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Scope and the development of epistemic modality:evidence from ought to

Rachel Nordlinger and Elizabeth Closs Traugott

English Language and Linguistics / Volume 1 / Issue 02 / November 1997, pp 295 - 317DOI: 10.1017/S1360674300000551, Published online: 12 September 2008

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1360674300000551

How to cite this article:Rachel Nordlinger and Elizabeth Closs Traugott (1997). Scope and the development ofepistemic modality: evidence from ought to. English Language and Linguistics, 1, pp295-317 doi:10.1017/S1360674300000551

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ENG. LANG. LING. 1(2): 295-317 (1997)

Scope and the development of epistemic modality: evidence fromought to

RACHEL NORDLINGER and ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTTStanford University

(Received 6 February 1997; revised 14 May 1997)

Discussions of modality (e.g. Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca, 1994; Coates, 1983; Lyons,1977; Palmer, 1986; Traugott, 1989) typically center around two issues: deonticity vs.epistemicity, and degree of subjectivity. Using diachronic evidence from the quasi-modal ought to, this paper argues for the need to recognize a third, crosscutting thesetwo: narrow vs. wide scope. We argue that the epistemic use of ought to developed outof a wide-scope deontic construction, in which the modal was used with deonticmeaning, but with propositional scope (contra Bybee, 1988). Rather than attributing anobligation to the subject (i.e. having narrow scope), the modal in this constructionmakes an assertion about the proposition as a whole, like an epistemic. However, suchought to constructions are found some four hundred years before the first epistemicexamples, and thus can be shown to be distinct from epistemic uses (contra Gamon,1994).

1 Introduction

In the literature on modality in general (e.g. Coates, 1983; Halliday, 1994[1985];Lyons, 1977; Palmer, 1986, 1990[1979]) and modality in semantic change (e.g. Bybee& Pagliuca, 1985; Shepherd, 1981; Sweetser, 1990; Traugott, 1989) discussions ofmodal meaning have typically focused on two main semantic properties: deonticityvs. epistemicity, and degree of subjectivity.1 In this paper, using diachronic evidencefrom the quasi-modal ought to, we argue for the need to recognize a third propertythat crosscuts deonticity and degree of subjectivity: narrow vs. wide scope.

We will argue that the epistemic meaning of ought to developed out of a wide-scope deontic construction which arose and spread during the Middle Englishperiod. In this construction the modal was used with its original deontic meaning ofobligation; however, like epistemic modals, it functioned to make an assertion about

Rachel Nordlinger presented an earlier version of this paper at the Linguistic Society of AmericaAnnual Meeting, San Diego, 1996, based on Nordlinger (1995). Several of the issues were presented byElizabeth Traugott in courses on the development of modality at the Australian Linguistics Institute,and on grammaticalization at FUMS, University of Uppsala, both in Summer 1994. We would like tothank Scott Schwenter and David Denison for many helpful comments. Of course, we are responsiblefor remaining inadequacies.

Our main data bases are: The dictionary of Old English corpus in electronic form (Cameron et al.,1980) (DOE); The Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (see e.g. Rissanen et al., 1993) (HC); the on-lineOxford English dictionary (OED); The Middle English dictionary (MED); United Press International topstories 1990-92 (UPI). Stanford Academic Text Services made access to these computerized corporapossible.

296 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

the proposition as a whole (i.e. had wide scope), rather than serving to link thesubject to the rest of the predicate, as deontic or agent-oriented modals prototypi-cally do. The spread of this construction, in providing the wide scope crucial forepistemic modality, enabled the rise of the epistemic use.

Somewhat similar proposals have been made by Bybee (1988) for may andGamon (1994) for the German modal mogen 'can', both verbs of ability, andtherefore neither clearly deontic. (To account for the fact that such modals sharemany characteristics with deontics, recently some researchers have expanded thedomain to agent-oriented modality, which in addition encompasses desire,ability, and root possibility, see Bybee & Pagliuca, 1985; Bybee & Fleischman,1995.) Gamon hypothesizes a wide-scope deontic reanalysis of miissen 'must', butfinds no unambiguous textual evidence for it. The case of ought to shows justsuch unambiguous evidence in the clearly deontic domain of obligation. Inaddition, ought to is an interesting case because it confirms earlier studies of thedevelopment of modal verbs in English (e.g. Traugott, 1989) that show thatstrongly subjective epistemicity arises later than weakly subjective epistemicity,not simultaneously with it as Gamon argues it does for German. In other words,similar modal developments in related languages may not follow exactly thesame paths at the micro-level, though at a more general macro-level they showremarkable similarities. Ought to is especially interesting because it has been littlestudied until recently, and then primarily in the Modern English period (Coates,1983; Myhill, 1995, 1997). Meanings of ought to that Myhill shows increasing intheir statistical frequency, as evidenced by American plays since the beginning ofthe nineteenth century, are shown to have histories that go back to MiddleEnglish.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss the use of ought toin present-day English with reference to general theories of modality and introduceour definition of scope. In section 3 we present the development of deontic ought tofrom Old English on, and in section 4 the development of epistemic ought to fromEarly Modern English on. In section 5 we suggest conclusions for the study ofmodality to be drawn from this study.

2 Ought to in Present-Day English

In this section we discuss the different properties of modality, illustrating thecontrasts with examples of ought to from Present-Day English (PDE). As Coates(1983: 70) points out, '[c]ompared with the other modal auxiliaries, OUGHT occursrelatively infrequently, particularly in written language'. Since historical data fromearlier periods of the language are written, we focus primarily on writtenexamples even in PDE, but supplement them with examples of spoken languagefrom Coates (1983). We begin with a brief description of the two standard modalproperties - deonticity/epistemicity and degree of subjectivity - and then introducescope.

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 297

2.1 Deontic vs. epistemic modality

The main distinction discussed in linguistic work on modality is that betweendeontic and epistemic modality. Deontic modality is generally defined as having todo with the 'necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents'(Lyons, 1977: 823). It is 'concerned with language as action, mostly with theexpression by the speaker of his attitude towards possible actions by himself andothers' (Palmer, 1986: 121). Deontic modals, therefore, typically appear withanimate subjects and agentive verbs (Coates, 1983: 21). Epistemic modality, on theother hand, is concerned with 'language as information' (Palmer, 1986: 121) and theextent to which a speaker knows or believes a proposition to be true (Lyons, 1977:824, 793). Since epistemic modals are concerned with the proposition as a whole,they are not subject to the same selectional restrictions that deontic modals usuallyare, and thus can also occur with inanimate subjects and/or non-agentive verbs.

These distinctions have a tradition rooted in logic. However, the deontic categoryhas been shown not to fit well with linguistic categories crosslinguistically or inlanguage change (Bybee & Fleischman, 1995: 5), and therefore other terms andcategorizations are often used. For example, Coates (1983, 1995) and Sweetser(1990) refer to the non-epistemic domain as 'root'. Palmer (1986, 1990[1979])recognizes ability and willingness as 'dynamic modality', in addition to deontic andepistemic modality. Finally, Bybee & Pagliuca (1985), Bybee & Fleischman (1995),Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca (1994), and Heine (1993, 1995) expand the deonticdomain to encompass ability, desire, and root possibility (general enabling condi-tions), and refer to this larger domain as 'agent-oriented' modality. Since ought toconcerns obligation, agent-oriented modality will not concern us directly. However,some of the conceptual properties that have been shown to be associated with it willbecome relevant. These are (based on Heine, 1995: 29, substantially abbreviated,and with roles in obligation constructions added):

(a) There is some force (the obliger) that has an interest in an event either occurring ornot.

(b) The event is typically to be performed by a controlling agent (the obligee).(c) The event is dynamic and typically leads to a change of state.(d) If the event does occur, it will do so after reference time.(e) The event is nonfactual, but there is a certain degree of probability that it will

occur.

The more a modal conforms to these characteristics, the more prototypically agent-oriented it will be. On the other hand, in particular contexts, one or more of thesecharacteristics may be absent. Heine suggests that epistemics share the characteristicof probability of occurrence (e), but are typically present-oriented, nondynamic,and, crucially, not subject to a controlling agent (1995: 31). Coates (1995: 56-61)points out that Heine's conceptual properties are therefore not uniquely defining ofeither kind of modality. The weakness of the distinction, she claims, is especiallyclear in the domain of possibility, and this in part explains why and how epistemic

298 RACHEL N O R D L I N G E R AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

meanings arise out of permission and ultimately ability meanings. Here we discusshow epistemic meaning arose directly out of an obligation, not a permission orability meaning.

It has long been noted that most of the English modals can be used to expresseither deontic or epistemic meaning, and ought to is no exception:

(1) (a) The message is not that we have an epidemic. It's that the rate of increase is sosignificant we ought to find out what's going on here. ('We are obliged to';deontic) (24 Aug. 1990, UPI)

(b) [I]t is sometime [sic] since I last wrote to you and though I am awaiting a letter Ithink that I ought to write to send you the money I owe you. ('I am obliged to';deontic) (Coates, 1983: 71)

(2) (a) The Connecticut doctor, in order to demonstrate such stains ought to haveoccurred if the incident happened as the woman described it . . . ('One wouldconclude that such stains would have occurred'; epistemic) (9 Dec. 1991, UPI)

(b) surely it ought to have been obvious to Tony that nobody in authority there wasgoing to have a person with my sort of reputation writing articles. ('One wouldconclude that'; epistemic) (Coates, 1983: 75)

Ought to in (1) expresses a moral or social obligation on the subject to bringabout the state of affairs described by the predicate. In this sense it is deontic,though the 'element of will' (Jespersen, 1924: 320-1) often associated with deonticforce (obligers) is not direct. In (2), ought to is not used with a meaning ofobligation, but rather means something more like 'probably', with an implicaturethat the past event being reported on is 'contra-factive' (Coates, 1983: 75). In otherwords, the modal in (2) is inferential; it indicates a tentative conclusion about thelikelihood of an event drawn by the speaker (or, in (2a), by the doctor whoseconclusions are being reported) on the basis of available or assumed information,and is epistemic.

In the deontic examples (1), ought to denotes a type of moral and/or socialobligation. In terms of the strength of obligation it expresses (Coates, 1983), it canbe positioned somewhere in the middle of the scale, between must at the strongestend and may at the weaker. As is true for all English modals (see e.g. Bybee et al.,1994; Coates, 1983; Horn, 1972; Steele, 1975), the force of epistemic ought to isdirectly related to that of its obligation meaning; it too falls somewhere in themiddle, denoting a tentative conclusion stronger than the possibility expressed byepistemic may, but weaker than the near certainty indicated by epistemic must. Thisis represented in the simplified scale in figure 1 (adapted from Horn, 1972).

One of the characteristics of ought to in PDE is that the epistemic and non-epistemic uses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Thus, there are many examplesof 'merger' (Coates, 1983)2 or 'indeterminacy' (Palmer, 1986), in which both usesseem to be possible, and even intended, in a single discourse context. Consider:

2 This term presupposes that the different uses are homonyms. In our view they are polysemous, not onlyhistorically (if they were homonymous we could not say that they were related semantically orpragmatically), but also synchronically.

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 299

Deontic

strong obligation

weak obligation

permission

Epistemic

inferred certainty

probability

possibility

MUST

OUGHT TO

MAY

Stronger

Weaker

Figure 1 Scale of deontic and epistemic force

(3) 'My response to them is going to be that our Natural Wildlife Refuges are veryimportant postage stamps across the land of America and we ought to be able toprotect 470 places,' Graham said. (14 Sept. 1991, UPI)

In this example, ought to is consistent with both an epistemic meaning ('We willprobably be able to . . .') and a deontic meaning ('We are morally obliged to bringabout the state of affairs such that we can . . .'). Furthermore, it is perfectlyconsistent with both of these meanings at once: it is not necessary to determinewhich of the meanings is intended in order to interpret the utterance. In fact, asCoates (1983: 78) suggests, speakers may even exploit this possibility in their use ofought to, intentionally conveying both an epistemic inferential meaning and adeontic moral meaning with the one utterance.

The continued acceptability of such indeterminate constructions with ought to (incontrast with modals such as must, with which such a construction is impossibleaccording to Bybee et al., 1994: 284) may be a reflection of the fact that thedevelopment of its epistemic use is still not fully completed. That this change is stillunderway is supported by the fact that nonepistemic uses of ought to greatlyoutnumber epistemic uses in the data: in Coates's corpus, epistemic uses areoutnumbered by 8:1 compared with roughly even numbers for must (1983: 77); in129 examples of ought to in the UPI on-line database, only one is clearly epistemic;and Palmer (1990: 60) reports that his corpus contained no epistemic examples ofought to at all.

Meanings of moral obligation, as in (1), fall at the stronger end of the deonticcontinuum, but there are a number of weaker uses of nonepistemic ought to inPresent-day English that are not accurately described as 'deontic' in the sense ofobligation, permission and requirement, or even as 'agent-oriented' in the sense ofthe expanded category including desire, ability, and root possibility. For example,ought to can also be used to express advisability (4), as well as such meanings as 'it isa good idea that . . .' (5) and 'it is proper/fitting that . . .' (6).

(4) 'I'll make it clear to President Gorbachev that he ought to view this outcome of thesummit very positively,' Bush said. (12 July 1990, UPI)

(5) (concerning a street festival)'I think we ought to do this again next year,' Hirsch yelled at the dispersing crowd.(15 July 1992, UPI)

300 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

(6) 'Let's not call it the George Bush recession. It ought to be called the George Mitchellrecession,' said Vice President Dan Quayle in reference to the Senate Democraticleader from Maine. (17 Nov. 1991, UPI)

This evidence suggests that we may need to expand our ideas of modality and possiblemodal meanings, to include a notion of 'advisability' and/or 'suitability'. Suchnotions have not been given much attention in general discussions of modality,although Coates (1983: 73) and Myhill & Smith (1995: 254) mention it briefly inconnection with ought to; Bybee et al. (1994: 183) cite some languages in which themeanings of obligation auxiliaries are glossed as 'be fitting, be proper', and Akatsuka(1992) elaborates on it in connection with Japanese expressions of modality.

2.2 Subjectivity

Modal uses can express more or less subjective viewpoints depending on the extentto which they express the attitudes, opinions or conclusions of the speaker (seeLyons, 1977: 797ff. for detailed discussion of this concept; also Benveniste,1966[1958]; Langacker, 1990; Lyons, 1982; Stein & Wright, 1995). Subjectivity inthis sense is an essential element of modality in natural language and, therefore, nomodal in natural language use is truly objective, although there is a considerabledistance between weakly subjective modals that appeal to norms and regularitiesand strongly subjective epistemic modals that are based solely on the speaker'sopinions and beliefs. Epistemics, which by definition involve the expression ofopinions and conclusions, are sometimes considered to be more subjective thandeontic modals. For example, Coates suggests that because forms like may and canthat express root possibility cannot be uniquely distinguished from agent-orientedmodalities by Heine's (1995) conceptual properties, subjectivity should therefore beregarded as the 'crucial distinction between forms expressing root possibility inEnglish and forms expressing epistemic possibility in English' (Coates, 1995: 59).

This might suggest that subjectivity is restricted to the epistemic domain.However, deontics as well as epistemics can be subjective (Lyons, 1977: 793). Thefollowing uses of ought to show that there is a cline of subjectivity within deonticuses of ought to; (7) is less subjective and (8) is more subjective:3

(7) On the other hand, we cannot tell American consumers that the federal governmentis doing what it ought to be to prevent exposing them to unnecessary risks, ('doingwhat the force of social norms suggests it ought to be doing') (16 July 1990, UPI)

(8) (a) There's a new book you ought to see. ('a new book that I urge you to see')(Coates, 1983: 71, spoken data)

(b) but what I say is that with the violent young thug - he ought to be beaten.(Ibid.)

3 Note that the degree of subjectivity that a modal use may have is almost always context dependent andso it is often not possible to consider an example to be conclusively more or less subjective. We providethese examples merely as an illustration of a possible interpretation of the modal, given the rightcontext.

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC M O D A L I T Y 301

An example such as (7) is less subjective since the modal is used to report onpressures that could be considered to be generally held as true. In contrast, theexamples in (8) express an attitude particular to the speaker, and thus are moresubjective.4

Because of the paucity of examples of epistemic ought to, it is not clear to whatextent degrees of subjectivity can be found in the epistemic domain as well.5 The soleunambiguous example of epistemic ought to found in the UPI stories data base, (2a)above, reports on a generally observable conclusion (one would expect stains tohave occurred, based on extensive prior medical experience). Coates cites what sheregards as an 'objective' epistemic (what we call a weakly subjective epistemic)conveying 'logical inference without speaker involvement' in (9):

(9) English is a very teachy subject. I agree mean [sic] it ought to be good.6 (Coates,1983: 74, spoken data)

By contrast, she says that (10) is subjective (what we would call more stronglysubjective):

(10) The job here ought to be finished in a matter of days. (Coates, 1983: 73, spokendata)

In the absence of context it is not possible to verify this distinction. However, wewould expect one, on the basis of the tendency for most epistemic modals to showdifferent degrees of subjectivity synchronically (Coates, 1983; Lyons, 1977) anddiachronically (Traugott, 1989).

2.3 Scope

We have seen that modal uses of ought to can be classified according to at least twoprimary factors: deonticity vs. epistemicity, and degree of subjectivity. In this sectionwe argue for the need to recognize a third: narrow vs. wide scope.

In a prototypical example of deontic modality such as (la), repeated here, ought toimposes an obligation on the subject to bring about the state of affairs described bythe predicate. Thus, the agent of the obligation is also the subject, and ought toserves as a linker relating this subject to the rest of the predicate.

(1) (a) The message is not that we have an epidemic. It's that the rate of increase is sosignificant we ought to find out what's going on here. (24 Aug. 1990, UPI)

In such constructions the modal is a part of the propositional content of the clause

4 Myhill (1997) has drawn attention to the very particular kind of subjectivity associated with ought to (asopposed to should, which implicates disagreement) in dialog: that of agreement about a specificobligation.

5 Sanders & Spooren (1996) suggest a complex cline for epistemic subjectivity in Dutch based on twokinds of evidence: knowledge-based and observation. Regularities based on social norms are, however,not clearly accounted for in this system, since they crosscut knowledge and observation.

6 We take this example to mean that the speaker considers English to be a very 'teachable' subject andthat, therefore, anybody could expect an English class to be good.

302 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

and can be said to have narrow scope (cf. Bybee, 1988; Gamon, 1994). This can berepresented semiformally as in (11), with square brackets enclosing the propositionalcontent of the clause:

(11) Narrow-scope deontic:we ought to find out[we, OUGHT TO (find out)]

In contrast, an epistemic modal as in (2a), repeated here, makes an assertionabout the truth of the proposition as a whole; it is external to the proposition andhas the whole proposition in its scope.

(2) (a) The Connecticut doctor, in order to demonstrate such stains ought to haveoccurred if the incident happened as the woman described i t . . . (9 Dec. 1991,UPI)

In these constructions the modal can be said to have wide, or propositional, scope,as shown in (12).

(12) Wide/propositional-scope epistemic:stains ought to have occurredOUGHT TO [stains, (have occurred)]

Wide scope has usually been associated only with epistemicity (see e.g. Bybee,1988; Lyons, 1977), and examples (1) and (2) seem to confirm this. However, asGamon (1994) shows, this is not always the case. In fact, the distinction of scopecrosscuts that between deontic and epistemic modals, rather than correlating with it:while epistemic ought to must necessarily have propositional scope, in its deonticfunction ought to may have either propositional or narrow scope. Consider thefollowing examples:

(13) (a) Senate Democratic leader George Mitchell, noting the increasing number ofwomen moving into the workplace, said job protection ought to be a basicright. ('. . . there is a moral obligation for people to consider job protection tobe a basic right') (2 Oct. 1991, UPI)

(b) Mothers who have been raped, mothers who are the victims of incest, by God,have rights too. And the bill ought to say that, ('those responsible for the billhave a moral responsibility to ensure that it says that') (4 July 1990, UPI)

In these examples, ought to imposes a deontic meaning of obligation on an agent asin (la) above, but unlike in (la), it is not the subject that has the obligation. Rather,the modal functions here to place an obligation on an unexpressed agent -interpretable as the general 'people' or 'one' in (13a) or as legislators in (13b) - tobring about the state of affairs described by the proposition as a whole. In contrastto (la), ought to here makes an assertion about the whole proposition; it is not a partof the propositional content of the clause with scope only over the VP. Thus, it hasthe same scopal properties as the epistemic modals in (2), as can be seen bycomparing the representation of the wide-scope deontic modal in (14) with that ofthe epistemic given in (12) above.

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 303

(14) Wide/propositional-scope deontic:the bill ought to say thatOUGHT TO [the bill, (say that)]

Like the prototypical deontic uses, these wide-scope deontic modal uses have todo with the 'necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents'(Lyons, 1977: 823). In narrow-scope deontic constructions the focus is on thelocation of the obligation: a particular agent, being the subject, is obliged to carryout an event. Wide-scope deontic uses, on the other hand, emphasize the particularevent that should be brought about. Since these constructions defocus the obligee,there is no requirement that it be the subject of the clause, nor need it even beexpressed, as illustrated by (13). Thus, (unambiguous) wide-scope deontic construc-tions are those involving obligation or advisability in which the subject of the clauseis inanimate. Examples like those in (13) might simply be considered instances ofnonprototypical agent-oriented uses (defocusing the willful force by the obliger andcontrol by an obligee) (Coates, 1995; Heine, 1995), but as Gamon (1994) points out,the difference is primarily scopal.7

Wide-scope deontic interpretations of the type discussed here are not restricted toought to, but appear to be possible with most deontic modals in Present-DayEnglish:

(15) (a) Clay pots . . . must have some protection from severe weather. (Coates, 1995:56)

(b) [T]he pollen may be taken from the stamens of one rose and transferred to thestigma of another. (Coates, 1995: 62)

Such 'wide-scope deontic' uses of modals have received some attention in theliterature under the name 'root possibility' (for may and can) (Bybee, 1988; Bybee etal., 1994; Coates, 1995), and 'root necessity' (for must) (Coates, 1995), or 'neutraldynamic modality' (Palmer, 1990[1979]). However, there are important differencesbetween these discussions and ours. Firstly, such studies do not always make explicitthe distinction between these constructions and regular 'root' modal uses: Coates,for example, implies that there is no difference between root obligation (e.g. deonticmust) and root necessity, at least with respect to the conceptual properties Heine(1995) identifies for agent-oriented modals (both involve all the prototypical proper-ties, as specified in figures 1 and 2 of Coates, 1995: 59-60). Secondly, even when aclear distinction is made, it is rarely described as one of scope. Palmer, for example,

7 It is possible that what we are calling narrow-scope deontic constructions are actually pragmaticallyambiguous (Horn, 1985; Sweetser, 1990) between wide-scope and narrow-scope interpretations. Bybeeet al. (1994: 198-9, 287) make a similar point in connection with may. For example, it may be that (la)has two possible readings:

(i) 'we are obliged to find out' (narrow scope: [we, OUGHT TO [find out])(ii) 'there is a moral/social obligation that we find out' (wide scope: OUGHT TO [we, (find out)])

This possibility requires further investigation. However, even if it proves true it will not affect theoverall picture of development presented here.

304 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

describes the distinction as primarily one of subjectivity (1990: 131): neutral dynamicmodality is in his view objective, while deontics are subjective.

Both Bybee and Gamon discuss root possibility meanings in terms of scope and,like us, hypothesize that these uses are the crucial diachronic link between deonticand epistemic meanings (at least for the modals of ability such as may (Bybee, 1988;also Bybee et al., 1994) and the German modal mo'gen (Gamon, 1994)). However,even here there are some differences in analysis. In Bybee's view, the shift from rootpossibility to epistemic possibility constitutes a 'change in scope for the modal fromverb phrase scope to propositional scope' (1988: 259); for us, the shift in scopeoccurs earlier, in the development of the wide-scope deontic meaning out of thenarrow-scope one. Gamon (1994) echoes Palmer's conflation of scope with sub-jectivity. He also tends to conflate it with epistemicity, and describes 'wide-scopedeontic uses' as being 'virtually indistinguishable' from what have been variouslycalled 'weakly subjective' epistemic (Traugott, 1989), 'objective' epistemic (Lyons,1977), or 'neutral dynamic' (Palmer, 1979) uses (Gamon, 1994: 125). In contrast, wesuggest that scope is distinct from epistemicity and subjectivity in the domain ofought to (weak obligation), and, by extension, probably also in the domain of abilityverbs.

Thus, while the scope distinction we have discussed above for ought to is largelyconsistent with proposals concerning root possibility and necessity, we argue fromthe diachronic and synchronic evidence that scope is the key criterion. Furthermore,it should be noted that claims about the relation of root possibility and necessity toobjectivity or weak subjectivity have been made primarily with respect to abilityverbs like may and can. However, there are clearly degrees of subjectivity in wide-scope deontic uses of ought to. (13a), for example, reports on generally held viewsconcerning justice and right, while (13b), even if drawing on such generally heldviews, is contextualized in a highly personal plea (highlighted by by God in thepreceding sentence). This is not unexpected if scope rather than weak subjectivity isthe criterion. Degrees of subjectivity operate within each domain: narrow-scopedeontics, wide-scope deontics, and epistemics.

2.4 Summary

In sum, on the basis of the ought to data, we can distinguish modal uses according tothe three criteria: (i) deontic or epistemic, (ii) lesser or greater subjectivity, and (iii)narrow or wide scope. The only absolute restriction is that an epistemic modal mustalways have wide scope. Otherwise all combinations are possible, as exemplifiedabove (see (1) and (2) for deontic vs. epistemic, (1) and (13) for narrow- vs. wide-scope deontics, (7) and (8) for less and more subjective deontics, (13a) and (13b) forless and more subjective wide-scope deontics, and (9) and (10) for less and moresubjective epistemics). As far as we know, no other discussion of modality in theliterature has explicitly distinguished these three parameters in this way. Within thesemantic change literature, for example, Traugott (1989), like Coates (1983) and

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 305

Lyons (1977), discusses epistemicity and subjectivity, but has no mention of scope.Gamon (1994), on the other hand, talks about scope, but does not distinguish it fullyfrom issues of subjectivity and epistemicity. And while Palmer (1990) makes a three-way distinction between epistemic, deontic and dynamic modality, in which thelatter shows some overlap with our wide-scope deontic uses, he does not distinguishthese categories from the notion of subjectivity. In contrast, as we have demon-strated above, the data from ought to show that these three criteria are notnecessarily related, but are merely different parameters along which modal uses canbe classified. In further support of this claim, we will see in section 3 that all threeparameters developed separately in the history of ought to.

3 The development of deontic ought to*

Ought to originates in Old English (OE) agan which is usually translated as 'have,own, possess'. Its most frequent use is as a transitive verb; the complement may beproperty, wealth, glory, power, etc. Typical examples include:9

(16) & ra5e J>aes se cing let geridan ealle pa land Jje his modorand right-after that that king caused bring:iNF all those lands that his motherahte him to handa & nam of hire eall J)aet heo ahte on golde & onhad him-self in control and took from her all that she had in gold and inseolfresilver'and immediately after the king caused all the lands that his mother owned to bebrought under his control and took from her everything she had in gold and silver'(1042 ChronE (Plummer) [DOEC])

A particularly frequent collocation in certain texts like the Anglo-Saxon Chronicleis with anweald 'control': the winner of a battle ah anweald, which entails not onlybeing more powerful but also getting the upper hand, getting control over others.Agan therefore is a stative verb with a strongly inchoative meaning (as is to beexpected from its preterite-present etymology).

Agan also occurs with nonfinite complements, some of which translate Latindebere. Of these, Mitchell (1985: §933) says that they may be closer to / have myhouse to let (i.e. possessive) than to / have to let my house (i.e. obligation).10 Anexample is:

8 The main periods of English are: Old English (OE) 700-1150, Middle English (ME) 1150-1500, EarlyModern English (EModE) 1500-1750, Modern English (ModE) 1750-.

9 Old English examples are taken from the computerized materials for the dictionary of Old English(Cameron et al., 1980) (DOEC). Many are to be found classified and discussed in the Dictionary of OldEnglish (DOE) ed. Healey et al. (1994), agan (entry compiled by Shigeru Ono). Unless otherwise stated,Middle English and Early Modern English examples are taken from the Helsinki Corpus as describedin Rissanen et al. (1993) (HC).

10 On constructions of the type have a house to let #vs. have to let a house and hypotheses about theirsemantic development, see e.g. Benveniste (1968), Fleischman (1982). Fischer (1994) argues that only asyntactic, not a semantic, account provides an explanation of the development of auxiliary have to V(as opposed to have it to V). There are many differences between the development of have to V and

306 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

(17) tuoege scyldgo woeron sume ricemenn an ahte to geldanne penningastwo debtors were certain:DAT rich-man:DAT one had to pay penniesfif hundra o3er fifteih.five hundred other fifty'there were two debtors to a rich man; one had 500 pennies to pay/had to pay 500pennies, the other 50' (late tenth-century Lind Gosp. p. 81 [DOEC])

Agan in such examples does not necessarily entail possession; in fact it probablydoes not in (17). Such meanings are often translated as 'owe'. In order to pay off thedebt the debtor will have to possess (temporarily) the pennies due, but at the time atwhich the debt is outstanding possession is only an implied obligation. Cases likethis are semantically intermediate between have my home to let (where the object'house' is referential) and have a letter to write (where the object 'letter' does not yetexist, and is therefore nonreferential). In cases like (17) the (implied) debt isreferential, but the pennies to pay it off are not (yet). Where the object may not yetexist (like the pennies) and especially does not yet exist (like the nonwntten letter)the semantics of possession is bleached, and the pragmatic inference of obligationstrengthened (Traugott & Konig, 1991). Semanticization of the obligation can besaid to occur when the object is no longer physical, only cognitive or experiential, asfor example in (20) below.11

By the end of the tenth century or the early eleventh century some instances occurwhich, according to the Dictionary of Old English (DOE, agan), 'shade into auxiliaryuses'. Two uses with nonfinite complements are relevant to our discussion.

In one construction the subject is defined in the DOE (agan II A.2.b) as 'theperson to whom the obligation is due'. In other words, the subject is in the semanticrecipient role as in:

(18) (a) be eorl heold Lincol agxnesbe king& benam himal 6aet he ahte tothe earl held Lincoln against the king and deprived him all that he ought tohauen.have'the earl held Lincoln against the king and deprived him of all that he ought tohave had' (ChronE 1140 (Plummer) [DOEC])

In this construction the obligations are secular rights accompanying kingship as in(18a) or other status. Inspection of the Toronto and Helsinki corpora suggests thatin late OE and early Middle English (ME) agan to habenne was an idiom that mightbe the equivalent in PDE of 'have/get the right to'. It refers primarily to social rights.Sometimes 'right' is explicitly mentioned:

ought to V, most especially the split between main verb and auxiliary have to, but not in the ought toconstruction. This suggests that a semantic rather than syntactic analysis is needed after all.

1' See Traugott & Konig (1991) and Hopper & Traugott (1993: chapter 4) for discussion of the balancebetween semantic bleaching and pragmatic strengthening, and for criteria for determining when aninference has become semanticized.

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 307

(18) (b) minerihte tha icctharafter mid rihte ah to habbene be mine fullenmy rights that I thereafter with right ought to have by my fullfrendsipe.friendship'my rights that I thereafter rightfully ought to have because of my completefriendship' Gate eleventh-century Ch 1 Wm (Dugdale 36) [DOEC])

This construction, like that in (17), may still be primarily possessive. In the idiomagan to habbene, agan may have meant 'get, come to have' and habban 'possess, havefor a long time'. The rights of kings are to obtain taxes, etc. on a regular basis intothe future, and to keep them. In so far as there is a modal inference in this type ofconstruction, the conceptual properties are present of a potential controller of asituation that may not have yet taken place but has a probability of doing so intothe future. In other words, the construction is weakly agent-oriented and deontic.Our hesitancy in claiming that this is deontic rather than possessive is basedprimarily on the earliness of the example. It should be noted, however, that quitesimilar examples (i.e. with referential subjects and stative verbs) appear later, such as(18c), well after the development of the full-fledged modal uses, and are presumablyto be analysed as unquestionably deontic then. For example, some five hundredyears later in a Shakespeare play, we find:

(18) (c) PORTIA: No, my Brutus,You have some sick offence within your mind,Which by the right and virtue of my placeI ought to know of.12

(1599 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar II. i. 267-70)

The other type of construction that 'shade[s] into auxiliary use' involves a subjectwhich is 'the person bound by the obligation' (the obligee) (DOE agan II A.2.a).This obligation may be social or moral:

(19) (a) iceow wylleeac eallswa cy&an, pact man ah seocementoI you:DAT wish also similarly say:iNF, that one ought sick men togeneosianne and deade bebyrian.13

visit:iNF and dead bury:iNF

12 Portia is referring to her rights as Brutus's wife.13 Infinitives in OE could be inflected (e.g. to geneosianne) or not (e.g. bebyrian). Agan favors the inflected

infinitive, and continued to do so into PDE (in the form ought). Warner (1993) suggests that this isbecause ouenlought did not become a member of the core modal group in the sixteenth century, having'retained the possibility of past time reference and its preterite was interpreted as formed according tothe full verb schema ofbought..." (1993: 204). However, there are many instances in ME of ouen in thepast tense but with present meaning, especially in the verb's modal sense (see (19c) and MED ouen 4a(c),4b(b), 4c(b), 5(c-j)), so although ought to in its past meaning was possible, it was far from obligatory. Astatistical study is ideally needed to demonstrate the increases of this past tense form with presentmeaning, and to what extent there might be evidence of modeling from bought etc., but even absent suchstatistics, Warner's hypothesis is questionable. Also, as Warner notes (1993: 115), like the other pre-modals but unlike main verbs, ouen occurs in elliptical constructions. Other possible reasons for thefailure of the verb to join the core modals may be its semantics which was tied to advisability ratherthan prototypical deonticity, and the lack of epistemic meanings until the nineteenth century. But theseare insufficient in themselves, and the reasons why ought did not become a core modal are still open.

308 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

'I also want to say to you that one ought to visit sick people and bury the dead'(early eleventh-century HomU 46 (Nap 57) [DOEC])

(b) and we symle geornlice his ba halgan and ba godcundan bebodu aganand we always eagerly his those saints and those sacred decrees oughtto gefyllanne and to gehealdanne on us sylfum.to fulfill:iNF and to observe:iNF in our selves:DAT'and we ought often to fulfil the sacred decrees of his saints and observe themin ourselves' (HomS 37.29 [DOEC]14)

(c) al englond ahte forte knowe of wham pat song isall England ought to know about whom that song is'all England ought to know who the song is about' (1307 Historical Poems 3;p. 22 [HC])

In these examples the subject is human, and therefore a willful controller. But it isalso indefinite and generic, whether it is the generic third-person pronoun man (19a),the first-person plural pronoun we (19b), or a generic NP metonymic of persons (alenglond in (19c)). The genre is homiletic and the topic is nonsecular obligations tothe Christian life. These obligations are formulated either as sayings (ic eow wylleeac cydan in (19a)) or as particular command(ment)s (bebodu in (19b)). It is possiblethat a metaphor is involved here analogizing Christian abstract obligation to afinancial debt such as we find reported in (17). In any event, the examples in (19) arenot fully prototypical narrow-scope deontics, since none has a uniquely referentialsubject, and (19c) modalizes a stative 'event'. They are, however, more clearlydeontic than examples like (18) because possession is virtually ruled out.

By the beginning of the thirteenth century we begin to find examples of type (20)with referential subjects, e.g.:

(20) Sire ich wes of swuch ealde bt ic ahte wel to habben wislukerSir I was of such age that I ought well to have wisely:coMPARiwite me.conducted me'Sir, I was of such an age that I certainly ought to have conducted myself morewisely' (the context is a confession) (cl230 Ancrene Wisse, p. 163 [HC])

(20) is a particularly telling example as ahte introduces a nonfinite past tenseconstruction marked by auxiliary have. Although it occurs occasionally in OE, thisconstruction with have was not widely used until ME (contrast (18a) with OE ahte tohauen (main verb) and the translation 'ought to have had'). It was restricted toposition after verbs with modal meanings (Denison, 1993: 354-5) and may beconsidered to be one of the factors by which to differentiate pre-modal from modalmeanings. On this view, ahte may be hypothesized to have been construed as amodal (at least semantically) at the latest by c. 1200. (20) involves cognitiveobligation and is a standard example of a narrow-scope deontic in which the subjectis also the agent of the obligation, being responsible for the situation projected to

14 In keeping with DOE policy, no date is provided for this transcription by the DOE of a BodleianLibrary MS.

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 309

occur in the complement of the verb. It is also weakly subjective since the speaker isappealing to social and religious mores as obligers or forces.

The narrow-scope deontic meaning of agan/ouen15 attributing moral or legalobligation to its subject remained its primary modal function in ME. Some furtherexamples are:

(21) (a) Man o g . . . to all cristene men beren pais and luue.one ought to all Christian men bear peace and love'One ought to (is morally obliged to) bear peace and love to all Christian men'(cl250 Gen. & Ex. 8 [Visser 1969: 1814])

(b) Wei oghte a preest ensample for to yive,well ought a priest example for to giveBy his clennesse, how that his sheep sholde lyve.by his purity how that his sheep should live'A priest really ought to (is morally obliged to) set an example by his purity asto how his flock should live' (cl390 Chaucer, Canterbury Tales ProL, p. 31.[HC])

(c) we wole answere as fre men oughte to done.we will answer as free men ought to do (1414 Appeal London, p. 202 [HC])

As in (20) these uses are only weakly subjective in that the speaker is merelyreporting an obligation which is imposed by a conventionalized, accepted set of rulesand expectations (such as the Church or the Law). The weakly subjective nature ofthis modal, combined with its association with morality and legality, means that theobligation which it imposes usually applies generally, and accounts for the frequencyof its occurrence with nonspecific, generic subjects as in (21) and the earlier OEexamples in (19). This strong propensity for use with nonspecific subjects also favorsa possible wide-scope reading, since the focus is on the event rather than the obligee.

Around 1300 a new construction is found, one in which the subject can beinanimate as in:

(22) (a) . . . before be noun. . . before the noon-timeWhan goddys seruyse owyp to be doun.when God's service ought to be done'before noon, when God's work should be done' (1303 Rob. of Brunne, Handl.Synne 1024 [Visser 1969: 1815])

(b) By the mone . . . ben bitokned erthelich thinges with whiche holy chircheby the moon . . . are signified earthly things with which holy churchoweth to be sustened.ought to be sustained'The moon signifies earthly things by which the holy church ought to besustained' (cl350 Apoc. in LuSE 29 p. 90 [MED])

(c) wherby that thei mowen be put in the nombre of thinges that oughten benwhereby that they must be put in the number of things that ought beenrequired or desired.required or desired

15 'Long a' became 'long o' in early ME, and velar /x/ (spelled g) became Iwl in the environment of backvowels.

310 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

'Whereby they must belong to the set of things that ought to be required ordesired' (cl380 Chaucer, Boece, p. 453 [HC])

These examples are passive, and therefore presumably have active counterparts inwhich the modal has narrow scope, the (pluralized, indefinite) agent to whom theobligation expressed by ought to is attributed, being the subject. However nonproto-typically deontic the earlier OE and ME examples of modal aganlouen are, theseuses are even more so, since the obligee is not expressed. They are equally weaklysubjective. The difference is one of scope in the sense discussed in section 2. In apassive construction, the modal has wide scope by virtue of its syntactic character-istics. Since it is not the surface subject to which the modal attributes the obligation,the modal no longer functions to relate the subject to the predicate, and thus doesnot have narrow scope.

In later ME we begin to see the spread of a new even more unambiguously wide-scope deontic construction in which the subject is not the obligee - it may beinanimate (e.g. 23a, c) or even a dummy subject (23b) - yet the verb is active. Notehere that the inanimate subjects are not metonymic for persons as in (19c). Also, theverbs in (23) are stative.

(23) (a) per ne faylede ri3t nou3t . . . vche ping as hit ou^te to beon.there not lacked right no t . . . each thing as it ought to be'Nothing was lacking . . . each thing as it ought to be.' (c.1390 Castle Love{\)122[MEDo«e«4a(c)])

(b) For oonly it owghte suffise to han lokid that God hymself, makere of allefor only it ought suffice to have seen that God himself maker of allnatures, ordeineth and dresseth alle thingis to gode.natural beings, ordains and directs all things to virtue'For it ought simply to be sufficient to have seen that God himself, maker of allnatural beings, ordains and directs all things to virtue' ('there is a generalmoral obligation that people find it sufficient that . . .') (cl380 Chaucer, Boece,p.454[HC])

(c) yn to whiche lane oghte no dore ne yeate open withoute licence of the Mater,in to which lane ought no door nor gate open without licence of the Mayor'Into which lane no door nor gate ought to open without the approval of theMayor' ('there is a legal obligation (on the part of the people) such tha t . . .')(cl450 Docum Chancery, p. 89 [HC])

Here ought to unambiguously has scope over the whole proposition. It signals thatthere is an obligation or requirement (arising from generally recognized rules andexpectations associated with morality, the law, and so on) on the part of someunspecified obligee (often understood to be a nonspecific, human agent) to ensurethat the world be in such a way that the state of affairs described by the propositionis true. Thus, while there clearly is an obligee present at some level of interpretation- a door or gate cannot be made (as in (23c)) unless there is someone who builds it -in these constructions, unlike in those in (19-22), the use of ought to does not focuson this obligee, but only on the proposition that, given the moral or legal framewhich the speaker assumes to be generally valid, is required to be true. Note that the

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 311

difference between (22) and (23) is not one of epistemicity since (23c), for example,does not mean 'one can conclude/I conclude that no door or gate shall open'. It isalso not one of subjectivity. The authority for the obligation in (22) and (23 a, b) isthe norms of Christian doctrine, in (23c) of the town, and the speaker does notimpose the obligation, except in the default sense of choosing the subject-matter.Rather, the difference is one of wide scope.

The conceptual properties typically associated with ought to in the ME period(and beyond into PDE) are as follows: the force is social and moral, the obligee isplural, generic or nonspecific, the event or situation inchoative, the temporal relationlater than speech time, and the event probable. The history of deontic ought tosketched here shows that from its very beginnings the modal refers to 'universal/societal principles' and is 'group-oriented' (Myhill, 1997). It is from the verybeginning a weak deontic, the defeasibility of which is well captured in thisinterchange (where may expresses ability, even right, and will intention):

(24) IST CITIZEN. Once if ('if indeed')16 he do require our voices, we ought not to denyhim.

2ND CITIZEN. We may, sir, if we will.3RD CITIZEN. We have the power ('moral right') in ourselves to do it, but it is a

power that we have no power to do.(1607-8 Shakespeare, Coriolanus II. iii. 1-5)

As we saw in section 2.2, ought to in PDE can be used with both weakly and morestrongly subjective meanings. Like other modals in the history of English ought to isattested with more subjective meanings over the course of its history and appearslike them to have undergone the process of subjectification. This is the process bywhich 'meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state/attitude towards the proposition' (Traugott, 1989: 35). In the earlier texts it is usedin only weakly subjective ways; appeal to external values predominates. By thesixteenth century we begin to find examples that suggest the speaker is identifyingwith these values, and is presenting him or herself rather than society as the forcebehind the obligation, though sometimes with appeals to reason and other allegedlyexternal criteria (25b):

(25) (a) And in Essex they vse to haue a chylde, to go in the forowe before the horsesor oxen, with a bagge or a hopper fall of corne: and he taketh his hande full ofcorne, and by lyttel and lytel casteth it in the sayde forowe. Me semeth, thatchylde oughte to haue moche dyscretion. (1534 Fitzherbert, Husbandry, p. 40[HC])

(b) Sir Sampson. Why look you there now. I'll maintain it, that by the rule of rightreason, this fellow ought to have been born without a palate. - 'S'heart, whatshould he do with a distinguishing palate? (1695 Congreve, Love for LoveIl.i.p. 244)

Myhill (1995) shows that in representative American plays written between 1824and 1947, ought to comes to be used for opinions based on 'fairness, justice,

16 This and the gloss below are provided in the Riverside Shakespeare, Boston: Houghton Mifflin (1974).

312 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

kindness, and prudence', and is often presented as tentative (hedged by / think, or itseems): 'Thus while the principles associated with the use of ought are universal(fairness, justice, kindness), the speaker often includes a hedge to indicate that this isonly a subjective interpretation of these universal principles' (Myhill, 1995: 177-8).He identifies agreement as a major pragmatic factor in plays from 1936 on (Myhill,1997). Our first example of ought to being used in conversation to convey agreementabout an obligation is:

(26) '. . . offer of marriage?' 'Your ladyship has declared it to be impossible.' 'It oughtto be so; it must be so, while he retains the use of his reason.' (1813 Austen, Pride:vol.III, chapter 14, p. 354)

In so far as wide-scope deontic ought to in examples like this expresses the speaker'sagreement, it is more subjective than earlier uses that simply draw on societal andreligious norms.

4 The development of epistemic ought to

As we have seen, the earliest examples of ought to are all deontic. In later ME thereare a few examples with inanimate or pleonastic subjects that might be interpreted ashaving an epistemic reading, such as (27):

(27) Chese yowawyf. . . Born of the gentileste . . .Ofal this lond so that it oghtechoose you a wife . . . born of the noblest... of all this land so that it oughtseme Honour to god and yow.seem honor to God and you'Choose a wife born of the noblest of all this land so that it should seem to be anhonor to God and you.' (cl 395 Chaucer, CT. Clerk's Tale 130-2 [MED])

Note that here the modal appears with the impersonal verb seme. This is just thetype of context in which Warner (1990) argues early epistemic meanings are found inOE. On the other hand, it oghte seme Honour to god and yow is embedded in apurposive clause introduced by so that, which suggests a partially deontic meaning.

It is not until late in the Early Modern English (EModE) period that we find thefirst clear epistemic constructions, and even then they are infrequent. Thus theevidence clearly shows that wide-scope deontic uses developed long before epistemicuses, and are therefore distinct from them. This is a different situation from the oneGamon hypothesizes for German, since, as mentioned in section 2.3, on his view,epistemics (or at least those associated with mogen and mu'ssen) are 'virtuallyindistinguishable' from wide-scope deontics (Gamon, 1994: 125).

Among the earliest unambiguous examples of epistemic uses of ought to in theHelsinki Corpus are:

(28) (a) For the Attrition having caus'd an intestine commotion in the parts of theConcrete, the heat or warmth that is thereby excited ought not to cease, assoon as ever the rubbing is over, but to continue capable of emitting Effluviafor some time afterwards. (1675-76 Boyle, Electricity, pp. 12-13 [HC])

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 313

(b) But in those things, where they ought to be common, if the spleen or the bodyswells . . . it is a dropsie or a consumption of the whole. (1673 Taylor,Marriage Ring, p. 18 [HC])

The contexts, being scientific and medical, suggest that here we have ought to in theweakly subjective, epistemic sense of 'can be expected to'. The first epistemicexample of ought to given in the OED is not until the nineteenth century (29a) andVisser's (1969: 1717) earliest examples are later still, for example (29b):

(29) (a) Sir John Reresby, who ought to have been well-informed, positively affirmsthat. . ." (1849 Macaulay, Hist. Eng. I. 659 note [OED])

(b) I really must try to grow camellias here . . . The peaty soil ought to suit them,oughtn't it? (1963 Iris Murdoch, The Unicorn, p. 150 [Visser 1969: 1819])

The late rise of epistemic uses of ought to is in contrast with other modals such asmay, might, shall and would, which are found with epistemic meanings in ME, andperhaps in OE also (Warner, 1990; Denison, 1993: 298-303).

We hypothesize that the new epistemic use of ought to found in later EModEdeveloped out of the wide-scope deontic use by the conventionalization of theconversational implicature that if something is socially or morally required andexpected then, given the assumption that people are generally concerned to do whatis socially and morally correct, it will probably be done. Thus, obligation in a worldof moral and social requirement implicates expectation in the world of inference andconclusion. As noted in section 2.1, Heine regards probability as the one conceptualproperty that prototypical deontics and epistemics have in common (thoughtypically for deontics the probability is projected into the future, while it is presentfor epistemics) (1995: 31). This is of course true for all deontics. What is unique toought to is that throughout its history it has favored contexts that invite wide-scopereadings (generics and nonspecific subjects) or require them (inanimate or 'imper-sonal' subjects). It has also favored contexts of the type Coates (1983) characterizesin PDE as mergers, in other words, contexts where a reading can be either deontic orepistemic, as in (3) and (27) above or in :

(30) . . . verely trustyng for the good minde that he bare them all none of them ani. . . truly trusting for the good will that he bore them all none of them anything would intende vnto hym warde where with he ought to be greued.thing would wish unto him contrary where with he ought to be grieved'Truly trusting that because of the good will that he bore them all, none of themwould wish anything against him by which he ought to be aggrieved'

i. 'he is morally/socially obliged/expected to be aggrieved'ii. 'one could reasonably conclude/expect that he would be aggrieved'

(1514-18 More, History of Richard III, p. 78 [HC])

Furthermore, it appears that in the case of ought to, while both narrow-scope andwide-scope deontic meanings give rise to the same implicatures of probability, it was

17 Absent further context, the epistemic meaning is suggested by be well-informed (an epistemic state), andaffirm (an epistemic locutionary verb).

314 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

not until the wide-scope construction existed for deontic uses, thus providing thenecessary propositional scope, that the epistemic use could semanticize as a modalmeaning in its own right - i.e. that the modal could become semantically poly-semous, rather than simply pragmatically ambiguous (Horn, 1985; Sweetser, 1990).Thus, as the chronological evidence for ought to shows, crucial to the association ofthese epistemic implicatures with the meaning of the modal is the existence ofconstructions in which the modal already has propositional scope.

We may note that the EModE examples are all weakly subjective, and it is notuntil the twentieth century that we find more strongly subjective examples. Onepossible example is (10) in section 2.2. Another may be:

(31) There ought to be some high bidding at Mssrs. Sotheby's on Dec. 18th.(19.. Everyman (in Kruisinga, Handbook II. i. p. 439) [Visser 1969: 1819])

though absent more context this is not certain. Thus, the evidence from ought toprovides some support for the process of increased subjectification, argued byTraugott (1989, 1995a) to be associated with the development of epistemic meaning.The prediction is that, since epistemic meanings participate in a general process ofsubjectification, they will increase in their subjectivity over time: initially beingweakly subjective and then developing more strongly subjective uses. In any event,there is no evidence in English such as Gamon (1994) finds in German for thesimultaneous development of strong and weak subjective uses.

We have suggested that the epistemic meaning arose out of deontic wide scope,together with the implicature that what is obliged to be done will be done and indeedis habitually done. A possible alternative view might be that epistemic meaningsarise via subjectification of root necessity. Such a view would seem to follow fromCoates's (1995: 59) claim that the only factor distinguishing between root andepistemic possibility in English is subjectivity.18 However, as discussed in section 2.3,the definition of root necessity is unclear. Furthermore, as we have seen, earlyexamples of epistemic ought to, such as (28), are not more strongly subjective thanexamples of wide-scope deontic ought to, such as are illustrated in (23).

5 Conclusion

The historical evidence concerning ought to supports the path of development fromdeontic to epistemic meaning shown in figure 2. As is typical in semantic change, theold meanings continue to coexist alongside the newer ones. In figure 2, a plain lineindicates continuity of use from one period to another; a line with arrows indicatesnot only continuity over time, but also increase in strength.

18 It would also seem to follow from Traugott's suggestion that the development of epistemic meaning isan instance of subjectification (1989: 37, where Tendency HI (subjectification) is hypothesized tomotivate the shift from deontic to epistemic meanings). While it is certainly true that epistemicmodality is generally more concerned with the belief or attitude of the speaker than deontic modality is,it is problematic to assume that all deontic modal uses are necessarily less subjective than epistemicones, as a comparison between (28) and (26) shows.

SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMIC MODALITY 315

Stage Meaning OE LOE ME EModE ModE

0 V of possession

1 Narrow scope deontic ---

II Wide scope deontic -

More subjective deontic . . .>. . .>. . .>. . .>. . .>. . .>

III Epistemic

More subjective epistemic —> —>

Figure 2 Path of development of ought to

As we have discussed, the nature of this development highlights the need torecognize three distinct parameters according to which modal uses are classified:deontic vs. epistemic, narrow-scope vs. wide-scope, and weak vs. strong subjectivity,each of which operates separately from the others. Thus, in ME we see thedevelopment of a wide-scope deontic construction out of a narrow-scope construc-tion due to its frequent use in constructions with generic subjects and later inpassives, in which the distinction between the two scope types is minimal. InEModE, we see the rise of the epistemic meaning due to the conventionalizing of theimplicatures associated with the deontic uses. The wide-scope deontic constructionwas a prerequisite for this development in providing the propositional scopenecessary for the epistemic meaning. Subjectification is largely orthogonal to thisdevelopment. It is a very widespread independent phenomenon, characteristic oflarge areas of semantic change, and not unique to modality (Traugott, 1995a,1995b). At the beginning of each stage, subjectivity is weak, but once the stage hasbeen reached subjectification can occur. However, it is not a prerequisite for thedevelopment of any new stage, nor the direct result of it. In fact, our data basesuggests subjectification did not occur for deontic ought to until EModE, and forepistemics not till Modern English. In other words, there is no evidence in Englishsuch as Gamon (1994) finds in German for the simultaneous development of strongand weak subjective uses. On the contrary, what we see is a gap of several centuriesbetween the development of weakly subjective meanings and the development ofmore strongly subjective ones.

The present paper has discussed the rise of wide-scope deontic uses with respect toonly one modal, ought to. The strength of the evidence from ought to presented here,in addition to that presented for may by Bybee (1988) and mogen by Gamon (1994),shows that the role of wide-scope deontics in the development of epistemic modalitydeserves testing for modals more generally.

316 RACHEL NORDLINGER AND ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT

Authors' addresses:Linguistics DepartmentStanford UniversityStanford, CA 94305-2150USArachel@csli. Stanford, edutraugott@csli.stanford edu

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