rest of the world will follow. Short-term job protection in the United States may benefit from tariffs on quotas on for­eign imports, but stable long-term jobs into the future can and will come only from our willingness to stay ahead of the world in information, in knowl­edge, in new ways of doing things, in out-inventing, out-researching, out-in­novating, and out-producing any other nation on Earth. We will not maintain that preeminence by default, we must earn it. It is the key to jobs for the future and the economic health of our Nation in an increasingly competitive world.

I invite my colleagues to join me in sending a message to the executive branch of our Government. The mes­sage is that greatness cannot emerge from the stifling of either macro- or micro-exploration of the unknown in the name of economic ideology; that the future will not be ours if we seek only the return of the past; that we have cast our lot as a people and a nation with giving man the freedom and the resources to use his ingenuity to find a better way-and that our character as a people is reflected by our commitment to this ideal.e

MORE SOVIET DISINFORMATION UNMASKED

e Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, Soviet doctrinal concepts have long called for the achievement of overall military su­periority. A significant part of the Soviet effort to achieve this goal is fo­cused on disrupting Western military programs. To this end, the Soviets employ a variety of techniques includ­ing disinformation, propaganda, diplo­matic pressure, and direct threats, and

sabotage, directed against government officials, allies, influential individuals, organizations, the media, and acade­mia.

The disruptive-and from the Soviet point of view, successful-effects have been particularly noticeable in the strategic nuclear weapons field, begin­ning under Stalin, intensifying under Khrushchev, and growing more so­phisticated under Brezhnev. The fol­lowing comment that appeared in Orbis several years ago on activities as­sociated with the resumption of at­mospheric nuclear weapons testing in 1961-62 illustrates the problem and, of special interest, the Presidential im­portance accorded to it:

Khrushchev savagely shattered the nucle­ar test moratorium with a sixty-megaton monster blast. Washington confidently sat back expecting worldwide protest demon­strations. It got a rude shock; the protest demonstrations came only when President Kennedy began pondering whether Ameri­can security required new tests. As a result, the President appointed his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, to head a cabinet-level study of the problem of subversion and the Ameri­can tools of statecraft.

More recently, the Soviets have been employing direct influence tactics to block NATO theater nuclear force modernization. While some data has been collected and published to show that the Soviet propaganda effort is both extensive and effective, there has been no known effort to lay out the full dimensions of the Soviet effort, assess its effectiveness, and identify approaches that can be undertaken to counteract such efforts.

A brief listing of possib ~ disinforma­tion cases in the 1960's an 1 1970's sug­gests that the Soviet d~ ·nformation program may be far mm e effective than most people would s1 tspect, and that if the United Sta'· ... does not begin to understand tr and learn how to counter it, all maj<. U.S. weap­ons programs will be subjt ~t to eff ec­tive Soviet manipulation.

I shall place in the REC'JRD the arti­cle entitled "The Growin5 Disinforma­tion Problem," that was Jublished this past fall in the Intemat onal Security Review. This article by Dr. Joseph Douglass describes the Soviet appara­tus behind these efforts and presents actual examples where Government and private industry analvses of de­fense issues have been gror sly mislead by Soviet disinformation.

Douglass became intensely interest­ed in this problem several years ago when he began to suspect problems of accuracy and validity with various types of intelligence data. Further work with high level defectors con­vinced him of both the need to care­fully scrutinize all data, including the sources and methods by which it was collected, and simultaneously the in­ability to do this and disinclination within the Government to take the disinformation problem seriously. One

of the more profound statements of the problem, was the very succinct statement by the former Deputy Di­rector of Counterintelligence at CIA, Mr. Raymond Rocca:

So we come to the real question: How does one get people at the political level, or even at the high or medium-high decisionmaking level within the intelligence organization to recognize that deception is a real problem?

It seems appropriate for Congress to focus some attention on the disinfor­mation problem. The attached article sheds important light on the growing problem of identifying and coping with Soviet propaganda and disinfor­mation. Dr. Douglass has analyzed some significant and heretofore un­known cases of Soviet disinformation. If further research into these cases proves that Soviet disinformation has in fact been as effective as Douglass suggests, then the problem is of utmost seriousness to U.S. national se­curity.

The article follows: THE GROWING DISINFORMATION PROBLEM

<By Joseph D. Douglass, Jr.> The importance of being sensitive to

Soviet-directed disinformation has gained considerable currency over the past few years. For many years the topic was kept under cover; now it is beginning to emerge and find its way into the popular market with such books as The Spike, into military publications such as The Retired Officer, which as recently as April 1981 had a disin­formation article entitled, "Russia's Propa­ganda Machine"; and into such specialized newsletters as the Accuracy in Media Re­ports.

Perhaps the major reason behind this emergence is a growing concern in the West over the possible effectiveness of Soviet dis­information in disrupting and derailing Western foreign policy and national securi­ty programs.

For example, in the early 1970's, the KGB used disinformation to bring about the U.S. decision to stop its chemical and biological warfare <CBW> research and preparedness activities. The result of this now is seen re­flected in the gross U.S./Soviet disparity in CW and BW capabilities.

In the mid-1970's, the Soviets carried out a massive program to convince the United States that the Soviet Union shared certain U.S. views on the impossibility of nuclear war and on the need to limit arms. They denied having any interest in a first-strike capability or in achieving military superiori­ty. This disinformation, if that is what it was, most likely was directed at countering new U.S. strategic nuclear programs <e.g., the B-1, MX, and cruise missile) none of which has yet emerged and simultaneously at lessening the impact of the new Soviet strategic nuclear systems <e.g., SS-18, SS-19, and SS-20 missiles> all of which now are operational. These possible disinformation themes were accepted without question in many official U.S. circles.

Later in the 1970's, Soviet disinformation efforts became most blatant in opposing NATO nuclear modernization, particularly the neutron bomb and long-range theater nuclear force weapons.

Of special concern in the late 1970's in the political area was the effectiveness of the Soviets in denigrating the U.S. image in the

3386 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 critical Middle East, and especially in turn­ing major portions of the Moslem communi­ty in that area of the world against the United States, for example, by accusing the U.S. of being behind the attack on the Grand Mosque at Mecca in November 1979.

The Soviets' most recent efforts in the 1980's can be seen in their campaign against the space shuttle and its possible military application, their support of various terror­ist and revolutionary activities <e.g., El Sal­vador), and their efforts to undermine U.S. policy concerning these activities and the affected countries.

Soviet disinformation has been very suc­cessful <and there still is very little appre­ciation of the magnitude of its success over the past 30 years), perhaps, because there is in general so little concern for the problem and so little sensitivity to the techniques being employed. In reviewing the broader problem of deception, within which disinfor­mation is imbedded, the former deputy chief of the counterintelligence staff, CIA, remarked as recently as 1980, that the real question is how to get people at the political level, or even at the high or medium-high decisionmaking level within the intelligence organization, to recognize that the problem is a real problem. 1

Another reason for disinformation's suc­cess may be the common tendency of people in the West to read what they want to read, hear what they want to hear, and see what they want to see. This is one reason that the Soviet literature is discounted by many who believe it can be used to support any desired position. This tendency also may lie behind Lenin's famous guidance to the first head of the Soviet Secret Police, Felix Dzerzhinskiy, when he sought counsel on the techniques to use in deceiving the West. Lenin advised, "Tell them what they want to believe."

This problem is further compounded be­cause of the variety of ways in which words, written or spoken, can be interpreted. Take for example the concept of warning. A warning can be such as a friend might pro­vide to alert someone or some country to a possible danger, for example, of an enemy preparing for war. Alternatively, the same warning could be meant or taken more in the context of a warden addressing a new prisoner; two different types of warnings and, possibly leading to different courses of action or inaction.

Another good example is the word "bal­ance." Balance can be used in the sense of measuring a degree of equivalency, as it often is used in the West in referring to the military or strategic balance. It can also be used in the sense of a ratio or collection of ingredients; for example, the proper balance of ingredients in a medicine, which has no sense of equivalency in it. Used in this sense, an appropriate balance of forces can mean superiority; that is, imbalance, if that is what is considered desirable.

A similar problem is caused by the very different meanings associated with words such as war, peace, neutrality, and defense when used in a Marxist-Leninist context. For example, the Soviet leaders definitely want peace, but peace, as they use the word, is only achieved when the threat of war, i.e., capitalism, no longer exists, which is quite different from the concept that Westerners have in mind when they speak of peace.

Similarly, peaceful coexistence to the So­viets does not describe a condition of inter­national harmony, but rather the process by which capitalism is to be destroyed without world war. For example, as stated in 1965 in

Footnotes at end of article.

the official journal of the Ministry of De­fense, "Capitalism, as the main obstacle on the way to the progressive development of human society, must and should be elimi­nated by the revolutionary struggle of the popular masses under conditions of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems-world war is not necessary for this." 2

Another general problem is the lack of long-range planning in the West. Disinfor­mation, in general acts gradually, and when applied gradually, it is most deceptive and effective. This is one reason why disinfor­mation plans are incorporated in the first instance in the Soviet Union as part of its Long-Range Global Plan and why disinfor­mation should be viewed as a component of strategic deception. In disinformation, many meachanism, many sources, are applied over a long period of time. This is why a long­term perspective and interest and a high degree of access to multi-source data are critical to identify and confirm what is hap­pening. Insofar as none of these conditions tend to exist anywhere in the U.S. govern­ment, the problem of coping with or com­bating Soviet-directed disinformation is fur­ther exacerbated.

The U.S. limited appreciation of Soviet long-range planning also is reflected in in­telligence analyses of Soviet strategic inten­tions. In recent Congressional hearings on this subject, Professor Richard Pipes point­ed out, "The fundamental problem is that the people drafting these estimates [Nation­al Intelligence Estimates] do not believe that there is such a thing as a Russian or Soviet grand strategy, for which reason they deal with each aspect of Soviet behav­ior separately. They deal with politics and military affairs separately, economics, pro­pagada and ideology separately, and then within each of these categories, with each item, such as each weapon system, separate­ly." 3 With disinformation, each individual piece seem innocuous, relatively harmless, and may be easily dismissed. However, until one puts the pieces together, studies their variety, and examines them and their effect with a long-term perspective and in the con­text of Soviet national strategy, such casual assessment may be grossly in error.

A closely related problem, equally serious in the West, is the tendency to discount dis­information as mere propaganda. Disinfor­mation should not be confused with propa­ganda. Propaganda, as it is understood in the West, is an important tool used as a sup­port element of disinformation. 4 But propa­ganda, per se, lacks the "precision and bite" of disinformation. As suggested above, disin­formation is much more akin to deception, strategic deception.

According to Soviet terminology, disinfor­mation is not just false or incorrect informa­tion. Disinformation also includes mislead­ing and incomplete information, which can contain strong elements of truth, that is "passed, fed, or confirmed to a targeted indi­vidual, group or activity." 5 The subject tar­geted, therefore, is not just a country. Spe­cial groups, for example, intelligence organi­zations, Congress, religious groups, acade­mia, and so forth, are all important targets of Soviet disinformation operation. Espe­cially important targets are individuals with special influence, e.g., teachers, religious leaders, and news commentators, and those with important decisionmaking authority, e.g., financial, industrial and, of course, to political leaders.

The recent CIA study Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda presented a clear definition of strategic disinformation that

was taken from a Soviet KGB training manual. Strategic disinformation, the manual explains, is used in support of State tasks. It is directed to mislead the enemy concerning basic questions of State policy, the military-economic status, and the scien­tific-technical achievements of the Soviet Union; the policy of certain imperialist states with respect to each other and to other countries; and the specific counterin­telligence tasks of the organs of State Secu­rity. 6

Certain types of tasks that disinformation contributes to are also identified in the CIA study. Additional tasks were identified in an earlier CIA release that was printed in the Congressional Record in 1965. 7 Priority Soviet disinformation tasks taken from these two CIA releases are:

Confuse world public opinion regarding the aggressive nature of certain Soviet poli­cies;

Create a favorable environment for the ·execution of Soviet foreign policy;

Influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military and political programs which are perceived as threaten­ing the Soviet Union;

Destory the confidence of the Congress and the American public in U.S. personnel and agencies engaged in anticommunist and cold war activity;

Undermine American prestige and demo­cratic institutions and denigrate American leaders with NATO governments and other non-communist countries; thereby contrib­uting directly to the breakup of the NATO alliance;

Sow distrust and create grounds for sub­version and revolt against the United States in the Western Hemisphere and among the new nations of Africa and Asia.

The close coupling between disinforma­tion and intelligence can be seen by compar­ing the above tasks with six specific tasks that Czech intelligence sevices were directed to assist the KGB with as part of the Soviet long-range plan that was developed in the late 1960's. According to a high-level Czech political officer, General Major Jan Sejna, who was granted political asylum by the United States in 1968, these tasks were stra­tegic civilian intelligence tasks of a long­term nature directed against the West, most specifically against NATO, and in direct support of the Soviet strategy of "peaceful coexistence." They were:

Discredit antiprogressive forces, for exam­ple, the Christian Democratic party leaders in West Germany, the de Gaulle party in France, the Social Democratic party in Aus­tria, the Conservative party in the United Kingdom, and the Christian Democratic party in Italy.

Support individuals and organizations who support the Soviet position on arms control proposals.

Discredit military-industrial complexes. Exacerbate internal NATO disharmony. Infiltrate international financial circles

<these are regarded as the best barometers for reading the economic and political cli­mate in capitalistic countries).

Isolate China economically from the West and politically from the third world. 8

This author's concern about Soviet disin­formation has grown mainly as a result of many hours of conversation with Mr. Sejna. Until the defection of General Pecepa in the late 1970's, Sejna was not only one of the highest ranking officers to leave the communist bloc, but also one of the best in­formed. Beginning in the mid-1950's, he had held very responsive positions in the highest

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3387 decisionmaking bodies in Czechoslovakia, in­cluding Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Defense; Working Secretary of the Defense Committee, which met on a weekly basis and had responsibility for fomulating policy and approving all military and intelligence operations; First Party Secretary at the Ministry of Defense and as such a member of the Kolegium of the Ministry of Defense; member of the Administrative Department, which controlled the military, justice, and the secret police; and member of the Cen­tral Committee of the Czech Communist party. His position drew him into frequent formal and informal contact with high-level political leaders of the Soviet Union <e.g., Khrushchev, Suslov, Grechko, Ponomarev, Brezhnev, and so forth) and with similar leaders from other communist and third world countries.

When he defected in February 1968, his character was directly attacked by the Czech and Soviet governments, perhaps be­cause of his wide ranging knowledge and well-disciplined memory. His bona fides have also been widely questioned in the West, perhaps in a sense for similar reasons and because what he had to say was so con­trary to the spirit of detente and certainly was not what many people wanted to hear. In the summer of 1975, Lord Chalfont, writ­ing in The Times <London), initiated a series of three articles dealing with Sejna's de­scription of the Soviet Long-Range Strate­gic Plan that was developed in the late 1960's to coordinate all Warsaw Pact efforts in their war against the capitalist West.9

The third article was delayed for several weeks. As explained by Lord Chalfont, the reason was pressure, both to suppress the story and to discredit General Sejna and di­minish the value of the information on Soviet foreign policy which he brought with him from Czechoslovakia. Lord Chalfont de­scribed these problems and his own efforts to verify the bona fides of General Sejna and the information. He "checked relevant details with independent sources who con­firmed in every case the factual accuracy of what General Sejna had said." I followed a similar practice whenever possible and the result has been the same.

As described by Sejna, 10 the main center of all strategy and policy in the Soviet Union is the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union <CPSU>. The party reigns supreme and within the party, the decisionmaking au­thority regarding deception and disinforma­tion resides with the First Secretary. While there are differences of opinion regarding the role and importance that various Soviet organizations play in disinformation, the following all appear to be heavily involved: The Politburo, the Defense Commmittee <Council), the Administration Department, the Department of Ideology, the Interna­tional Department, the International Infor­mation Department, the Department of Propaganda, the Department of Press, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and its research institutes, and of course the Com­mittee for State Security, the KGB.

The Politburo appears to be less involved than many would suspect. Its main occupa­tion is the day-to-day running of the party, not foreign policy, military matters, or intel­ligence. Its main formal involvement comes as an adjunct to its review and approval of the Soviet Long-Range Global Plan, the Po­litburo reviews the plan each year and ap­proves the goals, the methods by which the goals are to be achieved, and the decisions on who will participate and how, and how

the satellites will be exploited. Strategic de­ception and disinformation plans, in general terms, are included and approved as part of this plan.

The two most important bodies for decep­tion operations are probably the Defense Committee and the Administration Depart­ment. The Defense Committee represents and directs all the people in charge of na­tional defense, intelligence, and counterin­telligence. Only the Defense Committee is empowered to approve the long-term devel­opment of military forces of the Soviet Union, to approve the long-term plans of KGB intelligence and GRU <defense) intel­ligence, and only the Defense Committee is empowered to approve the integral strategic deception and disinformation plans. The Defense Committee decides, additionally, what information regarding these plans the First Secretary, or Secretary General, should give to the Politburo, and nothing else goes to the Politburo from the Defense Committee. The Defense Committee is in­volved with deception and disinformation planning and implementation worldwide. Topics addressed by the Defense Committee range far beyond what the West would nor­mally associate with military or defense matters. Some examples include: infiltration of foreign media; exploitation of religions; political differences between foreign politi­cal organizations and minorities; influence in foreign elections; actions to support sepa­ratist tendencies in various foreign leaders; and support for terrorist movements in the form of money, training, and technology. These all have important disinformation as­pects.

The lead deception oversight department is the Administration Department. This de­partment is one of the two most powerful departments in the communist system. This department controls the military forces, the police or KGB forces, and the legal mecha­nism or justice organization. Insofar as this department has control over both the GRU and KGB, it exercises the most important control mechanism for carrying out decep­tion and disinformation through the intelli­gence and counterintelligence services of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The second, generally most powerful, de­partment of the Central Committee is the Organization Department. This department controls the party mechanism. This depart­ment has control over personnel and posi­tions. This department is where the party strategy is prepared and where the Central Committee's interest in deception and disin­formation is most direct.

There is no counterpart to the Ideology Department in the West, yet this is an ex­tremely important department and one to which very high responsibility is assigned in the Soviet Union. This department is re­sponsible for exploiting Marxism-Leninism and for ensuring that Soviet strategy main­tains a proper course and heading. From an ideological point of view, this department can manipulate the communist movement, the social democratic parties, and other or­ganizations. As such, it has important con­trol over the Soviet propaganda machinery such as the press, television, and so forth, It is, for practical purposes, on a higher level of importance than either the Press Depart­ment or the Department of Propaganda.

The Ideology Department is also interest­ing in a very different, but possibly related, sense. Very little is known about this de­partment in the West, including its very ex­istence, which has not been confirmed. It is possible that the Department does not exist

as a "formal" Central Committee Depart­ment. It is also possible that its existence is secret to deliberately deemphasize the im­portance of ideology today in the Soviet system.

The International Department exercises control in varying degrees over the Soviet diplomatic corps, the diplomatic corps of the satellite nations, worldwide communist and revolutionary movements, the so-called democratic organizations, and so forth. Many of these frequently are used to dis­seminate Soviet propaganda and views. This department also has significant influence over KGB and GRU operations abroad.

The International Information Depart­ment of the CPSU directs the external Soviet propaganda effort. This department also has important information collection responsibilities. Its formation was an­nounced in March 1978 as part of a Central Committee decision to reorganize the entire foreign propaganda apparatus, improve its effectiveness, and open a new propaganda offensive against the West. 11 Other evi­dence suggests that this department may have come into existence in 1972. Creation of this new organization signaled the top leadership's desire to place even greater em­phasis on the role of propaganda in Soviet foreign policy and to increase centralized control and coordination of the entire Soviet propaganda network, ensuring that the network would be fully responsive to the demands of top policymakers and could be quickly mobilized to disseminate selected propaganda themes on a worldwide basis. As described in Humint, the head of this De­partment, Leonid Zamyatin, was initially a Soviet intelligence officer in charge of avia­tion and atomic energy. He also attended the Higher Diplomatic School and served in the United States for several years in high diplomatic capacities. Subsequently he was Deputy Director of the American Depart­ment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Press Department.12

A very important role is played by the Ministry of Defense, Department of Special Propaganda, which is supervised directly by the chief of the Main Political Administra­tion and the chief of the GRU. This depart­ment is responsible for collecting very im­portant information on governments, politi­cal leaders, military policy leaders, political parties, and influential persons in special­ized fields, such as economics, journalism, law, and so forth. This information is col­lected from open journals, the press, intelli­gence services and agents abroad, diplomatic corps, and other organizations, such as trade and union organizations, and of course, local communist parties. This infor­mation is collected first for party propagan­da use in peacetime for blackmail, for decep­tion and disinformation, and for informa­tion for party, military, and intelligence leaders; and second, for the preparation for war and revolution in each country. The De­partment of Special Propaganda also has the mechanisms and technology required to carry out deception and disinformation in war and revolutionary situations. For exam­ple, this department has its own mobile radio and television stations and the author­ity to use the air force and other services for flights over enemy territory to disseminate information.

Any discussion of the Soviet disinf orma­tion organization structure would be incom­plete without special mention of the Re­search Institutes of the Academy of Sci-ences, such as the Institute of World Econo-

3388 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 my and International Relations <IMEMO> and the Institute of the USA and Canada. This latter institute has been reported by a high-level Soviet defector as being under KGB control. 13 These institutes play impor­tant roles in collecting data and in the plan­ning and execution of operations. The Soviet disinformation efforts are designed by people with excellent knowledge of the targeted country. Disinformation planners are intimately familiar with all aspects of Western governments' finance, industry, media, legal systems, influential people, and organizations-information that the West graciously makes available for them. The studies of the research institutes, especially those oriented to the West, are not naive or heavy-handed. They are extremely sophisti­cated and up to date. As has been seen in the case of SALT, members of these insti­tutes also play major roles in communica­tion to <i.e., deceiving) the West, both orally and through the media.

It is interesting to note here that there has been emerging what may be a disinfor­mation effort to convince the various coun­tries being studied that the Soviet research institutes are ineffective and unimportant­that their reports only gather dust, a condi­tion that is highly believable in the West considering its own think-tank studies. In a similar manner, there also seems to be an effort to create the impression that field re­ports from diplomats and intelligence agents abroad tend to reflect what the writ­ers believe Moscow wants to hear and hence are also ineffective and misleading.

Tactical disinformation, according to the CIA quotations from the KGB training manual, is used in support of strategic disin­formation and, "in fact, comprises the prin­cipal disinformation work of the organs of State Security." The manual also notes that "disinformation on strategic matters falls within the jurisdiction of the government, the appropriate ministries and committees, and the high command of the country's armed forces. The organs of State Security constantly render assistance to other de­partments on this matter .... " 14

The important point here is that disinfor­mation is a state activity directed by the party. The KGB is only one of the State's implementing instruments. The KGB con­tributes and renders assistance to others. But, disinformation is spread far wider and, as indicated in the quotation, involves many ministries, committees, and of major impor­tance, the military high command. This con­trasts with another possible disinformation task, which appears oriented to "lay the blame" for disinformation and deception on the KGB, often referred as the "Center," possibly to make further use of the connota­tions associated with the word "center." One explanation for this task is that by so doing, the political and military leaders are placed above or outside of this insideous art by inference. But, as indicated in the quota­tion, nothing could be farther from the truth.

Deception and disinformation are carried out by the communist party, and within the party, by the KGB, the Ministry of Defense, the GRU, the Ministry of Foreign Policy, Press, and so forth. Within the Central Committee, each Secretary is responsible for how deception and disinformation are carried out within his respective depart­ment, organization, and ministry. At the same time, all these groups work under the bureau of the management of the Defense Committee and party apparatus, which con­trols how deception is carried out and ana­lyzes its results.

Soviet satellites also are involved in a co­ordinated manner. When the various plans have been approved within the Soviet Union, the satellites receive directions and guidance on how to prepare their own plans, and on which operations to incorporate in their own plans. Subsequently, each Warsaw Pact country prepares its plans, and again the critical organizations that do the planning are the counterpart ministries and departments of the Central Committees, ci­vilian and military intelligence, and counter­intelligence.

Here it is very important to recognize that the Soviet representatives participate at both the civilian and military intelligence headquarters of the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet representatives control the prep­aration of the satellite nation plans, and they have the authority to ensure that all directions from the Soviet Union are incor­porated in these plans.

Once these plans are prepared, they are presented to headquarters in Moscow, and, if approved, are subsequently presented to the Defense Committees of each of the sat­ellite countries. After the plan is approved by the Defense Committee, the agencies participating in the deception and disinfor­mation components of the plan are directed to carry out that plan through the decisions of the Defense Committee. Subsequently, each department, along with its intelligence organization and other committees, pre­pares its own plan-again, under the pres­ence and control of Soviet representatives. Thus, at all stages, Soviet representatives within the headquarters of intelligence and counterintelligence are able to monitor and control all details throughout the process of preparing detailed plans.

As indicated earlier, one good example of the nature of Soviet combined disinforma­tion planning and its effectiveness was the communist anti-neutron bomb campaign. To convey an idea of the range of activities un­dertaken in this case, President Brezhnev wrote letters to every Western government warning each that the neutron bomb was a serious threat to detente. The Dutch com­munists organized an "International Forum against the Neutron Bomb," which culmi­nated in a march of some 40,000 people. In Istanbul, a "peace committee" demonstrat­ed in front of the U.S. Consulate General. In Stuttgart, Frankfurt, and Dusseldorf, front groups delivered notes to U.S. Consul­ates General; in Bonn, two Soviet journal­ists were observed at a demonstration at the U.S. embassy; a front group in Lima, Peru sent a protest to the U.N.; in Tanzania, a World Peace Council delegation sought propaganda assistance from President Nyer­ere.15 And finally, a former CIA covert­action specialist described what he believes may have been the culminating blow when a group of devout "believers" demonstrated in front of the church in Washington where President Carter was attending services. As the specialist described the event, the Presi­dent saw their demonstration, went back to the White House, and canceled production of the weapon.1 s

A good example of the role of the Soviet research institutes in this campaign is a very incisive, succinct chapter by Professor M. Milshtein of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in the 1978 SIPRI book Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives. Professor Milshtein is also a Lieutenant General in the Soviet Army and an identi­fied former GRU officer, formerly with the General Staff Academy, facts overlooked in the SIPRI book. The principal points em-

phasized by Milshtein, referencing Western literature and directed toward NATO nucle­ar weapons, are: first, there is no such thing as a tactical nuclear weapon; second, the use of nuclear weapons can only lead to the de­struction and annihilation of Europe; third, there is no rational doctrine for their use; fourth, the weapons should not be improved because the improvements do not lessen the danger of nuclear war, rather they drastical­ly increase its possibility; fifth, any use, however limited, can lead to an irreversible escalation from tactical conflict to all-out nuclear war, and hence, can be an ominous step toward global nuclear disaster; and sixth, therefore, nuclear weapons must not be improved but must be reduced and com­pletely removed from all probable thea­ters.11 This message has been consistently communicated to the West since the early 1960's. It is quite different from the message contained in Soviet literature that is intend­ed for the Soviet military and that empha­sizes that Soviet forces must prepare to fight and win tactical nuclear wars. 18

The CIA estimates that the Soviets invest­ed over $100,000,000 in the antineutron bomb campaign from 1977 to 1980, or more than $30 million per year, which also should say something about how the Soviets view the potential of this weapon for NATO de­fense and alliance cohesiveness. This ex­penditure covered subsidies to West Europe­an communist parties, suborning of noncom­munists, contributions to common cause type affairs as quid pro quo for cooperation, direct advertisement, travel of Soviet and Bloc lobbyists to the West, and of Western groups to the USSR, where they could be influenced. 19 It apparently did not cover other "active measures" or clandestine oper­ations that might also have been part of the overall effort.

If the Soviets spent over $30 million per year just to defeat the neutron bomb, how much might they be spending to block mod­ernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear de­terrent. Considering the relative importance of the two areas, several hundred million dollars per year would not seem unduly ex­cessive. On the other hand, even if it were only $100 million per year, the magnitude of the problem this could create <or has cre­ated) could be enormous. Occasionally, this has stimulated some Presidential interest. For example, using the 1961-1962 nuclear test resumption as an example, as explained in an Orbis book review years ago:

"Khrushchev savagely shattered the nu­clear test moratorium with a sixty-megaton monster blast. Washington confidently sat back expecting worldwide protest demon­strations. It got a rude shock: the demon­stration came only when President Kennedy began pondering whether American security required new tests. As a result, the Presi­dent appointed his brother, Robert F. Ken­nedy, to head a cabinet level study of the problems of subversion and the American tools of statecraft." 20

The most difficult problem in dealing with disinformation is probably confirmation. It is very difficult to verify something as subtle and secretive as disinformation: and, indeed, perhaps the best an analyst can hope to achieve most of the time is merely to raise in the minds of the appropriate people the possibility that they may be being misled. This problem is exacerbated because there are many different and con­trasting beliefs that cannot be classified simply as right or wrong. While one may easily believe that something is merely propaganda or disinformation when it looks

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3389 wrong, the problem is how to demonstrate that this conclusion is indeed reasonable and then convince someone else that the in­formation may be tainted-especially when the information agrees with his or her pre­disposition.

For example, there are a number of recur­rent themes, all of which are likely to be true to a certain extent, that many intelli­gence officers, analysts, Soviettologists, po­litical scientists, high-level decisionmakers, and so forth believe to reflect correctly the state of affairs in the Soviet Union. At the same time, others believe that the publiciz­ing of these same themes is basically disin­formation, used either to establish credibil­ity <that is, to provide the proper setting) for other disinformation or as psychological efforts to "disarm" the West by communi­cating a message that causes the listener or reader to discount the serious nature of the Soviet threat. A few of the more prominent of such themes-potential candidates for disinformation-are:

The Soviet Union will change. The prob­lem with the Soviet Union is its top leaders. Nepotism, drunkenness, and debauchery run rampant. The leaders no longer have the respect of the bureaucrats. The thou­sands of middle level workers only work as best they can within a system they see as bad. The new leaders must respond to the economic and social chaos that the current leaders have caused before the whole system caves in.

There is a split in the leadership, and the West must play to the hand of the more moderate elements.

Convergence is possible and is proceeding. Signs of pluralism within the Soviet Union are already noticeable.

One should not pay attention to commu­nist ideology. Few people in the Soviet Union pay attention anymore to those con­cepts.

The Soviet Union is only defense oriented. The leaders lack self-confidence. They are not a threat to anyone and only want peace. Their use of force in Afghanistan, Czecho­slovakia, Finland, Hungary, and East Ger­many was only to quell uprisings and ensure stability on their borders. Their arms build­up is only a natural defensive reaction to the arms race initiated by the U.S.

The Soviet Union does not seek military superiority and does not have, nor has it ever had, a first strike nuclear strategy. Nu­clear war is not a valid instrument of poli­tics and any further augmentation of the existing stockpiles would be meaningless. The only alternative to nuclear war, which would be a disaster for all, is peaceful coex­istence.

While the contribution of these themes to the accomplishment of the general disinfor­mation tasks identified earlier is not diffi­cult to understand, this still does not make them disinformation. Their contribution per se is independent of their veracity; and, as indicated above, there is clearly some truth to some, if not all, of them. Many profes­sionals believe and would and do argue with conviction that the themes are basically true and thus are neither misleading nor disinformation.

A difficult case to assess, and one that may be a good example of several of the above themes acting in concert, is the Soviet peace campaign that was mounted in the mid-1970's. In the mid-1970's, there was a definite shift in tone in Soviet literature. In brief, the emergent themes were that the Soviets do not seek superiority; their doc­trine is strictly defensive and only in reac-

tion to the West; they do not have, nor have they ever had, a first-strike strategy; and, should the West try to upset the current "balance," it would only trigger another round in the arms race. Here the manner in which each point builds to the final "action message" <i.e., do not try to catch up; we will not let you> is very clear.

The main actors who were focused on the United States in this case have included the First Secretary, Brezhnev; Arbatov, Trofi­menko, Milshtein, Bogdanov, and Semeiko of the research institutes; political commen­tators such as Bovin; Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff; and Defense Minister Us­tinov. For example, on the eve of President Carter's inauguration, Brezhnev gave a major foreign policy speech in which he de­scribed as "absurd and totally unfounded" the allegation that the Soviet Union "strives for superiority in armaments with the aim of delivering a 'first strike' . . . the Soviet Union has always been and remains a con­vinced opponent of such concepts." This statement was reiterated by Henry Trofi­menko, a Soviet specialist on U.S. foreign policy and a member of the Academy of Sci­ences of the USSR, in an article published in Orbis later that year. 21

Another good example is an article by Bogdanov and Semeiko of the Institute of the USA and Canada <their prior ties run to the Soviet General Staff and the KGB) printed in Fortune in 1979. After discussing U.S. over-estimates of the "Soviet military threat" <always in quotation marks), the need to avoid discussing the statistics of Soviet military strength, and getting trapped in the endless numbers game <i.e., don't focus on the facts), they state:

"The Soviet Union is opposed to any idea of its own strategic superiority. This very notion is now meaningless, considering the vast scale of the stockpiled nuclear weapons. Besides, it is realized in the Soviet Union that any attempt to acquire such superiori­ty will be retaliated against, which would mean an endless arms race." 22

A good example of an article apparently designed for two audiences <East and West> is Marshal Ogarkov's entry in the new Soviet Military Encyclopedia <Volume VII, 1978) entitled. "Military Strategy." In it Ogarkov writes, "Soviet military strategy, as well as Soviet military doctrine as a whole, has a particularly defensive tendency; it does not provide for any preemptive strikes or premeditated attacks. . . . It does not have as its own objective the attainment of military-technical superiority .... We are threatening no one, and we are imposing our will on no one." And, referring to nucle­ar weapons. "At the foundation of Soviet military strategy lies the proposition that the Soviet Union, based on the principles of its policy, will not employ these weapons first."

However, Soviet military doctrine is defi­nitely and explicitly stated as offensive not defensive in their "internal" press; although one might state that it had a particularly defensive tendency. By Soviet definition, the West always unleashes or starts the war; hence, the Soviets do not speak of pre­meditated or preemptive strike. What they speak of is the strong need to strike first, which is called "seizing the initiative." Toward the end of his article, Ogarkov cor­rectly characterizes the Soviet view of modern operations as having increased scope and as "a bitter struggle to seize and maintain the initiative." Attaining military­technical superiority has always been a major Soviet objective. However, in the

1970's, the related dialogue was shifted to the topic of combat readiness, which in­cludes the adequacy of the material-techni­cal supply as its first concern. At the same time, because the Soviets had achieved su­periority during the decade, and because this perception had become clear through­out most of the world, in the 1970's it no longer was necessary to state that superiori­ty was an objective. In the 1970's, the mes­sage was that the West should not attempt to redress the imbalance.

Finally, the "no first use" statement is es­pecially unusual. It is completely inconsist­ent with Soviet statements of doctrine and strategy since the late 1950's. Consider, for example, the following representative ex­cerpt from the official Ministry of Defense journal, Voyennaya mysl':

"Victory in war depends upon the balance of forces. But, ... the side which has even a significant superiority in manpower and equipment can lose it very rapidly. The sur­prise use of nuclear weapons is able to sharply alter the possibilities of the sides and, consequently, make victory closer or remote. This new pattern of nuclear war has been considered by Soviet military doctrine both in the organization and equipping of the Armed Forces as well as in preparing them for conducting combat." 23

Ogarkov's statement of no first use can only be regarded as technically correct in the sense that the Soviet Union cannot be the first to employ these weapons because the United States already did so at the end of World War II against Japan.

The possible shift in Soviet doctrine <or in disinformation tactics) as discussed above has been noted in several U.S. government studies. For example, an August 1977 FBIS Trends paper entitled "Soviet Statements on the Consequences of Nuclear War" iden­tified a Soviet trend toward moderation, es­pecially in the 1970's, and, beginning in 1974, the emergence of the thesis that "cur­rent nuclear arsenals are sufficient to de­stroy all life on earth." In 1976, the study continues, lower-ranking military figures­veteran commentators on strategic affairs­voiced support for Brezhnev's thesis and concluded that any augmentation of exist­ing stockpiles was futile. 24 This was on the eve of the emergence of the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-20, SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 mis­siles, not to mention new naval and air force nuclear capabilities.

A Math Tech study in 1978 of Soviet stra­tegic intentions reached similar conclusions based on analysis of open source data pro­vided by FBIS. It also concluded that the evidence indicated that Soviet intentions were primarily defensive, reactive to the United States with a goal of parity, and that the Soviet leaders, including the seven mili­tary leaders in its sample, did not appear to devote much written or verbal attention to war-related questions. That is, based on its analysis, fighting and winning a future war was not found to be an issue to which Soviet leaders devoted much written or verbal ex­pression. This last observation is especially interesting considering that the next war is by proscription the primary concern of Soviet military doctrine and strategy.

In 1979, another FBIS report, President Brezhnev and the Soviet Union's Changing Security Policy, linked the change to the SALT process and concluded that "especial­ly since 1974, the USSR has come to recog­nize the limitations of military power and the benefits of military balance with the West in achieving national security." 211 Ac­cording to the FBIS analysis, the change

3390 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 became effective in 1974. "Beginning in 1974, President Brezhnev introduced new concepts and accompanying vocabulary into soviet strategy discourse, signaling a clear break with the notion that security derives directly from military power." This change, reasoned the FBIS analysis, represented the conclusion of a "debate" on nuclear war and Soviet security that had emerged following the 1972 and 1973 U.S.-Soviet summits.

A different interpretation might place greater significance on other events that took place in 1972-for example, Zamyatin taking charge of international propaganda in 1972 as discussed earlier, and the almost simultaneous upgrading of the KGB disin­formation "Department" to a "Service" status, indicating a corresponding growth in its importance. It is also possible that the Soviets took serious note of the joint Con­gressional Resolution, Public Law 92-448, which on September 30, 1972, approved the U.S.-Soviet Interim Executive Agreement growing out of the Strategic Arms Limita­tion Talks. The last sentence of this Resolu­tion reads as follows:

"Congress considers that the success of the interim agreement and the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the preser­vation of longstanding United States policy that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States should seek unilateral advan­tage by developing a first strike poten­tial." 26 <Emphasis added.>

This sense of Congress may have in­creased the Soviet appreciation of their need to "cover" their new strategic capabili­ties that were about to emerge, e.g., the new SRF strategic missiles, naval nuclear, and command/control capabilities for nuclear war, with carefully designed disinformation. In this hypothesis, one of their major tar­gets would have been the U.S. Congress. And, as indicated by the above-mentioned FBIS and contractor studies, their efforts could have been quite successful.

Each of these three studies had three common characteristics. First, all were based on open-source Soviet material that was readily available in the West through FBIS. Second, none appear to have consid­ered the possibility that the identified "changes" in Soviet nuclear doctrine may have been designed for Western consump­tion as part of a carefully orchestrated dis­information dimension of Soviet strategy. Third, none seemed to be very familiar with Soviet military doctrine (i.e., national secu­rity policy). The main points of this doc­trine are, because of its potential decisive­ness, preparing for nuclear war has been the highest priority task of the State since 1956; achieving superiority in nuclear weapons and methods of their use is the most impor­tant task both in peace and during the course of war; and the surprise use of nucle­ar weapons can radically change the balance and make victory closer or remote.

The importance of surprise and of striking first has been a hallmark of Soviet military doctrine since the mid-1950's. 27 From their analyses of surprise and the "initial period of the war" in a historical context, they have concluded that surprise is usually achieved "as a result of poor knowledge of the attacking side, subjective mistakes in evaluating the intentions and plans of the aggressor, and superficial analysis of the measures directed toward surprise." In the Soviet Military Encyclopedia <Volume 2, 1976) surprise is achieved first by "mislead­ing the enemy concerning Soviet inten­tions." In his recent article on deception

and disinformation, Sejna explained, "Per­haps the most important deception and dis­information operation is that designed to cover the military readiness [which includes size] of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact military forces, and, in particular, their readiness for surprise attack and first strike." 28

It is interesting to note that the Soviets also have directed an almost identical pitch toward NATO. Consider for example the following paragraph from the May 1980 meeting of the Political Consultative Com­mittee of Warsaw Pact Treaty Member­Countries:

" ... The Warsaw Treaty member-coun­tries declare once again that they have never striven and will not strive for military superiority; they are invariably coming out for safeguarding the military balance in ever lower levels, for reduction and elimina­tion of the military confrontation in Europe. They have not, have never had and will not have any other strategic doctrine except a defensive one. They have not, have never had and will not have intentions to build up the potential for the first nuclear strike. By the very nature of their social order, they cannot and will not strive for setting up "spheres of influence," for the es­tablishment of military or political control over any regions or international transport communication." 29

This discussion also concludes with the admonishment that NATO should not try to upset the current "balance" insofar as this would merely incite another arms race.

One of the more disconcerting aspects of a major portion of Soviet disinformation is the apparent lack of concern of the Western media in reprinting and distributing it. In addition to the previously mentioned arti­cles in Fortune and Orbis, a very good exam­ple is a commentary written by Zamyatin for Newsweek and printed on February 4, 1980. Zamyatin was described simply as "Brezhnev's chief foreign affairs spokesman and a member of the Communist Party Cen­tral Committee." While the article does in­dicate that his views are "predictably one­sided and self-serving." it also represents them as "an authoritative statement." The opening paragraph of Zamyatin's article provides an especially interesting insight into Soviet SALT negotiating tactics.

A scene I observed during the meeting of the two Presidents, Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter, in Vienna last June etched itself in my memory. After the official cere­mony of signing the SALT II treaty was over, a woman came up to the table and blessed with a cross that truly historic docu­ment. Surrounded by journalists later on, she said: "Please God that everything writ­ten in the treaty is translated into life." 30

Again, before discounting the possible role of such a tactic too rapidly, it is perhaps worth recalling the Washington Post article on the Vienna SALT conference the prior year, especially as regarding "small talk."

Vienna, June 16-Jimmy Carter takes out a pen and jots down what Leonid Brezhnev has told him in a moment of small talk, "God will not forgive us if we fail." 31

When the Western media reprints news from TASS or Pravda or publishes com­ments or articles by "respected" Soviet po­litical, military, diplomatic, or academic seers, it is rare to find any acknowledgment of the possibility that what they print may be part of a well-orchestrated Soviet decep­tion or disinformation operation, or other­wise caution or warn the reader. This pre­sents a problem insofar as the general reader, as indicated earlier, is neither sensi-

tive to the role of Soviet deception and dis­information directed against the West nor its effectiveness in furthering Soviet objec­tives. Soviet news items are presented or re­ported as through they are no different from those printed in the Boston Globe or The New York Times. Articles written by "ex" soviet generals and KGB officers, now in the assorted "research institutes," are presented as matter-of-factly <and without explanation of the individuals' prior associa­tions> as articles by former U.S. officials and academics. If there is a possibility that such Soviet-authored articles might be connected with State disinformation, then one might ask what difference there is between the media carrying these articles and ones such as the recent one by former Washington Post reporter Janet Cooke on "Little Jimmy." Of the two, at least Cooke's article may have had some redeeming social bene­fits. At least Cooke's article was not part of a long-range effort whose objective is the destruction of our form of government.

On the analytical side, it has become in­creasingly important for analysts to begin questioning critically both their own data and other analyses. Again, the reason is simple. Disinformation was given a promi­nent role in the late 1950's as part of Khru­shchev's peaceful coexistence strategy. Since that time, it has grown substantially with major organizational changes (promo­tions> taking place in the mid 1960's and early 1970's, perhaps an indication of its success.

Analysts, and analysis sponsors, might well reflect on the potential for mischief that could be introduced by a controlled so­ciety, and one bent on world domination, that appears able and willing to spend upward of $100,000,000 in three years just to counter the neutron bomb. Moreover, on a yearly basis, this is less than one percent of the total Soviet budget for propaganda and covert action, as estimated by the CIA.

While failure to read what is available and lack of incentives for analysts may in part be responsible for the U.S. shortcomings in assessing Soviet strategic intentions, as pointed out in recent Congressional hear­ings, Soviet Strategic Forces, the problem may be far deeper, far more complex. 32 For example, the problem also includes the fail­ure of analysts even to examine the bona fides of the data they do use. Most analysts simply do not concern themselves with criti­cally assessing data. In a sense, it is prob­ably just as well that they don't, because should they, they would soon encounter the intelligence collectors, who often block any attempt on the part of the analyst to criti­cally assess the data. This is especially true of much of the specific material that was identified as recommended reading in the above hearings. And, in this case, "security" certainly does not seem to be the underlying problem.

Part of the problem is the so-called "sources and methods" rule that is used to prevent analysts' access to "raw data." The impact of this rule was discussed in the recent Senate history of the CIA. "Intelli­gence anslysis found this arrangement [whereby the analysts were given only vague descriptions of assets providing the information] highly unsatisfactory, since they could not judge the quality of informa­tion they were receiving" and instead turned to open sources and COMINT for their data.33 What seems to have resulted is an analysis product that is assessed more in terms of the methodology, the acceptability of the conclusions, and the presentation

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3391 than in terms of the analysis itself and the data upon which it so critically depends. Analysis agencies are unwilling to question data, even after serious issues have been raised, in large measure because they be­lieve it will be fruitless, only cause trouble, and perhaps lead to curtailment of their access.

This problem may also suggest the need to ponder seriously the recent observation of the former deputy chief of counterintelli­gence, CIA, that the real question is how to get people at the high or medium-high deci­sionmaking level in the intelligence commu­nity to recognize that deception is a real problem. And considering that the current size of the Soviet budget within which de­ception and disinformation activities appear to be funded is in excess of $3 billion per year, the "problem" may well be more than merely the size or effectiveness of the Soviet-directed effort. Perhaps one should add to this the question of how to generate interest in good critical analysis, and, where there is interest, of how to come to grips with the organizational problem that can frustrate even the most determined effort to get at the truth.

So we appear to be caught in a bit of a circle, with no immediately apparent way out. Hopefully, concern for Soviet-directed disinformation will grow, and at the same time. Western research efforts, associated understanding, and ability to recognize and counter or otherwise neutralize it, also will improve. While Western freedoms may render the West particularly vulnerable to such manipulate efforts, these same free­doms have equally strong defense mecha­nisms that are especially effective when aroused. In the meantime, it is important to continue to study Soviet-directed disinfor­mation efforts as best we can, with special attention directed to keeping such studies as objective and balanced as possible to avoid the rebuttals that otherwise might well serve to remove, once again, the topic from public scrutiny and awareness.

FOOTNOTES 1 Raymond Rocca, "Discussion" in Roy Godson

Ced), Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's, Anal­ysis and Estimates CNSIC, 1980), p 157.

2 Col. V. Morozov, "Books on Laws of Armed Con­flict," Boyennaya mysl~ No. 7, 1965, FDD 962, May 25, 1966, p 80.

3 Soviet Strategic Forces, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Senate Committee on Intelligence <Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p 34.

• "The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign," Congresssional Record <House), Sep. tember 28, 1965, p 25391.

6 Ibid. a Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive),

Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Senate Committee on Intelligence <Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1980), p 63.

1 "The Soviet and Communist Block Defamation Campaign," p 25392.

8 Discussions during 1978-1979 with Jan Sejna, formerly General Major <U.S. Brigadier General equivalent> in the Czech Army.

9 Lord Chalfont, sequence of three articles, July 28, August 4, and September 9, 1975 in The Times <London>.

10 The description of Soviet organizations heavily involved in deception was drawn mainly from "Gen­eral Sejna on Soviet Deception.'' Congressional Record <Senate> December 20, 1979, pp 19536-19539 and discussions with the author.

11 Soviet Covert Action, p 61. 12 HUM/NT, The Human Intelligence Network

Report <June 15, 1981), Volume I, Issue 5, p 6. 13 AIM Report, <July 1, 1981>, Vol. X, No. 13, P 3. .. Soviet Covert Action, p 63. ••Ibid., pp 75-76. u Roy Godson Ced>, Intelligence Requirements for

the 1980s: Covert action CNSIC, forthcoming).

11 M. Milshtein, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Definition and Application, .. in Tacti­cal Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives <London: SIPRI, Taylor & Francis, Inc., 1978>.

18 See for example: William R. Kintner and Harri· et Fast Scott, The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs <Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968>: V.D. Sodolovskly, Soviet Military Strategy, 3rd ed., edited and translated by Harriet Fast Scott <New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1975>; V. Ye. Savkln, "The Basic Princi­ples of Operational Art and Tactics CA Soviet View)," Soviet Military Thought <Moscow>. 1972, No. 4, translated by U.S. Air Force <Washington: USGPO, 1974>; A.A. Sidorenko, "The Offensive <A Soviet View>." Soviet Military Thought <Moscow>. 1970, No. 1, translated by U.S. Air Force <Washing­ton: USGPO, 1974>: N.A. Lomov Ced>. "Scientific­Technical Progress and the Revolution In Military Affairs CA Soviet View>." Soviet Military Thought <Moscow>. 1973. No. 3, translated by U.S. Air Force <Washington: USGPO, 1974>.

1e Soviet Covert Action, p 76. 2 0 Eugene A. Methvin, "Subversion as a Tool of

Statecraft," Orbis (Fall 1972>, Vol. 26, No. 3, p 807. 11 Henry Trofimenko, "The Theology of Strate­

gy.'' Orbis (Fall 1977>, Vol. 21, No. 3, p 510. 22 Radomir Bogdanov and Lev Semeiko, "Soviet

Military Might, A Soviet View," Fortune, February 29, 1979, Vol. 99, No. 4, p 66.

as Lt. Col. V. Molchanovskiy, "The Dialetlcs of Possibility and Reality in Military Affairs," Soviet Military Thought, No. 7, 1971.

24 "Soviet Statements on the Consequences of Nu­clear War," FBIS Trends <August 17, 1977>. p S-1.

26 "President Brezhnev and the Soviet Union's Changing Security Policy," FBIS Analysis Report, FB 79-10009 <May 25, 1979>. p 1.

18 Roger P. Labrie Ced.), SALT Hand Book <Key Documents and Issues 1972-1979> <Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research>.

21 H.S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," Foreign Affairs <January 1958), and War and the Soviet Union CPraeger, 1959), p 167-214.

28 "General SeJna on Soviet Deception," p 19538. u Cited in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Disin­

formation," Strategic Review <Winter 1981), Vol. IX, No. 1, p 21.

30"The Kremlin Answers Carter," Newsweek <February 4, 1980), p 12.

31 Martin Schram, "Reference to God by Brezh­nev Hits Chord in Carter," Washington Post <June 17, 1979), p 1.

uSoviet Strategic Forces, p 31. 33 Final Report of the Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations with Respect on Intelli­gence Activities <Book IV>, Senate CUSGPO, 1976>. pp 47-48.

EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES ARE NECESSARY-IV

•Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, yester­day I discussed why bank involvement in ETC's is necessary. Today's ex­cerpts from Franklin Cole's article, "Establishing American Trading Com­panies," which appeared in the North­western Journal of International Law and Business, autumn 1980, explains how it works, referring to the 1980-passed bill, which differs only in detail from the current one. Of particular note is his comment that amendments to limit bank involvement in ETC's to noncontrolling interests actually pro­vide more risk for the bank rather than less, because the bank would not be able to stop imprudent actions. Mr. Cole points out correctly that the major means of limiting risk is the cap on bank assets that can be invested in the ETC's, which the bill limits to 5 percent. He also details the other safe­guards in the bill.

The excerpt follows:

BANK PARTICIPATION IN EXPORT TRADING COMPANIES

The Export Trading Company Act of 1980 does not authorize banking organizations 72

to undertake the activities of an export trading company directly. The Act does, however, permit banking organizations to invest up to $10 million in one or more sepa­rately incorporated export trading compa­nies without prior federal regulatory ap­proval, if the investment does not cause an export trading company to become a subsid­iary of the investing banking organization. 7 3

Investments that exceed the $10 million limit or that confer control of an export trading company upon the investing bank­ing organization 74 require prior approval of the appropriate federal banking agency. 75

A banking organization's aggregate invest­ment in export trading companies is limited by the Act to five percent of the banking or­ganization's consolidated surplus and cap­ital. 76 The Act also prohibits any banking organization from directly or indirectly in­vesting and lending more than ten percent of its capital surplus in or to an export trad­ing company. 77 These limits on a banking organization's financial exposure, either as an investor in or creditor of any export trad­ing company, apply regardless of whether the export trading company is controlled by the investing or lending banking organiza­tion.

In addition to mechanical statutory limits on a banking organization's investment in an export trading company, the Act empow­ers the appropriate federal banking regula­tory agency to order termination of an in­vestment on an export trading company whenever "it has reasonable cause to believe that the ownership or control of any invest­ment in an export trading company consti­tutes a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness or stability of the banking orga­nization and is inconsistent with sound banking principles, with the purposes of the Export Trading Company Act or with the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966." 78 Thus, while the Act relaxes prohi­bitions that had kept banks from involve­ment in export trading companies, the par­ticipation that will now be permitted re­mains strictly controlled by statute and by regulatory oversight.

On the Senate floor, with the support of certain federal banking authorities, 79 Sena­tor Proxmire proposed an additional restric­tion limiting the participation of banking organizations in export trading companies to a 20% non-controlling interest. 80 Had this been approved, it would not only have sig­nificantly tipped the balance against the formation of export trading companies, but would also have undermined the prudential limitations in the Act designed to guarantee the soundness of banking organizations. A controlling interest in an export trading company does not necessarily threaten the soundness of a bank more than a non-con­trolling interest. The bank's real financial exposure is determined by the total amount of assets it has at risk in the separately in­corporated export trading company, either as equity investment or in the form of loans, and this is already strictly controlled by the 5% and 10% capital surplus tests. 81 The public policy of ensuring bank soundness is already satisfied; controls over the affiliated export trading company's corporate govern­ance structure do no more to limit the bank­ing organization's capital at risk. Indeed,

Footnotes appear at end of article.

3392 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 limitations on a banking organization's abili­ty to obtain control of an export trading company in which the former's capital is at stake can actually increase the risk to the banking organization. Relegated to a minor­ity and non-controlling equity position, the banking organization would not be able to preclude those export trading company ac­tivities which the bank might consider un­sound and which might lead to the export trading company's collapse. Such an unfor­tunate scenario was recently played out in the financial collapse of the Real Estate In­vestment Trust industry.s 2 Unwilling to be placed in such a position again, banking or­ganizations might forego investing in or lending to export trading companies, s3 de­priving the export trading companies of needed know-how and financial resources.

While majority control of non-banking af­filiates by banking organizations is clearly called for to ensure the formation and suc­cess of export trading companies, it has been suggested that such control might give rise to possible conflicts of interest and to transactions between banks and export trad­ing companies which are unfairly biased in favor of one of the parties. It has been feared, for example, that ownership of export trading companies by banking orga­nizations would skew the latter's "arm's­length" credit judgments, and lead banks to grant loans to export trading companies when the loans-or the trading companies­were unsound. s4 Even if ownership did not lead to impaired judgment in granting of credit, some suggest that banking organiza­tions will feel compelled to rescue failing export trading companies which have come to be identified with the banking organiza­tion and whose financial condition is reflect­ed on the banking organization's consolidat­ed balance sheets.s 11

These concerns are without solid founda­tion, and even if potentially justifiable, are adequately safeguarded against by provi­sions of the Act. The Act does not suspend the numerous banking regulations and fidu­ciary laws which are applicable to a banking organization's top management. While there is the potential for insider misconduct in any transaction between corporate affili­ates, these stringent laws and regulations al­ready inhibit managerial overlaps and harmful self-dealing.ss It is unlikely that ra­tional bank officers, whose compensation is tied to the wisdom of their investments, would suddenly so compromise their profes­sional judgment that they would endanger the soundness of their banking organiza­tions with excessively risky loans. Still fur­ther assurance is provided by provisions of the Act which prohibit the total of a bank­ing organization's historical cost of direct and indirect investment in all loans to export trading companies from exceeding ten percent of the banking organization's capital and surplus,s1 and explicitly prohibit either extending credit to any export trad­ing company in which the banking organiza­tion holds any interest, or to customers of such a company, on terms more favorable than those afforded other similar borrowers in similar circumstances, or extending credit that involves more than normal risks of re­payment. ss Thus, the Act limits the amount of resources a bank may commit to the rescue of a failing export trading company, and furthermore, it prevents the sort of identification of a bank with the trading company, that would lead to a rescue at­tempt. s9 The Act, then, protects the sound­ness of the bank without preventing its af­filiation with an export trading company.

Another concern regarding the granting of credit by banking organizations is that bank affiliation with export trading compa­nies will lead to favoritism and anticompeti­tive tie-ins in which third parties would be extended unsound, undue, or simply unfair credit from banking organizations in return for the purchase of commodities or services from bank-affiliated export trading compa­nies. 90 These fears appear to be greatly ex­aggerated. With significant competition for credit and customers in an efficient capital market, and with little evidence of substan­tial reciprocal dealing problems in the past, there is little to suggest that our ordinary antitrust laws and policies could not ade­quately deal with any such problems that might arise.91

FOOTNOTES 72The term includes state and national banks,

federal savings banks, Edge Act and Agreement cor­porations, bank holding companies, and "bankers' banks." § 105<a><l>. "Bankers' banks" are banks whose stock is owned exclusively by other banks and which are engaged exclusively in providing banking services for other banks and their officers, directors or employees. § 105<a><5>. Through "bank­ers' banks" a number of smaller banks can join to form an export trading company.

73 § 105(b)Cl><A>. 74 § 105Cb><l><B>. In addition to investments which

cause an export trading company <ETC> to become a subsidiary of the investing banking organization, prior regulatory approval is required for invest­ments causing more than 50% of the voting stock of an ETC to be owned or controlled by banking orga­nizations. Id. The terms "control" and "subsidiary" have the same meaning as assigned to those terms in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 <1976 & Supp. III 1979). § 105Ca>Cl2). Section 2 of the 1956 Act defines "con­trol" as ownership of 25% or more of the voting shares, control of a majority of the directors, or ex­ercise of a controlling influence. 12 U.S.C. § 1841Ca>C2> <1976 & Supp. III 1979).

7 5 In reviewing proposals for investment in ETCs in excess of the discretionary limits, the appropri­ate federal banking agency must take into consider­ation the financial and managerial resources, com­petitive situation, and future prospects of the bank­ing organization and ETC concerned as well as the benefits of the proposal to U.S. business, industrial, and agricultural concerns <with special emphasis on small, medium-size and minority concerns>. and to U.S. competitiveness in world markets. § 105Cd>Cl>. A banking organization wishing either to make ad­ditional investments in ETCs, or to undertake through a subsidiary ETC a line of activity not pre­viously approved, must give the appropriate federal banking agency 90 days prior written notice, within which period the agency must act. § 105<b><2>. Ap­plications by banking organizations to make a $10 million investment or any controlling investment in an ETC must be acted upon by the appropriate fed­eral banking agency within 120 days.§ 105Cb><3>.

78 § 105Cb><l>. The limit for Edge Act and Agree­ment corporations not engaged in banking is 25%. Id. The 25% limit is smaller than currently provid­ed for non-banking Edge investments overseas under the Federal Reserve's Regulation K. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 <1980>. The 5% limit is the same as currently applied to national bank investments in small business investment companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225.111 <1980), and in community development corporations. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7480 <1980). In contrast national banks can invest in excess of 5% in safe de­posit corporations. 12 U.S.C. § 24 <1980), premise companies, 12 U.S.C. § 37l<d> <1976 & Supp. III 1979), bank service corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 1862Ca> <1976>, Edge Act and Agreement corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 618 <1976 & Supp. III 1979>. and agricultur­al credit corporations, 12 U.S.C. § 24 <1976). There is no limit on the amount a national bank can invest in Federal National Mortgage Association <FNMA> or Government National Mortgage Asso­ciation <GNMA> corporations authorized under Title IX of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, in the Student Loan Marketing Asso­ciation, or in non-banking companies permissible under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).

77 § 105(C)(2).

78 § 105Cd><4>. This broad regulatory authority to require divestiture of any ETC investment parallels powers over other bank holding company invest­ments which were given to the Federal Reserve under the Financial Institutions Regulatory and In­terest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 <1978> <codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.>.

19 See S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 8 <state­ment of Irvine Sprague, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation>. 61 <statement of Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Governors, Federal Re­serve System>; S. Rep. No. 735, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 34 <1980) <Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors. Federal Reserve System>.

80 Senator Proxmire's amendment was proposed Aug. 26, 1980, and defeated by voice vote, Cl980J 322 INT'L TRADE RPT. U.S. EXPORT WKLY. CBNA> at C-1 <Sept. 2, 1980>; 323 id. at C-1.

81 It has been suggested that a banking organiza­tion's liability may extend beyond its capital at risk if it has been providing management to an ETC or was engaged in significant intercompany transac­tions and if creditors of a failing ETC are able to "pierce the corporate veil." S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 11 <statement of Irvine Sprague, Chair­man, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation>. This is a purely speculative danger. Clark, supra note 58, at 834.

82 See Taylor, The Financial Collapse of the REIT Industry: An Analysis and Proposed Regulatory Framework, 9 .Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 451 <1978>.

83 In a similar context, in recommending that the Small Business Investment Companies Act be amended to remove a provision which prohibited a bank from acquiring 50% or more of the voting stock of an SBIC, the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee noted: "Allowing banks to control or wholly own a license would serve to encourage financial institutions which are interest­ed in the sound development of the SBIC program Cto invest) and would increase the amount of cap­ital available for small business investment." S. Rep. No. 420, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 <1976>.

84 See, e.g., S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 60 <statement of Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System>.

85 Id. at 61. 88 In addition, the Act specifically empowers the

appropriate federal banking agency, in approving applications for investments in export trading com­panies exceeding $10 million or conferring control on the investing banking organization, to impose such conditions as it may deem necessary to pre­vent possible conflicts of Interest, or banking prac· tices that would be unsafe or unsound. § 105<d><2>.

87 § 105Cc><2>. 88 § 105(C)(4). n § 105<c>Cl> prohibits an ETC from using a name

which is similar in any way to the name of the in­vesting banking organization. For a discussion of the consequences of the public confusing the name and identity of a risky affiliate with that of the in­termediary itself, see Schotland, Bank Holding Companies and Public Policy Today, in House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Financial Institutions and the Na­tion's Economy <FINE>. Compendium of Papers Prepared for the FINE Study 233, 270-277 <Comm. Print, 1976).

90 See, e.g., S. 2718 Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 <statement of Senator Proxmire>.

u Clark, supra note 58, at 827-28.e

CONTRIBUTIONS OF WOMEN IN HISTORY

e Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, Oregon is again taking a leading role in recognizing the contributions women have made in our history. Ac­tivities throughout the State in cele­bration of Women's History Week, the week of March 7 to 14, will focus at­tention on the part women have played in shaping our destiny.

I am proud to have been a conspon­sor of the original resolution which es­tablished Women's History Week to honor the significant contributions of the female members of our society.

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3393 Oregon is proud of the women who courageously crossed a continent to settle in the Oregon territory, and once there, made Oregon a State well known for its lead in notable accom­plishments by women.

Women have played such a vital role in shaping our American society that it is only fitting we pause to recognize and rediscover their achievements. Women have provided the impetus for many important social reforms and have made individual contributions in the fields of science, education, medi­cine, religion, and government. They have helped build America as home­makers and pioneers, and they have clearly led the way in establishing the charitable and philanthropic organiza­tions which have greatly improved the quality of American life.

I do not have to recite the accom­plishments of such great figures as Betsy Ross, Helen Keller, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Susan B. Anthony. They are symbols of what American women have achieved.

But there are others, most of them far less famous, who have made great contributions to society and deserve to be honored during Women's History Week. Among them are Janette Rankin, elected in 1917 as the first female Member of Congress; Margaret Sanger, who pioneered the family planning movement in this country; Harriet Tubman, the former slave who led the underground railroad that brought freedom to hundreds; and Louisa May Alcott, the 19th century author of more than 270 books and short stories.

My own State of Oregon has its own list of notable women who should be included in the honors. Among them are Tabitha Brown, a 66-year-old par­tial invalid, who led a wagon train through a disastrous shortcut-chosen by the train's male leadership-and brought it to a new life in the Oregon territory. Then in 1848, at the age of 71, this remarkable woman founded the Tualatin Academy, which is now known as Pacific University.

In 1836, Narcissa Whitman and Eliza Spaulding became the first American women to cross the Continental Divide. Narcissa Whitman helped her husband establish the Waiilatpu Mis­sion near Fort Walla Walla, where she taught in and managed the mission school.

Abigail Scott Duniway was Oregon's most indefatigable suffragist. She was successful in helping women in West­ern States get the vote years before Eastern women won that right. Abigail Duniway financed her efforts for suf­frage by managing and editing her own newspaper, the New Northwest.

Governor Chamberlain's secretary, Mrs. C. B. Shelton, became the first woman to govern Oregon when, in the early 1900's, he took a seat in the

Senate and left her in charge of State affairs.

Margaret Jewett Bailey wrote the first novel printed on the Pacific slope, and Dr. Bethenia Owens-Adair had to receive a second medical degree, when her first was discredited, to become Oregon's first woman physician.

Mr. President, these are not the only women who have contributed to Oregon and to the Nation. Every Member of this body could add women from their own State to the list. But I am pleased to call special attention to these few in the hopes we can better understand women's contributions to American life and their importance in our history·•

HANDLING OF AIRLINE RECORDERS

•Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I wish to inform my colleagues that I will off er an amendment in committee in­tended to clarify and improve the situ­ation regarding handling of tapes and transcripts of pilot conversations after an airline accident. In some instances, transcripts of conversations recorded by the cockpit voice recorder have become public shortly after an acci­dent while the investigation is still in­complete.

The disclosure of these conversa­tions without any other data about the accident can lead to serious mis­conceptions about an accident's cause and a crews' fault or lack of fault in an accident. The transcript must indeed be publicly released, but released to­gether with other factual data about the accident or incident.

On the personal side, the effect of the release of these conversations has been particularly severe on the rela­tives and other loved ones of cockpit crew members who were killed in the accident. Often, the last words of the pilots include personal and intimate expressions directed at spouses.

My amendment will remedy a prob­lem in the present procedures for han­dling cockpit voice recorder <CVR) tapes after airline accidents and inci­dents. The amendment directs the Na­tional Transportation Safety Board to withhold from public disclosure the CVR tapes and transcripts after an ac­cident. The transcripts could then be available to the public when the NTSB holds a public hearing on the accident. If a public hearing is delayed or not held, the transcripts would be avail­able no later than 60 days after the ac­cident. In the unlikely event that the recorder is not recovered immediately after the accident, then the tran­scripts would be available no later than 60 days after the recorder is re­covered.

This amendment would not alter the current practice whereby designated parties to an NTSB investigation have access to the information on the CVR

tape. Nor would this amendment affect the NTSB's returning the CVR tapes to their owner, the airline in­volved, when the investigation is com­plete.

I want to emphasize to my col­leagues that CVR transcripts would continue to be public, as they are now. What my amendment does is delay briefly the public availability of these transcripts out of concern for the feel­ings of the relatives and loved ones of those who were killed in the accident and to avoid misleading conclusions that can have an adverse impact on the investigation of the accident.

The following is the language of the amendment I intend to offer, which is supported by both the NTSB and the Airline Pilots Association:

COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER DISCLOSURE

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Board shall withhold from public disclosure cockpit voice recorder recordings and transcriptions, in whole and in part, of oral communications by and between flight crew members and ground stations, that are associated with accidents or incidents inves­tigated by the Board; Provided, that por­tions of a transcription of such oral commu­nications which the Board deems relevant and pertinent to the accident or incident shall be made available to the public by the Board at the time of the Board's public hearing, and in no event later than 60 days following the accident or incident; Provided, further, that nothing shall restrict the Board at any time from referring to cockpit voice recorder information in making safety recommendations.e

CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

e Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. Presi­dent, while spending reduction and tax revenue increases discussions domi­nate our legislative agenda, there are many who see the answers to rising costs, declining revenues, and lowered public confidence in public sector per­formance in changing the role of the public sector in meeting needs for public service. Ted Kalderie of Minne­apolis, until recently the executive di­rector of the Citizens League of Min­neapolis-St. Paul, reports on conclu­sions of a recent conference on the subject with United States and Euro­pean leaders. I ask that his report ap­pearing in Transatlantic Perspectives of January 1982 appear in the RECORD at this point.

The report follows: GOVERNMENT IN THE EIGHTIES: SHIFTING

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Caught between the rising costs for serv­ices and stable or declining revenues, the nations of Western Europe and the national and state governments in the United States are for the moment preoccupied with short­term expenditure and revenue policies. Partly, they are slashing programs and ben­efits; partly, as these cuts wound affected groups, they are restoring programs and benefits and raising some taxes. But this ap­proach represents a stop-gap course of

3394 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 action. Rapidly, it is becoming imperative for these nations to move to some longer­term and more fundamental response to the problem.

Almost everyone's preference is for long­term action on the revenue side, to stimu­late economic growth. But growing interna­tional economic competition makes it un­likely that the developed countries will be able to match the high levels of economic growth in the West of the quarter century from 1950 to 1975.

The remaining possibility is to do some­thing fundamental with public service on the expenditure side. This approach would involve a basic reshaping of the traditional model, which postulates a governmental agency financed by appropriations derived from taxes, providing services uniformly available and accessible without charge, with professionals accountable to elected of­ficials and elected officials accountable to the voters. Some restructuring would have considerable appeal. Many of the major costs arise in education, transportation, health care, public safety, and other social services. It is the remoteness and bureaucra­tization of many of these services that un­derlie the public's loss of confidence in the institutions of government. Even the grow­ing awareness of innovations and alterna­tives in the delivery of services has not yet really attracted government toward this line of policy. It is not just that restructuring is complex, difficult, and controversial. It is also that the ideas of choice and competi­tion that lie down that road seem to many persons wrong, improper, and basically in­consistent with their conception of the public sector.

Perception of this path is blocked by the way many people think about the problem, by a deficiency in theory. In the same way that, around the turn of the century, the United States needed a new conception of how to act in order to deal with the failures of the private sector, it now needs a new theory to permit it to deal with the failures that have begun to appear in the public sector.

Some constructive new thinking, however, is under way. It is possible now to sketch out a rough framework of ideas that gives some coherence to the various experiments now being tried, and to proposals now being advanced.

BASIC IDEAS EMERGE

A first basic element of a new view of the urban public sector involves recognition that community life-support systems depend on far more than government. Sci­entific American in 1970 talked about "the metabolism of cities." It is useful to think in almost biological terms about the systems for bringing in food and fuel, eliminating wastes, keeping order, educating and train­ing inhabitants, circulating and communi­cating, and continually rebuilding the physi­cal environment. Each of these, clearly, con­sists of a mixture of governmental and non­governmental elements. In transportation there are governmentally owned bus and rail facilities, but there are also private buses, commercial taxis, company-owned ve­hicles leased to employees, and a huge fleet of private automobiles that in many cities constitutes the largest single carrier of pas­sengers. Any reasonable planning and policy analysis must begin with the fact of a mixed and diverse system of movement. It is the same with every other system.

From this idea emerges a second basic idea about the essential role of the govern­ment. That role need not be as owner and

operator. The essential role is, rather, a policy role: to see what needs to be done, to insure that it is done, and to provide public financing if required. Government is essen­tially an arranger of things; at times, it is a buyer.

In the older and narrower conception, public officials see themselves essentially as members of a board of directors, as the ad­ministrative managers, of an operating en­terprise-a monopoly seller of services to themselves as a monopoly buyer. The new view will be of the policymaking body as the shaper of the larger community system; and even where there administrative depart­ment continues to operate, the elected offi­cials will increasingly view the department as one among many sellers and themselves as prudent buyers.

Third, there will be a new theory of ac­countability to replace the outworn notions that bureaucracies are adequately respon­sive to policy through management, and that policymakers are adequately responsive to citizens through elections. This tradition­al theory does not serve effectively in bring­ing down costs and improving performance.

The whole current debate about appropri­ate forms of accountability can, as it hap­pens, be handled almost perfectly by the formulation worked out in 1969 by the econ­omist Albert 0. Hirschman around the twin concepts of "exit" and "voice"-as different yet complementary "responses to decline in firms, organizations and states."

This formulation simply says that all per­formance is subject to deterioration. As this deterioration occurs, members or customers of the organization may simply leave; and their departure then impels those in charge to correct the failings that caused this exit. Or, dissatisfied members may stay-in a church, a business firm, a political adminis­tration, a marriage-and talk it out. Neither remedy works without the other present; and, as Mr. Hirschman showed, the mix must be constantly changing.

So in the future for government and public services, accountability will be en­forced somewhat more-and legitimately­by the pattern of choices, as citizens vote with their feet and exit.

FORMULATING THE STRATEGY

Businessmen, when called in as civic lead­ets, frequently think in terms of reorganiz­ing a firm, as if the need were simply for better management or greater centraliza­tion. A new view will see the problem rather as one of restructuring an industry, in which the object is to maintain incentives for innovation and change, and in which those organizations that perform well are rewarded and those that do not, fail.

Again, a four-part formulation of the re­shaping strategy accommodates many of the ideas moving through the discussion about the public sector today. The first ele­ment has to do with changes in the service itself.

There is the case of professional service: someone doing something for another person <usually but not always for pay>. Where this practice involves a permanent, public-employee staff, it is possible to con­sider the alternative of securing the service through contract. This can be important, both for the emphasis that contracts usual­ly place on performance, and for the incen­tive that the option not to renew creates in the contractor. These are alternatives within the concept of professional service.

There is also the case of alternatives to professional service. This is the self-help al­ternative. Here professionals drop out and

the user provides the labor, supported by others who provide the tools, materials, design, instruction, and sometimes the moti­vation. Examples abound: in transportation, the carpool/vanpool is such a supported self-help arrangment.

Another notion substitutes one service for another, usually in such a way as to achieve a better result at lower cost. Thus, there is growing interest in substituting conserva­tion for production, maintenance and pre­vention for repair <whether of houses or human beings), electronic communication for travel, and hospices for high-technology hospitals.

Some powerful ideas about personal re­sponsibility and self-reliance are involved here, along with some strong economic in­centives. Both can be consciously encour­aged through information and persuasion.

Important changes also are taking place in the way things are paid for. This is a cen­tral second element in the reshaping of the system. In some service areas the financial responsibility <and, indeed, the decision whether to provide them> may be shifted out of government to individuals, churches, or corporations. This shift is called "privat­ization."

The more important change is likely to be in the way tax money flows. In the past it has flowed directly to sellers, which is what they greatly desire. Now there is active in­terest in channeling the money instead to recipients, and requiring sellers to earn their revenues from these recipients; hence food stamps and transit stamps, housing vouchers and education vouchers. It is a strategic change that greatly diversifies the buyer side of public-service market, and makes the purchase of service a personal rather than political transaction. It is also very threatening to establish sellers because it means they have to earn their revenues in a marketplace.

Another variation is to leave off paying for the activity <fee-for-service> and begin paying for results. In a growing number of cases, doctors are now being given a fixed sum per capita with which to meet families' health needs for the year, with the doctors being allowed to keep what they do not spend. This approach puts the seller at risk for the cost of unnecessary expenditures.

Most important is the possibility that some part of the cost of a service may be charged to the user, and paid for through fees and charges. In fact, this is now the fastest-growing source of public finance in the United States. User charges will grow further, and will require improved mecha­nisms for aid to help those with the lowest incomes. Equity considerations cannot be handled best through low prices: the public resists the heavy taxation, operating manag­ers fear that it will not support mainte­nance, and analysts deplore such a non­need-based subsidy to upper-income people.

Third, as an element of restructuring, there is the opportunity to shift the roles and responsibilities on the buyer side. In one recent case in the United States where refuse collection had been bought by-the­household, a local private leader organized the neighborhood for a group purchase-of­service. Even a small aggregation on the buyer side produced a rationalization of pickup routes that made possible a reduc­tion in charges of 25 percent. The contract will be awarded competitively each year. In another case a big county government was able to reduce total expenditures on refuse collection by disaggregating the buyer side,

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3395 that is, by calling for bids separately for dis­tricts within the county.

A multilevel federal system offers oppor­tunities almost totally unexplored for rais­ing revenue at higher and therefore more equitable levels of the governmental system, and for distributing money to the lower-tier units on the express condition that they use it to purchase-rather than themselves to administer-service.

The fourth element of a restructuring strategy is on the seller side. The idea is to have a number of sellers competing. Just as the private sector tries to develop a number of suppliers, so can government. It can avoid what corporations have long learned to avoid-becoming dependent on a single sup­plier. The contracting must be thought through carefully. There is little to be gained by shifting from a monopoly public bureau to a noncompetitive contract. Dem­onstrations aimed at learning which system works better are pointless: either, alone, is dangerous. The sensible arrangement is a mixed system, with some direct labor and some contract, and with many organizations seeking the contract work.

Public works commissioners, such as state highway commissioners, have extensive ex­perience in how to maintain a competitive input market. They vary the size of the jobs let out for bid and the timing of the let­tings. When the prices are suspiciously high, they may use their own resources in­stead. They also may contract with munici­pal governments.

An aggressive effort can find, and draw in, new service entrepreneurs. More of these are likely to be in small business firms and nonprofit organizations than in big corpora­tions. Some governmental agencies might want to go on an entrepreneurial basis; some individuals in public service might want to form their own private firms to pro­vide services. And, of course, more of these kinds of entrepreneurs are likely to emerge and prosper if payment arrangement can be restructured so that there are a lot more nongovernmental buyers to sell to in a market that is more diverse and less politi­cal.

NEW ARRANGEMENTS ARE NEEDED

All these points emphasize the current change in thinking about the future of the public sector. Clearly, for the moment, short-term efforts at budget-cutting and tax-raising dominate the policy agenda, along with efforts to revive economic growth. The fourth major policy option­the effort to control costs by fundamentally restructuring the service-delivery system-is only beginning to be discussed.

As is normal, most of this thought and dis­cussion is beginning outside government. In the United States, investigators at the Stan­ford Research Institute are exploring what they call nonservice alternatives. Research­ers at The Rand Corporation are interested in improving the user-charge system. The American Enterprise Institute is supporting work on new forms of self-help, partly on the neighborhood scale. Some nonprofit or­ganizations and some corporations are ven­turing into the public-service market. The ideas are rising from many different well­springs.

Across state and local government in the United States, public officials are uncertain and apprehensive about these new ideas. They are reluctant to give up their tradi­tional managerial role. They are worried about political opposition from their em­ployees and their employees' unions. They are concerned about the equity question.

They wonder if citizens can be trusted with choice. They are uncomfortable with exit as an element of control-reluctant to concede the limitations on their system of voice.

All that can be said is that some really fundamental effort of this sort to improve the productivity or community systems is probably necessary in the 1980s and 1990s, and probably possible. Rising educational levels and an enormously increased capacity for the exchange of information are moving Western societies away from the older model of professionalized and bureaucra­tized service delivery. Some new arrange­ments, built around the appeal of diversity, responsibility, responsiveness, choice, and a greater built-in capacity for change, seem likely to come.e

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER-A CASE STUDY IN DEEP ROCK DRILLING

e Mr. SCHMITT. Mr. President, the Federal funding for basic science re­search and technology has historically provided tremendous direct and indi­rect spinoffs of U.S. industry. Al­though we are just beginning to exam­ine new mechanisms to encourage and maximize Government and industry cooperation, this past October, along with a variety of private and public in­stitutions in New Mexico, I sponsored the "Showcase for Technology." This turned out to be an unusually success­ful mechanism for this exchange.

High technology developments, dis­cussed at the conference, have been successfully transferred to industry. This result is an example of what can be accomplished by our National Lab­oratories. One typical example has been provided by technology transfer from geothermal drilling research.

Sandia, the national engineermg lab­oratory, was responsible for develop­ing instrumentation which would be used for production logging of geo­thermal wells, that is, assessment of the reservoir size and life. Geothermal resource exploration and production is small relative to oil and gas-in 1981, 80 geothermal wells were drilled com­pared to 80,000 oil and gas wells-thus the drilling industry has little incen­tive to develop technologies specific for geothermal energy recovery. Re­quired process and product changes to accommodate high temperature needs presented too great an investment risk. The Sandia program funded by DOE/Division of Geothermal Energy, has been successful in developing that technology and transferring it to in­dustry at a total program cost of less than $7 million, barely the cost of drilling one deep offshore gas well.

The Sandia high temperature elec­tronics program was completed in fiscal year 1981 and held a final sym­posium in Houston, December 8-9, 1981. Over 350 attendees, with papers and hardware demonstrated that not only had the technology been devel­oped, but a new era of instrumenta-tion was starting in many industries.

Some results are summarized in an Electronics magazine article which I ask be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

Items such as dielectrically isolated, silicon circuits were originally devel­oped by Sandia and Harris semicon­ductor for radiation resistance in weapon applications, have been modi­fied to make them temperature-toler­ant. Hybrid microcircuit technology used for high reliability, compact packaging in weapons has been modi­fied for high temperature logging tools and subsequently adopted by Gearheart, Schlumberger, Dresser, and other industries. This technology is being applied not only to the log­ging industries but also designed into electronics for use inside nuclear reac­tor containment structures, for moni­toring combustion in jet engines and other new applications. As stated in the Electronics article:

Sandia's approach encourage not only oil and gas firms, but also component compa­nies to jump into the high-temperature elec­tronics business. Sandia contracts already have permitted heat-resistant hybrid cir­cuits, complementary-MOS parts, and in­struments to be developed by firms like Te­ledyne Philbrick. Harris Corp.'s Semiductor Group, and General Electric Co.'s Space Systems division <ELECTRONICS, Aug. 14, 1980, p. 41>. Others with high-temperature­electronics programs include Burr-Brown Research Corp., Micro Networks Co., and MicroPac Industries, Inc.

This is just one example of technolo­gy transferred from the National Labs to private industry. Other transfers in­clude the downhole steam generator for enhanced oil recovery; rock failure mechanics for design of stimulation operations to recover gas from tight gas sands and Devonian shales; ad­vanced drilling and completion con­cepts: diagnostics for in situ shale oil recovery, coal gasification and en­hanced oil recovery; and many others.

Technology can be successfully transferred to private industry from New Mexico's National Laboratories such as Sandia and Los Alamos. How­ever, appropriate interactions, cli­mates, and laws are required. Sympo­sia such as the New Mexico Showcase for Technology, legislation such as the Schmitt-Ertel patent bill, and dedicat­ed staff such as those at the labs are needed to enhance effective use of the Federal R. & D. expenditures.

The material requested to be printed in the RECORD is as follows:

INDUSTRY WARMS To HIGH-TEMP R. & D. <By Roderic Beresford>

A major Government-funded research and development program in high-temperature semiconductor devices has just slid into the lap of industry. Work at Sandia National Laboratories has shown the feasibility of fabricating a wide range of semiconductors that can be used in environments where temperatures commonly reach 300°C or more.

3396 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 Oil- and gas-producing companies prob­

ably have the greatest interest in such tech­nology because their deep-well exploratory operations can reduce the risk of drilling a dry hole if they use electronic parts that can withstand high temperatures. Because of this need, firms like Schlumberger Ltd., Gearhart Industries Inc., and Dresser In­dustries Inc. are beginning to increase their commitment to high-temperature-electron­ics development and design, says Anthony F. Veneruso, former director of the Sandia program in Albuquerque, N.M.

This information transferral occurred during the High-Temperature Electronics and Instrumentation Conference in Hous­ton, held Dec. 7 and 8, where papers describ­ing Sandia's geothermal logging instrumen­tation development program were delivered to companies with a commmercial stake in such devices.

Veneruso himself is an example of the in­creased commercial commitment. He recent­ly moved to Gearhart, where his duties as manager of the Houston development labo­ratory include supervising work on high­temperature logging instruments.

"The Sandia program was a catalyst," says Veneruso. "It raised the awareness about the potential of high-temperature electron­ics in an industry relatively unfamiliar with it and showed these firms what kinds of ex­pertise they needed to continue research on their own." Although developments in the near future will rely on silicon-device tech­nology, the eventual commercialization of gallium phosphide, or other wide-bandgap semiconducting materials, promises operat­ing temperatures higher than those that are possible with silicon.

GaP widens. Junction leakage currents-a central problem in integrated-circuit design for high temperatures-depend on thermal­ly generated carriers, whose numbers drop with increasing bandgap. Recent work at Sandia documents the advantages to be ex­pected from GaP, a material with a wider bandgap than silicon.

Diodes and transistors fabricated with GaP operate reliably between 300° and 4oo·c. and a soo·c capability is in sight. These devices are made in magnesium­doped epitaxially grown layers.

Sandia's approach encouraged not only oil and gas firms, but also component compa­nies to jump into the high-temperature-elec­tronics business. Sandia contracts already have permitted heat-resistant hybrid cir­cuits, complementary-MOS parts, and in­struments to be developed by firms like Teledyne Philbrick, Harris Corp.'s Semicon­ductor Group, and General Electric Co.'s Space Systems division [Electronics, Aug. 14, 1980, p. 4ll. Others with high-tempera­ture-electronics programs include Burr­Brown Research Corp., Micro Net works Co., and MicroPac Industries Inc.

"I think the work Sandia started gave a lot of impetus to small, 'Lone Ranger' re­search operations buried in many compa­nies," Veneruso comments. Agreeing with him is Paul L. Sinclair, manager of Schlum­berger's Microelectronics Systems group in Houston. "We've been building electronic components for down-hole exploration for decades, but development of high-tempera­ture-circuit prototypes only got under way in 1980. It's still a relatively small program, but it's going to grow fast."

The Schlumberger group will concentrate on developing circuit designs, Sinclair adds. "We're scouting for components houses to build the parts for us."

Needed now. The time is ripe for high­temperature electronics because of dwin-

dling supplies of gas and oil from traditional sources, Sinclair maintains. "Every devel­oped country is scrambling for new sources; the last five years have seen phenomenal growth in geophysical well-logging oper­ations, which I'd estimate have been grow­ing at a rate of roughly 33 percent a year."

Probing deeper and deeper past many strata for fuel, drillers encounter steadily rising temperatures, which at the bottom of a well can reach a peak of 275°C. In addi­tion, a promising new oil-recovery method, using steam injection, must deal with tem­peratures that can reach a point around 2so·c.

So the need for all types of heat-resistant parts-sensors, amplifiers signal condition­ers, converters, and digital-processing and transmission equipment-is increasing dra­matically. "I anticipate that this will become the dominant technology for our in­dustry in the next 10 years," Sinclair as­serts.

"We're rather constrained by what chips the semiconductor makers can produce for us," he adds. "Although there are definite benefits to be gained from GaP, it is going to be years before we get our hands on this material in commercial !Cs."

In the meantime, making do with silicon will soon be a lot easier, because Harris Semiconductor in Melbourne, Fla., is about to make generally available its dielectrically isolated C-MOS parts, which are specified for 350°C. The group will base its product plans on the sentiments of the narrow market.

"There is not enough demand to warrant an entire high-temperature edition of the 4000-series logic family," points out Harris's Scott Falater, an analog product designer, "although we now have that capability. We are looking at universal gate chips, in which specific configurations could be selectively powered up by pin programming."

Dielectric isolation clears up two common failure modes in junction-isolated chips­latch-up and parasitic device formation. Otherwise, the fabrication process is not so different from conventional room-tempera­ture C-MOS. However, circuit designs must consider device behavior at high tempera­tures.

For example, forward-biased diodes drop only about 100 millivolts at 300°C, so biasing schemes based on diode strings are ruled out. Furthermore, leakage currents from a transistor's collector-base junction get so large that the net base-current flow re­verses, requiring bias circuits that can source and sink current.

Work needed. Although much of the Harris effort has been focused on circuit design "there is still much process refine­ment to be done," say Falater. A major stumbling block is electromigration-the rupturing of metal interconnects by current flow that is aggravated as the temperature rises.

In addition to this problem, the stability of metal layers is a prime concern for hybrid-circuit makers. Thin-film processes for passive components have demonstrated excellent performance in the temperature range of 350° to soo·c [Electronics, Jan. 3, 1980, p. 39].

Interconnection with the thick-film com­ponents, however, requires a special treat­ment. The usual gold-to-aluminum bonds that connect chip pads to wires and then to the thick-film conductors last only about 100 hours at 200°C. Burr-Brown gets up to 1,000 hours of operation by using an alumi­num-composition bond wire and doping the

gold films with platinum and palladium. The formula helps minimize the bond's in­termetallic phases.e

REPRESENTATIVE GEORGE MILLER'S ASBESTOS BILL

•Mr. HART. Mr. President. today the House Labor Standards Subcom­mittee, chaired by Representative GEORGE MILLER, began hearings on the Occupational Health Hazards Com­pensation Act of 1982. I commend Chairman MILLER for his leadership on this vitally important health issue.

Chairman MILLER and I have worked closely over the last year in developing proposals for a legislative remedy to provide compensation for workers dis­abled by occupation diseases. Our work has been based on the fact that the present workers' compensation statutes are inadequate, ineffective and inequitable. Congressman MIL­LER'S bill, like the legislation I have in­troduced in the Senate <S. 1634), builds on the recommendations of the National Commission on State Work­men's Compensation laws. There are significant differences in a number of the provisions of our bills. But we are continuing to work together to narrow these differences and to produce a leg­islative remedy which will be enacted by Congress, and which will effectively reform workers' compensation for oc­cupational disease.

Representative MILLER has made a major contribution to our Nation's ef­forts to finally come to grips with the complex occupational disease prob­lems we face. I hope my colleagues in the Senate and the House will consid­er his bill carefully, as well as my own legislation and any other proposals that are put forth, so that Congress will finally be in a position to act on the occupational issue in the months ahead.

Again, I commend Representative MILLER for his dedicated work on this matter and I ask that his opening statement from this morning's hearing be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The statement referred to is as fol­lows: STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE MILLER ON THE

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH HAZARDS COMPENSA­TION ACT OF 1982 I am introducing this morning, "The Oc­

cupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982."

This legislation will receive the immediate attention of the Subcommittee on Labor Standards. It is the product of five years of effort to identify the workers' compensation system's failure to provide adequate bene­fits to disable workers who suffer from occu­pational diseases.

The present compensation system is simply not designed for occupational dis­eases. Instead, this system takes workers who are victims of cancer and other dis­abling and fatal illnesses due to their jobs and makes them victims again-victims of an indifferent system which denies them, their families and their survivors the

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3397 income maintenance and medical care which they need and to which they are fully entitled.

Only about 5 per cent of workers disabled by occupational diseases receive benefits from the workers' compensation system. Moreover, the benefits that small fraction of workers receive are totally inadequate­less than half those receive by injury vic­tims.

The failure of the compensation system is alarming for the stricken worker and for the American taxpayers who pay $3 billion a year to victims of occupational diseases to make up for the shortcomings of the Work­er's Compensation System. That $3 billion loss from Social Security, Disability Insur­ance, Veterans' programs, Welfare, Food Stamps, Medicare, and Medicaid will grow every year in the future if we fail to develop a better, and fairer system for the worker.

This Subcommittee has held exhaustive hearings on occupational disease since 1978. We have been told repeatedly that over half of the victims of occupational disease re­ceive Social Security benefits. Another 17 percent receive Veteran's benefits. And an­other 16 percent depend on Welfare pro­grams.

At a time when these programs are strained to provide benefits to those who have nowhere else to turn, we cannot allow taxpayers' dollars to continue to subsidize hazardous industries and dangerous jobs in this country.

"The Occupational Health Hazards Com­pensation Act" will create a means for pro­viding the victims of occupational diseases, resulting from asbestos and uranium mining with adequate benefits on a timely basis. It will significantly reduce the demand on Social Security and other publicly funded programs by placing the burden where it has always belonged in cases of workers' compensation-on the responsible employ­ers, not on the taxpayers.

Past efforts to establish such a compensa­tion system for victims of asbestos diseases or other occupational illnesses have been acused of "bailing out industry." My legisla­tion will do no such thing.

My bill will provide more disabled workers with more income maintenance and health benefits than has ever been possible under the antiquated workers' compensation system without having to wait years for ad­ministrative processing or for their day in court. It provides an efficient-and an effec­tive-mechanism for processing compensa­tion claims.

This legislation places the financial burden where it properly belongs: with the manufacturers and the employers. I am hopeful that they, too, will support this leg­islation because it does establish a just system.

The legislation I introduce today builds on the recommendations of the National Com­mission on State Workmen's Compensation laws. While limiting initial coverage to as­bestos victims and uranium miners, about which the evidence of job-related diseases is unquestionable. The Bill includes a trigger mechanism for bringing additional diseases and occupations under its coverage when the scientific and medical evidence war­rants.

This legislation will not establish any new federal bureaucracy. It will result in the saving of billions of federal dollars because industry will pay not only for compensation benefits, but for the program's administra­tion, too. It will also save money by estab­lishing a program of surveillance and medi-

cal treatment to reduce the incidence and severity of occupational exposures.

Over the course of the year in which I have developed this Bill, I have solicited the advice of the broadest possible range of ex­perts-within the manufacturing industries, insurance, labor, compensation administra­tors, and the medical and scientific commu­nity.

This legislation is a synthesis of their best advice. Undoubtedly, it is not perfect. It will totally please no party in this complex, and often bitter debate. But this is a fair and fi­nancially sound program, and I intend to devote my time, and time of the Subcommit­tee, to assuring that it will be considered by the Congress this year.

Quite simply stated, we have dedicated a decade to debating and analyzing the issue of occupational disease compensation. We could debate it for another decade or more.

But there are tens of millions of men and women throughout this country, nearly a quarter of a million asbestos victims alone, who will die before the end of this century because of occupational disease. Millions more will be disabled. They will lose their wages and incur billions of dollars in health costs.

We need to accelerate our efforts to pre­vent the exposure of workers to hazardous substances in the workplace. My legislation will establish a program of surveillance and medical treatment to reduce the severity of occupational exposure in the future. This program is essential to reducing the inci­dence of occupational diseases in the future.

But for millions of men and women, it is too late. They have been exposed. After la­tency periods, of several decades, in some cases, they are going to get sick. They need the assurance of income maintenance, medi­cal care and survivors' benefits which the current compensation program promises them, but tragically fails to provide.

We must move on. I am grateful that so many members of the Subcommittee on Labor Standards have joined me in cospon­soring this legislation, because they recog­nize the seriousness of the problem and they share a commitment to moving the leg­islation this year.

I am also grateful to Dr. Irving Selikoff of Mt. Sinai Medical Center in New York who is internationally recognized as the leading occupational disease expert, for his valuable advice in the past, and for joining us today to provide us with his testimony on the need for occupational disease compensation legis­lation.e

SENATOR HAYAKAWA NOT A CANDIDATE FOR REELECTION

e MR. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, a few days ago our distinguished col­league from California, SAM HAYAKA­WA, announced that he will not be a candidate for reelection to the U.S. Senate. Like all of Sam's many friends in the Capitol and his millions of ad­mirers nationwide, I received this news with mixed emotions.

On the one hand, I can well appreci­ate the motives for his decision which he so eloquently and thoughtfully set forth in his remarks before the Re­publican State Convention in Monte­rey, Calif., on January 30. His observa­tions and his reaffirmation of the American dream is an inspiration. His plan to return to private life and the

resumption of his literary and journal­istic career portend the enrichment of the intellectual life of our country. So I can well understand his decision to leave the Senate at the end of 1982.

But this decision is also one which I must receive with regret. He has repre­sented his State and served our Nation with great distinction and his presence will be greatly missed in our delibera­tions. His keen insight and wisdom are literally irreplaceable. He will be greatly missed, and his valued contri­bution and friendship will be long re­membered.•

TEAMSTERS CENTRAL STATES PENSION FUND SUPPORTS S. 1785

•Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, George W. Lehr, the executive director of the Teamsters Central States Pension Fund, has informed me that the fund supports in principle the Labor Man­agement Racketeering Act of 1981, S. 1785.

The bill, which I introduced with the cosponsorship of Senators CHILES, ROTH, RUDMAN, NICKLES, DECONCINI, STENNIS, JOHNSTON, PRYOR, HOLLINGS and HATCH, is a result of hearings by the Permanent Subcommittee on In­vestigations on corrupt and irregular practices in the labor-management field.

The legislation increases the penal­ties for violations of the Taft-Hartley Act to prohibit persons convicted of certain crimes from holding of fices in unions and employee benefit plans. The measure also makes clear that the Labor Department has the responsibil­ity to detect, investigate and properly ref er for prosecution instances of cor­rupt practices in the management and operations of pension and welfare ben­efit plans.

S. 1785 also has the support of the AFL-CIO and the National Associa­tion of Stevedores.

Mr. President, I request that Mr. Lehr's letter of December 17, 1981, ex­pressing the fund's support for S. 1785 be printed in the RECORD.

The letter follows: CHICAGO, ILL., December 17, 1981.

Hon. SAM NUNN, Dirksen Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR NUNN: Pursuant to my tes­timony before the United States Senate Per­manent Subcommittee on Investigations on October 29, 1981, and my prior discussions with representatives of your staff, please be advised that the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund en­dorses in principle the bill CS. 1785) recently introduced by you, dealing with officials of employee benefit plans and providing for re­moval from office upon conviction of certain enumerated offenses.

Please accept the thanks of the Trustees and myself for soliciting our views in this

3398 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 regard, and let me know if we can be of any further assistance.

Sincerely yours, GEORGE W. LEHR,

Executive Director.•

BOTANIC GARDEN CONSERVATORY

e Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, the Joint Committee on the Library is an­nouncing today new procedures for congressional use of the Botanic Garden Conservatory, located at Inde­pendence Avenue and First Street SW.

Revised procedures for the after­hours use of the Conservatory are nec­essary to permit congressional use of the building after public visiting hours at little or no additional cost to the Government.

We urge all Members and their staffs to review the following letter from the Joint Committee and "Condi­tions for Use of the U.S. Botanic Garden Conservatory" for their infor­mation and convenience.

The following material explains the conditions in detail:

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE LIBRARY, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D. C., March 4, 1982. Re Procedures for Congressional Use of the

Conservatory of the U.S. Botanic Garden.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: This letter is intended to clarify for Senators, Representatives, con­gressional committees, Officers of the Con­gress, and their staffs the governing rules and procedures for congressional use of the Botanic Garden Conservatory, located at In­dependence Avenue and First Street, S.W.

In 1977 the Joint Committee on the Li­brary determined that the Conservatory, a beautiful and functional educational facility and museum, might be made available for congressional use after public visiting hours at little or no additional cost to the govern­ment.

In the ensuing four years, after-hours use of this popular building has increased to an extent that heavy personnel overtime costs are now being incurred and that the initial conditions require modification in order to achieve the original intent of use of the building for congressional purposes.

Therefore, to clarify that intent and to permit usage of the Conservatory at a level commensurate with available operating funds, the Joint Committee on the Library has adopted the following amended proce­dures for the information and convenience of eligible users.

Sincerely, AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS, M.C.,

Chairman, Joint Committee on the Library.

CHARLES Mee. MATHIAS, Jr., u.s.s., Vice-Chairman,

Joint Committee on the Library.

THE CONDITIONS FOR USE OF THE U.S. BOTANIC GARDEN CONSERVATORY

1. Facilities may be made available: A. For meetings or other functions origi­

nated and sponsored by Senators, Repre­sentatives, Congressional Committees, Offi­cers of the Congress and Congressional em­ployee associations, which are Congression­ally related. Personal celebrations such as birthdays or anniversaries are not permit­ted.

B. To other federal government agencies when requested by a Senator or Representa­tive.

C. To private, non-profit organizations qualifying under Internal Revenue Code 501CC6> provisions when requested by a Sen­ator or Representative. Evidence of 501CC6> status may be required.

2. Facilities are not available for meetings or functions:

A. Originated, sponsored or primarily at­tended by members of commercial or profit making organizations, trade associations, professional societies, social clubs and simi­lar entities.

B. Of any organization practicing discrimi­nation based on race, creed, color or nation­al origin.

C. Of organizations planning to charge ad­mission fees, make collections, seek contri­butions, give door prizes, have auctions or raffles, or sell articles while in the building.

D. Held for political or lobbying purposes. E. During June, July, or August, when the

Botanic Garden remains open to the public until 9:00 p.in.

F. That begin prior to 6:00 p.m. during months other than June, July, or August, or that continue beyond 11:00 p.m.

G. That propose preparation of food at the Botanic Garden, where only food pre­pared elsewhere in advance may be warmed.

H. At a frequency exceeding one evening per week, for all events.

I. During formal flower shows. J. Which include exhibits or other struc­

tures. 3. Procedures for reserving the facilities: Reservations may be made no more than 6

months in advance of the proposed event. All requests for use of the conservatory

must be approved by the Architect of the Capitol. A letter of request should be direct­ed to the Architect by the sponsoring Sena­tor or Representative, providing full details about the event, including the purpose of the meeting, particulars about the agency or organization if the Member is sponsoring an event under Paragraphs lB or lC above, the date and time that use of the facilities is desired, the approximate number of people to be in attendance, whether refreshments or a full meal is to be served, the name of the Senator's or Representative's staff con­tact for the event.

A Member's office may telephone the Bo­tanic Garden Office Cx58333) to determine if the date proposed for use of the facilities is open, and, if so, a tentative hold may be placed on the Conservatory pending a deci­sion by the Architect on the Member's writ­ten request for use of the facilities. Tele­phone requests of this nature should be fol­lowed up promptly by the Member's written request to avoid unauthorized staff requests that deny access to the facilities by other Members of Congress.e

AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING CRISIS

e Mr. DODD. Mr. President, while na­tional and congressional attention has focused on the plight of the housing industry, which suffers from one of its worst depressions in 40 years, the des­perate condition of the rental housing segment of that industry has received only passing notice. This is unfortu­nate, because rental housing serves one-third of our population, particu­larly that part which is elderly or lower income, and a good many of

these individuals rent because they have no other choice. High interest rates, urban economic conditions, and open administration hostility to rental housing are fast diminishing renters' opportunities for decent, affordable housing.

Mr. President, in preparation for leg­islation I have introduced to aid this damaged housing sector, I have con­ducted a review of conditions in rental housing markets, especially involving multifamily housing. I would like to share with my colleagues the results of that review.

In brief, the Nation faces a rental housing crisis that involves both a shortage of units and severe condi­tions in existing units. This rental housing shortage promises to grow worse in the next several years. While progress has been made in improving the quality of the housing stock, mil­lions of units remain substandard and deteriorating. Many people still live in unacceptably overcrowded units, which hastens a dwelling's decline. Moreover, millions of families must pay rents that consume substantial portions of their income-well over traditionally acceptable levels of 25 to 30 percent. Low-income families often spend years on lists waiting for feder­ally assisted units to become available. Although the crisis in rental housing has largely affected lower income people whose housing choices are the most limited, people earning moderate and even middle incomes are coming face to face with this crisis as their access to the homeownership market becomes increasingly restricted.

Let me present in greater detail the alarming conditions that persist in rental housing markets across the country. Before I do, however, I would like to note that assessing housing needs has always been difficult be­cause of the absence of any one reli­able measure. We must, therefore, rely on a variety of indicators and esti­mates of need. These measures include vacancy rates, substandard and over­crowding estimates, ability to pay, waiting lists for federally assisted housing, and prediction of rental hous­ing shortages based on supply and demand estimates.

A RENTAL HOUSING SHORTAGE A number of studies in recent years

have estimated that the supply of rental units is falling short of the number of units our people need or demand. Uriel Manheim, in a report for the National Association of Home­builders, found that in the last 5 years of the 1970's the total rental apart­ment (five units or more) shortage was estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000 units. A report prepared in HUD in 1980 gives some indication of the depth of the shortage to come. For 1980-90, it is estimated that the Nation will experience an annual

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3399 shortfall of multifamily units of be­tween 170,000 to 302,000 units. This prediction assumes that the Federal Government will continue to fulfill its responsibility by providing subsidized multifamily housing production in the range of 150,000 to 167,000 annually. If the proposed administration budget for fiscal year 1983 is enacted, Federal subsidized new production would be all but eliminated and, of course, the annual shortfall would then be consid­erably higher.

The Council of State Housing Agen­cies <CSHA), using Manheim's produc­tion estimates and the housing demand projections of J. Pitkin and G. Ma.snick of the MIT-Harvard joint center for urban studies, expects a shortfall of rental units of approxi­mately 3.25 million during the 1980's, which is in the upper range of the in­ternal HUD projection noted above. Manheim believes that there is an annual need for 500,000 new rental units to alleviate tight conditions and to create a healthy market. In 1980, however, only 279,000 multifamily rental units were begun, and in 1981 the number of such starts dropped 16.5 percent to approximately 233,000. Overall housing starts in 1980 and 1981 matched previous record lows. In 1980, housing starts were the lowest since 1975, and in 1981 starts were the lowest since 1946.

In a yet to be published study, An­thony Downs, in preliminary esti­mates, also predicts that there will be a shortage of rental housing in the decade of the eighties. In fact, accord­ing to Downs, even given reduced household formation due to such a shortage and at present production levels, there will remain an annual shortfall of 191,000 units. This short­fall is 68 percent of the entire multi­family rental production of 1981. Let me remind my colleagues that the very low-production level for 1981 was supplemented by federally subsidized units, the future of which is now in question.

Two other forces bear on the rental housing supply production of single family rental housing and condomini­um conversion. While single family housing contributes units to the stock of rental housing, the availability of such units for rent has been declining. In addition, very few new single family units are being built today for rental use, thereby diminishing another source of rental units.

Condominium conversions have con­tinued to increase in the last 3 years while the number of almost every other form of housing construction and rehabilitation has declined. While some conversions have been slowed temporarily by staggering interest rates, in 1980 the Advance Mortgage Corp. estimated conversions at 160,000. Despite high interest rates, this number is nevertheless a 10-per-89-069 ~23 (Pt. 3)

cent increase over 1979 and an 88-per­cent increase over 1978 when approxi­mately 85,000 units were converted. HUD estimates that 71 percent of the units converted in the 1970's were au­thorized between 1977 and 1979. The number of conversions not only in­creased in the last decade, but their impact has been felt in the depressed housing market of the late 1970's.

The actual effect of conversions on the rental market is controversial. Na­tionwide, a 1980 HUD study indicates net loss of rental units to be 5 out of every 100 conversions. A number of the units not included in this 5-per­cent loss are units converted but then offered for rent. They are, however, returned as rental units at much higher rents; rents which low- and moderate-income families cannot afford. The 1970's saw only 1.3 percent of the Nation's rental units converted, but the percent of rental units con­verted in cities or subsections of cities varies from 1 percent to as high as 30 percent. In addition, almost 60 percent of the units are concentrated in 12 large SMSA's. Thus, the impact upon a low- or moderate-income community can be quifo severe. With national rental vacancy rates running at 5 per­cent, and many urban areas with rates under 2 percent, the low- and moder­ate-income urban renter is having great difficulty finding an acceptable replacement unit.

In order to understand the extent of the crisis in rental housing, we need to look at the total housing market as well. We find that additional pressure will be placed on rental housing be­cause of an expected shortage of all types of housing in the 1980's. Using Pitkin's and Ma.snick's projections of housing demand and NAHB economist Michael Sumichrast's projections of housing starts, CSHA estimates a total housing shortage of over 5 million units. This figure includes single family homes.

The negative impact on the rental housing market will be seen in a varie­ty of ways. Middle-income families looking for homeownership will force the conversion of rental units at an ac­celerated pace. Rental vacancies, now nationally at 5 percent, will become still worse, decreasing mobility and housing choice. Low-income families presently living in older, declining units will be forced to remain still longer, and overcrowding will grow. The portion of income devoted to housing will rise still higher, as supply fails to match demand. We already see these consequences occurring in a number of rental markets.

HUD would have us believe that there is no rental housing shortage. This view would support the adminis­tration's desire to eliminate Federal rental housing production programs, although what would replace these programs is anyone's guess. The major

study upon which the Department relies is one produced by the Rand Corp. This report does not even ad­dress itself to the rental housing needs of the 1980's. Rather, it examines the economic stress in which landlords found themselves in the 1970's. Rand is correct in pointing out that because of declining operating returns, land­lords are often forced to abandon units and investors are unlikely to de­velop new rental properties. The ag­gregate data that Rand analyzed is never broken down to examine subpop­ulations, particularly low- and moder­ate-income sectors. Thus, hidden in national data are the needs of lower income renters. The author of the report, Ira S. Lowry, admits that his report is:

Unable to assess supply·demand balance in rental housing markets, either nationally or locally, so it cannot evaluate arguments about rental housing surplus or shortages.

In brief, the Rand report is of little help to us in determining need beyond pointing out that presently rental housing development is not economi­cally viable. It simply fails to support the claim that a rental housing short­age does not exist.

Rental housing faces an economic squeeze from all sides. Landlords do face escalating operating costs, includ­ing high energy prices. Rents have not, and cannot, keep pace with such costs which eventually reduces profit and maintenance. Consumer demand for, and achievement of, rent control further aggravates the financial pic­ture for rental housing. Prospective landlords are frightened off by tower­ing interest rates as well as by low op­erating returns. Such investors, thus, are squeezed out of the rental market. Renters, 50 percent of whom earn less than $10,000 annually and a majority of whom already pay more than 25 percent of their income for rent, are unable effectively to demand new rental construction. They simply cannot afford such housing. The pre­dicted shortage of rental units along with low vacancies rates and low pro­duction levels, place the renter in a squeeze as well. There are few winners in the rental housing market, while there are many who suffer its condi­tion.

SUBSTANDARD AND OVERCROWDED HOUSING

Mr. President, the Congress can look with pride at the great strides we have taken to eliminate substandard hous­ing. In 1940, almost half of the hous­ing stock could be considered sub­standard. With the efforts of both the public and private sectors, less than 10 percent of the stock was substandard by 1970. Progress continued through the 1970's, but the problem has not been eliminated. That partial progress is no excuse to bring our efforts to a close, as the administration proposes.

3400 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE March 4, 1982 Of the 36.6 million lower income

households, 5.3 million live in phys­ically inadequate housing. A physical­ly inadequate unit includes one of more of the following defects: Lack of a shared bathroom, multiple structur­al problems such as leaky roofs, holes in floor, walls or ceilings, recent evi­dence of rats or mice, or frequent breakdowns of toilets, heating or elec­trical systems. Again, national data needs to be broken down into sub­groups to see the true extent of the problems. For renters, 13.3 percent of units are physically inadequate, and for all black households, 19.1 percent, for Puerto Ricans 12.3 percent, for rural southerners 12.8 percent, for residents of large cities 9.6 percent, and for female headed households 10.1 percent. With 1 in 5 black households, and 1 in 10 female headed households living in substandard units, it is clear that such housing remains a serious problem. Also, as of 1978, overcrowd­ing remains a concern for 1.5 million additional households that were not in otherwise physically inadequate hous­ing. Overcrowding, for the first time in many years, has begun to increase again. It is likely to grow much worse with the expected rental housing shortages.

A MEASURE OF NEED

Each local public housing authority <PHA> keeps a list of those waiting to. occupy a public housing unit. These lists become a measure of need for rental housing. The increasing number of people on such lists, and the length of time they must wait for a unit, tes­tify to the major rental housing prob­lem.

In May of 1981, the National Asso­ciation of Housing and Redevelopment Officials <NAHRO> surveyed 22 PHA's which manage 369,000 units. These au­thorities had over 300,000 households on their waiting lists, or 83 percent of occupancy. While the annual average rate of tenants moving out of units re­mained unchanged, waiting lists in­creased, from 1980, by 28.5 percent.

Local data on waiting lists indicate an even more severe problem for some areas. In Hartford, Conn., the average wait was 2112 years in 1980; In New York, 11.3 years; in Baltimore, 14 years; in Boston, 3% years; in Detroit, 1.4 years; in San Antonio, 1.8 years; in Chicago, 2.17; and in Pittsburgh, 3.13 years. These families are waiting for a unit of public housing. What kind of alternatives do they face? In what kind of unit must they remain while they wait? Such waits clearly indicate that in most major cities rental hous­ing is simply not available that meets some minimum standard.

ABILITY TO PAY RENT

All reports, including the interim report of the President's Commission on Housing, find that the rent burden on low-income families has increased to unacceptable levels. Over 60 percent

of very low-income households-in­comes less than 50 percent of median family income-pay more than 30 per­cent of their incomes for rent. In addi­tion, almost 25 percent of low-income households-incomes between 50 and 80 percent of median family income­pay over 30 percent of their income for rent. This data likely understates the problem because a flat 30 percent ignores the important impact on affordability of variation in family size. An excessive rent burden clearly falls much more severely among lower and large households than among other groups. Such households have little choice but to secure the only available housing regardless of the rent burden it imposes.

CONCLUSION

Mr. President, the problems in rental housing markets are clearly nu­merous. There are no simple solutions. The President of the United States has proposed a solution that is inad­equate to these many problems. He has suggested a housing voucher pro­gram, that while it may approach the problem of housing affordability, will not construct, or cause the construc­tion of, one new rental unit. It simply does not address the huge rental hous­ing shortage we face. In addition, the proposed voucher program only par­tially addresses the affordability prob­lem because the program is not an en­titlement available to all who need it. The voucher, itself, is to average only $2,000 per family per year with no planned increases for inflation in suc­ceeding years. It begins at an inad­equate benefit level and grows worse with time. Besides 10,000 units of el­derly housing and a small moderate re­habilitation program, the administra­tion makes no attempt to deal with the crisis. It is clear that we need to devise a response to these problems that includes not only some type of adequate voucher program, but also a production. Only a production pro­gram can begin to relieve the short­ages felt most severely by low and moderate income families. Mr. Presi­dent, we must not lose faith in a prom­ise we made to the American people over 30 years ago-a promise of a decent home for every American.•

SOVIET REPRESSION AND THE CASE OF IDA NUDEL

e Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, the rapid deterioration of the Madrid Con­ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe can be directly attributed to the utterly reprehensible attitude of the Soviet delegation in resolutely blocking any progress. The Madrid Conference has slowly ground to a halt in the face of Soviet attempts to brutally suppress all internal dissent. This clear violation of the final act of the Helsinki accords, an agreement among nations to which the Soviet

Union freely signed, has been charac­terized by the U.S. Ambassador to Madrid, Max Kampelman, as "sheer hypocrisy"; a view to which I whole­heartedly ascribe.

The Soviet Union, in signing the Helsinki accords, pledged to respect human rights in both internal and ex­ternal affairs. I am sure that there is no need to point to the imperial char­acter of the Soviet regime. The at­tempts to extinguish the people of Af­ghanistan who would oppose the Soviet invasion as well as the brutal crackdown by the military government in Poland all show the true nature cf Soviet "hypocrisy".

What should be of equal concern to the people of the world is the internal repression in the Soviet Union that has little or no equal in the world today. The Soviet authorities, from the birth of the Soviet Union in the Revolution of 1917, have kept tight control over the domestic population through a campaign of terror. To con­trol a host of captive nations, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, to name a few, and virtually all of Eastern Europe, the Soviets have employed ruthless and disgusting tactics on an unimagi­nable scale. Purges and attempts at Russification have devastated various ethnic groups or national movements. If one were to devise some sort of his­torical tally of those who have died through ruthless oppression, the Soviet Union would be champion par excellance. ·

I rise today to speak of one particu­lar group that the Soviet regime ap­pears bent on destroying. This one re­ligion has suffered throughout the history of Soviet oppression and it now appears to be worsening. Jews in the Soviet Union have been the vic­tims of an orchestrated plan of geno­cide. Jewish emigration, 51,000 in 1979, has come to a virtual standstill. Even requesting permission to leave the Soviet Union can be hazardous. Would be emigrees are harassed, detained and often imprisoned on trumped up charges. Even the use of psychiatric facilities as a means of torture and de­tention is prevalent.

One example of this inhuman and viscious persecution was released from exile in Siberia on March 2. A Jew, a refusenik, an activist, a reformer and above all a human being fighting the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime: Ida Nudel has served close to 4 years of internal exile after being con­victed of "malicious hooliganism" under article 206/2 of the Soviet Criminal Code.

This conviction came after she re­peatedly protested the denial of an exit visa. Her history is one of contin­ual harassment, arrest, torture and depravation at the hand of the KGB. A true Prisoner of Conscience, Ida Nudel has had her life virtually de-

March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE 3401

stroyed because she refused to give up

the hope of one day living in Israel.

To me, this life of constant threats

and abuse, of intolerable living condi-

tions, is incomprehensible. I know it to

be true, but it is still difficult to con-

ceive. I appeal to all of my colleagues

to continue the fight against this true

evil. I know that it is difficult to perse-

vere in the face of total silence from

the Soviets. Every inquiry to Ambassa-

dor D obrynin has met with silence,

and I am sure that this is the norm

rather than the exception . Public

outcry and congressional pressure, I

am confident, will eventually yield re-

sults. We cannot let these people be

forgotten.

If I may paraphrase someone who

heretofore I would not have been

philosophically disposed to cite, Susan

Sontag, Communism is merely another

form of Fascism, Fascism w ith a

human f ace.·

JOB TRAINING LEGISLATION

·

Mr. QUAYLE. I am pleased to an-

nounce that I will be introducing the

administration's job training proposal

next week. The legislation will be co-

sponsored by Senator HATCH, chair-

man of the L abor and Human R e-

sources Committee. The administra-

tion's proposal is built on the same

fundamental principles as those which

guided the preparation of S. 2036, the

training for jobs bill which I intro-

duced last month with Senator KEN-

NEDY, Senator HAWKINS, and Senator

PELL . I am particularly pleased that

Senator HATCH has also agreed to be a

cosponsor of that bill. Both bills, as

well as other job training proposals

that have been in troduced in the

Senate and in the House, will be the

subject of joint hearings March 15

through March 18 before the Subcom-

mittee on Employment and Productivi-

ty which I chair and the Employment

Opportunities Subcommittee chaired

by Congressman HAWKINS.·

ORDER FOR THE RECOGNITION

OF SENATOR HAYAKAWA ON

MONDAY, MARCH 8, 1982

Mr. BAKER . Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that on Monday

when the S enate resumes, after the

recognition of the two leaders under

the standing order, the Senator from

California (Mr. HAYAKAWA) be recog-

nized for not to exceed 15 minutes

under a special order.

The VICE PRES ID EN T . Without

objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, is there

an order for Monday next?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate

will convene at 10:30 a.m.

May we have order in the S enate?

PROGRAM

Mr. BA KE R . Mr. President, on

Monday, under the order previously

entered, the S enate will convene at

1 0 :3 0 a.m. It is the intention of the

leadership to ask the Chair to lay this

matter before the Senate at 12:30. It is

hoped that we will begin consideration

of the Williams resolutions at 1 o'clock

and run until 6 o'clock, approximately.

RECESS UNTIL MONDAY, MARCH

8, 1982, AT 10:30 A.M.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move,

in accordance with the order previous-

ly entered, that the S enate stand in

recess until Monday at 10:30 a.m.

The motion was agreed to, and the

S enate, at 5:58 p.m., recessed until

Monday, March 8, 1982, at 10:30 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by

the Senate March 4, 1982:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Herman W. N ickel, of the D istrict of Co-

lumbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary

and Plenipotentiary of the United States of

America to the Republic of South Africa.

IN THE ARMY

The following-named officers for promo-

tion in the R eserve of the A rmy of the

United States, under the provisions of title

10, United States Code, section 3370:

To be colonel

Abel, Gene P.,

Abell, Julian L.,

Ackerman, Arlene A.,

Adams, Edward L.,

Adams, Henry L.,

Adams, John Q.,

Adams, Robert E.,

Adamson, David M.,

Addison, Louis C.,

Aepli, Emmett C.,

Affeldt, Ronald D.,

Akre, Richard D.,

Albee, Donald D.,

Albrecht, George H.,

Aldridge, Allan C.,

Alexander, Thomas H.,

Allen, John W.,

Allen, Richard F.,

Allen, Willard T.,

Allende, Velarde A.,

Alsip, Tommy G.,

Altman, Richard A.,

Amero, Clifford J.,

Amick, George L.,

Amos, Robert B.,

Anderson, Ben A.,

Anderson, Benny P.,

Anderson, Walter D.,

Andrysiak, Frank L.,

Arnold, Joseph R.,

Arntz, Benjamin L.,

Aske, Lambert J., Jr.,

Atherton, Walter B.,

Aubuchon, James M.,

Auerbach, Ernest S.,

Austin, Joseph R.,

Austin, William H.,

Ayres, Billy J.,

Bagley, Donald M.,

Baiden, Arthur H.,

Baker, John W.,

Baker, Merrill S.,

Baldwin, Harrison V.,

Ballard, Lawrence L.,

Barfield, Walter R.,

Barlament, Reginald,

Barnes, Wilson C.,

Barringer, David F.,

Bartlett, William A.,

Basler, Irvin P.,

Bassard, Knowlton H.,

Beach, Dwight E.,

Beachy, Donald K.,

Bean, Loring B.,

Becker, John B.,

Bedoka, Louis,

Bell, James F.,

Bell, Robert A.,

Belt, William P.,

Benbow, Edward A.,

Bennett, Basil 0.,

Bennett, Don P.,

Bergevin, Duane B.,

Berglund, David W.,

Bergman, Howard G.,

Beringer, Leroy H.,

Berry, James C.,

Bertolett, Craig R.,

Best, James R.,

Bicket, Howard J.,

Biscomb, William M.,

Bitonti, Frank,

Bitters, Tom G.,

Black, Emery R.,

Black, John R.,

Bland, Robert A.,

Blanford, Kenneth J.,

Blott, William C.,

Blunck, Leo G.,

Boatman, Howard,

Bodal, Robert A.,

Bodine, Robert,

Boehm, Harold L.,

Boerner, Mark S.,

Boerschel, August P.,

Boleware, Garland W.,

Bolton, Thomas N.,

Borcher, Dale H.,

Borden, Clifford C.,

Bowdy, James B.,

Bowling, Jimmy V.,

Bowman, James B.,

Bowman, Pasco M.,

Boyd, Donald G.,

Boyer, Ohlen R.,

Boynton, Earl W.,

Bradford, Henry M.,

Bradish, John T.,

Bradley, Paul R.,

Brandt, Robert J.,

Brashear, Jay,

Braverman, Robert,

Bray, William E.,

Breed, John W.,

Breeden, Howard L.,

Breeding, Joel W.,

Brewer, Charles E.,

Brill, Joseph N.,

Britton, J. V.,

Broadway, Buddy, S.,

Brooke, James A.,

Brooke, Robert D.,

Broome, James C.,

Brown, Carlton M.,

Brown, Donald P.,

Brown, Emmett L.,

Brown, Gerald V.,

Brown, Joe B.,

Brown, Lewis C.,

Brown, Michael A.,

Brown, Warren C.,

Brox Charles A.,

Broxson, Joseph E.,

Brunk, Gordon L.,

Bryan, Curtis H.,

Bryan, James C.,

Bryant, Douglas R.,

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3402

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

March 4, 1982

Buck, Robert H.,

Buck, Thomas E.,

Budd, Alan L.,

Bugbee, James T. Jr.,

Bullis, Lawrence H.,

Bumgardner, Rudolph,

Bundy, L. D. Lamar,

Burgmeier, Richard,

Burke, Glen D.,

Burkett, William E.,

Burns, Daniel T.,

Burt, Roy A. Jr.,

Butler, Richard G.,

Byrne, John P.,

Caldwell, Arthur H.,

Calhoun, John R.,

Callies, Fritz A.,

Canon, Anthony J.,

Canon, Val H. Jr.,

Cantrell, Jerry L.,

Capps Billy F.,

Cardile, Thomas C.,

Carl, William E.,

Carlson, Edwin S.,

Carlson, James S.,

Carpenter, Jimmie J.,

Carpenter, John A.,

Carrigan, Taylor K.,

Carroll, Joseph L.,

Carson, Earl W.,

Carte, Dale W.,

Carter, Kevin R.,

Carter, Ralph L.,

Carter, Thomas L.,

Carter, William C.,

Casey, Joe W.,

Casto, Eldridge R.,

Cattley, Robert A.,

Cavalaris, James G.,

Chambers, Lomer R.,

Chamblee, Herbert M.,

Champe, Gene E.,

Chandler, Jackie D.,

Channell, Howard F.,

Chavanne, Raymond E.,

Cheek, Forrest H.,

Chegar, Richard D.,

Cheney, John F.,

Chin, Dick K.,

Chirico, Anthony P.,

Chopin, Lamy J.,

Christians, Charles

Christy, William S.,

Clark, Clarence J.,

Clark, Joseph B.,

Clark, Robert G.,

Clum, Arnold N.,

Cochrane, Carl L.,

Cockrum, Robert E.,

Collins, Philip J.,

Conlon, Herbert S.,

Connelly, John E.,

Connors, Edward T.,

Conyne, Bruce J.,

Cook, John P.,

Cooper, Jack D.,

Copeland, William

F.,

Cormier, Richard F.,

Cort, Kenneth M.,

Cotchett, Joseph W.,

Coutts, William J.,

Couture, Bertrand L.,

Cox, Donald D.,

Cox, George H.,

Cox, Lloyd F.,

Coy, Alex D., Jr.,

Coyne, Lawrence J.,

Crabtree, Charles L.,

Craddock, Bo F.,

Cramer, Robert E.,

Crane, Morris R.,

Cristinzio, Joseph,

Cummings, David W.,

Cunningham, John D.,

Cuplin, Warren D.,

Curren, William F.,

Curtis, Daniel B.,

Daggett, Robert P.,

Dahlstedt, Carle E.,

Damico, Carl A.,

Darbyshire, David W.,

Darden, Winston A.,

Daria, Maurice D.,

Davis, Gene C.,

Davis, James L.,

Davis, Samuel R.,

Davis, Thomas D., .

Dawson, George A.,

Dean, Robert C.,

Decker, John C.,

DeFazio, Anthony J.,

DeGraw, Darrel G.,

Dehle, Richard A.,

DeJesus, Vincente,

DeLaurenti, Robert,

Delgehausen, Roger,

Del Sesto, Joseph R.,

Denny, Robert M.,

Desmarais, Michael,

DeVaughan, Zed F.,

DeVaughn, Louis E.,

DeWeese, Thomas J.,

DeWoskin, Alan E.,

Dexter, Hale G.,

Diaz, Alfred M.,

Diaz-Santiago, Ramon,

Dick, William W.,

Digre, Kenneth B.,

Diperna, Anthony J.,

Dixon, Robert L.,

Dolan, James G.,

Doll, William V.,

Dollahite, Thomas H.,

Domico, William D.,

Donaldson, Wilbert,

Dougherty, Alonzo D.,

Dougherty, Edward T.,

Doyle, Hayward, Jr.,

Doyle, William E.,

Drosdick, Joseph W,

Duda, Edwin J.,

Duerr, Richard D.,

Dunkelberger, James,

Dwarica, Nathan S.,

Eagon, Herbert B.,

Easley, John R.,

Eddy, Donald D.,

Edwards, Larry V.,

Edwards, Robert T.,

Eilts, Leonard G.,

Elam, Rudy T.,

Ellsworth, Bruce B.,

Elmore, Robert E.,

Engelhardt, Leonard,

Enslen, Frederick T.,

Erikson, Harold G.,

Essex, John E.,

Evangelist, Joseph,

Faeth, Paul E.,

Faglier, Richard W.,

Farias, Joseph D.,

Farragut, Wallace E.,

Faulkner, Charles B.,

Faulkner, Jack S.,

Faust, Ramon B.,

Feely, James L.,

Feisley, James L.,

Ferguson, Richard L.,

Ferrari, Mario J.,

Ferrell, Cornett L.,

Filiault, Edgar D.,

Filosa, Kenneth J.,

Fine, Donald L.,

Finlayson, John D.,

Finn, John J.,

Fischer, Ronald L.,

Fiser, David J.,

Fisher, Edward S.,

Flack, Charles G.,

Flanigan, Michael J.,

Fleenor, James R.,

Floeck, Jesse C.,

Foley, James F.,

Foley, Robert P.,

Ford, Clarence V.,

Ford, Howard F.,

Ford, Wilbur E.,

Foster, Harvey L.,

Foster, Wilfred J.,

Fowler, Jonas K.,

Franke, George E.,

Franklin, Eugene H.,

Franks, George R.,

Fraser, Donald S.,

Frickey, Norman G.,

Frost, Cyril E.,

Fuentes-Aviles, A.,

Fulton, David L.,

Furr, Carter B.,

Fusco, George M.,

Gableman, Jack R.,

Gantt, John B.,

Gantt, Richard A.,

Gantt, William A.,

Garbo, Salvatore J.,

Garry, Thomas P.,

Gavigan, David W.,

Gelfand, Louis,

Gerl, Kennard A.,

Gewet, Francis B.,

Giannakis, Neoclis

Gieske, Harry A.,

Gill, James E.,

Glatzel, Walter L.,

Glenn, Robert F.,

Glover, Julius E.,

Glover, William L.,

Godwin, James R.,

Goeben, Oscar E.,

Goette, Aubrey E.,

Goff, Roy C.,

Goldstrohm, William,

Gonion, Leo B.,

Gonzales, Richard E.,

Gooding, Warren M.,

Gorbea-Frontera, R.,

Gorman, William J.,

Gormley, William J.,

Graves, Thomas C.,

Graze, Robert L.,

Greene, Charles H.,

Greenspan, Jack M.,

Greer, Charlie K.,

Gresko, Charles N.,

Griffin, James M.,

Griffin, John R.,

Griffith, Franklin,

Griffith, Lebron D.,

Griffith, Robert G.,

Grimsley, William P.,

Grizzle, Richard A.,

Grohoski, Frank L.,

Grossman, Peter G.,

Gruner, George R.,

Gruselle, John C.,

Guggenheimer, Max L.,

Gulseth, Charles L.,

Gwynne, Harry S.,

Haithcock, Earl D.,

Hall, Charles K.,

Handy, Herman B.,

Hankerson, Charles,

Hannah, William J.,

Hansen, Harold N.,

Hanson, David B.,

Happersett, Joyce K.,

Hara, Henry S.,

Harber, Gary G.,

Harper, Clements L.,

Harper, Michael R.,

Harra, David F.,

Harris, Lee C.,

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

3403

March 4, 1982

Harris, Robert A.,

Harrison, James T.,

Harrison, John R.,

Haslam, Terry M.,

Hatch, Leighton,

Hauck, William J.,

Hawkins, Billy W.,

Headrick, Brian S.,

Heath, Clarence P.,

Heath, Stratton R.,

Hedgecoke, Wade R.,

Hein, Klaus P.,

Henderson, Jay J.,

Henderson, Lee A.,

Henderson, Max B.,

Hendricks, Frank D.,

Heuer, David A.,

Heynoski, Edward J.,

Hildebrand, Dean C.,

Hill, Donald E.,

Hill, James J.,

Hill, Leo,

Hitchcock, Henry W.,

Hobby, Brewster B.,

Hodges, Donald M.,

Hoerr, Juanita M.,

Holcomb, Gary E.,

Holcomb, William L.,

Holden, Oliver Jr.,

Holloway, Jesse C.,

Holmes, Clyde R.,

Holt, Richard L.,

Holzgruber, Alfred,

Honrychs, Sigmund J.,

Hood, Willard G.,

Hoover, John E.,

Hoover, Lawrence D.,

Howe, Charles B.,

Hubbard, John E.,

Hughes, Michael J.,

Hughes, Morton W.,

Humble, Bobby D.,

Hunt, Willie M.,

Hurley, James M.,

Husby, Paul W.,

Hutson, Kyle E.,

Hutt, William V.,

Hyland, Erik J.,

Iha, James Y.,

Irving, John W.,

Ishikawa, Norman T.,

Ison, Wade H.,

Ivory, Royce S.,

Jackson, Earnest L.,

Jackson, Ralph E.,

Jackson, Robert L.,

Jacobsen, Billy D.,

Jaimes, Daniel R.,

Jakubowski, Eugene,

James, Paul H.,

Jepson, John K.,

Johnson, Anton J.,

Johnson, Robert B.,

Johnston, Milton W.,

Jones, Alan D.,

Jones, Clare A.,

Jones, Glenn W.,

Jones, Martin A.,

Jones, Thomas P.,

Jones, Jimmie,

Juerjens, Robert R.,

Kafka, Alfred H.,

Kalinski, George,

Kallenbach, Richard,

Keenan, George,

Keeton, Jerry M.,

Kelly, Paul A.,

Kelly, William V.,

Kesserling, James A.,

Kidd, Richard G.,

Kilburn, Darrell D.,

Killian, Charles W.,

Kinney, Stevens P.,

Kirk, Jerry R.,

Kirkpatrick, Joseph,

Kirst, Daniel T.,

Klas, Terry C.,

Klein, Raymond, Jr.,

Knapp, Clarence C.,

Knappe, Martin G.,

Knotek, Charles A.,

Kohl, Delbert E.,

Kolenda, David W.,

Kondi, Albert J.,

Konz, Richard W.,

Kopcha, Paul J.,

Kopecky, Robert J.,

Kopp, Thomas E.,

Koster, Leslie N.,

Kozieja, Richard S.,

Krebs, Joseph E.,

Kreiner, Ronald D.,

Kreul, Donald E.,

Kringle, Paul R.,

Kulas, Julian E.,

Kurth, Louis E.,

LaFontaine, David L.,

Lally, John E.,

Lamastra, Anthony R.,

Lampman, Audis E.,

Lanz, Larry J.,

Larson, John D.,

Laswell, Franklin L.,

Latterell, Gerald W.,

Lauer, Paul H.,

Laurea, Lena,

Law, McEdward,

Lawrence, Warren J.,

Lawson, Patricia M.,

Leatherwood, Thomas,

Lee, Harry J.,

Leimer, Weldon H.,

Lemay, Francis J.,

Leslie, William F.,

Levin, Erwin J.,

Lewis, Robert P.,

Leyva, Richard D.,

Lidberg, Carl W.,

Lindsay, Rodney C.,

Linthicum, Elmer J.,

Litschke, Jerome C.,

Little, Ruby D.,

Livesay, Donald D.,

Livesay, James D.,

Livingston, Horace,

Loe, Robert D.,

Loftus, John T.,

Long, Gary D.,

Long, William H.,

Lowrie, Virgil A.,

Lueck, David H.,

Lundquist, Ronald W.,

Lutkus, John W.,

Lyle, Millard D.,

Lynn, Donald W.,

Lynn, James A.,

MacDonald, Bruce,

Mack, Douglas F.,

MacPherson, Neil D.,

Mahoney, Leo E.,

Mahoney, Robert G.,

Mahowald, Donald G.,

Malcom, Otis C.,

Mallan, Richard E.,

Malone, Doyle R.,

Manolakis, Soterios,

Margetts, Charles M.,

Martin, Bobby J.,

Martin, Irvin L.,

Martin, James R.,

Martin, John E.,

Martin, Kenneth K.,

Martin, Marion C.,

Martin, Paul D.,

Martin, Ralph S.,

Martin, Robert B.,

Masuoka, Edward C.,

Mathews, James E.,

Matteson, Gerald R.,

Mattson, Thomas E.,

Maynard, Donald A.,

Mazza, Gary E.,

McAllister, Eugene,

McCarthy, D. M.,

McCormick, Paul L.,

McCoy, Robert D.,

McCune, John H.

McDaniel, Donald M.,

McDonald, John D.,

McElwee, Claude W.,

McGillen, William D.,

McGillivray, James,

McGouldrick, John J.,

McGuire, James H.,

McIver, Farris E.,

McKee, Kenneth M.,

McKee, Robert M.,

McKell, Sterling R.,

McKenney, John B.,

McLaughlin, Hugh D.,

McLaurin, Donald K.,

McLaurin, Hugh M.,

McMeekin, James L.,

McNabb, Paul V.,

McNeil, Rodney W.,

McPhaul, Malcolm G.,

McSweeney, Arthur P.,

Meek, James G.,

Meharry, George L.,

Mellman, Jerry M.,

Mellskog, Donald J.,

Mercado, Bienvenido,

Mercuro, Peter T.,

Messenger, George H.,

Messmer, Gerald J.,

Meyers, Richard A.,

Michalski, Alan W.,

Miller, Charles L.,

Miller, Henry T.,

Miller, William N.,

Mitchell, James L.,

Mitsunaga, Jimi,

Molnar, Stephen P.,

Montgomery, Delbert,

Moore, Donald G.,

Moore, James E.,

Moore, Richard H.,

Moore, Tebbs S.,

Moore, Thomas J.,

Morales-Natal, Angel,

Morell, Alton X.,

Morgan, Audy C.

Morrison, James L.,

Mulcahy, T. D.,

Mullenix, George C.,

Muly, Carl A.,

Murphree, Carl E.,

Murphy, John L.,

Murphy, Raymond E.,

Muszynski, Thomas J.,

Nathe, David M.,

Nelms, William E.,

Nelson, Darrell W.,

Netherton, Henry E.,

Nicholson, Robert J.,

Nielsen, Chris Jr.,

Nix, John U.,

Norman, Carl S.,

Norton, Donald V.,

Nover, Edward P.,

Nugent, Edward J.,

O'Brien, Thomas P.,

O'Brien, William F.,

Oehler, Earl P.,

Orr, Billy J.,

Orten, Gary W.,

Ostrom, Robert E.,

Oura, Donald M.,

Padgett, Charles E.,

Palmeri, Vincent E.,

Palmieri, Henry J.,

Pantzke, Wallace M.,

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3404

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

March 4, 1982

Parler, Julius L.,

Pearson, Elon M.,

Peeler, Clarence E.,

Pendleton, Edmund J.,

Penton, Ben H.,

Perkinson, John L.,

Perrin, Jack J.,

Peterson, Charles R.,

Pfeifer, Jack D.,

Phillips, Billy M.,

Pickard, Thomas J.,

Pickle, Robert D.,

Pieraldi, Luis F.,

Pizzolatto, John R.,

Pleva, John F.,

Poelker, Richard J.,

Poirot, Robert J.,

Poole, Harvey L.,

Poppelreiter, N. F.,

Porch, Eben 0., III,

Potamos, James F.,

Potter, Philip L.,

Pouliot, Joseph N.,

Powell, James H., Jr.,

Power, Donald E.,

Prather, Charles N.,

Price, Edith M.,

Puckett, Harold W.,

Putty, William B.,

Quesada, Joseph R.,

Radcliffe, Robert G.,

Rainey, John W.,

Rkaowsky, Ihor R.,

Ramey, Jack D.,

Ramsey, Orville L.,

Raper, Francis E.,

Rapier, George L.,

Rarig, David A.,

Rea, Patrick E.,

Reagles, Carol L.,

Recher, Ronald R.,

Redmon, Billy E.,

Reeder, Richard F.,

Reilly, Donald F.,

Rennie, James C.,

Reynolds, Edward A.,

Rice, Norman C.,

Rickaby, Dale E.,

Robinson, Samuel J.,

Robison, Harold S.,

Rogers, George V.,

Rose, Richard G.,

Rowe, Benjamin D.,

Rowlands, Jack H.,

Ruddy, Merton E.,

Russon, Dee R.,

Rutledge, Charles 0.,

Salyer, James R.,

Sammon, Eugene E.,

Schauer, Franz P.,

Schember, Thomas A.,

Scheuchzer, Larry L.,

Schneider, Richard,

Schnupp, Regis A.,

Schramm, Harold A.,

Scott, Charles E.,

Scully, John E.,

Scully, John J.,

Sealock, David D.,

Sessoms, Charlie C.,

Shaute, Joseph J.,

Shearin, James M., Jr.,

Sheffield, David T.,

Shepard, Robert G.,

Sheppard, Leghlus,

Shetler, Robert C.,

Shevlin, John J.,

Shields, Gale A.,

Shields, Paul R.,

Shizuru, Eugene K.,

Shuckra, Leslie R.,

Shumway, Richard S.,

Shunatona, Baptiste,

Sills, Donal J.,

Sills, Jackie L.,

Simons, Donald S.,

Simonson, Elmer 0.,

Skipper, Curtis R.,

Slayton, Richard A.,

Slyter, Damon E.,

Small, Richard S.,

Smets, Russell J.,

Smets, William N.,

Smith, Charles E.,

Smith, Charles F., Jr.,

Smith, David A.,

Smith, David E.,

Smith, Donald G.,

Smith, Franklin J.,

Smith, Harold G.,

Smith, John E.,

Smith, Norbert F.,

Smith, Orville M.,

Smith, Richard L.,

Smith, Taylor M., Jr.,

Smithson, Leland D.,

Snodgrass, William,

Snyder, George C.,

Sokol, Leo J.,

Solomon, James R., Jr.,

Sosby, Earl B., Jr.,

Southcombe, Robert,

Sprang, Donald W.,

Springer, Bobby J.,

Springsteen, George,

Stafford, Roger 0.,

Stark, James M., Jr.,

Starring, John W.,

Stetts, Joseph J.,

Steuber, Richard R.,

Stewart, Jerry A.,

Stiglets, Jimmy W.,

Stone, Patrick S.,

Strickland, Edwin A.,

Strong, Bob C.,

Stuessi, Dennis A.,

Stull, Harman A.,

Sullivan, Daniel J.,

Sullivan, John J.,

Sullivan, M. F., Jr.,

Sunyak, Edward M.,

Swanson, Edward L.,

Sykora, Harold J.,

Temple, George M.,

Tennant, Harold B.,

Terrazas, Bert J.,

Testerman, James B.,

Thacker, Lyle V.,

Thackston, Carroll,

Thomas, Jackie L.,

Thomas, James L.,

Thompson, John A.

Thompson, Llewellyn,

Thrash, Melvin C.,

Thurmond, George E.,

Tibbetts, Roscoe C.,

Todd, James C.,

Todd, James P.,

Torrell, John J.,

Trabold, Charles J.,

Traxler, David L.,

Trombly, Donald D.,

Trudeau, Normand A.,

Tucker, Terry G.,

Tuft, John R.,

Turnage, Albert J.,

Turner, James A.,

Tyra, Thomas 0.,

Ulrich, Carl E.,

Underwood, John T.,

Upton, Frederick R.,

Uselton, Sammie R.,

Utley, Freddy D.,

Valdez, Victor G.,

Vanderveen, James R.,

Varese, Lewis J.,

Varnado, Billy W.,

Vaughn, William A.,

Velasco, H. P. Jr.,

Velasquez, Refugio,

Vincent, James L.,

Viney, John A.,

Voliva, Benjamin H.,

Volz, Russell L.,

Vos, Francis W.,

Vowell, Leonard G.,

Vozzella, Anthony P.,

Waits, Fred W.,

Walker, Clarence E.,

Walker, George Jr.,

Wallace, Glen K.,

Walling, Jack H.,

Ward, Frank J.,

Ward, John R.,

Warner, Clarence E.,

Waters, William H.,

Watkins, Bobby F.,

Watson, Robinson R.,

Wattel, Marshall L.,

Watts, Donald R.,

Webb, Kenneth R.,

Webber, Fredrick W.,

Wedinger, Robert H.,

Welch, Bobby R.,

Wells, William W.,

Wepster, Jan P.,

Whitaker, Mark, B., Jr.,

White, Gerald J.,

White, Joe I., Jr.,

White, Minor K.,

Whitlock, Charles L.,

Whitlock, Myles W.,

Wierenga, Melvin J.,

Wigley, George M.,

Wilkes, Earl C.,

Wilkinson, Theodore,

Williams, David C.,

Williams, Nevin R.,

Williamson, Charles,

Willis, Clinton V.,

Wilshire, Roy L.,

Wilson, Bobby D.,

Wilson, Robert W.,

Womack, James K.,

Wood, Kenneth C.,

Wood, Milton 0.,

Woods, Thomas R.,

Wootten, Charles W.,

Worth, Stephen G., Jr.,

Worthington, Earle,

Worthington, Milten,

Wright, Arvin L.,

York, Frederick A.,

Young, John R.,

Young, Ralph R.,

Young, Timothy R.,

Zaysoff, John, Jr.,

Zetterstrom, Thomas,

CHAPLAIN

to be colonel

Almquist, James A.,

Armstrong, Mack M.,

Barr, John C.,

Berberich, Thomas E.,

Byrne, Joseph P.,

Carver, Russel J.,

Conard, James M.,

Crowley, Donald L.,

Dowdell, Brian J.,

Dunn, Billy D.,

Foster, Robert D.,

Fullilove, Roy J.,

Fulmer, Guerry A.,

Georges, Nikos,

Goodner, James H.,

Gore, Albert N.,

Hasty, Charles R.,

Hoffmann, Wayne W.,

Humphrey, Donald C.,

Kinoshita, Carl K.,

Kissinger, Harry P.,

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE 3405March 4, 1982

Leath, James A.,

McCarty, Willis B.,

Neuville, Donald L.,

Nix, Billy R.,

O'Connor, John A.,

Ohsiek, John H.,

Pearce, Arthur J.,

Phillips, Daniel P.,

Privette, Coy C.,

Reed, Kenneth R.,

Rendahl, Roger E.,

Richardson, Leland,

Simons, John W.,

Thomas, William L.,

Thompson, Harold D.,

IN THE ARMY

The following-named officers for appoint-

ment in the R egular A rmy of the United

S tates, in their active duty grades, under

the prov isions of title 10 , United S tates

Code, sections 531, 532, and 533:

to be lieutenant colonel

Edwards, David L.,

Griffiths, John J.,

Halcomb, Dallas W.,

Purks, Stuart K.,

Smoot, Ralph R.,

Zore, John,

to be major

Cook, Lorenza A.,

Davis, Clarke T., Jr.,

Drake, Michael L.,

Falmlen, Martin, Jr.,

Garry, Kent J.,

Gates, John M.,

Jackson, David T.,

Kaczmarskyj, Orest,

Knapp, Gervid,

Krug, Samuel R.,

Murphy, Daniel T.,

O'Neill, Timothy R.,

Rachfal, John R.,

Reynolds, Johnny,

Ryan, Larry E.,

Smith, Lyle R.,

Smith, Stephen E.,

Testerman, Robert L.,

Thornton, Ellis D.,

Whittaker, James F.,

to be first lieutenant

Barbaro, Richard R.,

Denny, Stephen L.,

Deldo, Louis J., Jr.,

Dysart, Stanley H.,

Elmore, William C.,

Garcia, Michael D.,

Grover, Robert A.,

Hammer, Bradley D.,

Hanson, Larry J.,

Harthcock, Kerry A.,

Kruse, Richard W.,

Lawrence, Wade B.,

Maniscalco, Mary E.,

Martin, Winston K., II,

McKenzie, Colin S.,

Mengel, Mark B.,

Olsen, Wayne L.,

Robert, John P.,

Robinson, Undra,

Royal, Mike A.,

Sanders, Charles R., Jr.,

Slagel, Gerald A.,

Spaulding, Stephen A.,

IN THE U.S. ARMY

The following named Regular A rmy offi-

cers for permanent promotion in the U.S .

A rmy, in accordance with section 603, title

VI T ransition Provisions, D efense O fficer

Personnel Management A ct of 1980, with

dates of rank to be determined by the Secre-

tary of the Army:

to be lieutenant colonel

Adcock, Jerry W.,

Allen, Cullen S.,

Anckaitis, William H.,

Ash, Hughes L., Jr.,

Ballenger, Kenneth D.,

Barrell, Donald H.,

Barrett, Donald G.,

Blackwood, Jerry D.,

Boyd, William L.,

Brock, Orville L.,

Browning, Robert W.,

Brugh, Larry D.,

Bullock, Robert E.,

Cannon, Joe M.,

Carr, John M.,

Cartwright, Edward L., Jr.,

Cline, Corwyn M.,

Cottington, David C.,

Crockett, William A.,

Curbow, Elmer E.,

Daily, Jerry R.,

Davidson, James D.,

Degner, Herbert L.,

Devitt, John M.,

Dorsey, Ira,

Downer, George R.,

Edwards, Leroy E., Jr.,

Eidson, Edward W.,

Emery, Douglas E.,

Evans, John A.,

Flemming, Herbert M.,

Foster, David H.,

Fourson, George R., Jr.,

Freihube, Garry R.,

Gilliam, Taft R.,

Graham, Robert G.,

Grant, David E.,

Harper, John Jr.,

Harrington, William B.,

Harris, David J.,

Hogan, Donal D.,

Holmes, Allen E.,

Hooverson, Richard L.,

Johnson, Darrell R.,

Keller, John T.,

King, Charles T.,

Kirk, William M., Jr.,

Klingensmith, David B.,

Kobayashi, Norman T.,

Kroll, Gerald,

Laird, William R.,

Lambert, Harold E.,

Lanphear, Paul J.,

Lasater, Gerald D.,

Layman, John W.,

Lazzaro, Gerald J.,

Leeper, Leon E.,

Lewis, Sterling M., Jr.,

Liewert, Karl H.,

Lyerly, Edward D.,

Lynch, David F.,

Lytle, William L.,

Mayhew, Ronald E.,

Mcdaniel, Everett S.,

Meder, Gene L.,

Miner, James F.,

Molskow, Thomas S.,

Moore, Frederick T.,

Morris, Richard C.,

Neesmith, Delmus M.,

Nixon, Charlie J.,

Norton, Daniel B.,

Oconnor, Patrick M.,

Oelschig, Carl H., III,

Orr, Danford M.,

Raymond, Charles W., III,

Reedy, Clyde M.,

Reeves, Troy, Jr.,

Reynolds, Joseph C.,

Saxon, Rufus C.,

Schaaf, James C., Jr.,

Schuler, William D.,

Siegel, Herbert,

Sims, Jackie D.,

Slovacek, Anthony S.,

Smith, Irving B.,

Snoddy, George R.,

Spencer, Sherman L.,

Teates, Bryan W., Jr.,

Teska, Thomas E.,

Tolliver, Ronald P.,

Touhey, Henry J.,

Warnshuis, Roger E.,

Weedel, Joseph F.,

Whitaker, Lewis H., Jr.,

White, Donald R.,

Wolff, Robert R.,

Zook, Neil J.,

CHAPLAINS CORPS

to be lieutenant colonel

Scilley, George R.,

Woodbery, Jerry M.,

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

to be lieutenant colonel

Barnes, Perry A.,

Brouillette, Robert F.,

Donehew, Gerald R.,

Evans, Harold L.,

Gorby, Richard J.,

Hahn, Ruediger,

Kelley, Hubert A.,

Shannon, Sam, Jr.,

Sheek, Alton J.,

Soles, Elmer M.,

VETERINARY CORPS

to be lieutenant colonel

Garrett, Charles A.,

Vandercook, Richard A.,

ARMY NURSE CORPS

to be lieutenant colonel

Benedict, Jerry M.,

Foster, Imogene.,

To be major

Antholt, Steven M., Sr.,

Aubuchon, William F., Jr.,

Baird, Robert D.,

Barney, Michael L.,

Barnum, John M., Jr.,

Bates, Robert L.,

Beech, George W.,

Berry, Jerry L.,

Betit, Eugene D.,

Bird, Robert D.,

Bishop, Charles R.,

Blanchard, Robert C.,

Borns, Charles J.,

Boutin, Wilbur H., Jr.,

Brawn, Richard E., Kar.,

Brennan, Richard T.,

Brown, Gordon M., II,

Bush, James D.,

Cain, Michael E.,

Cannon, Carl H.,

Carroll, Jason D.,

Cherry, Atwood C.,

Clement, Ronald C.,

Coombe, David A.,

Crawford, Mike 0., III,

Cresswell, John R., III,

Crider, Don R.,

Curtis, Thomas M.,

Daniels, Richard A.,

Darden, Thomas S.,

Davis, Glenn E.,

Dempsey, Jack D.,

Ehrenreich, Richard L.,

Eichling, Robert E., Jr.,

Emig, John T.,

Estes, Richard D.,

Farless, Darold W., Jr.,

Farr, Richard S., II,

Faxon, Don R.,

Fields, Randall L.,

Flanagan, Michael H.,

Fuller, David W., Jr.,

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3406

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

March 4, 1982

Fulton, James W., Jr.,

Gattis, Thomas T.,

Gecowetts, Bernard E.,

Gentry, Joseph W.,

Glock, James H.,

Gordon, Robert E.,

Graham, Curtis C., Jr.,

Grassi, Augustine M.,

Haas, Allen J.,

Hampton, David A.,

Harris, Brooke L.,

Hatton, Gwyn R.,

Henkel, Jonathan C.,

Hill, Gerald L.,

Houston, Curtis A.,

Howard, Carrol J.,

Howell, Robert N., Jr.,

Hurley, Michael W.,

Jackson, Thomas H.,

James, Larry R.,

Jelinski, Barry J.,

Jennewine, William L., Jr.,

Jessup, Terry M.,

Johnson, Henry H., Jr.,

Jones, James H.,

Jones, James R.,

Jones, Richard E.,

Keldsen, Donald L.,

Keppeler, Clifford C.,

King, Larry L.,

Kirts, Bobby J.,

Konopka, Michael A.,

Koopman, Garold A.,

Lafrentz, James W.,

Latimer, John D.,

Lauer, Ronald A.,

Leader, Jason A.,

Lighthill, Michael S.,

Lilygren, Evan, Jr.,

Lindekugel, Claude P.,

Mabry, Dawson B.,

Mann, Roy E.,

Mayo, Charles E.,

Mcbride, Robert L. V.,

Mcdonnell, Patrick J., Jr.,

Miller, William G.,

Muceus, Peter L.,

Neely, Robert A.,

Nicholas, David P.,

Noble, Jeffrey D.,

Olivarez, Cayetano,

Orians, Frank J.,

Otto, Charles R.,

Peckinpaugh, Dennis P.,

Pierce, David W.,

Rainbolt, Michael T.,

Rees, Michael D.,

Reese, Justin M., III,

Riggs, Jerry W.,

Robinson, Robert L.,

Rock, Paul J.,

Ross, John L., Jr.,

Sawyer, Leroy,

Sax, James A.,

Saxby, Robert E.,

Sempek, Robert A.,

Shaw, Charles C.,

Simcoe, Darwin D.,

Singer, James C.,

Stankus, Frank T.,

Stark, Jeffrey A.,

Stephens, Bennie M.,

Stephens, L. D.,

Stringham, Glenn P.,

Sumera, Ronald R.,

Tarbutton, Thomas R.,

Taylor, James A.,

Terry, Richard A.,

Thomson, John E.,

Thonus, Francis W.,

Townsend, Steven N.,

Traynham, John C.,

Walker, Harold S., III,

Walls, James A.,

Weimer, Robert M.,

Wilgus, William D.,

Zygan, Robert F.,

CHAPLAINS CORPS

to be ma jor

Adams, Richaed L., Roy.,

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

to be ma jor

Aron, Bruce L.,

Bentz, Curtis L.,

Boyd, Ronald D.,

Brenner, Paul F.,

Childs, Ronald P.,

Dellinger, William R., S.,

Demars, Gary A.,

Devine, Jerry P.,

Goding, William R.,

Hanohano, William, Jr.,

Keller, Larry J.,

Kelly, Dennis M.,

Leavitt, Ronald N.,

Markham, Selwyn L.,

Nardozza, Anthony J.,

Slayton, Jack R.,

Strobel, Fred H.,

ARMY MEDICAL SPECIALIST CORPS

to be ma jor

Jesse, Norris F., II,

Martino, Louis A.,

VETERINARY CORPS

to be ma jor

Byrum, James W., Jr.,

Gaub, Steven D.,

Miller, John G.,

ARMY NURSE CORPS

to be ma jor

Lewis, Jane L.,

Man, Louisa P., Anton.,

Marcotte, Jerome J.,

Miller, Elizabeth A.,

Reed, Edwin D.,

Stegura, Frank H.,

Steib, Mary E.,

to be capta in

Ailport, John H.,

Carden, Randall B.,

Cervenka, Richard C.,

Durant, Donald C.,

Eltzroth, Richard H.,

Fernekes, Robert W.,

Hendricks, Kenton H.,

Herrmann, Arthur.,

Hesnard, David A.,

Hill, George W.,

Hodge, John P.,

Huskey, Leonard,

Kaelin, Joseph,

Malcolm, James R.,

McCaffrey, Michael,

Parker, Enoch A.,

Phillips, Frederick,

Rives, Paul W.,

Sauer, Charles P.,

Sims, Marzine, Jr.,

Tixier, Michael L.,

Toomy, Robert S.,

Walters, Larry J.,

Williams, Gilbert F.,

Young, Dan C.,

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

to be capta in

Ramos, Edwin T.,

ARMY NURSE CORPS

to be capta in

Baksic, Michael T.,

IN THE MARINE CORPS

The following-named naval reserve offi-

cers training corps graduates for permanent

appointment to the grade of second lieuten-

ant in the U.S . Marine C orps, pursuant to

title 10, United S tates Code, section 2107,

subject to the qualifications therefor as pro-

vided by law:

Montgomery,

Raketty, Gordon G.

Kenneth W.

Rau, Ronald C.

Morrison, Robert B. Rebholz, Joel L .

Morrissey, Desmond Reddick, Charles A .

P.

Reeve, Charles K.

Morsch, Jeffrey

Reiff, Gregory S.

Morton, Ulysses L.

Ren, Stephen J.

Murray, William G . R iggs, Robert C .

Nelson, Edward J.

Roach, Chris J.

Newman, William T. Roberts, Bernie C.

Nisbet, John E., Jr.

Robinson, Larry E.

Nobles, Charles M.

Robinson, Robert C.

Noonan, Patrick D.

Rollinger, Martin G.

Oates, Michael P.

Rooyakkers, Mark D.

Oblenes, Scott T.

Rule, Randol D.

O 'Brien, Michael D . Schubert, Dean M.

Officer, Lyn R.

Seaton, James B., III

Olson, Allen S.

Sedor, John W.

Omera, Francis X.

Severin, Frederick M.

O sterhout, Karol E . S impson, S teven S .

Osterman, Joseph L. Skinner, A lbert W.

Ottery, Willis D.

Smith, David A.

Pflederer, Raymond Smith, Gerald L .

F.

Smith, Steven M.

Pritchett, David F.

Steenson, Wayne R.

Proudfoot,

Stein, Nick F.

Christopher N.

Steinbach, Stanley S.

C O N FIRMA T IO N S

E xecutive nom inations confirmed by

the S enate March 4 , 1982:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Howard Kent Walker, of N ew Jersey, a

Foreign Service Officer of Class two, to be

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten-

tiary of the United States of America to the

Republic of Togo.

William Robert Casey, Jr., of Colorado, to

be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo-

tentiary of the United States of America to

the Republic of Niger.

Keith Lapham Brown, of Colorado, to be

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten-

tiary of the United States of America to the

Kingdom of Lesotho.

Anthony Cecil Eden Quainton, of Wash-

ington, a Career Member of the Senior For-

eign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, to

be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo-

tentiary of the United States of America to

Nicaragua.

Howard Eugene Douglas, of Virginia, to be

U.S . Coordinator for Refugee A ffairs and

Ambassador at Large while serving in this

position.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

COOPERATION AGENCY

Otto J. Reich, of Virginia, to be an Assist.

ant Administrator of the Agency for Inter-

national Development.

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Hugh W. Foster, of California, to be Alter-

nate Executive Director of the Inter-Ameri-

can Development Bank.

T he above nominations were approved

subject to the nominees' commitment to re-

spond to requests to appear and testify

before any duly constituted committee of

the Senate.

FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD

Jam es Jay Jackson, of T exas, to be a

Member of the Federal Home Loan Bank

Board for the remainder of the term expir-

ing June 30,1982.

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March 4, 1982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE 3407 THE JUDICIARY

Leroy J. Contie, Jr., of Ohio, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.

Robert B. Krupansky, of Ohio, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.

John R. Gibson, of Missouri, to be U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit.

Eugene F. Lynch, of California, to be U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of California.

Elizabeth A. Kovachevich, of Florida, to be U.S. District Judge for the Middle Dis­trict of Florida.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

J. William Petro, of Ohio, to be U.S. At­torney for the Northern District of Ohio for the term of 4 years.

Richard L. Cox, of Florida, to be U.S. Mar­shal for the Middle District of Florida for the term of 4 years.

Carlos C. Cruz, of Florida, to be U.S. Mar­shal for the Southern District of Florida for the term of 4 years.

M. Clifton Nettles III, of Georgia, to be U.S. Marshal for the Southern District of Georgia for the term of 4 years.

Eugene G. Liss, of New Jersey, to be U.S. Marshal for the District of New Jersey for the term of 4 years.

Rudolph G. Miller, of New Mexico, to be U.S. Marshal for the District of New Mexico for the term of 4 years.

Gene G. Abdallah, of South Dakota, to be U.S. Marshal for the District of South Dakota for the term of 4 years.

William J. Nettles, of Illinois, to be U.S. Marshal for the Southern District of Illinois for the term of 4 years.

Basil S. Baker, of Texas, to be U.S. Mar­shal for the Southern District of Texas for the term of 4 years.

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Mary Louise Smith, of Iowa, to be a Member of the Commission on Civil Rights.