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Self-organization in the study of complexity and Aristotelian Teleology

Introduction

Our contemporary science is largely a progeny of the 17th century scientific revolution.

Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes and Newton are some of the most prominent names of this

revolution, a revolution that was founded on the rejection of Aristotelian explanations of the natural

world. The revolution was founded on an account that could be categorized as a Platonic

mathematical account of the natural world; the new account displaced Aristotelian physics and

metaphysics, which had held sway for 18th centuries in shaping our understanding of the physical

world. A particular victim of the wholesale rejection of Aristotelian ideas was the notion of teleology

and final cause, an idea that has long been discarded as viable explanations in scientific thought.

However, more recently in the study of complex systems – a multidisciplinary area in science that

deals with the study of complex systems in meteorology, earth sciences, chemistry, cosmology,

biology, and evolutionary studies – there have been suggestions that Aristotle’s notion of teleology

could be rehabilitated, since the principle of ‘self-organization’1 which stands at the core of the

understanding in the study of complex and chaotic systems, bears particular resemblance to

Aristotle’s idea of final cause.

In this paper I will undertake an examination of Aristotle’s conception of teleology, review

some recent literature on the connection between Aristotle’s teleology and the study of complexity,

and answer whether teleology in the study of self-organized entities is a type of teleology that

Aristotle would have accepted under his definition. In section 1 I will examine Aristotle’s notion of

final cause, so we can better understand what Aristotle means by ‘final cause’. In section 2 I will

examine some recent scholarly contributions that connect Aristotle’s teleology to self-organization in

                                                                                                               1 Self-organization is a set of behaviors found in various natural systems anywhere from the molecular level to the macro-level in nature. These behaviors are characterized by an internal organization that seeks to maintain and propagate itself even though fluctuations in its environment seek to disturb it.

   

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the study of complexity, and see whether these connections bear merit. In section 3 I will briefly

outline some important conceptions in the study of complexity relevant to my project and explain

what it entails. In section 4 I will explain why Aristotle’s account of final cause is not analogous to

self-organization in the study of complexity. What I hope to present at the end of my analysis is that

the teleology that describes self-organized structures in the study of complex systems, while it may

bears some prima facie resemblance, it is in principle different than Aristotle’s conception of final

cause.

Section 1

Aristotle gives us four separate account of cause. They are not four separate causes that

explain some phenomena rather they are four different types of causal explanations that can be

provided for some phenomena. He provides the different type of causes in concise form in

Metaphysics Book 1.3 983a24-32, but gives us a more general picture of his causation in his

Metaphysics 5.2 and Physics 2.3. Aristotle tells us

“We call a cause (1) that from which (as immanent material) a thing comes into being, e.g. the bronze of the

statue…(2) The form or pattern, i.e., the formula of the essence and the classes which include this and the parts of the

formula. (3) That from which the change or the freedom from the change first begins, e.g. the father a cause of the child,

and in general the maker a cause of the thing made…(4) The end, i.e., that for the sake of which a thing is, e.g. health is

the cause of walking. For why does one walk? We say ‘in order that one maybe healthy’, and in speaking thus we think

we have given the cause.”2

In the above, we observe that Aristotle separates different type of causal explanations into material,

formal, efficient, and final cause. The material cause corresponds to the material component of how

something can be described. His formal cause corresponds to how something is structured and

functions. The efficient cause corresponds to the source of the change that is from where the change

was initiated. His final cause ‘that for the sake of which’ corresponds to why a thing exists the way it

                                                                                                               2 Metaphysics 5.2 1013a24-36 - Aristotle gives a similar account of his causation in Physics Book 2.3 194b24-35.

   

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does, it is supposed to be the primary explanation for a cause. For my project I will focus on getting

a better understanding of Aristotle’s final cause and why it was important to him as an explanation.

At the beginning of Physics 2.3 he gives us a clue to the importance he attaches to his final cause.

“Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do no think they know a thing till they have grasped the ‘why’ of it

(which is to grasp its primary cause).”3

We see that for Aristotle it was very important to answer the question of ‘why’ as a primary cause4.

Elsewhere in his Metaphysics he believes that those who can answer the question of ‘why’ are wiser.

“For man of experience know that the thing is so, but do not know why, while the other know the ‘why’ and the

cause…thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory themselves and

knowing the causes.”5

For Aristotle it appears that, in order to understand how something exists in nature, one needs to

provide some type of final explanation. Again he refers to the importance of knowing how to answer

the type of inquiry that asks why an object is thus. For Aristotle we need a primary explanation in

virtue of itself, in virtue of its nature.

“We think we understand a thing simpliciter (and not in the sophistic fashion accidentally) whenever we think we are

aware both that the explanation because of which the object is is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be

otherwise.”6

We might wonder why this is so important for Aristotle to have included a notion of final

cause as an end for which something exists in such and such a manner. Why is it intuitive for him to

ask the question of final cause? After all we find that Newton was against this type of explanation.

Here we find that in contrast with Newton, Aristotle’s world of plenum was not a world of void and

atom; under the atomistic view of the world, all changes could be described in quantitative terms as

movements of atom in the void. In such a world the source of change is always seen to be movement

                                                                                                               3 Physics 2.3 194b18-20 4 For Aristotle, primary cause is the best explanation for something. In cases where there is a final cause, this is the

primary cause, and in cases where there is no final cause, then the formal or efficient cause is the primary explanation 5 Metaphysics 1.1 981a28-30, 981b4-6 6 Posterior Analytics 1.2 71b9-12

   

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and collision, i.e., external cause, hence Aristotle’s efficient cause as a source of change continued as

an explanation in classical mechanics, while final cause was altogether discarded.

We observe another clue in regards to the importance of final cause in Aristotle’s Physics 2.1.

He explains that things exist by nature or by other causes.7 He also explains that in regards to things

that exists as artifice, i.e., bed, desk, etc., they have a nature insofar as they are made of a thing that

exists in nature, i.e., wood, rock. Aristotle also delineates between artifacts, which have the notion of

final cause as a cause imposed upon them, i.e., extrinsic teleology, and between those things that

exists naturally in nature, i.e., intrinsic teleology. For Aristotle, organic beings have their final cause

explained intrinsically centered about their own existence – the mode of existence best for their

flourishing. And in regards to nature belonging to things in the natural world Aristotle says that

“Nature is a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue

of itself.”8

We see that for Aristotle nature is a principle of change belonging to an object, in virtue of

the object itself. So a thing that has a nature has its own inner principle of rest and motion. Nature

being the principle of change, i.e., rest, motion. For Aristotle natural things that exist have a nature –

an inner principle of change. He believes that this principle is contained within natural things in the

world. So being a thing in nature is having an inner principle of change, in virtue of existing as such

and such a thing in nature.9 So it would make sense for Aristotle to say that a thing behaves in the

world – on the account of the nature it possesses. So for Aristotle nature as an inner principle,

explains how an object exists in the world. A natural thing, i.e., an animal, is that which has its own

inner principle of change, and natural things act in the world in virtue of their nature, i.e., inner

principle of change.

                                                                                                               7 Physics 2.1 192b9 8 Physics 2.1 192b21-22 9 Waterlow, 1982

   

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“An action for an end is present in things which come to be and are by nature. Further, where there is an end, all

the preceding steps are for the sake of that. Now surely as in action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in action, if

nothing interferes.”10

On the account of the above we are led to believe that Aristotle wants to connect his concept

of nature, as an inner principle of change, with his account of final cause. In Physics 2.2, Aristotle

gives us another clue about this connection when he connects nature, as the end ‘that for the sake of

which’, to the idea of change.

“The nature is the end or that for the sake of which. For a thing undergoes a continuous change toward some

end, that last stage is actually that for the sake of which. (That is who the poet was carried away into making an absurd

statement when he said ‘he has the end for the sake of which he was born’. For not every stage that is last claims to be an

end, but only that which is best.)”11

Aristotle says that things undergo many types of changes, but only the best can be seen as

‘that for the sake of which’, and not the last stage. We see that for Aristotle ‘that for the sake of

which’ is a particular type of change, which can be characterized as what is best for a thing and its

ability to flourish. Natural things display the capacity to pursue their own end, i.e., a bird building a

shelter for its young. In this example we see the capacity of some natural things to pursue its own

purpose – it shows that there is purposiveness in nature, i.e., in the birds activities. For Aristotle

purposiveness is a teleological explanation, and it is defined as what is best for some things in nature.

The purposive end is what is best or better for a thing so it can continue to exist.

Teleology explains the purpose of a thing in nature – to live a flourishing life. A life that is

best for the natural thing in the world. On this view, it maybe natural for him to be concerned about

providing a teleological account, why something is so and so. Especially since natural things have a

source of change in virtue of their existence as some natural thing. Of course this does not mean that

everything in nature has a final cause and Aristotle’s alludes to this in his explanation of the eclipse

in metaphysics 8.4. In the example of the eclipse he refuses to attach a teleological explanation for it

                                                                                                               10 Physics 2.8, 199a3-11 11 Physics 2.2 194a29-33

   

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and accepts motion, i.e., efficient cause, as the primary explanation. For Aristotle, in situations when

there is no final or formal cause for why something is thus, we have to rely on the formal or efficient

cause as the primary explanation.12 It follows that when it is possible to provide a final cause, there is

a central role to be played by his teleological explanation and Aristotle goes to some length to defend

his view in Physics 2.7 and 2.8. He goes on to defend his explanation of final cause from some

objections in Physics 2.8, especially against the issue of necessity, i.e., something could exist in such

an such a way purely due to necessity not on the account of teleology.

“A difficult presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better

so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity? (What is drawn up must cool, and what

has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows.)”13

Here Aristotle distinguishes clearly between his teleology, i.e. for the sake of something

because it is better for it, and explanation by the way of necessity. We may ask why is it that nature

must be a type of cause, why something in nature behaves in some way, and why it must be for the

sake of something? He explains that it must be either by necessity, chance, or purpose. And we know

that purpose or ‘that for the sake of which’ can be explained in terms of what is better or best for the

thing or entity.

He provides the example of sharp front teeth and blunt back teeth, and how it comes about in

some particular way related to the health of the animal. 14 In this example Aristotle defends his

teleological explanation from Empedocles explanation via necessity: the animal’s teeth arrangement

came about spontaneously, but because of necessity the only animals that survived are the ones that

had the proper and fit arrangement. Aristotle counters that the proper arrangement of teeth come

about for the most part in the same way, and contrasts the proper teeth arrangement, as something

that happen regularly, with the rare case of heat in the winter, where it happens rarely, i.e.,

spontaneously. Aristotle counters that the arrangement of the animal’s teeth cannot be out of chance

                                                                                                               12 Metaphysics 8.4 1044b12-15 13 Physics 2.8 198b17-19 14 Physics 2.8 198b33-35, 199a1-2

   

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nor pure necessity, rather the particular arrangement is beneficial to the animal’s welfare; since he

dismisses necessity and chance, he gives the teleological account of purposiveness within nature, i.e.

it must be for the sake of something.15

“For those thing are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at

some end: the same end is not reached from every principle; nor any chance end, but always the tendency in each is

towards the same end, if there is no impediment.”16

Aristotle’s teleological account is meant to be an explanation of what is best for something to

be and flourish, and this is meant especially in regards to organic things. We see this also in the types

of examples he provides: Aristotle provides the examples of animal and plant life to hammer home

the importance of final cause in nature. He gives examples of the swallow and its nest, the spider and

its web, and the plant and its leaves. For Aristotle nature is organized in such a way that ends found

in natural organic things are organized around a final cause: ‘that for the sake of which’. That final

cause is to be explained in terms of what is best for the object and what allows it to flourish.

It may now appear more intuitive to us why Aristotle connects his final cause to his notion of

natural substances. If he is identifying natural things that exist in nature, especially in regards to

organic life forms, and under his conception natural things have their inner principle of change

within themselves, it appears more plausible why things that exists in nature should on Aristotle’s

account, have their essence tied to their final cause – ‘that for the sake of which’. The identification

and explanation of natural things in the world and especially organic life, is tied to his teleological

explanation: things exists and continue to exist in the world in a way that is a best fit for their

particular existence.

To summarize, in this section I have examined Aristotle’s definition of the causes, his notion

of final cause. We saw that natural things have their own inner principle of change and display

purposiveness towards ends that allow them to live a flourishing life. Aristotle views the notion of

                                                                                                               15 Physics 2.8 198b10-20 16 Physics 2.8, 199b16-19

   

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Final cause as a type of explanation that provides the answer to why something exists in some

manner and why it continues to exist and be in some particular way: it exists because it is better or

best for its continued existence. It answers the existence of natural things, centered about the

conception of nature and the essence of the thing itself – what is best for its existence. Aristotle’s

final cause is also different than arguments from necessity or spontaneity. In the next section I will

examine some recent articles ties in Aristotle’s final cause to the study of complexity.

Section 2

In a recent article ‘Teleology and Final Causation in Aristotle and in Contemporary Science’

David Chase (2012) in a case study of the history of sciences outlines the connection between

Aristotle’s final cause and the study of complex sciences. Chase describes the paradigmatic

differences between Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle, an early empiricist, was the philosopher interested

in nature, while Plato as an idealist conceived of an eternal world of forms defined by precise

mathematical relations. Chase believes that Aristotle’s idea of final cause was driven particularly by

his tendency to study natural organic beings, and the idea of self-maintaining and self-striving entity

is readily observed in biological life.

Chase examines Aristotle’s place in the history of science and finds that Aristotle’s ideas are

described in unflattering terms. For Chase, this disrepute is partly because Aristotle’s notion of final

cause, which was thought to be closely connected to the conception of God. But we find that in

Physics 2.8 Aristotle says that purpose can be in something even if it is not a thinking being, i.e., an

animal.

“It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating.”17

This confusion can be explained on the account of the medieval adoption of Aristotle’s final cause

being influenced by its Christian context. Chase then examines Aristotle’s conception of final cause

and finds that striking connections exist between Aristotle’s notion and our understanding in the

                                                                                                               17 Physics 2.8, 199b26-27

   

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study of complexity. Chase also reviews some of the recent discoveries in the area of sciences,

broadly called the study of complexity. He finds that the idea of self-organization which is central to

the study of complexity, bears striking similarities to Aristotle’s conception of final cause and

teleological explanation.

By analyzing work done by researchers in the area, namely Thom, Prigogine and Rosen,

Chase finds that in complex open systems in the natural world entities emerge which are self-

replicating, self-repairing, and self-maintaining. These self-organized entities have a capacity for

self-preservation and are organized in such a way to maintain their structure even in the presence of

environmental fluctuations that aims to disrupt their viability. It has been long known that plant and

animal life possess this self-regulative feature that could be described in teleological terms. Varela

had introduced the existence of such auto-poietic18 structures in biology. According to Chase, some

of the more exciting parts in the research of complex systems, points to the existence of such

organized structures at the molecular level, i.e., chemical structures.

Chase finds that self-organization is characteristic of Aristotle’s teleological explanation of

causation ‘that for the sake of which’. On Chase’s view Aristotle introduced his notion of final cause

to provide an explanation of why things exist and persist in the world, such as they do. Chase say

that according to some scientists, the evidence in the natural world points to a self-organizing

principle that ensures that ordered structures emerge in a universe of increasing entropy – a universe

of increasing disorder according to the second law of thermodynamics. On his view, this self-

organizing principle observed in empirical observation is a type of intrinsic teleological explanation

that explains why self-organized structures exist in nature at both macro and microscopic levels; and

self-organized structures display a tendency to maintain themselves, even in the face of change in

environmental conditions.

                                                                                                               18 Auto-poietic structures were formulated to refer to living organic structures that displayed tendency to self-maintain, self-organize and self-replicate. They aim to maintain and conserve their balance in relations to changes in that environment.

   

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While the above may at first glance appear promising, in order to evaluate it we must refer

back to our analysis of final cause in section 1. There we found that final cause is an explanation in

virtue of what the best life is for a natural thing in the world. But here we have a dilemma: how can

existence of molecular structures be described in the way of the description of the best life for those

molecular structures? Do macroscopic structures such as Earth weather system and Jupiter’s cloud

pattern, or interstellar evolution of galaxies and solar systems count, or the chaotic perturbation of

galactic gravitational forces? Even if we answer in the affirmative to some of the above, we find

ourselves at odds on virtue of what we uncovered earlier: that teleology for Aristotle, is an

explanation in virtue of its purpose – what is best for a thing. It appears implausible that Aristotle

would accept any of those self-organized structures under his teleology. We know that in the

description of the lunar eclipse, he attributes no final cause to its explanation. Aristotle says that in

the absence of a final cause ‘telos’ in this example, the efficient cause, i.e., motion, is the primary

explanation.19

So it is clear that at least in regards to many of the examples of organized structures described

in the above Aristotle would not offer a teleological explanation ‘that for the sake of which’.

Moreover self-organization outlined by Chase, presents a challenge to Aristotle’s view, since

Aristotle believed that teleology was an explanation in terms of what is best for a thing. How broadly

can we construe this notion of self-organization and still map it to Aristotelian teleology if Aristotle’s

conception is narrower and different in an important sense. Aristotle refers to examples of animals

and plants in defending his teleology; so he clearly sees that organic life can be described in terms of

a teleological explanation. If Aristotle cites the lack of final cause in the examples of lunar eclipse

and rainfall, it appears implausible that self-organized molecular structures or macrostructures like

Jupiter’s cloud would fit under his account of teleology. So at this point it appears that Aristotle’s

                                                                                                               19 Metaphysics 8.4, 1044b9-15

   

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conception is narrower and his examples refer to organic life. Let us now examine how his

teleological account is important in a different sense, i.e., necessity vs. teleology as an argument.

We earlier saw that Aristotle presents the example of teeth arrangement in the animal as an

argument from teleology, i.e., what is best for the health of the animal, and separates it from

arguments from necessity. According to Aristotle, Empedocles and others with his views look to

provide only a necessary argument for all phenomena in nature. We saw earlier that Aristotle

rejected this view before giving his examples from biology. For Aristotle, while rain falls

necessarily, a formal cause maybe a more appropriate explanation for it, and other natural

phenomena that happen regularly. Moreover, teleology for Aristotle is a different argument than an

argument from necessity. Complex self-organized structures such as the weather and oceans would

be examples of formal necessary causes, rather than teleology. And it appears more plausible that

Aristotle would provide efficient or formal cause, as an explanation for at least some of the examples

we analyzed in the complex sciences.

Corning (1995) in ‘Synergy and self-organization in the evolution of complex systems’ draws

attention to the recent mathematical paradigms developed in the study of complexity in biology.

According to these models these auto-poietic self-organized processes, which are believed to be

inherent to organic life, are primarily responsible for the high degree of organization and order

observed in nature. There are organic microstructures that are self-organized and show a high degree

of purposiveness. According to Corning self-organization enables the existence of diverse organic

phenomena ordered and structured in particular ways in nature that allows for their continued

existence and preservation.

This description of self-organization as a teleological account, is narrower, and may fit

Aristotle’s conception of teleology in organic life. We may say that these micro-organic self-

organized structures show some type of purposive behavior in their activity. The only difficulty is

that Aristotle always takes a top-down non-reductive approach in his explanations, and does not

   

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allow for purposive micro-organic structures that constitute the flesh; since he thought that organic

matter was flesh throughout and the form animal or human is imposed on the structure

hierarchically.20 Of course it must be said that this more narrow conception of self-organization is at

least closer to Aristotle’s teleology in organic life; yet there is difficulty if we want to fit it in with

the rest of his metaphysics.

We have in this section provided some secondary literature on the connection between

teleology, and self-organization/auto-poiesis found in the study of complex natural systems. We find

that although there are self-organized structures in nature that appear to exhibit purposive behavior

aimed at some continuity, this purposiveness is different than Aristotle’s teleology. Aristotle’s

teleology focuses on the best life for an organic being, in the unity of its life. It does not apply to

non-organic things, and there is even some difficulty in explaining organic microstructures unless we

abandon parts of his metaphysics. In the next section I will briefly look at more specific explanations

of why there is complexity in nature, and how self-organization comes about.

Section 3

I will now examine some of the details in the study of complexity. The study of complexity

analyses how various phenomena are self-organized in nature, and how these complex structures

come about. This knowledge greatly aids our understanding of the evolutionary and emergent

features of our world. Through the study of self-organization we can understand how it is possible

that such a great diversity of phenomena exist in our world, given that according to the second law of

thermodynamics entropy – a concept that traditionally measures disorder in a system – is always

increasing in the universe. Complexity science attempts to explain how there can be order out of

disorder; order at the edge of chaos.

Complex systems examine features of phenomena that include persistent interactions that are

thermodynamic in character – they are irreversible. In irreversible processes, the system cannot

                                                                                                               20 Makin, 2013 Spring Lectures on Aristotle; Makin, 2009

   

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return to earlier states, because probabilistic microscopic interactions, lead to dissipation of energy

and increase in entropy, thus the system and its initial conditions become irreversible. This

irreversibility is present in self-organized structures, which maintain themselves, and display a

tendency to keep their own equilibrium in the face of energy fluctuations. Self-organized structures

appear in thermodynamic systems spontaneously due to energy fluctuations in the system. The

appearance of these self-organized structures in thermodynamic systems is in part regulated by

probabilistic outcomes.21 Once the energy of a system has reached a bifurcation22 point – the

thermodynamic limit – new structures appear. These structures are highly heterogeneous and self-

organizing, and maintain their own equilibrium vis a vis their environment.23 In the context of the

general increase in entropy in the universe – and increasing disorder as a measure of entropy – the

self-organizing structures are highly heterogeneous and therefore far from entropy, i.e., negative

entropy structures. On Prigogine’s view, the probabilistic outcomes at the micro-level, lead to

different evolutionary pathways – the system may emerge in different possible configurations.24 And

these pathways are a function of the probabilities, which are determined by local energy fluctuations

in different areas of the system.25 For Prigogine, irreversibility and indeterminacy at the microscopic

level leads to the path-dependent evolution, which we observe in the diversity of phenomena in the

world, and the diversity of life on earth.26

In this section we looked to understand self-organization and complexity in nature, and how

self-organized structures come to exist in the world. If we compare the account of self-organization

in this section, with Aristotelian teleology discussed in section 1, we can already see some clear

differences between self-organization as a teleological explanation in the study of complexity, and

Aristotle’s teleological explanation. We are now in a good position to examine why Aristotle’s final

                                                                                                               21 Prigogine, 1997, p.65-72 22 Bifurcation point is the point where the increase of entropy, i.e., disorder, leads to the emergence of dissipative self-

organized structures 23 Ibid, p.66 24 Ibid, p.66-72; J. Collier, 2008 25 Ibid, p.67-70, p.74-87 26 Ibid, ch-7

   

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cause is in principle, different than self-organization as a teleological explanation in the study of

complex systems. In the next section I will contrast self-organization described in this section, with

Aristotle’s account of final cause in section 1.

Section 4

From the preceding a picture maybe forming before us, in regards to Aristotle’s teleological

explanation and self-organization in the study of complexity. The preceding analysis was undertaken

with the following goal: to examine whether self-organization in the study of complexity, could be

understood as a type of causation that is analogous to Aristotle’s notion of final cause. The evidence

considered so far in our analysis, gives us the thought that Aristotle’s account of teleology, is not all

together the same as the account of self-organization, as a type of teleology in the study of

complexity. I will now consider this evidence.

We saw earlier that Aristotle’s final cause is an explanation of what is better or best in

relation to the life of the animal or plant. I also pointed out that all of Aristotle’s examples in Physics

2.8 in defense of his final cause are all examples of organic life – humans, animals, and plants. And

we saw that it is not clear that what is best for a living thing, can be transposed to what is best for

non-organic entities such as self-organized dissipative structures or weather systems. Aristotle also

explicitly avoids final cause as an explanation for rainfall or lunar eclipse. He cites such cases as

examples where there is no final cause; rather some things happen by necessity and are explained via

formal or efficient causes. Aristotle says that it would be absurd to attribute final causes to such

cases. We also saw earlier in Physics 2.2 that Aristotle distinguishes between final cause as the

purposive end of a human life, and the necessity of death – what necessarily will be the last stage of

that life – as a final end, when he points out the error of the poet’s judgment.27 For Aristotle, final

cause is intrinsically related to what is best for a living thing to flourish. So it seems doubtful that

                                                                                                               27 Physics 2.2 194a29-33

   

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non-organic self-organization at macroscopic and microscopic level could be placed under

Aristotle’s notion of final cause.

We also saw that in Physics 2.8 Aristotle distinguishes between arguments from necessity,

spontaneity, and final cause. For Aristotle, final causes are not explanations from necessity or

spontaneity. He also distinguishes arguments in terms of necessity, i.e., rainfall, from arguments in

terms of final causes, i.e., the arrangement of the animal’s teeth. For Aristotle, final causes are

distinct from explanations of necessity and regularity. The arrangement of the animal’s teeth is

explained in regards to what is best for the animal, while formal or efficient causes, maybe the

primary explanation of other regularly occurring natural phenomena such as rainfall or the lunar

eclipse.

Furthermore, inorganic self-organized structures appearing spontaneously in thermodynamic

systems would be incompatible with Aristotle’s notion of teleology, since he says that his final

cause, as an explanation, stands opposed to spontaneity and chance. 28 We saw earlier that

spontaneous appearance of self-organized structures as the consequence of increasing entropy, i.e.,

disorder, within a thermodynamic system are functions of probabilistic outcomes. It seems

implausible that Aristotle would accept probability and chance, as an explanation for the appearance

of self-organized structures, under his concept of final cause.

Moreover, on Chase’s account, self-organization as a principle and a regular phenomenon in

the behavior of chaotic systems, i.e., systems of increasing entropy, appears to be a type of law-like

generalization – that self-organization is a regular behavior in chaotic systems, and that the

appearance of order or organization is a regular feature of such systems.29 But from what we have

seen Aristotle distinguishes arguments in terms of necessity from arguments in terms of final causes.

And Aristotle tends to use formal or efficient cause as an explanation for non-organic phenomena,

i.e., rainfall and lunar eclipse. If Aristotle wanted to account for this regularity, it seems more

                                                                                                               28 Physics 2.8 198b24-36, 199a1-6 29 Chase, 2011

   

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plausible that for Aristotle, self-organization as a regular feature of thermodynamic systems is better

explained in terms of efficient or formal causes.

Having said the above, if we stay within the field of biology in the study of complexity, Aristotle’s

notion of final cause as an explanation retains some merit. Aristotelian final cause is an explanation

of the parts and features of animals and other organic life, in terms of what allows the animals to live

and flourish, maybe justifiable. This is because the primary feature of organic life is that it wants to

live and procreate, and Aristotle’s explanation is in terms of what enables the animal or plant to

flourish. We may even be able to expand this conception to include purposiveness at the level of

smaller organic structures within the body, although not without some difficulty due to Aristotle’s

anti-reductionism in his conception of matter. But self-organization as an explanation for the

diversity of non-organic phenomena in nature, is incompatible with Aristotelian purposiveness,

because Aristotle’s notion of what is better or best and his examples from biology, clearly points to

what is best for the flourishing of the animal or plant. It is difficult to map the idea of a flourishing

life as an end, to the idea that self-organized structures also seek to live and flourish.

Conclusion

I have examined whether Aristotle’s notion of final cause is congruent to the conception of

self-organization and teleology in the study of complexity. In section 1 we saw that Aristotle’s

notion of final cause is an explanation in regards to a natural thing in virtue of itself; more

specifically Aristotle cites examples of organic life and final cause as an explanation of what is best

for an animal or plant to flourish. In section 2 we looked at some recent scholarly work on the

connection between self-organization and Aristotelian teleology, and I began to point out some of the

difficulties with teleology in the study of complexity, as a type of teleology that Aristotle would have

accepted to be his own. In section 3 we looked to understand self-organization as a feature of

complex systems. While Chase and others have sought to adumbrate some equivalence between

teleology in self-organized structures, and Aristotle’s final cause, we have seen that the two notions

   

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are clearly different, because self-organization is a much broader notion that includes conception of

purposiveness in inorganic matter, while Aristotle saw purposiveness mainly in relation to organic

life. In section 4 we contrasted the differences between Aristotle’s final cause and self-organization

as a type of purposiveness. We saw that self-organization can be explained both in terms of

spontaneity, or necessity/regularity. But as Aristotle points out his final cause is distinct from

arguments in terms of necessity or spontaneity. We have seen, that while Aristotle’s notion of final

cause may still be applicable to some explanations of organic life, it is not analogous to the notion of

self-organization as a type of teleology in the study of complexity.

Bibliography

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Arshinov and Christian Fuchs, in Causality, Emergence, Self-Organisation, Moscow: NIA-Priroda.

   

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Corning, Peter A., (1995) “Synergy and self-organization in the evolution of complex systems”,

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