Modern Islamic Messianism: Eschatology to Teleology - TSpace

Modern Islamic Messianism: Eschatology to Teleology

By

Mateen Rokhsefat

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department for the Study

of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations

University of Toronto

© Copyright by Mateen Rokhsefat 2020

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Modern Islamic Messianism: Eschatology to Teleology

Mateen Rokhsefat

Doctor of Philosophy Department for the Study of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations

University of Toronto

2020

Abstract

In this dissertation, I use primary and secondary sources to trace the development and

transformation of the concept of Mahdi in Iran from the early 1900s to the late 1970s. I provide

an alternative historiography of the Mahdi that has been missing from the Mahdist scholarly work

arguing that there was a significant discursive shift regarding the Mahdi in Iranian religious

writings from a distant figure in the early period to a revolutionary figure of future hope and

justice in the late 1970s. In the early period, intellectual circles did not focus on the urgency of

the Mahdi’s arrival, content to maintain the Mahdi’s distance. This changed in the early 1940s

where the Mahdi took on a revolutionary aura and writings regarded his imminent arrival as

critical for the revolutionary ethos to reach its logical conclusion in religious and political

emancipation. In this dissertation, I argue that this discursive shift occurred due to a number of

factors which caused contemporary Iranian society to question the idea that emancipation would

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come from the constitutional revolution. This shift also occurred due to rising divergences among

intellectual circles including leftists, secularists, and nationalists whose criticisms of religion

forced the religious figures out of their intellectual comfort zones. I am mainly focused on

unpacking the nature of this factor by charting discursive treatments of the Mahdi through this

period among these various intellectual milieus.

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Table of Contents Abstract ii

Table of Contents iv

Notes on Transliteration, Names and Dates vi

Chapter 1 – Introduction 1

Arguments and Theory 1

Materials and Method 10

Literature Review 14

Historicizing Shi‘ite Eschatology 14

Early Shi‘ite Formation and Sectarianism 20

The Office of the Deputyship and the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam 23

Modern Literature 29

Conclusion 32

Chapter 2 – Parousia Postponed: Distant Mahdist Temporality 34

Introduction 34

The Role of Pragmatic and Law-Focused Shi‘ite Clerics 36

Babi/Baha’i Movements “Threaten” the Sanctifying Role of Mahdi 40

Assured Defense Against Babi/Baha’is and Other Foreign Forces 44

Protection of Shi‘ism Requires Othering of Babi/Baha’is 50

Conclusion 63

Chapter 3 – Critiquing Predestinarianism 65

Introduction 65

Brief Historical Context of the Intelligentsia’s Polemics 68

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr and the Rise of the Iranian Hero as Saviour 71

Kasravī and the “Myth of Mahdīgarī” 79

Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Religious Reform from Within 91

Hakamīzādah and Divine Uncertainty 97

Guardians of Charm and Magic and the “Shi‘ite Fable of the Mahdi” 104

Conclusion 108

Chapter 4 – Emergence of Teleological Messianism 111

Introduction 111

Historical Circumstances as Prelude to a Teleological Mahdi 114

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Brief Historical Background on the Rise of Religious Writing and Activism 123

“A Response Letter” to Thousand Years Old Secrets 126

Khomeini’s Inaugural Call to Action 130

Unveiling of Secrets and Condemnation of Enemies of Shi‘ism 132

Khomeini’s Earliest Compliance on Governance During Mahdi’s Absence 137

Khomeini’s Passionate Letter on “Rising Up” [Qīyām] 140

Religious Journals and the Defense of Mahdi 143

Āmulī and A Reason-based Belief in the Mahdi 143

Personal Qīyām against Enemies of Shi‘ism 148

The Shah as a “Friend” and the Guardian of Shi‘ite Religion 151

Ulama as Guardians of Charm and Magic 153

Pseudo-Philosophers 153

Bandits of Truth and Reality or Returnees to Barbarism and Ignorance 156

The Hujjatīya: Apolitical Defense of the Mahdi 166

Conclusion 168

Chapter 5 – Revolutionizing Messianism 170

Introduction 170

Futurist Shi‘ism 174

Davānī and a Hopeful Promise 190

Shabistarī and Universal Government 196

Quintessential Shi‘ite Ideologizers: Shariati and Bazargan 201

Conclusion 210

Chapter 6 – Conclusion 211

Epilogue 216

Bibliography 220

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Notes on Transliteration, Names and Dates

Regarding the transliteration of the Persian words, I have adopted the simplified version

of the Library of Congress Persian Romanisation Table. For a simplified reading of the material, I

have dropped the diacritics indicated in the Library of Congress Romanisation Table for Persian

letters such as ط ,ض ,ص ,ذ ,ح ,ث, and ظ. I use the common and contemporary spelling of names

of well-known and contemporary authors and personalities such as Mahdi, Khomeini, Iran,

Shariati, Amanat. In general matters of citation and footnotes, the 16th edition of The Chicago

Manual of Style has been followed. I will be providing my own translation of the majority of the

primary sources referred to in this work, unless an English translation is available and will be

mentioned.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Arguments and Theory

Historiography on modern Mahdism in Iran has primarily focused on Mahdist

conceptualizations post-1979, particularly the development of a politically advantageous

concept of the Mahdi used as a tool by powerful clerics to justify and consolidate a modern

Islamic theocracy. These studies tend to neglect the transformative evolution of Mahdi

conceptualizations across time in the decades leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Situated within the broader framework and literature of Shi‘ite historiography of the Mahdi

concept, this dissertation provides an alternative historiography of the Mahdi that has been

missing from the messianic scholarly work to-date. By tracing the development and

transformation of the concept of Mahdi in pre-revolutionary Iranian Shi‘ite writings,

specifically those from early 1900s to the late 1970s, I argue that evolving cultural, identity-

related and political influences affected and altered these conceptualizations, thereby

evolving the Mahdi, as a concept, from a distant figure in the 1900s, whose urgent arrival is

discursively and politically kept in abeyance, to be later reconfigured during the reshaping

influences of the formative 1940s and 1950s, and then emerging as an increasingly imminent,

revolutionary, and decidedly future capacitating figure in the 1960s and 1970s that helped

mobilize a revolutionary Mahdist fervor among Iranian Shi‘ites.

My central argument is that through discursive analysis, one can identify a shift from

an eschatological understanding of the Mahdi to a teleological understanding of the Mahdi

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and that by temporalizing the concept of the Mahdi one is able to, first, pin-point that the

shift occurred, and second, identify the nature of this transformation. Notably, the Mahdi is

characterized as moving from distant temporality1 to a revolutionary temporality; the

discursive shift creates a shift in the way temporality is regarded. The emergence of the

revolutionary temporality was a revolution in temporalizing not because the Mahdi was

regarded as imminently arriving – Shi‘ites always held the view that he would one day arrive -

but because the Mahdi was coming now instigated by human action. Keeping the advent of

the Mahdi undefined once empowered the Shi‘ite clerics; later, expediting his advent through

increasing discursive certainty of the Mahdi’s imminence empowered the clerics. The Iranian

Revolution became partly possible due to a discursive revolution on the Mahdi that preceded,

supported, and justified the Revolution. The Mahdi became a symbol or signifier for an end of

time that was emerging not only as a consequence of God’s action, but as a consequence of

human action, particularly table turning fervor to actualize a State/state of hope deemed to

now be in reach. The Mahdi now had a purpose in the political sphere, not just the religious

sphere. The temporal positionality of the Mahdi moving from abeyant to actualized is a

phenomenon that is revolutionary. In the current Iranian Shi‘ite scholarly focuses, this

fascinating transformation is left unknown or insufficiently analyzed. Revolution is about the

way space and time moves and turns, how ideas and actions evolve, revolve, and resolve

themselves in places and moments. One discovers from the revolution in Mahdi’s temporality

1 The use of the terms temporality or temporal in this dissertation, is my interpretation of Reinhart Koselleck’s definition of “historical time” which designates that historical periods under study do not necessarily conform to normative political and social chronological studies of Iran.

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in the Iranian Shi‘ite context that Mahdi conceptualizations are flexible, yielding, affirming,

mutable, and future/fate-changing. This is the case as the conceptualizations evolve and

revolve on themselves - not to a past, but to a future that is being inaugurated by end of time

purposeful action that expects and puts into momentum the end of the future by affirming

the now. The revolution in Mahdist discourse resolves contradictions or inconsistencies in the

way that messianism is attenuated when political expediency demands that the messiah’s

absence be privileged over his presence. In a sense, the revolutionary temporality of the

Mahdi saves early Shi‘ite conveniences and inconsistencies from themselves by re-affirming

the necessity of the future and futurality for emancipation.

In this chapter, in outlining the contextual framework for this study, I define key

concepts, introduce the historical perspective and arguments that shape this work, discuss my

method of inquiry and the materials that I will be examining; and review the literature that

covers the history of Shi‘ite eschatology and the development of conflicting concepts of

Mahdi in history. What is clear is that there is a dearth of modern literature on the pre-

revolutionary concept of the Mahdi and within the existing literature, an eschatological

understanding of the messiah is presupposed which obscures the clear emergence of a

teleological understanding of the Mahdi during the revolutionary period. By temporalizing the

Mahdi, by paying attention to the way he is understood in different moments in time, and

thus appreciating the Mahdi as a temporality-bound discursive concept that shifts from a

postponed concept to a revolutionary one, it is clear how the idea of the Mahdi’s advent gives

Shi‘ites hope, purpose, peace, and utopic enthusiasm. The concept of the saviour’s imminent

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arrival, a Mahdi that would inspire a revolutionary ethos because he is no longer simply a

signifier for the end of time, but now a signifier for an end that is purposeful and intrinsically

fulfilling, was a pre-condition for the Islamic theocracy that would emerge from an Iranian

monarchy. This discursive pre-condition is not described in detail in the extant literature of

this field. The revolutionary Mahdi with its teleological orientation rather than eschatological

orientation explains why the theocracy was regarded as a fulfillment of a utopian and

universal government overseeing a society with confidence and purpose. This teleological

orientation also reinforced, empowered, and justified Islamic clerics’ discursive excitement

about reclaiming the Mahdi from Iranian intelligentsia who were seen as blaming the ills of

society on Shi‘ite practices and beliefs. The concept gave the clerics focus, momentum, and

discursive leverage to justify their ascent to power. This dissertation helps fill these scholarly

gaps. This historiographic research offers a number of unique and necessary contributions to

Mahdist scholarship. This work is also offering a new understanding of modern Mahdist

messianism, as it illustrates that Mahdi has gone through modern transformations,

reinventions and reconfigurations during these periods. My understanding of religion, Islam

and Mahdi is that they have all gone through radical historical transformations. As the

requirements of the times and the needs of the people at different time periods change, they

leave their imprint on religion and key figures such as the messiah are reconceptualized,

redefined, and modernized over time.

In Chapter Two, I analyze the first phase of discursive Mahdism wherein I argue that, in

the wake of the constitutional revolution in the early 20th century, pragmatic Shi‘ite clerics

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had developed a discourse that kept the time of the Mahdi’s arrival in abeyance. Notably

absent in this discursive period is a focus on the messiah’s imminent return. I call this

particular discursive period “postponed Mahdism” where the Mahdi’s presence and return is

patiently left bracketed, hovering in a distant, unspecified, and conveniently vague time.

Understandings of the Mahdi are kept, therefore, in a distant temporality. Alternatively, one

may regard this temporality as the Mahdi’s atemporality2 by default, given the ways he and

his arrival are left hovering outside of time, however, I prefer to use the former term rather

than the latter throughout this study for the sake of clarity and focus. I examine the defining

qualities and characteristics of this period, and I argue that this discursive distance served to

reinforce the polemical “othering” of the Baha’is whom the Shi‘ite clerics perceived as a

threat and, thus, wished to discredit and dismiss in order to maintain the status quo.

Chapters Three and Four examine the writings of the middling years of this project

which I call the transitional period, and function as a pair in dialogue with one another. In

Chapter Three, I examine the arguments used in the 1940s to criticize Shi‘ism and the Mahdi.

This emergent polemical thinking had an enormous impact on the pragmatic clerics’ project

and its credibility as a force of Iranian intellectualism. In Chapter Four, I examine the nature of

Shi‘ite clerical defenses of the temporal abeyance and non-imminent appearance of the

Twelfth Imam against the polemical arguments and criticism, while defending their identity

and Shi‘ite beliefs. I argue that the critical voices examined in Chapter Three inadvertently

bring change to the religious Shi‘ite groups’ response, as the Shi‘ites come to the realization

2 Here I define ‘atemporal’ as a non-datable and indeterminable time frame.

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that repetitive defensive polemics against false Mahdis are ineffective against the onslaught

of sophisticated criticism. Chapter Four illuminates the nuances of the early signs of the

transformation in Shi‘ite groups’ responses to these criticisms which shifted from a patient

and postponed expectation of the Mahdi, to an active one in which the expectation of the

saviour is imminent and revolutionary. I describe this transformation in Chapter Five, titled

“Revolutionizing Messianism.”

Chapter Five examines religious writings of late 1950s – 1970s in which, I argue, the

expectation of the Twelfth Imam has become an imminent one, and the revolutionary

Mahdist project is fully underway. Here, I describe Shi‘ite writers, activists, and revolutionary

figures who are excitedly predicting great upheaval and an ushering in of Mahdi’s utopic and

universal government.

Through this analysis, I theorize political and social conceptions of the Mahdi vis-à-vis

temporality which, as Koselleck captures, is “oriented to the past or the present experience or

to expectations of a future state of affairs.”3 By examining the historical progression of the

understanding of Mahdi in the Iranian society, I show that the concept of the Mahdi, a basic

concept of the Shi‘ite religion, has shifted through alterations in time. Furthermore, I borrow

from Koselleck’s understanding of “historical time” through which concepts, in this case the

Mahdi, carry “overlapping old and new meanings or… acquire altogether new meanings.”4

3 Melvin Richter and Michaela W. Richter, "Introduction: Translation of Reinhart Koselleck's "Krise," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe," Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2 (2006): 346.

4 Richter & Richter, "Introduction: Translation of Reinhart Koselleck's "Krise," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe," 346.

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Based on this understanding that historical time periods occupy new or different qualities of

time that are distinct from one to the other, and that these periods have “their own specific

characteristics,”5 and that they might be overlapping, I argue that the concept of the Mahdi was

characterized by a distant temporality in the early 1900s through the early 1940s that shifted to

a markedly revolutionary one in the Shi‘ite literature of later decades.

A brief examination and explication of temporality in relation to expectations of the

appearance of the Mahdi in Iran before the Islamic Revolution, provides both a context for

the argument presented in this research and an introduction for those without knowledge of

the concepts.

Before the Islamic Revolution, Shi‘ites did not believe that individuals were responsible

or capable to “will” the appearance of the Mahdi; only the “Divine Will” could bring the

messiah’s appearance. The notion of the saviour’s advent during pre-revolutionary times can

be described as existing in a “distant future,” meaning that one cannot estimate, measure or

put a time frame on Mahdi’s arrival and appearance. In this parousia postponed temporality,

the figure of Mahdi is far away in space and time. This temporality does not promise that an

anticipator of Mahdi, even one who performs all of his or her duties, will, with certainty, live

to see the appearance of the messiah. Thus, because the arrival is kept in abeyance, left to

emerge in a temporality that has yet to be defined and in a future time that is inaccessible

precisely because it is indefinable, anticipators do not plan for the appearance. Given the

perceived fact that the Mahdi’s arrival is indeterminate and unknowable, anticipators will

5 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 167.

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defend the Twelfth Imam’s existence and perform their duties while acknowledging that the

Mahdi’s advent is an event that cannot be forced and over which they have no control.

Concepts of expectation and appearance of the Twelfth Imam have been a constant in

the everyday Shi‘ite discourse on the Mahdi. Shi‘ites must be both prepared for the arrival

and, at the same time, not expect that any preparation or performance of duties means that

the parousia is imminent. This patient attitude towards the concepts of expectation and

appearance of the Mahdi demonstrates an understanding that the arrival and appearance of

the Mahdi were positioned far in the distant optics of the believers, and therefore not in the

believers’ control, and one could not force its occurrence. Indeed, preparation for the arrival

is a lesson in patience, and it teaches the Shi‘ite listener that the Mahdi’s appearance is both

temporally postponed and out of the believers’ control.

For most Shi‘ite scholars writing before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, concepts of

expectation and appearance of the Mahdi were similar to those that were common in social

discourse. For these scholars, the expectation and appearance of the Mahdi was temporally

bracketed (or abeyant) and chiefly eschatological. The prevailing belief among Shi‘ite scholars

was that the clergy should avoid getting involved in the dirty business of politics and instead

concentrate on spiritual concerns such as preaching the word of God, studying within

seminaries, and training future generations of theologians.6 While a group of Shi‘ite jurists

became involved in the pragmatic maintenance of founding, solidifying, and codifying Shi‘ite

religious beliefs into laws and institutions developed after the constitutional revolution of

6 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions. 473.

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1906 - 1911, their pragmatic defense of a patient and distant concept of the Mahdi remained

a religious one.

This transformation in Shi‘ite thought from a temporally abeyant, postponed Mahdi to

a temporally activated messiah whose expectation is imminent and revolutionary is

discursively and substantively similar to transformations found in the Jewish Messianic

tradition. Religious Judaism shifted from a “passive” drive for emancipation to an active one

facilitated by Zionism as a discursive concept designed to defend the founding of Israel as

emancipation’s material realization. The novelty of religious Zionism, of course, was that it

reintroduced the political dimension into Jewish messianic tradition by insisting on the

religious right and obligation of Jews in the post-emancipation period to take an active part in

the process of God-ordained national redemption. Shubert Spero argues that prior to the

emergence of religious Zionism, historians associated “passivism and political quietism” with

the belief in the Jewish Messiah.7 Eliezer Don-Yehiya similarly argues that messianism is a

central tenet of Judaism and believed to be a godly designed redemption of the Jewish people

and all of mankind.8 Don-Yehiya also argues that “the traditional concept of Jewish

messianism reflected a passive and apolitical attitude, which obliged Jews to await patiently

the miraculous coming of the Messiah.”9 The Shi‘ite clerics have historically followed a similar

tradition of quietism and non-interference in politics. While there were always exceptions, I

7 Shubert Spero, "Does Traditional Jewish Messianism Imply Inevitability? Is There a Political Role for Messianists in Israel Today?" Modern Judaism 8, no. 3 (1988): 271.

8 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim,” Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 2 (April 1987): 222.

9 Don-Yehiya, “Jewish Messianism,” 223.

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argue that similar attitudes in waiting for the Mahdi were in place in Iran until Ayatollah

Khomeini’s forceful entry into the political scene brought the radical transformation of this

long-practiced system.10

Materials and Method

To research this historiography of changes and transformations in Iranian Shi‘ites’

understanding of the concept of the Mahdi from one period to the next, I employ discourse

analysis as a method by which to examine references to the Mahdi in religious writings such

as primary books, prayers, and articles. The focus of my particular examination and analysis of

these materials was to uncover the defining characteristics of each period and the nuanced

differences between them, show how the shift occurred from one time period to the next,

identify the influences affecting the shifts, describe how this shift and differences manifest,

and discuss the reactions the shifts elicited from the people being affected by them.

Discourse analysis appropriately and usefully enables examination of a range of

primary and contemporary sources, in this case, discourses about the Mahdi. Discourse

analysis, as a framework of inquiry, is used to explore how authors have amended and

redirected Islamic discourses to meet new challenges and conflicts that materialized in

different historical eras.11 This is, therefore, a discursive historiography of the concept of the

messiah during the time periods examined that is an original scholarly contribution to this

field. I specifically identify a shift that occurred in these years from an eschatological

10 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 473.

11 Samira Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009), 5.

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understanding of Mahdi to a teleological conception of Mahdi. In this study, I will be

examining discursive shifts in the decades leading up to the Islamic Revolution for an

historiography of this concept. Analysis of trends in messianic discourse and concepts during

this period fills a significant gap in the literature. This historiography provides a much-needed

contribution to Shi‘ite messianic scholarship by analyzing and evaluating the elements,

nuances, silences, emphasis, and features of Mahdist conceptualizations in primary and

secondary sources.

In order to disseminate their ideas, authors can employ several written modes of

discourse such as “journalistic essays, scholarly treatises, and didactic fiction of various sorts,

including dialogues, stories, plays, and poems”12 to convey their views, critiques and solutions

to an intended audience. In Iran, for example, in response to challenges from critics such as

Ahmad Kasravī and Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah, religious personalities such as Ruhollah Khomeini

and Muhammad Khālisīzādah published books and journal articles of their own as rebuttals.

Many religious thinkers, writers, and speakers, both clerics and non-clerics, engaged in this

“intellectual struggle” and produced a significant “religious literature.”13

Because these published works offer historians the only path to, and source of

information on challenges and ideas regarding the Mahdi that preoccupied the religious

Shi‘ite thinkers of the period under study, this dissertation relies heavily on these writings.

12 Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition, 5.

13 Rasūl Ja‘farīyān, Jaryānhā va sāzmānhā-yi mazhabī-sīyāsī-i Irān: az rūy-i kār āmadan-i Muhammad Rizā Shāh tā pīrūzī-i inqilāb-i Islāmī, 1320-1357. 6th repr. (Qum: 1385/2006): 19-20.

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Written and published works benefit historians by revealing the audiences and listeners for,

or about whom the authors write. Thus, we can know that, for the majority of the writing

examined in this study, the intended audience – as indicated by the writers themselves – is

religious Shi‘ites and, specifically, educated youth, younger generations and their parents. In

instances of writing in which the topic of discussion is minority religions, such as Babism and

Baha’ism, the writers direct their words to the followers of these faiths because, in the

writers’ views, the followers are still considered Shi‘ites, even if they consider them misguided

and confused.

It is important to note that in previous scholarly historiography about Iran, there has

been a widespread inclination to trace and present history through a definite set of political

periodization and polarization. Indeed, the writers examined in this scholarly research may

appear to fall within one of two groups, either the “Islamist religious traditionalists” or the

“secular modernists,” that appear to be at odds with one another. Essentially, the

modernization and secularization of Iran in the early turn of the century produced these two

groups that are always treated as binaries and at odds with each other. As Mohamad

Tavakoli-Targhi argues, the first half of the twentieth century Iranian milieu experienced an

anti-religious and anti-clerical movement, while the opposite happened in the second half of

the twentieth century, with Iran witnessing a religious and “clerical movement.”14 While I

argue that I am analyzing this contested dialogue between these two ideational movements, I

14 Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, “Tajaddud-i ikhtirā‘ī, tamaddun-i ‘āriyatī, va inqilāb-i rawhānī,” Iran Nameh 1, no. 20 (1381/2002): 207.

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also believe that their fluidity and hybridity and the influence and significance of this dialogue

resulted in the shift that I am investigating. It is important to stress that the debates and

exchange of arguments between these contesting and competing groups often informed and

even led to appropriation of ideas on the part of the religious groups. In my view, these

groups are, in fact, in dialogue with and informed by one another. Rather than focus on the

differences between these two groups as a contested binary of those who mostly do not see

eye to eye, this study, while acknowledging these binaries, chooses to bypass this problematic

formulation, a formulation which has been addressed elsewhere, to focus instead on the

outcome that this contestation and dialogue has had on the shift and transformation in the

understanding of the concept of the Twelfth Imam.

This research offers an alternative periodization of the history of the concept of the

Mahdi which is political and social in the Iranian milieu. It argues the understanding of the

concept of messiah changed from a distant one to a revolutionary one as a result of the

above-mentioned contestation. Naturally, this hybridization of the Mahdist understanding is

an Islamic movement that did not come out of a vacuum but through dialogue and discourse

with Arab leftism and nationalism and various movements that were trans-Islamic. While this

development lends itself to a larger comparative analysis in the Muslim world, because of the

scant focus and attention the transformation of the concept of Mahdi has received in the

Iranian scholarly milieu that is why I’m focusing exclusively on how it developed in Iran and in

the conclusion I will reflect on some comparative perspectives. This research is an original and

necessary alternative periodization of the time period under study: a periodization focused on

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the shift in the understanding of the concept of the Mahdi. My original contribution is the

identification of a shift from an eschatological understanding of the Twelfth Imam in early

twentieth century Iran, to a teleological conception of the Mahdi in the revolutionary years. I

emphasize that while the teleological Mahdi is still divinely planned, he is mediated by the

Shi‘ite population’s actions.

Literature Review

Rather than comprehensively overviewing the emergence of the concept of the

messiah which can be found in other sources and is outside the scope of this study, I examine

the emergence of the concept of saviour in Shi‘ite thought and highlight the existing historical

understanding of the Twelfth Imam as it contrasts with the understanding of the concept of

Mahdi that I examine in the rest of the paper. This review begins by historicizing the concept

of Shi‘ite eschatology, it then overviews findings from the literature on early Shi‘ite formation

and sectarianism, and discusses the Office of the Deputyship particularly with regard to the

occultation of the Twelfth Imam. Several gaps in the literature are filled by the work

conducted in this dissertation.

Historicizing Shi‘ite Eschatology

Eschatological religions provide comforting end-time narratives for their adherents

through a promise of eternal and perfect life after death.15 These end-time narratives function

15 Ryan S. Bisel and Debra J. Ford, "Diagnosing Pathogenic Eschatology," Communication Studies 59, no. 4 (2008): 341.

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to strengthen the resolve and faith of a persecuted group, especially during a crisis.16 In order

to explore the transformation of the Mahdi from distant to a revolutionary figure, a history of

Shi‘ite eschatology is warranted.

The concept of the Twelfth Imam described by the scholars of Iranian history whom I

am critiquing is ahistorical and eschatological in the sense that the scholars are preoccupied

with an anticipated historical individual who is alleged to rise at the end of time. These

scholars have a fixed and unchanging understanding and notion of Mahdi as a religious

individual. They also have an eschatological understanding and conception of the messiah

that is manifest in a normative Shi‘ite narration in which the Twelfth Imam is an individual

who will arrive at the end of time to bring justice and wipe out corruption. Teleological and

eschatological conceptions of Mahdi are distinct categories, neither of which can be reduced

to the other.17 As I will argue in later chapters, scholars holding this fixed concept of the

Mahdi have failed to comprehend that the understanding of the saviour as an historical

concept changed during the decades examined in this research.

Indeed, both Jewish and Christian eschatological literature sources are rather similar

to Muslim sources in their eschatological conceptions of the messiah. Further, both Jewish

and Christian sources use and refer to non-Muslim eschatological sources and books in terms

of similar themes, images, forms and symbols.18 Other non-Muslim eschatological

16 Bisel and Ford, "Diagnosing Pathogenic Eschatology,” 341-342.

17 A. W. Argyle, “Teleology and Eschatology,” Theology 57, no. 414 (1954): 446.

18 Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf and Lisa M. Franke, "Narrative Reconfigurations of Islamic Eschatological Signs: The Portents of the ‘Hour’ in Grey Literature and on the Internet," Archiv Orientalni 83, no. 3 (2015): 414.

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orientations synthesize Islamic and Zoroastrian beliefs with local custom in Iran resulting in a

similar eschatology and apocalyptic worldview. One example is Zoroastrianism where the

messiah figure of Saoshyant, similar to the Shi‘ite idea of the Mahdi, ushers in the end of

time.19

The Muslim idea of Messiah or Mahdi describes a chosen person who will “appear” or

“rise” against existing, intolerable, this-worldly authority. The time of Prophet Muhammad’s

rule was, and still is, considered to be the ideal epoch in Islamic history. Abdulaziz Sachedina

argues that the idea of Mahdi originated among a group of Muslims who, on becoming

disillusioned with the state of affairs after the Prophet’s brilliant rule, idealized him as more

than an ordinary man and saw him as the divinely chosen saviour.20 Based on the idea of

Mahdi as a divinely chosen saviour, this group of Muslims began to look forward to the rule of

a descendent of Muhammad who would also be named Muhammad and who would fill the

earth with justice and rid it of oppression.21 Soon after the Prophet’s death, however, the

Muslim community disagreed about whether his successor should be among his descendants

or among tribe leaders. The early Shi‘ites, or Imamites,22 who sympathized with the claim of

the prophet’s descendants, are generally considered to be those who also desired the

19 Navid Fozi, "Neo-Iranian Nationalism: Pre-Islamic Grandeur and Shi'i Eschatology in President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's Rhetoric," The Middle East Journal 70, no. 2 (2016): 232-233.

20 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi‘ism (Albany: State University of New York, 1980), 3.

21 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 3.

22 The terms “Imamite” and “Shi‘ite” are not clearly differentiated by Sachedina. Generally, “Imamite” refers to the group of early Shi‘ites during their formative years and explains their adherence to the designated descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, known as the Imams.

17

appearance of the messianic Imam.23

According to Sachedina, soon after the Prophet’s death, Muslims who had pro-Shi‘ite

tendencies – that is those who wished the descendants of the Prophet to succeed as leaders

of the Muslim community – were also those who harboured chiliastic hopes.24 Sachedina

asserts that because of the Shi‘ites frustration with the Caliphates who came to power after

the Prophet’s death,

[the] notion of the divinely guided saviour Imam, the Mahdi, who was believed

to have been equally endowed with divine knowledge as the Prophet had been,

seized the imaginations of all those who were deprived of their rights under the

existing regimes.25

An important feature of the Imamites’ notion of salvation was the requirement that

each Shi‘ite individual should know and acknowledge the Imam of his/her time because the

Imam alone “could bring a true Islamic rule of justice and equity in the world.”26 This

explanation of the role of messiah is reiterated by Sajjad Rizvi when he maintains that it is

through their devotion to the person of the Imam that believers owe the Mahdi the path to

salvation.27

In the Book of Daniel, Jesus is presented as the eschatological prophet who announces




26 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 6-7.

27 Sajjad Rizvi, “Authority in Absence? Shi‘i Politics of Salvation from the Classical Period to Modern Republicanism,” Studies in Christian Ethics 29, no. 2 (May 2016): 205.

18

the explosion of “a new and definitive time of salvation.”28 Sachedina argues that a similar

perspective explains the Imamite inclination to have each generation expect the appearance

of the Mahdi in “their lifetime to redress their grievances against the growing political turmoil

of the period.”29 This expectation of the appearance of the Mahdi in one’s lifetime was

instrumental in the development of the notion of the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in the

later decades of the Imamite belief formation.

In contrast to Sachedina, Hossein Modarressi does not provide much analysis on the

formation of the concept of the Twelfth Imam. He simply maintains that,

by late first/early eighth century, the belief was already well established in the

Muslim community that at some future time, a revolutionary leader from the

House of the Prophet would rise up, overthrow unjust government, and establish

the rule of justice and truth. This millenarian figure was called by the Shi‘ites the

qa’im, ‘the one who rises up.’30

However, Modarressi usefully differentiates between the terms “qā’im” and the “Mahdi” to a

greater degree than Sachedina. Ismail Poonawala, reviewing Modarressi’s work, argues that

while Modarressi contends that the concept of qā’im was known to the Imamite community,

the Mahdi concept was, in fact, imported.31 Modarressi thus argues that the concept of an

28 William Franke, “Apocalypse and the breaking-open of Dialogue: A negatively theological perspective,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47, no. 2 (2000): 71.


30 Hossein Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam: Abu Ja’far ibn Qiba al-Razi and his Contribution to Imamite Shi‘ite Thought (Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 1993): 6.

31 Ismail K. Poonawala. “Review of Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam: Abu Ja'far ibn Qiba al-Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shi‘ite Thought by Hossein Modarressi,” Journal of Law and Religion 15, (2001): 457.

19

Imam who would be the qā’im was well established in the Imamite mentality, and “a short

time later, the concept of Mahdi, ‘the rightly guided one,’ thus far essentially a non-Imamite

concept, was also introduced.”32

Saïd Amir Arjomand, in contrast, attempts to explicate the Shi‘ite development of the

concept of occultation of the Hidden Imam by employing Max Weber’s “notion of

rationalization,” to understand salvific world religions such as Shi‘ite Islam.33 Arjomand

explains that the “adoption” of the concept of occultation by the Shi‘ites is “a case of the

rationalization of a fairly common religious theme of disappearance-parousia34 through

specific theological elaboration.”35 In the same vein, Arjomand further asserts that the

concept of a concealed apocalyptic leader,

had chiliastic origins and was adopted in a desperate effort to resolve the

immediate problems of Imamate36 and succession in the second half of the ninth

century. This idea, however, underwent a series of subtle modifications and

developed into a doctrine that resulted in a basic transformation of the Imamate

from a legitimist theory of authority of the descendants of ‘Ali into a principle of

salvation.37

32 Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 89.

33 Saïd Amir Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology: Absence of the Imam and Transition from Chiliasm to Law in Shi‘ism,” The Journal of Religion 76, no. 4 (1996): 549.

34 Arjomand defines “parousia” as zuhūr or appearance, referring to the appearance of the Hidden Imam.

35 Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology,” 549, (Italics in original).

36 The term “Imamate” should not be confused with “Imamite.” The former refers to the concept of the qualified leadership of the Muslim community by an Imam and therefore refers to the leadership institution. For a definition of “Imamite,” please refer to note 21.

37 Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology,” 548-549.

20

Arjomand, being primarily a sociologist, applies a rational and sociological explanation to argue

that the Shi‘ites’ development of the concept of the occulted Imam is the adoption or

appropriation of a “fairly common religious theme.”38 In this next section, I discuss conflict in

early Shi‘ites understandings of the Mahdi and how scholars debate “moderate” and

“extremist”39 views in early Shi‘ite beliefs.

Early Shi‘ite Formation and Sectarianism

Throughout the formative years of Shi‘ite or Imamite structuring, at least fourteen

factions were identified. These factions were mainly the result of disagreements over

succession, as well as questions of doctrine and religious law.40 In our contemporary times,

only a few major Shi‘ite groups remain: the Zaydis, who are also known as the Fivers; the

Ismailis, or the Seveners who believe in the succession of seven Imams after the Prophet

Muhammad; and the Twelver Shi‘ites, who believe in the occultation of their last Imam who is

also known as the Twelfth or Hidden Imam.41

Many of the succession and doctrinal discords that arose during early Shi‘ite formation

were the result of the messianic tendency of the Imamites, who continuously expected the

arrival of Mahdi, as the deliverer figure of Islam. In the early period of Imamite Shi‘ism,

Sachedina explains, almost all Imams were believed not to have died and were considered to

38 Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology,” 548-549.

39 I have to point out that the use of these problematic value-judgment terms is that of the scholars such as Arjomand, Poonawala, Sachedina, Hodgson, Modarressi, Gleave and others who choose to use such terms to designate differences in opinion.

40 Saïd Amir Arjomand, "Imam Absconditus and the Beginnings of a Theology of Occultation: Imami Shi‘ism Circa 280-90 A.H./900 A.D.," Journal of the American Oriental Society 117, no. 1 (1997): 1.

41 Etan Kohlberg, “From Imāmiyya to Ithnā-'Ashariyya,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, no. 3 (1976): 522.

21

be the anticipated messiah.42 These expectations led to divisions within the Imamite followers

who created groups that could be roughly termed the “extremists” and the “moderates.”

Both Sachedina and Modarressi make the distinction between early period “extremist”

Shi‘ites and the mainstream “moderates.” Sachedina and Hodgson use the term “moderates"

for the forerunners to the current Twelver Shi‘ites.43 Sachedina argues that for the

“moderate” Shi‘ites, known as the Imamites or Twelvers,

the disappearance of the twelfth Imam in A.D. 873 may have in effect marked

the beginning of the accentuation of the title Mahdi, to designate an

eschatological leader…[c]onsequently, it is in the Imamite form of Shi‘ism that

we ought to study Islamic messianism because only this school of Shi‘ism

continued to cherish chiliastic hopes.44

An explanation of this division is also delineated in Marshall Hodgson’s classic “How Did the

Early Shi’a Become Sectarian?” As described by Robert Gleave, Hodgson identifies two crucial

elements in the emergence of Shi‘ite sectarianism: the development of ghulāt forms of

Shi‘ism by those who made “exaggerated” claims about the divine nature of the Imams and

the theological work of the seventh Imam and his companions in formulating a more

“moderate” Shi‘ite idea of the role and nature of the Imams.45 Hodgson explains that the term

ghulāt, or “exaggerators,” was used by later Twelver Shi‘ites who thought of themselves as


43 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, “How Did the Early Shī'a become Sectarian?” Journal of the American Oriental

Society 75, no. 1 (1955): 4.


45 Robert Gleave, “Recent Research into the History of Early Shi‘ism,” History Compass 7 (2009): 1596.

22

“moderates,” and designated as “extremist” any other Shi‘ite whose thinking shocked them.46

Both Modarressi and Sachedina assert that the Imams and their faithful followers

consistently condemned the exaggerated assertions about themselves and distanced

themselves from associating with ghulāt groups. Contested ideas put forth by these groups

were, for example, claims that the Imams were performing miracles, hearing angels, receiving

divine revelation, hearing prayers at their shrines, and having knowledge of the unseen.47 As it

is commonly known among Muslims in Iran today, many of these assertions remain

widespread, having infiltrated the beliefs of present-day Shi‘ites.

In agreement with Modarressi and Sachedina, Arjomand also maintains that one of the

primary challenges of the early Imams was the struggle to discard “extremist” beliefs and

notions that were introduced by the ghulāt.48 According to Arjomand, the Imams’ main goal

was to keep a “religious discipline” in order to have control over the ghulāt's chiliastic

tendencies.49 The early Imams were unsuccessful in their efforts, however, for as Arjomand

states, “quite a few extremist ideas concerning the charismatic and superhuman status of the

Imams penetrated the Shi‘ite orthodoxy.”50 Next, I discuss scholars’ interpretations of the

response to the problem of a successor to the eleventh Imam, particularly the role of the

46 Hodgson, “How Did the Early Shī'a become Sectarian?” 4.

47 Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 45-46.

48 Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology,” 550.



23

Twelfth Imam’s “deputy”51 and the effects of the Office of the Deputyship on Shi‘ite doctrine.

The Office of the Deputyship and the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam

After the eleventh Imam’s death, the question of whether he had a son and successor

became highly contested, and it remains contested today. Modarressi’s careful explication of

whether the eleventh Imam had a successor is worth examining closely as an example not

only of how Modarressi avoids taking a position about the Mahdi in this instance, but also of

how he avoids expressing his own opinion throughout his book. Describing a most difficult

doctrinal turmoil, Modarressi artfully maintains that, “fortunately that situation did not come

up and the Twelfth Imam was born although until his father's death the news about his birth

and existence was not publicized.”52 By framing the sentence in this “positive” manner,

Modarressi appears to be asserting to the reader that the Twelfth Imam was born. However, a

close look at the end of his sentence reveals that the position stated in the sentence is

referenced, and in fact, almost all of Modarressi’s sentences are referenced.53 Modarressi has

cleverly phrased the sentence in such a way that he cannot be accused of disputing or

disbelieving the existence of the Imam, and conversely, he cannot be accused of revealing the

fact that he embraces belief in the existence of the Imam himself. Modarressi does not

speculate about the birth any further.

51 A person who was also referred to as agent or wakīl and was responsible as caretaker of the office of the Imamate in the absence of the Twelfth Imam.


53 Modarressi uses references extensively. Almost all his sentences end with a footnote and the footnotes and explanations usually take up the majority of the page, sometimes leaving only a few lines for the main text. This is an intensely researched work.

24

Modarressi maintains that, after the eleventh Imam died, Al-Amri, the first deputy,

continued caretaking of the office of the Imamate in absence of a son who, although many

doubted the son existed, was said to have gone into occultation.54 According to Modarressi,

most of the Imam’s local representatives publicly acknowledged the Hidden Imam’s

existence;55 however, as Modaressi adds, “those who did so were confirmed in their posts and

were authorized to collect religious taxes from the Imamite community on behalf of the

Hidden Imam.”56 The careful reader of Modarressi’s book can discern Modarressi’s emphasis

on the importance of the collection of these religious taxes. Thus, Modarressi leaves the

impression that many political motivations were, in fact, economical, and that the collection

of religious taxes played an important role in the formation of key Shi‘ite doctrines.

Sachedina, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of an oppressive political

atmosphere as a key element in the development of Shi‘ite doctrine. Sachedina argues that

two important factors contributed to the formation of “the theory of the occult Imamate of

the Imami Shi‘ism:” the chaotic situation created by the atrocities of the Sunni Caliphates

against the Imams and the confusion that arose over the succession of the eleventh Imam.57

The confusion in succession developed because the eleventh Imam died apparently with no

known offspring. However, because the eleventh Imam had been in danger, and thus in hiding

for most of his life, those who asserted that he had a son used the same reasoning — that the





25

son was in danger and hiding — to explain the son’s absence and unknown whereabouts.58 As

a result, Sachedina explains, after the death of the eleventh Imam, his successor “was

declared to be in occultation, and the guardianship of the nascent Imamite community was

left in the hands of the agents.”59

Modarressi and Sachedina are similarly at odds regarding the deputies or agents of the

Imam. Modarressi consistently uses terminology referring to an atmosphere of “severe doubt

and uncertainty”60 under the leadership of these deputies, and he maintains that many

“harbored deep doubts about the actual existence of such a son,”61 doubts which led to

desertions and formations of splinter sects. Modarressi explains that while most Imamites

accepted Al-Amri’s claim to be the deputy of the Hidden Imam, they doubted Al-Amri’s

credibility, and they had serious doubts about an agent receiving the religious funds.62 The

doubt surrounding Al-Amri’s receiving of religious funds brings us back to Modarressi’s

highlighting of economic motivations that may have shaped Shi‘ite doctrine. Modarressi

explains that Al-Amri’s son, Muhammad, took over as deputy after his father’s death and

continued in this role for a long time, even as there were challenges to his authority, including

challenges by those who had not disputed his father’s deputyship.63

In contrast to Modarressi, Sachedina does not refer to any disputes regarding the






63 Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 93

26

deputyship of the son, Muhammad Al-Amri. Sachedina maintains that the second agent held

the office for fifty years, ultimately becoming the undisputed leader of the Imamite

community.64 Sachedina also asserts that the process of unifying the Imamites and the

recognition of their doctrines was mostly achieved under the second agent’s leadership.65 For

Sachedina, the study of the Imamite messianic phenomenon is actually the study of the

elaboration, systematization and crystallization of the Imamite doctrine of the Mahdi by his

directly appointed agents, followed by his indirect spokesmen, the Shi‘ite jurists.66

Sachedina accords great importance to the office of the deputyship, and unlike

Modarressi, he offers no criticism of the institution. Indeed, Sachedina considers the office’s

merit to be so significant that he asserts that the institution of the deputyship ensured the

survival of the Imamite religion during the vicissitudes of the following centuries and prepared

the ground for the Shi‘ite jurists to assume the religious leadership of the Imamite Shi‘ites in

the absence of the Hidden Imam.67 Sachedina places the Imamite jurists in a secondary

position to the deputies, in their role as leaders and consolidators of the Shi‘ite community.

Sachedina’s argument for positioning the deputies above the jurists is contrary to

Modarressi’s argument, for as discussed below, Modarressi credits the Imamite jurists with

the task of securing the future of Twelver Shi‘ism.

Sachedina maintains that under the leadership of the eleventh Imam, the primary


65 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, 90-91.



27

function of the deputies was to handle the taxes.68 However, after the disappearance of the

last Imam, “the agents were the virtual leaders of the Shi‘ites, looking after both their

religious as well as their financial affairs.”69 Modarressi agrees with Sachedina as far as the

financial responsibility of the agents, however, regarding religious or legal questions,

Modarressi explains that soon after the deputyship of the second agent, the community was

ordered to refer religious questions to Imamite jurists.70 In Modarressi’s scenario, the agents

themselves were not versed in legal knowledge, and they did not have access to the Hidden

Imam, so they could not ask the Hidden Imam to answer legal questions. Were the agents to

attempt to answer legal questions without legal knowledge or access to the Hidden Imam,

any mistaken answers would have made apparent that the agents were not in contact with

the Hidden Imam. A mistake by an agent who claimed to have been in contact with the

Hidden Imam might also have led people to question the authority of the Hidden Imam

because the Imam was supposed to be the ultimate source of religious knowledge.

While Sachedina mainly attributes the consolidation of Shi‘ism to the effective

leadership of the eminent deputies of the Hidden Imam, Modarressi emphatically attributes

this feat to the Shi‘ite religious jurists who were also transmitters of hadith.71 Modarressi

asserts that there is substantial evidence to suggest that more than eighty years after the



70 Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation, 94

71 Encyclopedia of Islam defines al-ḥadīth̲̲ as speech, report, also known as tradition. It is considered to be the

account of what the Prophet Muhammad said or did, or of his tacit approval of something said or done in his presence. Muslim scholars of the early period went to great lengths to collect the reports of his actions and statements.

28

“birth” of the Hidden Imam, the “absolute majority” of the Shi‘ite community, stretching from

Iraq to Iran, “were in a [similar] state of fierce doubt and one way or another rejected the

existence of a vanished Imam,” which resulted in a great number of desertions and

conversions to other sects.72 This crisis occurred because the Shi‘ites believed that the order

and succession of the Imams would continue until the end of time, and the fear that there

was no longer any Imam made the situation especially unusual and unsettling.73 Modarressi

argues that “[i]t was thanks mainly to the tireless efforts of the Imamite transmitters of hadith

that this situation gradually changed.”74 Modarressi attributes this success to the extensive

circulation and use of a well-known and pre-existing Sunni report that was attributed to the

Prophet Muhammad “in which he predicted that there would be twelve caliphs after him, all

from his tribe, the Quraysh.”75 Modarressi asserts that the existence of this hadith, and its

subsequent widespread circulation within the Imamite community contributed greatly to the

amelioration of the succession crisis.76

The work of collecting similar reports of the Prophet Muhammad’s predictions started

with Imamite theologians, such as Abū Ja'far Muhammad ibn Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kulayni al-

Rāzi (864 CE - 941 CE) and 'Ali ibn Bābūyah (923 CE – 991 CE).77 Modarressi argues that later

scholars managed to collect reports that “not only predicted the number of the Imams but







29

had even disclosed the full list of their names, including the vanished one that was last on the

list.”78 While this assertion appears problematic to the modern historian, it is nevertheless

important to consider, for as Modarressi explains, these reports “were extremely

instrumental in gradually removing the doubts and uncertainties of the Imamite community

and persuading the Imamites of the truth of the doctrine.”79 Furthermore, Modarressi reasons

that these hadiths eventually formed the essential component in the early Imamites’

argument on the Occultation and supported the “truth” of the Twelver Shi‘ite doctrine.80

Modern Literature

In the scholarship on the Imamite doctrine, researchers trace the historical background

for the emergence and creation of the figure of the messiah in Shi‘ite thought. The

contemporary literature focuses on the post-revolutionary governmentalization of the Mahdi,

and his role or status as a tool for the State. Whereas this literature tends to focus on messianic

understandings of the Mahdi as redeemer or saviour in an eschatological capacity, these

focuses obfuscate or ignore the dominant discursive writings on the Mahdi which are

teleological in nature rather than eschatological (as claimed) leading into the revolutionary

period that helped to justify and empower the Iranian state. Abbas Amanat captures the wide-

ranging ways that messianism is addressed in Iranian thought. For example, Amanat argues




30

that,

messianism is one of the most powerful, diverse and enduring expressions of

Islam in Iran throughout its long history. Messianic speculations are especially

evident in Shi‘ite literature ranging from Hadith, theology, and philosophy to

occult sciences, and folklore. Messianic yearnings also motivated a number of

epoch-making popular movements with political ambitions and lasting influence

on Iranian cultural identity.81

Though the notion of messianism is central to the Shi‘ite faith, it is difficult to find many

Western academic sources on this topic. This scarcity of sources is confirmed in the preface to

Sachedina’s Islamic Messianism, written in 1980, when he states that “modern western

scholars have written virtually nothing on the subject of the Mahdi idea in Imamite Shi‘ism.”82

Sachedina’s observation remains true today, with the exception of the substantial book Crisis

and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi‘ite Islam by Hossein Modarressi, who is both

a Princeton scholar and a prominent Shi‘ite theologian. In addition, short encyclopedic and

scholarly articles or book chapters, mainly those by Saïd Amir Arjomand, Robert Gleave,

Marshall Hodgson and Etan Kohlberg, can be found. Jassim Hussain’s The Occultation of the

12th Imam: A Historical Background is also worth mentioning, however, this work is minor and

of a less significant nature. Arjomand also notes the scarcity of Western academic research,

maintaining that “[t]he development of the doctrine of occultation has not received any

81 Abbas Amanat, “Islam in Iran v. Messianic Islam in Iran” Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. XIV, Fasc. 2, pp. 130-134;

available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/islam-in-iran-v-messianic-islam-in-iran (accessed March 21, 2018).

82 Sachedina, Islamic Messianism, ix.

31

systematic treatment as such in modern historical and critical scholarship.”83 Arjomand lists

“[t]he important works that touch on the issue [Shi‘ite messianism],”84 which are primarily the

works of Hodgson, Kohlberg and Modarressi. Like Sachedina, Modaressi, and others address

the pre-modern history and the development of the role of the Mahdi, writers such as Abbas

Amanat, Mehdi Khalaji and Saïd Amir Arjomand trace the modern history of the concept of

the Twelfth Imam – albeit in a more concise and limited manner – focusing chiefly on political

and post-revolutionary aspects.

None of these scholars and researchers, however, have investigated the

historiography of a shift in pre-revolutionary Shi‘ite messianic discourse and understanding in

early modern Iranian history, or researched the role and influence of thinkers such as Kasravī,

Sharī‘at Sangalajī, and Hakamīzādah, and their detractors, such as Khomeini, in bringing about

this shift. My research addresses this gap in the modern study and discursive historiography

of the Mahdi. At the same time, this research addresses another gap in scholarly literature by

providing an alternative pre-revolutionary historiography of the concept of Mahdi: while

scholarly historical work on the Iranian revolution argued from the lens of martyrdom and

Karbala narrative has been exhaustive, research into a Shi‘ite revolutionary messianic

perspective is still lacking and previous scholarly work that has been done from a

revolutionary perspective primarily addresses post-revolutionary statist uses of the concept of

83 Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology: Absence of the Imam and Transition from Chiliasm to Law in Shiʿism,” 548.

84 Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology: Absence of the Imam and Transition from Chiliasm to Law in Shiʿism,” 548 n 2.

32

the Twelfth Imam.

This work is also unique as a scholarly examination of religious material directed at a

lay audience that examines and traces the progress of this shifting Mahdist understanding

during pre-revolutionary years because modern writers of literature on this topic have either

been non-academics (i.e. Mehdi Khalaji, Akbar Ganji) or they have focused on political

messianism of post-revolutionary Iran (i.e. Abbas Amanat, Afshin Shahi, Mojtaba Mahdavi.)

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have introduced and historicized scholarly examinations of the Mahdi

which, in the Imamite literature, primarily focused on him as a saviour-figure that was

codified in Shi‘ite doctrine for spiritual (or, as argued by Modarressi, possibly pragmatic)

purposes, and in the contemporary literature, focused on the ways that post-revolutionary

writings on the Twelfth Imam made him relevant to the statist project. The historiographic

research in this dissertation offers a number of unique and necessary contributions to Mahdi

scholarship that challenge and call into question the premises of the contemporary fixation on

making the Twelfth Imam an alibi for the state and that obfuscate or ignore the discourse that

made him a revolutionary figure in the first place. In the next chapter, I identify and examine

the defining qualities and characteristics of the distant messianic temporality that, I argue,

was predominant in the pragmatic Shi‘ite clerics’ writings following the constitutional

revolution of the early twentieth century Iran, and equally important, the role of the Baha’i

challenge in shaping the Shi‘ite clerical understanding of the Mahdi. Shi‘ites had encountered

the Babi challenge prior to the constitutional revolution, and because of this challenge, the

33

advent was postponed; the constitutional revolution itself further reinforced the postponed

and distant nature of the Mahdi.

34

Chapter 2 – Parousia Postponed: Distant Mahdist Temporality

Introduction

Parousia is a Greek term that refers to the coming and presence of a prophetic figure

in the Bible. Brought into the Shi‘ite context, the parousia of the Mahdi is about the arrival,

whether imminent or not, of a redeemer that will transform the spiritual landscape of those

who believe in him and change the course of history. While the Babi/Baha’i movement had

played a decisive role in giving discursive traction to the idea of postponing the parousia of

the Twelfth Imam, the Iranian constitutional revolution itself, given the constitutional leaders’

focus on pragmatism and legalistic framework, only served to intensify the postponement of

the coming of the Mahdi. I call this moment, ‘parousia postponed.’

The dynamics of the parousia postponed moment or period are evident in the writings

of Shi‘ite clerics during the years following the constitutional revolution which provide evidence

for and explanation of the distant Mahdist expectation. To make this case, I first discuss the role

of Shi‘ite clerics in the early twentieth century when they rose to play a prominent, pragmatic

and present-focused role as a result of the constitutional revolution (1906 - 1911). For this

period, I examine the writings of powerful clerics who keep the Mahdi and his arrival in

abeyance for pragmatic reasons. I also discuss the defining qualities and characteristics of the

distant temporality as revealed in their writings which value and place considerable emphasis

on the performance of duties without expectation of the Mahdi’s imminent appearance. As I

show later in Chapter Five, in the revolutionary period, there is a decisive shift from this

orientation where the Mahdi’s arrival or presence becomes the driving force behind building an

35

end of time that is already divinely planned, but now directly mediated by the actions of

believers and subjects of the state. In the early period, the concept of the Mahdi is assuring but

his divine presence is bracketed because it is unnecessary for social and political action,

however in the later period of this study, the Mahdi’s divine imminence is centralized and

deemed crucial for social and political action.

Thus, I describe how the distant view of the concept of Mahdi – the Shi‘ite belief in

Mahdi as an end of time saviour who will deliver humanity – regards the Twelfth Iman as an

assured concept but whose presence was not a necessary condition for societal transformation.

During this period of time, Shi‘ite clerics are confident that the messiah will eventually appear;

they are satisfied that his arrival is assured and are not interested in ushering it into existence.

They are confident that those who believe that Mahdi has already arrived, such as the Babis

and Baha’is, are incorrect. While the validity and reality of the Twelfth Imam’s existence was

often affirmed in attempts among Shi‘ites to define religious responsibilities in anticipation of

the Twelfth Imam’s arrival or appearance, he was mainly held as a distant and non-imminent

figure. Rarely did discourse on the saviour at this time denote urgency or expectation that

meeting or not meeting responsibilities would affect when the messiah would appear, and

therefore the Mahdi did not have an explicitly purposeful quality during this period. Through

close examination of period writings, I identify and explain a significant distinguishing feature of

this period: an obsessive preoccupation with Baha’i activity and the Babi/Baha’i refutations and

contestations which would come to have a profound impact on the conceptual shift that the

Mahdi makes from having an eschatological orientation to having a teleological orientation.

To be clear, while I address the fact that the clerics’ work following the constitutional

36

revolution of 1906 - 1911 was primarily present-focused and pragmatic – in the sense that the

clerics’ task was to make certain that the modern legal system was based on shari’a and to

ward off perceived political competitors, particularly the Babis/Baha’is – I maintain that the

Mahdist understanding that guided and colored the messianic expectations of the early 1900s

through the mid-1940s was mainly a distant one. This chapter illuminates how the postponed

Mahdist understanding served to reinforce a polemical “othering” of groups that the Shi‘ite

clerics perceived as a threat and, thus, wished to discredit and dismiss in order to maintain the

status quo, in particular that Shi‘ism, shari’a, and Shi‘ite identity remain pre-eminent in Iran and

that the clerics maintain control of the constitutional narrative.

The Role of Pragmatic and Law-Focused Shi‘ite Clerics

Shi‘ite clerics held prominent and significant roles after the Iranian constitutional

revolution. Their involvement in parliamentary decision and law making at the time was

pragmatic and law-focused. Notably their immediate concerns focused on ensuring that

legislation was compliant with shari’a. They held distant messianic expectations.

A prominent feature of the Iranian constitutional revolution was the significant leading

role of influential Shi‘ite mujtahids in the popular protests that forced the hand of the Qajar

king to grant Iran the constitution.85 Before the constitutional revolution, a dual and

mismanaged judiciary system existed and (mis)functioned in Iran: the shar’i courts of religious

85 Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Islam and Constitutionalism Since the Nineteenth Century,” in Constitutional Politics in the Middle East: With Special Reference to Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, ed. Saïd Amir Arjomand, (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008): 35.

37

jurists, and customary or ‘orfi courts.86 After the constitutional revolution, it was consensually

agreed that the constitutional government and the new parliament were responsible for

ratifying, unifying and organizing the shambled judiciary system.87

The clerical establishment became deeply engaged and politicized during the years

following the constitutional revolution, and they took a central role in the process of reforming

the judicial system by collaborating with the state to create a legal framework for a

constitutional mode of government that stayed within Islamic guidelines. Indeed, as the clerics

argued in parliament, the primary focus of the clerical establishment was to make sure that the

laws being drafted in the parliament were in accord with Islamic law. Arjomand maintains that

the creators of the modern Iranian legal profession were entirely dependent on these religious

jurists for “judiciary reorganization.”88

In the post-constitutional era, many legal and semi-legal institutions, such as the

religious courts mahzar that were established to provide governmental services, were managed

by clerics. The clerics were engaged in the process of implementing the shari’a, at least to the

extent that they could be involved within the limits of the constitution. The manner of the

clerics’ involvement in the court system serves as an example of how the clerical establishment

of the post-constitutional era was not interested in an imminent and revolutionary view of

Mahdi, which was a view that shifted in later decades. Rather, the pragmatic clerics’ focus in

86 Saïd Amir Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” in The Rule of Law, Islam and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran, eds. Saïd Amir Arjomand and Nathan J. Brown, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2013): 16-17.

87 Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” 17.

88 Arjomand, “Shi‘ite Jurists and the Iranian Law and Constitutional Order in the Twentieth Century,” 22.

38

these early years was on their present condition, as demonstrated by their immediate concern

for constitutionalizing Islam and Shi‘ism, safeguarding that laws of state were in accordance

with shari’a, and by their involvement in everyday institutional functions.

Two important articles of the new constitution highlight the central role of clerics during

this period and serve as evidence that the clerical establishment was granted institutional

authority within the parliament.89 The first article stressed the Shi‘ite identity of the nation and

raised it above the national character of the Iranian people.90 The second article of the

Fundamental Law asl-i du-i mutamam-i qānūn-i asāsī was even more essential in establishing

the prominent role of the clerics, for it reasserted the role of religious clerics as the

representatives of the Twelfth Imam inside the parliament and upheld the clerics’ right to

permanently instruct both the government and the ruler.91

Iranian, Article 2. At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National

Consultative Assembly . . . be at variance with the sacred principles of Islam or

the Laws of [the Prophet Mohammad]. It is hereby declared that it is for the

ulama . . . to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are, or are not,

conformable to the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that

there shall exist at all times a Committee composed of no less than five

mojtaheds or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of

the age . . . This Article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of the

Mahdi [the Messiah].92

89 Janet Afary, “The Place of Shi‘i Clerics in the First Iranian Constitution,” Critical Research on Religion 1, no. 3 (December 2013): 328-329.

90 Afary, “The Place of Shi‘i Clerics in the First Iranian Constitution,” 330.

91 Afary, “The Place of Shi‘i Clerics in the First Iranian Constitution,” 330-331.

92 Afary, “The Place of Shi‘i Clerics in the First Iranian Constitution,” 331.

39

The constitutionalists’ mission was to postpone the arrival of Mahdi because they were legally

focused at this time. Clerics and religious figures were, in fact, active in organizing the

ratification of constitutional laws, meeting daily with deputies and officials to discuss and plan

legal terminology and laws in accordance with Shi‘ite jurisprudence.93 These efforts facilitated

the parliament committee’s preparation of new laws and amendments, by making certain that

Islamic principles were fully accommodated.94 The amended constitution was to be consistent

with the laws of shari’a as well as constitutional monarchy, and all parliament members were

to pledge allegiance to these principles and observe the interests of Iran based on the

"Mohammedan" shari’a laws.95

The revised constitution also included several other articles that strengthened the role

of Islam and Shi‘ism within the political structure. While these amendments included rights –

such as the freedom of publication, the freedom of teaching and learning sciences and crafts,

and the freedom to form associations – these rights were all contingent upon their accordance

and adherence to Islamic principles.96 Another important article in the constitution made

certain that the legitimacy of all legal decisions and ratifications was also conditional on

accordance with the values of Islamic law.97 Furthermore, a committee of at least five Muslim

jurists was given the power to dispute or reject any part of any proposal that they believed to

93 Mangol Bayat, Iran's First Revolution: Shi‘ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 175 & Saïd Amir Arjomand, "The 1906-07 Iranian Constitution and the Constitutional Debate on Islam," in Journal of Persianate Studies 5, no. 2 (2012): 161.

94 Saïd Amir Arjomand, "The 1906-07 Iranian Constitution and the Constitutional Debate on Islam," in Journal of Persianate Studies 5, no. 2 (2012): 160.

95 Arjomand, "The 1906-07 Iranian Constitution,” 161.

96 Afary, “The Place of Shi‘i Clerics,” 335-338 & Arjomand, "The 1906-07 Iranian Constitution,” 164.


40

be in disagreement with the sacred religious laws.98 In such situations, the decision of the

committee of clerics was to be upheld and obeyed, and significantly, this article was not to be

changed and altered until the appearance of the Hidden Imam.99

Several important Shi‘ite jurists of Najaf, including Ākhūnd Mullā Muhammad Kāzim

Khurāsānī (d. 1911) and Mullā ʿAbd-Allāh Māzandarānī (d. 1912) were pro-constitutionalists and

made many attempts to safeguard the efforts of the establishment of the constitution.100 They

actively countered the arguments of anti-constitutionalists through writing letters, issuing

fatwas, endorsing pamphlets and working with other parliamentary deputies, lay-people, and

minor pro-constitutionalist clerics.101 For example, these jurists endorsed a treatise, by a cleric

named Shaykh Esmāʿil Mujtahid-i Najafī Mahallātī (d. 1924), which explained a ruling which

maintained that any opposition to constitutional principles was equivalent to waging war

against the Hidden Imam himself.102 Concurrently, the Shi‘ite clerics were also facing other

forces that seemed to threaten their identity. Of the practiced religions during this time in Iran,

Shi‘ite clerics were particularly concerned with the newly emerging religions of

Babism/Baha’ism, as their core belief that the Mahdi had already appeared, delegitimized the

Shi‘ite concept of a distant Mahdi.

Babi/Baha’i Movements “Threaten” the Sanctifying Role of Mahdi






41

In this section, I discuss Shi‘ites’ perceptions of threats to the progress they had made

following the constitutional revolution and how their views of a postponed messianic

expectation facilitated the legitimization of their own projects and beliefs and de-legitimized

those they perceived as enemies. Some Shi‘ites took recourse to the extremely common theme

of “othering” religious minority groups and targeted them as the enemy.

As the pragmatic Shi‘ite clerics worked to ensure that the new constitution upheld

Islamic principles, they maintained the concept of the saviour as an eschatological figure. Thus,

for the Shi‘ites, the Mahdi’s presence aided in sanctioning and legitimizing the constitutional

revolution. During this time, the general attitude of the Shi‘ites toward the Mahdi was based on

the belief in the existence of the Twelfth Imam as an individual, and while the Shi‘ites had an

eschatological confidence in his eventual unannounced appearance, no specific time, schedule,

or effort ensured when the Mahdi was coming. Usually in religious writings, the conditions for

appearance are described, yet in the writings of this time, no suggestions or information were

offered for planning, preparing or timing of the messiah’s arrival and appearance. Instead, one

who believed in the Mahdi must only and simply wait in the present for him to appear.

Shi‘ites were threatened by religious competitors, particularly the Babis/Baha’is who, by

claiming that the Twelfth Imam had already appeared, were perceived as delegitimizing, and

thus ruining the clerics’ hard work and their legal and pragmatic investment in their present

condition. In Omid Ghaemmaghami’s view, many of the eschatological and messianic strains

that “exploded onto the religious landscape” concerning the Twelfth Imam were, for the most

42

part, due to the “birth of the Babi religion and its metamorphosis into the Baha’i faith.”103 Mina

Yazdani argues that anti-Babi and anti-Baha’i polemical writings portrayed a movement that

arose from within the heart of Iran’s religious heritage and were intended to depict the

Babis/Baha’is as the country’s internal “other.”104

For Shi‘ite religious writers, the “othering” takes the form of engagement in religious

polemics against the Babis and Baha’is by emphatically denouncing them as wrongful claimants

of Mahdism. By contesting the claimants’ Mahdism, the Shi‘ite writers employ a means of

“defensiveness” to protect their beliefs and values. Indeed, the religious writers’ defensive

attitude is repeatedly displayed in their writings on the Twelfth Imam, which almost always

take the shape of an attack on religious minorities and “Mahdi-claimants.” The writers attempt

to discredit their enemies by explaining that, throughout history, many people have claimed to

be the messiah, and the claimants have all been defeated and proven wrong. Thus, they argue,

the same will be true of the new religions of Babism and Baha’ism whose “erroneousness” will

soon be revealed.

Ghaemmaghami’s work, referring to the “vitriolic rhetoric” that is directed at the

Babi/Baha’i movement and the accusations of Babis/Baha’is being agents of foreign

“colonialist” governments,105 is an example of how “defensiveness” in religious literature was

stressing the importance of safeguarding the “holy shari’a” that had been continuously under

103 Omid Ghaemmaghami, “Arresting the Eschaton: Mirza Husayn Tabarsi Nuri (d. 1902) and the Babi and Baha’i Religions,” in Journal of Religious History, 36:4 (2012): 493.

104 Mina Yazdani, Religious Contentions in Modern Iran, 1881-1941 (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2011), 6.

105 Ghaemmaghami, “Arresting the Eschaton: Mirza Husayn Tabarsi Nuri (d. 1902) and the Babi and Baha’i Religions,” 496.

43

attack. Here, the argument takes form in the idea that Islam has been threatened since its early

days and these criticisms continue “until this era, through the intrusion of foreigners into our

country; the propagation of misguided and deceitful sects and their infiltration into Muslim

affairs.”106 Muslims who worried that such efforts would very likely result in the extinction of

Islam and the disintegration of Shi‘ism and, instead, “strengthen false and corrupt religions that

were growing,”107 proposed measures to counter “this immense danger.”108 In the following

example, “the pious public” was to perform four actions or duties: the first duty was the

protection, propagation and continuation of religious seminaries, which served as the

protectors of Islam; otherwise, these critical institutions could soon be eradicated.109 The

second duty was the correct education of children in accordance with shari’a to instill “the right

values.”110 The third duty was “enjoining good and forbidding wrong.”111 The fourth duty

consisted of

the continuation of Islamic obligations and customs through one’s actions,

behavior, speech, eating and clothing in a way that they are different from

foreigners and do not resemble enemies of religion…so that it will result in

ending foreigners’ greed in attracting Muslims and security from deceits of

enemies of religion.112

106 Qulām Hussein, “Zikr-i ahvāl-i tarīkhī-yi mudaiyan-i mahdavīat va yā illatulilal-i id’ahā-yi kāzibih [The Historical Circumstances of Mahdi-laimants or the First Cause of False Claim],” Tazakurāt-i Diyānatī, no. 9 (1305/1926): 7-8.

107 Hussein, “Zikr-i ahvāl-i tarīkhī-yi mudaiyan-i mahdavīat va yā illatulilal-i id’ahā-yi kāzibih,” 8.



110 Hussein, “Zikr-i ahvāl-i tarīkhī-yi mudaiyan-i mahdavīat va yā illatulilal-i id’ahā-yi kāzibih,” 9-10.



44

The proposals illustrate a strong emphasis on keeping the Twelver Shi‘ite identity intact and

safeguarding children and youth against foreign, secular and “misguided” influence. Although it

is not overtly stated, these duties are to be enacted in the present with the intended effect of

maintaining the Shi‘ite faith while waiting for the Twelfth Imam. The duties are not performed

in expectation of bringing about the appearance of the Mahdi, which is assumed to be an

assured event in this time period. The patient and assured attitude of a distant messianic

expectation that underlies the performance of these duties will stand in contrast to Shi‘ite

clerics’ writings examined in later chapters.

Assured Defense Against Babi/Baha’is and Other Foreign Forces

In this section, I highlight the assured characteristic of the Mahdi’s postponed

appearance in Shi‘ite writings of this time. At this time, the Shi‘ites are confident and satisfied

with their understanding of a messiah who is in abeyance but whom they trust will eventually

appear at a later time. The Shi‘ite religious writers’ assured understanding of the Mahdi’s

distant appearance is important to note for two reasons, a) because of the manner in which this

assured conception is used as a defense against forces the Shi‘ite clerics find threatening, and

b) because this assured conception of a postponed Mahdi will stand in contrast to later writings

of religious writers when the Twelfth Imam’s appearance is rather imminent and revolutionary.

The concept of Mahdi as a remote end of time saviour who will save humanity was, as

described earlier in this chapter, an assured concept that repeatedly appears in the literature as

a defense against outside forces and a means of othering religious minorities. I pay particular

45

attention to a significant characteristic of this literature, and one of the methods used to

defend Shi‘ite identity in this period, which was the religious writers’ use of threats against

Babis and Baha’is.

Several monthly or bi-monthly religious journals and magazines such as Maktab-i Islām,

Ayīn-i Islām, Tazakurāt-i Dīyānatī, Akhtar, and Taqaddum published polemical and propagandist

articles that conveyed the theme of “othering” Babis and Baha’is, which I argue is a defense

mechanism of this period. Religious personalities and writers of this time, such as Sabāh

Kāzirūnī and Nusratullāh Nūrīyānī were also the pioneers and founders of some of these earliest

and important religious journals and publications that were instrumental in spreading their

message to the Shi‘ite educated audience. Many writers of this period attempt to strengthen

their arguments by clothing them in “scientific” “reason” and “logic,” notions that were gaining

increasing popularity in post-constitutional revolutionary era because of growing access to

secular and western education and knowledge. Some Shi‘ite clerics found the rise of Western

educational influence threatening to their beliefs, yet they incorporated similar rhetorical

elements to strengthen their arguments as it found resonance with their audience. These

authors are certain of the Mahdi’s eventual, yet postponed appearance and maintain a

contented and patient expectation of this inevitable event.

One of the religious personalities, Muhammad Hussein Kāshif al-Qitā (1877-1956), was a

leading Iraqi-Iranian Shi‘ite scholar of the time. In response to the chaotic times following

World War I, Kāshif al-Qitā argues that the present need for a Mahdi figure is to safeguard

humanity against many threats that he foresees in the future. Such threats included: 1) utter

destruction that will surely result with the threats of technological progress that will render

46

humanity’s old ways of living obsolete and irrelevant;113 2) competitive advancements in

military production that will ensure any peace agreements among ambitious nations to be short

lived,114 and 3) the possibility of hundreds of years of war as a result of improvements in

military weaponry that will surely and completely destroy the world.115 Faced with this bleak

inevitability, the author argues that, in order to maintain the continuation of human existence,

it is necessary and “obvious” that some “holy presence” with “a perfect nature” will appear to

destroy all the instruments of oppression and injustice and to unite all of humanity under the

banner of safety.116 While Kāshif al-Qitā enumerates the various advancements in technology

and weaponry and admits the rapidly modernizing process, his argument reveals no immediacy

in ameliorating this situation. Regardless of the dire circumstances that shape the environment

that the author inhabits and imagines, his outlook and understanding regarding the inevitability

of Mahdi’s appearance remains assured and informs the author’s expectation of things to

come. This expectation of the Twelfth Imam does not include any of the acceleration or urgency

concerning the advent – as I will show in later chapters – that appears and becomes prevalent

in the writings of the clerics in decades leading up to the Iranian Revolution. The author’s is a

contented and patient expectation of an assured but far off event.

The assured attitude towards the inevitability of this eventual and distant appearance,

and thus the falsity of “Mahdi-claimants,” is evident in the terminology used to describe the

113 Muhammad Hussein Kāshif al-Qitā, “Tulū-i āftāb-i sa’ādat dar qarn-i āyand-i aqlan lāzim ast,” Tazakurāt-i Diyānatī 1, no. 8, (1305/1926): 4.

114 Kāshif al-Qitā, “Tulū-i āftāb-i sa’ādat dar qarn-i āyand-i aqlan lāzim ast,” 4-5.

115 Kāshif al-Qitā, “Tulū-i āftāb-i sa’ādat dar qarn-i āyand-i aqlan lāzim ast,” 5.


47

Mahdi. This terminology is in contrast with the one used during the revolutionary period that

will be discussed in later chapters. In “The Historical Circumstances of Mahdi-claimants or the

First Cause of False Claims,” an article published in 1305/1926, another religious writer who is

simply referred to as Hussein, describes the Mahdi by using the term “the Great Guider,” as

well as the more common term “the absolute peacemaker.”117 The terminology used here is

markedly different from the terminology used in articles that will be written during the

revolutionary period, when the Mahdi is described as a “riser” and articles refer to notions such

as “the revolution of Mahdi” or “Mahdi’s universal governance.” The terms “guider” and

“peacemaker” do not imply any revolutionary activism, fervor, or immediacy. Rather the terms

fit with the author’s assured conception of a peaceful messiah whose appearance at an

unspecified distant time to guide his followers, is a certainty.

In another instance, Hussein argues that in a chaotic political world that is continuously

changing, the “Mahdi-claimants” are incapable of accomplishing the same outcome as

promised by the Mahdi’s appearance.118 The contradictory behavior and the falsity of “Mahdi-

claimants” renders them incapable of leading humanity “to the great happiness that we are

expecting from the Absolute Peacemaker and the Great Guider.”119 Indeed, the author wonders

how religions “based on falsity” can save humans from the contradictory and corrupt behavior

of “worldly politicians.”120 This comprehension of the concept of Mahdi recognizes the Twelfth

Imam as responsible for guiding people towards peace and happiness, but it stops short of





48

claiming that the Mahdi possesses any worldly attributes, such as occupying political and social

roles. Hussein does not, for example, claim the Twelfth Imam as a political leader or a

revolutionary riser, characteristics that might suggest a political or social upheaval that could

potentially facilitate his undertaking. Once again, although the Mahdi’s appearance is a

certainty for this writer, there is no assumption that this appearance can be expedited in any

way or that he can be expected at a specific time. The author’s position demonstrates the

contented patient expectation that Shi‘ites of this time possessed for an inevitable event that

was to occur at an undesignated postponed time and over which there was no control.

Similarly, Kāshif al-Qitā cites a Qur’anic verse regarding “enjoining good and forbidding

wrong.”121 The cleric interprets the verse to mean “a group of Muslims amongst you should

invite others to goodness – that is inviting them to religious beliefs and the religion of Islam –

and not to religious rules and the dos and don’ts of religion.”122 He argues that since the

occultation of the Imam of Time, “the world of Islam is shrouded in darkness,” hence the best

path to reach the intended goals of Islam is “the creation of religious circles devoid of any

political obligations.”123 He praises one such “circle or group” that has been established in the

town of Tabriz, prays for their success and continued service to the Muslim community, and

concludes his piece by praying that other pious Muslims should endeavor to follow a similar

path.124 The cleric’s encouragement that Shi‘ites focus on religious matters and avoid political

affiliations and participation while waiting for the messiah’s appearance is characteristic of the





49

patient, assured and distant view of the concept of Mahdi during this time. Kāshif al-Qitā’s trust

in this established concept of the Twelfth Imam during this time, allows him to advise his

followers and audience to refrain from political activity and trust in the promise of the Mahdi’s

appearance.

The early 1940s see an increase in the publication of Shi‘ite messianic articles that are

directed at the general Shi‘ite audience and, thus, filled with less religious jargon. In one

journal, which devoted a section to answering inquiries from readers, a reader asks that the

journal publish articles regarding Mahdism, its formation, and the eventual appearance of the

Twelfth Imam.125 Rather than comply with the request, the reader instead receives a rather

dismissive response in which he is informed that the topic of the end of time saviour and his

existence has already been addressed in many books.126 The journal advises the inquiring

reader and others “to read the book al-Mahdi by Mr. Seyed Sadr al-din Sadr and the book Islam

and Mahdism by Mr. Seyed Muhammad Bāqīr Hijāzī ... as well as the last chapter of the book,

the Household of the Prophet.”127 Readers are instructed “that the study of these books is

completely enough for their ‘mental awakening’.”128 This response exemplifies a reoccurring

assured attitude and engagement with the concept of the Mahdi that is characteristic of this

period. Indeed, even when there is a specific request and desire from the Shi‘ite audience for

more information on the messiah, the response is almost a reprimand. Instead of engaging in

125 “Ayīn-i Islām va khānandigān [Ayīn-i Islām and Readers],” Ayīn-i Islām va khānandigān,” Ayīn-i Islām 1, no. 4, (1323/1944): 5.

126 “Ayīn-i Islām va khānandigān [Ayīn-i Islām and Readers],” 5.



50

an opportunity for dialogue, the reader is told in essence that, we already have and know all we

need. What is noteworthy of the journal’s response is its satisfaction with the existing literature

on the saviour. Further, its dismissive reaction regarding the request reinforces the contented

and fulfilled attitude towards the concept of Mahdi at this time. Deep engagement with the

Twelfth Imam, or any preoccupation with his future appearance, is not a concern for the

author, who advises that sufficient engagement with the concept of Mahdi can be limited to

some common religious books and the usual repetitive information. This distant attitude

towards the messianic concept will stand in stark contrast to the later revolutionary period,

during which this concept is transformed and Mahdi becomes a figure who is discussed in a

lively and palpable manner and whose appearance is imminent.

Protection of Shi‘ism Requires Othering of Babi/Baha’is

“Othering,” as a method of defensiveness, has happened throughout Iranian history,

and it continues in contemporary times. In this section, I examine in detail how an assured and

distant view of the concept of the Mahdi, which defines the religious writings during the years

following the constitutional revolution, is used as a method of othering religious minorities,

specifically the Babi/Baha’is. Once again, this close examination will serve in contrast to the

revolutionary messianism examined in later chapters.

Whether clearly naming others or using euphemisms, from the relatively benign “self-

interested” and “false claimants,” to more openly denigrating terms, the “othering” of

minorities, particularly the Babis/Baha’is, continues to be found both in Shi‘ite writings on

seemingly unrelated topics as well as in work that directly addresses this perceived threat to

51

Shi‘ite identity. Because the othering method of defensiveness continued beyond the years

immediately following the constitutional revolution, many of the polemical articles examined in

this section were written in later years.

Among the most prolific of the religious Shi‘ite writers of this period were Sabāh

Kāzirūnī, and Nusratullāh Nūrīyānī the concessionaire and chief editor of Āyīn-i Islām. This

journal stood as one of the most important and influential politico-religious journals of the early

1940s. The content of this journal reveals the attitudes and sentiments of this distant Mahdist

period of time. One topic that appears in many of the writings is the importance of the

continued performance of Shi‘ites’ duties and responsibilities during the time of the

occultation. As discussed previously, this patient performance of duties, without an imminent

expectation of the Twelfth Imam, negates the Babi/Baha’i claim that the Mahdi has already

arrived and protects the Shi‘ite identity from influence by ‘others.’

Shi‘ites are discouraged from increasingly anticipating the appearance of the Imam of

Time in order to resolve their hardships. For example, in Nūrīānī’s article “Mīlād-i Hazrat-i

Qāim,” Shi‘ites are urged to resist postponing their worldly affairs “to the time of the

appearance” and are chastised for considering Mahdi’s absence as a time of uncertainty and

wandering.129 Because Nūrīyānī believes that these assumptions give more opportunity to

“false claimants” of Mahdihood.130 He stresses that Shi‘ites should obey and perform their

duties while anticipating the Twelfth Imam, and the fact that is still in his occultation does not

129 Nusratullāh Nūrīyānī, “Mīlād-i Hazrat-i Qāim [The Birthday of His Holiness the Riser],” Ayīn-i Islām 1, no. 21 (1323/1944): 1.

130 Nūrīyānī, “Mīlād-i Hazrat-i Qāim [The Birthday of His Holiness the Riser],” 1.

52

negate the performance of duties.131 The patient attitude toward a faraway conception of

Mahdi’s appearance serves to affirm and strengthen the Shi‘ites’ belief that he has not

appeared. Their belief is a direct negation of the Babi/Baha’i views and rejects the messiah’s

arrival. This belief confirms the “validity” of the Shi‘ites’ views and dismisses any uncertainty

regarding a distant Mahdi. This postponed Shi‘ite messianic period will contrast significantly

with the revolutionary messianic period in which discourse on the imminent appearance and

uprising is widespread, fueled by exciting environments, events and moods, and an

exceptionally hopeful future.

The event of the birthday of the Twelfth Imam132 is one of the main occasions when the

Mahdi is mentioned and discussed during this time. In almost every case, religious writers use

this occasion to divert attention to the threat of Babis/Baha’is and find ample excuse to

discredit, denigrate, and attack. In his short piece written for the occasion, Nūrīyānī explains

that God has assigned a saviour who is currently hidden, and “when the world is engulfed with

oppression and injustice…God’s peacemaker will rise to save humanity and will envelope

society with justice, security and comfort.”133 Nūrīyānī explains that when God wills to repair

the world, He will make the Imam appear, and this repair will be done at his [Mahdi] hands.134

Nūrīyānī argues that while the appearance “is a certain fact, the time of the appearance is not

clear, not even for the Imam of Time. Therefore, those who specify a time for the appearance


132 The birthday of the Twelfth Imam is historically celebrated by Twelver Shi‘ites on the fifth of Sha’bān, which is the eight month of the Islamic calendar.



53

are liars and self-interested, because no one aside from God is knowledgeable of this

information.”135 The author’s statement is significant as it demonstrates Shi‘ite clerics tactics to

discredit Babis/Baha’is by reminding their audience that Mahdi remains hidden and his arrival

can only be achieved through God’s will.

In the “Confessions of Seyed Ali Muhammad known as Bab,” Sabāh Kāzirūnī denounces

the validity of Babi and Baha’i claims and leadership by discrediting their leaders. Kāzirūnī

addresses his article to the “common Babis, Azalis and Baha’is,” in the hope that he can return

them to the right path, which he believes to be Twelver Shi‘ism.136 Bab’s confessions are

important because the Babis considered him the anticipated saviour, and the Azalis and Baha’is

considered him “the annunciator” of their respective leaders.137 Kāzirūnī, however, argues that

the Bab has outright denounced himself, through his confessions, and as such had revealed the

falsity of the claim of these three sects.138 He asserts, “religion-creators and propagators

actively try to hide these straightforward confessions from people, so that they can continue to

mislead people into their faith, and for their own gain and survival.”139 By reiterating his own

arguments made in his previous articles, Kāzirūnī uses them as valid proof of the authenticity of

the confessions made by the Bab. Therefore, Kāzirūnī claims to prove the invalidity of the three


136 Sabāh Kāzirūnī, “Aqārīr-i Seyed Ali Muhammad Ma’rūf bi Bāb [the Confessions of Seyed Ali Muhammad known as Bāb],” Ayīn-i Islām, no. 52, (1323/1945): 29.

137 Kāzirūnī, “Aqārīr-i Seyed Ali Muhammad Ma’rūf bi Bāb [the Confessions of Seyed Ali Muhammad known as Bāb],” 29.



54

religions that he considers as main rivals and enemies of Shi‘ite Islam. Kāzirūnī also elaborately

describes the “contradictory hallucinations” and even “immoral” religious rulings of the Bab,

such as the Bab’s “permission of illicit relationships.”140 He concludes that the Bab did not have

“acumen and capacity and as a result of austerity under the sun and other hardships, he had

lost his mind and spirit.”141 Kāzirūnī ends the article by asking both those who have already

fallen victim to these propagandas and those for whom doubts have been created to contact

him, so that he can assist them in discarding the doubts.142 Kāzirūnī’s article differs from others

in a telling manner, because the audience of the article is “the other,” Babis/Baha’is. While

Kāzirūnī’s concern remains his preoccupation with the present condition and immediate

struggles against the perceived threat to Shi‘ism, the author is calling for his audience to change

their views rather than accept the false Mahdi in whom they have been “duped” to believe. For

Shi‘ite readers, of course, this article would serve to support and validate their beliefs.

In a short article titled, “We are Seeking a Peacemaker that all People are also Waiting

for Him,” marking the birthday of the Twelfth Imam, Nūrīyānī congratulates Shi‘ites on the

“happy birth of the saviour and leader of humankind,” and dedicates his article to “the general

anticipators of his holy steps.” 143 He bestows his writing to Shi‘ite readers whom he believes

wish for the appearance of the “real peacemaker,” given their trust in the Mahdi to save




143 Nusratullāh Nūrīyānī, “Jūyāyih Muslihī Hastīm kah Hamah ahl-i ‘ālam ham intīzār-i Oū rā dārand [We are Seeking a Peacemaker that all Peoples are also Waiting for Him],” Ayīn-i Islām, no. 11 (1327/1948): 2.

55

humanity from the “whirlpool of abjection and hardship.”144 Repeating similar themes from his

own articles and those of other Shi‘ite writers, Nūrīyānī starts by stating the “obvious” to his

readers: “that almost all societies of the world – and not only Muslims or Shi‘ites – are

anticipating the appearance of a peacemaker.”145 He proceeds to argue that while others are

anticipating “an anonymous and incognito peacemaker,” the Twelver Shi‘ites, “who the

accuracy and authenticity of their logical religious views and beliefs has been proven by men of

understanding and research,” have not lost the straight path and do not seek an unknown

person.146 Nūrīānī’s article is similar to other religious literature of his time. He does not

elaborate on what the “logical views and beliefs” he discusses might be, on the identity of the

“men of reason” he mentions, or on the specifics of their arguments.

During the patient and assured period, Shi‘ite authors’ assertions and arguments are not

in-depth and are not accompanied by strong proof as represented by the insufficient reasoning

provided by Nūrīānī. These authors are satisfied with merely invoking Shi‘ite religious belief as

the only necessary support for their arguments. Also, in a manner similar to other religious

writers of the time, Nūrīyānī resorts to “othering” rival minority religious groups when he draws

on the familiar theme of Mahdi-impersonators (Mahdī-namaha). He maintains that history

books, especially Islamic ones, are full of references to “false” Mahdis, “whose existence

144 Nūrīyānī, “Jūyāyih Muslihī Hastīm kah Hamah ahl-i ‘ālam ham intīzār-i Oū rā dārand [We are Seeking a Peacemaker that all Peoples are also Waiting for Him],” 2.



56

created immeasurable hardship for the people of the world, especially Muslims.”147 He further

argues that Mahdi-impersonators and their followers attempted, in every manner possible, to

take advantage of the situation by claiming Mahdihood, prophethood and even divinity, in

order to achieve their ambitions of pomp, wealth and grandeur.148

Nūrīyānī concludes by arguing that since humans are still living in a world filled with

oppression and injustice, then it is “obvious the promised Mahdi and the agreed peacemaker

has not appeared yet,” and humankind are still anticipating his appearance while enduring

severe hardships.149 In this manner, the author is denying the truth of the Baha’i claim that the

messiah has appeared already. Yet at the same time, and again in a manner similar to many

other religious literature of this period, no urgency for action can be detected in Nūrīyānī’s

assertions. For example, the author does not provide any recommendations, proposals, or

advice that might suggest the need for the saviour’s appearance to be expedited or imminent.

This lack of urgency and assured acceptance of the circumstances about the appearance

signifies a far and distant understanding of the concept of Mahdi that was prevalent during this

era.

In another article for the occasion of the birthday of the Twelfth Imam, Nūrīyānī

describes the view of Twelver Shi‘ites regarding the figure of Mahdi and the role he will play in

the Shi‘ite community and the wider world upon his appearance. In Nūrīānī’s description of this




57

role, the messiah is tasked with saving humanity and covering the earth with justice at a time

when the world is engulfed with injustice and oppression.150 Nūrīyānī cites his own

explanations, using the Shi‘ite belief in the concept of a postponed messiah who is yet to

appear, as evidence for the erroneousness of Mahdi-claimants. In Nūrīānī’s explanation, the

manner in which the Babis/Baha’is have “taken advantage” of this concept “exposes the falsity

of Babi/Baha’i beliefs.”151 He implies that despite the arrival of this claimed “Mahdi,” none of

the promised reforms and missions of the Twelfth Imam have yet been accomplished.152

Nūrīyānī argues that the fact that the world is still steeped in chaos is testament to the

falseness of the Mahdi-claimants.153 Nūrīyānī claims that he does not wish to focus on the topic

of the Twelfth Imam but, rather, on a “bunch of foreign adventurers who, like leeches, have

gripped our society and are sucking the blood of naïve people with their poisonous

propaganda.”154 This statement not only reveals differing conflicting religious views, but also

sheds light on the political polemics and ramifications during this time.

It is significant that Nūrīyānī admits that he does not want to focus on the topic of the

Mahdi despite the article being dedicated to the birthday of the Twelfth Imam. Instead, he uses

this opportunity to vilify the appointed “other” of the Shi‘ites by denouncing them as foreigners

150 Nusratullāh Nūrīyānī, “Pānzdahum-i shabān yā rūz-i vilādat-i Imām Zamān [The Fifteenth of Sha’bān or the Birthday of the Imam of Time],” Ayīn-i Islām 4, no. 11 (1326/1947): 1.

151 Nūrīyānī, “Pānzdahum-i shabān yā rūz-i vilādat-i Imām Zamān [The Fifteenth of Sha’bān or the Birthday of the Imam of Time],” 1.




58

who poison society and young Iranians. Nūrīyānī further blames the Babis/Baha’is of “attracting

naïve young Persians to lecherous activities with their banquets and parties,”155 effectively

condemning the “other” of distancing “impressionable” segments of society from their Shi‘ite

values. This sentiment is reflective of scholar Mina Yazdani’s argument when she maintains that

accusations of Babi/Baha’i cooperation with imperialist powers were meant to create schisms

in Shi‘ite Islam.156 Considering that the religion of Shi‘ism was regarded as the main source of

national solidarity among Iranians,157 this accusation against Babis/Baha’is denounces them as

dangerous traitors of the whole Iranian nation. Similarly, we see this method of argumentation

here, where Nūrīyānī asserts that these foreigners are dispossessing the Shi‘ites of “their faith,

spirituality, patriotism and love of monarchy, which leads to the destruction of Iran.”158

Noteworthy in the religious discourse of Shi‘ite writers during this period, is the fact that

“Iranian patriotism” and “Iranian monarchy” are concepts that are valued and upheld even by

religious personalities. However, a major transformation will be discerned during the

revolutionary era, where values of Iranian patriotism and respect for the monarchy are

replaced by “Mahdi’s revolution” and “Mahdi’s universal government.” During this postponed

messianic period, Nūrīyānī excuses the government’s inactivity and indifference towards the

exploits of the foreigners he finds so threatening, by merely stating that the government “does

not have enough time to prevent their actions,” and it is only in God’s hands to shame the


156 Mina Yazdani, “Anti-Baha’i Polemics and Historiography,” The Baha’i Studies Review 17, no. 1 (2011): 95.

157 Yazdani, “Anti-Baha’i Polemics and Historiography,” 95.


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foreigners.159 He displays a forgiving and complacent attitude towards the ruling Pahlavi

establishment of the time. Nūrīyānī is representative of many Shi‘ite writers who during this

time, are preoccupied with cooperating with the Pahlavi state. Yet again, the patient and

assured characteristics that define this distant Mahdist era are evident in the manner in which

Nūrīyānī expresses the complete powerlessness of pious Shi‘ites in the face of “enemies.” He

does not suggest any means or measures to combat or alleviate this situation. Nūrīyānī merely

shames the enemies and presents God as the only entity capable of action against enemies of

Shi‘ism. He ends the article by congratulating Shi‘ites on the birth of the Twelfth Imam and

prays that God sends the peacemaker of humanity as soon as possible to entrust the world to

his endless compassion and mercy.160 Effectively, Nūrīyānī merely encourages Shi‘ite readers to

trust that God will send the Mahdi to rectify their existing problems.

Nūrīyānī concludes that he has written this article specifically for the occasion and

celebration of the Twelfth Imam’s birth. In reality, however, the majority of the article is

dedicated to defending the concept of the Mahdi as a religious figure. Nūrīyānī spends most of

the article arguing to prove the existence of the Hidden Imam, discussing the Mahdi’s

usefulness in contemporary times and especially, denouncing the Mahdi’s detractors and

enemies. He devotes only a short paragraph at the end of his piece to congratulating the Shi‘ite

readers and celebrating the Twelfth Imam’s birth on this auspicious day. The content of this

piece demonstrates the disproportionate imbalance between the justifying and defensive



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arguments for the concept of the Mahdi, versus congratulatory sentiments for the occasion of

his birth. In addition, it demonstrates their compulsive effort in continuously defending their

own views, as well as discrediting and attacking those who threaten their Shi‘ite identity and

values.

“Othering” takes the form of fiction in “Yiksad va dah Hikāyat: Hikāyat-i Sad va Sī”

published in Āyīn-i Islām, which features three short stories that are, we are told, penned by a

“former Baha’i.”161 We are informed that Abdulhussein Āyatī (1881 - 1952) was a former

promulgator of the Baha’i religion, but had since returned to Shi‘ism and had begun to actively

refute his former beliefs.162 “The Three Ignorants” tells the tale of three villagers who have

never stepped out of their small village and are absolutely ignorant of the outside world;163

“The Three Idiots” is about three characters who claimed prophethood;164 and “The Followers”

is a story that brings together the “three fools, the three idiots and the three deceivers”165 of

the previous stories. In essence, Āyatī uses these metaphorical stories, that are filled with

symbolism and contain a moral story, to identify the characters as those who claimed to either

be closely affiliated with the Twelfth Imam or to have impersonated him. One of the characters

is identified as Baha’ullāh, the founder of the Baha’i faith. Āyatī concludes that people who

161 Abdulhussein Āyatī, “Yiksad va dah Hikāyat: Hikāyat-i Sad va Sī [One Hundred and One Stories: One Hundred and Thirtieth Story],” Āyīn-i Islām 6, no. 24 (20 Ābān 1328/11 November 1949): 11.

162 Āyatī, “Yiksad va dah Hikāyat: Hikāyat-i Sad va Sī [One Hundred and One Stories: One Hundred and Thirtieth Story],” 11.




61

believe “fools,” in spite of the fools’ lies and contradictions, and people who follow Mahdi-

impersonators are “naïve sheep,”166 and “flocks, ignorants, and idiots have the same

mentality.”167 The stories, the culmination of which is an anti-Mahdi-impersonator message,

highlight the need for a person who has returned to Islam to prove his piety by resorting to

lambasting his former faith and belief. In essence, a person returning to Islam must participate

in othering practices in order to be proven and accepted as a devout Shi‘ite.

“The Role of Mahdism in the Political Scene,” the final article that I examine in this

chapter, is engrossed in providing a historical justification for the existence and validity of the

Twelfth Imam. In addition, the article is significant in that, in contrast to most of the articles I

examine, especially articles detailing a historical narrative, this article appears to be well

researched and referenced.

The author, identified only by his initials, primarily details the political history of early

Islam. He argues that the majority of caliphs and rulers of early Islamic period around the time

of the Umayyad claimed to be the Mahdi, and almost each one of them provided a type of

prophetic hadith to justify their claim.168 He also briefly mentions two similar “fake” Mahdis:

one that emerged in Sudan whose followers still claim that he is not dead, and a second one

that emerged more recently in Iran.169 According to Sh. the Bab first emerged in Shiraz and



168 S. J. Sh., “Naqsh-i Mahdaviat dar Sahniy-i Siyāsat [The Role of Mahdism in the Political Scene],” Nāmiy-i Furūgh-i Ilm, no. 3 (Khurdād 1329/May 1950): 23.

169 Sh., “Naqsh-i Mahdaviat dar Sahniy-i Siyāsat [The Role of Mahdism in the Political Scene],” 23.

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after his death, his followers claimed he had merely ascended to heaven.170 Next the author

jumps into analyzing his contemporary times and relates that Mirzā Hussein Ali Nūrī also

claimed “false Mahdism,” and his followers, “hold its trusteeship and now the title of Mahdism

is altered and a new name has replaced it,”171 which he states to be the Baha’i faith. Sh.

concludes by arguing that, “since false Mahdism began and was spread by the Iranians, we now

witness that after eleven centuries and making its round around the world, this claim has

resurfaced yet again in Iran.”172 In his concluding remarks Sh. ends the article by maintaining

that “today this sect is managed by Shoqi Effendi Rabbani and it is one of the most important

propagation tools of foreign policy in Iran.”173 The author abruptly ends the article and does not

elaborate on this political allegation. Such accusations that religious leaders of minority

religions collude and facilitate foreign intrusion in Iran’s decision-making and policies, serve as

one of the main methods of alienating and othering Baha’i citizens. In addition, by providing a

lengthy history of repetitive instances of Mahdis “appearing” throughout the Islamic history,

these religious writers want to assert the falsity of these other minority faiths. This

historiography supports my argument that the actions and discourse of Shi‘ite religious writers

of this postponed messianic period effectively displayed a belief of a far removed saviour figure

who was in abeyance, and whose appearance was anything short of imminent and

revolutionary.





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Conclusion

During early twentieth century, Iranian clerics and Islamic intellectuals built a pragmatic-

legalistic framework into the Iranian constitution by perceiving and defending the Mahdi as a

distant and non-imminent redeemer. This action was a two-fold win for the clerics who could

discursively maintain command of the status quo relationship between the constitution and the

saviour insofar as the latter would not be contingent on the arrival of the former, but also to

ensure that their ideological opponents and their troubling fixation on the Twelfth Imam would

be unable to ascend, gain traction, and have a platform to have a voice in this newly emerging

system of governance. The constitutional revolution in Iran of 1906 - 1911 was a dramatic

outcome of massive social and political mobilization. The people who rose to prominence

during the uprisings were a group of pragmatic legalist clerics who were determined to ensure

that constitutional and legal frameworks, their implementation and emergence in the here and

now were guided by shari’a. This clerical focus differs markedly from the same group’s focus in

later decades on bringing about the appearance of the person of the Mahdi as a socially and

politically emancipative necessity.

Preoccupation with the present conditionality of the constitutional, legal, and discursive

emergence and its immediate struggles were foregrounded and privileged by the Shi‘ite clerics

as they simultaneously expressed an understanding of Mahdism that was waiting in a distant

temporality, and, thus, whose arrival was held in abeyance and decidedly non-imminent. When

it did focus on the Twelfth Imam, clerical discourse was either engrossed in providing historical

and logical justifications for the existence and validity of the Mahdi, or working to undermine

and put into disrepute the main oppositions and enemies of the clerics, the “Mahdi-

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impersonators” and their competing religious beliefs and identities. The Twelfth Imam’s

assured appearance was uncontested in this discourse. The clerics imputed significant social

and political credence to a Mahdi that resided in a postponed and non-imminent temporality

and sustained their conflict and ‘othering’ of the Babi/Baha’i movements.

The heart of this analysis are Chapters Three and Four which examine the transition that

took place in the discursive tradition of this clerical group: clerical discourse underwent a

marked ideational transformation that moved from building a social and political project

backdropped by an abeyant messiah to building a project that was actively foregrounding and

celebrating a revolutionary Mahdi whose time had come. The following chapters unpack

further the context for this transition period by outlining and examining the global and internal

influences that begin to affect and shape the Twelver messianic identity. One result of these

influences is a shift in this distant understanding of the concept of the Mahdi to an ardent,

active and imminent outlook in which believers perceive and feel the victory and revolution of a

Mahdi who will soon come to realization.

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Chapter 3 – Critiquing Predestinarianism

Introduction

Shi‘ite clerics’ writings in the period immediately following the constitutional revolution

of 1906 - 1911 rendered the Mahdi as a distant figure and this distance usefully served their

‘othering’ of opponents, particularly the Babis/Baha’is. By the 1970s, however, the Mahdi is an

imminent and revolutionary figure symbolizing hope and justice for the future. What happened

to bring about this dramatic and significant shift? One very important factor that prompted this

shift was that several prominent Intelligentsia174 personalities such as Hussein Kāzimzādah

Irānshahr, Ahmad Kasravī and Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah began to critique predestination

understandings in Islam and Shi‘ism and believed religion to be conducive for the comfort of

people in this world in the here and now where the focus would be on finding salvation in this

life and not necessarily on finding salvation at the end of time.

The clerical establishment sought to reclaim the narrative about the importance of

predestination by re-injecting the messiah concept with a new and decidedly compelling

importance as the redeemer to whom Shi‘ites must turn, to help bring about a salvational end

of time. Contestation, which is another way of saying that a politics of vying discursive pre-

eminence, drove the transformation of the Mahdi as a religious signifier and renewed his

significance for social and political order. From this period of discursive contestation and

counter-contestation, a politics of competing intellectual accounts produces a series of

revolutionary necessary conditions to create a utopian and purposeful end of time, one of

174 Similar to Mangol Bayat (1991) I use this term in its broadest possible sense.

66

which is that the Mahdi must no longer be considered distant and abeyant, but present and

revolutionary.

Chapters Three and Four, which function as a pair in dialogue with one another and

form the transitional period, examine this question. In Chapter Three, I chart rising divergent

factors, consisting of several intelligentsia – including nationalists, secularists, reformists and

leftists175 that independently seem to criticize and dismiss religious beliefs within the Iranian

society. The direct criticisms made by these factors necessitate a response from the religious

Shi‘ites, and in Chapter Four, I examine this response and rebuttal.

In the early 1940’s, both direct and indirect influences and challenges affected Iranian

society, culture, and religion and, ultimately, brought about a shift in the concept of the Mahdi.

Stephanie Cronin asserts that at the beginning of the twentieth century, social-democratic ideas

made rapid headway, first among Iranians educated in Europe, and then in Iran itself.176

Indirect challenges and influences included the notion of modernity177 in the shape of

education and lifestyle, scientific advancements, and secular ideologies and modes of life.

Direct challenges took the form of criticisms of religion by emerging influential Iranian thinkers:

175 The leftists – as they are more commonly and broadly identified in contemporary Iranian discourse – could be either described as socialists, communists, Marxists or a myriad of these terms. These groups continuously branched off, changed names, and direction. Therefore, it is difficult to concretely identify and categorize them or identify a certain ideology with a specific group. However, for the purposes of clarity, I will refer to their ideology and influence collectively as the “leftists,” unless otherwise identified by their own writings or by their detractors. For a more detailed history of these groups refer to Maxime Rodinson’s Marxism and the Muslim World, Asef Bayat’s “Shari'ati and Marx: A Critique of an "Islamic" Critique of Marxism," Sepehr Zabih’s Communist Movement in Iran, and Reza Ghods’ "The Iranian Communist Movement under Reza Shah."

176 Stephanie Cronin, "The Left in Iran: Illusion and Disillusion: Review Article," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 3 (2000): 231.

177 The concept of modernity employed in this project is the one perceived by the religious groups which equates modernity with the secularization of society and the fading away of the importance of religion in society.

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the nationalists, the secularists, the reformists and the leftists. For the sake of focus and clarity,

this chapter closely examines these direct challenges which are representative written works by

the above critics of Shi‘ism, who challenged the Shi‘ite religious clerics into action and propelled

them to create a new understanding of the Mahdi, whose culmination will be discussed in

Chapter Five.

I examine criticisms made by Hussein Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, whose argument about the

rise of an Iranian hero as saviour represents the prevailing nationalist polemics; Ahmad Kasravī

examines the “Myth of Mahdīgarī” and represents the secularist polemics; Mīrzā Rizā Qulī

Sharī‘at Sangalajī, whose arguments for religious reform from within Islam represent the

reformist polemics as well as Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah whose critical work pushed forth stronger

reformist ideas, and Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn, an anonymously published piece that

represents the leftist polemics.

The coup-d’état of Rizā Shah in 1921 had effectively ended the pragmatic constitutional

era and brought a modernizing and authoritarian rule to Iran. Critical thinkers began to

recognize that religious figures and groups no longer believed in Shi‘ism’s cooperation and

harmonization with the government. Kasravī and other critical voices comprehended that the

relationship between the religious groups and the government was no longer a pragmatic

cooperation, because of the religious groups’ constant complaint against the state and lack of

collaboration between the two. Furthermore, Sajjad Rizvi states that a normative concept of

authority in Shi‘ism argues that only the Twelfth Imam holds legitimate authority and all

obedience, allegiance and devotion are owed to him; therefore, all other claims to authority

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were not divinely mandated and hence illegitimate.178 This rejection of all other authority and

power, consequently meant the eventual detachment and disconnection of the religious

audience with the power-holders. The challengers of this religious idea were critical of this

particular understanding of Shi‘ite Islam that had become prevalent during this time which led

to discord and division in society.

These critical voices argued that the Shi‘ite religion and its advocates encouraged non-

cooperation with the state government which led to the corruption and deterioration of the

Iranian society and nation. They believed that the religious forces’ attitude and belief in a

predestinarian human nature, and especially belief in the emancipatory nature of the Mahdi’s

appearance was the main cause of the ruin and downfall of Iranian culture and society. These

critics of Shi‘ite religion and clerics wanted to rationalize religion by arguing that humans had

the capacity for free will and wanted them to think critically about their religion and its beliefs.

Brief Historical Context of the Intelligentsia’s Polemics

Rizā Shah’s autocratic rule followed the politically chaotic and unsuccessful

constitutional revolution (1906 - 1911). The Shah’s reforms of the educational system and his

push for modernization and secularization of the Iranian society increased the advancement of

secular, nationalist and progressive organizations, such as the Revival party, and publications,

including the journals Irānshahr, Farangistān, and Āyandah.179 As part of a growing western-

178 Rizvi, “Authority in Absence,” 209.

179 Mohammad Amini, “Kasravi, Aḥmad v. as Social and Religious Reformer,” Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. XVI, Fasc. 1, p. 97-99; available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kasravi-ahmad-v (accessed 27 June 2019) & Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 123.

69

educated population, the founders and members of these organizations and publications

eagerly worked to implement reforms based on their newfound knowledge and desire for

progress and advancement of Iran. Religious groups, however, perceived these secular

aspirations as attacks on Shi‘ism, Islam, and core religious beliefs. Works by Ahmad Kasravī and

Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah, for example, called for the separation of religion from politics and the

expansion of educational facilities for all, including women,180 possibilities that were anathema

to prevailing Shi‘ite practices and beliefs. That some of the secular reformist critics had once

been Shi‘ite clerics particularly upset and disconcerted religious groups.

Religious groups feared the influence of these intelligentsia both on Shi‘ite Iranian

society in general and on Iranian youth in particular. They were right to be concerned, for the

era marked the triumph of secularist trends and highlighted the shrinking of clerical authority in

society.181 As more youth were becoming educated and sought to study abroad, these religious

groups felt their beliefs and values were increasingly questioned based on new rational

methods of thinking and felt the pressing need to defend and preserve their ideals and

principles.

Adversarial ideological groups whose polemics threatened Shi‘ite clerics’ beliefs include

the national progressives who promoted the idea of a new and progressive Iran [Irān-i Nuvin]

that would lead to social and educational advancement and progress and is represented in this

chapter by Hussein Kāzimzādah Irānshahr; the secularists who wished to modernize Iran and

Shi‘ism and are represented in this chapter by Ahmad Kasravī, an independent critical voice of


181 Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution, 10.

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secularists, and his controversial book Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad [Read and Judge] (c.

1323/1945); the reformists, who wanted to see some reform to the religion and mostly were

critical of the superstitious practices and frills that they believed had attached themselves to

the pure religion are represented in this chapter by Mīrzā Rizā Qulī Sharī‘at Sangalajī; similarly,

Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah is also a reformist who proposed varied versions of religious

reformation with the goal of ridding religion of superstition and authored one of the first

writings critical of some Shi‘ite practices, Asrār-i Hizār Sālah [Thousand Years Old Secrets] (c.

1322/1943); Another group represented here by the allegedly “communist”-publication

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn [Guardians of Charm and Magic] (c. 1331/1952), were those who

followed some type of socialist or leftist ideals and were preoccupied with the idea of justice

and equality, as well as freeing the society from religion.

During this time, the Pahlavis were able to effectively purge the clerics from the

judiciary and education, and succeeded in establishing their legitimacy on the pre-Islamic past

and in the process, created a secular national identity, by drawing on pre-Islamic resources that

the intellectuals had developed, and therefore an anti-Islamic sentiment was cultivated among

Iranians.182 During this “modern dictatorship,” Shi‘ite clerics believed that increasingly secular

educated intellectuals negatively influenced the social, political and cultural atmosphere of the

Iranian society against the clergy.183 At the turn of the century in Iran, increasingly progressive

forms of education were represented through the works of the abovementioned intellectuals in

which they criticized the non-rational nature of Shi‘ite thinking and the role of the clerics in

182 Fozi, "Neo-Iranian Nationalism,” 248.

183 Ja‘farīyān, Jaryānhā va sāzmānhā-yi mazhabī-sīyāsī-i Irān, 15.

71

perpetuating a non-cooperative attitude with the government. These views eventually created

an atmosphere for change that was instrumental in refocusing and redirecting religious views,

including the concept of the Mahdi. Shi‘ites believe that “westernized modernizers” comprising

different groups and ideologies, such as the nationalist progressives, secularists, “Marxists,”

“communists,” and others had one common view and goal – they regarded Islam and Shi‘ism as

one of the main causes of Iran’s backwardness and were united in their struggle against it.184

Tavakoli-Targhi argues that, in fact, these intellectuals’ criticism of the clerical establishment

and established religious beliefs lay the groundwork for the novel rebuilding of religious

thought and action that emerged in later years.185

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr and the Rise of the Iranian Hero as Saviour

Many thinkers and writers of Iran’s turn-of-the-century historical narrative belong in the

liberal progressive category, including Hussein Kāzimzādah Irānshahr (d. 1962), Ahmad Farhād

(d. 1971), Habibullāh Pūr Rizā (b. 1900), Sādiq Rizāzādah Shafaq (d. 1971) and Seyed Hassan

Taqīzādah (d. 1970). For the purposes of this dissertation, I will focus on one such liberal

progressive and a predecessor to the other personalities discussed and examined in this

chapter, Hussein Kāzimzādah Irānshahr (1884 - 1962). Kāzimzādah Irānshahr was considered

“an ardent Iranian nationalist” and a journal publisher whose extensive writings on political,

religious and educational topics appeared in his journals Kāvah and, perhaps best known,


185 Tavakoli-Targhi, “Tajaddud-i ikhtirā‘ī, tamaddun-i ‘āriyatī, va inqilāb-i rawhānī,” 207.

72

Irānshahr,186 published in Germany from 1922 to 1927. Kāzimzādah Irānshahr studied law in

Belgium and France, and he taught and worked in Cambridge and Berlin.187 Because of Iran’s

precarious political situation, he chose Berlin as the place from which to co-published Kāvah

and, in 1922, founded Irānshahr.188 Tavakoli-Targhi calls Kāzimzādah Irānshahr a pioneer of

Iranian cultural ijtihad and argues that he played a pivotal role in “future planning” and

research of modernity.189 During his retirement, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr established a spiritual

school of thought in Switzerland, where he lived the rest of his life surrounded by his

followers.190

Widely distributed in Iran, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s journal, Irānshahr’s progressive

nationalist inclination is evident by the topics it covered. Abrahamian maintains that the

majority of articles in Irānshahr held a favorable view of pre-Islamic Iran, and the content

centered around the importance of secular and public education, the need to improve women’s

status, and modern and western technology and thought.191 Tavakoli-Targhi argues that

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr considered the “sentiment of national pride” to be the essential

foundation of renewal and modernity.192 In the early decades of the 20th century, the character

of Kāvah was an established national icon, and symbolized the rebellion of the Iranian national

186 Jamshid Behnam, “Irānšahr, Hosayn Kāẓemzāda,” Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. XIII, Fasc. 5, pp. 537-539; available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iransahr-hosayn-kazemzada (accessed 27 June 2019).

187 Behnam, “Irānšahr”

188 Behnam, “Irānšahr


190 Behnam, “Irānšahr”



73

and progressive movements. Any invocation of the name “Kāvah” by nationalists such as

Muhammad Hussein Furūqi (d. 1907) and Mirzā Fath Ali Akhūndzādah (d. 1878) sent a

“deliberate political message” for national uprising against foreign powers and a corrupt

monarchy.193 Published from 1916 - 1922, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s nationalist newspaper

Kāvah, the masthead of which “featured an engraving of Kāva arousing the people and raising

the banner of rebellion,”194 serves as an example of “appropriation” and “reliance on secular

icons.”195

Shi‘ite clerics felt that journals such as Kāvah, Irānshahr and other similar journals

cultivated a prevalent recurring theme that was an anti-Islamic, anti-clerical and anti-religious

stance.196 In his article “Āyandah Bashar [The Future of Humanity],” published some years after

WWI, for example, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr presents a miserable and despondent image of a

world filled with “carnage, pillage … revolutions, political and economic chaos,” and he portrays

the twentieth century as one of the worst times in history.197 Arguing that the establishment of

many international organizations and meetings, the publication of statements, and holding

prayer sessions had not alleviated any of the world’s problems,198 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr

questions the cause of this great worldly chaos and wonders “what momentous event is to

193 Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 148.

194 “Kāva Newspaper,” Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. XVI, Fasc. 2, pp. 132-35; available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kava (accessed 20 April 2017).

195 Kashani-Sabet, Frontier Fictions, 148.


197 Hussein Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, “Āyandah Bashar,” Irānshahr 4, no. 4 (1 Tīr 1305/23 June 1926): 193-194.

198 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, “Āyandah,” 194.

74

appear?”199 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr asserts that while religious teachings and clerics

continuously and unsuccessfully warn people to mend their sinful ways, he considers these

current times as “divine wrath.”200 He argues that in addition to the failure of international

organizations to solve the world’s problems, the belief in the “return and appearance of a

promised Messiah [that] is found in [a] majority of religions,”201 also failed as a method by

which to change humanity for the better.202

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr continues to explain that many “claimants of messianism” have

appeared around the world and created organizations and followers for themselves and claim

the “appearance of a saviour … a spiritual teacher or a teacher of humanity ... a religious father

or elder brother.”203 In effect, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr not only reduces Shi‘ism to a generic

religion with a stereotypical Messiah, he also criticizes Shi‘ism for its failure to guide humanity

to the straight path. His emphasis is on delegitimizing Shi‘ism by reducing the importance of the

central figure of Shi‘ite thought, the Mahdi, with the intended consequence of creating

skepticism amongst Shi‘ites and creating doubt in the minds of those believers who were

anticipating the Mahdi and his deliverance.

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr presents an optimistic outlook for his audience in which he

believes humanity has a “bright future,” albeit with difficult conditions that he believes are the


200 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, “Āyandah,” 197-198.




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“result of excesses and extremes.”204 In order to achieve this bright future, he stresses that

humans need to brave the current situation, perform their responsibilities, avoid these

extremes, and “consider the laws of progress and evolution.”205 In Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s

argument, humans have the responsibility of guiding themselves through these tumultuous

times because they have many qualities that have not been fully utilized, such as the power of

thought, which can enable them to achieve this feat.206 By defeating ignorance and replacing it

with science and education, especially accompanied with morality and virtue,207 humans

become not only capable of achieving a blissful utopic future, but also solely responsible for

bringing about this future through their faculties of willpower and thought.208

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s belief that humans are solely responsible for and capable of

bringing about their own future happiness and wellbeing, negates the Shi‘ite notion of the

Mahdi. With that negation, he also removes the concomitant requirement that Shi‘ite believers

anticipate a heavenly and otherworldly being – as well as the requirement that they perform

religious rituals and religious duties. Perhaps most threateningly to the Shi‘ite clerics,

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s argument eliminates the need for clerics altogether. His message to his

audience and the Iranians at large advocates for a self-fulfilling ability to achieve happiness and

well-being, which is ultimately a direct contradiction of the very role of clerics, who would have

otherwise facilitated and accomplished the performance of duties.




207 Hussein Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, “Āyandah Bashar,” Irānshahr 4, no. 6 (1 Shahrīvar 1305/24 August 1926): 326.


76

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr advances his view by appropriating the legend of the Iranian

national hero, Kāvah the blacksmith. Kāvah rebelled against the cruel ruler Zahhāk, who, to

satisfy the two snakes growing on his shoulders, would daily feed them the brains of two young

men. Employing the terminology of this Iranian national hero, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr asserts

that it is the responsibility of each Iranian to become “an iron-clawed Kāvah” and rebel against

their own personal, carnal and immoral Zahhāks.209 Kāvah symbolizes humans’ rational thought

and free will. Kāzimzādah Irānshahr believes that all humans have a personal internal Kāvah to

fight for them and save them, therefore they do not need an external figure such as Mahdi as a

saviour. Just as the Shi‘ite clerics described humanity anticipating an expected saviour in the

form of the Mahdi, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr essentially describes humanity anticipating an

awaited saviour in the form of Kāvah, the Iranian national and revolutionary hero, who here

appropriates the characteristics and responsibilities of the Mahdi. In essence, at least in the

eyes of religious groups, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr replaces the religious concept of Mahdi with a

national and profane figure.

In Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s writings, Kāvah symbolizes an internal power of volition that

exists in everyone, and he represents a “divine will” in humanity that is capable of defeating the

“demon of carnality and the Zahhāk of ignorance.”210 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr appeals to his

readers to “awaken and seek assistance” from “this Kāvah, this divine blessing, this heavenly

envoy,” because humanity’s “liberation from misery” and “peaceful existence” requires the



77

“victory” of Kāvah.211 Whether presented as an internal willpower or a political hero, Kāvah

represents the promised saviour whom Kāzimzādah Irānshahr and other nationalists invoke in

the service of bringing about an utopic future that everyone seeks.

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr argues that humanity continues to evolve in order to reach its

final purpose, which is to become the “perfect human.”212 The current chaotic human situation

makes it apparent, then, that humanity has not yet reached its “point of completion

[perfection].”213 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr is optimistic about the future of humanity and

enumerates ten signs that “point to the betterment” of this future.214 Some of these optimistic

signs are the propagation of mysticism among Western thinkers, as well as a decrease in

“religious fanaticism” and its replacement with “brotherhood and equality.”215 The tenth and

most important of Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s signs, that is pertinent to our topic, is an increased

belief in the appearance of a saviour. Because of people’s “anxiety and inquietude...regarding

daily problems and future dangers…they are more inclined to believe in the appearance of a

promised Messiah.”216 Along with the inclination to believe in a Messiah, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr

notes an increase in people who claim “greatness, prophecy and being harbingers of good

news,” and discusses how worry predisposes a great number of followers to gravitate to “these

claims and beliefs as people impatiently anticipate the appearance of humanity’s saviour and


212 Hussein Kāzimzādah Irānshahr. “Āyandah Bashar,” Irānshahr 4, no. 7 (1 Mihr 1305/ 24 September 1926): 387.


214 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, “Āyandah,” 385-386.



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teacher.”217 Kāzimzādah Irānshahr believes that all these signs can be summarized in two

sentences which characterize and differentiate the future of humanity: 1) in politics and

materiality, our world is progressing towards unity and internationalism, and 2) in thought and

mood, humanity is stepping towards brotherhood and spirituality.218 He then “deduces” that all

these signs and characteristics are symptoms that signal the beginning of “a new civilization and

new era.”219

It is noteworthy to mention that nowhere in his discussions of a promised saviour, does

Kāzimzādah Irānshahr mention the Shi‘ite Twelfth Imam or a promised Mahdi. Kāzimzādah

Irānshahr believes that humans, and not only Iranians, are turning to spirituality and

anticipating a saviour which he perceives as a positive sign and a good omen for the future of

humanity. This turn to spirituality indicates that a sense of hopefulness remains in humanity.

However, he appears to believe in a more universal, personal, secular and earthly idea of a

saviour, represented symbolically by the nationalist hero Kāvah who stands for a sense of

volition that lies deep within each person and must be awakened. Because his audience is the

Iranian Shi‘ites, his message about a universal idea of a saviour can be perceived as an attack on

their Shi‘ite identity. Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s argument does away with the main defining

feature of Shi‘ite Twelver identity, that is the Mahdi. He expects humans to be capable and

solely reliant on themselves to save the world which removes their need for a saviour who is

specified as the Twelfth Imam of the Shi‘ites in the Iranian context. The elimination of the need




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for a Twelfth Imam of the Shi‘ites directly threatens the core identity of Twelver Shi‘ism.

Kasravī and the “Myth of Mahdīgarī”

Ahmad Kasravī (1890 - 1946) was born into a poor religious family in Tabriz and trained

in clerical studies from a young age. He later chose a legal profession and became a reputed

historian of Iran and a social thinker who influenced many later Iranian intellectuals. A teenager

during the time of the constitutional revolution, Kasravī avidly pursued its development. As an

adult, he wrote an influential history of the constitutional revolution and remained committed

to the cause until the end of his life. He worked as a judge, and in addition to his political

writings, penned several books on Iranian geography and languages.

In the previous years leading to the publication of his seminal work, Bikhānand va

Dāvari Kunanad [Read and Judge] (c. 1323/1945), Kasravī had published other books such as

Khudā bā Māst [God Is With Us] (c. 1321/1942) and Darbār-i Islām [About Islam] (c.

1321/1943). These earlier works illustrate his developing thought that led to the publication of

his famous and controversial Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad [Read and Judge], which he

republished later with some additions.220 In the foreword of the newly-titled Shi‘ism (Shi’i-gari):

Ahmad Kasravi (2011), the contemporary publisher of the book, Mohammad Amini maintains

that Kasravī’s thought progressed from the “reform and modernization of Shi‘ism,” followed by

a serious overhaul of Islamic thought itself, eventually to instigation of a pure religion, and

finally the complete abandonment of all religions.221 In the early 1930s, “when the enforced

220 Mohammad Amini. Shi‘ism (Shi‘i-gari) Ahmad Kasravi (L.A: Ketab Corp., 2011), 18-19.

221 Amini, Shi‘ism (Shi’i-gari): Ahmad Kasravi, 17.

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modernization of the country was in full swing,”222 Kasravī began publishing his journal Peymān,

which established his status as a “reformer,” or in his own words, “a destroyer of illusions.”223

In his later years, Kasravī supported a denominational unification for all Iranians and advocated

for the establishment of a “pure religion.”224 Tavakoli-Targhi argues that Hussein Kāzimzādah

Irānshahr influenced Kasravī, and indeed, Kasravī published several articles in both Kāvah and

Irānshahr, Kāzimzādah Irānshahr’s journals.225

In Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad [Read and Judge], Kasravī provides an explanation for

writing this book. He believes that the Iranian masses are in harmful misdirection, and it is his

wish to guide them and alleviate their situation, “all the while performing this tremendous yet

valuable task with proof and reason.”226 True to his profession as a lawyer, Kasravī repeatedly

demands that readers should approach his book with an open mind, re-read it, and as the title

suggests, “judge its contents based on the reasons provided.”227 Kasravī’s discussion of the

foundation of Shi‘ism argues that after the death of prophet Muhammad, leaders of different

Arab tribes began to compete for the leadership of the new Muslim community.228 The

followers of Ali, the Alavis, were called Shi‘ites,229 and “Shī’īgarī,” as Kasravī calls Shi‘ism, was

222 Ali Reza Manafzadeh, “Kasravī, Aḥmad: Life and Work,” Encyclopædia Iranica, Vol. XVI, Fasc. 1, p. 87-92; available online at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/Kasravī-ahmad-i (accessed online on 11 June 2018).

223 Manafzadeh, “Kasravī, Aḥmad: Life and Work.”

224 Manafzadeh, “Kasravī, Aḥmad: Life and Work.”

225 Tavakoli-Targhi “Tajaddud-i ikhtirā‘ī, tamaddun-i ‘āriyatī, va inqilāb-i rawhānī,” 214.

226 Ahmad Kasravī, (Shī’īgarī) Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad [Read and Judge] (Tehran: Kitāb-furūshī Pāydār, 1944), 3.

227 Kasravī, Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad, 4.



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initially a pure political endeavor by good and commendable men who struggled purely and

honorably toward a righteous path they believed in.”230 Kasravī proceeds to provide a history of

the development and the political shaping of this creed and the role of the early Imams and

their followers. Sharing a similar view as Hakamīzādah’s, Kasravī argues that Shi‘ism was chiefly

a political movement that branched off in early Islamic period and that Shi‘ism’s followers

began to have mostly controversial beliefs.231 Kasravī traces the history of Shī’īgarī’s spread into

Iran, through different dynasties, to its “bloody establishment” by the Safavid dynasty.232 Since

the Safavid dynasty, he argues, the “politics of religion and country combined together” in

Iran.233

In contrast to Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah, Kasravī discusses the

concept of the Mahdi extensively, and he is vocal about his controversial opinions, which in the

end cost him his life through assassination by Shi‘ite fundamentalists.234 Kasravī states that

when the eleventh chosen Imam of Shi‘ites died without a known child, a surprising and new

development led to the scattering of Shi‘ite followers.235 At the time of the eleventh Imam’s

death, some argued that the Imamate had ended; others believed the eleventh Imam’s brother

was to be his successor; and yet another group, the predecessors of the Twelver Shi‘ites, held

the view that the eleventh Imam’s five year old son was hidden from people, was the true


231 Kasravī, Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad, 6-9.



234 Interestingly, Abrahamian mostly paints Kasravī as a historian who was chiefly concerned with factionalism and disunity among Iranian tribes and maintains that Kasravī, “was to hammer away at these themes until his assassination in 1946 by a group of Shi’i fundamentalists.” Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 126.


82

successor, and only a few chosen ones were in contact with the hidden Imam.236 Kasravī

wonders why a leader should not be present among his people and questions the need for the

Imam’s hiding.237

Initially a few select people allegedly acted as mediators between the Hidden Imam and

his followers. Kasravī emphasizes that during the time of the four agents, the agents took

advantage of the story of Mahdism by presenting their hidden Imam as “the Mahdi.”238 Kasravī

takes this opportunity to delve into the history of the concept of Mahdism itself which he calls

“Mahdīgarī.”239 He maintains that all religions and cultures, especially Judaism and

Zoroastrianism, have always awaited a Messiah, and argues that the idea of a messiah entered

Islam through the Iranians.240 During the early political struggles for Muslim leadership,

followers claimed Mahdihood for almost all the contenders for early Shi‘ite leadership. Even the

Abbasids took advantage of the idea of Mahdihood by linking their rise and establishment to

this idea.241

Kasravī argues that in the same manner, Twelver Shi‘ites also took advantage of the idea

of an end of time messiah and created hundreds of hadiths and even attributed more

wondrous stories to Mahdism, such as the appearance of a Dajjal or anti-Christ, and the three

hundred and thirteen followers of Mahdi who would rise in his support from Shi‘ite cities after







83

his appearance.242 Kasravī further criticizes Shī’īgarī’s concept of the Hidden Imam by arguing

that even a “caliph” chosen by God, must, like a prophet, always be present and active in

society in order to guide and lead the people.243 A caliph who hides himself from the people

and advises that his followers practice dissimulation – actions Kasravī attributed to Shi‘ite

Imams – acts in a way that is both wrong and divisive.244

Kasravī further intensifies his criticism of the concept of the Hidden Imam by

questioning why no one learned of the birth of the eleventh Imam’s child and why the child

would “fear the government and hide when his fathers did not?”245 Kasravī dismisses the

Shi‘ites’ answer, that “the Hidden Imam is as the sun behind a cloud,” by arguing that “the sun

stays behind a cloud for a short while and its warmth and brightness shines through the cloud,

but your Imam does neither, only his name is present.”246 Kasravī also questions the allegedly

long lifespan of the Hidden Imam, arguing that it is impossible for a person to live longer than a

hundred years or so, because God’s actions are based on a set order and He never deters from

them.247 The notion of the Hidden Imam’s unnaturally long life allows humans to call into

question God’s ability: why was God unable to make the Mahdi appear at the right time instead

of keeping him hidden and wandering for a thousand years?248

Kasravī believes that all messianism is an illusion, is contrary to the natural law of the








84

universe, and prohibits people from doing good deeds because they assume that they have no

control over the evil that exists in the world.249 Because of his intense belief in humans’ ability

to reason, Kasravī argues that “Mahdīgarī is nothing more than a fantasy,”250 and it is

impossible to claim that someone will come and perform exaggerated actions that are out of

God’s order of things.251 Mocking the Shi‘ites’ reasoning that other religions also await a

saviour, Kasravī reasons that the fact that a myth exists in other religions is not a sign of its

veracity.252 Kasravī denounces the Shi‘ites’ claim that prophet Muhammad was aware of

Mahdi’s existence.253 He states that the prophet always maintained that he had no knowledge

of “the unknown” and that the Qur’an also does not make references to this “fantastic story” 254

about a hidden Mahdi that is to appear at the end of time.

Kasravī directs further criticism at unfounded and exaggerated stories of the end of time

that make “a laughing-stock” of God’s orderly plan of creation.255 He believes these

exaggerated stories are an affront to God as well as the Imams, portraying them as worldly,

vindictive and blood-thirsty.256 Critical of Babism and Baha’ism as well, Kasravī blames “the

myth of Mahdi” for creating these faiths, which he also holds accountable for the growing

249 Manafzadeh, “Kasravī”








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unrest in society.257 He ends the chapter by lamenting that “these are the bitter fruits of that

[Shī’īgarī] political tree,”258 referring to the initial inception of Shī’īgarī as a political religion.

A running theme in Kasravī’s work is a constant concern for Iran’s miserable current

circumstances and future state of affairs. His impressions of repeatedly witnessing Iranians

flocking to pilgrimage in Iraq during a sensitive time when foreign forces were forcefully

invading Iran’s borders, leads him to lament bitterly that citizens who act indifferent to the

plight of their country deserve to be miserable and remain subordinate to foreigners.259 Kasravī

views the disregard for life and apathetic attitude to current political events as the result of the

belief that their country is “kept safe by Imam Rizā and the Twelfth Imam and hence they do

not lift a finger for its safekeeping.”260 Kasravī believes that an effective and functional state

requires proper taxation and a strong army.261 This cannot be achieved when the religious

leaders accuse the state rulers to be illegitimate – because they are not the Hidden Imam – and

discourage people to engage and cooperate with the state.262

In Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad, Kasravī criticizes the work of two European orientalists

only identified as the “French Marbin” (could he be confused with Corbin?) and the “German

Josef,” whose writings263 “maliciously and out of political interests,”264 promoted and defended




260 Kasravī, Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad, 83 & 89.

261 Kasravī, Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad, 89

262 Kasravī, Bikhānand va Dāvari Kunanad, 89

263 This book refers to Sīyāsat al-husaynīyah published in 1325/1947 by Mirzā Ali Akbar Kitābfurūsh Tihrānī. The authors are identified as “German Monsieur Marbin” and “French Doctor Joseph.”


86

Shi‘ite beliefs, created much enthusiasm among Shi‘ite clerics, and led to the creation of groups

called “the anticipators.”265 The anticipators had begun to perform mourning sessions similar to

those of Karbala commemoration.266 The anticipators, however, performed their mourning

sessions with the objective of calling forth the appearance of the Twelfth Imam, and their cry

and prayer resulted from the Mahdi’s delay in appearance.267 Kasravī argues that when the

mourning sessions failed to make the Imam appear and the anticipators took a cleric’s

suggestion that they make “a pilgrimage to Karbalā,” the pilgrimage resulted not in the

appearance of the Mahdi but, rather, in the creation of thousands of beggar children in Iranian

towns whose “fathers had gone to Karbalā.”268 Kasravī bitterly explains that these western

orientalists argued that the belief in the Imam of Time always kept Shi‘ites hopeful and

prepared for combat and Shi‘ites endeavored to promote their creed and their cause

throughout the world.269 Kasravī believes that, in fact, his observations and discernment of

Iranian history and environment proves the opposite: that Shi‘ites prefer to debase themselves

because they trust that the Mahdi “will come and fix everything.”270

Kasravī’s observations about Iran’s state of affairs are noteworthy as his sharp criticism

presents the consequences of viewing the Twelfth Imam as distant. Considering my argument,

that during this period of time, the Mahdi is regarded by the Shi‘ites as a postponed figure and







87

in abeyance, we can now see that Kasravī is unraveling the issues associated with this view. In

his observation he faults the clerics’ view of the Mahdi as distant, specifically in regard to

Iranian sovereignty and foreign threats. Because he says that when Iranian Shi‘ites consider the

end of time saviour as responsible for (fixing) the state of affairs in Iran, Iranians do not do their

patriotic responsibility of safe keeping their nation. Kasravī’s criticism presents to the clerics the

threat associated with their distant understanding of Mahdi. In essence, I argue that Kasravī is

among the critics who inadvertently initiated the shift in understanding of Mahdi from

postponed to imminent, by bringing awareness to the problems and shortcomings of regarding

the saviour as an inaccessible figure.

As I will demonstrate in the next chapters, criticisms towards clerics and their Shi‘ite

beliefs from thinkers such as Kasravī prompt the Shi‘ite leaders and activists to transform their

discourse and outlook from a mostly polemical and distant understanding of the messiah to a

more imminent revolutionary one. In doing so, their expectation was changed through

theorizing and arguing for a revolutionary and active view towards the concept of the Mahdi,

instead of patiently anticipating him to come and take matters into his own hands.

A significant portion of Kasravī’s argument focuses on the role of the established clerical

institution in perpetuating many Shi‘ite practices and beliefs he considers to be erroneous and

detrimental to the Iranian nation. One aspect of Kasravī’s criticism is his questioning of the

Shi‘ite leadership. Kasravī highlights what he believes to be an issue in Shi‘ism, given that

leadership is understood to belong to the Hidden Imam, clerics who claim to be the Imam’s

successors also claim that leadership belongs to them during his absence.271 After the last


88

mediator of the Hidden Imam died without a successor, clerics and jurists asserted themselves

as the successors to the Imam and began the leadership of Shi‘ites by taking advantage of

religious sayings attributed to the Imams, such as, “those among you who are knowledgeable

about us are our proof.”272

Kasravī contends that the clerics claim to be the “general successors” to the Hidden

Imam and the immense clerical bureaucracy’s whole legitimacy is based solely on these sayings

through which clerics have elevated themselves over the people.273 They consider governance

as their own right and believe any other government administration except that of the Hidden

Imam to be “unjust” and an “usurpation.”274 This claim of the clerics creates indecision and

confusion among people, since clerics believe governance belongs to them, but they do not and

cannot take control of it; therefore another form of government needs to be in power but

people cannot trust that either.275 In essence, Kasravī criticizes his contemporary clerics

because they discourage and prohibit people from cooperating with the government.”276

Critics such as Kasravī accuse the religious groups of being maximalists who take more

of their share from the government, refuse to compromise on issues, take advantage of their

societal position and, not only do not contribute to society, but rather contribute to its

corruption. The clerics take money from people because of the religious rule that “one fifth and






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the share of the Imam,” from their income should be given to the clerics. 277 Kasravī directs the

bulk of his focus on the clerics and the clerical institution for “their oppression and bullying.”278

Kasravī wishes to lessen the power of the clerics and to bring them under the control of

the state. He believes that any criticism of the state and government should be within reason,

and he wants to make religion rational, progressive and plannable. Kasravī asserts that the

clerics copy the behavior of their Imams, by not struggling for the procurement of the caliphate

or the government and by not cooperating with the people in power; furthermore, clerics

encourage their followers to be hostile with the government.279 Kasravī believes that the

coercion of the clerics is even worse because if governance was handed to the Imams, the

Imams would have accepted to rule, but the clerics, who “are a group that cannot lead,” prefer

to remain in their cities and rule peacefully without any difficulties and “get paid easy

money.”280

According to Kasravī the real “wish of the clerics” is for the people “to believe the clerics

as their leaders and to give them their money.”281 At the same time the clerics prefer for any

government to exist while performing the governmental duties and for the people to treat said

government as an “usurper” and “unjust,” and discourage and prohibit people from

cooperating with the government.282 To Kasravī, governance requires an army, a city council







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and other offices, and accountability for the peace and maintenance of cities and the

population; however, the clerics avoid such responsibilities because they want to rule without

any consequence.283 Therefore, Kasravī is highlighting my argument that a Mahdi who is distant

and in abeyance facilitates this type of effortless, leisurely, care-free and free-loading

leadership. The longer the Mahdi stays away and his expectation hovers in the future, the

longer the clerics can benefit from and take advantage of this privileged position. Kasravī’s

message to Shi‘ite clerics and his solution for the plight of Iran is almost prophetic:

Why don’t you take on the leadership? Why won’t you establish Shari’a law?

What is stopping you? If it’s because of the fear of government, with all your

followers, if you set to work, the [current] government will undoubtedly not

thwart you. As of yet, when did you ever attempt, or rise up or want to do this

and were unsuccessful? Why don’t you rise up to take the government as your

own, instead of creating disillusionment among the people?284

Kasravī could have never imagined that contrary to his views about the clerics’ lack of

leadership, there would come a day when the Shi‘ite clergy became the all-powerful leaders of

Iran. Ironically, his arguments and challenges effectively provoked and roused the religious

groups and personalities into action. As Tavakoli-Targhi asserts, Kasravī’s writings and ideas

influenced many later personalities, including the leaders and pioneers of the Islamic

movement in Iran, such as Shariati and Khomeini.285 In the next chapter, my examination of

Khomeini’s rebuttal work, and other refutations against detractors like Kasravī, I will trace the




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outcome of this contestation and the gradual awakening and revolutionary formation of a

Shi‘ite Mahdism in which the Shi‘ites begin to break out of their redundant polemical discourse.

Influenced by the running themes and theologies of the time – such as the secularists and

leftists – the Shi‘ites start to launch a more active, innovative and dynamic approach to their

view of the Mahdi.

Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Religious Reform from Within

A highly-educated Shi‘ite cleric, Mīrzā Rizā Qulī Sharī‘at Sangalajī (1891 - 1944) was born

in Iran during the Qajar reign and hailed from a long line of Shi‘ite 'ulama. He studied several

Islamic sciences, such as fiqh, philosophy, kalām and 'irfān, under the tutelage of his own father

and several other prominent Shi‘ite 'ulama and spent several years in Najaf.286 Sharī‘at Sangalajī

was among the reform-minded clerics who “began writing and speaking openly against the

centuries-old superstitious beliefs and practices condoned or encouraged by the

ulama.”287 Sharī‘at Sangalajī held similar views as Ahmad Kasravī and Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah

and used similar arguments for penning his books. There are also many similarities between the

reform movement of Shi‘ites such as Sharī‘at Sangalajī or Hakamīzādah with well-known

Muslim reformers such as Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh who wished to revive

the purity of early Islam. As maintained by Ali Rahnema, there is evidence that Sharī‘at Sangalajī

was influenced by Sunni religious reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and Muhammad Rashid


287 Amini, “Kasravi, Aḥmad v. as Social and Religious Reformer.”

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Rida.288 Along with Hakamīzādah, Sharī‘at Sangalajī was considered an insider reformer of

Shi‘ism in Iran because he specifically focused on returning Shi‘ism back to its earliest Islamic

roots rather than looking to Westerners for reformist ideas. Reformers such as Sharī‘at

Sangalajī or Hakamīzādah did not want to dispose themselves of tradition or Islam; they arose

from within the Islamic tradition and wanted to incorporate change and reform from within.

Sharī‘at Sangalajī’s books Tawhīd-i Ibādat [Unity of Worship] and Kilīd-i Fahm-i Qur’an [A Key to

the Understanding of Qur’an] addressed internal issues of Shi‘ism and he used his writings as

vehicles of criticism against what he considered to be the introduction and proliferation of shirk

(polytheism), superstition and bid’a (innovation) in Shi‘ite Islam and he was critical of and

opposed to the idea of taqlīd (imitation).289 In Unity of Worship, he sets out to portray how the

“pure” Islam, or in particular, Shi‘ism of the time of the prophet and the companions, had been

corrupted with many innovative and un-Islamic introductions and superstitions.290

In The Key to Understanding Qur'an, Sharī‘at Sangalajī writes of his responsibility to

disseminate his knowledge about religion, to purge Qur'an and Islam of superstition, and to

introduce the true religion to Muslims.291 He had reached a new understanding of religion: he

was on a mission to research the early years of Islam, and uncover the early Muslims’

understanding of the Qur’an.292 In this manner he wanted to discover the real religion of

288 Ali Rahnema, Shi’i Reformation in Iran: The Life and Theology of Sharia’t Sangelaji (London: Routledge, 2016), 3.

289 Because there are no English translations for Sharī‘at Sangalajī’s books, I have provided my own translation of the material.

290 Mirzā Rizā Qulī Sharī‘at Sangalajī, Tawhīd-i Ibādat [Unity of Worship] (Tehrān: Chāpkhān-i Tābān, 1320/1941), 4.

291 Sharī‘at Sangalajī, Tawhīd-i Ibādat, 6.

292 Mirzā Rizā Qulī Sharī‘at Sangalajī, Kilīd-i Fahm-i Qur’an [A Key to the Understanding of Qur’an] (Tehrān: Majlis, 1322/1943), 5.

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Muslims before the fragmentation of Islam into different branches and the emergence of

different schools of thought.293 He had come to the conclusion that the Qur’an could be

understood by all people and he despised those who claimed to have superior knowledge of

the Qur’an and wanted to make Qur’anic exegesis their own exclusive privilege.294 Scholars are

chastised for (ab)using the Qur'an for their own aims, such as introducing their own twisted

interpretations, inculcating the people with religious innovation, as well as entrapping the

population in superstition and delusions.295 Specific Shi‘ite practices that compete with the

notion of God’s unity and which he identifies as superstitious innovations include practices such

as the wearing of special rings and stones for protection, the veneration of tombs and shrines,

the offering of sacrifice for other than God, and the tying of cloth or string to trees and shrines

for wishes and prayers, and many other such practices.296

Sharī‘at Sangalajī’s above argument against innovative practices that do not appear in

the Qur’an, coupled with his criticism of imitation (taqlīd). He considered “imitation” of

religious scholars’ opinions to be an innovation of Shi‘ites and therefore forbidden.297

Employing Qur’anic exegesis of these scholars of religion, functions as a form of imitation and

is, therefore, also forbidden.298 If Qur’anic exegesis and understanding were the specialty of a

few, then the rest of Muslims were obliged to imitate the views of these select few. By making

293 Sharī‘at Sangalajī, Kilīd-i Fahm-i Qur’an, 5.



296 Sharī‘at Sangalajī, Tawhīd-i Ibādat, 40-41.



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rejection of imitation his central message and by proposing a break from the practice of

imitation, Sharī‘at Sangalajī undermines the authority of the “conservative”299 schools of

thought and the authority of Shi‘ite clerics whose practice is based on these schools of thought.

Sharī‘at Sangalajī found this control over Islamic and Qur’anic understanding

objectionable and vowed that he would not be discouraged by any reproach and

condemnation.300 He repeatedly stresses that his mind and heart have cleared, and he has been

guided to the true understanding of Qur'an. Therefore, he had written his books in order to

show the way in understanding the holy book and prove that “wrongful claimants” had

prevented people from comprehending the true Qur'an.301

The aim of reviving Islam was not a new phenomenon and had been occurring in the

previous centuries; yet, modernist reformers encountered a new challenge that was inherent to

their era and foreign to earlier reformers, and that was the phenomenon of modernity.302 While

these critical voices believed that modernity and Islam were compatible, the conservatives

accused them of compromising Islam and leading to its total destruction.303 Conservative

Muslims viewed modernity as a Western imperialist phenomenon that threatened Islam.

Therefore, during this developing stage, any of the reformers’ suggestions were greeted with

299 The use of the term ‘conservative’ here refers to “people who attempt to preserve the general outlines of the existing social order. They are the protectors of the status quo,” from Amal Ghazal, “Sufism, Ijtihad and Modernity, Yusuf al-Nabhani in the Age of ‘Abd al-Hamid II,” Archivum Ottomanicum 19 (2001): 241.



302 Charles Kurzman, Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 6.

303 Ghazal, “Sufism, Ijtihad and Modernity, Yusuf al-Nabhani in the Age of ‘Abd al-Hamid II,” 241.

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suspicion because their views were considered as an alien idea and foreign intrusion.

Prominent religious scholars seldom called for a reconsideration of Islamic legal tradition, new

teaching methods, or the adoption of a modern legal philosophy; for them “legal reform

equaled succumbing to an alien secular modernity.”304 One of the characteristics of the early

twentieth century Iran, is the way established power-wielders – i.e. the Shi‘ite clerics –

challenged the efforts exerted by reformers such as Hakamīzādah and Sharī‘at Sangalajī

because they especially disrupted the realm of religious knowledge acquisition and distribution.

Amanat, for example, asserts that clerics, such as Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah, who

attempted to reinterpret Shi‘ite theology and exegesis in early Pahlavi era, “were marginalized

or soundly defeated by the jurists of Qum.”305 Through their disruption, the reformers were,

using the metaphor of Hudson, creating waves that were hitting rocks (as opposed to

sandcastles).306 This action was consequential: despite crashing their waves of discontent

against a formidable bulwark, they were having an impact on the receiving clerical body.

Insiders such as Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah created internal disruptions within

their respective religious establishments. They were some of the first in the early twentieth

century Iranian Shi‘ite milieu examined here, to deeply disrupt the peace, and they did so from

within the conservative clerical establishment and atmosphere of the time. Sharī‘at Sangalajī,

Hakamīzādah and Kasravī’s criticism of the dominant Islamic discourse, or the status quo,

304 Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism (London: I.B. Taurus, 2009), 189.

305 Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism, 189.

306 Michael Hudson, “Awakening Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reflections on the Current Wave of Protest in the Arab World,” In The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? edited by Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, Ziad Abu-Rish, (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 26.

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rattled the conservative establishment as well as the society at large. These critics presented

arguments that pulled the masses, as well as their conservative leaders, out of their comfort

zones and forced them to consider new ideas. It is therefore not surprising that Sharī‘at

Sangalajī was attacked by the conservative Shi‘ite scholars because of his views. His steadfast

criticism of Shi‘ite practices and the clergy did not go unnoticed during his own time and raised

the ire of many – including Ayatollah Khomeini. His detractor, Khomeini, claims in his book

Kashf-i asrār, that Sharī‘at Sangalajī simply wanted to spite the clerics, and therefore, until the

end of his life, Sharī‘at Sangalajī “remained steadfast in ideas which he himself did not believe

in … and all learned people know of his disgraceful and debunked works.”307

A significant aspect of these reformers’ thinking was that their criticism emerged from

within the Islamic tradition, and they were equipped with clerical background and Islamic

knowledge. It is due to this insider’s point of view that their critique and ideas proved to be

challenging for the religious establishments. Though Sharī‘at Sangalajī is not directly attacking

or questioning the notion of the Mahdi, he is part of the group of thinkers whose criticism of

the clerical establishment propels these Shi‘ite clerics into action and into defending their

views. By criticizing the Shi‘ite views and clerical establishment, he is undermining the Shi‘ite

religion as a whole, which triggers the clerics to feel the urgency of acting and refuting these

polemics. The Mahdi figure reflects this changing mood and the move to action, brought upon

by these polemics, including Sharī‘at Sangalajī, which prompts the shift from a distant messiah

to an revolutionary one.

307 Ruhallah Khomeini, Kashf-i asrār [Unveiling of Secrets] (n.p.: n.d.), 57-58.

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Hakamīzādah and Divine Uncertainty

Amongst the critical books targeting Shi‘ism and its practices was Ali Akbar

Hakamīzādah’s Asrār-i Hizār Sālah [Thousand Years Old Secrets] (c. 1322/1943) which received

a tremendous and swift response from Khomeini and other Shi‘ite activists. In the epilogue of

Kasravī’s contemporarily published book, Shi‘ism (Shi’i-gari) Ahmad Kasravi, its publisher, Amini

provides a brief historical context of the importance of this book. In addition to his book Asrār-i

Hizār Sālah, Hakamīzādah also published a short-lived magazine called Humayūn in the city of

Qum where he met with Kasravī a few times.308

Indeed, Khomeini’s cultural activities began with his response to Hakamīzādah’s book

and this book provided the setting through which Khomeini first began formulating his political,

social and religious views.309 In the introduction to his controversial book, Hakamīzādah

explains his motive for writing, which is to rescue the truth of religion – monotheism and piety

– from religious leaders who mis-use it for their political and personal intents and to awaken

the masses from their captivity.310 Hailing from a clerical family and the son of a reputed cleric,

Hakamīzādah’s own training in clerical studies gave him the background and skills to utilize

similar methods of religious argumentation as the clerics – quoting from and citing the Qur’an

and the hadith – to criticize the clerics’ “faulty” religiosity. Hakamīzādah mostly attempted to

reform certain religious practices and beliefs and contrary to some intellectuals, he did not

want to eradicate religion from society. One of the main indicators of his desire for reform, is

308 Ja‘farīyān, Jaryānhā va sāzmānhā-yi mazhabī-sīyāsī-i Irān, 352-353.


310 Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah, Asrār-i Hizār Sālah, n.p., n.d. (c. 1943), 1.

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his criticism of the erosion of religion in Iran, as he laments that “it is better to destroy a city in

the name of politics rather than religion.”311

In the first chapter of Asrār-i Hizār Sālah, titled “God,” Hakamīzādah criticizes some

present-day Shi‘ite practices, such as visiting shrines of Imams to pray to the Imams for

miracles, instead of praying to God, as tantamount to polytheism.312 He further criticizes Shi‘ite

practices that question God’s justice, such as divination through Qur’an, God changing the date

of the uprising of the qā’im313 several times, and the utterance of one small prayer equaling the

compensation of a thousand martyrs.314 Through these criticisms, he faults Shi‘ite leaders for

having reduced the almighty God to an unjust, indecisive and childish God who requires a

doorman, a minister or an intermediary for humans to access Him.315 He laments that many

additions and innovations have wrongly attached themselves to religion because of political

reasons of the time.316 Now after many centuries have passed, these erroneous practices

continue to persist, because they have become aggrandized through imitation practices and

habits, and have attached themselves as inseparable and integral parts of religious practice.317

Like Kasravī, Hakamīzādah believes that the exploitation of people’s religious beliefs and

contradictory religious claims have contributed greatly to the weakening of societal morality

and values. Contradictions in Shi‘ite belief that cause a weakening of people’s trust in religious

311 Hakamīzādah, Asrār-i Hizār Sālah, 12.

312 Hakamīzādah, Asrār-i Hizār Sālah, 2-3.

313 Qā’im (the Riser) is a title used for the Twelfth Imam.





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truths include, for example, an unpopular assertion that the real Qur’an will be brought by the

Imam of Time because the current Qur’an is manipulated.318 This assertion raises further

questions for Muslims and is quite problematic. The Qur’an is supposed to be one of the main

proofs of the truthfulness of prophet Muhammad, and because Muslims believe that the

Qur’an is the only uncorrupted and untouched holy book, if it is claimed that the current Qur’an

is manipulated, then what would be the “difference between the Qur’an and other holy

books?”319

Hakamīzādah follows Kasravī in criticizing the Shi‘ite belief that “any government before

the uprising of the Imam is invalid,” as a harmful belief.320 According to this belief, any

government other than that of the Mahdi, despite being run by just and moral rulers, is

illegitimate or an usurpation, and Muslims are prohibited from collaborating with it.

Hakamīzādah stresses some of the repercussions of failing to cooperate with the government,

including: the confusion of people regarding governance, weakening of the independence and

tranquility of the country, gravely damaging the government’s treasury, rendering government

employees lazy and cynical about work, and as a result, the pressure of all these failures is on

the masses.321 Hakamīzādah also worries that if a war erupts in the country, people will lack

motivation to protect their country because they are neither religious enough nor patriotic

enough for either quality to be called upon as a source of courage during the time of war.322



320 Hakamīzādah, Asrār-i Hizār Sālah, 19 & 21.



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According to Hakamīzādah, one of the biggest misfortunes of Iran is that whenever the legal

system introduces a law that is different from religious law (shari’a), that law is automatically

considered an innovation by the religious groups and, thus, unacceptable.323 He believes that

other laws are necessary because religious law, no matter how complete and comprehensive,

cannot possibly satisfy all of society’s needs in the modern age.324

Another side effect of non-cooperation of the population with the government is when

Iranians do not respect the current legal system and consider themselves clever and shrewd

while blatantly disobeying laws.325 Hakamīzādah identifies this as an outcome of this lawless

and unjust state of affairs that has contributed significantly to the deterioration of the Iranian

society. In essence, similar to Kasravī, he faults the failure of the government apparatus and as

a consequence, the eventual weakening of the Iranian nation on the Shi‘ite belief perpetuated

by the clerics who encourage non-cooperation with an “usurper” government. He believes that

failure to cooperate with a secular government harms both Iran as a nation and its population,

and by penning this book and drawing attention to these issues, he wishes to engage and

involve the clerics and religious people with these issues.

Hakamīzādah laments the perceived weakness of the Iranian nation and the corruption

of religion at the hands of religious leaders. He wants to demystify the untouchability of the

clerical establishment and believes that this system is in need of great reform. However, the

Shi‘ite religious system remains entrenched and corrupt because it is placed on such a high




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pedestal that no criticism can be directed at it and no individual attempts to challenge it.326

Hakamīzādah disagrees with “our present-day religion that says that during the time of the

occultation, the religious jurist is the successor to the Twelfth Imam,”327 for he finds the notion

that a jurisconsult should become involved in the business of governance as irrelevant as

medicine to mechanics.328 While he believes in the definite separation of religion from politics,

Hakamīzādah accords great responsibility to the role clerics can and should play in the Iranian

society. Because “the cleric is a doctor of the soul,” his work is more important than a medical

doctor’s, for only clerics can save themselves and the masses from corruption by “purging

religion of falsehoods and freeing minds from superstition.”329

Hakamīzādah concludes his book by explaining that before publishing, he drafted its

contents into 13 - 15 questions that he sent as a letter to many clerics for a response, but he

received none, and as a result of their silence, he had to publish this book.330 He reiterates his

questions and his request for a “polite and fair” response to his book from “the well-informed,

and not others.”331 In an effort to ameliorate the plight of his countrymen and what he

perceives as the destitute condition of the Shi‘ite religion during his time, Hakamīzādah is

explicitly demanding that knowledgeable clerics engage with him and his questions.

Hakamīzādah’s demand supports my argument that thinkers such as him and Kasravī







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were directly confronting Shi‘ite clerics and their comfortable status quo by holding them

accountable for the decline of religion and the destitute state of affairs in Iran. It is apparent

that the clerics did not take Hakamīzādah’s inquiry seriously and ignored his personal requests

for answers. It supports my argument that the clerics of this time period were still content with

the idea of a distant Mahdi and keeping the understanding of his appearance in abeyance. They

put little to no effort to engage with questions pertaining to Shi‘ism and with extension,

regarding the concept of the messiah. This disregard is similar to the contented and deficient

reply from the editor of the religious journal, Ayīn-i Islām, to enquiries from their readers about

the Mahdi, which I discussed in Chapter Two.

There is a clear paucity of the discussion of the Mahdi in Hakamīzādah’s work. Unlike

Kasravī who addressed and criticized the topic of the Twelfth Imam and forcefully declared it a

damaging fabrication and an addition to Shi‘ism, Hakamīzādah avoids the topic at every turn.

References about the Mahdi are mostly made through discussions about the end of time,

where he vaguely and briefly refers to some ambiguous religious sayings (hadīth) about signs of

the end of time and some predictions about anti-Christ (dajjāl) characters.332 It appears to the

reader that Hakamīzādah evades further explanation on these sayings and highlights to his

readers that various interpretations existed and some were even attributed to Rizā Shah and

others.333 His criticism is centered around Shi‘ite notions such as the arrival of the saviour or

ideas that are indirectly related to him, such as the changing time of the uprising of the qā’im

and the question of Mahdi’s rule being the only legitimate government. While Hakamīzādah



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does not hesitate to criticize and reprimand Shi‘ite beliefs, such as “problematic” religious

sayings about the Hidden Imam and the implementation of religious law, it’s possible that he

considers the topic of the Mahdi too sensitive and taboo – maybe even too dangerous – to

address. Without further addressing or elaborating on the concept of the Mahdi or the

“appearance of the Imam,” Hakamīzādah merely directs anyone who is interested in searching

“the truth,” to examine the thirteenth volume of the book Bihār al-Anwār,334 the chapter titled

the “Signs of the Appearance.”335 Hakamīzādah seems to believe that the study of this chapter

will make the reader “realize what constitutes the basis of their life, belief and work.”336 He

does not dwell on what he thinks of this material and instead suggests his readers to obtain

their own judgement by conducting their own study of the material. Although refusing to

directly engage with an in-depth analysis of the concept of the Mahdi as Kasravī does, similar to

Kasravī, Hakamīzādah appeals to his readers’ sense of reason and logic in regard to the concept

of the Mahdi.

Hakamīzādah’s religious knowledge and background, as well as his passion and desire to

purify Shi‘ism, threatened religious leadership more than the complete irreligiosity and atheism

of later leftists or “communists,” for Hakamīzādah attempted to amend and reform practices

that constituted the livelihood of the religious classes, while appealing to the piety of the

masses to see the truth of his words.

334 Bihār al-Anwār is a collection of Shi‘ite religious sayings and traditions (hadiths) gathered by the seventeenth century Shi‘ite Iranian cleric Muhammad Bāqir Majlisī (d. 1699).



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Guardians of Charm and Magic and the “Shi‘ite Fable of the Mahdi”

Amongst the polemics criticizing Shi‘ite beliefs and the clerical establishment, leftist or

“communist” activities presented one of the most contentious and effectively vexing rebukes. A

varied group of leftist organizations and publications sprouted in mid-twentieth century Iran.

According to Abrahamian only a few continued to operate for more than a few years and the

rest disintegrated and splintered eventually.337 Prominent groups included the Iran party, the

Comrades’ party, the Justice party, the Fatherland party and some of the publications were

Irān-i Naw (The New Iran), Mardum (The People), Imrūz va Fardā (Today and Tomorrow) to

name a few.338 The leftist groups had a tremendous influence on the Iranian society and the

intellectual milieu of religious groups began to change and shift with the rise and promulgation

of these differing voices and views. According to Cronin, the influence of the leftists, “in both

organizational and ideological terms, on the evolution of Islamist trends, including on Khumayni

himself, is clear.”339

One publication that greatly raised the ire of the religious groups and personalities and

created tremendous controversy and backlash was an anonymously published book, allegedly

by the “Communists,” although no Communists admitted writing the book or took ownership of

the book’s ideas. Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn [Guardians of Charm and Magic] (c. 1331/1952)

was published almost a decade later than Kasravī and Hakamīzādah’s books. Similar to the

works of Kasravī, Hakamīzādah and Sharī‘at Sangalajī, this “communist” publication has not



339 Cronin, "The Left in Iran: Illusion and Disillusion,” 231.

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been analyzed extensively by historians and it supports my argument that these publications

were greatly influential in contributing to the transformation of the religious groups’ outlook

towards the concept of Mahdi.340

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn incorporates novel leftist terms such as “oppressors,”

“imperialism” and “revolution,” to name a few. We will see that such language serves to be

appropriated and utilized later by religious groups and personalities in their own defenses and

rebuttals. The anonymous author argues that, through deception and charms, the “guardians,”

who are intended to be the Shi‘ite clergy, have kept the masses captive for years.341 Using

concepts “such as God, prophet, and Imam,” the clergy who “call themselves leaders of

society,” pressure and convince the oppressed population to endure imposed hardships and

injustices for otherworldly promises, while the clergy themselves take benefit of this world’s

luxuries.342 As did Kasravī’s work, Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn tackles the taboo topic of the

concept of the Mahdi. In fact, a central and initial target of its criticism of “Shi‘ite fables” is “the

ridiculous myth of the appearance of the Mahdi of the end of time.”343 Nigahbānān-i Sihr va

Afsūn posits that it is through this “fable” that people’s oppression is legitimized and injustice is

legalized.344 The “pulpits” constantly remind people that God wants them to endure difficult

times, because the clerics believe the present times are “the end of time.”345 Echoing the

340 I will address the influence of leftist views on Shi‘ite thinkers more concretely in Chapter Five.

341 Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn [Guardians of Charm and Magic] (n.p.: 1331/1952), 3.

342 Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn, 3-4.

343 Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn, 5.



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sentiments of previous critics, the anonymous author questions the lack of support of the

Shi‘ite clerics in assisting the people. Asserting that clerics do not encourage or help people to

find solutions to alleviate their hardships, instead Shi‘ite clerics tell people to “await the day of

deliverance and the appearance of the missing Imam.”346 The anonymous author alludes to the

assured confidence of the clerics by criticizing their indifference regarding the plight of their

followers. By emphasizing that people should merely endure and be patient and not actively

struggle against their hardship, this assertion of Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn is supporting my

argument that the Shi‘ite establishment during this time viewed the Mahdi as distant and a

figure that was in abeyance.

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn warns the reader that “sitting to wait for the promised

Mahdi,” will not fix suffering and oppression.347 The Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn ridicules the

“irony” of Mahdi’s appearance because Mahdi initially embarks on a killing spree to avenge the

carnage at the event of Karbala: “this Imam, with this type of thinking and behavior, is

supposed to fill the world with law and justice?!!”348 The role of the liberating Mahdi is

entrusted to the laborer and sufferer: “that Mahdi of the End of Time … is the iron fist of the

laborer, “that will soon descend upon oppressors and free the homeland from religion.” 349 The

author does not see the necessity of “mosque and church” in this “era of science and

knowledge,” and suggests that these sites of worship should instead be transformed into





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secular high schools and universities.350 Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn further laments that during

“this era of the atom when human knowledge has unveiled all the secrets of nature,” there

exist “leaders” who entrap people with such falsehoods.351 Struggle against these clerics, “even

direct struggle … will lead to their [clerics] humiliating defeat,” because “even a young person

with some rudimentary education … can realize the idiocy and ignorance of clerics.”352

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn offers hope for an easy “struggle” against Shi‘ite clerics

because the clerics are grossly undereducated and unacquainted with “new philosophical and

scientific theories,” have no conception of the spirit and position of time periods, and have no

knowledge of societal changes and the process of natural evolution.353 Nigahbānān-i Sihr va

Afsūn, clearly not anticipating the 1979 Islamic Revolution, concludes that the superstitious and

“black-hearted” clerics cannot be the leaders of the masses in an era of science and

knowledge.354

Readers of Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn are assured that their present suffering will not

last long because it is “impossible to stop society from its evolutionary process and to halt the

roaring torrent of progress and revolution.”355 The author promises that in the very near future,

the shackles of ignorance and captivity will be broken, and instead of the present degenerate

and hated system, a new system will be created that is devoid of “sir, master, ayatollah and







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imam.”356 In its final pages, Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn confidently asserts an inevitable victory

because religion is one of the powers that is declining in the world.357 The book asserts that “we

should be careful not to come into a head-on combat with the clerics … or to mock their beliefs

with animosity;”358 although in effect, the book has done just that.

While the previous polemical works of Kasravī and Hakamīzādah directed against the

Shi‘ite establishment had elicited some reaction from religious groups and personalities, they

were unable to leave an effective and lasting mark. This time, after almost a decade, the

distribution of this contentious and anti-religious Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn in the Iranian

society, provoked responses that were many and swift. Several clerics and religious figures such

Muhammad Khālisīzādah and Nāsir Makārim Shīrazī were especially active in their reactions

and rebuttals. An exceptionally difficult work to find, an excerpt of Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn

was included in Khālisīzādah’s rebuttal book titled Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat which is

purportedly an edited collection of Khālisīzādah’s speeches against Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn.

For the purposes of clarity and coherence, I will examine Khālisīzādah’s book in Chapter Four,

where I demonstrate that Shi‘ite clerics’ realization that these newer threats from the leftists

were more dangerous than their threats from their old enemies, the Babis/Baha’is.

Conclusion

Rising and divergent intellectual circles in the mid-twentieth century – including

nationalists, secularists, reformists and leftists – all worked to criticize and challenge Shi‘ite




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religious beliefs as harmful to Iranian society. In this chapter, I closely examined representative

works by this group of critics: Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, whose argument about the rise of an

Iranian hero as saviour represents the prevailing nationalist polemics; Kasravī, whose

Bikhānand va Dāvarī Kunanad examines the “Myth of Mahdīgarī” and represents the secularist

polemics; Sharī‘at Sangalajī, whose arguments for religious reform from within Islam represent

the reformist polemics as well as Hakamīzādah’s Asrār-i Hizār Sālah; finally the unauthored

piece, Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn represents the leftist polemics. The publication of these

several books in a short few years, soon after the abdication of Rizā Shah in 1942, paved the

way for a great and vicious reaction by the religious groups against the authors of these anti-

Shi‘ite polemical works.359

The 1940s and 1950s era was a period of realization and transformation for the Shi‘ite

religious groups and clerics who believed that their beliefs were under constant criticism from

various sources of polemics. Criticisms made by these polemical voices demanded a response

from the religious Shi‘ites. I examine the religious clerics’ response to uncover how this

discourse brought about a shift in Mahdist understanding, from a distant figure to an imminent

revolutionary one.

It was at this time that Shi‘ite religious groups began to comprehend that their position

and identity were being threatened by new enemies other than the Babi/Baha’i threat. These

new enemies were produced by new ideologies of a changing twentieth century. The threat

presented by the above-discussed polemical groups were noticeably different, because they

actively attacked and denounced Shi‘ite beliefs and the clerical establishment. In comparison,

359 Amini, Shi‘ism (Shi’i-gari): Ahmad Kasravi, 18-19.

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the Baha’is’ mere presence as a competing religion was perceived as a threat by Shi‘ite clerics.

The Shi‘ites realized that it was no longer effective and convincing to simply reject and

denounce their enemies’ views and to reiterate their own beliefs without providing a novel or

active change in their viewpoints.

The earliest elicited Shi‘ite responses and rebuttals included Khomeini’s Kashf-i asrār,

Khālisīzādah’s Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat [The Bandits of Truth and Reality] and writings of

clerics such as Ansārī, Amulī, and Makārim Shīrazī. These responses gradually began to move

away from a distant, polemical, and repetitive defense, and started showing signs of a more

active, engaged, and reason-based discourse. A discourse that included terms such a “qīyām

[rising up]” and “Mahdi’s universal government,” which began to sow the seeds of

transformation and heralded the birth of an imminent revolutionary understanding of the

Shi‘ite messianic figure.

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Chapter 4 – Emergence of Teleological Messianism

Introduction

In this chapter I examine how religious writers’ response to critiques of Shi‘ite practices

led to the emergence of an ideological notion of Islam and a teleological conception of Mahdi.

Shi‘ite writers and personalities were sensitive to critical voices around them, and some

criticisms proved too insulting to disregard. Repetitive condemnations of false Mahdis (i.e.

Babi/Baha’i views), which functioned as effective defense against competing religious faiths in

the distant Mahdist period, lost power under the onslaught of sophisticated intelligentsia’s

criticisms on Shi‘ite beliefs and identity. A growing number of individuals as well as ideological

groups, at different intervals or simultaneously, were considered to have the adversarial role

vis-à-vis the Shi‘ite thinking.

Carl Schmitt’s understanding of how “enemy” discourse drives contestation as a

productive or emancipative form of politics is helpfully deployed in this chapter to examine how

a shared identity (Shi‘ism) is shaped through perceived conflict and enmity between groups of

people. I argue that in response to critical attacks on their collective identity, Shi‘ite clerics and

other religious groups defended themselves by designating an enemy360 (the critical voices) and

intensifying their religious rebuttals and responses. Such responses correspond with Schmitt’s

notion of someone or a group who is deemed to be a threat to one’s way of life and, hence, an

enemy. According to Schmitt, the friend-enemy antithesis remains an ever-present possibility

360 This is a running and continuous theme which is a shared concept with contemporary Iranian religious and state discourse – the presence and awareness of an ‘enemy’ who is always scheming to harm Shi‘ism or Shi‘ite Iran.

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for all people who exist in a political sphere and for some writers, such as Chantal Mouffe, is a

necessary condition for an emancipatory politics, unless contestation becomes moral

antagonism which disrupts political order itself.361

Schmitt maintains that “each participant [in a conflict] is in a position to judge whether

the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or

fought in order to preserve one’s own form of existence.”362 Schmitt argues that the “actual

participants” of a conflict are the only ones who can correctly identify and understand the

acrimonious situation.363 This chapter examines the responses and rebuttals of the Shi‘ite

writers who represent the participants who feel their livelihood and way of life are threatened.

Shi‘ite writers are constantly on the lookout for the enemy’s malicious activities, and it is,

therefore, required of them to remain vigilant and to protect themselves by keeping their guard

up. Throughout this chapter, I will use the general term “enemy” to refer to critical and

polemical voices against Shi‘ism.

In Chapter Three, I examined and closely investigated their arguments against Shi‘ism

and the concept of Mahdi in polemical works of Kāzimzādah Irānshahr, Kasravī, Sharī‘at

Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah. The critical voices inadvertently transformed the religious groups’

repetitive discourse of polemical defense into a new discourse of action. This chapter

361 Carl Schmitt, “The Concept of the Political,” in The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 28; Chantal Mouffe, On the political. New York: Routledge, 2011: 5. Chantal Mouffe examines the importance of contestation for democracy, however, in the Iranian context, the discursive conflict driving the politics of Mahdist discourse facilitated, or was a productive precondition for the Iranian revolutionary ethos and the universal government sought by Shi’ite clerics; whether the moral ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ of the Mahdist discourse productively or unproductively disrupted the political order is a matter of perspective.

362 Schmitt, “The Concept of the Political,” 27.


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investigates the nuances and slight signs of transformation that mark the beginning of a shift in

the understanding of a distant concept of Mahdi to a revolutionary one detected in these

defenses. In their effort to refute influential detractors, religious writers begin to employ and

incorporate terms and concepts such as “reason,” “universal government of Mahdi,” “social

justice,” and “militancy.”364

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Muhammad Khālisīzādah, as well as the minor clerics

Sirāj Ansārī and Mustafa Āmulī, represent the defenses of Twelver Shi‘ism and the Mahdist idea

that arose in response to criticisms of religious thought and life. Beyond Kashf-i asrār [Unveiling

of Secrets], which was the definitive response to polemics, Khomeini published a short letter,

“Bikhānīd va Bi Kār Bandīd [Read and Act],” in direct reply to Kasravī’s Bikhānand va Dāvarī

Kunanad [Read and Judge]. In the letter, Khomeini chastises Shi‘ite clerics-at-large for their

inaction and their failure to “rise up (qīyām)” against attacks. In response to Khomeini’s rebuke,

one of these clerics, Khālisīzādah, produced a short reply to the polemical voices. In addition,

Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat (Bandits of Truth and Reality), is considered to be Khālisīzādah’s

speeches directed as a response to the alleged “communist”-published Nigahbānān-i Sihr va

Afsūn. Rahnamāy-i Haqāyiq [The Guide to Truths] (c. 1329/1950), a booklet published by the

zealot and terrorist organization Fadā’īān-i Islām [Devotees of Islam], headed by the young

clerical student Navvāb Safavī, is another early written response to polemics. In fact, criticisms

of Islam and Shi‘ism led to the founding of Fadā’īān-i Islām [Devotees of Islam], and the group’s

main purpose was combatting Islam’s detractors. It is worth mentioning that when the

364 It is important to note that many of these writings, terms and concepts fall within more than one identified time-period and can overlap. While acknowledging this fluidity, I argue that a traceable shift occurs within these Mahdist writings, concepts and terms.

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Fadā’īān-i Islām [Devotees of Islam] found written dialogue to be unsatisfactory as a method of

achieving their goals, they made several attempts at assassinating secular detractors, including

the successful assassination of Kasravī.

Historical Circumstances as Prelude to a Teleological Mahdi

There is a clear detachment between the Shi‘ite clerics and the Pahlavi state spanning

the rule of both Pahlavi monarchs (1920s - 1960s). Shi‘ism and Islam are acknowledged as the

identity of the state, but the Pahlavi government is indifferent to the figure of Mahdi. Due to

the particularity of the historical circumstances of this time, the birth of the Mahdi became

increasingly an occasion for many of the religious Shi'ites' celebrations such as weddings, get-

togethers, and other events. This increase in the celebration of the Twelfth Imam’s birthday

was a prelude to the transformation of an eschatological understanding of Mahdi to a

teleological and ideological conception of Mahdi. The Pahlavi’s detachment from the Mahdi is

demonstrated in the stark contrast of the lack of Mahdist holidays and celebrations during the

Pahlavi state and the abundance of such celebrations during the current Iranian government.365

The omission of this specific Shi‘ite identity, which took the form of ignoring Shi‘ite messianic

365 In this part, I will focus my attention to investigating the importance accorded or references – or lack-there-of – to the Twelfth Imam or whether events related to him were celebrated or acknowledged during the Pahlavi era. In this manner, I wish to investigate whether a shift has occurred between the current Iranian regime’s overtly politicized and appropriated concept of the Twelfth Imam and that of the Pahlavi regime’s dealing and management of such a concept, even in the form of any celebrations or acknowledgment of the Twelfth Imam, who was and still is a large part of the Iranian Shi‘ite identity. It is important to emphasize that while I extensively searched the national archives and gathered as much information as possible in regard to communications made regarding to celebrations of any kind that occurred in Tehran and some other Iranian provinces, no official references to such celebrations or communications made about the Twelfth Imam were found. No official references were found in relation to the Twelfth Imam even with the help of the staff at the archives who instructed me to use diverse and broad terms to get as many results as possible from the archives’ search engines. On the other hand, I found extensive celebratory telegrams, letters and official correspondence from various parts of Iran to and from the Pahlavi governing centres related to many other religious, cultural and other celebrations and events.

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celebrations, leads to a backlash in which Shi‘ite celebrations of the saviour eventually became

an important form of identity reinforcement in the later Revolutionary period.

This indifference and overpass of a key part of Shi‘ite identity by the ruling Pahlavi

establishment played a significant role in the intensification and prominence of the concept of

Mahdi in later years.

An official document of the Ministry of Finance dated 21st February 1927 maintains that

the only celebrations that are included in official ceremonies are the following: Nawrūz (the

Persian new year), the celebration of the coronation, and the religious celebrations of eid al-

mab’ath (or bi’sat )366 and eid al-qadīr.367 The choice and celebration of these specific events

represents several aspects of the cultural and religious identity of the Iranian nation that the

Pahlavi government sought to uphold. The Nawrūz celebration symbolizes the most cultural

aspect of the Iranian identity. The coronation celebration commemorates and celebrates the

monarchy and upholds the monarchical tradition. Mab’ath celebrates the prophethood of

Muhammad and, thus, validates Iran as a Muslim nation that respects the prophet of the

Muslims. Major Islamic celebrations and feasts, such as eid al-adha368 and eid al-fitr,369 are

mostly omitted from the official greeting celebrations of the Pahlavi government. However, the

feast of eid al-qadīr is officially celebrated, which affirms the Shi‘ite identity as the majority

366 Muslims celebrate eid-al mab’ath as the anniversary of the prophethood of Muhammad.

367 Eid al-qadīr is an important Shi‘ite celebration where it is believed that Prophet Muhammad chose Ali Ibn Abi-Talib as his successor.

368 Eid al-adha or “festival of sacrifice” is celebrated universally by all Muslims on the 10th day of the Islamic month of Hajj.

369 Eid al-fitr or “festival of the breaking of the fast” marks the end of the Islamic month of Ramadan and it is celebrated by Muslims worldwide.

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religious denomination of the Iranian nation. These celebrations of Nawrūz, eid al-mab’ath, eid

al-qadīr are also referred to as the “a’yād-i salāsah” (the triple feasts).370

The Pahlavi government officially celebrated and acknowledged only key religious

events and holidays, such as eid al-qadīr and eid al-mab’ath. During this pre-revolutionary

period, the majority if not all of the references to events and festivities related to the Twelfth

Imam were undertaken by civilians such as wealthy bazaar merchants or independent mosques,

religious organizations or private individuals. During this pre-revolutionary period, the core of

the small number of the documents that contained any type of reference to the Twelfth Imam

pertained to non-state related organizations or to private individuals and entities. In a small

brochure communique-type with the title The Best Worship is the Anticipation of the Arrival

(afzal al-ibāda Intizār al-faraj), the birthday of the Imam of Time is congratulated to the

“entirety” of Shi‘ites. The document, which is an invitation for the celebration of the birthday of

the Twelfth Imam is simply signed by “the board of anticipators” (hiy’at-i muntazirān).371 The

text of the invitation is as follows: “for the occasion of the blessed birth of his holiness on

Saturday the fifteenth of the glorious Sha’bān, that corresponds to 13 April 1940, a ceremony

for ‘mentioning the virtues of the Anticipated Imam’ is organized from three until six PM in the

prayer area (musallā) of Safdar Khān.”372 The announcement continues that, “hereby all ranks

are invited to participate in the aforementioned celebration and enjoy the remarks of the

370 “Mavād-i dastūr-i pazīrāyī dar a’yād-i salāsah dar vilāyāt,” (1307/1928), 350/518, National Archives and Library of Iran.

371 “Āgāhī va davat nāmahāyī barguzārī majālis-i jashn bi munāsibat-i mīlād-i hazrat-i mahdi,” (1319/1940), 296/20701, National Archives and Library of Iran.


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speakers and bestow honor and thanks on this board.”373

Other instances where the birthday of the Twelfth Imam is mentioned and celebrated is

through commercial groups such as specific unions or group of businessmen. One invitation

with the heading “With the Approval of God Almighty,” states a very similar text as the above

for the “blessed” occasion of the birthday of “his holiness the Imam of Time, may God Almighty

expedite his apparition.”374 This announcement informs the invitees that a celebration will be

held at “the Sarāy-i Khājah during the nights of 14, 15, and 16 of this [month of] Sha’bān from 8

to 10 pm. We request that you honor us with your presence in the aforementioned religious

celebration. [signed:] The merchants of Sarāy-i Khājah”375

Another mention of the Twelfth Imam is as the heading of invitations to wedding

celebrations of private individuals by their respective families. The simple wedding invitations

are similar in their design and formulations with two religious headings, short sentences

informing the guests of the impending wedding, the time and date and at the bottom the

address of the house where the wedding party occurs. The two religious formulations are as

follows: “with the approval of God Almighty” and underneath, “in the shadow of the attention

of his holiness the Imam of Time may God expedite his apparition.”376 For the Shi‘ites, the

centrality of Mahdi is crucial to their Shi‘ite identity so much so, that in spite of all the Pahlavi





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restrictions, the celebrations of Mahdi’s birthday are routinely coincided with the Shi‘ites’

important life milestones.

There is evidence that the government banned outwardly public religious celebrations

by civilians. The following official correspondence provides a good example regarding these

celebrations. Dated October 9, 1928 on the letterhead of the Interior Minister, the letter

advises the provincial government of Qum on the celebration requirements in a new report

detailing that “holding celebratory events and illumination are allowed” only during the

“birthday of his royal majesty the Shah,” as well as the “triple feasts” [a’yād-i salāsah].377 The

provincial government is further advised that “aside from these mentioned cases, no

demonstration of any kind is permitted outside of homes [but] they are free inside their

homes.”378

A document on the letterhead of the Ministers of Chairmanship, issued on 26th January

1928, is one of the few instances of an official Pahlavi government correspondence document

mentioning the Twelfth Imam. This document is revealing as it discloses the stringent

procedures and restrictions required for performing these celebrations. Official and religious

celebrations necessitate the decision of the government cabinet and are categorized into

official or unofficial celebrations that also need a direct report to “his majesty the King.”379 The

document specifies that the celebrations for which an official ceremony is required are the




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following: the Persian new year (Nawrūz), the coronation celebration, mab’ath and qadīr.380

Celebrations for which unofficial ceremony will be performed are: eid al-adha, eid al-fitr,

celebration of constitutional revolution, the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, the birthday of

Imam Ali, the birthday of Imam Hussein, and the birthday of Imam Mahdi.381 Not many

documents exist that provide more information on these official and unofficial celebrations that

are being performed during the Pahlavi reign. Those that do exist are simple congratulatory

telegrams between different provincial governments and the central government on the

occasion of “the triple feasts.”

It appears that there are more official documents stipulating rules and regulations

regarding banned celebrations and “illuminations” (holiday lighting), which were chiefly

reserved for the feasts mandated by the government. A telling document sent by the Interior

Minister from the bureau of General Affairs on 13 September 1938, offers insight into a

prohibition of celebrations that are not mandated and regulated by the government of the

time. The Interior Minister emphasizes the state’s position on event celebrations throughout

the country and uses these official correspondence to admonish government officials about

instances of “celebrations and illuminations” that have been performed outside of government

designated times and dictates, by stating that “it has been noticed about cities and townships

that celebrations and feasts have been organized other than the specified ones.”382 He regrets




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that this has occurred “despite” prior repeated and “anticipated communications” being made

to government officials about “ceremony regulations.”383 The minister advises the officials that

they should “inform people that demonstrations that are not in their specified time, are against

regulations and they should go about their work and businesses and perform every function on

its designated time.”384 He professes his confidence that given that this “circular” has been

distributed with everyone, they “should take the utmost care that such actions do not occur

again.”385

Several similar documents and correspondence from other provincial governments,

such as Larestan and Abadeh, request clarification and information on the proper procedure for

celebrating the “triple feasts.” For example, one document from The Ministry of Interior, dated

almost 20 years later, on 5 February 1942, and bearing the imperial sun and lion emblem from

the provincial government of Larestan requests information regarding the celebration of the

“triple feasts” and wonders whether hosting a reception for these feasts is “solely the

responsibility of the governors or whether the prefects have such duty as well.”386

While the coup d’état of 1953 is now widely recognized as a sorely unfortunate major

defeat in the democratic process of the Iranian nation, at the time it was considered the utmost

victorious moment by the monarchists and supporters of the Pahlavi dynasty and regime. As




386 “Bakhshnāmah: ijrāyī marāsim-i salām-i khās va ā’m dar a’yād-i millī va mazhabī,” (1321/1942), 240/40064, National Archives and Library of Iran.

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little as the Mahdi was mentioned in official documents, one of these times is when the Mahdi

is credited with having protected the Pahlavi monarchy. In a transcript of a speech given by the

governor of Qum, for a 1953 celebration of eid al-qadīr, the governor gloriously exalts the

position of the Pahlavi regime and, in an excessively flowery language, greets its reinstitution.

An interesting aspect of this letter is the author’s use of religious language and his thanking of

the Almighty, the Prophet and the Imams for aiding the restoration of the Pahlavi regime and

maintains that it was under “the auspices of his majesty the Guardian of Time [the Mahdi] –

may almighty God expedite his apparition,” that Iran’s “nationality and ethnic honor” and “six-

thousand years history of our kingdom” were saved.387 During this rare instance where the

assistance of the Twelfth Imam is mentioned and referred to in an “official” document, the

aforementioned author quickly adds that it was actually “due to royal blessings and measures

taken by the young, sapient and popular king” that “this vessel [Iran] that was caught in stormy

seas and near perdition, safely reached its intended shore.”388 The author even salutes the

“popular and great” Shah of Iran for being the “‘protector and supporter of the true religion of

Islam.’”389

Finding references related to the topic of the Twelfth Imam in the Pahlavi era, especially

and specifically official and government-related documents – has proven to be a rather

daunting task. However, as historians also attest, it is no surprise that religious liberties and

proclamations were stifled during the Pahlavi era – more so during Rizā Shah and the majority

387 “Vizārat-i kishvar,” (1332/1953), 293/6831, National Archives and Library of Iran.



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of the reign of his son. A telling example of such censorship can be found at the National

Archives, dating to 1957, in which a document references the censorship of a religious book

titled “the Question of Expectation” (Mas’ālah Intizār)390 undertaken by the Ministry of Culture

and Arts during the Pahlavi era. It is noteworthy to point out that the author of the

controversial book, Makārim Shīrazī, is currently a high-ranking cleric within the Iranian

government.

The anti-Islamic sentiment that was cultivated in the Pahlavi era, coupled with the

attacks of the polemics analyzed in the previous chapter, sets the scene for the religious

rebuttals of Chapter Four. The Pahlavi state kept religious celebrations at a minimum and these

are quite bereft of any mention of the notion of Mahdi. As one of the most central signifiers of

the Shi‘ite identity, the Pahlavi government’s dismissive attitude towards the Mahdi is

intentional. Considering that official government correspondence and documents during the

Pahlavi period included specific instructions on the minutest detail such as the color of the

socks of the participants.391 It is evident that the absence of an official Pahlavi discourse on the

Mahdi, coupled with tight-bound regulations and prohibitions regarding the type of

celebrations allowed for civilians, is one of the factors that sets the stage for the religious Shi‘ite

figures to draw closer and utilize the figure of Mahdi in later decades.

390 “Mumayizi va chāp-i kitāb-i ‘Mas’ālah Intizār,’” (1336/1957), 264/335, National Archives and Library of Iran.


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Brief Historical Background on the Rise of Religious Writing and Activism

There is much overlap in my research of the Shi‘ite personalities and their activities,

hence a fixed and rigid chronological survey is perplexing. However, the aim of this project is to

trace a definite and observable shift and transformation in the understanding of the concept of

the messiah by examining the evolution and progress of this concept through this religious

literature. Religious writing and activism, of course, existed years before criticism of Shi‘ism led

to the responses that I examine in this chapter. While a fixed and rigidly chronological survey is

not the intent of this research, my research does trace a definite and observable shift in the

understanding of the concept of Mahdi in religious literature through the decades (early 1910s

– early 1970s), as clerics and religious lay people took upon themselves the task of defending

their beliefs and Shi‘ite identity. Working either independently or as members of like-minded

groups and organizations, they wrote and published, mostly in the form of either individual

articles or journals.

Two of the earliest publications are Tazakurāt-i Dīyānatī (1927 - 1929), also called

Jamīyat-i Dīyānati, which was founded by Qulāmhussein Turk Tabrīzī, and Taqaddum (1928-

1930), published by Farāmarzī brothers. Scholarly historians such as Ervand Abrahamian and

Abbas Amanat, whose works examine the period during which Tazakurāt-i Dīyānatī and

Taqaddum were published, fail to discuss these works and their founders. Indeed, one of the

earliest religious journals was Khirad, first published in Shahrīvar 1321 (September 1942), long

after Tazakurāt-i Dīyānatī and Taqaddum had appeared. While Ja‘farīyān’s comparatively

thorough historical survey of Iranian religious groups, personalities and movements that began

their activism in the early 1940s, describes a struggle against Pahlavi-imposed modernization

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and secularization, it does not take into account the influential nationalists and secularists such

as Kazimzādah, Kasravī, and Hakamīzādah, whom I have examined.

Most importantly for this research, Ja‘farīyān provides no discussion of a historical

development of the concept of the Mahdi. He does mention the establishment of some

Mahdist institutions such as the “Anjuman-i Khayrīyah Hujjatīyah Mahdavīyah,” which was

established in 1954 and had chapters called “House of the Imam Zaman” in a number of towns.

The “Anjuman-i Khayrīyah Hujjatīyah Mahdavīyah promulgated Shi‘ite knowledge on the

Mahdi, organized speeches and sermons, celebrated the birth of Mahdi, and “guid[ed] those

who had become Baha’is to the straight path.”392 This institution was established through the

efforts of Haj Shaikh Mahmūd Halabī who, along with his political activism, was also active in his

struggle against Baha’ism.393

Many Islamic associations and clubs were organized after the abdication of Rizā Shah.

During Rizā Shah’s reign, the government had taken over the educational system and schools,

and the religious groups had not been in control of education.394 During the early reign of the

second Pahlavi shah, however, the stifling atmosphere of his father’s rule was relaxed, if only

temporarily. Religious groups also gained access to radio during the second Pahlavi reign

because the Pahlavi monarchy wanted religion to thwart the increasing rise of “communism” in

Iran.395 The surge in religious publications and activism began in the early 1940s, and most of

the activists’ efforts served the goals of countering the impetuses of “modernizers” and





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reversing the damages accumulated by the policies of Rizā Shah’s period.396 Examples of

religious activist publications include Āyīn-i Islām that began publication in early 1945, the

yearly publication of Nūr-i Dānish that began in 1946, and Nidāy-i Haq that was first published

in 1951.397 Āyīn-i Islām was received so enthusiastically that its publishers declared themselves

astonished.398

Religious figures who produced literature during this earliest period include Muhammad

al-Hussein al-Kāshif al-Qitā (1877 - 1956), a leading Iraqi Shi‘ite scholar who was part of the

Sunni-Shi‘ite rapprochement movement in the 1940s - 50s, and Abdulhussein Āyatī (1881 -

1952), a former promulgator of Baha’ism who had since returned to Islam to write in refutation

of Baha’ism. Among the most prolific of the religious Shi‘ite writers were Sabāh Kāzirūnī and

Nusratullah Nūrīyānī, the concessionaire and chief editor of Āyīn-i Islām, the most influential

politico-religious journal of the early 1940s. An important supporter and contributor to Āyīn-i

Islām was Mahdī Sirāj Ansārī (1896 - 1962), author of the book Nabard Bā Bīdīnī [Battle with

The Unbelievers] (1945) and founder of the Association of Battle against Disbelief (Jamyīat

Mubarizi Bā Bīdīnī), an association with which Navvāb Safavī399 is reputed to have cooperated.

Sirāj Ansārī later organized the Itihādiyah Muslimīn-i Irān and Jamyīat-i Havādārān-i Tashayuh

and became a member of the board of directors of Jāmi’ah Talīmāt-i Islāmī.400 Sirāj Ansārī’s




399 Navvāb Safavī is the founder of the organization Fadā’īān-i Islām and the author of the booklet Rahnamāy-i Haqāyiq [The Guide to Truths]. His organization is responsible for the assassination of several figures, such as Kasravī, whom they deemed as enemies of Islam and Shi‘ism.


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activities are attributed to his desire to defend against Ahmad Kasravī’s criticisms of Shi‘ite

Islam,401 discussed in Chapter Three.

Another prolific religious activist of the early 1940s, Atā’ullah Shahābpūr (Kirmānshāhī)

aimed to prove the harmony of Islam with modern ideas (dānish-i jadīd). Atā’ullah Shahābpūr

established the Association of Islamic Propagation and the religious journals Majd and Nūr-i

Dānish [Light and Knowledge], which appeared in several languages.402

Religious groups were beginning to found organizations and to actively publish books

and articles in religious journals, with the goal of engaging, advising and warning the Iranian

Shi‘ite readership against the dangers of enemies of Shi‘ism in the form of rising secularist and

leftist intelligentsia. The condition of being continuously on the defensive is evident in these

religious groups’ rhetoric as illustrated by many publications that describe and identify the

enemy to their audience. The religious groups were uncertain of the future of their way of life

and feared that their children and youth were losing their identify and religion in the emerging

modern and secular society.

“A Response Letter” to Thousand Years Old Secrets

Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah’s Asrār-i Hizār Sālah [Thousand Years Old Secrets] generated few

responses, and with the exceptions of Muhammad Khālisīzādah and Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeini, clerical groups dismissed the arguments of those who did respond as weak and



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confusing.403 As discussed earlier in this chapter, Khomeini’s response in Kashf-i asrār [Unveiling

of Secrets] addresses attacks by Hakamīzādah, as well as those of Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Ahmad

Kasravī. This section addresses Khālisīzādah’s “Risālah Javābīyah [A Response Letter].”

Muhammad Khālisīzādah (1890 - 1963) was a well-known Iraqi-Iranian clerical

personality and political activist. Following in the footsteps of his father, a distinguished Iraqi

Shi‘ite jurist, Khālisīzādah wrote prolifically, supported rapprochement between Shi‘ites and

Sunnis, avidly opposed British political influence, and promoted political power for Shi‘ite

clerics and jurists.404 Mina Yazdani argues that Khālisīzādah’s political activism and ideas may

have influenced Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers.405 According to Ja‘farīyān, Muhammad

Khālisīzādah had controversial “tastes” and views that alienated him from the conservative

clerical establishment.406 Therefore, his attempts at religious involvement and writing were

thwarted. Otherwise, Khālisīzādah could have been one of the most active politico-religious

people during this transitional period in Iranian history.407 Khālisīzādah, while a religious cleric,

found himself at odds with both conservative groups as well as the “modernizers,” and in spite

of many political pressures such as continuous exiles and prohibitions from owning

independent publications, he was still active and responsible for several organizations and

journals (i.e. Light and Responsibility).408

403 Nāsir Jamālzādah and Maysam Aghādādī, “Jaygāh va Ta’sīr-i Kitāb-i Kashf-i asrār-i Khumaynī dar Tahavvulāt-i Sīyāsī Tārīkhī-i Muāsir-i Irān,” Fasl Nāmah Rahyāftī 3, no. 9 (1388/2009): 81-98.

404 Mina Yazdani, “Ḵāleṣizāda, Moḥammad B. Moḥammad-Mahdi,” Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition, 2015, available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/khalesizada (accessed on 07 October 2015).

405 Yazdani, “Ḵāleṣizāda, Moḥammad B. Moḥammad-Mahdi.”



408 Ja‘farīyān, Jaryānhā va sāzmānhā-yi mazhabī-sīyāsī-i Irān, 68 & 87.

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Khālisīzādah’s initial response to Hakamīzādah’s Asrār-i Hizār Sālah [Thousand Years Old

Secrets] was a short article, “Risālah Javābīyah [A Response Letter]”, published in Āyīn-i Islām.

“Risālah Javābīyah [A Response Letter”] was the first in a series of pieces Khālisīzādah wrote as

criticism of Hakamīzādah’s book, and in 1945, the collected articles were published as Kashf-al

Astār: Javāb bar Asrār-i Hizār Sālah [A Reply to Thousand Years Old Secrets].409 Because of

Khālisīzādah’s controversial views and “bold statements,” a group of clerical “jurists in Qom

decided to restrict the publication of Kašf al-astār and instead chose Ayatollah Ruḥ-Allāh

Ḵomeyni (d. 1989) to write the rebuttal.”410

In his series of articles, published in Āyīn-i Islām under the heading “Risālah Javābīyah [A

Response Letter],” Khālisīzādah admits that he is obliging Shi‘ite readers who had demanded

him to respond to Hakamīzādah's “booklet.”411 Khālisīzādah finds Hakamizadah’s arguments to

be self-contradictory and, thus, muddled as “it seems that the aim and goal of the author

[Hakamīzādah] is not clear, since on the one hand he shows interest for Islam and on the other,

he argues that the rules of Islam are not satisfactory for the needs of contemporary

humanity.”412 Khālisīzādah equates this claim to denying religion since a religion whose rules

are not enough for humanity, is no longer a religion, “but rather a plaything and a waste of

time.413 Khālisīzādah also argues that Hakamīzādah’s reliance on “superstitious” sayings and

hadith, and his repetitious accusations against ignorant authors, only serve to cause worry and


410 Mina Yazdani, “Ḵāleṣizāda, Moḥammad B. Moḥammad-Mahdi.”

411 Muhammad Khālisīzādah, “Risālah Javābīyah [A Response Letter],” Āyīn-i Islām 1, no. 5 (26 Farvardīn

1323/15 April 1944): 3

412 Khālisīzādah, “Risālah Javābīyah,” 3.


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confusion amongst the naïve masses and shake the belief of the uninformed.414

Furthermore, Khālisīzādah provides advice and guidance to his readers, who are the

practicing and religious Shi‘ite audience of religious journals such as Āyīn-i Islām. He stresses to

Shi‘ite readers that while replying to critics’ “prejudiced intentions,” it is important to respond

in a measured way and not act with “ignorant zealotry” and avoid labelling these critics as

infidels.415 Khālisīzādah further advises the Shi‘ite readers to teach the “pure religion of Islam,”

to endeavor to eradicate superstition from their teachings, and to acquaint themselves and

their students with “current world situation, scientific realities, and technical explorations.”416

Based on readings of some of Kasravī’s articles published in the journal Peymān,

Khālisīzādah also dismisses Kasravī, calling Kasravī “anxious, confused and uninformed.”417

Khālisīzādah explains his initial lack of response to Kasravī’s writings on his own incarceration by

the Pahlavi regime, which he blames for its role as “the promoter of anxiety and confusion”

amongst the people and its thwarting of the efforts of people such as himself whose purpose is

guidance to the straight path and the elimination of any skepticism in the Shi‘ite population.418

Most significantly, unlike Sirāj Ansārī who, as was described in Chapter Two, views the Pahlavi

Shah favorably as the protector of the religion of Islam, Khālisīzādah views the Pahlavi regime

as an enemy and blames the regime for the injustice and corruption rampant in the country.419







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Khālisīzādah advises the clerical institution to avoid the government and to not have any

expectations from the government to uphold “national rules and systems.”420 In this

transitional period, other religious figures who were ready for change and ready to assert

themselves and who later view the Mahdi as a vehicle to oppose the polemics, reject this

lenient response by Khālisīzādah. The rejection of this response signified that a more forceful

and critical reply was required which is an indication of this transitional period. That religious

voices exhibit such differing attitudes supports the argument that an active transition toward a

dynamic endeavour for a revolutionary understanding of the Mahdi is underway.

Khomeini’s Inaugural Call to Action

Ruhollah Khomeini is often credited with single handedly changing the Iranian Shi‘ite

approach to politics and religion. Earlier literature on the Mahdi by religious and lay

personalities who were actively writing and, as a result, (re)shaping the concept of the Mahdi is

routinely ignored. Mehdi Khalaji argues that Khomeini had always been an “anti-messianic

Shiite jurist who believed that waiting for the Mahdi did not require political passivity, but

rather a need for religious government.”421 Khalaji also focuses on the political nature of

Khomeini’s arguments. In contrast, I argue that during the postponed Mahdist period, religious

personalities such as Khomeini inhabited a pragmatic religious environment in which their

messianic concerns focused on polemical defense against Babis/Baha’is. They were not yet

concerned with politicizing the Mahdi.


421 Mehdi Khalaji, “Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy,” The Washington Institute of Near East Policy 78, (2008): 6.

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Ruhollah Khomeini’s Kashf-i asrār [Unveiling of Secrets] was his polemical reply to Ali

Akbar Hakamīzādah's Asrār-i Hizār Sālah [The Thousand Years Old Secrets]. However, it also

served as a contentious response to Sharī‘at Sangalajī, Ahmad Kasravī and other such thinkers.

Khomeini’s sweeping attack of “pseudo-secular” polemics against Shi‘ite beliefs and practices

harshly criticized the growing secularism of state and society. He criticized the tyrannical

conditions during the reign of Rizā Pahlavi, as well.422 Dabashi notes increasing concern about

the prevalence of secular ideas and an equally powerful preoccupation with “the West” in the

tone of Kashf-i asrār.423 Others argue that Kashf-i asrār served as a defense of private property

and written on the request of rich merchants who had opposed Rizā Pahlavi’s policy of building

a centralized secular state.424 Keddie argues that almost every one of Rizā Pahlavi’s reforms

intruded upon clergy and was met with unhappy silence, but nothing happened until after Rizā

Pahlavi’s death when Khomeini’s Kashf-i asrār was published as a response to Kasravī and

Hakamīzādah who had chastised the clergy for opposition to these reforms.425 One of

Khomeini’s main methods of defense against attackers of Shi‘ite Islam is to present his

arguments in the form of hadiths or interpretations of Qur’an, which are the main methods of

many of the Shi‘ite activists and writers. The method is faulty at its core, however, because

critics of Shi‘ism do not share the beliefs on which the vast majority of the hadiths are based.

422 Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 412.

423 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 412.

424 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (California: University of California Press, 1993), 40-43.

425 Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi‘ism from Quietism to Revolution, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 60.

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Khomeini and the other activists and writers may, indeed, be oblivious to the beliefs of their

critics, and they may altogether be addressing a different audience: Shi‘ites who had started to

doubt and question their beliefs because of the criticisms of the enemies.

The second half of Kashf-i asrār presents Khomeini’s first programmatic assertion of the

clergy’s political role, including ideas that he will develop, 30 years later, in Islamic

Government.426 Abbas Amanat describes Kashf-i asrār [Unveiling of Secrets], as a polemical

“defense of Shi‘ism against Wahhabi-inspired attacks as well as against Ahmad Kasravī’s

critique,” in contrast to his “later works” of the 1950s and 60s that resembled most the

propaganda discourse of Iranian communists and the Left.427 In the next chapter I will examine

leftist influence on Khomeini’s ideas and writing.

Unveiling of Secrets and Condemnation of Enemies of Shi‘ism

In Kashf-i asrār [Unveiling of Secrets], Khomeini questions the root of polemical and

anti-Shi‘ite arguments made by Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah, and accuses them of being

Wahhabis, one of the most damning labels in Shi‘ites’ views. Khomeini presents a faulty history

of the Wahhabi movement, until the conversion of Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud (d. 1765), the head of

the House of Sa’ud in Arabia, to Wahhabism428 and laments the rise to power of the Sa’ud

house, with its many wars of expansion and attacks on Mecca and Karbala. He accuses some

current writers of trying to “show-off” and “appear as intellectuals,” by following the “jāhīlī”

ideas of Wahhabis, because the writers claim to be open-minded and desire to rid themselves

426 Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran, 61.

427 Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism (London: I.B. Taurus, 2009), 216.

428 Khomeini, Kashf-i asrār, 4-5.

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of imitation.429 Khomeini’s intense desire to discredit Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah takes

the form of racist tirades in which Khomeini accuses these “enemies” of disobeying Qur'an and

Islam, disrespecting the great men of religion, and following the religion of the “savages of

Arabia.”430 Khomeini explains that “these topics,” meaning attacks on Shi‘ism by a myriad of

enemies, have existed since early Islam, but because Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah did

not want to credit “a bunch of black foolish desert-dwellers,” meaning Arabs, as the sources of

their ideas, they claimed to be the originators of these “vulgar topics.”431 Other than Sharī‘at

Sangalajī, Khomeini does not legitimize by naming those he accuses; rather, he generalizes by

referring to “these authors” or addressing them as “adventurers” and other disparaging

terms.432 Khomeini accuses them of criticizing issues “about which they have no knowledge,

understanding or training,” of attacking the scholars of Islam, “people’s rightful guides,” in

order to pave the way for “their own twisted intentions;”433 and for not seeking answers from a

“knowledgeable scholar,” but instead blindly following the Wahhabis.434 In fact, Hakamīzādah

and others had demanded replies from “knowledgeable scholars” in their original polemical

writings.

Khomeini denounces these “troublesome adventurers” for blaming their country and

culture's backwardness on Islam and its religious leaders, and for believing that the

429 Khomeini, Kashf-i asrār, 4.




433 Khomeini, Kashf-i asrār, 5 & 8.


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abandonment of religious practices is necessary to achieve a great civilization.435 He blames the

oppressive and tyrannical twenty years reign of Rizā Pahlavi as well as people’s refusal “to rise

up in defense of their rights,” which had emboldened the “defenders of irreligiosity.”436

Khomeini’s primary objective is the rejection of “Wahhabi” claims, which he blames on

Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah.437 However, Khomeini's accusations betray their

contradictory nature. On the one hand, he maintains that Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah

began their attacks on religion because they wanted to emulate the West and believed religion

was the obstacle for Iranians to achieve a civilization similar to the West. On the other hand,

Khomeini accuses these thinkers of Wahhabism and of attacking Shi‘ite practices based on their

Wahhabi belief. However, because Wahhabis were vehemently against any type of innovative

practices, if these Iranian thinkers were in fact Wahhabis, they would regard any kind of

Westernization and Western practices as highly innovative and heretical.

To understand the mindset of Khomeini and the reason for accusations of Wahhabism,

one must consider its historical genealogy. Shi‘ites view their encounter with Wahhabism as a

terrible tragedy. In the 1800s, the Al-Sa’ud Wahhabi armies attacked Karbala, sacking Shi‘ite

holy sites and shrines to eradicate Shi‘ite practices that the Wahhabis considered tantamount

to polytheism.438 According to David Commins, “the Wahhabis’ atrocities against Shi‘i Muslims

… sullied the Wahhabis’ name throughout much of the Muslim world.”439 Because of the




438 David D. Commins, Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 23.

439 Commins, Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria, 23.

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Wahhabis’ religious zeal and violence against Shi‘ism, the Shi‘ite clerical establishment became

suspicious of any criticism of their beliefs and practices. If criticized by a religious person or

group, the Shi‘ite clerical establishment accused the offending party of Wahhabism, regardless

of the criticism itself or the party that issued the criticism. Further, the thinkers’ criticism

directly attacked ideas at the foundation of official clerical practices and, therefore, provoked

hostile, sometimes violent responses.

Khomeini bitterly accuses “these thinkers”440 of pretending to be Muslims and worrying

about true Islam, while never admonishing the secularization of society, which he sees in the

forceful removal of hijab, the mixing of boys and girls in pools, the spread and sale of alcohol,

and so on.441 Khomeini concludes that these people have ulterior motives other than the

defense of religion.442 This assertion of Khomeini might mean that Khomeini believes critics of

Shi‘ism do not really care about religious reform, but rather want to spread self-gratifying and

lascivious practices in Iran.

Khomeini directly addresses Hakamīzādah’s criticism of Shi‘ites whom, Hakamīzādah

claimed, falsely attributed indecisiveness to God by changing the time of “[the riser’s uprising]

qīyām-i qā’im.”443 Khomeini laments the necessity of engaging in “fine philosophical thoughts

with ignorant children [i.e. Hakamīzādah]” and of simplifying complex religious and

440 It is clear that Khomeini had read and was aware of Kasravī’s early books, although he may not have been certain about who wrote the books. Khomeini repeatedly asks his readers to judge his words against the words in Kasravī’s books; he mocks Kasravī’s use of unfamiliar Iranian words, calling them “savage incomprehensible words;” and he directly refers to God is with Us, one of Kasravī's works, see Khomeini, Kashf-i asrār, 59-61.




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philosophical concepts “so that they can comprehend.”444 Khomeini maintains that to

understand complex concepts the critics of Shi‘ism must refer to the works of great Muslim

philosophers and scholars for clarification.445 In fact, Khomeini does not adequately address

Hakamīzādah’s criticisms and deems him too ignorant to understand “complicated”

philosophical matters. In reality, Khomeini believes that the main goal and intent of these

enemies is to render Shi‘ite followers skeptical of their religious leaders.446

In a moment of effervescence, by stringing along fiery slogans, Khomeini calls on “all

pious religious brothers, Persian speaking friends and others to denounce these shameful

books, these invitations to Zoroastrianism, these insults to sanctities” through employing

“national ardour, a religious movement, patriotic anger, and an iron fist… we have to wipe

these unclean seeds,” otherwise they will destroy “you and your ancient remembrances, put

fire to your holy books and the pure spilled blood of your martyrs.”447 In essence, Khomeini is

calling on people to actively rise up and safeguard the Twelver Shi‘ite identity. Similar to other

Shi‘ite writers, Khomeini admits that “he rose to do this matter,” by which he means the writing

of his book as a response, because he is worried that young people will be led astray by the

critics’ dangerous ideas.448 These passionate words of Khomeini foreshadow his revolutionary

calls to action that riled up the Iranian population in the immediate years leading to the Iranian

444 Hakamīzādah complained that the Shi‘ites believed that the Mahdi would come in the 70th year of Hijra, but because Hussein was killed, God raged against humans and extended the Mahdi’s arrival to 140 years, and then, because the clergy told this secret to the people, God’s position changed again, and He no longer designated a time for this uprising, see Khomeini, Kashf-i asrār, 83-84.





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Revolution of 1979. We witness the beginning of a fertile ground that enabled the shift for

these revolutionary calls to action, which I argue, began with the responses to critical attacks.

Khomeini’s Earliest Compliance on Governance During Mahdi’s Absence

In Chapter Three, “The Clergy” of Kashf-i asrār, Khomeini answers the critics of Shi‘ism

who question whether a jurisprudent mujtahid is the successor of the Hidden Imam during the

occultation and whether governance and guardianship are a legal part of a mujtahid’s role.449 In

contrast to the immediate years leading to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when Khomeini is

the chief opponent of the Pahlavi regime, in this earlier transitional period of time (mid-1940s -

1950s) he displays a mild, conciliatory attitude towards the monarchy. In contrast to the

immediate pre-revolutionary years, Khomeini chastises enemies for trying to disrupt the peace

between the clerical classes and the ruling monarchy. He maintains that these critics of Shi‘ism

accuse the clergy of claiming governance and guardianship during the absence of the Twelfth

Imam and do not consider the monarchy as the legitimate political rulers.450 Even though as

discussed earlier, the Pahlavi government was dismissive of Mahdist identity, at this stage

Khomeini does not want to disrupt the clerical stability with the monarchy. While he subtly

criticizes the Pahlavi regime, the target of his wrath are the polemical voices against Shi‘ism

whom he considers as the main enemies and addresses in his writings.

Khomeini begins to justify the authority of the clergy by demonstrating that they are the

vehicle of God’s wisdom. Khomeini responds that governance based on wisdom is an essential



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part of human life, only God is capable of such correct wisdom, and He is the owner of all

creatures and lands; hence, His commands are applicable to them.451 Therefore, when God

gives governance to someone, that person’s commands become obligatory, and people should

not accept any decrees and commands other than those of God or those sanctioned by Him,

because all other lawmakers are humans and fallible.452 These assertions of Khomeini regarding

an all-powerful and infallible leader is another indicative sign of an emerging revolutionary

Mahdist government.

Khomeini bases his ideal government wholly on God’s rules and justice. The role of

clergy is neither to oppose the current government nor to disrupt the foundation of

government and monarchy; rather, the clergy ought only to “oppose some figures in power,”

for the sake of the country.453 Khomeini claims that the clergy should only perform clerical

work,454 however, he proceeds to entail far greater responsibilities for the clergy. Khomeini

strongly criticizes the use of European and Western laws in Iran and proposes that a just ruler

should be chosen who does not defy God’s rules, someone who avoids oppression and

repression, and argues that the parliament should be made up of jurists or should be under

their supervision.455

Khomeini further believes that the people and especially the government are

responsible for increasing the influence of the clergy in the affairs of state because the clergy






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are the most effective in ensuring the safety of the country by thwarting foreign policies.456

Because of constant foreign threat, the army and the military need the help of the clergy the

most and must be under the influence of the clergy.457 Khomeini concludes that because of

these reasons, the clergy should never separate from the government.458 Khomeini is “not

saying that government should be with a jurist, rather ... that government should be ruled with

God’s law.”459 He believes that governance should be done with the supervision of the clergy

because it is in the interest of the country and people.460 These early arguments are in support

of Khomeini’s later theory of “the guardianship of the jurisconsult” which he honed and

published years later in a more detailed book titled, The Islamic Government (1970). His

arguments here show signs in support of clerical power in government and I argue that his

assertions signify the emergence of a shift toward revolutionary ideals where “Mahdi’s

universal and just government” becomes a reality.

By arguing that “a government is only oppressive if it does not act upon its

responsibilities,”461 Khomeini is hinting that the Pahlavi government is oppressive by subtly

accusing it of shirking its leadership responsibilities. He is effectively insinuating that it is the

clergy who are the suitable and rightful protectors of both Shi‘ism and Iran. The occasion of

responding to the polemical thinkers has given Khomeini the opportunity to criticize the Pahlavi







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regime. In fact, Khomeini is planting the early seeds of revolution and paving the way for a shift

in the Shi‘ite understanding of leadership.

Khomeini’s Passionate Letter on “Rising Up” [Qīyām]

The arrival and appearance of the Mahdi at the end of time appears repeatedly in

historical and religious Shi‘ite sources as a central Shi‘ite belief. It is a notion that is used

repeatedly in historical and religious Shi‘ite sources to describe and explain the appearance of

Mahdi. Changes in the terminology that is used to describe this appearance is of utmost

significance to our research, since it will signify a shift in the Shi‘ites’ concept of the Mahdi.

Describing the messiah’s coming as a mere arrival or appearance signifies a very different

messianic understanding than describing it as an uprising or rising up (qīyām). An uprising

denotes a dynamic and volatile action, and “Mahdi’s advent” (qīyām-i Mahdī) signifies a sudden

upheaval and disturbance in the status quo: he does not simply and calmly “appear.” Mahdi’s

qīyām signifies his revolt and rise against universal oppression and injustice. Mahdi rises to

confront adversaries and enemies, to take universal revenge on the oppressors, and to deliver

the oppressed. Hence his arrival is forceful and cataclysmic, and not a simple appearance and

arrival.

Khomeini’s following letter contains language and especially terminology that is

significant in light of this explanation. In Urdībihisht 1323/May 1944, Khomeini published a fiery

short letter titled “Bikhānīd va Bi Kār Bandīd [Read and Act]” in response to Kasravī’s recently

published Bikhānand va Dāvarī Kunanad; however, what is significant about this letter is that

Khomeini does not address Kasravī in it, but rather, his contemporary Shi‘ite clerics and

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religious figures. Khomeini berates the Shi‘ite religious scholars for their silence and inaction

vis-à-vis Kasravī’s defamatory publication, and he contrasts the scholars to prophets Moses and

Muhammad, whose rising up (qīyām) against their enemies for the sake of God is what

rendered them victorious over ignorance and oppression.462 Khomeini believes individual self-

interest and the “abandonment of ‘rising up’ (qīyām) for the sake of God” cause the miserable

and submissive condition of Muslim countries.463

Because people only engage in selfish and personal qīyām, “the spirit of unity and

brotherhood has become dormant in Muslim nations.”464 Khomeini’s list of the many woes and

insubordinations that have been imposed by secular forces and from which he believes

Muslims are suffering include the loss of control over religious education, the usurpation of

religious endowments, the forceful removal of hijab and its consequences, and the influences

of secular and immoral publications.465

Khomeini lists these examples and as per his characteristically repetitive style of speech

and writing, he stresses that these are the results of “personal qīyām,” “qīyām for personal gain

and interests,” and “qīyām for sensuality.”466 Khomeini calls on religious and pious people to

abandon personal interests and hasten for a “reformative qīyām,” for if they do not rise up for

God and if they fail to propagate religious ceremonies, their beliefs will be overpowered by

462 Ruhallah Khomeini, “Bikhānīd va Bi Kār Bandīd,” n.p., n.d.

463 Khomeini, “Bikhānīd va Bi Kār Bandīd.”




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false intentions.467 He addresses the audacity of enemies such as Kasravī against “the Hidden

Imam,” and the silence of clerics and their unsatisfactory efforts.468 He rebukes Shi‘ites by

maintaining that they should learn religiosity from the Baha’is who are always in contact with

all their members and protect them regardless of their location – if there is the slightest

infringement against one of them, all of them will rise up in support.469 Khomeini forewarns his

readers that if they fail to heed his message and do not answer his call to action against the

enemies, the consequences will be dire. He ends the letter by concluding that because “you did

not rise up for your legitimate rights,” irreligiosity is taking over the country and “soon

irreligious people will overpower you divided people to such an extent that your fate will be

worse than during the time of Rizā Khān.”470 Khomeini’s adamant and severe rebuke to Shi‘ites

about the dire consequences of their failure to take action against “irreligiosity” is far removed

from the contented and assured attitude of religious personalities during the distant Mahdist

period. During the aforementioned period, the religious writers effectively refused to satisfy

Shi‘ite readers’ inquiries about the Mahdi, while here we witness Khomeini’s severe

admonishment of the clerical establishment for its “silence” and failure to defend the Mahdi.

This letter indicates the early developments of Khomeini’s and other religious

personalities’ rebellious and revolutionary calls, outbursts and activities. Khomeini’s emphasis

on, and the repetitive use of the concept of qīyām and its benefits, signifies the implanting of

this idea of rebellion and uprising in the minds of Shi‘ites and within Shi‘ite literature, and





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signals the shift away from simplistic affirmations toward an active revolutionary movement

within religious circles.

Religious Journals and the Defense of Mahdi

Āmulī and A Reason-based Belief in the Mahdi

Most of the articles or topics related to the Mahdi that were published in the Pahlavi

period appeared in independent religious journals. The importance of the theme of identifying

the enemy is evident in the following religious articles written in refutation of the critics of

Shi‘ism (enemies), either through direct or indirect naming of people such as Kasravī and

bringing forth arguments to counter their anti-Mahdi or anti-Shi‘ite attacks.

Mustafā Āmulī (Hisāmuddīn) is another Shi‘ite cleric whose series of articles, “The

Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi,”471 is a direct refutation of Kasravī. Āmulī informs the

readers about a book named “A Few Questions from Kasravī” which is a refutation of Kasravī’s

claims and is intended as a guide to direct him to the correct and straight path, since he has

“denied many necessities and foundations of the sacred religion of Islam.”472 Kasravī is accused

of considering Muslim beliefs to be old and unsuitable for contemporary times, and most

importantly, he considers the belief in the existence of the Imam of Time as superstition.473

Āmulī is surprised that “such people” claim as superstitious “any unknown question for

which they cannot find a solution and any hidden truth of which they have no knowledge.”474

471 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 19 (4 Murdād 1325/26 July 1946): 5.

472 Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi],” 5.

473 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 21 (18 Murdād 1325/9 August 1946): 11.

474 Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd,” 11.

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He argues that a rule amongst scientists and philosophers says with “certainty that ‘not

knowing or not understanding something does not mean it does not exist.’”475

In “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd,” Āmulī “proves” the existence of the Twelfth

Imam by arguing that many religious traditions have been transmitted to both Shi‘ite and Sunni

sources that have proven that prophet Muhammad had given the good news to the world

about the existence, appearance and the “long life of this leader, saviour and great peacemaker

[the Mahdi].”476 Āmulī further argues that because Muslims believe that the “Prophet’s

infallibility, veracity, and wisdom have been proven,” and because prophet Muhammad never

speaks “out of passion or conjecture – his word is divine revelation,”477 hence, Āmulī concludes

that these religious traditions tell the truth about the Mahdi. Āmulī advises that before the

promises of religious leaders can be trusted, true believers must check facts using the tools of

proof and argument.478 One of these promises is the existence of the Twelfth Imam, which a

real and pure-hearted Shi‘ite will believe through the study of traditions.479 An important sign

of a shift that is occurring in this transitional period is that while Āmulī maintains that a “real

Shi‘ite” must trust the traditions of his/her faith, he also insists that the study of religion should

be accompanied by fact-checking tools of argument. In our examination of religious literature in

the distant Mahdist period, we could hardly find this new-found appreciation of the study of



477 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 23 (1 Shahrīvar 1325/23 August 1946): 5.

478 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 21 (18 Murdād 1325/9 August 1946): 11.

479 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 23 (1 Shahrīvar 1325/23 August 1946): 5.

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religion based on methods of reasoning and analysis.

Āmulī ends the article by arguing that if someone objects that the long life of the Mahdi

is against nature and reason, they should be told that whoever has faith in the unlimited ability

and existence of God will know that adding extra years to a person’s life is not impossible or

difficult for Him; otherwise, it means that they believe God’s ability is limited or imperfect.480 To

question the long life of the Mahdi, he concludes, is the mindset of an ungodly person who

hasn’t truly recognized God and imagines an incapable and imperfect creature instead of Him

and that’s why they question Him.”481

Āmulī’s arguments in this piece illustrate a shifting approach and worldview which

stresses the importance of reason, enquiry and evidence to prove the existence of the Mahdi

and the ways in which a true believer will reach such conclusions, not only because he is told to

believe but also because he has consciously investigated and studied this matter based on

enquiry and reason. To Shi‘ite believers, who feel threatened and perceive their religious beliefs

and values to be under attack by secularist “enemies” such as Kasravī, Amuli’s suggestion that

Shi‘ites support their religious beliefs and counter the arguments of the secularists by using

reason and logic makes sense.

In “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd,” Āmulī suggests that if people of a few

centuries ago were told about contemporary inventions such as the radio, they would have

denied that such a thing exists and argued that such inventions are against reason.482 Āmulī



482 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 25 (15 Shahrīvar 1325/6 September 1946]: 5.

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further notes that the times are different now: when scientists claim that the future will bring

advanced technology, people believe the scientists immediately.483 People have faith in

scientists’ expertise because scientists have more knowledge about the future of technology

than people who have no scientific training.484 Āmulī laments that people are more eager to

believe a foreign scientist, whose honesty is not verified, than to believe their own Prophet,

whose knowledge comes directly from God.485

Ironically, Āmulī contradicts his own disdain for referring to Western science or

scientists to prove one’s argument, when he uses advances in science to support his own

argument in defense of the Mahdi’s longevity. Āmulī argues that contemporary advancements

in health and science can vouch for the Mahdi’s long life, “as a certain French doctor has proven

in his book, The Path to Happiness.”486 Interestingly, Āmulī initially stresses that one needs to

believe in all the Islamic principles based on rational and scientific reasons, and only then will

the acceptance of the Mahdi’s long life become easy.487 One who does not accept Islamic

principles based on reason and argument has no right to discuss or argue this matter.488

Āmulī’s piece incorporates common methods by which the Mahdist activists during the

transitional period defended their beliefs: logic, reason, argument, and employing the ideas of

modern science and western scientists. Āmulī hopes to reach and influence a young, educated




486 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvāy-i āyandah yā Mahdīy-i Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 26 (22 Shahrīvar 1325/13 September 1946): 5.



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Shi‘ite audience by arguing in favor of the Mahdi and by using techniques and concepts that he

believes his audience will find appealingly modern and novel.

Āmulī’s description of the appearance of the Mahdi is characteristic of the shifting

concept of Mahdi during the transitional years. Rather than a distant figure, the concept of

Mahdi in Āmulī’s description begins to shift toward an anticipated, active and political presence

in the world. Āmulī describes Mahdi as the new “king” of the world who “will spread his

kingdom and empire on earth.”489 Āmulī emphasizes the Mahdi as king and ruler by maintaining

that “even at the last hour of the universe when everything is on the verge of destruction, God

will send a saviour, a guide and peace-maker, a powerful king and emperor, to save humanity

from total misery.”490 In fact, Mahdi’s appearance equals the creation of a great and

unparalleled empire and kingship that will conquer and vanquish all enemies.491 The Mahdi will

establish a utopic government and utopic city (madīnah fāzalah), a “just” reign (saltanat) based

on an Islamic plan and his greatness and government (dawlat) will cover the earth.492 Āmuli’s

characteristic description of the Mahdi during these transitional years differs from the fully-

fledged revolutionary idea of Mahdi that is yet to come. As we will see in Chapter Five, the

description of Mahdi’s reign shifts from the vocabulary of Mahdi’s “kingdom and empire,” to

“Mahdi’s administration” (hukūmat-i Mahdī) and “Mahdi’s government” (dawlat-i Mahdī),

because during the revolutionary years, the populace’s primary enemy is the institution of

489 Mustafā Āmulī, “Pīshvā-yi āyandi yā Mahdī-yi Mu’ūd [The Future Leader or the Promised Mahdi]” Āyīn -i Islām 3, no. 32 (3 Ābān 1325/25 October 1946): 10.

490 Āmulī, “Pīshvā-yi āyandi yā Mahdī-yi Mu’ūd,” 9.



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monarchy, which represents tyranny, oppression and injustice. Therefore, the use of

monarchical words such as “kingdom” are no longer appropriate to be used for the government

of Mahdi, which is supposed to be the most just government on earth.

A further indication of a gradual shift to a revolutionary outlook is the appearance of the

topics of armed struggle and militancy. Āmulī stresses that, to achieve the governance of

Mahdi, the development of a powerful military is necessary to battle the critics of religion and

enemies of humanity and justice.493 The future outcome of Āmulī’s “readiness and militancy” is

evident in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as well as the resistance during the Iran-Iraq war.

Personal Qīyām against Enemies of Shi‘ism

One of the editors of Āyīn-i Islām, a cleric named Mahdī Sirāj Ansārī, had established a

religious organization called Struggle Against Irreligiosity and he was an active and prolific

religious writer defending against enemies such as Kasravī.494 He is worth mentioning within

this historical discourse because he is one of the most prolific Shi‘ite writers against anti-

religious polemics and he claims in his own words that he is a “religious propagator who felt

obligated to rise up (qīyām namāyam) for his religious duty.”495 Similar to the accumulating

rebuttals that took place in these years, Kasravī served as one of Ansārī’s targets in his series of

articles published and titled “Shī’ah chah mīgūyad? [What Says the Shi’a]” in Āyīn-i Islām. Ansārī

begins his articles by reminding his readers of the beginning of the Islamic time, by claiming



495 Mahdī Sirāj Ansāri, “Mā az Rawshanfikran va Pākdilan-i Jahān Dāvari Mītalabīm kah az Dāstān-i mā va Kasravī Āgāh Shudah va Ghizāvat Namāyand [We Demand Arbitration from the World’s Intellectuals and Pure-Hearted to become Aware of Our Story and Kasravī’s and Judge Us]” Āyīn-i Islām 2, no. 48 (3 Isfand 1324/22 February 1946): 5.

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that “the enemies of Shi‘ism have struggled to eradicate [the Shi‘ites],” whom Ansārī calls the

true “followers of justice and truth.”496 He claims that the enemies of Shi‘ism are using the

“belief in the Twelfth Imam as an excuse, will not stop at any vilification and defamation … [,]

and have accused and called a God-worshipping sect all types of names such as idol-

worshippers, worshippers of superstition, heretic, infidel etc ... .”497

While upset by these attacks on the Shi‘ite faith, Ansārī consoles his readers with an

assurance of God’s support and the idea that they may take comfort in His protection.498 Ending

his first article on a hopeful note, Ansārī reminds his readers that in spite of injustice, “from the

beginning, the God of Shi‘ites was their protector and the more enemies have pursued to

destroy this sect, the more God has defeated their plans and He augments the power of the

Shi‘ites on a daily basis and illuminates the realities of the Shi‘ites.”499 By adopting a consoling

tone, he encourages his readers to do personal qīyām like himself, and defend their honor.500

Rather, his tone calms them into placing their trust in the assured power of God, for as he

argues, one cannot have a more powerful friend and supporter than God.501

In the third part of this series of articles, Ansārī again addresses the theme of “enemies

of Shi‘ism,” this time focusing on the fact that, since the death of the eleventh Imam (Mahdi’s

father), the topic of the Twelfth Imam created great conflict between Shi‘ism and its

496 Mahdī Sirāj Ansāri, “Shī’ah chah mīgūyad? [What Says the Shi‘ite?]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 20, (11 Murdād 1325/2 August 1946): 7.

497 Ansāri, “Shī’ah chah mīgūyad?” 7.





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enemies.502 In this instance, Ansārī names the enemy: the controversial historian Ahmad

Kasravī.503

According to Ansārī, Kasravī’s “Shi’igari,” and other writings about the Imam Zaman,

may appear to present new ideas to “numbskull and uninformed youth who are unaware and

unsuspecting;”504 however, Kasravī’s claims were not considered novel by Ansārī because he

argues Kasravī has “a habit” of plagiarizing the “words of others and ascribing them to

himself.”505 By accusing Kasravī of plagiarism and dishonesty, Ansārī aims to diminish the

credibility of Kasravī’s arguments.

Ansārī spends the greater part of his articles on defensive response to Kasravī’s

criticism.506 Similar to other religious writers such as Khālisīzādah, Ansārī responds to the

critique of the impossibility of the Mahdi’s long life by referencing the “western scientific

discoveries” of Russian and American “professors” who have discovered drugs that extend

human life to one thousand years of age.507 Ansārī uses modern scientific discoveries as a

method by which to defend traditional religious beliefs. In response to the criticism that

Shi‘ites’ belief in “anticipating the appearance” of the Mahdi means passively waiting for the

502 Mahdī Sirāj Ansāri, “Shī’ah chah mīgūyad? [What Says the Shi‘ite?]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 21 (18 Murdād 1325/9 August 1946): 6.




506 Ansārī accuses Kasravī of being a materialist, a synonym for communist, claiming that Kasravī “is one hundred percent in agreement with the materialists and wants to reconcile materialism with religion and theism,” see Mahdī Sirāj Ansāri, “Shī’ah chah mīgūyad? [What Says the Shi‘ite?]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 28 (5 Mihr 1325/27 September 1946): 6.

507 Mahdī Sirāj Ansāri, “Shī’ah chah mīgūyad? [What Says the Shi‘ite?]” Āyīn-i Islām 3, no. 29 (12 Mihr 1325/4 October 1946): 6.

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Mahdi to appear and solve all problems while succumbing to oppression and allowing the

enemies of Islam to disparage the religion,508 Ansārī argues that a true anticipator knows his

religious responsibility and, like a “responsible soldier,” will always be prepared for combat, and

ready for sacrifice, and resistant to irreligion, aggression and abuse.509

Ansārī and Āmulī’s writings and refutations, while paler in comparison to the fiery calls

to action of Khomeini, contribute to the discursive shift in these transitional and formative

years. Furthermore, the accumulation of these rebuttals sets the fertile ground that Khomeini

initiated and creates a sense of urgency.

The Shah as a “Friend” and the Guardian of Shi‘ite Religion

Sirāj Ansārī’s “Ālāhazrat humāyūnī tavajuh farmāyand [His Royal Excellency Should Pay

Attention]” directly addresses “His Excellency the Shah” in respectful, flattering and

complimentary language, with no trace of anti-monarchist and anti-establishment sentiments

that are rampant in the later Revolutionary writings. Most significantly, when the piece was

written in 1947, Ansārī was one of the most outspoken and active detractors of anti-Shi‘ite

critics, such as Kasravī.

Referring to the young Shah’s recent address to seminary students in Azarbayjan, in

which the Shah argued that the majority of the people of Iran have religious inclinations, Ansārī

argues that religious inclination should not only be respected by the Shah but also be protected

508 Mahdī Sirāj Ansāri, “Shī’ah chah mīgūyad? [What Says the Shi‘ite?]” Āyīn-i Islām 4, no. 35 (24 Ābān 1325/15 November 1946): 6.


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by the Shah against anti-religious actions.510 Ansārī appeals to the Shah for protection to

support and reinforce the religious inclination within the population that the Shah himself

recognized.511

When Ansārī wrote his appeal to the Shah, the Pahlavi regime was not yet an enemy of

Shi‘ite religion or Iranian society the way it became in the Revolutionary period. Ansārī

addresses the Shah as the friend and protector of the Shi‘ite religion, and Ansārī appeals to the

Shah to defend Shi‘ite religion. This rapprochement with the monarchy and designating and

highlighting the ruling establishment as a ”friend” and counterpart in the fight against the

“enemies of Shi‘ism,” is similar to Khomeini, who in Kashf-i asrār [Unveiling of Secrets], was still

appealing to the good graces of the monarchy and chastising those who intended to create a

rift and discord between the clergy and the state.

Ansārī asks for the Shah’s assistance by pointing out the promulgation of materialism,

anti-religious behaviour and activities in Iran, such as widespread sites of gambling, alcohol

stores, clubs and parties of mixed genders ... etc.512 Ansārī presents the prevention of

corruption in society as the most essential of all basic state measures,513 and he compares the

Shah’s responsibility towards the Iranian society to an architect,

because no matter how skillful an architect, if he wants to erect a building, he

will be no match against countless agents of destruction who will continuously

target his building; hence, the first step is to get rid of the destructors and then

510 Mahdī Sirāj Ansāri, “Ālāhazrat humāyūnī tavajuh farmāyand [His Royal Excellency Should Pay Attention]” Āyīn-i Islām 4, no. 11 (12 Tīr 1326/4 July 1947): 2.

511 Ansārī, “Ālāhazrat humāyūnī tavajuh farmāyand,” 2-3.



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proceed to build the building.514

Ansārī repeatedly appeals to the Shah as the only official in whom the people place their trust

and still have expectations because they have lost hope in the efficacy of all other government

institutions.515 Ansārī prays for the Shah and wishes that the Shah’s rule “remain under the

protection of almighty God and receive the special attentions of the Twelfth Imam for the

country’s independence … and the promulgation of the Ja’fari religion … .”516

As demonstrated, we can see that during this transitional period, religious writers such

as Khomeini and Ansārī have a conciliatory attitude toward the monarchy. To Ansārī, the Shah

is the primary recourse both to safeguard Shi‘ism in Iran and to combat sources of irreligiosity

and corruption. However, during the emergence of the Revolutionary period, the Shah will

become the epitome of vice and religious corruption, and he will be portrayed as public enemy

number one.

Ulama as Guardians of Charm and Magic

Pseudo-Philosophers

Several books by activists and clerics attempt to defend against the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va

Afsūn. The “intellectual struggle” against Marxism, Communism and materialism, was quite

widespread in “religious literature” during these developing years.517 “Tens of titles were

published” such as Communism and Morality (1330/1951), by Seyed Qulāmrizā Saīdī; Ihrāq-i





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Lānihāy-i Fisād dar radd-i Yāvihāy-i Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn [Burning the Nest of Corruption

in Rejecting the Guardians’ Nonsense] (1331/1952) ; Regarding Materialism or the Source of

Corruption (1333/1954), by Sirāj Ansārī; Communism from the Point of View of Reason and

Islam (1334/1955), by Abulfazl Nabavī Qumī; and After Communism, the Government of Truth

and Justice (1333/1954), by Abdulhussein Kāfī.518

Fīlsūfnamāhā [Pseudo-Philosophers] (1336/1956), by Nāsir Makārim Shīrazī, who is

currently an important Iranian religious leader and was once part of the Islamic Republic of

Iran’s early ruling class, is a response to Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn [Guardians of Charm and

Magic] that takes the form of fiction. A contemporary pro-Makārim Shīrazī website that has

published a copy of the Pseudo-Philosophers maintains that this book is written in the style of a

novel and combines the “communist style of thinking … and their wrong and weak points,” with

some social and historical realities.519 Though Makārim Shīrazī was not a professional novelist,

the book was extremely popular, and with thirty publications it became one of the most

influential and best-selling books of the 1950s decade.520 Makārim Shīrazī is credited with

feeling “a sense of duty and using the modern and attractive medium of a novel to critique and

undermine” the leftist ideologies.521

Makārim Shīrazī writes in the voice of Mahmud and details leftist ideologies and

viewpoints by offering counterarguments supported by the text of Qur’an and hadith. Leftists

518 Ja‘farīyān, Jaryānhā va sāzmānhā-yi mazhabī-sīyāsī-i Irān, 360 n1.

519 “Rumān-i khāndani-yi Ayatullāh Makārim Shīrazī,” Tibyān, accessed April 6, 2017, http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=128066

520 Tibyān, “Rumān-i khāndani-yi Ayatullāh Makārim Shīrazī.”

521 Tibyān, “Rumān-i khāndani-yi Ayatullāh Makārim Shīrazī.”

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are referred to as “communists,” “materialists,” and “fake philosophers” or “pseudo-

philosophers.” Mahmud, the religious protagonist of the story, explains that when the original

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn [Guardians of Charm and Magic] was published, its extreme

disrespect for religion elicited such vehement opposition, including from the communists

themselves, that communist leaders denied ownership by accusing imperialist powers of

publishing and falsely attributing the book to the communists.522 Mahmud rejects the

communists’ disavowal of authorship, arguing that communists will say and do anything to

advance their goal of revolution.523

Mahmud explains the views of communists regarding religion. He argues that while

Russian communist leaders refrained from open aggression and criticism against religion in

order to not raise the ire of the religious population, Iranian communists committed a faux-pas

by not following their Russian leaders’ example and by not taking into account the religious

atmosphere of Iran and published the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn.524 Fīlsūfnamāhā, through the

person of Mahmud, then proceeds to challenge the communist accusations presented in the

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn that God and religion are the creations of human thought and they

believe the best way to combat religion is through advancing the scientific materialist

worldview, especially among the youth.

It is evident that Makārim Shīrazī, similar to many religious Iranians of the time,

regarded the leftists and their communist ideology as enemies of the Shi‘ite religion and its way

522 Nāsir Makārim Shīrazī, Fīlsūfnamāhā [Pseudo-Philosophers] (Qum: Hikmat, 1336/1956), 15.

523 Makārim Shīrazī, Fīlsūfnamāhā, 16-17.

524 Makārim Shīrazī, Fīlsūfnamāhā, 20.

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of life. Therefore, it was imperative that someone had to respond to such an anti-Shi‘ite book

that was allegedly published by the communists, by using a similar discourse and language as

the communists themselves. Fīlsūfnamāhā also focuses on identifying the “enemies” of Shi‘ism

and the enemies’ methods of destruction are pointed out to the Shi‘ite readers. The readers are

warned of the dangers and potential damage that this anti-religious thinking and ideology can

implement on the Iranian nation and population.

Bandits of Truth and Reality or Returnees to Barbarism and Ignorance

In addition to these responses, a foremost important book examined here is a collection

of the aforementioned cleric, Muhammad Khālisīzādah, whose speeches against the

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn, published as a book in February 1952 and titled Rāhzanān-i Haq va

Haqīqat [Bandits of Truth and Reality or Returnees to Barbarism and Ignorance]. Amongst other

rebuttal works examined during this transitional historical period, Khālisīzādah is an important

cleric as he has taken it upon himself to address the leftist elements in the polemical attacks.

Religious apologists such as Khālisīzādah believe that the enemy’s aim is the obliteration of

faith and morality, and they want to stress the morally depraved characteristic of the enemy.

The Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat included parts of the original Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn

and requested its readers “to read the book [Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn] attentively and to

recommend it to others as well so as to get informed of some people’s … insanity … and their

enmity to truth … and to do your responsibility to obey God’s command.”525 While the

Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat had initially informed its readers that it will include a full copy of

525 Muhammad Khālisīzādah, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat [Bandits of Truth and Reality] (Baqdād: Chāpkhān-i Ma’ārif, 1330/1952), 1 & 19.

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the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn book to satisfy “its readers’ curiosity,” yet only the introduction

and three final pages of the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn were included. An accompanying

explanation justified the decision by claiming that “the rest of the book is a repetition of the

same … and except for a few sentences here and there, it didn’t have any other useful

information.”526 With this meager and unsatisfactory explanation, and in contradiction to their

own promise in the introduction of the book, the publishers do not include the full copy of the

alleged “communist” Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn. Khālisīzādah impresses upon the publication

and spread of the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn believing that all Muslims must become aware of

it in order to perform their religious duty to combat and counter it.527 While this

recommendation is repeated throughout the book and the introduction had promised that the

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn will be included in its entirety, yet the book contradicts itself and

only the introduction and three final pages are included. This blatant contradiction in the

Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat’s introduction undermines the author’s repeated emphasis on this

importance and a Muslim’s responsibility of “fully and attentively studying” this book. It leads

one to presume that the author suffices it to only provide his readers with the

counterarguments because, in reality, he could be wary of allowing people to read the

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn. Especially because copies of the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn were

sparse and hard to find, even during the time of its publication.

After the introduction, a general overview of the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn is provided

which begins by explaining that the title is aimed at the clerics and “preachers of religion and in

526 Khālisīzādah, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat, 31.

527 Khālisīzādah, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat, 75 & 124.

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addition, it insults God, prophets, and especially the last prophet (Muhammad) and especially

his holiness the Imam of Time.”528 The author further argues that he wants to take this

opportunity to impress upon the scholars of religion to “endeavour harder in explaining and

extolling the science and realities of Islam and to publish so that it no longer leaves any

opportunity for enemies.”529

Khālisīzādah and other religious defenders believe that the Muslim youth and society

are enthralled and enchanted by western lifestyle and progress, and therefore they urge

Muslim leaders to work harder to educate their Muslim audience that Islam has many similar

qualities. Schmitt argues that “a political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically

ugly,”530 and in fact, Khālisīzādah believes that it is the allure of the enemy’s way of life that is a

threat to the Shi‘ite identity. That is why Khālisīzādah insists that his colleagues should

endeavor to enlighten Muslims of the “science and realities of Islam” in order to rival and

compete with the attraction of the enemy.531 The poison of communism must be expunged

from the youth’s minds and to do this, religious scholars must prove to the youth that science is

not separate from religion and “science without godliness is pure ignorance.”532

Khālisīzādah’s demand to his colleagues is a great example of a desire and drive for

more engagement and active participation from religious groups and clerics in defending or

combatting their shared views. In other words, the clerics are keenly noticing the confrontation






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and attacks directed at them and their beliefs and they realize that they must begin

conceptualizing their views, especially those related to the Mahdi, in a novel, different and

acceptable manner in the new modern era. Khālisīzādah ends the introduction by reasserting

that “all Muslim governments should publish books such as the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn and

not ban them so that religious people should know of the communists’ ominous design and not

fear such publications because they … only attract some naïve people and if these books are

given to a scientist, they will point out the book’s delusions and superstitions.”533

The importance of the religious writers’ rejections and refutations is their insistence on

clarifying any doubts or reservations that have been created for Shi‘ites, especially “the

tempting of naïve young people.”534 The anger of religious groups and individuals is mostly

directed at the idea that “impressionable” and “naïve” Muslim youth and children’s piety and

faith is being threatened by communists, atheists or other enemies. They are afraid and

worried of losing future Shi‘ite generations to these new ideologies and hence they feel the

urgency of combatting their views and stress on a Muslim’s responsibility and duty to do the

same.

Against the accusations of the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn that mocked the appearance

of the Mahdi, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat argues by resorting to sayings from the Prophet

Muhammad and other Imams that state “at the end of time some events will happen after

which his excellency the Imam of Time will appear and we have already witnessed these events



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and the truths of these news from a thousand three hundred years ago has been proven.”535

These aforementioned events that the author claims have been already occurring are: denial

and rejection of Qur’an and prayer, men and women engaging in business together, the spread

of adultery and children born out of wedlock … etc, which are all signs of contemporary

times.536 The author believes that people who did not belong to this day and age at least had an

excuse, however, contemporary deniers of the appearance of Mahdi have no excuse since they

are currently witnessing the events of the end of time.537

Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat also claims that all the qualities of the Dajjāl (anti-Christ)

correspond with the communists based on shared qualities mentioned in the hadiths: they both

attempt to hide the truth; the Dajjāl claims to be God and kills those who worship the real God,

the same way the communist leaders act like God and communists have killed God-worshipers

in communist-controlled areas.538 The book finally concludes that the communists are the

Dajjāl and therefore, their presence proves that this is the time of the appearance of the

promised Mahdi.539 Furthermore, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat argues that the hadiths predict

that Christ and the promised Mahdi will both combat the Dajjāl at the End of Time, therefore

“Christians and Muslims will join forces to get rid of the oppression of Dajjāl (communist Dajjāl)

… since they work for the same goal.”540




538 Khālisīzādah, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat, 50-51.



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He next addresses several points related to this argument which are the same ones used

by other authors who attempt to prove the existence of the Mahdi. These arguments include

the Shi‘ite view that the belief in the existence of the Mahdi requires belief in monotheism.541

Another argument is that all faiths and religions, whether Christianity, Buddhism, or Judaism

also anticipate a promised Messiah; and regarding those who deny Mahdi’s long life, he asserts

that these people do not believe in scientific progress and even accuses them of prohibiting the

evolution of science, since scientific advances can easily lengthen one’s life.542

Furthermore, the communists accuse that the belief in the Mahdi forces people to

endure oppression and prohibits them from struggling against oppression since they wait for

the Mahdi to appear and remove their oppression.543 The author proceeds to argue against this

accusation in more detail by using the Qur’anic story of God’s punishment of the Israelites for

their sole reliance on Moses and their inactivity and lack of struggle against their deplorable

situation.544 It is further asserted that “as oppression itself is forbidden in Islamic shari’a, so is

enduring it and not struggling against it, and it is obligatory to struggle against oppression and it

is not permitted that shari’a rules remain suspended by anticipating the appearance of the

Imam of Time.”545 The followers of Mahdi should endeavour as best they can in performing

shari’a acts, which includes the expulsion of oppression which pleases the Mahdi and that is

why “you see that the Iranian nation is showing resistance to heresy and the power of the






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communists and they will not sit idly by until all communists are perished.”546

To counter the communists’ argument that Islam is decaying and is at odds with science

and intellect, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat merely proceeds to argue through citing Qur’anic

verses and maintaining that the Qur’an and sayings have already proven such scientific

discoveries as the atom and the speed of light.547 In other future religious publications we can

see a shift in this argumentation where instead of solely focusing on unpersuasive arguments

based on religious texts, which non-religious individuals do not believe in the first place, the

religious writers resort to citing from Western scientists and their works in a bid to be relatable

and convincing to their hesitant readers. The author of Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat further

chastises the communists who deny the existence of God, solely based on their limited

knowledge, especially since “they have themselves admitted that science evolves day by day

and it is currently imperfect,” hence, how dare they deny God with this imperfect and

incomplete science?548

Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat laments that no one ever responds or counters the

arguments of the communists and interestingly religious scholars are criticized for being the

only ones aware of religious truths and never seeking to inform people or to eliminate doubts

or superstitions.549 In an instance of self-directed reproach and criticism of religious scholars,

Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat bemoans that a lack of resources and means such as “journals,





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propagators, leaders, office or radio” hinders efforts of reaching people.550 Due to these

shortcomings, “the realities of Islam” are restricted only to seminaries and “worse yet, Islamic

propagation and pulpits are mostly occupied by the uneducated and uninformed who relay

misinformation about Islam,”551 which creates further confusion and objection. Unfortunately,

knowledgeable and “real scholars and mujtahids refuse to go on the pulpits or write in journals

or speak on the radio.”552

A sign of the shift in this transitional period is that defenders like Khālisīzādah feel that

in order to convey their message and combat their enemies they need to find new methods of

communication to reach a broader audience such as the radio. In order to prohibit the

publication of such books as Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn and to thwart their influence,

Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat further stresses upon scholars to “show determination in declaring

the realities of Islam to the world, to personally speak from the pulpits and on radios and to

send missionaries all over the world.”553 The responsibility is placed on the shoulders of the

scholars who had failed to divulge the realities of religion to people, and failed to put a stop to

the spread of superstition that was done in the name of religion, which has resulted in

confusion and misguidance amongst the people.554

Khālisīzādah asserts that the modern world should be built based on the truths of Islam

and the modern world cannot be managed except with the teachings of Islam and only Islam





554 Khālisīzādah, Rāhzanān-i Haq va Haqīqat, 74 & 124.

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can stop the superstitions of communism.555 He urges young people who desire true progress

and modernity to rise (qīyām) against communism with all their power in order to destroy its

superstition.556 The author stresses the importance of eradicating communism and believes

only the teachings of Islam can succeed in doing that and he asserts that it is the responsibility

of each person to rise (qīyām ) for this serious matter.557 It is important to note that the

concept of “rising up” (qīyām) which is chiefly used in relation to Mahdi and his eventual

uprising or an invitation for people to rise against injustice in the world is here attributed to

one’s responsibility in combating communism through education and spread of information.

It is incumbent upon each pious Muslim to dispel superstition and reveal Islam’s truths

until no trace of communism remains and even if this type of society or group [majma’] is not

established, it is still every individual’s responsibility to rise up (qīyām) for this important

matter.558 A Muslim should only expect self-satisfaction and rewards in the afterlife as forms of

compensation for his/her struggle against communism or other enemies.559 However, in the

Revolutionary period, the responsibilities and ideals of Shi‘ite Muslims are more concrete and

rewarding as they are called to rise up and implement a just and egalitarian government,

country or society and a peaceful and utopian world, especially in regards to anticipating the

Mahdi.

In this chapter we witness the transformation of the religious groups’ reasoning from






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being a primarily religious argumentation and reliance on Qur’an and hadith – a method and

outlook that was examined in the “Parousia Postponed” period, Chapter Two – to an increasing

reliance on logic and reason, and gradually the conception of Mahdi is transformed from one

regarded as superstitious, to one defended by rational methods. Contending works of Kasravī,

Hakamīzādah and the Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn have compelled religious groups and thinkers

to face the pressing challenge of moving away from purely defensive and polemical tones, and

instead inspired them to shape and initiate an understanding of Mahdi that is novel and

dynamic.

This shift and transformation will increasingly become viewed as a necessity by the

religious groups who gradually begin to utilize the terminology of leftists and progressives to be

relatable to a changing and developing society. There was initially a period that displayed a

distant polemical messianic worldview that was devoid of its own positive plan, and now as

examined and illustrated in this chapter, through dialogue and interaction with progressive

nationalists, secularists and leftists, similar viewpoints and notions, (such as utopia, progress,

revolution, rising up … ) become infiltrated and seep into religious groups’ terminology. This

adaptation and appropriation demonstrates the shift from an earlier phase in which Shi‘ites

patiently anticipated the Mahdi to appear and in the process were accused of promulgating

superstition, and instead demarcates the awakening dynamism of religious groups whose new

understanding of Mahdi involves talking less of Mahdi-impersonators, and focusing more on

Mahdi’s uprising, Mahdi’s government and linking it to borrowed and inspired terminology,

such as social justice, revolution … etc. Religious groups and writers have unwittingly begun

planning and bringing about this positive revolutionary Mahdist project.

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The Hujjatīya: Apolitical Defense of the Mahdi

An Islamic organization that was chiefly concerned with the Mahdi, the “Anjuman-i

Khayrīyah Hujjatīyah Mahdavīyah, (Hujjatīya Society),560 was established in 1332/1954. This

institution was established with the activism of Haj Shaikh Mahmūd Halabī.561 Their main

activities known to the public, included propagation of Shi‘ite knowledge on the Imam of Time,

organization of sermons, and celebration of the birth of Mahdi.562 It is accepted knowledge that

this society existed and was undisputedly dedicated to the Mahdi, yet due to its banned and

secretive nature, there were limitations in accessing material for Hujjatīya.563 This organization

was created to combat enemies of Islam and Shi‘ism, specifically the Babis/Baha’is and the

secularists. Amanat maintains that the Hujjatīya Society advocated “vigilance for the impending

advent of the Mahdi and for combating what they considered to be deniers of the Mahdi’s

return – above all, the Baha'is of Iran.”564 In essence, Amanat believes that the Hujjatīya was

founded to combat the perceived growth of Baha’ism in Iran and anti-Baha’i activities.

However, I argue against this viewpoint, because anti-Baha’i activities were already

rampant and very common from several decades prior. If this Society was established only

because of the Baha’is, it would have been established several decades earlier when anti-Baha’i

sentiments began with the birth of this religion. As I examined in Chapter Two on postponed

560 Devotees of Hujjat al-Allah: the proof of God, the Mahdi.



563 During my research in Iran, I did not find any material in the National Archives and when I made contacts to acquire some further information, my interlocutors informed me that access is denied and they started to interrogate me instead.


167

Mahdism, during this time, minority religions represented the most important, if not the only

opponents and “enemies” of Shi‘ism. Yet, the Hujjatīya Society was established decades later

during the transitional years and after the accumulation and spread of many more polemical

voices and ideologies such as the progressive nationalists, secularists, and especially the leftists.

The inception of this organization appears to be in response to the controversial publication of

Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn as it was founded soon after its publication. And this further

supports my argument that this organization was not solely founded due to anti-Baha’i

sentiments, but was part of the rise of the Shi‘ite defensive rebuttals.

Arjomand also discusses the Hujjatīya’s role in post-1979 Iranian Revolution and does

not clarify its function in its early years, only mentioning that they were concerned chiefly with

combatting and refuting Baha’ism as the main enemy of Islam.565 Khalaji argues that the

Hujjatīya were “an ideological group” that “advocated a traditional view of Islam,” which meant

it acknowledged the nonreligious ruling establishment and prohibited any attempts to

overthrow it; hence, Khomeini was always at odds with them.566

After the 1979 Revolution, the Society encountered much opposition from the

revolutionary Islamic forces who were gaining increasing power. Some of the accusations

levelled against them were that the religious activities of the Society was of a cultural nature

and not politically ideological and in line with Khomeini’s notion of the Guardianship of the

Jurisconsult, hence they were “stationary as opposed to dynamic.”567 Khomeini banned the

565 Saïd Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 157.

566 Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics: on the Rationality of Iranian Policy, 6 & 10.

567 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 157.

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Hujjatīya in 1983 because of its unpopular anti-war stance and also because he was concerned

about the influence of competing Shi‘ite messianic trends that could potentially “reshape his

leadership and the direction of his revolution,” hence he had to “harness and disband” any such

organizations, of which Hujjatīya was the most important one.568 While the Hujjatīya is

consistently considered as a traditionalist and apolitical Iranian religious organization, according

to Khalaji, it is possible that at some point, the revolutionary atmosphere and discourse

affected their viewpoint.569 Khalaji argues that even though the “concept of revolution was

absent in Hujjatīya’s discourse by principle,” yet two books were published570 by this

organization that represented the Mahdi as “a revolutionary leader.”571

Conclusion

This chapter traced Shi‘ite clerics’ arguments in significant works written in response to

attacks from polemical voices such as national progressives, secularists, reformers and leftists.

It showed a nascent and gradual shift in the defensive writings of the religious groups and

personalities as they recognize their need for an alternative project and explanation that both

distinguishes them from previously established enemies such as Babis and Baha’is, and

produces a satisfying response to new challenges posed by new enemies, such as secular,

reformist and leftist detractors. Signs of a shift toward a revolutionary understanding of Mahdi

stems from these polemics and rebuttals.

568 Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi‘ism, 68 & 222.

569 Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics: on the Rationality of Iranian Policy, 11.

570 Several attempts were made to find copies of these books from the interlibrary loan, but I was informed that the copies are unfortunately lost or stolen.

571 Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics: on the Rationality of Iranian Policy, 11.

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In the next chapter, I will describe the Revolutionary Mahdist temporality which

occurred due to the culmination of the transformative shift examined in the transitional period.

As argued and illustrated in this chapter, the increase in the usage of terms and concepts such

as Khomeini’s urgent behest to rising up (qīyām), Āmulī’s referral to Mahdi’s government,

administration, and his “utopic city,” and the general increase and dynamism in the activism of

religious groups and personalities, is indicative that they are no longer merely concerned with

defending a distant understanding of Mahdi. Rather the shift and changes in their environment

compelled them to create a new understanding of the concept of Mahdi that is future oriented

and revolutionary, and as it will be illustrated in the next chapter, it prepares them for an

exciting and imminent new understanding of the concept of the Mahdi.

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Chapter 5 – Revolutionizing Messianism

Introduction

The emergence of a redeemer who is present and imminent in the Shi‘ite discourse

highlights the inadequacy of human agency alone to bring about change. Unlike Christian

discourse however, around the return of Jesus which regarded human action as dispensable

in the face of God’s all-knowing ownership of the final hour, the Shi‘ite counter-contestation

of the intelligentsia’s re-inscription of human agency re-affirms the Godly mandate of the

redeemer facilitated by human agency.572 The Shi‘ite counter-turn also accepts the necessary

‘fact-ness’ or inevitability of the end of time; and end of time made possible through human

interventions and investment (e.g. purposeful end of time characterized and enabled by

utopian governance). The Mahdi is divinely planned but mediated by the actions of believers

and subjects in a teleological fashion.

In this chapter, I describe the final stage of the transformation of the Mahdi concept to

the revolutionary understanding. In this Revolutionary period, the concept of Mahdi has

become ideologically and politically advantageous. Shi‘ite groups are ready for the arrival of

Mahdi and they are preparing the conditions for Mahdi’s appearance. In the second half of

the twentieth century there were many figures who contributed to the ideologization of

Shi‘ism, prominent among them are Seyed Mahmūd Tāliqānī, Ali Shariati, and Mahdi

Bazargan. Mir Zohair Husain calls the "ideologization of Islam" as the “reaffirmation of Islam

as a political idiom in which Islamic symbols, ideas, and ideals are cultivated by

572 Tat-Siong Benny Liew, Politics of Parousia: Reading Mark Inter(con)textually (Boston: Brill, 1999), 120.

171

practitioners”573 of Islam. This ideological revolutionary and understanding of Mahdi did not

emerge from a vacuum: Shi‘ite writers of Iran were influenced and there is evidence that their

ideas and discourse changed over time due to a broader discursive context. Shi‘ite discourse is

highly affected by leftist discursive innovations which influenced Iranian society by producing

brand-new ways of thinking and by helping to transform or re-interpret the meaning of ideas,

symbols and notions from the national cultural tradition, based on foreign ideologies that

were on the rise.574 I argue that the leftist influence did not produce a new type of ideology

but rather the prominence of their critiques prompted Shi‘ite clerics to re-interpret the

existing and established, yet distant understanding of Mahdi into a revolutionary one whose

arrival was deemed to be happening now; Parousia postponed became Parousia now.

Religious groups and personalities began to respond to this leftist influence and to

break from their comfort zones. Clerics were hard-pressed to better define their identity and

views vis-à-vis these leftist ideas and commence their dynamic understanding of the figure of

Mahdi. Shi‘ite activists and religious personalities begin appropriating terms floating about

during their contemporary time and were engaged in discussions using new terminology

previously absent in Shi‘ite discourse. Terms take on new definitions and are redefined, terms

such as reason, utopia, social justice, Mahdi’s universal government, and Mahdi’s revolution,

which have strong associations with leftist ideology. Through this “transformation and re-

573 Mir Zohair Husain, “The Ideologization of Islam: Meaning, Manifestations and Causes,” in Islam in a Changing World, eds. Anders Jerichow & J.B. Simonsen (London: Routledge, 1997), 91.

574 Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World. trans. Michael Pallis (London: Zed Press, 1979), 44.

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interpretation of the meaning of ideas and symbols,”575 religious groups begin to associate

these predominantly leftist terms with the appearance and revolt of Mahdi. With the

adoption of this novel terminology, Shi‘ite activists and religious writers revamp their

discourse into a positive project of revolution where the conceptualized future belongs to the

Mahdi.

Religious groups and personalities use Mahdi as a vehicle of social deliverance for

Shi‘ites during a time they considered the world, and especially their country, to be brimming

with injustice and oppression. This illustrates Rodinson’s contention that “the ‘introduction’ of

communist ideology in underdeveloped countries takes place subtly. Certain selected themes

and notions of communist propaganda are presented to the people, who then spontaneously

select those themes, ideas and actions which answer to their own aspirations.”576 I argue that

a revolutionary understanding of Mahdi differed from most leftist ideals, as one notion of

Marxism prophesized “a society of total harmony, with no State, bureaucracy or law.”577

Aware that there existed strong incompatibilities between Shi‘ism and leftist ideology, Shi‘ite

religious groups and personalities inadvertently appropriated leftist terms to push forward

their revolutionary messianic discourse. Specifically, Shi‘ites believed that the Marxian

“utopia” lacked Islam’s holy shari’a law and therefore, they had a deficient utopia, while the

Mahdist utopia would be filled with justice and law [adl va dād]. In addition, religious Shi‘ites

575 Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, 44.


577 Martin Krygier, “Review of Marxism and Law, by Martin Collins” U.N.S.W. Law Journal 6, no. 2 (1983): 240.

173

believed that the appearance of a specific religious figure, the Mahdi, would bring forth such

harmony.

The appearance of the Mahdi is no longer unannounced, vague and distant as it was in

the previous decades discussed in Chapters Two and Three (pre-1940s). Instead, the

conditions for the appearance of the Mahdi are here and imminent and Shi‘ites cannot sit idly

by and contentedly wait for a distant Mahdi to appear. In this chapter, I show that Shi‘ites

expect Mahdi’s appearance and arrival by actively planning and organizing for his appearance

and demonstrating their readiness for the Imam of the Time. They feel compelled to seriously

embark on and begin the work of making the appearance a reality. I argue that these

aspirations become part of the Mahdist project in bringing about the revolutionary shift in the

understanding of Mahdi.

Two of the most discussed aspects and elements of Mahdi’s appearance and evidence

of a future-oriented outlook are his promised uprising and his eventual establishment of a

government which represent the ultimate ideals of victory for Twelver Shi‘ism and epitomize

Mahdi’s ultimate goal and accomplishment. While in the previous chapter I examined a nascent

referral to Mahdi’s advent (qīyām) and Mahdi’s universal government, in this chapter I will

examine religious personalities and writings that use new terminology and actively refer to the

revolution of Mahdi (qīyām va inghilāb-i Mahdī) as well as the governance or government of

Mahdi (hukūmat-i Mahdī). Arjomand also attests to this increase in apocalyptic Mahdist

sentiment in pre-revolutionary days. However, Arjomand does not detect and trace this

emergence as early as I do in this research, nor does he examine the transformation of the

174

understanding of Mahdi. He only points to this increased apocalypticism in the later decades as

part of the general revival of religion in the late 1960s and 1970s and only argues that “there

was a marked increase in the popularity of du'ā-yi nudbah, the supplication for the return of the

Hidden Imam as the Mahdi."578

In this chapter I will examine the messianic revolutionary discourse that shaped this

Revolutionary period, beginning with the writings of religious revolutionary activists such as

Muhammad Taqī Burhanī, Hussein Nūrī and Ali Davānī, Seyed Mahmūd Tāliqānī, and

Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī. This chapter concludes with the most quintessential Iranian

religious revolutionary figures of the late 1960s - 1970s such as Mahdi Bazargan, Murtizā

Mutahharī, Ali Shariati and Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, all of whom begin to produce

increasingly revolutionary material. These writers are excitedly anticipating the future and

predicting great upheaval and ushering Mahdi’s utopic and universal government.

Futurist Shi‘ism

Many Shi‘ite personalities and figures incidentally adopt leftist ideology. Rodinson

maintains that many Muslims commonly re-interpret their own religious symbols and ideas as

the equivalents of existing communist themes and ideas.579 In this manner novel or foreign

ideas can become Islamicized, and consequently made more understandable and accessible

to the faithful, and “at the same time classical Islam is credited with ideas and discoveries



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which are usually believed to be of European origin.”580 Seyed Mahmūd Tāliqānī (1911-1979)

was one of the most important and leading clerical figures of the early revolutionary

movement in Iran, with Abrahamian calling him “a maverick among religious leaders" who

was jailed often because of his lectures and activities against the Pahlavi monarchy.581 Tāliqānī

is well-known for his affinities for leftist thinking, and his writings appear to be highly

influenced by socialist ideology. His most popular book, Islam and Property (1330/1952)582

“argued that socialism and Islam were compatible because God had created the world for

mankind and had no intention of dividing humanity into exploiting and exploited classes.”583

Signs of Tāliqānī’s socialist affinities are further evident in an article titled “Anticipating

the Appearance” that was published in the religious journal Majmū-’i Hikmat in 1338/1960.

Tāliqānī explains that humanity’s “ideal city” or utopia is God’s governance on people by the

people, where social justice, freedom, universal brotherhood and friendly cooperation

prevails.584 It is evident that based on early Islamic rules, politics and religion are the same

and are inseparable in this universal government.585 Describing the circumstances of the

Mahdi’s appearance at the end of time, Tāliqānī employs both a religious language, as well as

using leftist terminology to talk about the three hundred and thirteen followers of the Mahdi



582 The second edition of this book was in 1330/1952, however I have not been able to locate the first edition.


584 Seyed Mahmūd Tāliqānī, “Dar Intizār-i Zuhūr [Anticipating the Appearance]” Majmū’i Hikmat 3, no. 2

(Farvardīn 1338/April 1959): 12-18.

585 Tāliqānī, “Dar Intizār-i Zuhūr,” 12-18.

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who rise up after his appearance to assist him. He explains that they are “the special

companions and the special nucleus of this organization (hasti-yi markazī-yi īn tashkīlāt)” of

the Mahdi.586 He describes them further by increasingly leftist terms such as, “this group are

the managers of different organizations (tashkīlāt) and heads of parties (sarān-i hizb),”587 by

utilizing the distinctly leftist terms, “tashkīlāt” and “hizb,” that mean “organization” and

“party or group.” Furthermore, he describes the role of these parties in assisting the Mahdi in

performing “reforms (islāhāt)” and “serving the community (khidmat bi ijtimā’).”588

Tāliqānī further points to many socialist ideals that have been the promise of

communists and Marxists, such as the “ideal utopic city of humankind,” “freedom,” “universal

brotherhood and social justice,” and asserts that these promises will be established through

the appearance of the Mahdi.589 He argues that since “politics and religion are the same and

inseparable,” and in this universal government that is based on “the initial orders of Islam,”

spirituality will be strong and worldwide, and materials will be used by humanity as well.590

These earlier writings of Tāliqānī that showcase the emergence of his socialist

sympathies are described as a movement of many "Shia clerics” who attempted to blend

Shi‘ism “with Marxist ideals in order to compete with leftist movements for youthful

586 Tāliqānī, “Dar Intizār-i Zuhūr,” 14.





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supporters."591 Through resorting to some sayings of the Imams, Tāliqānī has to “perforce”

point out in the concluding remarks that the topic of the appearance of a rightful government

[dawlat-i haq] and the establishment of Islam’s administration [hukūmat-i Islām] and the

implementation of Qur’anic laws at the hands of the upriser (qā’im) of the house of

Muhammad has been mentioned frequently in Muslim sources.592 Tāliqānī ends the article by

asserting that all Muslims agree on the basis of this belief and prays for both the appearance

of the Mahdi and the establishment of his universal rule, as well as for the salvation of

“material-worshipping humans of both east and west,”593 which he means to refer to

communist and socialist followers.

Two aspects of this article are significant in clearly distinguishing it from earlier

religious writings that appeared during the postponed Mahdist period. The terms used to

identify and describe the Mahdi no longer simply represent a distant and patient view of the

Mahdi such as “guider” and “peacemaker.” Instead the Mahdi is called the “riser,” which

denotes characteristics such as action, upheaval and change. Furthermore, an important shift

in outlook to the concept of Mahdi can be discerned in the increase of the types of prayers

that actively express angst and impatience for the Mahdi’s appearance and use terms such as

demanding God to “expedite” or “hasten” the appearance of Mahdi. This is a clear shift and a

demarcation in praying methods for the appearance of Mahdi from the earliest period, which

591 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: Norton, 2006), 126–127.

592 Tāliqānī, “Dar Intizār-i Zuhūr,” 12-18.


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I argue demonstrates a definite shift in understanding the concept of Mahdi.

Seyed Hādī Khosrawshāhī, who is currently a well-known cleric in the Iranian ruling

establishment, published an article titled “Universal Peacemaker/Reformer” in which he

begins by using the novel and untranslated term “futurism,” and arguing that this concept

“means belief in the period of the End of Time and anticipating the appearance of the hidden

saviour and the great universal peacemaker.”594 He continues that this concept of “futurism”

is a definite principle of all monotheistic religions, but because of “provocations of the

enemies of Islam,” the concept of Mahdism has been reduced to “a baseless superstition.”595

Khosrawshāhī offers the religion of Shi‘ism as the suitable response for achieving

several ideological and global concepts of the time, such as socialism’s Third Camp,

succeeding to bring about “international peace,” and offering a “united Muslim front” in

response to “neo pan-Islamism.”596 In another article titled “Our Great and Universal

Peacemaker/Reformer,” similar to his previous article and others published later, this current

article is significant since terms and concepts that were mostly part of the secular or

communist discourse, and were not necessarily Mahdist descriptions or characteristics, were

applied and used to describe the concept of Mahdi. Some of these terms are “universal,”

“freedom and brotherhood (āzādī va barādarī),” human society (jāmiy’i basharī),” and “holy

594 Seyed Hādī Khosrawshāhī, “Muslih-i Jahānī [Universal Peacemaker/Reformer]” Nāmi-yi Āstān-i Quds no. 3, (Bahman 1339/February 1961): 18.

595 Khosrawshāhī, “Muslih-i Jahānī,” 18.

596 Khosrawshāhī, “Muslih-i Jahānī,” 19.

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ideals (ārmān-i muqadas).”597

Arjomand also attests to this growing communist discourse within the “clerical

activists of Qom” by maintaining that for the occasion of the birth of the Mahdi in 1964, the

religious newspaper intiqām (Revenge) operated with the aim of “enlightening of drugged

minds, the awakening of dormant religious sentiments…and mobilization of all with the

ideological [sic] weapon of faith."598 In support of his argument that Islamic principles,

especially the concept of the Mahdi were in accordance with reason, Khosrawshāhī resorts to

employing, mostly erroneously, many new “western” terms such as existentialism defined as

“one should be happy,” ātiīsti “atheism,” “followers of urgastīc (tendency for debauchery,

drunkenness…,” surnāturālīzm, and “system of philosophy of atomism.”599 Khosrawshāhī

argues that the followers of atomism “are today called materialists and Marxists.”600

Interestingly Khosrawshāhī places them in opposition to the concept of futurism which he

believes to represent the concept of Mahdi.601

It is not clear where this concept of “futurism” is taken from, however, it is significant

that during this time the authors use it instead of the concept of Mahdi in an attempt to

reconcile, include and appropriate new and emerging western, modern, scientific notions and

ideas into Shi‘ite discourse and understanding. As Talattof argues, Muslim thinkers were

597 Seyed Hādī Khosrawshāhī, “Bahs-i aghīda-‘i: Muslih-i Buzurg va Jahānī-yi mā [Our Great and Universal

Peacemaker/Reformer]” Majmū-’i Hikmat 3, no. 2 (Farvardīn 1338/April 1959): 32-33.

598 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 95-96.

599 Khosrawshāhī, “Bahs-i aghīda-‘i: Muslih-i Buzurg va Jahānī-yi mā,” 30.


601 Khosrawshāhī, “Bahs-i aghīda-‘i: Muslih-i Buzurg va Jahānī-yi mā,” 28-35.

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attempting to interpret and understand Islamic jurisprudence to accommodate Western

notions such as science.602

Khosrawshāhī ends the article by concluding that “futurism plays a strong role in

strengthening the Shi‘ite morale,” because the belief in the Imam of Time, will always give

them assurance and support in times of “social struggle.”603 Furthermore, Shi‘ites believe that

the only “just social regime” is the Islamic government and Qur’an’s holy rules, and “all

Muslim believers know that the executor of laws, and the extender of social justice is our

great and universal leader,” and he will be desired by all of humanity and “our mindset will be

the only universal mindset.”604

An influential cleric of this period, Muhammad Hussein Tabātabā’ī, also known as

Allāma Tabātabā’ī or Alamulhudā (1902 - 1981), was also active in his refutations of

materialists and in his attempts to reconcile these novel and intriguing concepts with Islamic

principles in order to provide a suitable alternative for younger Shi‘ites. In a 1339/1960 article

on “Mahdi, the Hidden and Universal Reformer/Renovator,” similar to Khosrawshāhī,

Tabātabā’ī uses the concept of “Futurism.” He merely maintains that “the belief in the period

of the End of Time and waiting the appearance of the hidden saviour which is so-called as

Futurism,” is a theological concept that is present among all holy books and religions.605

602 Kamran Talattof, "Comrade Akbar: Islam, Marxism, and Modernity," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 3 (2005): 643. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed February 24, 2019).



605 Seyed Muhammad Hussein Tabātabā’ī, “Mahdī Muslih-i Ghaybi va Jahānī [Mahdi, the Hidden and Universal Reformer/Renovator],” in Maktab-i Tashayuh, no. 4 (Urdībihisht 1339/May 1960): 376.

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Unlike Khosrawshāhī, Tabātabā’ī does not explain this concept further and only delves into

providing Qur’anic verses and traditions as proof of the Mahdi’s existence.

Another article published a few years later in Piyk-i Islām indicates a hopeful certainty

for a “just government” by bearing this futural proclamation as its title: “The World is

Anticipating the Appearance of the Great Peacemaker/Reformer and the Establishment of a

Just Government [Jahān dar Intizār-i Zuhūr-i Muslih-i Buzurg va Tashkīl-i Hukūmat-i

Ādilah].”606 Not only is this article foreseeing the imminent expectation and appearance of the

Mahdi, in addition, it portrays a hopeful and future-oriented view of the establishment of

Mahdi’s government. Opening his article with some of Hafiz’s famous hopeful poetry, the

author, similar to other religious writers of this time, asserts that the idea of a just

government has been part of the thinking of wisemen and scholars throughout history, such

as Plato who considered this matter inevitable and believed the requirement for a just

governance necessitated humanity to undergo a great moral, scientific and mental

upheaval.607 The rise of various ideologies and schools of thought, and the spread of

specifically leftist notions of universal justice, helped shape the rhetoric of hope and justice in

this imminent revolutionary Mahdist fervor, that was gaining increasing momentum in the

1960s and 1970s.

Talattof wonders how anyone can deny contact and influence of leftist ideology with

606 Muhammad Taqī Burhānī, “Jahān dar Intizār-i Zuhūr-i Muslih-i Buzurg va Tashkīl-i Hukūmat-i Ādilah [The world is Anticipating the Appearance of the Great Peacemaker/Reformer and the Establishment of a Just Government],” Piyk-i Islām 1, no. 1 (Day 1341/January 1963): 24.

607 Burhānī, “Jahān dar Intizār-i Zuhūr-i Muslih-i Buzurg va Tashkīl-i Hukūmat-i Ādilah,” 24.

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Islam with the obvious “existence of common terminology and concepts such as tāghūt (a

term fundamentalists [Muslims] used during the Pahlavi era to refer to the ruling class,

“bourgeois comprador,” mustaz’afīn (the oppressed classes), proletariat, hukūmat-i adl (the

rule of justice), and the “people’s democratic republic”?”608 In “The Promised Mahdi PBUH

[Mahdī-i Mu’ūd]” Hussein Nūrī, one of the founders of the seminary journal Maktab-i Islām,609

uses the method of resorting to Sunni historical sources to assert that the belief in a promised

Mahdi is not specific to Shi‘ites, as well as bringing proof for his long life.610 After listing and

describing the many signs of Mahdi’s appearance as well as his utopic “reign [saltanat],” Nūrī

explains that the “miraculous predictions” in the sayings of Imams and the Prophet that

“previously appeared impossible and improbable, now appear possible, even achievable,”

because of amazing advancements in science and industry.611 As an example, he names

important political international meetings – likely the UN – where representatives of great

countries are equipped with devices that instantly translate a speaker’s words to any

language; therefore, because of this device’s invention, it is not improbable at all that Mahdi’s

voice could be heard and understood by all people in their own native language.612

608 Talattof, Kamran. "Comrade Akbar: Islam, Marxism, and Modernity,” 643.

609 Several of the revolutionary religious figures mentioned in this research were active in establishing Maktab-i Islām, one of most prominent religious-seminary journals of the pre-revolutionary years, which according to Ja‘farīyān was established with the funding of bazaar merchants. Ja‘farīyān argues that in the years preceding 1979 revolution, this religious-seminary journal was affected by innovative Islamic currents and was the only one of its kind to offer its readers new religious opinions that came out of Qum, Ja‘farīyān, Jaryānhā va sāzmānhā-yi mazhabī-sīyāsī-i Irān, 181-182.

610 Hussein Nūrī, “Mahdī-i Mu’ūd [The Promised Mahdi],” Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 5, no. 4 (Day 1342/January1964): 12-18.

611 Nūrī, “Mahdī-i Mu’ūd,” 13.

612 Nūrī, “Mahdī-i Mu’ūd,” 15-16.

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Furthermore, he argues that with the creation of high-speed jets and spaceships, Mahdi’s

purported riding on clouds that is mentioned in the hadiths as well as the Bible, no longer

seems as farfetched and hence, Islam’s realities that seemed impossible in the past, have

currently become reality.613

Other signs of a shift in the Mahdist outlook is the appropriation of terms from other

ideologies by these Islamic activists. Muslims, while maintaining an unfriendly and

contentious attitude towards communism, seem to readily borrow and incorporate ideas

from communist ideology whenever such ideas correspond with the requirements of their

own ideas and values.614 As mentioned previously, the previous pragmatic polemical period

was devoid of its own positive plan, yet through dialogue and interaction with leftist notions

of utopia, the Shi‘ite activists came into contact with terms that were not traditionally

associated with the Mahdi but appropriated them into concepts such as “Mahdi’s ideal city

ārmān shahrah Mahdī.” Other examples of the use of communist terms such as “revolution,”

“justice,” “unity” and “universal” is when Nūrī states that “one of the characteristics of the

flagbearer of this revolution of universal happiness/welfare [sa’ādat] is the spread of justice

throughout the world.”615 The notion of Mahdi being a “flagbearer” of a “revolution” is in

itself another significant shift from how religious writers of this emerging revolutionary

Mahdist period had transformed and changed their understanding and perspective of the

Mahdi concept from a mostly polemical and distant understanding of Mahdi in the previous




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period. The mood and tone of many of these articles are hopeful and look forward to the

future, such as the last two articles began or ended with positive and optimistic poetry.

Furthermore, Nūrī’s futural and imminent outlook is evident as he confidently ends the article

by stating that since Muslims look forward to this happy day, “we should never lose hope and

become corrupt like our environment, rather, we must remain steadfast and perform our

duties and have pure faith that final victory is ours and be prepared for that happy day with a

joyful spirit and a heart full of hope.”616

Ali Quddūsī also focuses much of his attention on this notion of the Shi‘ites’

hopefulness. Ali Quddūsī became part of an “irregular revolutionary organization,” who

cooperated actively in producing the religious journals Intiqām and Bi’sat, and later on

becoming involved with revolutionary issues, promoting the leadership of Khomeini and the

production of revolutionary pamphlets.617 Quddūsī believes that the stronger the social and

individual development of a society and the more hopeful their outlook is towards the future,

their historical process will be better and their relation to the idea and hope for humanity.618

The author states that “despair is the demon of misery and hope is the angel of glory,” and

argues that history and experience have shown that intelligent and worthy nations are

hopeful of the future and have hence reached life’s full potential, versus hopeless and

unworthy nations that have always been victims of disasters and downfalls.619 Quddūsī



618 Ali Quddūsī, “Dar Rāh-i Mubārizi-yi Marg va Zindigī [In a Life and Death Struggle],” Ma’ārif-i Ja’farī no. 3 (Isfand 1343/March 1965): 78.

619 Quddūsī, “Dar Rāh-i Mubārizi-yi Marg va Zindigī,” 78-79.

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maintains that the famous tradition: “the best of actions, is anticipation [of the Twelfth

Imam]”620 has provided the Shi‘ites with the “biggest and most valued power” that helps

propel them to reach “their principal goal – which is a meaningful life.”621

Quddūsī further states that this powerful message that “has been shrouded in the

guise of a simple religious teaching,”622 has revitalized the sense of hopefulness in Muslim

nations and caused them to become some of “the most powerful warriors of the path of

freedom and progress.”623 Unlike in the past, this sense of hopefulness is coupled with

struggle and upheaval and the outcome of it is not merely the production of pious Muslims,

but rather “warriors.” The author goes on to repeat that hope for the future is the secret to a

nation’s longevity and progress and explains the mechanisms of this theory by making the

medical comparison of giving hope to a patient, “we have seen repeatedly … how

disappointing a sick person from treatment and informing him of dangerous illnesses has a

strange effect on his decline and death, while providing the spirit of hope has seen many

patients cured.”624 Proceeding in his clumsy and sometimes incoherent narrative, this author

provides a good example of the transition to revolutionary Mahdist understanding by painting

his readers a scene in which the hope for an upheaval in the future allows a nation to

overcome any obstacle,

a nation that is hopeful, one day a hand will come out of a powerful hidden

620 This sentence means: the worthiest of actions is the anticipation of the appearance (of the Twelfth Imam).

621 Quddūsī, “Dar Rāh-i Mubārizi-yi Marg va Zindigī,” 79.




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sleeve and with its mighty sword will seek justice from the oppressor, a nation

that has aspiration a day will come that a divine coach will have the pleasure of

pulling out the possessions of the poor out of the throat of the profligate

wealthy, a nation that is believing in the brilliant future a law court full of justice

and independence will replace the unfounded bī-asl courts to seek the rights of

deprived and the rights of the oppressed from oppressors.625

He concludes that “this type of nation will not fall to its knees while facing oppressions,

hardships and hunger and as a result, it will reach its goal which is a life full of pleasure and

blessing.”626 Quddūsī maintains that “criminal colonialists” have learned about the

effectiveness of this “astounding Islamic rule much earlier than the Muslims themselves,”

because they are always scheming against these nations.627 These colonialists have realized

the extent of the effectiveness of this “spirit of hope” in Muslims’ perseverance and struggles

of life, “and its first condition is the struggle against colonialism and colonialists.”628 Quddūsī

does not identify these “colonialists,” but accords them much power and control in their

attempts at sabotaging and influencing Muslim nations’ way of life. He argues that while the

colonialists knew that “creating sources of prostitution and getting people accustomed to

debauchery and living in pleasure – while effective in damaging Islamic principles and customs

– yet it was not enough to lose the spirit of hope and create despair.”629






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Political changes and developments in the 1950s - 1960s provided the necessity of

creating change within the seminary and religious teachings in order to respond to new

demands in cultural and educational curriculum for a new generation of clerical students.630

The establishment of schools such as Haqqānī, Dār al-Zahrā (a female seminary school) and

Maktab-i Tawhīd for new clerical students were some of these efforts made in response to

change, by clerics such as Ali Quddūsī, Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī and Bihishtī, among

many.631 Arjomand maintains that from the early 1960s onward, an increased number of

religious societies were formed in the universities, abroad and by educated groups such as

engineers and physicians and they cooperated with the group of “clerical publicists.”632

Arjomand includes future leaders of the nascent Iranian revolutionary movement such as

Tāliqānī, Bihishtī and others among this group of religious publicists, who wanted to combine

“a concern for Islamic reform with formulation and dissemination of an Islamic traditionalist

ideology attractive to the intelligentsia.”633

Similar to Rodinson, Kamran Talattof contends that when Islamic thinking comes into

contact with other ideological or political paradigms, “it responds by producing an ideology

similar to the one it has come into contact with — similar in terms of sociopolitical agendas,

rituals, and figurative language.”634 Faced with new ideologies and influences, clerics, religious


631 Ja‘farīyān, Jaryānhā va sāzmānhā-yi mazhabī-sīyāsī-i Irān, 172 & 179.



634 Talattof, "Comrade Akbar: Islam, Marxism, and Modernity," 635.

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groups and individuals were motivated to defend themselves and even to adopt a similar

language, follow a similar manner and path of thoughts in order to counter or appropriate

these ideologies, and most importantly, to quash any doubts that might have been created for

Shi‘ite followers.

In addition to an increase in religious journals, newspapers, organizations and schools,

the late 1950s witnesses a surge in the production of revolutionary Mahdist books such as

Mahdī Bāqirī’s Pīrozīy-i Hatmī dar Hukūmat-i Jahānī Mahdī (Certain Victory in Mahdi’s

Universal Government) (p.d. 1336/1958), Pīshguyīhāy-i rahbarān-i Islām Nisbat bi Mardum-i

duri ākharazamān (Prophecies of Islamic Leaders About the People of The End of Time) (p.d.

1337/1959), Mahdi Bazargan’s redundant title of Hukūmat-i jahānī vāhid (Universal United

Government) (p.d. 1342/1964), Muhammad Hussein Tabātabāī’s The Impurities of the Ages in

the Signs of the Appearance (p.d. 1342/1964), Muhammad Bihisthī’s Religions and

Messianism or Views and Opinions About Mahdī (p.d. 1344/1966), Habībullah Mazrūqī’s

Shi‘ism and Mahdism (p.d. 1345/1967), Ibrāhīm Amīnī’s Mahdi dādgustar-i jahān yā mahdī

moūd (The World’s Judge or the Promised) (p.d. 1346/1948), Muhammad Hakimi’s Dar Fajr-i

Sāhil (On the Shore of Appearance or the Dawn of the Beach) (p.d. 1348/1970), Bāqir

Nahāvandī’s Qā’im bi Haq (The Rightful Riser) (p.d. 1349/1971), Muhammad Rizā Hakīmī’s

Khurshīd-i Maqrib (The Sun of West/Sunset) (p.d. 1350/1972), Pāyān-i Shab-i Sīāh (The End of

the Black Night) by unknown author (p.d. 1352/1974), Muhammad Salihī Azārī’s Sukhanī

Chand dar Qiybat-i Imām Zamān (A Few Words in the Absence of the Imam of Time) (p.d.

1352/1974), Hassan Saīd’s Hami dar intizār-I ūyand (Everyone is Waiting for Him) (p.d.

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1352/1974) and Navīd (Promise) by unknown author (p.d. 1354/1976). From 1355/1977 to

very early revolutionary years (i.e. 1361/1983) more than forty books were published on the

Mahdi, which are too many to cite here.

During the period of early 1960s, Arjomand further maintains that figures such as

Tāliqānī and Bihishtī were part of a clerical militant movement, faithful to the continuously

exiled and jailed Khomeini, and who also became his “clerical advisers,” and were active in

distributing pamphlets, “embarking in clandestine political journalism and organization,” and

used “religious sermons as a political platform.”635 Bihishtī was among this group and he

became one of the most well-known members of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the

martyred founder and leader of the Islamic Republican Party, which was to become the “sole

party of the Islamic ideological state of the near future.”636 Militant clerics active in the pre-

revolutionary years were able to master “the art of ideological politics and succeeded in

conducting politics in their own terms” by freeing themselves from the discourse of the

“Communists” and “Marxists in political analysis, as they had earlier freed themselves from

the tutelage of the liberals and nationalists in the elaboration of a coherent world view and

ideology.”637

635 Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 94-95.



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Davānī and a Hopeful Promise

A religious scholar that was most vigorous in his messianic writings during the earlier

part of this revolutionary Mahdist period is Ali Davānī. Amanat argues that as a clerical scholar

and historian, Davānī was instrumental in producing a “new Persian translation of volume

thirteen of Bihar al-Anwar; a massive compendium of Shi'i hadith, of which this volume was

exclusively devoted to the Occultation and Advent of the Mahdi.”638 Amanat further asserts

that, in the years to come, Davānī seems to have supplemented this work with apocalyptic

prophecies from other religious traditions, and along with other contemporary Shi‘ite

advocates of Mahdism, “adopted with greater vigor the universalized notion of the Mahdi as

fulfillment of all messianic prophecies (and not merely Shi'i Islam).”639

Between the years 1967-1968 Ali Davānī published a series of articles titled “the

Saviour that the World is Anticipating [Mu’ūdī kī Jahān dar Intizār-i ūst]” in the journal Dars-

hāyi az Maktab-i Islām. In one article subtitled the “Saviour Mahdī in Sunni Sources [Mahdī-i

Mu’ūd dar manābe’ ahl-i sunnat]” the author proceeds to prove the argument that the

Twelfth Imam exists and is the destined Muslim saviour directly descended from the Twelver

branch of Prophet’s progeny. He brings forth hadith sayings that he traces to the closest

companions of the prophet, even to some of the “four rightly guided” Caliphs, in order to

establish that these personalities have heard from the Prophet himself about the proof of



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Mahdī.640 He further names some of the “most reliable Sunni jurists and gatherers of Sunni

hadith … which exceed hundreds” who in later Islamic history had in their scholarly works

recorded some of the most credible traditions in regards to the Twelfth Imam.641 Davānī

maintains that yet it is “surprising and disappointing” that with the existence of such proven

record in their own scholarly sources that “some contemporary Sunni writers and a few

zealous Ulama” deny such “a reality.”642 The other articles in this series seem more or less a

repetition of one another and do not offer much varied information. For example, another

article in this series published only two months later in June 1967 with the subtitle “the

Promised Mahdī in Islamic Traditions, is the Child of Imam Hassan Asgarī [Mahdī Mu’ūd dar

rivāyāt-i islāmī, farzand-i imām hassan-i asgarī ast]” contains almost the same material and

information as the “Saviour Mahdī in Sunni Sources [Mahdī-i Mu’ūd dar manābi’ ahl-i

sunnat.]” In the last piece of this series, Davānī summarizes that based on his previous articles

we can conclude that the belief in a heavenly and extraordinary man who will

save the world from distress and straying has been agreed upon by all nations

and followers of heavenly religions and even people who are far from civilization

also anticipate his appearance. In this series of articles, we have proven with

evidence that this saviour is the Twelfth Imam of Shi‘ites Hujjat ibn al-Asgarī

(PBUH) and traditions from both reliable Sunni and Shi‘ite sources have provided

640 Ali Davānī, “Mu’ūd-i kah Jahān dar Intizār-i ūst: Mahdī-i Mu’ūd dar Manābi’ Ahl-i Sunnat [The Saviour that the World is Anticipating: The Saviour Mahdi in Sunni Sources]” Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 8, no. 5 (Farvardīn 1346/April 1967): 66.

641 Davānī, “Mu’ūd-i kah Jahān dar Intizār-i ūst,” 67-68.

642 Davānī, “Mu’ūd-i kah Jahān dar Intizār-i ūst,” 67.

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his full characteristics.643

We can once again witness this common theme among the writers of this period on their

emphasis that almost all other faiths, nations and even uncivilized societies believe in a

saviour. In addition, these authors refer to Islamic traditions to prove their point. They further

engage in a fatalistic language to refer to contemporary world affairs and situation and paint a

grim and hopeless picture of a cruel world divided between the powerful oppressors and the

defenseless oppressed. Hence, such a world and its majority oppressed inhabitants are in dire

need of a saviour, who as the authors maintain, is no other than the Twelfth Imam of Shi‘ites.

In a part of his article with the subheading “Global Justice is a Response and Reaction

to Universal Injustice [idālat-i jahāni vākunish zulm-i umūmī ast],” Davānī further maintains

that it is now proven that this material world is incapable of defending itself and unable to

stop carnage and injustice and even “the UN, the Security Council and the Declaration of

Human Rights” have all become a plaything of powerful countries and only serve as a means

to an end and are at the service of dominant nations.644 Weak and deprived nations face a

bleak future and “live in a state of fear, anxiety and shock” and only look forward to a “darker

future.”645 Most of these types of writings also include questions that are posed to the

readers and the authors answer their own questions by providing either an obvious short

643 Ali Davānī, “Mu’ūd-i kah Jahān dar Intizār-i ūst: Jahān dar Dulat-i Mahdī [The Saviour that the World is Anticipating: The World in Mahdi’s Government]” Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 9, no. 12 (Ābān 1347/November 1968): 47.



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answer or provide a vague, circular and redundant reply.

In this case, after painting a picture of a bleak and hopeless contemporary situation,

Davānī proceeds to ask: “where will this deplorable situation lead to, what will happen in the

long run, and where will the bewildered humanity turn to?”646 Davānī next claims that the

Shi‘ite society answers this question: “by stating that these dark nights have a bright morning.

The reaction to all this oppression and injustice is global justice and a powerful government

that will finally come to realization and its promising flag will be raised throughout the

world.”647 Here again we see this enthusiastic and expectant looking towards a better future

where the Mahdi is supposed to deliver, not only the Shi‘ites, but all of humanity from

incurred injustices. The author goes further by providing some examples of global events that

will “usher in the luminous logic of the Shi‘ite society and the excellent goal that is the

appearance of the promised Mahdī of Islam.”648 Davānī enumerates several examples of

world phenomenon that he believes foretell the coming of the Mahdī, such as the prohibition

of the spread of nuclear weapons, prevention of the arms race, murmurings of a permanent

and stable peace, the rebellion of the younger generation who are the creators of the future

world, as well as similar “mutations and movements” in this regard that are happening in

other parts of the world.649

It seems that while the author utilizes the common language of other Mahdist authors





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and initially depicts a bleak and hopeless world, yet it is apparent that the late 1960s Western

atmosphere and discourse of “make peace, not war” has left a hopeful impression on his

outlook. The author next proceeds to bring forth several Shi‘ite traditions from the Prophet

and other Shi‘ite Imams to support his argument that the idea of the Promised Mahdī “will

soon gain universality and will prepare the global scene for receiving his united global

government, universal peace and public justice.”650 In another part of the article subtitled

“Mahdī and his Companions [Mahdī va Yārān-i ū],” Davānī argues that the government plan of

the Imam is the “final and most complete of all the world’s reformist and revolutionary plans,

naturally its executors must be determined, powerful, devoted and worthy people.”651

Amanat believes that this “new Shi‘i version of the universal Mahdi” who “was given a

new mission to ultimately establish a “universal governance” (hukūmat-i jahānī),” was an

adaptation of Baha’i beliefs.652 However, Amanat ignores that for several decades, as

discussed in this research, many internal and foreign sources of influence, other than

Baha’ism, have been competing and contending in the Iranian intellectual milieu. Over the

years, more potent ideologies and arguments than Baha’ism had become available in the

Iranian environment, such as nationalist progressives, secularism, communism, imperialism,

colonialism, and the modern notion of an international United Assembly. Even the use of the

term “universal government” is far more indicative of a socialist and leftist influence than

anything else. In the late 1970s with the strong influence of leftist ideologies in the Iranian

650 Davānī, “Mu’ūd-i kah Jahān dar Intizār-i ūst,” 49-50.



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milieu, it was becoming normal and acceptable for Muslims to have principles, ideas and

values that were not substantially Islamic in origin, “a good Muslim can now be inspired by

theories and ideologies which have some value aside from Islam, Islamic values and the

Muslim ideological system.”653

Another article by Davānī best exemplifies the shift from postponed pragmatic

Mahdism to a revolutionary messianic understanding. Published in August 1970 in the

religious journal Dars-hāyi az Maktab-i Islām, Davānī’s article is a polemical response to

another article published in the newspaper, The Fighting Man [Mard-i Mubārīz].654 This

Tehran newspaper article addresses “The Question of the Occultation [mas’alah-yi qaybat]”

and had been published for the occasion of the death of the eleventh Imam.655 Davānī

believes that The Fighting Man article should be “subject to all manner of criticism and

objection.”656 Davānī claims that many people from across the country had sought

prosecution for the writers and publisher of the offending newspaper and in addition, had

demanded that learned clerics respond to this article.657 While the Pahlavi regime was equally

notorious in terms of censorship and media clampdown, because of the Pahlavi government’s

controversial and contradictory relationship with religious groups, religiously provocative

topics could be published, much to the chagrin and anger of the religious forces.


654 Ali Davānī, “Tuzīhī Darbārih Tavaludah Hazrat-i Valī-i Asr [An Explanation about the Birth of the Imam of Time]” Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 11, no. 8 (Murdād 1349/July 1970): 24.

655 Davānī, “Tuzīhī Darbārih Tavaludah Hazrat-i Valī-i Asr,” 24.



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Shabistarī and Universal Government

The preoccupation of these Shi‘ite writers with the role that United Nations played in

their contemporary times is evident as another writer dedicates a series of his articles to

examining this role. These series of articles published between 1965-1967 by Muhammad

Mujtahid Shabistarī titled “Hukūmat-i Jahānī-yi Islām: Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah-yi Jahān

[Islam’s Universal Government: One Universal Government for the Whole World],” begins

with arguing that the recent bloody world wars have made the establishment of a “united

universal government” ever more necessary, and everyone has come to the realization that

these superficial borders should be eradicated and all humankind should live in brotherly

unity under one government, or “internationalism” as the author calls it, which is an idea that

can be traced far back in philosophical discussions.658 The author argues that the

establishment of this “universal government” can be done through three methods: 1) the

spread and propagation of it as an ideology, or 2) through power, force and military

measures, or 3) through both of these methods.659

Shabistarī further asserts that in the contemporary period, the communists have

adopted the third manner and through propagating their ideology by chanting “workers of the

world unite!” and by resorting to forceful measures, they aim to establish their proletariat

658 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah-yi Jahān: Falsafah Intirnāsionālizm [One Government for the Whole World: The Philosophy of Internationalism]” Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 7, no. 5 (Isfand 1344/February 1966): 27-28.

659 Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah-yi Jahān: Falsafah Intirnāsionālizm,” 29.

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government.660 The author emphasizes the uselessness of other united governing bodies

because after WWI, nations established the “defective League of Nations” with the aim that

this organization can facilitate and solve international issues.661 However, the breakout of

WWII was testament to the failure of these governing bodies because “self-interested

governments” wanted to advance their own policies, but under the “‘mask’ of an

international society.”662 Finally, in 1945, the United Nations was established with the aim of

avoiding war and creating a universal society.663 The author concludes the article by stating

that in future articles, he will present his central discussion and analysis of Islam’s plan for the

establishment of a universal government and its two primary paths in achieving this purpose –

that is through ideology or through power and force.664

The title of the next article, “The Organization that Was Supposed to be the Guardian

of Peace and Unity,” illustrates the author’s opinion and Shabistarī proceeds to list several of

the United Nations’ claimed purposes, but argues that in reality, the UN has failed in its

purpose and the prospect of universal peace is bleak.665 The “right of veto” of powerful

nations is a major bulwark in rendering any decisions effective, as apparent from conflicts in

Palestine, Congo, Kashmir and the creation of Eastern and Western power blocks and the






665 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah Jahān: Sāzmān-i kah banā būd nigahbān-i sulh va vahdat bāshad [One Government for the Whole World: The Organization that was Supposed to be the Guardian of Peace and Unity]” Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 7, no. 6 (Farvardīn 1345/March 1966): 55-58.

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eventual decomposition of the world into different defensive organizations have all

undermined the UN’s role in sensitive peace issues.666

Even more daunting is the production of more sophisticated and dangerous weapons

such as the atomic bomb by the same nations who have the right of veto, hence the current

atmosphere has prompted some to think of creating an organization more complete than the

UN, under the plan of a “United Universal Government.”667 While applauding the efforts of

several scientists and educated Westerners for their proposed plans and conferences for a

“universal government under the law,” Shabistarī wonders whether this idea is only a dream

“similar to Plato’s utopia, a sweet and golden dream that appears to never come to

fruition!”668 The author believes that these types of plans, similar to the League of Nations

and the UN, are always condemned to fail in the current situation because of several factors,

such as the self-interest of superpowers, “frighteningly” advanced nuclear weapons, lack of

altruism and humanism.669 These plans will always fail unless a deep and continuous moral

resurrection occurs that establishes justice, law and true respect for human rights.670

Muslim societies, depending on the country and culture, have taken up a position vis-

666 Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah Jahān: Sāzmān-i kah banā būd nigahbān-i sulh va vahdat bāshad,” 57.

667 Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah Jahān: Sāzmān-i kah banā būd nigahbān-i sulh va vahdat bāshad,” 58.

668 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah Jahān: Tarh-i Jadid: Hukūmat-i Mutahid-i Jahānī [One Government for the Whole World: A New Plan: A United Universal Government,” Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 7, no. 7 (Urdībihisht 1345/April 1966): 65.

669 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah Jahān: īn Tarh ha Mahkūm Bih Shikast Ast [One Government for the Whole World: These Plans are destined for Failure]" Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 7, no. 8 (Khurdād 1345/May 1966): 29-32.

670 Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah Jahān: īn Tarh ha Mahkūm Bih Shikast Ast," 29-30.

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à-vis leftist and socialist values, and they have been influenced both by either “liberal-

humanitarian utopianism” or “scientific rationalism.”671 This line of argument and reasoning is

prevalent in Shabistarī’s writing, with his references to leftist types of notions, terms and

ideology, and their accordance with Shi‘ite thinking. According to Shabistarī, Islam has a

specific plan for establishing a universal government, because it has a “social doctrine” as well

as complete laws and principles for all of humanity’s individual and societal needs such as in

economy, law, politics, ethics and morality.672 Shabistarī argues that Islam can create

worldwide “unity” through creating a wide intellectual and ideological transformation and

upheaval.673 Through resorting to several Qur’anic verses and traditions, Shabistarī further

argues that the “issue of human rights” which is of such great importance in the

contemporary world, is in essence an Islamic principle, rather than a “European gift.”674

Rodinson also points to the evident role played by Qur’anic and hadith arguments to support

the Islamization of foreign ideas and values,675 which is a well-known and prevalent method in

these Shi‘ite writings.

In the next issue, Shabistarī is forthright in asserting the plans for an “Islamic

revolution” to bring about unity and peace to the world. He explains the plan for establishing


672 Shabistarī, “Yak Hukūmat Barāyi Hamah Jahān: īn Tarh ha Mahkūm Bih Shikast Ast," 31.

673 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Islām Yak Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Payrīzī Mīkunad: Barābari va Barādari-yi Insānhā: Yak Gām Bisūyi Hukūmat-i Jahān-i [Islam Establishes a Universal Government: Equality and Brotherhood of Humans: One Step Closer to a Universal Government]" Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 7, no. 10 (Murdād 1345/July 1966): 55.

674 Shabistarī, “Islām Yak Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Payrīzī Mīkunad: Barābari va Barādari-yi Insānhā: Yak Gām Bisūyi Hukūmat-i Jahān-i,” 57.

675 Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World,” 42.

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the “universal government of Islam,” and argues that Islam has “a practical and promotional

program” to replace the shortcomings of other religions and ideologies and will establish the

“Islamic system” through “a deep and wide intellectual revolution, without resorting to force

(except in situations where others thwart this intellectual revolution).”676 In a later issue titled

“The Mission of a Revolutionary Society!?” Shabistarī argues that “revolutions happen to

change the status quo and devise a new plan,” and he proceeds to explain the conditions best

fitted for a successful revolution by arguing that all revolutions have two outstanding

attributes and distinctions: 1) the collapse of the status quo, and 2) clash and struggle

between the protective forces of the previous situation with revolutionary forces.677 He

further asserts that while everyone is aware of a “revolutionary person,” most are not familiar

with a “revolutionary society,” and proceeds to define such a society in which people wish to

renew their “principles and values” and want to embrace “transformative ideas.”678 Once this

“revolutionary force” takes momentum in the society, gains power and starts a following,

“not only will it not fail, but it will proceed with all its principles and values until it proves itself

as a reality to the world and it might even assume responsibility for the revolutionary

leadership of other societies,” because the “ultimate goal is the revolutionary leadership of

676 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Islām: Falsafa-yi Khās-i Islām: dar Mas’ala ‘Hamzīstī-yi Mazhabī’ [Islam’s Universal Government: Islam’s Unique Philosophy: Topic of “Religious Coexistence’]" Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 8, no. 6 (Urdībihisht 1346/April 1967): 15.

677 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Islām: Ma’mūrīat-i Yak Jāma’i-yi Inqilābī!? [Islam’s Universal Government: The Mission of a Revolutionary Society!?]" Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 9, no. 4 (Isfand 1346/March 1968): 34.

678 Shabistarī, “Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Islām: Ma’mūrīat-i Yak Jāma’i-yi Inqilābī!?” 34.

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the world.”679 He effectively predicts that “‘the universal Islamic society’ will begin with a

‘revolutionary society,’” one that was initially “a small and limited revolutionary society, but

powerful, progressive and constructive.”680

In the next issue Shabistarī talks about eventual “ideological and intellectual clashes”

that will arise and the “necessity for armed struggle to safeguard the spread” of this universal

Islamic revolution.681 These clashes are inevitable if the “brand new (naw zuhūr) revolution” is

threatened or thwarted.682 Shabistarī believes that in essence, the “law of jihad” in Islam is

nothing other than “defense of revolution,” because jihad is the “defense of the progression

and spread of Islamic revolution.”683 Other topics that were the focus of this period such as

religious coexistence, nationalism, international rights, humans rights, United Nation’s

Charter, imperialism, neo-colonialism, economic provisions for society, and other global

matters were all explained as either having a basis in Islam or that Islam had a proper solution

and plan for that topic or problem.

Quintessential Shi‘ite Ideologizers: Shariati and Bazargan

By the early to mid-1960s, revolutionary sentiments had effectively overtaken and

replaced the pragmatic and distant attitude of the previous postponed Mahdist Iranian milieu.

679 Shabistarī, “Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Islām: Ma’mūrīat-i Yak Jāma’i-yi Inqilābī!?” 34-35.

680 Shabistarī, “Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Islām: Ma’mūrīat-i Yak Jāma’i-yi Inqilābī!?” 35.

681 Shabistarī, “Hukūmat-i Jahān-i Islām: Ma’mūrīat-i Yak Jāma’i-yi Inqilābī!?” 34-35.

682 Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, “Jahād, Ghānūn-i Buzurg-i Islām: Difa’ az Inqilāb: Jahād-i Islāmi [Jihad, Islam’s Great Law: Defense of Revolution: Islamic Jihad]" Darshā-yi az Maktab-i Islām 10, no. 6 (Khurdād 1348/June 1969): 24.

683 Shabistarī, “Jahād, Ghānūn-i Buzurg-i Islām: Difa’ az Inqilāb: Jahād-i Islāmi,” 24.

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The following years produced some of the most quintessential revolutionary figures widely

known to Iranians, such as Murtizā Mutahharī, Mahdi Bazargan, Ali Shariati, and of course

Ayatullah Khomeini, to name a few. While these figures are widely credited with bringing

about and heralding the revolutionary sentiment that led to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, yet

their work had been building on the religious literature produced by the Shi‘ite activists

examined in the above paragraphs such as Davānī, Shabistarī, Āmulī, Ansārī and many others.

In a concise two-page Appendix on “The 20th Century Shi‘ite Establishment,” Mahdi

Khalaji provides the “historical” background of pre-1979 revolutionary period, by mainly

focusing on the politicization of major Shi‘ite institutions in Iran. He summarily mentions the

role of Rizā Shah’s modernization on the Shi‘ite’s messianic message by limiting his discussion

to the Shi‘ite cleric Murtizā Mutahharī and the role of Marxism in influencing his arguments. 684

His discussion of this pre-revolutionary historical period fails to discuss the role of many

important personalities discussed in this research and their respective writings. Most glaring is

the lack of discussion of important publications and writings of central historical figures

discussed in the postponed Mahdist period, such as national progressives Hussein Kāzimzādah

Irānshahr, secularists like Ahmad Kasravī, religious reformists such as Ali Akbar Hakamīzādah

and Sharī‘at Sangalajī. I have previously demonstrated Khalaji’s overpoliticization,

oversimplification and lack of deep historical analysis and investigation of this topic.

Furthermore, several influential clerics such as Tāliqānī, Mutahharī and Muhammad

Bihishtī whom Arjomand calls “clerical publicists and orthodox reformists,” “became associated

684 Khalaji, Apocalyptic Politics: on the Rationality of Iranian Policy, 37-38.

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with the more serious associations of laymen and university students” in the decade before the

1979 revolution.685 Mutahharī gave a series of talks “in 1970 at the Islamic Association

(Anjuman) of Engineers” of whom Mahdi Bazargan was a founding member and these talks

were published under the title of the Khadamāt-i Mutiqābil-i Islām va Irān (Mutual Services of

Islam and Iran) which discussed “increasing political awareness and national consciousness in

the Third World.”686 Soon after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Mutahharī, one of

Khomeini’s closest aids and the chairman of the Revolutionary Council, was assassinated along

with many other leading revolutionary figures such as Bihishtī and Muhammad Rizā Bāhunar in

a series of attacks by the nascent Islamic Republic’s opponents.

Mahdi Bazargan had founded the first Islamic society in the University of Tehran in

1942 and he was a major influence until the 1960s. But his influence on Islamic reform was

overtaken by the charismatic figure of Ali Shariati, whose message had “a much stronger bent

for revolutionary ideology.”687 Dabashi argues that from the 1940s through the 1970s, it had

become “abundantly and repeatedly clear that the Marxist discourse had successfully and

thoroughly established the Iranian political agenda.”688 In discussing the works and ideology

of Mahdi Bazargan, a French-educated university professor, engineer, religious activist and

the first prime minister of the Islamic Republic, Dabashi argues that “virtually every term,

concept, and concern with which Bazargan chooses to identify and circumscribe ‘the Islamic




688 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of Islamic Revolution, 353.

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Ideology’ is mandated by the tacit, and thus compelling, legitimacy of the Marxist

discourse.”689

Talattof also argues that pre-revolutionary Muslim writers “usurped” the leftists’

rhetoric to convey new meanings in favor of their new state ideology that was beginning to

take shape.690 He lists such terminology as “revolution,” “spring of freedom,” “imperialism”

(cultural and other forms), “antagonistic,” “conflict,” “fight until victory,” “rights of deprived

nations,” “international revolution,” and “exportation of revolution.”691 Talattof also depicts

Shariati’s love-hate relationship with leftist views. He maintains that in Shariati’s Islamology,

which is otherwise known “for being anti-Marxist with regard to Marx’s atheism, Shariati

explains the process through which Marx became a political leader and praises him for his

sociological interpretation of oppression in history. At times Shariati appropriates Marx’s

ideas for Islam, and at other times he finds in Marx notions acceptable to Islam.”692 There is

great consensus among scholars of modern Iran among others Ervand Abrahamian, Asef

Bayat, Sohrab Behdad and Brad Hanson who agree that Shariati drew much inspiration from

leftist and socialist ideas in formulating his own revolutionary Islamic ideology.

Ali Shariati, while well-known for his ideological transformation and revolutionizing the





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Shi‘ite religion and specifically the concept of martyrdom693, had also offered a novel and

revolutionary concept regarding the notion of anticipating the Mahdi in Shi‘ism. In a speech

titled “Anticipation, the Religion of Protest,” Shariati examines the various opinions regarding

the issue of “anticipation” and the belief in the “Imam of Time” and “the End of Time” and he

describes, in ardent revolutionary terms, this finality that anticipates the Mahdi as a “the

principle of the final revolution.”694

Shariati argues that some opponents of the belief in Mahdi’s anticipation argue that it

renders society irresponsible, stationary and no one will fight against corruption, or take the

smallest step to write against terrible conditions, because everyone is waiting for the Mahdi’s

appearance to hasten.695 He explains that the “educated non-religious person” believes that

they should fight to bring people out of this “crippling and fruitless anticipation and shift the

masses’ hope and faith from the Hidden Imam to present leaders, and from his hidden

uprising to their social uprising, and from a supernatural willpower (volition) to their own

willpower, and turn their attention to their own great responsibilities.”696

In his breakdown of the responses to the concept of the Mahdi, Shariati maintains that

the “modern religious groups” have recently published some works and have replied to the

attacks of educated non-religious intellectuals and have tried to defend the long life of the

693 While Shariati revolutionizes the idea of martyrdom, however, he is informed by and building upon earlier Shi‘ite practitioners and theorizers such as Ni‘matullah Sālihī Najafābādī’s highly contentious book, Shahīd-i Jāvīd 1348/1970.

694 Ali Shariati, Intizār: Mazhab-i Itirāz [Anticipation: Religion of Protest] (n.p., 1351/1972), 3.

695 Shariati, Intizār: Mazhab-i Itirāz [Anticipation: Religion of Protest], 3.

696 Shariati, Intizār: Mazhab-i Itirāz [Anticipation: Religion of Protest], 4-5.

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Mahdi based on scientific reasons.697 Shariati further stresses his own revolutionary argument

for the concept of Mahdi and his appearance and argues that we must look at the belief in the

Mahdi from a different point of view since it does not suffice to just try and find proof about

Mahdi’s existence or long life, rather, Shi‘ites have to doubt the type of understanding that

they have regarding the concept of the Mahdi and should ask themselves about the benefits,

effects, goals and advantages of this belief and the belief in the “revolution of the End of

Time,” both for our current society and for our future destiny.698 Shariati believes that there

are two types of anticipation in Shi‘ism: positive anticipation and negative anticipation, and

they contradict each other since one is the “greatest factor in degeneration and the other is

the greatest factor for action and advancement;” one is the upholder of the status quo, and

the other is progressive and future-oriented.699

Similar to other religious writers, Shariati also argues that all great cultures believe in a

“return to an original golden age,” however, with the difference that with Shariati this is

accomplished through a belief in a “great and lifesaving revolution in the future.”700 He also

refers to the concept of futurism that other writers discussed and explains this as “an ideology

and religion that is based on a positive future and guides its followers towards the future.”701

Shariati explains that “basically the belief in the promised Mahdi and the essence of


698 Shariati, Intizār: Mazhab-i Itirāz [Anticipation: Religion of Protest], 14-15.




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anticipation in fact means futurism,” and looking to the future and not the past, and

anticipating the future means being hopeful.702 He concludes that in fact anticipation signifies

a prepared person who anticipates the sounding of the final revolution and this person is

responsible to be ready, committed and equipped to participate in this struggle (jihad) and

“each Shi‘ite goes to bed each night with the hope of hearing the song of the Imam.”703

Dabashi argues that Shariati’s newly “reconstructed narrative” of anticipation allows

revolutionary hopefuls to find their voice in its “universal appeal,” and in order to legitimize

his revolutionary reading of Islam, Shariati had to discredit the traditionally maintained view

of the Mahdi and anticipation.704

Mahdi Bazargan also provided similar new interpretations of the concept of the

anticipation of the Mahdi and placed the onus on the scholars of religion to provide a hopeful

and active interpretation and understanding of the concept and restore this concept which at

its present format is “negative and a source of despair, resignation and idleness.”705 Bazargan

believes that in fact, the concept of anticipation is a miraculous piece that Shi‘ism possesses

and can have profitable capital that is capable of immense utilization.706 Bazargan argues that

the Shi‘ite clerics are the inheritors of a proud past and are the connection and link to the

Hidden Imam, hence they are needed for the anticipation and should be the “annunciators of




705 Mahdi Bazargan, “Intizārāt-i Mardum az Marāj’i” in Bahsī dar Bāri Marja’īat va Ruhānīat (n.p., Anjuman-i Kitāb, 1341/1962), 107.

706 Bazargan, “Intizārāt-i Mardum az Marāj’i,” 107.

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the lifesaving future of world humanity.”707

As Rodinson asserts, the Muslim thinkers who develop re-interpretations of leftist

terminology, concept and ideology are in general religious men who have no intention of

adopting the communists’ fundamental atheism.708 Ruhollah Khomeini is largely reputed to

have won the favor and hearts of the Iranian population for his outspoken support of the

“downtrodden” and the “oppressed,” which were distinctly leftist terminology that were

ubiquitously mentioned as topics of his sermons and speeches. Talattof also points to this

affinity of Khomeini with “quasi-socialist, egalitarian, or government-controlled economy” in

which his anti-capitalist discourse resonated with the poor and “always comprises a huge part

of their revolutionary discourse.”709 In the late 1960s, Khomeini began to seriously consider

an “Islamic government as an alternative to the Shah's” and his “theory of vilāyat-i faqīh

(Mandate of the Jurist), delivered as lectures in 1970 and published in the same year, is a bold

innovation in the history of Shi‘ism.”710 This theory rejects the separation of religion and

politics, and through it, Khomeini argues that in the absence of “the divinely inspired Imam,”

the Mahdi, sovereignty is delegated upon qualified jurists or the Shi‘ite religious scholars, and

“as the authoritative interpreters of the Sacred Law,” the religious leaders are entitled to

rule.711 Khomeini’s infamous early promises of free electricity, water and housing are common

707 Bazargan, “Intizārāt-i Mardum az Marāj’i,” 108.





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knowledge within Iranian society. Rula Abisaab also discusses the Shi‘ite Lebanese-Iranian

cleric Sayyid Musa Sadr’s similar affinity with “the dispossessed” and the rise of the mahrūmīn

movement around his figure in Shi‘ite Lebanon during the same period, when much of

Lebanese society, whether Shi‘ite or Sunni, was immersed in leftist ideology.712 Shi‘ite scholars

and clerics were influenced by the political and social environment around them and were

familiar with other Arab and Islamic reformist, nationalist and leftist ideologies and trends

happening in the greater Muslim world. Especially because Shi‘ite clerics were well-versed in

the Arabic language and many of them had roots and networks with Arab Muslim countries

such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, therefore they were well-aware and influenced by such

trends and ideologies as pan-Arabism, Egyptian nationalism, Muslim Brotherhood and pan-

Islamism.

Arjomand’s explanation of a messianic and futurist mood in late 1970s proves my

argument of a pronounced connection between revolutionary fervor and Mahdism during this

period, when an “unmistakably apocalyptic mood was observable during the religious month

of Muharram 1399 (December 1978),” and the masses were intensely discussing the

possibility of Khomeini being “the Imam of the Age and the Lord of Time.”713 Arjomand

maintains that Khomeini was very aware and careful of exploiting the growing messianic

yearning of this revolutionary Mahdist period and “without claiming to be the returning

712 Rula Jurdi Abisaab, "Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, the Lebanese State, and the Left," Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies 8, no. 2 (2015): 131-157. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed March 14, 2019): 142-145.


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Mahdi,” he encouraged his acclamation as the Imam,714 which was a term reserved for the

Mahdi until this time.

Conclusion

The decades that preceded the 1979 Iranian Revolution witnessed the emergence of a

decidedly imminent revolutionary understanding of the Mahdi prompted by clerical

recognition that their beliefs are under the onslaught of more sophisticated secular and

critical attacks. The religious activists felt that they could not remain idle in the face of

repetitive condemnations from the intelligentsia. This chapter has examined the character

and dimensions of the revolutionary Mahdist project when it was fully underway that saw

Shi‘ite writers, activists and revolutionary figures excitedly predicting great upheaval and

actively ushering forth the Mahdi’s utopic and universal government. This revolutionary

temporality is distinct because it represents a redemptive movement for the clerical

establishment who had faced trans-regional secular nationalist and leftist influences and

whose vocal and charismatic ideologues such as Khomeini and Shariati had not just overcome

the odds, but had risen to positions of great social pre-eminence and credibility. They had

turned the Mahdist conceptualization into a positive project of governance, a universal

revolution of the Mahdi was built on their near-complete discursive politics of redemption

made possible through clever and timely contestation.


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Chapter 6 – Conclusion

This dissertation traced and examined the progression and transformation of the

concept of Mahdi in Iran from early 1900s to the late 1970s. The goal of this research has been

to provide a historiography of the concept of Mahdi that has been missing from the Shi‘ite

messianic scholarly work. This historical analysis provided an examination of a shift from a

pragmatic polemical understanding of Mahdi that shaped the discursive atmosphere of the

early 1900s to early-1940s, when the emergence of a dynamic understanding of Mahdi was

taking shape, to its culmination in late 1970s, when revolutionary Mahdist fervour had

overtaken Shi‘ite Iranians. As Shahi maintains, Shi‘ite symbols and narratives were employed

for revolutionary mobilization against the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of the Islamic

Republic of Iran began a “new chapter for the official politicization of Mahdism in Iran.”715 After

the coup d’état of 1953, the tensions between the Shah’s regime and the clerics intensified. The

Iranian regime increasingly moved the state into the secular domain and promoted equality for

all citizens regardless of their religious affiliation. To the clerics this felt as an attack on religion

and Shi‘ism in particular, and they felt the need to protect Islam, Shi‘ism, and their identity.

Therefore, to respect and safeguard the identity of the majority, the clerics’ idea of

creating an Islamic state is based on Islamic Shi‘ite law, Islamic morality and the Twelfth Imam’s

rule of justice and law. The state that the clerics have identified with the Twelfth Imam is

intended to come and restore Shi‘ite Islam and to bring social justice for them. The clerics are

rethinking the end of time as the end of a corrupt political order, as the end of the Pahlavi

715 Afshin Shahi, “Paradoxes of Iranian Messianic Politics,” Digest of Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (2012): 114.

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regime and the coming of a new government that is based on Shi‘ite Islam and the equality and

justice that it will bring for its adherents.

This project primarily researched and analyzed primary writings such as articles and

books and provided a literature review in the form of additional secondary sources. Through

this method the shortcomings and gaps of the scholarly work on contemporary Shi‘ite Mahdism

were stressed and the new contributions of this present research to the field were highlighted.

Iranian historical scholarship has mostly neglected to trace the effect of the concept of Mahdi in

the revolutionary historiography of the 1979 Iranian revolution. While the Iranian historical

scholarship on modern Mahdism is a limited area of research, the majority scholarly analyses

focus on post-1979 Iranian Revolution and examine the governmentalization and

developmentalization of the concept of the Mahdi as a political tool of the Islamic Republic of

Iran.

This dissertation has filled several gaps in the literature on Mahdist discourse. The

existing literature tends to focus on the post-1979 context in Iran and temporalizes the Mahdi

as an eschatological phenomenon and discursive concept. These predominant understandings

and historicizations of the Mahdi fail to account for the role that a teleological Mahdi played

in justifying and empowering many Shi’ite writers during the revolutionary period. I show that

the concept of a revolutionary Mahdi was a logical outcome of the criticisms filed against the

Islamic clergy and other Islamic writers. The latter were spurred on by the polemics from the

intelligentsia and used the idea of a revolutionary and imminent Mahdi to create purpose,

hope, utopia, and peace from the End of Times narratives, as well as claiming themselves to

be the voices of this revolutionary emergence. There is no sustained literature on the pre-

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revolutionary Mahdi. This dissertation describes the shift that occurred during the early

modern period where Iranian writings moved from describing an eschatological Mahdi that is

in a continual state of being postponed, to describing a teleological Mahdi as imminent and

revolutionary. As the Mahdi becomes discursively revolutionary and teleological, he stops

being a signifier for the End of Time and begins to be a signifier for an End of Time that is

purposeful, intentional, and fulfilling. This transformation in discursive signification acts as a

pre-condition for the Islamic theocracy and is self-fulfilling, inevitable, and a logical outgrowth

of this ideational terrain. A revolutionary Mahdi that is teleologically oriented rather than

eschatologically oriented provides important context for why the Islamic theocracy was seen

as fulfilling a utopian and universal (Mahdist) government and why many people in Iranian

society embraced the role of the clerics as leaders imbuing their social and political futures

with goals that enthused and empowered them. Future research can help unpack how pivotal

this discursive shift was for the rise of the political theocracy in Iran. Given the scope of this

dissertation, I maintain that as the Islamic clerics actively contested Iranian intelligentsia’s

interpretations of the Mahdi, they not only provided the groundwork that would justify their

revolutionary ascent, but also were able to use the concept as leverage to gain ideological

traction to counter and eventually silence their intellectual opponents.

To support the argument that a shift in the concept of Mahdi had occurred in the

suggested time frame of 1900s to 1970s, this project was broken into four chapters with

Chapter Two analyzing and describing a pragmatic polemical milieu obsessed with othering a

religious adversary; Chapter Five analyzing and examining an Iranian environment steeped in

messianic revolutionary fervour, looking straight towards a Mahdist expectation whose

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culmination is the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Chapters Three and Four give context to these

chapters by describing dynamics in this transitional period. They examine and argue the

sources, causes, challenges and responses that elicited this shift from eschatology to teleology

of Mahdist conceptualizations.

In Chapter Two, I argue that the messianic understanding that guided and colored the

discursive atmosphere of the early 1900s to 1940s was mainly a distant one, with significant

polemical and pragmatic undertones. This view of the Mahdi was based on Shi‘ite messianic

belief about an End of Time saviour who would deliver humanity. This view of the Mahdi as

saviour was regarded as a certain and given concept. While religious writings and publications

were quite limited during this time, a rise in Shi‘ite activism is chiefly witnessed in the early

1940s. Religious personalities of this time such as Sabāh Kāzirūni, Sirāj Ansārī and Nusratullāh

Nūrīyānī were also the pioneers and founders of some of the earliest and most important

religious journals and publications that were instrumental in spreading their message to the

Shi‘ite educated audience. A significant distinguishing mark of this period is the obsessive

investment in anti-Baha’i activities and a preoccupation to refute and attack the Babis and

Baha’is. During this time, the main Mahdist activities were ardent defenses of the validity and

reality of the existence of the Mahdi and sometimes enumerating the responsibilities of the

Shi‘ites for Mahdi’s arrival. Yet this process of justification rarely ever denoted any urgency or

need to expedite the Mahdi’s appearance. The Babis and Baha’is had already played a key role

in postponing the advent or Parousia of the Mahdi. The constitutional revolution provided a

reason to keep the Mahdi’s arrival in abeyance.

Chapters Three and Four examine discourse in the transitional period that demonstrates

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and analyzes the causes and effects of the Mahdist shift and its progression from a postponed

messianist concept to an imminent and revolutionary one. From the analysis in these chapters,

I find that by temporalizing the Mahdi, I identify a discursive shift about the Mahdi and that this

discursive shift from an End of Time understanding to a purposeful End of Time understanding

brought the Mahdi into an imminent temporality in true teleological form.

This research argues that naturally the Iranian messianic revolutionary fervour and

sentiment did not occur in a vacuum. Chapter Three helps contextualize and explain various

ideologies and schools of thought such as the liberal progressive nationalists represented

through the works of Kazimzādah Irānshahr; the secularists and modernists such as Kasravī;

Shi‘ite reformists such as Sharī‘at Sangalajī and Hakamīzādah, and most significant influencers

of later years, the leftists. The critical works and publications that these groups produced were

highly effective in propelling the Shi‘ite groups out of their comfort zones. Kasravī’s Bikhānand

va Dāvari Kunanad [Read and Judge], Hakamīzādah’s Asrār-i Hizār Sālah [Thousand Years Old

Secrets] and the alleged “communist”-produced Nigahbānān-i Sihr va Afsūn [Guardians of

Charm and Magic], in particular, were intended as direct attacks on Shi‘ite beliefs and clergy. I

argue that these works shook many Shi‘ite groups and personalities to the core and were

instrumental in their realization that far more ominous powers were brewing that were more

attractive, influential, and stronger “enemies” than the Baha’is and other Mahdi-claimants.

Chapter Four examines the emerging religious voices and personalities such as Āmulī, Ansārī,

Khomeini and Khālisīzādah who felt obligated to respond to these attacks, “safeguard

impressionable young Shi‘ites” and especially the Shi‘ite religion and belief from these

“spiteful” influencers.

216

The last Chapter Five illustrates and discusses the revolutionary Mahdist language and

rhetoric having by this time (early 1960s) overtaken the distant understanding of the concept of

the Mahdi of the earlier preliminary period (Chapter Two) in the Shi‘ite Iranian milieu. In this

Revolutionary period, lesser-known Shi‘ite figures such as Davānī, Khosrawshāhī and Quddūsī

discuss leftist and socialist-inspired notions such as “Mahdi’s revolution” and “Mahdi’s universal

revolution,” and pave the way for quintessential revolutionary Shi‘ite figures such as Khomeini,

Tāliqānī, Bazargan and Shariati.

Several factors were influential in expediting and bringing this revolutionary

understanding of Mahdi to fruition. Bazargan believed that the concept of anticipation and the

belief in the Mahdi was an untapped gold-mine that Shi‘ite scholars and their followers had to

take the utmost advantage. Shariati is almost unanimously proclaimed as the Iranian

revolutionary ideologue, however, he was also effective in providing a “positive future”

understanding of the concept of the appearance of Mahdi, one that expected Shi‘ites to be

ever-ready, hopeful, and “anticipating the final revolution.” Furthermore, Khomeini’s

introduction of the concept of the vilāyat al-faqīh also provided a theological solution to the

leadership-in-the-absence-of-the-Mahdi question for many Shi‘ites who found themselves

more receptive to a messianic revolutionary environment.

Epilogue

This research examined and historicized the shift that signaled a break from a pragmatic

and postponed Mahdist temporality to a revolutionary one. Yet there still exists another second

shift that occurred from the revolutionary Shi‘ite messianic temporality to a statist and

217

developmentalist temporality that begins in late 1980s - early 1990s until the present times.

After the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the religious groups and personalities reached

that ideal future they had aspired through the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Therefore, their task is now different, they have to legitimize it, governmentalize it,

institutionalize it, safeguard it. Faced with increasing public hostility towards the current Iranian

supreme leader (valī-i faqīh) Ali Khamenei and critical discontent, the Iranian state has been

continually searching for ways to strengthen its legitimacy by arguing for the valī-i faqīh’s

indispensability.

To this effect, by increasing its apocalyptic and religious rhetoric, the regime has

discovered a stabilizing ideological system. This rhetoric publicizes and endorses an increased

propinquity between the valī-i faqīh and the Mahdi. To achieve this end, the government and

its supporters have been promoting and propagating this ideology by saturating their rhetoric

and references to Khamenei with language specific to the Mahdi. By heightening its apocalyptic

rhetoric, the regime is implicitly aligning the idea of the Mahdi with valī-i faqīh in order to

strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and gain control over disgruntled segments of society.

However, for the sake of originality, brevity, and focus, this research has only addressed and

researched the first shift (from a distant temporality to an imminent revolutionary messianic

temporality) and there existed a great amount of untapped and original scholarly material to

research the first shift. I do not wish to address the second shift from revolutionary Mahdist

temporality to a statist and developmental one because I believe a separate research project is

necessary to fully address this second shift.

During the turbulent years leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and even during

218

the very early stages of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, many writers filled with the

(fulfilled) hopes of establishing a Shi‘ite government proclaimed and prophesized this period of

time as a prelude and signs of the expedited appearance and coming of the Mahdi. Two of the

most debated and anticipated characteristics and elements of Mahdi’s appearance, his

promised uprising and his eventual establishment of a just government, represent the definitive

ideals of victory for Shi‘ites and symbolize Mahdi’s ultimate objective and triumph.

Furthermore, these two aspects and elements in Mahdi’s expected arrival directly reflect and

parallel the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of

Iran which according to many views – whether inside Iran or among Muslims of other nations -

was and still is considered and regarded as a phenomenal victory for Shi‘ite Islam and a prelude

for Mahdi’s eventual uprising and government. It is important to note that Iran’s identity as a

Shi‘ite nation is part of the legacy of Iranian nationalism. This Shi‘ite Mahdist movement is not a

transnational Islamic movement. Iranian national sovereignty became the very foundation for

developing these Islamic ideas. The Islamic movement in Iran, which I have conceptualized here

as teleological Mahdism was intimately linked to a national project in a very similar way that

the Zionist ruling elite used the messianic vision as an ideology for the emerging Israeli society

by employing and reinforcing messianic terminology after the establishment of Israel.716

Furthermore, similar to the Mahdist hopefuls who applauded the ushering in of “Mahdi’s

universal government” and strove to make that a reality, many Christians and Jews have the

conviction that “Israel was created for an important mission in history and was to play a vital

716 Nir Kedar, “‘We Need the Messiah so That He May Not Come’: On David Ben-Gurion’s Use of Messianic Language,” Israel Affairs 19, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 394.

219

role in the process that was to precede the Messiah’s arrival.”717

In a future project, one must seek to draw parallels and comparisons between the kind

of hopes, dreams and descriptions of Mahdi’s uprising and government that were made during

these euphoric pre-revolutionary years. These future projects and scholarly works should

investigate whether any correlations are made or exist between the imagined, aspired and

expected advent (qīyām) of Mahdi and the Islamic Revolution of 1979, as well as the promised

government of Mahdi and the current Iranian government. Furthermore, many questions can

be asked and hopefully answered by comparing the pre-revolutionary projections and

descriptions of hope and the ideal Mahdist uprising and governance, with the current situation

and state of the Iranian Islamic government. If the Shi‘ites expected complete justice and law

(adl va dād), did the Islamic government promise and deliver a similar or comparable state of

complete justice and lawfulness? One such example of this type of promise can be Ayatollah

Khomeini’s promise of the Islamic state’s provision of free water and electricity to the Iranian

population. What similarities existed between the projected hopes of the pre-revolutionary

Shi‘ites for an ideal and just Muslim society compared to the eventual Islamic government who

at times describes itself as the prelude to, or proof of Mahdi’s promised government?

717 Yaakov Ariel, “Doomsday in Jerusalem? Christian Messianic Groups and the Rebuilding of the Temple,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2001): 3.

220

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