Final, 31 October 1999

Péter Tálas and László Valki

THE NEW ENTRANTS: HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND POLAND

The three countries joined NATO just twelve days before air

strikes against Yugoslavia began, though, originally, the

accession was planned to take place in April 1999 at the

Washington Summit. Nevertheless, the attitude of these

countries to the air strikes was not determined by whether or

not they were members on 24 March, but by the fact that all

three were desirous of joining the North Atlantic Alliance,

and thus the West, since the early nineties. In other words,

they wanted to rejoin the community of states they had been

separated from by history. Naturally, their attitudes showed a

difference in the details.

Hungary

The Hungarian government consistently supported the air

campaign against Yugoslavia and took an active part by opening

its airspace and airfields to NATO aircraft. Opposition

parties and majority public opinion also approved the NATO

operation. In April 1999, 53 percent of the respondents were

in favour of NATO intervention.i In many ways this was due to

the allout effort by both the socialist, liberal and the

conservative parties in the preceding years to achieve

accession. In the fall of 1997 85 percent of the people voted

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for membership, and in February 1999 the Parliament ratified

the Washington Treaty by a 96 percent majority. Only the

representatives of the extreme right wing MIÉP (Party for

Hungarian Justice and Life) opposed ratification. In spring

1999 there was no doubt what Hungary’s decision concerning air

strikes against Yugoslavia would be. Since public opinion, as

well as every coalition and major opposition party resolutely

supported NATO accession, the government could only decide in

favour of air strikes.

Geographically, Hungary’s position was very important. It

had common borders with Yugoslavia, and—since the Dayton Peace

Agreement—a military base and airfield in the southern part of

the country, at Taszár, had been providing logistical support

for the IFOR/SFOR operations. In October 1998, NATO had

requested permission to use Hungarian airspace, and in March

1999 it extended its request to the use of the Hungarian

airfields as well. (Parliamentary approval was necessary for

both of these requests.) Parliament gave the first permission

in time, which had to be amended on 24 March 1999, extending

the operation to “the unrestricted use of Hungarian airspace,

airfields, including their service and air control equipment

to reconnaissance, combat and transport aircraft and

helicopters”.ii The extraordinary session of Parliament for

discussing the draft a representative of the leading coalition

party, the Federation of Young Democrats, said that Hungary

would not be directly involved in military operations. The

i “Szonda a NATO-hadműveletről” (Poll on the NATO operation). Népszabadság, 23 April 1999, pp. 1,2.ii Resolution No. 20/1999 (III.24) OGY (emphasis added).

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draft resolution was approved by all but one parliamentary

party, the MIÉP. The draft’s wording and the government’s

explanation later gave rise to a debate among the parties.

Initially, the media did not focus on the legal

background of the air strikes, their legitimacy, nor their

efficiency. Later, a debate evolved in the Hungarian press

among leading Hungarian intellectuals about the legitimacy and

efficiency of the NATO air strikes. Another debate evolved in

connection with the use of ground forces. Seeing the lack of

success of the first three weeks of air strikes, there was

growing speculation in the Western media that the war could

not be ended without the use of ground forces. Observers

supposed that its geographical position would make Hungary

most suitable for launching a ground invasion. Hungarian

military leaders also thought that a ground attack was

inevitable and that it would have to be launched from Hungary.

But the government did not support such a plan. On 16 April in

London, Prime Minister Orbán declared that Hungary could

undertake only such commitments which do not endanger the

lives of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina. The build-up of

ground forces taking several weeks was dangerous insofar as it

would give Milosevic sufficient time to deploy his special

police units against ethnic Hungarians who did not have even

an armed organisation like the KLA and thus would not have

been able to defend themselves. The opposition parties

expressed a similar view.

This understanding ended when leading NATO politicians

asked Hungary at the Washington Summit to allow the deployment

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of F-18 fighters to Taszár, which would take off from

Hungarian territory to bomb Yugoslav targets. They also

requested permission to station KC-135 tankers at the civilian

airport in Budapest for refuelling the fighter bombers. At the

meeting of the parliamentary parties following the Washington

Summit, Orbán declared that on the basis of the previous

resolution passed by Parliament the government will give the

necessary authorisation. Chairman of the Socialist Party

László Kovács protested, saying that the “situation has

changed” since that resolution was adopted. He added that his

party “did not wish to see Hungary drift with the tide of

events but instead try to shape them to suit national

interests. Hungarian participation must not reach a level as

to pose unavoidable risks for Hungary and the ethnic

Hungarians in Vojvodina”.iii On 29 April two socialist MPs

submitted a draft resolution to Parliament on the amendment of

the previous resolution. They proposed that the word

“unrestricted” be deleted from the resolution, and Parliament

refuse permission for aircraft taking-off from Hungary to

launch air strikes against Yugoslavia. In his reply, the Prime

Minister said that the Socialist Party was reneging on its

original agreement since it too had voted for the clearly

phrased resolution a few weeks before. As former coalition

partner of the socialists, the liberal party also disagreed

with the motion. Moreover, the media, which often made rather

sceptical observations about the war, called the motion

populist, and the Socialist Party’s rejection of what it had

iii Népszabadság, 29 April 1999, p. 2.

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once given its approval to unethical. In any event, the

government granted permission for the stationing of the

Hornets in Taszár, which were deployed against Yugoslav

targets for the first time on 29 May.

Throughout, Vojvodina’s situation continued to influence

policy concerning Hungarian participation. When the decision

on launching the air strikes was made, the government

immediately expressed its concern about Vojvodina and the fate

of ethnic Hungarians. The reason was that this created a

contradictory situation whereby Hungary--together with other

member states—had made a decision about approving the

launching air strikes whose targets included Hungarian

settlements. On 26 March, Foreign State Secretary Zsolt Németh

asked Belgrade to do everything in its power to prevent

retaliation against ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina.iv Indeed,

Milosevic did not order any retaliatory actions against them

during the air strikes, probably due not so much to this and

similar diplomatic messages, as to the Serb dictator’s

reluctance to engage in yet another conflict, this time with

Hungary .

Hungarian diplomats spoke up on behalf of Vojvodina in

NATO as well. What the Hungarian permanent representative and

other politicians wanted was to prevent the bombing of the

whole province. This was obviously too much to expect.

According to the last census, conducted in 1991, only 18.2 per

cent of the population of the province (a little over 300 000

people) were ethnic Hungarians, many of whom subsequently

iv Népszabadság, 27 April 1999, p. 2.

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emigrated to Hungary in the first half of the nineties during

the Balkan wars. At the same time, a considerable number of

Serbs, who were driven out of Krajina in Croatia, sought

refuge there, as a result of which the ratio of Hungarians

declined to 12-15 percent. Moreover, between October 1998 and

March 1999, Milosevic deployed considerable Serb troops in

Vojvodina and built a defensive line with entrenched tanks

near the Hungarian border. Thus NATO planners could hardly

consider Vojvodina a “neutral” Hungarian province, and the

region had to share Yugoslavia’s fate. Barely a few days after

the outbreak of the war, its capital, Novi Sad, and other

targets came under heavy attack by cruise missiles and air

bombs, in the course of which, on 31 March and the ensuing

days, all three bridges over the Danube and oil refineries in

Novi Sad and were destroyed.

What Budapest strove to attain from the start was that

under no circumstances should Hungary have to participate

directly in the attacks. Foreign Minister János Martonyi said

that it was not in Yugoslavia’s interest to extend the

conflict to Hungary, and the latter had no wish to participate

in any military action but would participate in a possible

peacekeeping mission.v Leading NATO politicians considered this

acceptable. It had always been the Alliance’s position that

directly neighbouring states do not have to take part in

military operations. In fact, such participation even would be

counterproductive since it entails the possibility of a direct

v MTI (Hungarian Press Agency), 25 March 1999.

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armed conflict and consequently a dangerous escalation in the

fighting .

Vojvodina became an issue in Hungarian politics in

another respect as well. The head of the extreme right MIÉP,

István Csurka, issued a statement to the effect that the

status of areas near the border where Hungarians constitute

the majority should be changed, specifically, by annexing them

to Hungary.vi He knew that neither the other Hungarian parties

nor the West would support this idea, and that, they would

react adversely. He was obviously addressing his presumed

constituency and did not care that his statements would cause

the most harm to the Hungarians in Vojvodina itself. Indeed,

the Serb media cited Csurka’s statements on every possible

occasion as proof that NATO wanted to tear Kosovo in the south

and Vojvodina in the north out of the federation, and thus

reduce Yugoslavia to the smallest size possible. Responding to

Csurka’s announcement the Hungarian Prime Minister merely said

that “the government program does not include border

modification.” He added by way of explanation that he “does

not wish to give weight to views that differ from the

cabinet’s intentions and, therefore, he shall not react to

such statements.”vii Later, following the Washington Summit, he

said, “Hungary’s problem today is not that there might be loud

irredentist demands, this question is raised by what may be

called insignificant forces. ... My job is to represent

Hungarians and not to waste words.”viii Foreign Minister János

Martonyi was more outspoken on this issue. He said that „the

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Washington Statement on Kosovo underlined the territorial

integrity of all states in the region. … [In the same way] the

Hungarian Government does not have any territorial claims

whatsoever vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. We appreciate the intention

of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina to live in their homeland

even under these difficult circumstances.”ix Both the

opposition socialist and the liberal party objected that the

Prime Minister failed to clearly distance himself from the

extreme right party’s statements concerning territorial

revision.x

Toward the end of the war, the governing coalition

returned to the question of Vojvodina, saying that NATO must

guarantee the rights of minorities living there. Hungarian

diplomatic efforts were successful insofar as the declaration

on Kosovo formulated at the Washington Summit mentions the

ethnic minorities in Vojvodina. The declaration states that

the heads of state and government participating at the summit

“express ... support for the objective of a democratic

F[ederal] R[epublic] of Y[ugoslavia] which protects the rights

of all minorities, including those in Vojvodina and

Sandjak...”xi Later, after the air operations had ended, the

Hungarian government strove to have the international

vi MTI, 2 June 1999.vii Népszabadság, 29 April 1999, p. 2.viii Interview on the Hungarian Radio Kossuth, Budapest, 29 April1999.ix „Nincs határrevíziós szándék” (There is No Intention of Border Revision) Népszabadság, 30 April 1993, p. 3. x Statement made by the chairman of the Socialist Party, LászlóKovács, ibid., and the chairman of the Free Democrats, Bálint Magyar, at a press conference, MTI, 8 May 1999.

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community accept the restoration of Vojvodina’s autonomy which

was taken away in 1989. The government argued that since

Milosevic had deprived Vojvodina of this status simultaneously

with Kosovo, it should be restored simultaneously. The

government, aware that ethnic Hungarians constitute only a

lesser group, worked out an autonomy plan. The official

version was first submitted on 10 June 1999 at the conference

in Cologne for framing the Stability Pact for South Eastern

Europe.xii Later, the autonomy plan was worked out in greater

detail with the help of the two major political parties of

Vojvodina Hungarians and the experts of the Hungarian Foreign

Ministry, and was subsequently sent to a number of Western

capitals in the summer of 1999. Mr. Orbán also mentioned it in

his speech at the Sarajevo Summit, but the communiqué on the

Summit made no reference to Vojvodina.xiii The Hungarian

autonomy plan was politely but openly rejected by most NATO

politicians. Western diplomatic and political reactions

indicated that concern over Vojvodina diminished in light of

the tasks related to the consolidation of Kosovo and the

democratic transformation of Yugoslavia. As to the Serbian

opposition, none of the politicians, from Draskovic to

Djukanovic, has ever said that if in power, he would be ready

to grant Vojvodina what the ethnic Hungarians (and not the

local Serbs) are asking. Nevertheless, the Hungarian

government believes that the plan should be kept on the

agenda, otherwise it would renounce forever the establishment

of self-government too ethnic Hungarians.

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In connection with the Kosovo crisis Hungary came into

conflict with Russia on two occasions. On 10 April a Russian-

Belarus convoy of 73 vehicles carrying relief cargo arrived at

the Hungarian border. The convoy also included eight tanker

trucks filled with 57,000 litres (14,820 gallons) of gas oil,

and five armoured vehicles. Referring to the mandatory embargo

resolution of the Security Council, the Hungarian government

denied entry to the whole convoy. The Russian press harshly

attacked Hungary for this move, the Russian ambassador was

recalled, and the Hungarian Foreign Minister was asked to

postpone his Moscow visit planned for September. After two

days of negotiations, a compromise was reached whereupon the

eight tanker trucks stopped at the Yugoslav border and

returned to Russia from there later on, while the five

armoured vehicles did not even enter Hungarian territory. The

other transport vehicles reached Belgrade without further

problems.

The second incident occurred when, after the end of the

Kosovo crisis and before the accord defining the status of

Russian troops in KFOR was signed, Moscow requested permission

for the transit flight of aircraft transporting the Russian

peacekeeping troops. The request was for six aircraft and a

crew of ten, but it soon came to light that actually they

xi Statement on Kosovo. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council Washington, D.C. on 23 and 24 April 1999. NATO Press Communiqué S-1 (99)62, para 16.xii Statement by the head of the Hungarian delegation on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Cologne, 10 June 1999.xiii See Sarajevo Summit Declaration, 30 July 1999 (MTI).

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wanted to transport an armed force of 600 men to Kosovo. Since

Budapest did not wish to give Moscow the opportunity to

perform another military trick like the one in Pristina, it

refused permission until Brussels approved the flight. The

Russian defence ministry officially accused the Hungarian

authorities with obstruction of the transit flight, and, as a

result, the Russian media was again full of statements and

commentaries condemning Hungary’s behaviour. “There’s a

hysteria campaign in Russia against Hungary,” the former

Hungarian ambassador to Moscow observed at the Hungarian

Parliament’s session.xiv But after a while the Russians put an

end to the campaign, and, in November, the Hungarian Foreign

Minister received an invitation to visit Moscow.

Poland

Poland, from amongst the new member nations, had supported

NATO`s intervention in Kosovo the most decisively and would

likely have done so even if accession had taken place at a

later date. Amongst the three new member states Poland had the

greatest public support for joining the Alliance, even during

the preparatory period preceding the accession itself. Public

support did not fade, although a slight decrease appeared

during the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia.

As far as the actual public judgment regarding the NATO

air campaign is concerned, opinion polls indicated that during

the first month of air operations , public support had

xiv MTI, 15 June 1999.

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increased with the Poles (being 48 percent at the end of

March, 54 percent in the middle of April, and reaching 55

percent just before the end of April ). In spite of the fact

that this support had somewhat declined (going down to 53

percent in the middle of May and even to 50 percent towards

the end of that month), those favoring the NATO campaign had

always been the majority.xv

The Polish government was striving to express its definite

commitment to allied decisions in spite of its austere

financial resources, regarding the NATO campaign as a final

test for the new members, while not losing sight of the

behavior of Prague or Budapest. Polish diplomats accredited to

Brussels and Washington were among the first to suggest the

bombardment of Serb TV and radio stations in order to crush

Milosevic’s propaganda machine. Moreover they were determined

in principle to support the idea of supplementing air strikes

with land operations.xvi Warsaw made an obvious effort to act as

a committed full member of NATO. To what extent certain parts

of the offers were sincere established in nature and to what

extent they were merely political gestures should be regarded

as a different matter. According to some military leaders the

Warsaw government, for whom it was a rather serious problem to

raise five million Zlotys necessary to set up the Polish IFOR

contingent, would not have been able to finance its promises

if truly called to account by the Alliance.xvii Whether it was

xv “Poparcie dla Sojuszu”, Rzeczpospolita, 11 June 1999.xvi “Egzamin dla nowych czlonków”, Rzeczpospolita, 23 April1999.xvii “Brak pieniedzy na akcje na Balkanach”, Rzeczpospolita, 5May 1999.

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true or not is beyond our competence to decide. By all means,

no request was passed on to Warsaw for the use of Polish

airspace, nor were the Poles asked to participate in the

maritime blockade against Yugoslavia.

The consistent policy adopted by the Warsaw government by

no means meant that the political elite and the Polish public

shared exactly the same views concerning allied air strikes.

On the contrary, the Kosovo conflict had divided the public as

well as the politicians rather deeply. Politicians were

divided on the issue not according to their respective party

affiliations.

Polish politicians were strongly divided on the issue of

the Kosovo conflict. The divisions which arose concerning the

assessment of the NATO campaign could not be simplified as a

difference of opinion between the left and right, since views

were highly divergent on the issue even within these political

blocs.

The Kosovo conflict was the source of a considerable split

in the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD). Deeply opposing

views had been developed by the social-democratic and the

socialist(post-communist) wings of the party. The latter,

forming a minority faction in the party, strongly objected to

the war, arguing that since NATO did not have sufficient

reason to launch the air campaign, the war was unjust because

the Alliance was the aggressor. It is more likely that they

were motivated by their previously demonstrated anti-NATO

sentiments, and the fact that Russia sided with Serbia, which

also left a mark on their statements and policies. The

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socialist faction of the SLD has to date kept a kind of

nostalgic view of Moscow, regardless of who is in power there.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, Leszek Miller, Marek Borowski and

Krzysztof Janik, representing the SLD mainstream and the so–

called social–democratic wing, supported the NATO campaign

throughout the conflict. This wing had been most committed to

the idea of joining NATO previously as well, therefore their

views showed continuity. Moreover, they were granted the

opportunity to prove that they were not led by tactical

considerations in their earlier policies concerning NATO. It

also provided a chance for the SLD to demonstrate their

fellowship and unity with the English and German social

democrats and to prove that they had left behind their post–

communist past, thus becoming an equal member of the community

of Western Europe's social democrats.

The war in Kosovo was an issue creating divisions within

the political right wing as well. To face the political

challenge presented by the NATO campaign was most difficult

for the Christian and national political bloc. One of the

reasons was that NATO had violated, both formally and legally,

the sovereignty of an independent country. Another reason for

doubts was that one of the confronting sides involved in the

Kosovo conflict had been represented by „global” liberals,

long perceived as dangerous enemies in the opinion of)

nationalist and Christian circles. Criticism of NATO from the

side of the Christian-national right did not mean, however,

speaking up for Milosevic. Prominent leaders of this political

bloc never had doubts that the ethnic cleansing going on in

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Kosovo was executed according to Miloshevic`s orders. Also the

political right in Poland primarily saw the communist in the

Yugoslav President and that he was a representative of Serb

national interests was a secondary issue.

From the Polish political spectrum it was the Freedom

Union alone, as a moderate liberal party in the centre, that

most firmly supported the NATO campaign in Kosovo. UW leaders

tried to explain their zealous determination by claiming that

pro-Serbian political groups had become too radical in Poland,

but this reasoning did not seem to work. It is more likely

that the UW was the only political party in Poland which

regarded the issue of the Kosovo conflict as a major test

presented to the new NATO members. The zealous attitude of the

party must have been determined by the ‘jitters’ of this

decisive test. This may as well have been one of the reasons

why internal disputes on the issue of Kosovo had hardly been

leaked out abroad through the official channels. Bronislaw

Geremek and Janusz Onyszkiewicz played an important role in

controlling the flow of information, with their respective

ministries keeping in permanent contact with Brussels and

Washington.

The Polish People’s party (PSL) failed to establish a

clear viewpoint on the issue of NATO’s Kosovo campaign. This

party had the largest group of opposition to the NATO campaign

among its supporters.xviii

xviii 45 percent of PSL voters were for the air strikes, 39 percent were against, while 16 percent had no particular opinion.

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In Poland, NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia were mostly

criticized by the radicals of the socialist and the post-

communist left wing, and also by right wing national democrats

outside the governing coalition. The campaign was backed by

center right wing parties (UW, AWS), including more moderate

formations within the so-called national bloc, like the

Christian-National Union (ZChN), the opposition party

Reconstruction of Poland Movement (ROP) or the liberal social

democrats of SLD. The Polish People’s Party was between those

opposing and those in favor of the operation but closer the

former. The NATO campaign was generally favored by the

moderates of the political spectrum, no matter whether they

were on the left or on the right. These are the political

groups which are likely to govern Poland in various political

constellations for many years ahead in the future.

The Czech Republic

Amongst the new members of NATO it was the Czech Republic in

which the loudest and most spectacular debate had been brought

about by the air campaign of the North Atlantic Alliance. This

went so far that the Czech Republic was the only NATO country,

except for Greece, which although having granted its vote kept

demonstrating views of open „dissent”. The Czech behavior was

not at all unexpected at best only for those whose attention

had only been drawn to Prague first by the issue of air

strikes.

The Czech Republic needed NATO membership not primarily

because of external threat or a security challenge. This was

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indicated by the fact that Czech foreign and security policy

had not given special priority to the issue of NATO accession.

NATO membership only became a top priority again after it

became obvious that joining the European Union, which they

eagerly hoped to achieve in a very short time, was not going

to take place in the near future. At the same time, security

organizations which earlier were preferred by Prague (e.g. the

OSCE and the UN), had lost some of their importance. Along

with this process, the North Atlantic Alliance, with its newly

established institutions (NACC, PfP, the NATO-Russia Permanent

Council, EAPC, etc.) began taking over the actual role of

these organizations. NATO accession meant an important step

towards full integration into Western Europe, and it was

gradually accepted that the Alliance was impossible to ignore

as an institution of European security architecture.

Between 1989 and early 1997, the Czechs were not much

interested in security policy and NATO accession.

Subsequently, public support for full membership in the

Alliance only slightly increased. Therefore opinion polls

showed decreasing support for NATO membership aspirations.

Although the Madrid invitation for full membership caused a

slightly positive change concerning the support of joining

NATO, public support remained lower than in Hungary or Poland.

It follows from the foregoing events that the allied air

campaign against Yugoslavia was received by the Czech public

most critically. According to the polls only about 38 percent

of the population agreed with air strikes on military targets,

while 48 percent were against it.xix It is more surprising,

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though, that within only a couple of days, practically less

than a fortnight, public support for the air strike went up to

50 percent in the Czech Republic.xx

Reactions of the political elite were even more

surprising, Vaclav Havel was the only politician to show some

understanding towards the launching of the air campaign. In

his short television speech broadcasted on 25 March he

recalled the progress to the final escalation of the conflict

in the Balkans, the failure of negotiations with the Serbs and

he promised to secure his full support of the operations.

Statements made by Prime Minister Milos Zeman and

Parliamentary Speaker Vaclav Klaus and the behavior of

political parties opposing the NATO campaign had been heavily

criticized by the Czech media and a part of the country’s

political experts. The primary importance of the debate was

that it brought to light some of the problems concerning the

national image, contrasting the different viewpoints of the

political elite and various groups within Czech society.

Disputes also provided an excellent opportunity to view things

from a more self-critical aspect, which should have taken

place perhaps a decade earlier, at least long before joining

NATO. The Havel versus Zeman-Klaus dispute ended with more

success for the latter, although the government had to show

more flexibility as a consequence of harsh criticism from

abroad.

xix “Polowa Czechów przeciwna atakom”, Rzeczpospolita, 29 March1999.xx “Czechy wysylaja szpital polowy dla Albanii”, Rzeczpospolita,April 7, 1999.

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Resolute support was to be expected only from two smaller

opposition parties: the liberal Freedom Union (US), a party

founded by ODS dissidents , and the Christian democratic KDU-

CSL. The prominent leaders of the catholic clergy shared the

opinion of president Havel.

Although the Czech government kept distancing itself from

the Kosovo conflict, they considered sending field hospital

equipment and medical personnel (84 doctors and nurses plus 18

persons to guard their safety). This aid was supposed to ease

the sufferings of both Albanians and Serbs, as it was

emphasized by Prime Minister Milos Zeman. However, equipment

and personnel were only expected to be deployed after 40-60

days due to the alleged delay caused by lengthy legal

preparations. After the heavy assault of criticism from the

opposition and some international pressure on 6 April the

government passed a decision to send a one hundred-person

medical contingent with proper assets as well as a

humanitarian aid transport of food and sanitary equipment. The

decision was made, however, only after many critics were

scandalized over the government’s somewhat modest financial

contribution (10,000 dollars) to the budget of the Red Cross.

It turned out later that Zeman and his government were

hesitant concerning other issues as well. At the turn of April

and May they created an extremely embarrassing situation for

by NATO granting approval to allied attacks on lines of

communication and targets along transport routes for long

hours, which led to a considerable delay of any further steps.

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On 6 April the government approved the opening of Czech

airspace and airfields to allied military aircraft. In the

cabinet of nineteen members two ministers abstaining from

voting and one of them voting against. On 19 April Defence

Minister Vladimir Vetchy announced that the Czech Republic was

ready to make available its military airfields for allied use

if such a request arrived from Brussels. In spite of the fact

that all political parties promise their support to the

proposal of the government, it was only passed by the

Parliament after five hours of stormy debate on 22 April (with

the supportive votes of 145 representatives out of 181

present). Some social democrats together with the Communists

voted against the proposal and the Communist Party organized

an anti-NATO rally in front of the Parliament building. Direct

participation in possible land operations was a non-issue ,

since the Zeman government strongly opposed the idea of a

ground attack. Both Zeman and Foreign Minister Kavan declared

that Prague was not willing to support allied plans of such

kind, also adding that the involvement of Czech troops was

supposed to be limited to helping and defending the Albanian

refugees.

It was the Czech Republic where the NATO campaign created

the most problematic situation. None of the new members were

confronted by exactly the same problems. The Czechs had to

face new challenges concerning their integration into the

European institutions. Unless they deal with the challenges

and problems with clear objectivity, they may experience

situations even more difficult to handle.

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