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Europe v. America The Transatlantic Divide over International Security1 Paper delivered to the conference on New Security Agendas: European and Australian Perspectives King’s College, London, June 2004. Dr. Rémy Davison School of Government The University of Tasmania Locked Bag 22 Hobart Tasmania 7001 Australia Email: Remy.Davison@utas.edu.au Draft only. Please do not cite without written permission.

1 The author thanks Barry Buzan, Michael Cox, Gareth Evans, Sir Laurence Freedman, Peter Shearman and William Tow for their valuable comments.

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Abstract In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch wrote of a transatlantic ‘security community’ More recently, Barry Buzan (1983) emphasized the profound structural implications for the international system of a ‘fully-developed’ European Union. In the post-Cold War era, both intra-European and transatlantic divisions have emerged over key issues in international security, such as fighting terrorism, and intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many players in the new Europe of the post-Cold War era find themselves at significant variance with many of the security doctrines with which traditionally. These include a North Atlantic alliance; the development of Europe as a ‘third force’ in international politics; and a commitment to a wider, deeper process of European integration which sought to implement not only a single European market, but also common foreign, security and defence policies. A multi-track Europe has emerged, comprising proponents of American power; opponents of US unilateralism; and uncommitted neutrals. The newly-expanded EU from 2004 will include east European members of NATO, many of which supported US intervention in Iraq, cohabiting with ‘old Europe’ opponents of the American ‘hyperpower’, such as France and Germany. Russia, together with Germany, has also demonstrated a new willingness to act in opposition to American foreign policy. As Jean Dufourcq of the EU Military Committee argues, the transatlantic divide is ‘no longer a debatable issue; it is a reality that has resulted from a variety of convergent circumstances.’ (Dufourcq, 2004). In a global imbalance of power, three European states - Russia, Germany and France (together with China) - have developed a distinct preference for multilateral initiatives, with a view to ‘diluting’ American power via the development of a multipolar global order. Conversely, a number of the major ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers - the UK and Australia - have supported the US’s anti-terrorist initiatives and pre-emption doctrines strongly. As a consequence of these divisions, the chasm between European and American security policy has rarely been as deep as it is at present. Has this chasm developed as a result of 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s policies, such as NMD/TMD, the ‘war on terror’ and the American-led intervention in Iraq? Asman (2003) argues that ‘One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the collapse of the Atlantic alliance - the current rift has been unprecedented in its scope, intensity, and, at times, pettiness.’ How profound is this rift between the transatlantic allies? What is the likely impact this division will have upon the international security architecture? This paper argues that the division over security policy in Europe represents a profound shift in the dynamics of the international system, as some of the major powers seek to redress the imbalance of a unipolar system dominated by American military power. The paper conjectures that this renewed struggle over the balance of power has not been in evidence since the Cold War.

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1. Introduction In March 2004, the Council for Foreign Relations released a document titled Renewing the Atlantic Partnership. Its authors were an unlikely collection of realists, neoliberals and historians. Many have served in both Republican and Democratic US administrations. They included Henry Kissinger, Andrew Moravcsik, John Ikenberry, Robert Kagan, Laura Tyson, John Lewis Gaddis, Guiliano Amato, Brent Scowcroft, Sylvia Matthews, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Josef Joffe, Timothy Garton-Ash and Stephen Walt.2 This disparate group held at least two interests in common: first, they have all had a long-standing scholarly or foreign policy interest in Europe; and second, they clearly felt that the transatlantic impasse had reached crisis proportions. Predictably, the authors of Renewing the Atlantic Partnership saw the war in Iraq as the critical juncture in Euro-American relations. ‘It was the first major crisis within the alliance to take place in the absence of an agreed-upon danger.’ [original emphasis retained] (CFR 2004: 9). One of the key problems with much of the post-9/11 literature is that one is either for the United States or against it. Little or no opportunity exists for a ‘third way’, which is probably best represented by a return to the UN Security Council-led status quo of the early 1990s. Few authors, it seems, are intellectually capable of providing balanced criticism and evaluation of the post-9/11 world.3 There is little doubt that American unilateralists are in the ascendancy, just as it is certain that Atlanticists are in decline. The question is whether this decline is terminal, or merely an aberration which will disappear as soon as wounds opened by the Iraq conflict are healed. But for the Council on Foreign Relations report, the rupturing of the transatlantic alliance can be repaired - but the Europeans must recognize that they must ‘abandon their pretensions’ to multipolarity: The Task Force believes strongly that there is no alternative to complementarity, That means,for the Europeans, abandoning the pretension that their power as currently constituted can bring about multipolarity or that confrontation is the best way to influence the United States.For America,it means recalling that military strength alone did not win the Cold War. Rather, victory came about because the multidimensional power of the United States and its allies ultimately prevailed over the Soviet Union’s single dimension of strength - its military power.’ (CFR 2004: 12). Throughout this paper, there is an emphasis upon the concept of the ‘hegemonic internationalist’: a dominant power which attempts to export its socio-cultural and economic systems internationally. The following section reviews the literature dealing with unipolarity, unilateralism and multilateralism in the wake of the Cold War. Section 2 Kissinger, for example served in both the Nixon and Ford Administrations, Tyson and Matthews in the Clinton Administration, Scowcroft in the Nixon, Ford, Reagan and Bush Snr. Administrations, Ikenberry in Bush Snr’s Administration, and Kagan in the Reagan Administration. 3 See, for example, Stephen Holmes’ review of Robert Kagan’s book, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. Holmes employs phrases such as ‘he is wrong’, and refers to US military power as ‘a warped lens distorting the way the Bush administration defines the direst threats facing the country.’ Another example includes, ‘This is apparently the thinking (if you can call it that) behind the administration's mindlessly denigrating remarks about Europe. See Holmes (2003), ‘Why We Need Europe’, The American Prospect, Vol. 14, No. 4, April 1.

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three discusses whether the construction of ‘the west’ and questions whether the transatlantic ‘alliance’ is, in fact, illusory. The fourth section evaluates the role of NATO, while section five identifies the transatlantic divide with the consolidation and expansion of American unilateralism. Sections six and seven are devoted to briefly outlining the positions of ‘old Europe’ - France and Germany, and their respective responses to the Iraq war. The eighth section examines the relative weakness of the European powers, and argues that this accounts for many of their responses to US unilateralism. Finally, the concluding section argues that the counter-hegemonic coalition against the US is a product of the gross asymmetries in military and financial power inherent in the present international system, and it is this that has produced the transatlantic rift. 2. The Mystery of the Missing Balance of Power Analysts frequently conflate unipolarity with unilateralism, and multipolarity with multilateralism. As Van Oudenaren (2004: 64) points out, the concepts are not necessarily related. Polarity describes a system-level distribution of power, whereas multilateralism and unilateralism are ‘policy choices’.4 In 1990, Charles Krauthammer theorized that, albeit briefly, the international system had experienced an ephemeral period of strategic unipolarity in which the Soviet Union, in terminal decline, no longer represented a second pole of power. Japan, still in the economic ascendant, was about to experience a catastrophic meltdown. Krauthammer was wrong, a point he acknowledged in his more recent article on the subject.5 Other adherents to the ‘momentary’ theory include Charles Knight, who asserts that ‘The United States understands that today's unipolar world is transitory, and that ascending powers and nuisance states will eventually challenge the post-Cold War order and, therefore, the interests of the United States and its allies.”6 Paul Kennedy, whose highly-influential 1987 book came down decidedly on the ‘declinist’ side of the debate on US hegemony, recanted publicly, stating that history had never seen such disparity in military capacity as existed in the post-Cold War era. The structural implications of this profound change in the balance of power meant that the United States would almost inevitably emerge as a revisionist power in a unipolar world.. For Van Oudenaren (2004: 66), Krauthammer and Kagan view the current US policy as ‘unipolar unilateralism’. Unipolarity, Krauthammer and Kagan argue, compels the hegemonic state to adopt the unilateralist policies necessary to maintain unipolarity. Secretary of State Albright recognized this when she stated that ‘we will behave multilaterally when we can and unilaterally when we must.’7 Neoconservatives, such as Huntington, are at significant variance with both traditional and neorealists. According to Huntington (1999), ‘A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers.’ However, he also argues that ‘American 4 J. Van Oudenaren (2004), ‘Unipolar Versus Unilateral’, Policy Review. April/May, Issue 124; pp. 63-75. 5 C. Krauthammer (2002), ‘The Unipolar Moment Revisited’, The National Interest; Winter 2002/2003; 70; pp. 5-17. 6 Charles Knight (2002), ‘Bush Administration Policy Toward Europe: continuity and change’, in Volker Kröning, Lutz Unterseher, and Günter Verheugen (eds), Hegemonie oder Stabilität: Alternativen zur Militarisierung der Politik (Bremen: Edition Temmen). 7 Cited in M. Cox (2001), “American Power Before and After September 11: dizzy with success?”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, p. 276.

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officials quite naturally tend to act as if the world were unipolar.’8 For Huntington (1999), the current world order is ‘hybrid’ system which he describes ‘uni-multipolar’. By this, he means that the US is the sole superpower surrounded by several great - some potentially hostile - powers. As a consequence, although the US dominant, according to Huntington it is also compelled to act in concord with other major powers. As such, Huntington rejects the notion that the US can act unilaterally or that the system is a ‘pure’ unipolar one, although US élites would prefer unipolarity, and often act as though the system were unipolar. However, in 1999, Huntington asserted ‘that moment has passed’. Middle-range theories, which emphasise the importance of domestic political actors and ideological cleavages between political parties, frequently argue that changes of government can affect states’ foreign policy preferences profoundly. For example, Gordon and Shapiro argue that ‘it was the philosophies, personalities, decisions, and mistakes of the leaders who happened to be in office in 2001–2003 that led to the depth of the transatlantic clash over Iraq.’9 The most recent example of this was the Spanish defection from the US coalition, following the Madrid bombing and the subsequent election of the Socialist government. However, the issue arises as to whether the Spanish case is the exception which proves the rule. As Waltz and Art (1968) demonstrated in their comparative study of Britain and the US, foreign affairs is a dirigiste area of national policy where little account is taken of public opinion. Waltz and Art found that foreign policy is a relatively autonomous realm in national politics, and that few voters in democratic states are influenced by foreign policy issues.10 Although there is conflicting evidence on this point in the public reaction to the prospect of war in Iraq, it is notable that Blair joined the coalition despite a clear majority of British voters against war. Spanish and Italian public opinion was also even more stronglu opposed to war, but this did not affect the two governments’ decision to join the US-led coalition. Conversely, two-level and multilevel theorists posit that the realist account of alliance diplomacy is excessively concerned with the notion of ‘the national interest’ and the agglomeration of power by atomistic units within the international system. They argue that mere changes of government can, and do, make substantial differences to national policy preferences. Critics of the Bush Administration argue that Clinton, or even Bush Snr, would not have employed a doctrine of pre-emption or regime change against Iraq. However, there is little evidence to support this point, despite protestations of Gore and Albright to the contrary. Asking upon what footing the transatlantic relationship might

8 It is revealing to read Huntington’s commentary in light of the subsequent Iraq war: ‘More serious military interventions have to meet three conditions: They have to be legitimated through some international organization, such as the United Nations where they are subject to Russian, Chinese, or French veto; they also require the participation of allied forces, which may or may not be forthcoming; and they have to involve no American casualties and virtually no "collateral" casualties.’ In 2003, only one of these conditions was fulfilled, although arguably the US had little need to coalition forces, at least from a tactical perspective. It is also virtually inconceivable that the US would take any field of war without at least some allies, irrespective of the poverty of their actual military commitments. See S. P. Huntington (1999), ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, March/April, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 25-38. 9 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War: p. 11. 10 K. Waltz and J. Art (1968), Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The British and American Experiences (Boston: MIT Press).

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be had Gore taken office in 2001 is an interesting parlour game, but nothing more. It is more instructive to examine how a possible future president - John Kerry - might deal with the complexities of the transatlantic alliance. Kerry’s injudicious remark in early 2004 that Europeans were awaiting a Kerry victory in November led Republicans to paint Kerry as ‘bin Laden’s candidate’. The Guardian editorialised that ‘Nothing in world politics would make more difference to the rest of us than a change in the White House.’11 Former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine described the US’s approach to the war on terror as ‘simplistic’.12 European polls support the notion that the US administration in deeply unpopular. Polls conducted in April 2004 found 85% disapproval for Bush in France, 57% in Britain, 85% in Germany and 60% in Russia.13 Conversely, for neorealists, such as Waltz (1979), unilateralism is a product of unipolarity: In neorealist theory, according to Waltz, states ‘at a minimum seek their own preservation, and at a maximum, drive for universal domination.’14 In neorealist theory, a hegemonic power in a unipolar system can choose to pursue multilateralist policies, but it is more likely to opt for unilateralism. As Anthony Cordesman notes, ‘While it is acting from selfish motives, the United States is defining tangible power projection missions far beyond the periphery of NATO for the first time since the end of the Cold War – if not the first time since NATO began addressing the issue.15 By contrast, Van Oudenaren argues that the unipolar/unilateral thesis is insufficiently supported by evidence. For example, Ikenberry’s study of the behaviour of dominant powers in 1815, 1919 and 1945 suggests that powerful states use a combination of soft and hard power to attain policy objectives, often by limiting their own power via the creation of institutions or the use of concert diplomacy aimed at restoring and maintaining the balance of power. But this perspective does not match the facts. The US has rarely been a sincere multilateralist. Moreover, it will determinedly seek to maintain the current global imbalance of power via both hard and soft power, as appropriate. Non-realists underplay this hard fact about hegemonic states, whether they are in the ascendant or in terminal decline. Neoliberals point to US support for post-war multilateral institutions, such as the GATT, World Bank and IMF, as well as regional institutions, such as the OEEC and the EC. All of these institutions involved the Europeans, gave them a role in post-war reconstruction, and consolidated the mirage of transatlanticism. For Keohane (1984), these institutions represent ‘embedded liberalism’, and the challenge is not managing US hegemony, but addressing and managing global governance in a post-hegemonic world order.16 However, the Bretton Woods and other institutions prove the exceptions, rather than the rule. Until 1917, the US stood in splendid isolation of its European counterparts during the Great War. Again, until 1941, the US stood aloof as Brussels, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Paris fell, content to engage in minimalist support of Britain with Lend- 11 Cited in The New Tork Times (2004), ‘Across party lines, Europe is anti-Bush’, May 7. 12 France Inter (2001), interview with Hubert Védrine, Question Directe, Paris, 6 February. 13 The New Tork Times (2004), ‘Across party lines, Europe is anti-Bush’, May 7. 14 Waltz cited in R. Keohane (ed.) (1986), Neorealism and its Critics, p. 173. 15 Anthony Cordesman, quoted in Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘The Transatlantic Alliance - Coredesman: US push on greater Middle East could cause NATO, EU friction’, online. Available: <http://www.csis.org/press/pr04_03.pdf> Accessed January 16, 2004. 16 R. Keohane (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

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Lease. Only Pearl Harbor, and Hitler’s ill-considered declaration of war against America, brought the US into the European theatre of conflict. Harries points to Truman’s ‘ruthless’ cessation of Lend-Lease as representative of the US’s utter disregard for its European allies and any notion of ‘western’ affinity.17 US rejections of the League of Nations, the UN Convention against torture, the ICJ, the ICC, UNCLOS III, the Ottowa Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol and the ABM Treaty demonstrate that the US has a long history of disdain for international regimes which do not serve its national interests. In the 1990s, the US also rid the UN of one Secretary-General, appointed its own preferred candidate, caused two Assistant Secretaries-General to resign in protest over the economic blockade of Iraq, threatened to boycott UN institutions if the economic blockade on Iraq were lifted, and bombed Belgrade without UNSC authorization.18 In some cases, such as the GATT, WTO and UN, the US has simply circumvented multilateral institutions by engaging in bilateral initiatives (the 1981 US-Japan VER; the 1985 Plaza Accord), or aggressive unilateralism (the 1988 Omnibus Act; the punitive tariff threats levelled against Japan, China and South Korea during the 1990s; the US-EU banana regime dispute; the US Farm Bill) and the US Senate’s 1999 rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).19 A number of these were the responsibility of the Bush Administration; however, American unilateralism predates Bush II by a number of decades. The WTC attacks did not alter the balance of power, as previous conflicts had, such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Instead, the 9/11 strikes represented a fundamental challenge to US hegemony and compelled the Bush Administration to call its allies to arms. In the first instance - the war against the Taliban - they were not disappointed. France and Germany provided substantial forces for both the war in Afghanistan, and the peacekeeping effort, respectively. The UNSC authorized a resolution which was justified under the doctrine of self-defence detailed in UNC Art. 51. But the US decision to recommence its aggressive pursuit of arms inspections in Iraq signalled that Afghanistan was only the first battle in the war on terror. America’s unilateral declaration of its right to employ a pre-emptive strike doctrine suggested an implicit goal: the prevention of America’s security from being undermined by constraints imposed by other powers, including those of the US’s traditional allies (Chace 2003: 2).20 3. An illusory transatlantic alliance? No analysis of the transatlantic alliance is possible without reference to the often-difficult relationship between the Europeans and the US. Indeed, the US has fought wars against most of the major European powers. Britain (War of Independence; War of 1812); Germany (1917-18; 1941-45); Austria-Hungary (1917-18); and Italy (1941-45). The US also came close to conflict with 19th-century Tsarist Russia as it attempted to 17 Harries (1993), ‘The collapse of 'the West”’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4. 18 NATO and the US claimed to be acting under UNC Art. 52(1), although Art. 53(1) declares that 'no enforcement action shall be taken' by regional bodies 'without the authorisation of the Security Council' 19 The US has observed a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests since 1992, but the non-ratification of the CTBT leaves the door open for the reactivation of such tests. Similarly, although the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) was not ratified by the US Senate, the Carter Administration and subsequent administration have adhered to its articles. See further, Terry L. Deibel (2002), ‘The Death of a Treaty’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 81: 5; pp. 142- 20 James Chace, ‘Present at the Destruction: the death of American internationalism’, World Policy Journal, 20, 1 (Spring 2003).

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extend its influence across the Bering Strait into Alaska, and even had pretensions to control of territories in the northern continental US. The most recent conflicts between the US and European states have, of course, taken place during and immediately after the Cold War, including interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Who or what is ‘the west’? A number of critiques of transatlanticism are similar to criticisms of the EU project. In the latter case, some theorists posit that the notion of ‘Europe’ is entirely constructed by élites. As the late Susan Strange (1998) asked, ‘Who are EU?’21 Owen Harries suggests that the Euro-American relationship was essentially a marriage of convenience, based firmly upon the existence of a common enemy. It was doubtful, Harries (1993: 41) argued, whether the relationship could survive the disappearance of the Soviet Union.22 Similarly, Robert Kagan (2002: 3) argues that ‘It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.’23 In their response to Kagan’s thesis, Asmus and Pollack (2002: 115) demonstrate the dangers associatyed with prediction: in 2002, they argued that ‘Putin has opted to protect Moscow’s interests by cooperating with the US and Europe rather than by trying to play a spoiler role’.24 As Harries notes, the greatest conflicts of the twentieth century were largely internecine where ‘the west’ essentially fought against itself. Moreover, with the expansion of the EU to 25 member states in May 2004, the very concept of ‘the west’ in the post-Cold War order becomes exceptionally blurred. Central, eastern and southern European citizens increasingly identify themselves with ‘the west’. Dominique Mosi25 (2003) complicates the issue by identifying two ‘wests’: one American, one European. Donald Rumsfeld went further in distinguishing between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’. Rumsfeld was implying that the ‘new Europeans’ were part of ‘the (American) west’, whereas France and Germany clearly belonged to the ‘old’ European conception of the west. Although none of this is particularly useful, it does point to the death of the traditional concept of the ‘political west’, which meant the US plus its alliance partners: the member countries of NATO and the OECD. But in the case of Iraq, as Rumsfeld noted, the mission determines the coalition. History tells us a great deal about European attitudes to hegemonic internationalists. Here, the concept of ‘hegemonic internationalist’ is defined as a dominant power which attempts to export its socio-cultural and economic systems internationally. Examples may include the Roman empire, the Napoleonic empire and, possibly, Nazi Germany.26 21 As the late Susan Strange (1998) asked, ‘Who are EU? Ambiguities in the concept of Competitiveness’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36, No.1 (March), pp. 103-14 22 O. Harries (1993), ‘The collapse of 'the West”’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4. p. 44. 23 R. Kagan (2002), ‘Power and Weakness’, Policy Review, June/July, Issue 113; pp. 3-29. 24 This waas clearly an inaccurate reading of Russian foreign policy as, in the case of the Iraq war, there was little cooperation between the US and ‘old Europe’, and Putin ultimately backed the Franco-German position. Given Putin’s move in 2004 to re-establish Russia’s eminence as a nuclear power, the assertion that Russia is now a ‘cooperative’ power is exceedingly dubious. See R. D. Asmus and K. Pollack (2002), ‘The New Transatlantic Project: A response to Robert Kagan’, Policy Review, Issue 115, October/November, pp. 3-19. 25 D. Mosi (2003), ‘Reinventing the West’, Foreign Affairs, November/December, Vol. 82, No. 6, p.67. 26 It is worth noting that Britain was not a hegemonic internationalist during its period of international dominance between 1815 and 1914. The UK provided a great number of international public goods throughout its tenure, but it did not seek to export its socio-cultural system (except to its empire), and it did not utilize its hegemonic position to upset the balance of power. Rather, Britain acted consistently to restore balance, except in 1870-71.

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Even before the US became an internationalist power, both France and Britain were careful to avoid embroiling the US in hostilities during the Napoleonic wars, although Napoleon himself attempted to enlist American support for his war against Britain and its empire. But it was ultimately British seizures of US merchant ships which resulted in the War of 1812. In 1917, it was clear that the Great War had reached a stalemate where neither side could achieve victory without the decisive intercession of the US.27 However, if the French and British assumed that the US would quietly retreat and leave the Europeans to return to concert diplomacy, they were gravely mistaken. Conversely, German élites were grateful for President Wilson’s articulation of a peace based upon the Fourteen Points, self-determination and the establishment of a League of Nations, largely because, if implemented, the Americans’ plans would ameliorate the worst effects of the punitive peace treaty the French and British were certain to impose. Wilson’s position was virtually ignored at Versailles in 1919, and his own Congress rejected the entire concept of the League of Nations.28 This record demonstrates that the US was rarely an isolationist power in the twentieth century. More accurately, for almost a hundred years, America has demonstrated the traits of a hegemonic internationalist, and its foreign policy goals have always been treated with wariness and suspicion, even among the European states it helped liberate and protect. US interests in Europe have always been motivated by strategy, rather than cultural affinity or altruism, despite constant proclamations of the ‘special relationship’ between the US and UK29 (and, more recently, a similar theme has emerged in US-Australian relations). At critical junctures in the last century, the US has intervened in European affairs largely because its own interests were threatened by emerging hegemonic challengers in Europe. The Great War disrupted American commerce significantly, and threatened and killed its civilians, even prior to 1917. The Americans did not retreat into isolation, even after the Senate’s rejection of Versailles. J.P. Morgan bankers and numerous American economists were intimately involved with the Dawes and Young Plans which restructured German reparation payments. US firms invested heavily in Europe and both American commerce and Roosevelt’s administrations were concerned by the Nazi appropriation of US assets in Germany during the 1930s, and in occupied Europe from 1940.30 The German ascendancy (1940-41) also affected American commerce profoundly, and the Axis represented a potential threat to US oil supplies from the Middle East. Similarly, the 1945-8 Soviet takeover of eastern Europe posed a direct challenge to US interests in western Europe. The American response was to fund the Christian Democrats in Italy and to develop both the West German Basic Law and the social market economy which underpinned the new Federal Republic. In short, the US quickly adopted the role of hegemonic internationalist, a position both the French and the British attempted to deny it in both 1919 and 1945. At Versailles, 27 The US ambassador following the American decision to enter the war, commented to Raymond Poincaré that the US had never forgotten that the French had sent Lafayette and French forces to fight for American independence. Poincaré replied that the French were not fighting for American independence; they were there to fight the British. 28 It is notable, however, that the defeat of the League proposal in the Senate was a close-run thing. 29 In a meeting with Blair, Clinton was reminded to mention the ‘special relationship’ and then burst out laughing. 30 In fact, the ‘true’ American isolationists, very much in the minority, were represented by figures such as Charles Lindbergh, who stood for the ‘America First’ group’s agenda.

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both Lloyd George and Clemenceau impatiently brushed aside Wilson’s call for self-determination and decolonisation. Similarly, Churchill and de Gaulle tried to ignore Roosevelt’s promptings to engage in decolonisation. However, it was not until the 1956 Suez Crisis that France and Britain were forced to accept that US hegemony could be less than benign when the two European powers attempted to take matters into their own hands without consulting the Eisenhower Administration. In this instance, the US intervened and stopped the war following the bombing of Cairo and while troops were actually on the ground. Suez was particularly significant because it resulted in two different responses from the UK and France: in the former case, it led British élites to the inevitable conclusion that their interests were best served if they acted as an American satellite; but for France, it indicated that Americans’ identification of their foreign policy interests were entirely distinct from those of Europe. The American refusal to share nuclear technology with France, while arming the British with Polaris, confirmed French suspicions of the existence of an ‘Anglosphere’. De Gaulle in particular was convinced that this meant that NATO was primarily designed to protect Anglo-American, not continental, security interests, and de Gaulle moved to develop France’s own independent nuclear deterrent as quickly as possible.31 4. NATO: strategic asset or liability? It is worthwhile recalling that NATO was only passed by a reluctant US Congress after assurances from President Truman that it was merely a temporary measure. Some 54 years later, that bastion of trade and commerce, The Wall Street Journal, editorialized, that NATO was no longer a useful tool of US policy. It questioned whether NATO ‘continued to serve the interests of the United States.’ The WSJ launched a broadside at Germany, claiming the Federal Republic had ‘an agenda aimed less at defusing war than at actively promoting American defeat.’ Unless NATO members staged a dramatic change in direction, ‘[NATO] has outlived its usefulness.’ Moreover, the Journal declared that ‘What President Bush calls “a coalition of the willing” will become America’s new security alliance.’ The notion that the West Europeans could pursue anything resembling independent foreign policies within the confines of NATO was ruthlessly crushed by the US’s reaction to the Anglo-French actions over Suez in 1956. Suez had three immediate repercussions. First, it forced the British to move irrevocably into the American camp; second, it convinced the French that the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ could not be trusted; and, third, it firmly consolidated the fact that, when it came to foreign policy, the US was far more than merely primus inter pares. The French position resulted in its development of an independent nuclear deterrent in 1964. This had an immediate impact upon French foreign policy, both within Europe and internationally. First, France adopted a foreign policy which was aggressively independent of the transatlantic alliance, characterised by its recognition of Communist China in 1964; second, France boycotted EC institutions in 1965, resulting in the 1966 Luxembourg Agreement, which institutionalised the national veto in EC affairs; and, third, de Gaulle announced France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command in 31 The extent of de Gaulle’s desire for independence from its European allies is made apparent in his memoirs, where he also notes that he would not have signed the 1957 Rome Treaty (establishing the EC) had he assumed power prior to its promulgation.

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1966.32 In 1967-8, concerned about US FDI in key European industries, de Gaulle launched a determined attempt to destabilize the US dollar:gold system, which found belated success in the ‘Nixon shock’ of 1971 collapse of the post-war fixed exchange-rate system. By signalling the emergence of French diplomatic exceptionalism in dramatic form, de Gaulle was merely putting in practice Kissinger’s realism: The defence of Europe cannot be conducted solely from North America, because however firm allied unity may be, a nation cannot be counted on to commit suicide in defence of a foreign territory.33 It is significant that Franco-German initiatives, such as the establishment of EC-CMEA economic relations, Ostpolitik and the Helsinki Accords, took place during a period of relative American weakness, recovering from multifarious shocks, such as the collapse of the dollar:gold fixed-exchange régime, the 1973-4 oil crisis, withdrawal from Vietnam, and Watergate. By contrast, the ‘Second Cold War’, as Fred Halliday termed it, was characterised by a forceful American reassertiveness, the implementation of NATO first-strike capabilities and the activation of the SDI programme. Despite the pressure exerted by the Reagan Administration, the French government insisted on persisting with the Soviet gas pipeline deal, even in the midst of the 1980-81 Polish crisis. By contrast, protests by West German Greens and SPD politicians failed to dissuade the CDU government from allowing the US to place Pershing II nuclear missiles in West Germany. These not only gave NATO a first-strike capability, but also meant that the FRG was likely to be the primary target of Soviet defence planners. In summary, the French and German positions demonstrated their relative strength and weakness, respectively. France could strike out an independent foreign policy position, forging closer links with the USSR and China, while remaining outside NATO’s integrated command structure.34 Conversely, West Germany was forced to accede to US demands due to its inability to provide adequately for its own security. Its only other alternative was to align itself more closely with France, which itself was not an alternative, as French conventional and nuclear missile defence was designed largely to fight a war on German territory. It is instructive to consider the reaction the late President Reagan provoked when he effectively launched the Second Cold War, as Fred Halliday termed it, against the USSR. Reagan’s forceful ‘negotiate from strength’ stance saw US defence spending soar to $2 trillion over six years, the highest level as a proportion of GDP since Eisenhower. The Reagan Administration’s policies provoked tensions in the transatlantic relationship, particularly with the installation of Pershing II missiles in West Germany and the Administration’s articulation of a first use doctrine. As Michael Howard (1987) notes, ‘1987 saw relations between the governments of the United States and its European allies reach a nadir’.35 In 1987, two veterans of US strategic policy, Fred Iklé and Arnold Wohlstetter authored a report on the future of NATO. The Iklé-Wohlstetter report recommended a significant upgrade in NATO’s capabilities, despite the fact that the INF Treaty was to be signed in 32 This took effect in 1968. France did not leave the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s ‘governing body’ and remains a member. 33 Kissinger (1959) cited in E. P. Thompson and D. Smith (eds) (1980), Protest and Survive (Harmondsworth: Penguin), p. 95. 34 NATO is under the operational control of SACEUR, the commander of which is always an American. 35 M. Howard (1987), ‘A European Perspective on the Reagan Years’, Foreign Affairs, 1987/88

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Washington in December that year, which would eliminate an entire class of short and medium-range nuclear missiles from the east and west European theatres.36 In January 1988, in a ceremony at the Elysée, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl presided over the creation of the Franco-German Defence Force, the first West European international force outside NATO’s integrated command structure. Its symbolism was far greater than its military pretensions; here was a Franco-German force under French command. It had taken over 20 years for France to manage even a token pan-European response to its abrupt departure from NATO in 1966. Nevertheless, it was a portent of what was later to become the fledgling Eurocorps. The 1997 Senate hearings on the expansion of NATO saw the prospective enlargement endorsed by Atlanticists such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Clinton Administration estimated it would cost up to $US35 billion over 13 years to fund the expansion, of which more than 90% would be funded by the Americans. However, expert testimony estimated the real cost was, more realistically, closer to $US90-150 billion, with the US paying at least half the amount.37 In 1990, John Mearsheimer predicted - inaccurately - that the end of the Cold War would restore multipolarity and place a brake upon EU integration. He also argued that Germany would become closer to Russia, a prophecy which has proven at least partly correct.38 The EU - led by France and Germany - has developed stronger links with the Russian Federation, evidenced by the EU’s critical support in 2004 for Russian membership of the WTO. In return, the Putin government agreed to ratify and implement the Kyoto Protocol. Given the closer relations between Paris, Berlin and Moscow arising out of their united opposition to the American-led invasion of Iraq, such an outcome is unlikely to be pure coincidence. The key point here is that Russia has moved, in the space of a decade, from a virtual American satellite to a much stronger relationship with its EU neighbours. Tsarist history suggests Russia has much more in common with Europe than it does with the US or China, both of which have always had a traditionally uneasy relationship with the Russian giant. Russia has also been heavily dependent upon the IMF in recent years, particularly during the 1999 ruble crisis. Although the US has been the key policy maker in the IMF throughout its history, EU members still control 40% of the IMF’s capital, versus the Americans’ 25%. However, US policy positions at the IMF have generally prevailed. During Gulf War I, NATO played a key strategic role in the removal of Saddam’s troops from Kuwait and the decimation of Iraqi forces. Not only did France supply the third-largest military force in the Gulf, but within four months of German unification, the Luftwaffe was at war again, albeit under the auspices of NATO, and American command. Turkey played a major role as a base for coalition forces which directed attacks against Iraq from the north.

36 The elimination of the Pershing Is in western European were earmarked for removal in any case as they were obsolete. 37 New York Times (1997), ‘Senate Panel Hears Debate on Costs, Benefits of Bigger NATO’, October 10. 38 J. Mearsheimer, (1990) ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’. International Security , Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 5–56.

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If one doubted the transatlantic alliance was in trouble, one needed to look no further than Colin Powell’s spirited defence of NATO in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 2003. Powell is widely viewed as the leading moderate within the Bush Administration; ‘dovish’ according to some; a realist according to others. Powell cited the ‘bruising’ debate in the North Atlantic Council on military assistance to Turkey as evidence of the deep conflicts within NATO. Without mentioning France - which attempted to block a NATO defence of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq in March 200339 - Powell painted a picture of allies who disagreed over certain policy areas, but who also shared ‘almost half a century of solid cooperation.’40 The irony that many new central and east European NATO members were at war in Iraq even before their formal accession, while diplomatic wars took place between NATO’s coalitionists and non-belligerents could not have been lost upon the Europeans. Contrary to Harries’ expectations, NATO’s expansion took place without significant Russian opposition, which demonstrated not only Russia’s relative weakness, but also the extent to which Moscow had become dependent upon the west. Whereas Gorbachev courted enormous (western) popularity by renouncing the Brezhnev Doctrine and ‘losing’ eastern Europe, the 2004 expansion of NATO to the Russian borders had no discernible impact upon Vladimir Putin’s electoral standing. NATO’s expansions may turn out to be merely symbolic, rather than strategically important in any meaningful way. For Josef Joffe (2003: 157), the division between the NATO powers in 2002-03 meant the death of NATO as we knew it, resulting in an ‘ad hoc and à la carte’ alliance.41 As NATO’s own web site rather tersely puts it, ‘The campaign against Iraq in 2003 was conducted by a coalition of forces from different countries, some of which were NATO member countries and some were not. NATO as an organisation had no role in the campaign but undertook a number of measures in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to ensure the security of one of its members, Turkey, in the event of a threat to it resulting from the war in Iraq.’42 This statement glosses over the fact that the French were attempting to prevent NATO from defending Turkey in the North Atlantic Council, forcing the Turks to invoke NATO’s Article 4. The Franco-German North Atlantic agenda comprises the reconstruction of Iraq, combating terrorism and the stabilization of the Middle East. However, this is at significant variance with the internationalist American agenda, which envisages a democratic Iraq allied with the US, the elimination of terrorism and the transformation of the Middle East. This demonstrates the key policy differences between status quo Europeans and revisionist unilateralists. The latter suspect that a containment doctrine, such as that practised against Iraq throughout 1991-2003, is insufficient in a war against both state-sponsored and transnational terrorism and, like the ‘Spanish ulcer’, containment is only a temporary measure at best. For American unilateralists, NATO can and should be used for major peacekeeping operations, such as Kosovo, 39 R. Davison (2004), ‘French Security after 9/11: Franco-American Discord’, in P. Shearman and M. Sussex (eds), European Security After 9/11 (Aldershot: Ashgate), p. 78. 40 C. Powell, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2003. Online. Available: <http://http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3153> Accessed May 16, 2003. 41 J. Joffe (2003), ‘Continental Divides’, The National Interest, Spring, pp. 157-60. 42 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2004), ‘NATO ?Issues - Frequently Asked Questions’. Online. Available <http://http://www.nato.int/issues/faq/index.html#A8> Accessed June 3, 2004.

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Afghanistan and Iraq. But the Americans view NATO as an alliance which should merely support, and cooperate with, US policy. By contrast, the non-coalitionist Europeans want NATO to act as a partnership in the post-Cold War environment. This is a policy chasm which is unlikely to be closed. 5. From Aggressive Unilateralism to Transatlantic Division Two-level or reductionist theories frequently point to the 2000 election of the Bush Administration as the decisive turning-point in a US policy shift from multilateralism to aggressive unilateralism. There is little evidence to support this assertion. In reality, it was 9/11 which fundamentally altered the US’s response to threats. The post-Cold War order saw the US exercising a relatively benign hegemony during both the Clinton and early Bush II Administrations. If there was a ‘neo-conservative plot’ to remove Saddam and occupy Iraq, there was no indication of this either in the 2000 presidential campaign, or in the months before September 11. As Papayoanou43 (1999) argues, the level of interdependence between status quo and revisionist powers affects states’ foreign policy decision making. This realist perspective on alliance behaviour suggests that interdependent status quo powers will react aggressively towards revisionist powers which threaten to destabilise or overthrow the existing balance of power or the international order. Numerous examples of this may be found: the seven coalitions against revolutionary France and Napoleon, led by Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia; the British, French, Russian and American alliance against Germany and Austria-Hungary; and the Anglo-Russian-American coalition against the Axis. As a hegemonic internationalist, it is unlikely that the US would have been as inclined to implement its military and economic policies via instruments such as NATO, the GATT, the IMF and the UN, had the US not held a dominant position. When it was impossible to achieve consensus (for example, in the UNSC during the Cold War), the US acted alone, or virtually alone, in conflicts such as Vietnam. It is notable that scarcely had the ink dried on the Final Act of the Uruguay Round that the US launched a ruthless programme of aggressive trade unilateralism against its Cold War allies - Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, as well as trade sanctions against China. Consequently, the fact that the US spent considerable time and resources amassing an international coalition against Iraq in 1990-91, should rank as a rarity in US foreign policy, rather than common practice. It was a piece of cautious coalitionism, tempered by the persistence of the collapsing Soviet Union, that will not be repeated. The fact is that the US throughout the Cold War was always much more than primus inter pares, and its national policy preferences were not restricted by the West Europeans, the EU, NATO or any other power other than the Soviet Union. Any specialist on EU-US trade relations knows full well that an agricultural cold war has existed between the Europeans and Americans at least since 1964.44

43 Paul A. Papayoanou (1999), Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), chaps. 4 –5. 44 1964 marked the commencement of the Kennedy Round of GATT, which was characterised by the so-called ‘chicken wars’.

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If there was a failure in neorealism, it was not its so-called failure to predict the end of the Soviet Union, the Cold War and strategic bipolarity; it was its underestimation and lack of focus upon what the implications of a unipolar international system might be. Clearly, for Waltz, strategic bipolarity was the most stable structure as it tended to minimize the system’s propensity for large-scale war between major powers.45 Moreover, the temperature of the Cold War was ‘kept cool by the presence of nuclear weapons’.46 Strategic bipolarity, and the crucial Soviet veto in the UNSC kept the US from exercising an entirely free hand. Nevertheless, with the exception of France, there were few instances throughout the Cold War period when the US did not get its own way on issues of global significance. In 1991, the implosion of the USSR removed the only genuine obstacle to unilateralism. Moreover, the emergence of a unipolar system meant that the US could truly become a global, rather than semi-global, power. In the absence of constraints such as bipolarity, it is scarcely surprising that the US has become a more unilateralist power. The mistake the Europeans, and others, made previously was in thinking that the US had ever been a multilateralist power. One hundred years ago, the British and French signed the path-breaking entente cordiale, a document which explicitly recognized the German threat to the European balance of power. A century later, the positions were reversed: the Franco-German axis faced an Anglo-American alliance which appeared determined to encircle the two most powerful members of the EU with European coalitionist partners which, if not hostile precisely, demonstrated vociferous support for Anglo-American intervention in Iraq. These included Italy, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.47 Given that NATO had expanded to the borders of Russia, and US troops were stationed in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, it was scarcely surprising the Russian Federation reacted by promptly joining the anti-war faction led by France and Germany.48 If nothing else, the French, Germans and Russians were taken aback by the rapidity with which the US had expanded its global strategic reach in the post 9/11 environment, a process which took only months to accomplish. Thus, it was almost predictable that three-fifths of the UNSC’s permanent members would oppose what they viewed as the US’s strategic aggrandisement in Iraq (and, by extension, the Middle East), which they saw as an attempt to consolidate the global military dominance of the US still further. In effect, the logic of balance, dormant for much of the post-Cold War period, dramatically swung back into play as the US-led coalition moved inevitably towards war in Iraq. What was striking about the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis was the impotence of its response, as it sought refuge in abstruse aspects of international law By contrast, China kept its powder dry as it waited to see whether US would return to the UNSC to obtain a further resolution, or whether the Americans would simply circumvent the Security Council. Nevertheless, the 2003 Iraq war saw a larger coalition assembled against Saddam than the coalition of 1990-91. The key difference was that the Atlantic community - at one in 1991 - was deeply divided in 2002-03. Ranged against the US were France, Germany

45 K. Waltz, (1964) ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus, Vol. 93, pp. 881-909. 46 K. Waltz (1988), ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History’. 47 Note here the ‘Vilnius 10’ letter of support from east European members of NATO. 48 The annoyance of the Russians over the Belgrade bombing and Kosovo intervention is well-known. See further, A. D. Muraviev (2004), ‘9/11 and Russian Perceptions of Europe and NATO’, in P. Shearman and M. Sussex (eds), European Security After 9/11 (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 107-27.

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and Russia, while the UK, Italy, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Turkey, among a number of other European states, supported the American position. Among the ‘undeclared’ coalitionists were the Gulf Cooperation Council members (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Critics pointed to the Bush Administration’s generous arms and aid packages which were offered to prospective coalition members, but similar arrangements were made in 1990 by Bush I. Both Bush administrations employed a combination of soft and hard power to assemble coalitions. Hartung and Ciarocca note that Yemen’s ‘No’ vote against the war in 1990 resulted in the cancellation of all US aid to Yemen within 72 hours. Similarly, Mauritius publicly censured its UN ambassador for his less-than-vociferous support for UNSCR 1441, in order to avoid US opprobrium in the form of aid reductions or cancellations.49 The impact of US power has also manifested itself commercially in the wake of the Iraq war. Secretary of State Powell warned that France and Germany would face ‘consequences’ as a result of their opposition to the US intervention in Iraq. These have taken the form of excluding French and German companies from contracts in Iraq in favour of US, British and other coalitionists’ firms, although German firms have actively sought to establish commercial contracts with the Iraqi provisional authority.50 But this is nothing new; in the 1990s, Egypt attempted to use aid credits to purchase submarines from German firm HDW. However, the credit was reserved for American arms purchases only.51 ‘Old Europe’ - France and Germany - was unlikely to be bribed with offers of sweeteners. However, ‘New Europe’ - such as Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland - saw considerable advantages in supporting the US position. These included subsidized arms sales and possible US aid packages. However, US policy makers - including Colin Powell - continued to propagate the myth prior to the Iraq war that Franco-German interests in Iraq were predominantly commercial and this, to some extent, explained their diplomatic opposition to US intervention. In 2004, Chirac consolidated this impression at the G8 meeting by refusing to forgive Iraqi debt. However, as Gordon and Shapiro note, from 1997 to 2002, French two-way trade with Iraq comprised less than 0.5 per cent of France’s total trade - a paltry 0.07 per cent of GDP. German two-way trade with Iraq was even lower - 0.063 per cent of German total trade. Most of the imports from Iraq were oil, although these comprised around one sixth of the annual level of oil imports from Iraq by the US.52 As economic interdependence was extremely low or non-existent between the French, Germans and Iraq, it is scarcely plausible that ‘Old Europe’ opposed American pre-emption on the basis of commercial interests. Equally, although it was oft-claimed in Europe, Australia and elsewhere that the US wanted to control Iraqi oil, it is significant that the US was Iraq’s largest oil customer throughout the 1990-2003 blockade period, and supplies have not yet been restored to pre-war levels. This forced up oil prices to highs not seen

49 W. D Hartung and M. Ciarrocca (2003), ‘Buying a coalition’, The Nation, March 17, Vol. 276, Issue 10, p. 2. 50 Radio Deutsche Welle (2004), ‘German Industry Eyes Iraq Contracts After Handover’, broadcast June 3. 51 Ultimately, the Egyptians circumvented this requirement by purchasing a licence from HDW to manufacture the submarines themselves. See J-P Hébert (1999), ‘Le système américain d'exportation d'armements’, Le Débat Stratégique, No. 44, May. 52 Gordon and Shapiro, pp. 77-78.

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since Gulf War I, which obliged the US to request OPEC output increases in June 2004. In oil-dependent and price-conscious Europe, this did not improve the US’s popularity. ‘Old Europe’ - which has dirigisme at its core - and accounts for half the EU’s GDP, has also been troubled by the outspokenness and rapidity of the transformation of the EU from an acquis which has been broadly compliant with Franco-German politico-economic demands for half a century, to a sharply-divided group of states. This has come as a profound shock to the Franco-German axis, whose leading and guiding role in the process of EU integration has remained largely unchallenged since 1950. The grand projets of Europe - CAP; CFSP, the Single Market and EMU - have been driven primarily by the Franco-German tandem, and the EU itself is largely the result of decades of Franco-German intergovernmental consensus and compromise.53 Despite Britain’s frequent derogations from EU policy (such as EMU), European integration has persisted, even in the absence of a deeper British commitment to the European project. This ‘hub-and-spokes’ approach to integration meant that most other EU states were virtually peripheral to the process. The complementary dual centrifugal forces of NATO and the EU have also drawn Europe’s southern and eastern peripheries into the EU and western mainstreams.54 Greece, Portugal and Spain’s integration with NATO and the EU in the late 1970s and 1980s was followed by the rapid normalization of relations between the EU/NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries from 1990. The assimilation of central and eastern European states into NATO, together with the accession of ten central, southern and eastern European countries to the EU in 2004, appeared to confirm the primacy of the EU as the axis of the European integration project. Thus, it was a rude shock to Franco-German primacy when Poland, the Baltic republics, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, all of which had been granted EU membership, plus Romania (an applicant country) joined the US-led coalition in 2002-03. Chirac went public with his disapproval of the new EU members, chastising their behaviour as ‘infantile’ and ‘dangerous’.55 He went further and launched a thinly-veiled threat at the Vilnius 10, stating that several referenda might need to take place in order to confirm their accession to the EU. Chirac’s shock at the actions of the acceding EU countries was in sharp contrast with his optimism of 1997: ‘Europe will only be a great power, probably the first, in tomorrow’s world if it is united. That presupposes the completion of a European Union of 26 or 27 and the security architecture which will allow us to live without anxiety.’56 That unity, even if much of it was illusory, is now in serious jeopardy. However, the failure of the US to link Iraq conclusively with either WMD development or Al-Qaeda has driven several states in the ‘New Europe’, if not back into the arms of ‘Old Europe’, to reappraise seriously their commitment to the US-led coalition. Poland will cut its troop commitment from 2005, and Polish government ministers have said they might not have supported the coalition had they been aware that the intelligence concerning Iraq’s alleged WMD and Al-Qaeda links was seriously misleading. Former

53 R. Davison (1998), ‘Euromoney: from divergence to convergence in EU international monetary relations?’, Australasian Journal of European Integration, I, pp. 79-130. 54 R. Davison (1998), ‘An Ever Closer Union? Rethinking European Peripheries’, in P. B. Murray and L. T. Holmes (eds), Europe: Rethinking the Boundaries (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 63-92. 55 Davison, ‘French Security after 9/11’, p. 75. 56 Quoted in New Europe (1997), ‘Chirac Calls on Czechs to Share Vision’, New Europe, 13 April, p. 14.

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president Lech Walesa also declared he would not have sent troops to Iraq. However, Walesa also blamed France and Germany for their inability to prevent the war and their failure to establish a common EU foreign policy position on Iraq. Walesa argued that ‘They neglected to bring together the old and new EU member states. Such an important organization as the European Union should have spoken out with one voice against the war. If that had been the case, the United States could not have ignored it. Instead, France and Germany allowed Europe to split on the issue, and therefore we had war. France and Germany are responsible.’57 Nevertheless, despite some misgivings, Polish president Aleksander Kwasniewski has said Poland will not withdraw from Iraq. The Czech Republic also reassessed its personnel commitment in 2004 and will withdraw 80 military police from Basra in 2005. Conversely, Ukraine increased its commitment ten-fold in July 2004, with almost 2,000 troops in the field.58 However, the most auspicious volte-face was delivered by Spain, with the new government announcing the withdrawal of troops following the Madrid bombing. Nevertheless, the terrorist attack in Spain did not alter Italy’s position, with premier Silvio Berlusconi placing no deadline on Italian troop withdrawals; Berlusconi declared only that Italian forces would remain in Iraq until ‘ until democracy and stability are ensured.’59 Public opinion on the negative impact of Iraq on terrorism and national security is virtually uniform across Europe in early 2004, although voters differ concerning the extent of the problem. Only 10 per cent or fewer of those polled in Europe said the Iraq war had reduced the threat of terrorism. In France, over 50 per cent said the terror threat had increased due to the war, while the figure was 75 per cent in Germany,. The highest threat level was felt in Spain with 85 per cent. In terms of whether Bush’s role in world affairs was positive or negative, over 50 per cent of Italians felt it was negative, while in Britain the figure was over 66 per cent. Nevertheless, a majority of Italian and British voters asserted that, despite the failure to find WMDs in Iraq, there were other reasons to justify the war.60 British, French and German participation in Gulf War I consolidated their positions as the pre-eminent West European powers, while simultaneously satisfying differing national interest positions. For Britain, Saddam’s aggression presented numerous threats to British commercial interests in the Middle East, as well as the potential to destabilize the precarious military balance in the region. For France, the invasion of Kuwait satisfied the principle of casus belli and underscored the role of international law in the restoration and maintenance of state sovereignty. It gave France the opportunity to play not only a role in the war against Saddam, but also a chance to influence the structure of the emerging post-Cold War international order. In the newly-united Germany’s case, the Gulf War presented it with a unique opportunity to assert itself as a full member of the international community. However, Britain was less alarmed by the impact of Iraqi aggression on world oil prices than France and Germany. The latter remain more highly susceptible to fluctuations in global oil supplies and energy costs than the British, who

57 Radio Deutsche Welle (2004), ‘Lech Walesa: Germany and France Share Blame for Iraq War’, broadcast 26 May. 58 Radio Deutsche Welle (2004), ‘Washington Wants German Support for Iraq UN Resolution’, broadcast 1 June. 59 Radio Deutsche Welle (2004), ‘As Spain Withdraws, Italy Pledges to Keep Troops In Iraq’, broadcast 21 May. 60 USA Today (2004), ‘International poll: Many think Iraq war upped terror threat’, March 4.

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were buffered by North Sea oil production and revenues. The 1973-74 oil crisis had initiated a decade of stagflation in Europe, and the prospect of a short conflict, which ensured the stability of the region, and of oil supplies, was vastly preferable to the uncertainty of leaving Saddam in control of Kuwait and with forces in reach of Saudi Arabia. One explanation infrequently discussed in the transatlantic divide is the impact of September 11 itself. Commentators ask why France and Germany were solidly behind the US in the war against the Taliban, to the extent that France deployed several thousand troops throughout Afghanistan. Yet, within 12 months of the US’s occupation of Kabul, the France and Germany found themselves diametrically opposed to further US interventions where there were not direct connections with the 9/11 attacks. The first explanation relates to the uncertainty following 9/11. Like the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, was Al-Qaeda planning multiple, simultaneous strikes elsewhere? This was seen as entirely possible, particularly given the undetected presence of the Al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, and its apparent freedom to seek targets throughout Europe - such as Brussels - without detection by European intelligence services. Thus, it was clearly comprehensible that the Europeans approved a rapid strike upon the Taliban, the most readily-identifiable state-based sponsors of terrorism, in order to increase their own sense of security, a point supported by opinion polls in most European states. However, in the absence of any strikes in Europe over the next 12 months, it was evident that some European leaders, notably Chirac and Schroeder, felt confident enough to resist US demands for a harsh UNSC resolution which would be unacceptable to Saddam and, as a consequence, form the legal basis for his removal. The Franco-German consensus was that the removal of the Taliban had removed one immediate threat and severely damaged bin Laden’s operational capabilities. The US, Australia and Britain believed that Jemaah Islamiyah’s successful strike in Bali in October 2002 should have obliterated any complacency felt in Europe; however, this did not alter the Franco-German position on Iraq, which hardened in November 2002 as UNSCR 1441 The protracted negotiations over 1441, and the subsequent disagreements over its interpretation, were the key causes behind the very public transatlantic rupture. 6. The French position No state has been apportioned more of the blame for the recent breakdown in transatlantic relations than France, a campaign largely orchestrated from the White House and media sympathetic to the Bush agenda. Although Russia, China and Germany signalled their strong opposition to a US-led war in Iraq, France headed the diplomatic opposition to the US in 2002-03 and, thus, attracted the lion’s share of the opprobrium. France’s objections to war in Iraq were legalistic, but Chirac and foreign minister Dominique de Villepin were concerned that a second UNSCR would force France to exercise its veto, something the Chinese had not indicated they would do. Thus, Chirac pre-emptively and publicly stated that France would vote against a second resolution. Many commentators saw this as Gallic recalcitrance, but this is far from the reality. First, the French urged the Americans not to return to the UNSC as they would not have the numbers to pass a resolution. Second, Paris did not want to exercise its veto for the

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first time since 1956. Consequently, the French government informed the American and British governments that they should not return to the UNSC and seek a second resolution. In effect, if the US and UK were intent on war with, it would be in defiance of international law and, moreover, the French ambassador told an NSA adviser that this would undermine Bush’s argument that the US was authorized to intervene in Iraq under 1441.61 In the wave of Francophobia which swept the US, and anti-Bush protests in France (and Germany), important aspects of cooperation between the two powers were ignored. During the Iraq war, France permitted flyovers by B52s, gave coalition forces access to French bases, and supplied the coalition with communications and imagery.62 France (and Germany) also offered to train Iraqi police and security forces, as NATO committed itself to do in its June 2004 meeting.63 However, the French government insisted no NATO flag should be flown in Iraq.64 However, the overall direction of French policy towards the US - which has a long history of ‘nuisance’ value - was to contain the ‘adventurism’ of the hyperpower within a multilateral framework. In this respect, France was, and is, behaving like any great power which fears the direct and indirect security implications of the US’s war on terror and the implications this may have for domestic security. By 2004, France could point to the Madrid bombings as evidence that American policy had backfired, and that Europeans might be forced to bear the brunt of the consequences. That a new European alliance - comprising France, Germany, Russia, Spain and Belgium - is being forged is becoming increasingly likely. The Franco-German-Spanish triumvirate, all current Security Council members, perceive a unique opportunity to ‘multilateralise’ the Anglo-American mission in Iraq and want to play a role in the reconstruction of Iraq, as well as in the politics of the Middle East more broadly. The French-led European alliance, in adopting UNSCR 1546, believed they had returned to the US to the fold of international law. But the Europeans did not succeed in achieving their preferred outcome: full sovereignty of Iraq with veto powers over coalition military activities. Naturally, the British and the Americans could not permit a resolution granting full sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government which could dictate Anglo-American military and security operations. In essence, 1546 merely confirmed UNSCR 1511, which authorized the coalitionists’ occupation forces. 7. The German position A retired German army officer, writing in the International Herald Tribune, said that, ‘You Americans have been telling us for 60 years that we must never go to war. You have made the Germans pacifists. We have accepted that war is never a solution. We

61 Gordon and Shapiro, pp. 147-8. 62 Brookings Institution, Center on the United States and France (2003), ‘The United States and France after the war in Iraq’, symposium, Washington DC, December 12. On line. Available: <http://www.brookings.edu/> Accessed February 6, 2004. 63 As Philip Gordon said, the NATO offer amounted to very little, but it was better than nothing. P. Gordon quoted on American Public Radio (2004), broadcast June 27, 2004. 64 CNN (2004), ‘U.S. welcomes NATO pledge to train Iraqi troops’, June 28. Online. Available <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/06/28/turkey.bush/index.html> Accessed June 28, 2004.

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believed that even more because of our own history. Now you attack us because Germany doesn't want to go to war.’65 Analysts point to Germany’s increasing tendency towards foreign policy exceptionalism, and argue that the SPD-Green coalition has been largely responsible for Germany’s drift away from the US and NATO into the French camp. But this is inaccurate. German perceptions of security altered markedly during the late 1980s as the Cold War ebbed away. The chief architects of this new foreign policy were Chancellor Kohl and foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Genscher himself was a key exponent of Ostpolitik in partnership with Chancellor Brandt in the 1970s. Given that Germany’s recasting of itself as both civilian and European power has been glaringly apparent since at least the early 1970s, claims that Schröder and Fischer have been largely responsible for Germany’s alleged volte-face appear somewhat hollow. The major difference since 1991 is that Germany is no longer as restricted by the structural constraints upon its actions imposed by the international system. Kohl’s first objective in the late 1980s was securing German unification, for which it appeared he was willing to pay virtually any price, to the extent that he even gave Gorbachev’s proposal of a neutral, united Germany outside NATO serious consideration. This was something neither the Americans nor the French would permit, and German unification took place with its NATO status unchanged, due predominantly to the Soviets’ inability to force the issue. Instead, Germany paid billions in removal costs for the departing Soviet army (Shearman 1995: 96-7).66 However, Kohl also had to satisfy Mitterrand’s European ambitions and assure the French government that a unified Germany would not become the preponderant player in EC politics. In 1989, Kohl agreed to the convocation of two IGCs, which ultimately produced the Maastricht Treaty in late 1991. Two of the three Maastricht ‘pillars’ were Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Both were essentially French grands projets designed to ‘Europeanize’ German monetary power and foreign policy. Maastricht was the price Kohl was forced to pay in order to secure German unification.67 Both Kohl and Mitterrand, who had initiated the Franco-German Defence Forces Agreement and the Franco-German Brigade, perceived a genuine opportunity for joint French and German leadership of common European policies on security and foreign affairs. However, Franco-German relations experienced a distinct cooling during the first years of Chirac’s presidency, and Schröder’s Germany appeared, at least initially, to move closer to Britain and the Blair government on a number of EU policy issues. However, 9/11 and the Iraq question destroyed the cautious Franco-British entente, established at St. Malo in 1998, and drove Germany back into the French fold by 2002. The German SPD-Green government prevaricated at every turn from 2002 when there were clear signs a conflict with Iraq was forthcoming. First, Germany signalled a 65 Quoted in Executive Intelligence Review (2003), ‘Pro-American Germans Oppose Iraq War’, March 7. 66 P. Shearman, ‘Russian Policy Toward Western Europe: The German Axis’, in Shearman (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990 (Boulder: Westview), pp. 93-109. 67 Mitterrand could have insisted upon a formal enlargement process as, technically, East Germany would be admitted as a new member of the EC. This would have been a lengthy process, requiring an application (which could be ‘left on the table’), Commission assessment, a Commission Opinion (doubtless negative, given the ramshackle state of the GDR economy), and any one of the 12 EC member states could veto admission in either the Council of Ministers or the European Council.

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cautious acceptance of a return of UN arms inspectors to Iraq. Then, during the German elections, Schröder and foreign minister Joschka Fischer sought to distance themselves and the SPD-Green coalition from the Bush Administration, with Schröder refusing to take a call from Bush and reportedly equating Bush’s policies with those of Hitler, a point repeated by one of Schröder’s less temperate ministers during the election.68 The story reportedly infuriated Bush and led Defence Secretary Rumsfeld to declare US relations with Germany ‘poisoned’. This would have been viewed as little more than the rough-and-tumble of domestic politics where a German chancellor faced a tight election and running an anti-US campaign would bolster the government’s re-election chances. Post-election, Schröder moved quickly to heal the rift with Bush and phoned the US president, who had not called to congratulate him on his re-election. Rumsfeld, who had refused to meet with German officials for six weeks, visited Berlin in November 2002, and declared relations ‘unpoisoned’ at a press conference with German defence minister, Peter Struck. Rumsfeld had reason for optimism; the Germans had indicated they would not necessarily oppose a new resolution on Iraq, with Schröder and Fischer in January 2003 refusing to pre-empt any decisions the UNSC might reach. However, Schröder subtly altered the tone of the language he had employed during the election. In 2002, he was stating that Germany would have no involvement in a war in Iraq; by January, he was saying no active involvement. Matters came to a head at the February 2003 security policy conference held, ironically, at Munich, where the Portuguese foreign minister assailed Fischer as a pacifist, arguing that pacifists were ‘wrong in 1939, wrong in the 1980s and wrong on Milocevic.’ Fischer responded by criticising the Portuguese contribution to peacekeeping in Afghanistan in comparison with Germany’s commitment.69 Germany’s importance has increased markedly since its elevation to temporary membership of the UNSC, a position it did not occupy during the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis. Nevertheless, Germany’s position on Iraq under Schröder appears opportunistic and disingenuous rather than rooted in legalism or moralism. During the 2002 election, Schröder sought to draw a sharp distinction between himself and his Christian Democrat opponent, Edmund Stoiber, on foreign policy. Schröder said that Germany would not support US intervention in Iraq, even in the event of a UN mandate or proof of the existence of WMDs in Iraq, denouncing US policy as ‘adventurism’, which suspiciously echoed former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine.70 Conversely, Stoiber supported the Bush Administration strongly, despite clear public opposition to the war, which suggests the CDU/CSU coalition may need to rethink seriously its stance on Iraq. The Schröder government’s retreat to the Franco-German position of non-intervention in Iraq is part of a broader package of military and security reforms which reflect German austerity at a time of fiscal weakness.71 Germany runs second only to the US in terms of foreign deployments, which cost Euro 1.15 billion in 2003, less than 5 per cent

68 International Herald Tribune (2002), ‘Washington and Berlin healing rift’, November 11. 69 Gordon and Shapiro, pp. 133-4. 70 J. Joffe (2002), ‘Just Don't Mention the War’, Time, 15 September. 71 Germany exceeded the limits established by the EU Stability Pact, which places a -3.0% floor on fiscal deficits, for the third year running in 2004.

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of its total defence budget. Defence Minister Struck made it clear that Germany would not participate if NATO forces were assigned to Iraq.72 This was confirmed at the Istanbul NATO summit in June 2004, where Schröder reiterated his opposition to sending any German troops to Iraq. The German press has generally supported the government’s anti-US, anti-British stance, with several papers engaging in barely-disguised schadenfreude at UK troops’ involvement in human rights violations in Iraq, calling for the resignation of British defence minister Geoff Hoon and describing Blair’s foreign policy as a ‘pile of shards’. Die Welt, although less critical, nevertheless described Blair as ‘as an aide to the American administration’ and deplored the insensitivity of politicians on both sides of the Atlantic to the prisoners’ plight.73 The fact that Germany is unwilling to play a military role commensurate with its economic size should be no surprise. First, no French government is likely to permit a German military commitment that is larger than its own to any significant international operation. Second, German forces are not equipped or trained to undertake complex operations in major international conflicts. Third, Germany has developed into a civilian power since 1945. Fourth, Germany’s economic problems are serious and considerable structural adjustments are required over the next decade. In the absence of an immediate, demonstrable security threat, Germany is likely to remain inwardly focussed over the next few years, although international crises will, periodically, force it to show its hand. However, as Walter Mead has argued, the transatlantic divide is not, essentially, a Washington-Paris issue; it is a Washington-Berlin issue.74 If the US and Germany can heal the divisions that exist between them, then France may be isolated. However, this overlooks some important issues. First, despite the West German commitment to NATO throughout the Cold War, the FRG simultaneously maintained a strong partnership with France in EC affairs and pursued Ostpolitik vigorously. Second, if Germany adopts a more Atlanticist foreign policy, this will not alter the imbalance of forces ranged against the Anglosphere in the UNSC;75 indeed, a German defection might even compel Paris to seek even closer diplomatic ties with Russia and China. The EU’s agreement to sponsor Russia’s admission to the WTO in exchange for an agreement on Kyoto demonstrates how much closer Russia is becoming to the EU which, despite its divisions, is still largely institutionally driven by the Franco-German tandem. 8. The Perils of Weakness The gross disparity between European and American military power has produced considerable political asymmetries. EU countries have little ability to project their power. Of the EU member states, only France and Britain possess the military 72 Radio Deutsche Welle (2004), ‘Germany To Shorten Missions Abroad, Stop Guarding U.S. Bases’, broadcast May 2. 73 See, for example, Mitteldeutsche Zeitung (2004), May 11; and Die Welt (2004), May 11. 74 Brookings Institution, Center on the United States and France (2003), ‘The United States and France after the war in Iraq’, symposium, Washington DC, December 12. On line. Available: <http://www.brookings.edu/> Accessed February 6, 2004. 75 Conrad Black suggest recently - apparently seriously - that Britain should join NAFTA rather than integrate further with the EU.

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capabilities necessary to conduct out-of-area conflict operations. They also have the capacity to play supporting or specialized roles in major conflicts, such as the Gulf War and Afghanistan. Conversely, neither Germany nor Italy have such capabilities. The decentering of Europe as the world’s most important region has taken over a century to develop. With the end of the Cold War, Europe is no longer America’s dominant security concern. Despite its Euro, its recent expansion, its well-established institutions and single market, Europe is a region in decline, and the EU has perhaps only temporarily arrested that decline. The relative politico-military weakness of Europe is reflected in the defensive positionality of France and Germany. Involvement in the war would have made them even more likely targets of terrorism, just as Japanese, Italian, South Korean, Turkish and other coalitionist forces have been. As Mead asks, would transatlantic solidarity and Franco-German involvement in the war in Iraq have made any substantial difference to the outcome?76 No fewer US soldiers would have died and Islamic states and peoples would have viewed the war as yet another manifestation of western imperial power seizing Iraqi oil and establishing a new satellite state in the Middle East. It is not US unilateralism which has ruptured the transatlantic alliance; it is the very imbalance of power between the US and its allies which introduces a ‘mutuality of suspicion’77 into the relationship. As Keohane and Nye (1977) note78, one aspect of complex interdependence can be military interdependence. Throughout the Cold War, although the asymmetries between US and West European military power were only too apparent, the US was clearly obliged to defend Western Europe from a Soviet attack, for both strategic and economic reasons. Because Europe was vulnerable, the US needed Europeans’ cooperation over issues such as nuclear weapons installations, intelligence sharing and force command structure. These the European NATO partners gave willingly, as the price of such a security regime was comparatively low. It is notable that it is only when the asymmetry of the military relationship shifted somewhat - i.e., when France developed its own nuclear weapons from 1964 - that France felt sufficiently independent in a military sense to leave the NATO alliance and remove the compromise to its sovereignty it felt NATO posed.79 Unlike Britain, France also maintained a large standing army and compulsory national service until recently. Britain, reliant upon the US for much of its nuclear weapons technology and with a small military force, never had the option of independence available to France. Germany, by contrast, was in a much weaker position than Britain, not only due to its geopolitical proximity to the Warsaw Pact countries, but because it had no independent 76 Brookings Institution, Center on the United States and France (2003), ‘The United States and France after the war in Iraq’, symposium, Washington DC, December 12. On line. Available: <http://www.brookings.edu/> Accessed February 6, 2004. 77 The phrase is Waltz’s. See K. Waltz (1970), ‘The Myth of National Interdependence’, in C. P. Kindleberger (ed.), The International Corporation ( New York: MIT Press). 78 R. Keohane and J. Nye (1977), Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown). 79 The UK developed nuclear weapons earlier than France and did not display the same tendencies towards independence. However, in contrast with France, Britain had relied heavily upon nuclear technology supplied by the US government, particularly in relation to its deployment of Polaris. Arguably, the UK never developed the level of independence from US nuclear technology experienced by France, where the programme was wholly autonomous of the US, as a direct consequence of policies pursued by both Eisenhower and Kennedy, both of whom had refused to share nuclear technologies with France.

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nuclear deterrent and no prospect of developing one. The deployment of Pershing IIs in West Germany in 1982, the subject of much criticism from the German left, nevertheless indicated the weakness of the West German position: there was no half-way house, no neutral position to which politicians of the Federal Republic could safely retreat; this option was available only to West European states of little or no strategic interest to the United States, such as Ireland, Austria and Sweden. West Germany’s enormous strategic and economic importance to Western Europe meant that a Federal Republic outside the confines of NATO would be simply unacceptable, not only to the US, but also to France and Britain. This is why Gorbachev’s repeated bait of unification in return for German neutrality was such a concern for military planners and NATO member governments in the 1980s. It was inconceivable that any of Germany’s allies would permit it to accept such an offer; and, as it turned out, Gorbachev and the USSR were shortly to be spoken of only in the past tense. During the 2004 Georgia G8 summit, much of the global media argued that a seismic shift had occurred in relations between the US and other permanent UNSC members. The consensus was that America had adopted a more conciliatory position in an attempt to mollify its sternest critics: France, Germany and Russia. The Spanish withdrawal and the German refusal to countenance even a limited role in a NATO deployment to Iraq arrived at an unpropitious moment for the US, as Germany and Spain occupied temporary seats on the UNSC. However, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times interpreted UNSCR 1546 as an American return to pragmatism and a recognition of the need to involve other major powers in the security and reconstruction of Iraq.80 This is far from accurate. The US conceded little or no ground in the UNSC. Effectively, 1546 merely legitimates and legalises the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq. Almost 90% of the 160,000 troops which will remain in Iraq will be American. Regardless of claims of ‘Iraqi sovereignty’, given the overwhelming presence of US security forces, assertions of ‘sovereignty’ are nonsensical. Chirac tacitly recognized this in voting to support 1546, arguing that a unanimous resolution was the only means of avoiding a crisis.81 9. Conclusions: Whither - or wither? - the transatlantic alliance? The question is not whether there should be a transatlantic alliance, but what sort of transatlantic alliance there should be. The question is purely normative. Whatever form the alliance takes, it is crucial to understand that we live in an American international order, of American construction, maintained by American hegemony. From a realist perspective, this policy divergence between some of the Europeans and the Americans is primarily the result of military asymmetry and, thus, the political weakness of the European states. It is scarcely surprising the US is behaving as a giant does, simply because it can. It is also entirely predictable, given West European acquiescence to most American strategic policy since 1945, that the US would demand - and expect - compliance in the post-Cold War era. At the same time, one should not be surprised that many European states reacted with antipathy towards US unilateralism. Hegemonic internationalist states always provoke 80 The Australian (2004), ‘Sea Change for G8’, June 12, p. 23. 81 The Australian (2004), ‘Leap of Faith’, June 12, p. 19.

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defensive reactions in allies, satellites and enemy states alike. Allies and satellites fear being dragged into costly, lengthy conflicts, the outcomes of which are largely unpredictable. Enemy states fear the hegemonic internationalist because they may be the next target in its sights. From 1960 until 1973, EC and EFTA analysts spoke of Europe ‘at sixes and sevens’. A major reconfiguration of the ‘sixes and the sevens’ may have taken place in 2002-03, but the constellations of alliances are still best described as an ‘inner core’ and an ‘outer periphery’.82 On the semi-periphery are the Scandinavian countries and traditional neutrals. Italy and the Netherlands may well be ‘torn’ states, uncertain as to whether their future lies in transatlanticism or closer integration with the Franco-German axis. The majority of the west European coalitionists, unsurprisingly, are former EFTA members, with long-established ties to Britain.83 This may not explain their foreign policy behaviour, but the dynamics of EU integration have a significant impact upon the positionality of the member states. Spain,84 Portugal, Britain, Denmark, and even Italy, have never been a genuine part of this ‘inner core’ of ‘fast-track’ EU integrationists. The key question for transatlantic relations is, as Paecht (2003) asks, whether the two positions staked out by the Europeans and the Americans, are reconcilable.85 This very much depends whether systemic conditions permit the US and Europe to remain revisionist and status quo powers, respectively. Jean Dufourcq, of the French Navy and the EU Military Committee, is merely articulating the French multilateralist perspective when he argues that ‘each of the big players in the world of the 21st century - Europe, America, China and Russia - must be assigned a role in the common effort to stabilize the international security environment. It is not for the United States, on its own, to define these roles.’86 The US has been keen to downplay and even discourage developments that reduce its hegemonic position in international politics. The view of world affairs presented by Samuel Huntington87 has encouraged a lack of appreciation of the growing power and importance of the EU by putting forward a view of the ‘west’ as a single cultural entity centred on the US in a world where the divisions between cultural entities are those which are most important. Such a view papers over the cultural divisions between the US and the EU, and stresses common culture as a source of strength.88 France is now much closer to achieving its long-held ambition to establish a ‘third force’ in international politics. However, in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet era, this ‘third force’ has evolved into a ‘second force’ and it is not based exclusively in Europe. 82 Davison, ‘An Ever Closer Union?’, p. 86. 83 The UK, Portugal, Denmark and Spain. 84 Dufourcq argues the Spanish conservative former government ‘discreetly aspires to take over from London as Washington’s favourite transatlantic intermediary.’ See Dufourcq (2003), ‘The Transatlantic Allergy: Partnership or Strategic Counterweight?’, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, Center on the United States and France, p. 3. 85 Arthur Paecht (2003), ‘Les Relations Transatlantiques’ (Paris: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques). 86 Dufourcq, ‘The Transatlantic Allergy: Partnership or Strategic Counterweight?’, p. 5. 87 S. P. Huntington (1996), The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); and S. P. Huntington (1993), ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72, 3. (Summer), pp. 22-49. 88 R. Davison and H. Field (1997), ‘The Creation of a New European Superpower?’, paper presented to the biennial ECSA-NZ conference, University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1997.

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The forces of balance have introduced a new phase in international relations which has swept aside Cold War allegiances and antagonisms, replacing them with an axis which seeks to contain the more destabilizing elements of the US’s aggressive unilateralism. France, Russia, China - and, to a lesser extent, Germany - have developed an uneven, cautious and unpredictable coalition which is aimed purely at containing the dual American aims of democratic universalism and economic globalization. This has resulted in the destruction of the predictability of the transatlantic alliance, and Europe and America will continue to experience turbulence and uncertainty as their tactics and objectives are likely to diverge further, rather than converge. Russia and China have an obvious strategic interest in opposing US programmes, such as NMD and TMD, while France and Germany see US unilateralism as not only destabilizing regions such as the Middle East, but also threatening their own domestic security. Nevertheless, the strategy of the counter-hegemonic states is also counter-intuitive; persistent opposition of the US will not only doom any semblance of a coherent transatlantic alliance, but it is also likely to prompt the US to circumvent international law even more frequently, as it perceives that its key policy objectives are more quickly and efficiently achieved without the imprimatur of the UNSC. Irrespective of the administration in power, the US is also likely to remain a hegemonic internationalist until the global strategic environment curtails its ability to do so. The success of its policy will be determined by the extent to which American political and economic ideas are exported successfully to the rest of the world. This US policy is virtually an inevitable consequence of the structure of the international system, and this phase of unipolarity - which has been, and will be, much more than a ‘moment’ - will persist until it is replaced by the re-emergence of new phase of strategic multipolarity or bipolarity. It is only once this semblance of balance is restored that the transatlantic alliance may be revived.