Review of the Year: International - AJC Archives

Review of the Year: International

-1. THE PALESTINE PROBLEM1

-By Louis Shub—

THE SPECIAL SESSION ON PALESTINE of the United NationsGeneral Assembly ended on May 15, 1947. An eleven-nationcommittee of inquiry was established and empowered tosubmit proposals for the solution of the problem of Palestinein about ninety days.

This action by the United Nations was but the most recentstep to break the stalemate existing between the three con-tending parties; the Jews, the Arabs and the British. Through-out the deliberations of the Assembly, beginning April 28,however, it was clear that the problem had not become anymore susceptible of solution because fifty-five nations ratherthan one or two or three endeavored to solve it. The basicelements remained the same—pressure of the Jews of Europetoward their promised homeland, aspirations of the Jews ofPalestine to self-rule, opposition of the Arabs in Palestine andsurrounding states to any change that might give the Jews apopulation of greater influence in Palestine, and the networkof Great Power interests in the Mediterranean Basin. Inabilityto reconcile these factors was the basis for the failure of theUnited States and Great Britain to solve the problem con-jointly, and the failure of Britain's single-handed efforts some-what later.

1 This article deals with the international political developments. Fora summary of events within Palestine see the article by Lotta Levensohn,p. 444—ED.

483

484 AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The new Special Committee set up by the Assembly hadbefore it a dossier of plans that failed to achieve commonagreement: the Morrison-Grady plan, commonly referred toas the Federalization plan; the Bevin proposal, known as thecantonization plan; and the Arab program for an Arab Pales-tine state. The dossier did not contain a plan by the JewishAgency, for it had not officially participated in the ill-fatedconferences of September 1946, or January 1947 (Englandhaving refused to place the Agency proposal for a Jewish statein an adequate area of Palestine on the agenda).

In addition to these previously known plans, the SpecialCommittee was likely to consider proposals for a UnitedNations Trusteeship until Palestine could be adjudged readyfor independence or continuance of British responsibilityunder the terms provided in the League Mandate or a UnitedNations Trusteeship. It was expected that the Committeewould also consider the plan of the Anglo-American Com-mittee of Inquiry. Although the British dossier did not containany reference to this plan, it will undoubtedly receive con-siderable study by its multilateral successor, and it representsa convenient springboard from which to gain a perspective ofthe whole problem.

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Plan

In April 1946 the Anglo-American Committee recom-mended that Palestine be neither an Arab nor a Jewish statebut a single state in which all sections of the community couldparticipate. It is also recommended that Palestine be con-tinued under mandate pending the execution of a trusteeshipagreement under the United Nations.

On immigration, it recommended that 100,000 Jewishimmigrants be authorized admission into Palestine immedi-ately and thereafter in accordance with the mandate. Itrecommended further that the acquisition of land be permittedirrespective of race and that restrictions on transfer of land berescinded.

PALESTINE PROBLEM 485

The proposal of "perpetual trusteeship" provided an inter-lude for the realization of final goals and at the same timeprovided for the satisfaction of Jewish interests in regard toimmigration and British interests, insofar as it retains theMandate. The Arabs were to be compensated for concessionson Jewish immigration through large grants and subsidies toencourage social and economic development in Palestine andsurrounding countries.

The Report's statement that "because it (Palestine) is aholy land, Palestine is not and can never become a land whichany race or religion can justly claim as its very own" wasgiven significance by the instruction to the U. N. Special Com-mittee to "give most careful consideration to the religiousinterests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity."

Developments Leading to Morrison Plan

The Anglo-American Inquiry Committee Report's imme-diate objective, the prompt admission of 100,000 Jews intoPalestine, was endorsed by President Truman. His desire forimmediate implementation was, however, nullified by PrimeMinister Attlee's insistence that the recommendations beaccepted as a whole, that the United States furnish militaryand financial assistance for the implementation of the recom-mendations, and that the illegal Jewish armies disband andsurrender their arms.

A diplomatic tug-of-war ensued not only between thePresident of the United States and the British authorities butalso between President Truman and the State Department.In the latter connection, it became necessary for the StateDepartment to declare "that it must be clear that the Presi-dent's statements are controlling upon all the departments ofgovernment." The President's persistence in his immigrationstand culminated in the establishment on July 11, 1946 of aCabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems, con-sisting of the Secretaries of State, War and Treasury. Follow-ing preliminary deliberations, a committee of alternates underHenry Grady went to England to explore the problem furtherwith a similar group appointed by the British cabinet.


Anglo-American Cabinet Committee Plan

Following three weeks of deliberation, the Anglo-AmericanCabinet Committee on July 26, 1946 recommended a federal-ization scheme for the consideration of their respective govern-ments.

It was proposed that the two governments should seek tocreate conditions favorable to the resettlement of a substantialnumber of displaced persons in Europe itself. Recognizingthat there would still be a movement to find new homes outsideEurope, the committee urged establishment of an Inter-national Refugee Organization designed to deal effectivelywith the problem of refugees and displaced persons as a whole,Finally, the committee recommended making an appeal to allmembers of the United Nations to receive in territories undertheir control a portion of Europe's displaced persons, includingJews.

Accepting the principle that Palestine, as a whole, can beneither a Jewish nor an Arab state, the plan calls for thefederalization of Palestine into Jewish, Arab and CentralGovernment provinces. Very strong powers would be vestedin the Central (British) Government and very little autonomywould exist in the Jewish and Arab provinces. The Jewishprovince would comprise the Plains of Sharon and Esdraelonand part of Galilee, with a total area of about 1,500 squaremiles. The remainder of the country, with the exception ofthe districts of Jerusalem, Bethlehem and the Negeb, wouldconstitute the Arab zone. The admission of 100,000 EuropeanJews would take place within twelve months after acceptanceof the constitutional proposals arising from discussion of theplan.

The distribution of the population would be about 451,000Jews in the Jewish zone, 15,000 in the Arab zone and 100,000in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Jewish zone would have aminority of 301,000 Arabs; 815,000 Arabs would be in theArab zone and about 90,000 in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.Large sums of money would have to be made available toboth Jews and Arabs. Most of the money for Jewish purposeswould have to be raised among Jews themselves; about


$300,000,000 would be provided the Arabs of Palestine andthe rest of the Middle East by the United States. Immigration"to the extent to which the absorptive capacity of the countrywill not thereby be exceeded" was to be controlled by theCentral Government.

That Great Britain's desire to effect an agreement amongJews and Arabs and present a fait accompli to the GeneralAssembly would be thwarted became evident with the initialreaction of the Jewish Agency and the Arabs.

The Jewish Agency rejected the plan because it failed tooffer independence to either Arabs or Jews and meant thatself-government would be illusory.

General dissatisfaction with the plan was expressed by otherJewish bodies on the following grounds: the area allotted forJewish immigration was too small as was the amount of self-government offered to the Jews and Arabs; there were noprovisions for adequate and early participation by Jews andArabs in responsible posts in the Central Government. Theinsistence by Great Britain that no Jewish immigration intoPalestine would be possible unless the provisional autonomyplan were accepted in toto was roundly condemned.

The Arab office of Jerusalem condemned the plan as"similar to the Partition scheme in 1937" which the Arabsresisted and recorded their determination to reject any formof partition as stronger than ever. The Arab office added thatit rejected the idea of Jewish-owned land in an Arab territoryand opposed the establishment of a Jewish state, even a smallJewish settlement.

September London Conference

Despite rejection of the plan by the two groups most directlyaffected in Palestine—the Jewish Agency and the Arab HigherCommittee—Great Britain invited representatives of the sevenArab states and the Arab League to a conference in Londonto begin on September 9, 1946.

Meeting insParis in August, the Jewish Agency refused toattend the London Conference. On August 10, in a letterto the British Colonial Secretary, George H. Hall, Chaim


Weizmann pointed out that the Agency refused to accept theMorrison plan as a basis for negotiation, but was prepared toparticipate in the Conference if establishment of a Jewishstate in an "adequate area" of Palestine was to be the purposeof the discussion. In addition, the Agency demanded full free-dom to designate its own Conference delegates, including thosedetained or subject to detention.

The reference to "the establishment of a Jewish State in anadequate area of Palestine" made by Dr. Weizmann in hisletter to the Colonial Secretary, signalled the reappearance ofpartition as a proposed solution. Not only was Great Britainpresented with this proposal but so was the United States, forNahum Goldmann was sent to Washington by the JewishAgency to present the Agency's proposal. This plan had beenagreed on by the Agency in Paris in August because it hadbeen felt that the British Government would agree to the earlyadmission of 100,000 Jews only if this step were coupled withthe solution of the Palestine problem as a whole.

The Jewish Agency's position has since become a basic issueof conflict among Zionists, many of whom felt that thebargaining position of the Jewish Agency was weakened whenit took the initiative in offering partition instead of awaitingsuch an offer from the British.

With respect to the Agency plan, Judge Joseph M. Pros-kauer, on behalf of the American Jewish Committee, statedthat the plan is "a reasonable base on which to build discus-sion." He remarked further that "insofar as its salient featureshave been announced, it stresses as its main objective the crea-tion of a governmental unit into which Jews may immigrate asof right. All agree that this immigration is the true, main andimmediate objective. This immigration is vital to the savingof human life."

The Arabs rejected the Morrison plan and instead proposeda unitary state which would preclude "the cutting off of Pales-tine to make a home for immigrants of a different nationality."Under the proposal, an independent Arab state was to comeinto being by the end of 1948, following an interim governmentthat would be subject to the veto power of a British HighCommissioner.


Expressing a desire to study these Arab proposals morefully, the British Government postponed the scheduled Sep-tember conference to December 15 and then to January 14,1947. This adjournment was viewed with great misgiving byPresident Truman. In a letter of October 4, he outlined theactivities of the United States with regard to Palestine fromthe day of Earl Harrison's report. In reiterating his interestin the earliest possible admission to Palestine of 100,000Jewish refugees, the President expressed the belief that a solu-tion along the lines of the Agency plan proposing "a viableJewish state in control of its own immigration and economicpolicies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the wholeof Palestine" would command the support of public opinionin the United States.

Second London Conference

The intervening months between the unsuccessful Sep-tember conference and the conference called for late January,were replete with frustration for Jewish hopes, grumbling bythe Arabs, and growing resentment by the British which wasreflected in anti-Jewish statements by Ernest Bevin.

At the conference the Arabs were insistent on the plan theyhad offered previously and refused to accept any compromise.Though outside the conference, the Jewish Agency continuedto press at informal meetings for the procedural point of havingBritain place on the agenda the principle of a Jewish state inan adequate area of Palestine.

The Bevin Plan was submitted to the conference on Feb-ruary 7, 1947 and was communicated to representatives of theJewish Agency. The plan provided for creation of two semi-autonomous states, Arab and Jewish, subject to the over-allauthority of the British Government. No boundaries were tobe set for the two states. The areas included in either statedid not have to be contiguous but were to be determined by amajority of the population in a particular district. Theimmigration of Jews to Palestine, now limited to 1,500 amonth, was to be increased at a rate of 4,000 monthly, for twoyears.


The plan was to run for five years, but after two years theHigh Commissioner, a British official to whom questionsrelating to such matters as international relations and defensewere to be referred, could decide whether the rate of immi-gration of Jews was more than the "absorptive capacity" ofthe area and reduce it if necessary. "Local councils in thevarious communities within the Arab and Jewish areas wouldhave sole contact with the outside bodies." If, after the five-year trial, the plan was not a success, the entire problem ofPalestine would be referred to the Trusteeship Council of theUnited Nations.

Both the Arabs and the Jewish Agency issued categoricalrejections; the former, on the basis of unqualified oppositionto any further Jewish immigration and their demand for theimmediate establishment of an Arab state; the latter, on theground that the Bevin plan provided even less than theMorrison plan in regard to immigration and that the Pales-tinian state to be established after five years would still containa large Arab majority and would in reality guarantee an Arabstate.

PALESTINE PROBLEM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Owing to the complete failure of the two conferences, onFebruary 17, 1947, Mr. Bevin told the House of Commonsthat the Palestine problem was to be submitted to the UnitedNations. On February 20, the British government, in linewith its intention not to propose any specific recommendationof its own, issued a White Paper, which contained the Arab,Morrison and Bevin plans together with other documents, andpresented it to the United Nations for consideration.

Bevin's Proposal

In a speech on February 21, 1947, Bevin delineated what,in his opinion, the political structure of Palestine should be.Declaring that the very issuance of the White Paper portendedEngland's belief that it had fulfilled the commitments of theBalfour Declaration and the Mandate, Secretary Bevin con-tended that the Jewish claim to Palestine was based purely on


humanitarian grounds. He was, therefore, prepared to relaxthe provisions of the White Paper to the extent of admitting100,000 Jews into Palestine at the present rate of 1500 monthly.Beyond that, Jewish immigration into Palestine was to bedecided by the elected representatives of Palestine. This, ineffect, meant that Jewish immigration was to be dependentupon Arab consent and was essentially a proposal to create apermanent Jewish minority in Palestine. This was admittedby Bevin when he stated, "I cannot alter the balance ofpeople in a state."

That Bevin was proposing an Arab state was likewiseindicated by citing Arab proposals as reasonable and difficultof answer. Although Bevin mentioned that the Anglo-Ameri-can Committee of Inquiry did not recommend a Jewish state,he failed to note that neither did the Committee recommendan Arab state.

In addition, Bevin charged President Truman with sabo-taging a possible settlement of the Palestine problem forcampaign purposes. President Truman was accused of under-mining the chances of a truce with the Zionists by issuing astatement on October 4, 1946, which demanded the admissionof 100,000 Jews into Palestine.

The White House publicly rebuked Bevin for his suggestion.An unprecedented statement issued February 26, 1947 pointedout that President Truman's pronouncement of October 4,1946 was merely a reafnrmation of the United States Govern-ment's attitude toward Palestine since August 31, 1945, whenthe President addressed a communication to Prime MinisterAttlee on the subject of admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine.* On February 26 the Jewish Agency issued a statement

attacking Mr. Bevin's address as misleading on the groundsthat he was presenting his proposal of a unitary state inPalestine as a compromise between Arab and Jewish demandswhereas actually a unitary state would have an Arab majorityand would, therefore, be an Arab state.

At its meeting in Cairo in March the Arab League indicatedthat it would argue the case before the United Nations on thebasis of complete independence for Palestine as an Arab state,and repeated its demand for the complete cessation of immi-


gration into Palestine. The League also declared that if aninterim trustee were proposed, it would invoke Article 73 ofthe United Nations Charter which states that the interests ofthe inhabitants of trust territories are paramount. This,according to the Arabs, would rule out provisions for admissionof European Jewish refugees who are non-inhabitants.

The Arabs have for some time contended that underArticle 79, they alone are the "states directly concerned" andare entitled to settle with Great Britain the terms of thetrusteeship. This thesis would exclude the United States andthe Jewish Agency as well. The Soviet Union has expresseditself quite strongly on the issue of "states directly concerned."N. V. Novikov, Soviet representative on the TrusteeshipCommittee, declared that the attempt by Great Britain tosolve the question of Palestine through direct negotiations withJewish and Arab representatives constituted a violation ofArticle 79. Thus, it was anticipated that Russia wouldoppose any attempt of the Arabs to declare themselves theonly "states directly concerned."

Considerable confusion followed Bevin's proposal to submitthe Palestine question to the United Nations. The sevenmonths' delay involved in placing the issue before the GeneralAssembly, which was scheduled not to meet until September,was greatly deplored. In seeking to expedite an early studyof the problem by a responsible body, the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, Trygve Lie, proposed that a fact-findingbody be set up by a special committee of fifty-five membersto study the Palestine question. This body would report tothe political committee which in turn would report to theGeneral Assembly. At first, however, nothing developed,because the United States insisted that Great Britain shouldofficially sponsor the proposal for a special Palestine investi-gating committee and also formulate concrete suggestions forUnited Nations procedure.

Despite Great Britain's repeated insistence that it could notgive the United Nations carte blanche in the Palestine ques-tion, on April 2 it submitted a formal request for a specialsession of the General Assembly. The British note containeda double request; first, that the question of Palestine be put


on the agenda of the regular Assembly session in September;second, that a special session be called to set up and instructa committee to gather information for the regular meeting.It also disclosed that the British Government would submitto the September session an account of its administration ofthe League of Nations Mandate covering the Holy Land.

The majority necessary for calling the special session wasobtained by April 11 and the following day, Trygve Lie cablednotice of the session. His cable prescribed that the session belimited to appointing a fact-finding committee to investigateconditions in Palestine and report to the nations at the regularAssembly meeting in September.

The Arab League immediately challenged the cable's intent,when it intimated on April 19 that it would ask the UnitedNations for an immediate decision on Palestine. Faris-Bey ElGhoury of Syria, spokesman for the League, stated that theArabs would fight the appointment of a commission of inquiryand would ask for the immediate creation of an independentstate in Palestine. This was in complete contradiction to theintention of the American and British delegations which hopedto confine the discussion to the appointment of a board ofinquiry.

The Jewish Agency appealed to the United Nations torecommend that, pending a decision on a long-term solutionto the Palestine problem, Great Britain re-open the Holy Landto immediate Jewish immigration and during the interimperiod outlaw "existing measures of racial discrimination thatrestrict the sale of land to Jews in 94 per cent of the country."

The Agency also noted that both the Arab world and GreatBritain were formally represented in the United Nations andthat the Jewish people, without such representation, wereapproaching the special session of the Assembly under a greatdisadvantage.

Deliberations of Special Session

The first session on April 28matters and the election of DrPresident. The word "Palestine" was mentioned only once.

The first session on April 28 was devoted to organizationalmatters and the election of Dr. Oswald Aranha as AssemblyPr#»ciH*»nt Th<» wnrH "Pnlfstinp" W9S mcntinncH nnlv r\r\r<t*


The delegates then turned to the procedural matter beforethem. From April 29 on there was debate in committee andplenary session. The debate turned on two questions. Thefirst was "What is the function of the Special Assembly?"The second was, "Should the Zionists be represented duringthe discussions?"

The Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, SaudiArabia—demanded that the Assembly debate the whole Pales-tine problem and vote on the termination of the Britishmandate. They disapproved Zionist representation.

The United States and Britain opposed the Arabs. Theyfavored limiting the Assembly to the simple act of setting upa United Nations Inquiry Commission to investigate Palestine,postponing all basic debate and action until the regular sessionof the Assembly. They came out for Zionist representation incommittee meetings but not in the full Assembly.

Russia lined up with the Arabs on one issue, opposed themon the other. The Soviet delegate favored a full dress debateon Palestine "but not necessarily a decision." On the otherhand, Russia urged that the Zionists be heard by the GeneralAssembly rather than by the committee.

The voice of the Jews was not heard in the United Nationsdeliberations. But outside the United Nations meetingsstrenuous efforts were made to win a hearing for their position.The Zionists brought pressure on the State Department togain support for their plea. They argued, and the UnitedStates supported them to a degree, that the Jewish Agency forPalestine which is recognized as a semi-official organ underthe mandate should present the Jewish case.

In the course of the first week's debate the Assemblyapproved the Anglo-American position on the question ofsetting the Agenda. After acrimonious debate the first twodays, the General Committee voted 8 to 1 to confine theagenda to establishment of the Inquiry Commission. Fivenations, including Russia, abstained from voting. The Arabdelegates took their fight to the floor of the General Assembly.Again they were defeated 24 to 10.

The second issue—Zionist participation—was debated in-


conclusively in the first week in the General Committee andwas finally taken to the Political and Security Committee.

The question of Jewish representation was further compli-cated by the fact that other groups besides the Jewish Agencysought accreditation. However, on May 3, the full Assemblydirected the Political and Security Committee to hear theJewish Agency and to consider a request for a hearing by theArab Higher Committee, a self-constituted political body forthe Palestine Arabs organized in 1936 to represent parties thenactive in Palestine. Its organizer and first chairman was theGrand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin El Husseini, exiled fromPalestine early in the war because of his pro-Nazi sympathies.

The five Arab League States in the United Nations tookumbrage and threatened to boycott the sessions unless theAssembly met again to retract this action. The Assemblyacceded to the request in an emergency meeting. The Politicaland Security Committee adjourned; reconstituted itself as aplenary session; directed the committee by a vote of 39-1 tohear the Arab Higher Committee, thus satisfying the delegatesand setting the stage for the Arab-Jewish debate which wasto be confined to advice on the nature and scope of the InquiryCommittee.

The principal spokesman for the Jewish Agency before theFirst Committee of the General Assembly on May 8 was AbbaHillel Silver, Chairman of the Agency's American section.The spokesman for the Arab Higher Committee was HenryCattan, a Jerusalem lawyer. These were the major points theymade:

Dr. Silver: These international commitments . . . . cannotnow be erased . . . . The Jewish people . . . . (rely) uponthe honor and pledged word of the world community.Mr. Cattan: The Balfour Declaration was made withoutthe consent . . . . of the people most directly affected . . . .Various pledges (were) given to the Arabs before and afterthe Balfour Declaration with regard ito the recognition oftheir (sovereignty).Dr. Silver: The national home is still in the making; it hasnot yet been fully established . . . . The opportunity (for itsdevelopment) must now be fully restored.


Mr. Cattan: It is high time that Palestine's right to inde-pendence be recognized . . . . It is high time also that apolicy (the mandate) which has been impairing the ethno-logical and political structure of the country be brought toan end.Dr. Silver: The Mandatory Government . . . . assumed asits prime obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration into(Palestine).Mr. Cattan: Immigration initiated under the mandate isthreatening the very existence of the Arab nations.Dr. Silver: There is a desperate urgency about this tragichuman problem, my friends, which brooks no delay. Animmediate relaxation of the restrictive measures on immi-gration . . . . will be a boon to these suffering humans.Mr. Cattan: The linking of the refugee problem with Pales-tine has made and would continue to make the solution ofboth problems infinitely more difficult . . . . The Mandatory(must) take immediate steps for the complete stoppage ofall Jewish immigration into Palestine.

These arguments make it clear that a crucial issue is theadmission of Jews into Palestine. Arab insistence on immediateindependence would mean the creation of a state in which theJews would be a minority and thus unable to affect immi-gration. By the same token, the halting of immigration wouldeliminate the possibility of a Jewish state in all of Palestine.

The Issue of Independence

After several days of Arab-Jewish debate, during which theArab spokesmen appealed to racial and religious prejudice,the United Nations turned to a discussion of the scope andcomposition of the Inquiry Commission. Led by Herschel V.Johnson, the United States campaigned for giving the broadestinstruction to the projected inquiry and objected to a Sovietproposal which it felt might morally prejudice the investigationto recommend immediate independence.

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet delegate, held it to be "desirable"that the inquiry frame an immediate proposal for inde-pendence, or at least several alternative recommendations.


Gromyko proposed an amendment "including a proposal onthe question of establishing without delay the independentstate of Palestine."

Several smaller nations argued that they wanted to studyall the facts before they made any kind of advance commit-ment. They felt, however, that the generalized instructionmight consider ultimate independence for Palestine for in thedebates every nation had endorsed the goal of independence,a point specified in the League of Nations mandate.

Issue of Representation and Big Five

Another issue battled over was representation in the UnitedNations Committee of Inquiry. The debate centered aroundthe desire of the United States to keep the members of the BigFive from obtaining any position on the Inquiry Committee.The United States sought a seven-member neutral committee,with broad terms of reference allowing the investigators to goanywhere and make any decision.

Arguing for Big Five participation, Andrei Gromyko statedthat Russia had no material interest in the Palestine problemand that the Soviet Jewish population as far as he knew didnot have much interest in immigration to Palestine. He addedthat Russia was ready to participate not only in the UnitedNations decision in Palestine but also in the assembling of factsin the case.

In reply, Warren Austin, head of the United States delega-tion, stated that, "Our fear is that opposing views and debateamong the permanent members (the Big Five) if they wereon the special committee, over details would cause delay bythe intrusion of other interests which are perfectly obvioushere. Everybody knows about them. They are constantlyarising on every detail."

It was clear that he was referring, among other problems,to the clash of Big Three political interests in the Near andMiddle East; the special interests of Britain as the mandatepower administering Palestine; the United States' programsof aid for Greece and Turkey; Russia's desire for warm water


ports; vital oil interests and competition for the favors of theArab peoples.

On the question of the role of the Big Five, Sir AlexanderCadogan stated:

My Government are in rather a peculiar position. Theywould find themselves, if they were members of that com-mittee, at times in the witness stand, and then after that, amoment or two later, would resume their seats with thejury. It is a principls, of course, that we have always—andI think everybody has—upheld, that no man should bejudge in his own cause, and I think, we should be put in asomewhat embarrassing and difficult position.

In the final vote, on May 13, the Assembly approved theAustralian proposal that eleven nations, excluding the BigFive, constitute the Committee of Inquiry. The vote was 46to 7 with Arab States, Turkey and Afghanistan in opposition.Following are the terms of the inquiry:

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations hasbeen called into special session for the purpose of consti-tuting and instructing a special committee to prepare, forthe consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly,a report on the question of Palestine,The General Assembly resolves that:

(1) A Special Committee be created for the above-mentioned purpose consisting of the representatives of Aus-tralia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran,the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

(2) The Special Committee shall have the widest powersto ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questionsand issues relevant to the problem of Palestine.

(3) The Special Committee shall determine its ownprocedure.

(4) The Special Committee shall conduct investigationsin Palestine, and wherever it may deem useful, receive andexamine written or oral testimony, whichever it may con-sider appropriate in each case, from the mandatory power,from representatives of the population of Palestine, from govern-ments and from such organizations and individuals as it may deemnecessary.


(5) The Special Committee shall give most careful con-sideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam,Judaism and Christianity.

(6) The Special Committee shall prepare a report to theGeneral Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it mayconsider appropriate for the solution of the problem ofPalestine.

(7) The Special Committee's report shall be communi-cated to the Secretary-General not later than 1 September,1947, in order that it may be circulated to the members ofthe Uaited Nations in time for consideration by the secondregular session of the General Assembly . . . .

Observers felt that the membership of the eleven-nationSpecial Committee was a fairly balanced group. India andIran were regarded as definite supporters of the Arabs. InAssembly and committee debate, Asaf Ali, representative ofIndia, had been one of the most frequent speakers for theArab case. Iran had voted consistently for the Arab viewpoint,but Nastollah Entezam, delegate from Teheran, was reportedto have declared that his government would give its delegateon the Inquiry Committee a completely free hand. It also wasfelt that with its large number of Arab inhabitants, Peru mightlean in the Arab direction.

Canada and Australia were regarded as naturally predis-posed toward Great Britain. Sweden, Uruguay and theNetherlands did not indicate that they favored any party andwere viewed as neutral.

Guatemala was reportedly among the pro-Zionist. It hadconsistently been friendly and had argued for a Jewish Agencyvoice in the debates of the political committee. Czecho-slovakia and Yugoslavia, the latter with a large Moslem popu-lation, showed pro-Zionist attitudes. In both cases, however,it was felt that their positions would be influenced by the standof the Soviet Union.

What Russia's ultimate position would be was uncertainafter the adjournment of the Assembly. However, the viewsexpressed by Andrei Gromyko the next to the last day of theAssembly's session came as a surprise to most observers.


Russian Stand on Palestine

Andrei Gromyko, whose speech on May 14 was unwelcometo the Arabs but highly pleasing to Jewish representatives,opened his talk by defining the Palestine problem as "an acutepolitical problem" which the United Nations had the respon-sibility to solve. He continued

The fact that not a single Western European state has beenin a position to guarantee the defense of the elementaryrights of the Jewish people or compensate them for theviolence they have suffered at the hands of the Fascisthangmen explains the aspiration of the Jews for the creationof a state of their own. It would be unjust not to take thisinto account and to deny the right of the Jewish people tothe realization of such an aspiration . . . .We must bear in mind the incontestable fact that the popu-lation of Palestine consists of two peoples, Arabs and Jews.Each of these has its historical roots in Palestine . . . . Neitherhistory nor the conditions which have arisen in Palestinenow can justify any unilateral solution of the Palestineproblem, either in favor of the creation of an independentArab state, ignoring the lawful rights of the Jewish people,or in favor of the creation of an independent Jewish state,ignoring the lawful rights of the Arab population. A justsettlement can be found only if account is taken in sufficientdegree of the lawful interests of both peoples. These con-siderations are the basis upon which the Soviet Uniondelegation concludes that the lawful interests both of theJewish and of the Arab peoples of Palestine can be defendedin a proper manner only by the creation of one dual, demo-cratic Arab-Jewish state.Such a state should be founded upon equal rights for theJewish and Arab populations which might constitute afoundation for cooperation between these two peoples intheir common interest to the advantage of them both.Is it not clear that in solving the question of Palestine itwould be very useful to take into account the experiencegained through such friendly co-existence and friendly com-munity of life between different nationalities within thethe framework of a single state? The settlement of theproblem of Palestine by the creation of a single Arab-Jewish


state with equal rights for Jews and Arabs might in this waybe considered as one of the possible solutions, and as thesolution most deserving attention, of this complicatedproblem.Such a solution of the question concerning the future ofPalestine might provide a sound basis for the peaceful co-existence and cooperation of the Arab and Jewish popu-lations of Palestine, in the interests of both these peoples, forthe good of the whole population of the country, and forthe peace and security of the Near East.If it were found that this plan was unrealizable on accountof the deterioration of relations between Jews and Arabs,and it is highly important that we have the opinion of thecommittee on this question, then it would be necessary toconsider an alternative solution which, like the first, has itsadvocates in Palestine and which consists of the division ofPalestine into two independent separate states—one, Jewish,and one, Arab.

These statements indicate a reversal of the traditionalSoviet position on Palestine. Recognition of Jewish rights inPalestine was a change from the attitude that Zionism is atool of British imperialism. The proposal to consider partitionlined up Russia with a similar proposal made in October byPresident Truman to Prime Minister Attlee. Moreover, thisadvocacy of partition, which is anathema to the Arabs, couldhelp dispel the concern of the United States and Great Britainthat their espousal of partition might drive the oil-rich Arabcountries into the Russian orbit.

This new position was startling not only to the Zionists butto the Communist parties as well. During the war, theCommunists had endorsed the Balfour Declaration in linewith the vote taken by the delegation of the Soviet TradeUnion at the World Trade Union Conference in London, inFebruary 1945. Here the declaration was made that "theJewish people must be enabled to continue the rebuilding ofPalestine as their National Home."

However, a change was noted when an article, "MiddleEast Powder Keg," by K. Serezhin appeared in the February1, 1946 issue of New Times, a Moscow magazine. Serezhin


attacked British sponsorship of the Arab League and thelatter's general subordination to British imperial interests.With respect to Palestine, the author wrote: "In contradictionto the majority of the Arab states which have already beengranted formal independence, Palestine is still mandated toGreat Britain." Not only was this statement a first intimationthat Russia regarded Palestine as an Arab state but the authorwent on to censure the Arab League for its failure to act withsufficient speed in the attempt to create a Palestine state.

The view of Palestine as Arab in character was the basis ofSerezhin's position on Jewish immigration to Palestine: "Thepublication of President's Truman's message containing theproposal to transfer 100,000 Jews from Europe to Palestineand the subsequent British-American negotiations on thissubject have added to the complexity of the Palestine prob-lem." The cornerstone of the new Soviet position followedby the Communist parties was that Jewish immigration toPalestine must be dependent upon Arab consent.

The British Communist Party in its memorandum to theAnglo-American Committee of Inquiry demanded immediateindependence for Palestine, which meant in essence an Arabstate condemning the Jews to a permanent minority.

Difficulties Facing the UNSCOP

On May 26, 1947 the Special Committee of Inquiry intoPalestine began its preparations to study the challengingproblem of Palestine in what Trygve Lie hoped would be aspirit "impartial but not detached, objective but deeplycomprehensive." Eleven members of the committee and theiralternates, representatives of eleven sovereign nations, wereexpected to doff the mantle of national interest during theirdeliberations. The election of the Swedish representative,Emil Sandstroem, was an auspicious beginning, for it osten-sibly transcended the obstacles that were implicit in choosinga chairman from nations already predisposed to a givensolution. Potential eastern and western alignments alreadyexisted with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and Australiaand Canada, respectively. A third partisan grouping con-


sisted of the two Moslem nations, India and Iran, whosepro-Arab leanings were barely concealed. Thus only five ofthe eleven were left more or less unattached, though no suchtruly political vacuum exists.

Attendant difficulties in addition to the above intrinsicobstacles confronted the Committee because of the aggravatedinternal situation in Palestine as reflected in the following:1) England's continued deportation of Jewish immigrantsarriving in Palestine over and above the established Britishquota of 1,500, culminating in the deportation of the 4,500Jews aboard the Exodus, and her request on May 23 that UNmembers "prevent the transit to their territory and thedeparture from their ports, of Jews attempting to enter Pales-tine illegally." 2) the continued struggle of the Irgun againstthe British administration that was climaxed with the execu-tion of the three Irgunists, provoking further outbreaks andadding to an already charged atmosphere. 3) the avowedand subsequently fulfilled intentions of the Palestine ArabHigher Committee to boycott the hearings because it was ofthe opinion that "inquiry into the Palestine problem hasalready reached the point of saturation." Jamal El Husseini,vice-president of the Arab Committee, contended that Arabrefusal to cooperate stemmed from the following reasons:a) termination of the British Mandate and independence forPalestine were not in the terms of reference, b) the InquiryCommittee was empowered to include the problem of theJewish displaced persons in Europe.1 c) the interest of theinhabitants of Palestine had been by-passed by the Assemblyresolution which spoke of the world religious interest in theHoly Land. The interests of the three great religions werecharacterized as a prelude to further foreign interferenceleading to the set-up of a trusteeship.

Jewish Testimony Before the UNSCOP

While the Palestine Arabs prepared to boycott the InquiryCommittee the Jewish Agenc*y prepared to present its case.Considerable confusion prevailed in Zionist circles becauseBen-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, upon


returning to Jerusalem, expressed the following opinion onMay 21: "We must not ignore realities. The United Nationswill not acquiesce in turning the whole of Palestine into aJewish state now, and there will perhaps be a need to leavea part of the country under the mandate and a second part—where the Jews are settled as well as the barren area—becomea Jewish state." He noted that a Jewish state in all of Palestinewould always be the main objective of Zionism, but wasunattainable at this time.

Thus there flared anew the latent struggle between theovert advocates of partition in the Jewish Agency, and thosewho would conceivably accept partition only if it is presentedby a third party, if at all. These "unofficial" views were notrepeated so unreservedly in later testimony before the Com-mission because of a desire to prevent an open rift in theAgency which was technically bound to abide by the decisiontaken by the World Zionist Congress last December, whichasked for a state without specifying its extent. Thus whentestifying on July 7 before the Special Committee, Ben-Gurionstated that the Jewish Agency demands that the UnitedNations confirm the Zionist claim to all Palestine as a Jewishstate, and that if it approve the Jewish Agency's plan for theimmigration of one million Jews and the development of thecountry to accommodate them and to raise the Arab standardof life. In the interim Ben-Gurion proposed that the UnitedNations should supervise and to a certain extent administerthe country. He failed to indicate however, how UN super-vision would differ from UN trusteeship, which he expresslyopposed.

Although Ben-Gurion advanced the maximalist claim toPalestine he by-passed these claims when, in answer to whetheror not he would consider a compromise, he replied as follows:"In London we told the British government that we wereready to consider a viable Jewish state in an adequate areaof Palestine. We will stand by that attitude of last year."When asked to state the Agency's position on Weizmann'sproposed solution of partition,^ Ben-Gurion remarked "thatpartition in an adequate area of Palestine was acceptable asa basis for discussion."


The coalition decision of the World Zionist Congress toavoid a stand on partition was further circumvented by theappearance as a witness of D. Remez, chairman of the VaadLeumi of Palestine. He stated that the Vaad Leumi associateditself with the Jewish Agency's political program but was alsoready to negotiate for the establishment of a Jewish state in aviable adequate area of Palestine as a compromise.

Fearing that partition through innuendo would not besufficient, the pro-partitionists maneuvered an invitation forDr. Weizmann who was not bound by any official formulae.Dr. Weizmann openly espoused partition and as to the extentof the state observed that a partitioned Jewish state must bebig enough to absorb 1,500,000 people within a reasonabletime. Such a state could be achieved if to a somewhat im-proved Peel line was added the Southern Palestinian desert,usually called the Negev.

Dr. Weizmann favored partition over both the Morrisonand Bevin federal plans. He declared that they would excludeJewish settlement from the greater part of the mandatory areawithout even assuring the Jews complete freedom in the smallarea remaining. Moreover, the Arabs would be free to excludeJews from their large province while the Jews would not befree to admit immigrants to their minute province. TheJewish areas in both schemes are so inadequate that evensovereignty would not make them acceptable. The lack offinality in both plans also troubled Dr. Weizmann. Sincefederalism, he declared, does not offer complete independence,both Jews and Arabs would still be dependent on a thirdparty, whether British or international. A further gravedisability would be that federalism does not offer the Jews aplace in the United Nations. Partition implies a politicalseparation and leaves economic cooperation to a process ofevolution. It is perfectly feasible to reconcile separate sover-eignty with unified services in fields of mutual interest. Thereis little doubt that the cards were stacked in favor of partitionfor the maximalist case was really presented with tongue incheek. The case presented by Dr. Silver before the specialsession of the General Assembly, was not repeated for thebenefit of the UNSCOP. Silver no longer aspired towards


the immediate realization of the Biltmore Declaration becausehe realized that the presence of a Jewish minority at the pres-ent time militated against such realization. He retreated tothe position of seeking a postponement of the ultimate until aJewish majority is obtained in all of Palestine. In this waypartition could be obviated and yet the demand for a Jewishstate in all of Palestine could be retained.

A plan along these lines had been proposed by Dr. Sneh, amember of the Jewish Agency Executive. He has proposedcontinued Jewish immigration, and unpartitioned Palestine,equal representation of Jews and Arabs on a temporarygovernment guaranteed by the United Nations. This proposalprovides for cooperation with the UN as a decisive politicalfactor in contrast to Zionist official schemes, all of which leaneither towards Britain or Britain plus America. In actualitywhat is being proposed is a continuation of the Mandate andits liberalization with respect to immigration, and some formof bi-nationalism. Its major intent is to avoid partition andto concentrate upon creating a Jewish majority in Palestine.This is very much in line with the political direction ofDr. Silver.

The exponents of bi-nationalism likewise had their oppor-tunity to speak when Judah L. Magnes presented his views onbehalf of the Ihud Association. He again proposed politicalparity as a solution whereby Palestine is to be a countrycomposed of two equal nationalities where each is to haveequal political power regardless of which is the majority. Asto immigration, Dr. Magnes proposed Jewish immigration upto numerical parity with the Arabs, but failed to explain howsuch numerical parity could be permanently maintained. Healso advanced the need for a transitional period of trusteeshipunder the United Nations with Great Britain as trustee. Inthe interim, while the Mandate is operative, an equal numberof Jews and Arabs should be appointed to the ExecutiveCouncil, to the Secretariat as heads of non-controversialgovernment departments. The Hashomer Hatzair, also advo-cates of bi-nationalism, were critical of Magnes' acceptance ofBritain as a trustee, proposing instead a three powered trustee-ship on the grounds that Palestine under Britain, would of


necessity be included in her international power politics.Official Agency criticism of the Magnes program of bi-nationalism was based on the following points: l) the absenceof equal effort towards accord on the Arab side. 2) a statecannot be divided in its own purpose—it is either the mainobjective of the state to absorb immigrants in an expandedeconomy; or it is not. In Magnes' state this would be theaspiration of one half and the apprehension of the other. AJewish veto could thus do nothing to the Arabs, whereas anArab veto could prevent a Jewish majority.

Among ostensible advocates of bi-nationalism have beenthe Communist Party groups of Palestine. Mr. Mikunisrepresenting the Palestine Communist Party, in objecting toDr. Magnes' conception of parity, envisaged an independentunitary state with political safeguards. Palestine would be astate with two Houses: first, a House of Representativeselected democratically on the basis of proportionate repre-sentation, and a House of the people elected democraticallyon a regional basis, and composed of fifty per cent Jews andfifty per cent Arabs. E. Preminger, member of the CentralCommittee of the Palestine Communist Union, in testifyingon July 17th, came out for the creation of an independentdemocratic united state, common to both Jews and Arabs,built on full national and political equality for both its nationsand on full democratic rights for all its inhabitants. Nationaland political equality are too often mistakenly equated withpolitical parity.

On the basic issue of Jewish immigration into Palestine,the Communists stated that the number of Jews to be admittedto Palestine could be settled by the country's own government,once Palestine was declared independent. They evaded ques-tions about the seeming unwillingness of Palestine's Arabmajority to admit even one more Jew to the country. Theyby-passed the question of Jewish immigration by falling backupon the general principle that the United Nations shouldprovide facilities for displaced Jews desirous to return to theircountries of origin where democratic regimes have beenestablished, as well as those interested in emigration to othercountries including Palestine.


Arab Testimony Before the UNSCOP

Testimony of the members of the Arab League was held inBeirut, Lebanon, on July 21. The refrain was the same. Inbrief, the Arab case was that the Arabs had never accepted theBalfour Declaration favoring a Jewish national home in Pales-tine, that they did not now accept it and that they felt fullyjustified in resisting any further attempts to impose it on them.The theme of aggression and resistance by violence to a Zioniststate was constantly reiterated. The Arab statement read asfollows: "The Arabs cannot be blamed if they should rise asone man to defend their natural rights to repel aggression anddo their duty for future generations."

Transjordan's absence from the Lebanon hearings andrequest that the UNSCOP come to Trans-Jordan led to abelief that that country might submit a separate proposaladvocating partition. This was based on the general beliefthat Trans-Jordan in seeking a greater Syria, might concedea Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine, whereby the Arabsection of Palestine would be annexed to Trans-Jordan. Sucha possibility had actually been suggested by the Jewish Agencyplan submitted last August on the partition of Palestine. Thisexpected independent line did not materialize, however, forthe Premier of Trans-Jordan, Samir Pasha el Rifai declaredthat both the Jewish and Palestine problems could be solvedby the settlement of European Jewish displaced persons inother countries.

The UNSCOP Report

As the American Jewish Year Book was about to go to press,the proposed solution of the UNSCOP was released. Becauseof this only a bare summary of the plan is possible.

The majority report, signed by representatives of Canada,Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Swedenand Uruguay, proposed partition of Palestine into Jewish andArab states respectively following a transitional period thatwas to end on September 1, 1949. Great Britain was to retain


the mandate subject to UN supervision, during which timeit was to permit the immigration of 150,000 Jews into theJewish area. If independence did not ensue following thetransitional period, immigration was to continue at the rateof 60,000 a year.

To obviate the general criticism that partition would createtwo economically unviable states, the Report posits the estab-lishment of an economic union to deal with a customs union,common currency and the operation of communications andtransportation services. Thus the plan reconciles separatesovereignty with unified services in fields of mutual interest.

The boundaries were drawn up to coincide as much aspossible with the present distribution of the Jewish and Arabpopulations, with the exception of the port of Jaffa which isabout 90 per cent Arab and adjoins Tel Aviv. The Jewishstate would include eastern Galilee, the Esdraelon plain, mostof the coastal plain and the entire Beer-Sheba district. Thisincludes the Negeb, the sparsely populated desert area in thesouth. The Arab area would include western Galilee, the hillcountry of Sumaria and Judea (excluding the Jerusalem area),and a narrow strip of the coast in the south from Isdud to theEgyptian frontier.

The territory proposed for the Jewish state closely approxi-mates that requested by the Jewish Agency except for thehills of western Galilee which it sought in order to have alarger contiguous boundary with Christian Lebanon. Theinclusion of the Negeb was especially welcome because of thelarge number of Jews that may be settled therein once thereclamation projects are put into effect. The Negeb's 4,500square miles are almost half of the whole area of 10,000 squaremiles comprising Palestine.

It is estimated that in the recommended Jewish state therewould be 500,000 Jews and 416,000 Arabs, but this ratio wouldbe considerably changed in a short time if 150,000 Jews wereto be admitted into Palestine by September 1, 1949. Afterthat date there would not be any limitations to Jewish immi-gration except as dictated by the proposed sovereign Jewishstate. The Arab state is estimated at 715,000 Arabs and 8,000Jews.


The Report likewise proposed the internationalization ofJerusalem and the integration of its economy with that of thetwo states through the proposed joint economic union. Thus,100,000 Jews and 106,000 Arabs are removed from the physi-cal orbit of either state, except that provision is made for theresidents of Jerusalem to opt for citizenship of either state.One may assume that the option will proceed along ethniclines except that one may expect deviations if the economicand political advantages of citizenship in one state are greaterthan those in the other. It is not unlikely, therefore, that manyof Jerusalem's Arabs will seek citizenship in the Jewishstate.

The minority federation plan supported by India, Iran andYugoslavia calls for the creation of an independent federalstate of Palestine following a transitional period not exceedingthree years, during which responsibility for administeringPalestine and preparing it for independence shall be entrustedto an authority to be decided by the General Assembly. Afederal legislature is to be established, composed of a lowerHouse elected on a racial parity basis, and another Houseelected on a proportionate basis.

An international commission composed of three Arab, threeJewish and three United Nation representatives would beappointed to estimate the absorptive capacity of the Jewishstate to determine the extent of Jewish immigration. Thusno provision is made for immediate Jewish immigration, as inthe majority report.

The major territorial difference between the two plans isthat the Arabs would get a much larger share of the coastalarea and part of the Beer-Sheba sub-district.

Besides the constitutional and territorial differences in thetwo plans, one must recognize the political implications.Germane to the minority report is the proposal that theadministering authority should be decided upon by theGeneral Assembly. Common to both reports, however, wasthe recognition of the case for a Jewish homeland.

The Arabs naturally reacted negatively to both proposals.The first official Zionist reaction was expressed in a resolution


adopted by the Zionist General Council, meeting in Zurichon September 3, 1947, which read in part as follows: "TheCouncil notes with satisfaction that a substantial majorityof the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recom-mended the early establishment of a sovereign Jewish state.The territory proposed is a minor part of the territory origi-nally promised the Jewish people on the basis of its historicrights . . . . There are other features of the proposal whichrequire careful examination." The Council found the federa-tion plan "wholly unacceptable." Advocates of bi-nationalismvoiced their disapproval of the partition report. The reactionsof other Jewish organizations are not available as this is beingwritten.

GREAT POWER INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

That Great Britain has been thinking of Palestine in connec-tion with its strategy in the Middle East has long been evident.During the war the British military staffs responsible for futureplanning began to create an over-all plan for Middle Eastdefense. The program contemplated partial, if not complete,withdrawal from Egypt and shifting the strategic center toTransjordan and Palestine. It has been questioned whetherthe British Government can afford to gamble on quittingEgypt if the Holy Land is not available as the principal basefor guarding the Suez Canal and serving as a pipeline fromthe oil fields of Iraq and Iran.

Besides its inherent usefulness Palestine also is integral to theuse of Transjordan which is slated to be an important Britishbase. Under the terms of the treaty concluded in 1946 betweenTransjordan and Great Britain, the latter has almost unlimitedrights to use Transjordan as a military center in case ofnecessity. However, access to Transjordan depends largely onPalestine, for Transjordan's only port, Aqaba, is inferior toHaifa.

Palestine also is vital to Great Britain for its oil. One branchof the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline terminates inHaifa. The British are not inclined to entrust the safety of


vital pipelines to another great power or to young and unstablegovernments.

These considerations tend to negate the belief that GreatBritain's withdrawal from Greece and Turkey portended acomplete retreat from the Middle East which would leave theUnited States in command. At most, it means that GreatBritain is calling upon the United States to act jointly in theMiddle East vis-a-vis Russia. Ernest Bevin made this clear ina speech on May 28, 1947, when he frankly stressed the impor-tance of oil for the standard of living of every Briton. Heconcluded, "We cannot afford to lose our position in theMiddle East."

Role of the Arab League

The Arab League has become pivotal in the resolution ofthe British-Russian struggle for the Middle East. Repeatedstatements about the illusory nature of the League have beendisproved and prophecies about its imminent dissolution havenot materialized. As a matter of fact, being wooed by GreatBritain and the Soviet Union has enhanced the League'simportance. This trend was foreshadowed by the entrance ofthe Arab bloc of six powers into the United Nations. In thisconnection, Azzam Pasha, General Secretary of the ArabLeague, declared that "at San Francisco, in London and NewYork the votes of the Arab League were eagerly sought by therival Big Powers. This was proof enough of the new status ofthe Arab countries."

At the United Nations sessions in London, the Russiandelegation was vociferous in demanding withdrawal of Frenchand British troops from Syria. Aided by Russian influence,the Arab League bloc prevented Turkey from obtaining chair-manship of committees and was instrumental in keepingTurkey and Iran out of both the Economic and Social Counciland the Security Council.

More specifically with respect to Palestine, it should benoted that the Arab League succeeded in having Iraq elected


to the Trusteeship Council and participated as a unit at theSeptember and January London Conferences on Palestine.The action of the Arab League at these deliberations was asmuch an indication of a desire to effect an agreement onPalestine as to prevent Russia from taking an influential rolein the situation, for these feudal countries fear Communistinroads which may upset their existing social and economicstructure.

The major unifying factor in the Arab League has been theissue of Palestine. At a conference in Bludan, Syria in June1946 a Permanent Committee for the Boycott of Zionist Goodswas set up and has since been in operation. In addition, thePalestine Arab Higher Executive Committee is now whollyfinanced by Arab League grants. Despite this close cooper-ation between the Palestine Arab Higher Executive Com-mittee and the Arab League, the latter did not succeed ininducing the Palestine Arabs to attend the London Conferencein September because Grand Mufti Haj Amen El Husseinihad been barred as a member of their delegation.

The Palestine Arab boycott of the conference was reputedlybased on the fear that the League might be amenable tocompromise despite the unyielding attitude indicated by theplan presented to the British. These suspicions on the part ofthe Palestine Arabs were grounded in the fear that in orderto obtain greater concessions from Great Britain with respectto evacuation of its troops from Egypt, the latter might accedeto some form of partition proposed by the British.

At the September session of the United Nations Assembly,the Arab bloc sought to bring the subject of Palestine into thedeliberations through indirection. Resolutions of a seeminglyinnocuous nature were introduced to serve as a basis forexcluding further Jewish immigration into Palestine. Althoughmost of the innocently worded resolutions were defeated,Egypt finally succeeded in introducing an amendment intothe International Refugee Organization Constitution whichrequires guarding against the resettlement of refugees anddisplaced persons in territories against the wishes of the nativepopulation.


Oil Interests in the Middle East

Although Great Britain hopes to gain American support inorder to meet Russian expansion, it has not been unmindfulthat the United States has an exclusive franchise to perhapsthe richest oil reserves in the world in the Middle East. Inthe Palestine debate Great Britain sought to embarrass theUnited States in these oil lands by describing the historicAmerican interest in Palestine as a bid for votes in Congres-sional elections.

Actually, the oil interests of all the Big Three powersimpinge upon each other. Great Britain, first to stake claimsin the Middle East, has exclusive rights to rich concessions inSouthern Iran and holds major shares of the fields in Iraq.The Soviet Union has exclusive rights in northern Iran whereit is believed large petroleum fields exist. An extensive Russianmission, including economists and geologists, reportedly waspreparing to make an investigation of the mineral wealth inthe Middle East. It also is believed that considerable oildeposits exist in Yemen.

The United States moved into the Middle East relativelyrecently and now has extensive holdings in Saudi Arabia,Bahrein and Ethiopia. In The New York Times of November28, 1946, C. L. Sulzberger reported that "American oil townsare now materializing along the baking east coast of medievalSaudi Arabia and inland amid the shifting sand dunes aspossibly the greatest petroleum boom in history takes shapealong hitherto little explored regions on the Persian Gulf."

It since has been reported that two big oil deals wereconsummated under which American companies would ex-ploit more thoroughly the vast oil interests of the Middle East.It was disclosed that the Arabian-American Oil Company,with exclusive rights to the Saudi Arabian fields, would sellabout thirty per cent of its holdings to the Standard OilCompany of New Jersey and ten per cent to the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company.

A second agreement also was reported; according to this,Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum agreed inprinciple with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd. to purchase


substantial quantities of crude oil from the British companywhich operates in Iran.

With respect to the possible effect of American oil interestsin Palestine, the following paragraph in the aforementionedSulzberger article should be noted:

They say that although King Ibn Saud has been irritatedwith the question, the King told one "Aramco" executivethat rumors he might withdraw the oil concession becauseof American support of the Zionists were "hot wind."

Ibn Saud's denial is less important than the fact that theAmerican oil interests would look unfavorably on a policy suchas that reflected in President Truman's strongly worded letterto Ibn Saud in October 1946 which has antagonized the Arabworld.

THE WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS

With the eleven-nation sub-committee about to explore allaspects of the Palestine problem, the Jewish Agency was seenas compelled to define a long-range political aim. Statementsto the United Nations in April by Abba Hillel Silver andDavid Ben-Gurion were ambiguous for they could be inter-preted as favoring a Jewish state in all of Palestine when aJewish majority evolves, or they could be construed as approv-ing partition. Their utterances were typical of the constantpostponement and evasion of the question of ultimate politicalform. This was particularly true during the last World ZionistCongress when a radical change in leadership took placewithout, however, making any substantial decisions. Thisbecomes clear from a review of the activities of the Congress.

Composed of 375 delegates, the World Zionist Congress metin Basle, Switzerland on December 9, 1946 for the first timesince 1939. The Congress was confronted with two majorproblems: participation in the Conference on Palestine calledby Great Britain and election of the future leadership of theZionist movement. The latter problem was virtually decidedwhen the Congress, by a vote of 171 to 154, rejected partici-pation in the Conference "under present circumstances." This


was generally interpreted as a vote of no confidence in Dr.Chaim Weizmann's leadership and as a desire to manifestgreater resistance to British policies.

Struggle for Leadership and Control

The inability to replace Dr. Weizmann as President of theWorld Zionist Congress resulted in a coalition executivecomposed of eight General Zionists, seven Labor Zionists andfour Mizrachi. The establishment of a coalition executive andthe qualified refusal to participate in the Conference indicatedthe inability of any single group to dominate the Congress.

This unprecedented failure of a World Zionist Congress toelect a president may be explained by a number of complexand interrelated factors. Throughout the Congress the person-ality and policies of Chaim Weizmann were the paramountissues. It is likely that his leadership would have been chal-lenged long before, had a Congress been able to convene. Dr.Weizmann was never considered an enthusiastic exponent ofthe Biltmore program, which has been the corner stone ofAmerican Zionist policy as represented by the Abba HillelSilver's Zionist Organization of America since 1942.

The latest controversy came to the fore when the JewishAgency proposed in August, 1946 to participate in the Sep-tember Conference called by Great Britain, if the establish-ment of a viable Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestinewere the purpose of the discussion. Dr. Silver succeeded inobtaining an implied censure of this policy at the conventionof the Zionist Organization of America which again endorsedthe Biltmore program, though the resolution did not close thedoor to partition.

Thus the ZOA delegation came to Basle prepared tochallenge the policy of the Agency, Weizmann's personalleadership and to vie with the Palestinian Labor leaders forcontrol of the World Zionist Organization and the JewishAgency. The American Zionists under Dr. Silver had longbeen contending that because of the importance of the UnitedStates and because the American Jewish community is the


largest in the world, it should be given commensurate influencein dictating Zionist policies. It was also felt by Silver'sfollowers that Weizmann's pro-British orientation had im-peded the realization of the Biltmore program. Dr. Silver hadlong maintained that pressure should be brought upon GreatBritain through American channels and that this could bedone properly only by American Zionists. Internecine conflictin United States Zionist circles had been rife ever since theJewish Agency established an office in Washington under Dr.Nahum Goldmann during the war—for Goldmann actedindependently of the American Zionist Emergency Council,the highest Zionist authority in the United States. TheAmerican Zionists gained their objective when it was decidedat the Congress that Dr. Silver would be chairman of theWashington office, though Moshe Shertok of the PalestineLabor group will be stationed there.

To counterbalance the likely change in emphasis that wouldresult from Dr. Silver's control of Zionist politics on theAmerican scene, the Agency office in London was placedunder the influence of individuals who believed that Englandcan be prevailed upon to make concessions in the direction ofboth interim immigration and partition. The Palestine Laborparty retained control of the Palestine office.

Trusteeship and Partition

It should be noted that the World Zionist Congress passeda resolution rejecting "any new Trusteeship over Palestinesuperseding the protest Mandate by which the establishmentof the Jewish State would be prevented or postponed."

On March 31, 1947, David Ben-Gurion explained theAgency's fear of international trusteeship on the ground thatGreat Britain wanted Palestine to assume the status of aninternational trusteeship under which the obligations of themandate would no longer apply and under which the Jewswould remain a minority group. In his opinion, internationaltrusteeship would be but a euphemism for turning Palestineinto a second Malta.


This negative attitude on trusteeship has not crystallizedinto a formal policy. On April 27, 1947, Dr. Silver and Mr.Shertok stated in a press interview that the Agency wouldwelcome United Nations trusteeship over Palestine if it wereeffectively enforced and if rights granted to the Jews by theLeague of Nations were guaranteed. If, for example, it shouldbe recommended that Palestine be placed under the UnitedNations, it would be up to Great Britain to submit a trusteeshipagreement which would have to be approved by a two-thirdsvote of the Assembly and presumably would also require theacquiescence of the Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

The Russian espousal of a bi-national state somewhatstrengthened the Hashomer Hatzair which has only 20 dele-gates of the 171 in the Jewish National Assembly of Palestine.They continued to seek Dr. Weizmann's return to the Zionistleadership and in this they have been supported by the AliyahChadashah (New Settler) party which also holds 20 seats inthe Assembly and which seeks Weizmann's recall.

Ths issue of partition has been paramount since the lastWorld Zionist Congress. It has been evident, however, thatdespite failing to take a definitive stand on partition and evenpreventing its being proposed as a solution, the pro-parti-tionists in the Agency have had the upper hand and haveacted accordingly despite all protestations. To date, there hasbeen an informal acceptance of partition.

It may perhaps be paradoxical but is nevertheless true thatthe advocates of a Jewish state in all of Palestine are nowprepared to retreat and have adopted a long range position.Seeing that it is well nigh impossible to attain a Jewish state inall of Palestine without a Jewish majority, they have fallenback on an interim solution based solely on further Jewishimmigration. Thus the extremists became the moderates byshunting political ultimates to a side.

The pro-partitionists have been bolstered in their stand bythe positions taken by the non-Zionist bodies such as theAmerican Jewish Committee and the Anglo-Jewish Associa-tion. In August 1946, Judge Proskauer, President of the Amer-ican Jewish Committee, endorsed the Jewish Agency plansubmitted to the State Department by Nahum Goldmann.


The Anglo-Jewish Association has likewise indicated its accept-ance of partition as desirable or opposed to either the Morrisonor Bevin plan.

Composition of Jewish Agency Executive

Knowledge of the stand taken by these organizations thatapproximate the opinion of the majority on the present agencyExecutive, and British challenge that the Agency is withoutnon-Zionist representation, has led to a reconsideration of thecomposition of the Agency Executive. On March 23, 1947the Executive of the Jewish Agency adopted the followingresolution:

The Executive considered changes which have come in thecomposition of the extended Jewish Agency as a sequel tothe destruction of European Jewry and other alterationswhich have occurred over the years, and decided to examinethe changes which are necessary to introduce into theConstitution of the Agency so as to adjust it to new realities.The conclusions from this examination will be submitted tothe Zionist General Council's session.

The changes necessary for "adjustment to its new realities"had already taken place with the increase in the number ofAmerican Zionist members in the Agency Executive in August1945. This trend was further strengthened during the BasleCongress. The previous Agency Executive did not have anAmerican Zionist on the Executive except for Louis Lipskywho had only an advisory vote.

The rectification of the existing omission of non-Zionists inthe "enlarged" Jewish Agency which according to its Consti-tution should contain equal representation of Zionists and non-Zionists, had not taken place in the Spring of 1947, thoughpreliminary meetings have been held. It should be noted thatthough the non-Zionists have in the past represented onlyindividuals, the meetings that took place in April were con-ducted organizationally with the non-Zionists being repre-sented by the Agudas Israel and the American JewishCommittee. Also participating were the American Jewish


Conference and the World Jewish Congress, organizations thatcan not be considered non-Zionist in ideology, and this mayprove to be an obstacle in the way of reconstitution. TheAmerican Jewish Committee may be said to represent at suchmeetings the interests of other non-Zionist bodies such as theAnglo-Jewish Association of Great Britain and the AllianceIsraelite Universelle of France.

-2. DISPLACED PERSONS-

By Philip S. Bernstein—

THE NAZI WAR not only destroyed 6,000,000 European Jews,their homes and communities, but also left a tragic aftermathof homelessness and hatred. It is estimated that some 30,000Jews were found alive in the concentration camps by theliberating Allied armies. They had neither the strength northe will to return to the lands where they had lost every-thing.

Repatriates from Russia

A much larger group, who later became the bulk of thedisplaced Jews, were those who had been repatriated fromRussia. These people had fled from Poland before the ad-vancing German armies, found temporary haven in the Balticcountries and in White Russia and, subsequently, were sent towork in the interior of Russia—middle Asia, Siberia, etc. Inthe fall of 1945 and in the spring of 1946, all who could provePolish citizenship were given the choice of remaining inRussia or of returning to Poland. Nearly all of them, approx-imately 150,000 persons, elected to return to Poland. Theyhoped to find their families, their possessions and a new freeway of life. Instead, they discovered that their loved ones hadbeen exterminated, their property demolished or confiscated,

DISPLACED PERSONS 521

and their hopes blasted by pogroms. The latter culminated inthe Kielce pogrom of July 4, 1946, in which forty-two Jewswere murdered outright by Polish men, women and children,with the apparent approval of the entire community. Disap-pointment and fear pushed 130,000 Polish Jews toward havenin the U. S. Zones of Germany and Austria. In the spring andsummer of 1946, they were moved also by the hope, stimulatedby the recommendation of the Anglo-American Commissionto admit 100,000 displaced persons into Palestine, that Ger-many would be the staging area for their emigration to theirultimate desired goals.

Still another group of Jews, stirred by similar, though notso desperate, motivation, infiltrated from other east Europeancountries, notably Hungary and Rumania. These, together,never constituted more than 15 per cent of the infiltration.

Policies of Occupation Authorities

In the U. S. Zones the basic policy for the reception andcare of displaced persons was formulated by General DwightD. Eisenhower. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Expe-ditionary Forces, he announced that "The liberation, careand repatriation of United Nations displaced persons is amajor Allied objective," and enjoined the use of all availableresources at the disposal of the military commanders to accom-plish this aim.

This policy was maintained by his successor, General JosephT. McNarney. Facing the onrushing, irresistible flood ofrefugees pouring across the Polish border, through Czecho-slovakia, into Austria and Germany, he ordered his armies toadmit them and to take care of them.

In the British Zones the refugee Jews received different andinferior treatment. They were denied DP status and treatedlike the Germans. Energetic efforts were made to preventtheir admittance; on the other hand, they were not discour-aged from migrating from the British to the U. S. Zones. Asa result, the British never had more than 10 per cent of thetotal Jewish DP population of the U. S. Zones.


Only a handful of Jews found haven in the French Zones,where their food and care were reported to be inadequate.

The Russians were alleged to have denied the existence ofa separate Jewish DP group. Very few Jews remained in theRussian Zones. They were not anti-Soviet but preferred not tobe under Russian control.

The great flow of east European Jews was reduced to atrickle in the fall of 1946. As contrasted with 3,900 whocrossed the Polish-Czechoslovakian border in one night inAugust of that year, the winter months saw practically nomovement. Nor was there any substantial movement inprospect when, on April 21, 1947, General Lucius D. Clay,Commander in Chief of the European Command, issued anorder denying DP care to any further infiltrees. This orderdid not close the borders of the U. S. Zones to infiltrees, butclosed the camps to them. Henceforth, they were dependentfor sustenance on the indigenous economy and on the help ofJewish voluntary agencies.

At this point the population of displaced Jews becamestable. On June 1, 1947, there were 156,646 Jewish displacedpersons in U. S. Zone, Germany, of whom 123,778 lived incamps. In U. S. Zone, Austria, according to official reports,there were 27,456. The British Zones in Germany and Austriacontained about 16,000; the French Zones about 2,000. Therewere reported to be about 25,000 Jewish displaced persons inItaly.

Although there was no compulsion to live in camps, approx-imately 80 per cent of the Jews preferred to do so because ofbetter care and greater security. At the time of stabilization,Jews constituted approximately one-quarter of the total DPpopulation; the other large groups consisted chiefly of Polesand Baits.

The United States Army recognized a special responsibilitytoward the Jews because of their special suffering. This wasdue, both to the basic traditions' and policy of the UnitedStates toward victims of persecution and to the criticism oftheir early treatment by President Truman's special emissary,Mr. Earl Harrison. Jews were given the following advantagesover other DP's, some of whom were alleged to have collabo-


rated with the Nazis: They were automatically granted DPstatus and exempted from the screening imposed on others;their basic ration of 2,200 calories was higher than the basicration of the non-Jews, 2,000; German police were not per-mitted to enter Jewish camps for the purpose of makingarrests; no raids could be made on Jewish camps, except withtop level approval; the trials of Jewish offenders were orderedto be expedited; those convicted were exempt from servingtheir sentences in German jails and were not subject to com-pulsory repatriation; there was a special Adviser on JewishAffairs at the Headquarters of the Theater Commander, atfirst Judge Simon H. Rifkind and, subsequently, Rabbi PhilipS. Bernstein of Rochester, New York; on September 7, 1946,General McNarney gave official recognition to the CentralCommittee of Liberated Jews, their democratically electedrepresentative organization; the Jews were exempted from therepatriation pressures designed to induce other DP's to returnto their native lands.

By the spring of 1947, the Jews were settled in the followinginstallations:

Hospitals & Sanatoriums

Number ofInstallations

6339

1391448

303

Population(in 1000)

1033.6

43.74.13.5

157.9

Population (in% of total)

67.0%2.5%

25.3%2.8%2.4%

100.0%

Agency Services

Recognizing the need for camp administration by an inter-national civilian body, arrangements were made for the UnitedNations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to assumethis function. At the height of its program, UNRRA had some4,000 persons in Germany alone, administering its DP activi-ties. Its staff was truly international and, in many instances,Jews encountered profound sympathy in the non-Jewish per-sonnel. The Army gave food, clothing and shelter; UNRRAprovided administration and some amenities.


The need for supplementary services by Jewish voluntaryagencies was recognized not only by American Jewry, whichcontributed the largest sums in the history of philanthropy,but also by the Army and UNRRA. The American JointDistribution Committee steadily built up a program of useful-ness, providing supplementary food and clothing, amenitiesand medicaments, educational and religious equipment, aswell as immigration and other services. The Jewish Agency forPalestine not only participated in activities designed to prepareJews for migration to Palestine, including the establishment ofHachsharoth, but assumed responsibility for instruction in thecamps. The children were given a Zionist orientation, whichreflected the outlook and the wish of the camp communities.The Hebrew Immigration Aid Society offered various immi-gration services. The world ORT Union conducted occupa-tional training schools. The Vaad Hatzala devoted itself to therehabilitation of orthodox Jewish life among the displacedpersons and assisted a number of orthodox rabbis in migratingto the States. The Jewish chaplains in the United StatesArmy, who rendered yeoman service in the early days ofliberation, continued to render special, though more limited,services, as the time passed.

The Central Committee of Liberated Jews, founded throughthe initiative of Chaplain Abraham J. Klausner on June 15,1945, became a highly organized institution, prepared to takeover most of the functions and services to the DP's. The AJDCtransferred to this body many of its functional responsibilities.

Health Conditions of DP's

When liberated from concentration camps, the Jews weresociologically abnormal. All the older people and all thechildren had been exterminated. The intellectuals, the profes-sional people, the leadership, the sick, the weak, had perished.Chiefly those survived whose labor or skill was useful to theircaptors. The handful of survivors found that their familieshad been destroyed.

In due course the Jewish will to live asserted itself. Mar-riages abounded. The birthrate was higher than in any other


Jewish community. Despite lack of privacy and normalcy,illegitimate births were rare. In lands where venereal diseasehad become almost ubiquitous among the military and civilianpopulations, it was negligible among the Jews.

Their health steadily improved. Flesh was put on wastedfigures. The camps were justly proud of the prowess of theirathletic teams. The children, especially those born in thecamps, were normal, healthy specimens. In the dreadfulwinter of 1946-47, there were no epidemics, no deaths fromhunger or cold—a tribute both to their own reserves of healthand to the care given them by the United States Army.

It should be added that the normalization was partly dueto the infiltration of large numbers of repatriated Polish Jews.For the most part, these people had fled to Russia as familygroups. They escaped Nazi extermination and degradation.Their old people and children, their rabbis and leaders,survived. They worked very hard in Russia, enduring manyprivations, but emerged in reasonably good health. Thus,they transplanted to Germany the sociological structure of aPolish Jewish community.

Age and Occupational Structure

The age distribution of the Jewish DP population in as-sembly centers, as of February 1, 1947, follows:

Age Group

Under 1

1-5

6-17

Total, 0-17

18-44

Total

Total

Total, 18 and over

GRAND TOTAL

Number and Sex

6,610

5,386

16,099

—

54,639 (men)42,041 (women)

6,776 (men)5,486 (women)

—

—

Totals

—

—

—

28,095

98,680

12,262

110,942

139,037


The Jews who were rescued from the concentration campswere not strong enough to work, nor did they have the willto do so. Under the Nazis, work meant slavery and, ulti-mately, death. In Germany they were unwilling to upbuildthe economy of the nation that had despoiled them. Boththeir physical disability and their attitude found sympathyamong the Americans, and no special effort was made toinduce or compel them to work. But, as time passed, and,particularly, with the influx of the repatriated Polish Jews, thesituation changed. They took over all the functions of thecamps. They became its teachers, nurses, cooks, policemen,garbage collectors, shoemakers, etc. Work projects were estab-lished in a number of camps which produced clothing, shoes,utensils, toys, etc. By the summer of 1947, it was evident inmost camps that about one-third of the population were work-ing, which constituted over one-half of the employables. Con-siderable numbers were enrolled in occupational trainingschools. A study of the Jewish DP's employed at their primaryskills revealed the following information: :

OCCUPATION MEN WOMEN

Accountants 984 639Business Executives 988 224Salesmen 977 298Farmers .1 . . , . . . . / 1102 325Nurses 540Auto Mechanics 567Drivers 1035Butchers 1074Bakers 814Domestics 1660Locksmiths 1367Shoemakers 2032Tailors or Seamstresses 3717 4886Teachers, Professors, Academics 424 381Textile Workers 960 603

Black marketing, it must be added, also constituted anoccupation. Obviously, this was not peculiar to the Jews, forall Germany—indeed, most of Europe—was in the throes ofthe black market, owing to the scarcity of necessities. Further-


more, a rigid interpretation of regulations regarded barter asblack market. Thus, a father who might exchange a packageof cigarettes for a bottle of milk for his child would be regardedas a law-breaker. Nevertheless, because Jews were segregatedinto special communities, where their activities seemed to beconducted in a goldfish bowl, their share of "operators" madethem particularly vulnerable to the charge of black marketing.

Political and Cultural Activities

The Jews enjoyed a lively political life. They elected theirown camp committees who, in turn, chose regional commit-tees. At the top stood the Central Committee of LiberatedJews with a highly organized political apparatus which em-ployed, in 1947, about 1,000 persons in its various bureaus.At first the various committees were chosen, regardless ofparty affiliation. Most of the top leadership seemed to be ofLithuanian descent. In time, and reflecting the heightenedZionist tensions, party alignments played a greater role. Atthe Congress of Liberated Jews in February, 1947, the CentralCommittee was elected entirely on a party basis. The Zionistparties, reflecting the structure of Palestine politics, were:Hashomer Hatzair, both branches of the Poale Zion, Pechach,Mizrachi, General Zionists, Revisionists, and Aguda.

Camps conducted interesting cultural programs. Lecturesand concerts were given by their own people and by outsidecelebrities. Theatrical groups sprang up. Lecture courseswere presented. Volks-Universitaten were founded. Therewere as many newspapers and magazines as could be suppliedwith paper.

Religious activities enjoyed a moderate success. Not allJews were religious, but more of them participated in observ-ances than would have done so in a normal community. Therewas no Liberal or Reform Judaism among them. They wereeither observant Orthodox Jews or, if indifferent, insisted upontraditional ceremonies in times of need.

One or more synagogues were to be found in all camps.In most of the larger camps there, was a Mikvah. The Armyassisted in arrangements for Kosher meat. Many of the


smaller camps had only a Kosher kitchen; the larger campshad both Kosher and general kitchens.

Despite their sufferings, the Jews did not berate nor denyGod. Nor did they indulge in the mystical escapism whichbecame popular in France and in England. They did notbecome faddists. They retained a tough-minded, critical real-ism about their universe, from which faith was not lacking.

Morale

Although some of the camps consisted of small houses, mostof them were converted German barracks. Large, drab,rectangular buildings faced an open square. Because bombed-out Germany was overcrowded, both with its own populationand with millions of Germans expelled from other countries,housing space for DP's was limited. Frequently, therefore,from four to ten people of different ages and sexes wouldoccupy one room. There was little privacy, few amenities.Although health regulations required communal eating, mostpeople in large camps managed to prepare their own meals intheir own sleeping quarters.

The adults were short, by comparison with Americans orGermans. In manner they were excitable, their emotionseasily aroused. Crowds would quickly gather around a visitoror an argument. Confronted with ugly quarters and limitedfood, their life was a constant selfish struggle for existence. Onthe other hand, they were capable of great generosity andself-sacrifice. No camp population ever refused to admit anyof their brethren fleeing from persecution. Established campsshared their meager food with new camps that were in need.On the fringes of many camps were numerous Jews who,prevented from registration in these particular camps bymaximal capacity regulations, were fed by friends and rela-tives from their own limited rations.

The individual Jew seemed reasonably normal under ab-normal conditions. As a mass, however, they frequentlyshowed signs of hysteria. Wild, unfounded rumors spread likewildfire, and were devoured. Although they developed day


by day relations with many Germans, the men sometimes withGerman women, they hated them with an unforgiving hate.They were unwilling to accept any plan which involved someconcession to the Germans.

The Children

The children were remarkable. At first, there were none.Then, rescue parties began to bring in from Poland those whohad hidden in forests, caves and cellars; those who had foughtwith partisan bands; and those who had been hidden byChristians. Most of them had undergone fantastic experiences.One was thrown, in a suitcase, out of a moving train by hisparents on their way to the extermination chambers. Anotherwas chloroformed by his physician father and carried out ofthe Kovno Ghetto in a sack of potatoes. Others had registeredas Christians or Moslems. Many of these children had noJewish education and knew no Yiddish. Most of them wereprematurely aged and wizened. Under affectionate andgenerous care, both by the DP's and by the various agencies,they soon became normal Jewish boys and girls. Theseunattached, and usually orphaned, boys and girls numberedover 5,000. They lived in special children's centers. Theyconducted their own vigorous cultural and athletic programs.Their entertainments were imaginative and creative. Theother children, numbering over 22,000, lived with their fami-lies in the camps.

Testimony of General Clay

Looking back over the horrors visited upon these people,the losses they suffered, the ugliness of camp life, the dreary,protracted delays in their resettlement, and all the threats ofdemoralization, these Jewish displaced persons achieved aremarkable rehabilitation. General Lucius D. Clay who, asMilitary Governor and, later, as Commander in Chief of theEuropean Command, observed them closely for two years,passed this judgment upon them:


The behavior of the Jewish displaced persons has notbeen a major problem at any time since the surrender ofGermany. I wish that I could say the same for all othergroups. The Jewish displaced persons were quickly gath-ered into communities where their religious and selected com-munity leaders insisted on an orderly pattern of communitylife. Of course, we have had many minor problems resultingfrom the assembly of large numbers of Jewish displacedpersons in the midst of the people who had caused theirsuffering. Moreover, the unsettled economic conditions inGermany have made barter trading and black marketoperations a common problem. Even in this field, the Jew-ish displaced persons have not been conspicuous in theiractivities as compared to other displaced persons groups or,in fact, as compared to the German population itself.

The Jewish displaced persons have on the whole estab-lished an excellent record insofar as crimes of violence areconcerned, and in spite of their very natural hatred of theGerman people have been remarkably restrained in avoid-ing incidents of a serious nature with the German popu-lation.

In view of the conditions under which they have had tolive in Germany, with their future unsettled and their pastsuffering clear at hand, their record for preserving law andorder is to my mind one of the remarkable achievementswhich I have witnessed during my more than two years inGermany.

By the summer of 1947, the prospects of these people werenot good. UNRRA had expired. Gone were its vast fundsand large trained staff. The International Refugee Organi-zation had replaced it, but with severely limited funds andpersonnel. Under pressure from an economy-minded Con-gress, the United States Army was attempting the occupationof Germany with substantially reduced forces, with no moneyand little attention for the DP's. The heaviest burdens in theirhistory were falling upon the voluntary agencies at a timewhen a reversal in economic trends was cutting deeply intotheir funds.


DP—German Relations

The continuing abnormalities of their lives in Germanycould not help but bring about some deterioration in therelations of the displaced Jews with the German populationand with the Army.

Studies of Germans' attitudes revealed that four out of everyten would participate in, or condone, overt acts against Jews.An additional four were ardent German racists or nationalists,easily susceptible to anti-Semitic incitement. In addition totheir anti-Semitic predisposition and conditioning, these Ger-mans were confronted with terrible housing, food and fuelshortages. They resented the displaced persons in their midstand begrudged whatever they received. Although few overtacts occurred, the tensions were mounting. Anti-Semiticthreats, songs, abuse were again heard.

The high level policy of the United States Army continuedto be as sympathetic and as fair as could be expected underthe circumstances. But, on the operational level, difficultieswere increasing. The military personnel in the field hadcontacts with DP's only at the point of trouble. Because thesesoldiers were usually young and lacking in background for theunderstanding of so alien and complex a problem, it was hardfor them to have a sympathetic or just evaluation of these up-rooted Jews. Increasingly, as United States policy turnedmore activities over to the Germans and, also, as Germangirls influenced American men, the Americans were affectedby German attitudes.

Emigration a Compelling Necessity

These external threats of deterioration and growing innerdangers of demoralization made it clear that the Jews couldnot and should not stay much longer in Germany. But whereshould they go? Very few wished to return to their lands oforigin. Despite the announced good intentions of the Polishgovernment, they felt they could not trust the Polish peoplewho had committed and permitted such outrages as theKielce pogrom. They feared, too, that their return in any


numbers to Poland would again evoke the same violent anti-Semitism.

Responsible organizations and persons, including the writer,explored various immigration possibilities. In most instances,it developed either that the countries did not want Jews orwanted such categories of labor as were not to be found amongJews, such as miners and lumbermen. Norway offered toreplenish its slaughtered Jewish population, but the numberswere small. France granted 8,000 transient visas. OtherEuropean countries took a few. The United States, by thereestablishment of the quota system, took larger numbers, butaltogether, by the summer of 1947, they constituted less than5 per cent of the DP population.

After much painful exploration it became clear that therewere only two realistic possibilities: increased immigration tothe United States and mass resettlement in Palestine. About25 per cent of the displaced persons wished to emigrate to theUnited States, chiefly to join their relatives. Having lost mostof their families, there was a natural and overwhelming desireto reunite with the remaining fragments. The immigration ofsome 60,000 Jews to the United States over a period of timewould obviously impose no hardships. In the early stages, theirfamilies and the Jewish communities would take care of them.Their work skills and native intelligence would enable themto make a useful contribution to American life.

Resettlement in Palestine was the passionate and unquench-able wish of most of the displaced Jews. The opening of itsdoors at any moment would have led 90 per cent of them inthat direction. Simultaneous immigration possibilities to theUnited States and Palestine would have found 75 per cent onthe road to Zion. Even the attempt permanently to close thedoors of Palestine would have found at least 50 per centprepared to oppose all delays and obstacles with their unflag-ging determination to go there. There were no anti-Zionistsamong the DP's. Even those who were migrating to theUnited States believed in the Jewish National Home. TheirZionist views reflected the divisions in the Zionist movement.But all of them believed in the need for creating a Jewish statein Palestine, not necessarily in all of Palestine.

THE IRO 533

This powerful national urge expressed itself in steady andgrowing unauthorized immigration to Palestine. The young,the vigorous, the unattached went first. It was estimated, bythe summer of 1947, that 30,000 from Germany and Austriahad migrated toward Palestine since liberation. The obstaclesplaced in their path were very great, but neither hardship norhazards could deter them. Out they went in growing numbers.

AM YISRAEL CHAI.

-3. THE IRO1

REFUGEES AND Displaced Persons totaling over a million dur-ing the past year, in Germany, Austria, Italy, as well as outsideof Europe, were being cared for with the aid of UNRRA, theArmies of Occupation, the Intergovernmental Committee onRefugees (IGC) and voluntary welfare organizations. A largepart of the DP's lived in camps; others found temporary homesoutside the camps. Most of the camps were administered byUNRRA, while food, clothing and medicine were providedby the control authorities in the various zones of occupationof the Western powers.

The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees providedlegal protection, maintenance and assistance in resettlementfor the refugees under its jurisdiction. Originally establishedin 1938 to assist German victims of the Nazis, it had in 1943expanded its program to aid all victims of racial, religiousor political persecution. Though many governments wereformally affiliated with it, it was to all intents and purposesan Anglo-American body. Its funds were provided mainlyby the United States and the United Kingdom. A specialprovision in the German reparations agreement, signed in

1 Prepared in the office of the American Jewish Committee.


January 1946, had placed under its administration a sumof $25,000,000 out of German assets, to be used for the re-habilitation and resettlement of the victims of the Nazis.

The voluntary welfare organizations cooperated with andsupplemented the assistance rendered by the governmentalagencies.

At the time of writing (spring 1947), the status of the DPproblem was confused and uncertain. UNRRA was scheduledto terminate its DP services by the end of June 1947. TheIGC was generally judged not to have fulfilled the goals forwhich it was organized.

The first session of the United Nations General Assembly,held February 1946, had given recognition to the internationalscope of the refugee and DP problem and had referred it forstudy to the Economic and Social Council. The Council, inturn, had established a Special Committee on Refugees andDP's which had met in London from April 1 to August 1, 1946,and had produced a report including a draft constitutionfor a non-permanent organization to be called the Interna-tional Refugee Organization (IRO). The report of theSpecial Committee, summarizing both majority and minorityopinions, was debated at the Third Session of the Economicand Social Council in September 1946 and again at the ses-sion of the General Assembly which followed (October-December 1946). Toward the close of this session the GeneralAssembly finally voted to submit the draft constitution to theindividual members of the United Nations for their approval.According to the constitution, the IRO was to come intoexistence after ratification by fifteen countries whose contri-butions would provide at least seventy-five per cent of itsoperational budget.

Function and Scope

The functions of the IRO, as defined in the constitution,were to be: (1) repatriation; (2) identification, registrationand classification; (3) care and assistance; (4) legal and polit-ical protection; (5) transportation; and (6) resettlement andreestablishment in new countries.

THE IRO 535

Of these, the primary function was to be the encourage-ment of voluntary repatriation. However, refugees and DP'swho—in complete freedom and after receiving full knowl-edge of the facts—refused repatriation were to be providedwith maintenance and legal protection in their present placesof residence, and to receive aid in their resettlement in newcountries.

The term "refugee" was defined as applying (1) to a per-son outside his own country, who was either a victim of Nazi,Fascist or Falangist persecution or a pre-war refugee; (2) aperson outside his own country, who, as a result of eventssubsequent to the outbreak of the war, is unable or unwillingto avail himself of the protection of his own country; (3) aperson who, having resided in Germany or Austria, and beingof Jewish origin or a foreigner or stateless person, was a vic-tim of Nazi persecution and has not yet been formally resettledtherein; and (4) unaccompanied children who are warorphans or whose parents have disappeared and who areoutside of their own country.

The term "displaced person" was defined as applying to aperson who, as a result of the actions of the Nazi, Fascist,quisling or similar regimes, "has been deported from, or hasbeen obliged to leave, his country of nationality or formerhabitual residence, such as persons who were compelled toundertake forced labor or who were deported for racial, reli-gious or political reasons."

The constitution also listed those classes of persons whomight not become the concern of the IRO. These included:(1) war criminals, quislings, traitors and persons who, undercertain conditions, assisted the enemy; (2) persons of Ger-man ethnic origin who had been transferred to Germanyfrom other countries; and (3) persons who, since the end ofhostilities had, under certain conditions, sought to overthrowtheir own governments by armed force, or had become leadersof movements hostile to their own governments, or sponsorsof movements directed against repatriation.

These definitions and principles represented an attempt toarrive at a compromise between the views of the East Euro-pean countries—the countries of origin of most of the displaced


persons—which emphasized the view that resettlement shouldbe a minor part of the IRO program, and the views of theWestern nations which, stressing the humanitarian conceptof asylum, sought to expand the definitions and classes ofpersons who might be assisted by the IRO, and who opposedinvoluntary repatriation.

The East European governments objected to the constitu-tion, among other reasons, on the grounds that its consti-tutional provisions against anti-repatriation propaganda werenot adequate. They opposed its omission of the proposal thatgovernments of the countries of origin be consulted beforeappointment of camp administrators. In general, while agree-ing to IRO assistance to victims of Nazi and Fascist regimes,they objected to similar assistance to refugees and DP'swhose chief reason for refusing to be repatriated was opposi-tion to the new regimes in their countries of origin.

These debates did not in the main specifically concern theJews. The claim of the Jewish refugees and DP's to assistancewas recognized by all sides, and virtually all classes of Jewishrefugees were covered by the IRO constitution. The remnantsof Jewish refugees from Greater Germany were covered in thecategory of pre-war refugees. Those from Eastern Europewere covered by the definitions of DP's.

For a time there was disagreement over the status of thenative Jews of Germany and Austria who were residing intheir own countries. IRO assistance to them had beenopposed by the British delegation on the grounds that for theIRO to act in regard to persons inside their own countrieswould establish a dangerous precedent. It was argued thatit might imply correctness of the Nazi claim that there is noplace for Jews in Central Europe. The British, supported bythe Lebanese, also argued that it would introduce the prin-ciple of racial discrimination in favor of Jews—in the refugeeand DP problem. However, the opposition was overruled.A special paragraph was introduced in the draft constitutionby the Special Committee on Refugees and DP's and en-dorsed by the Economic and Social Council at its June 1946session, covering assistance to German and Austrian Jews intheir native countries, who had either returned to their coun-

THE IRO 537

tries of origin as a result of war circumstances, or who hadnever left those countries.

The interests of Jewish refugees were also indirectly threat-ened by a proposed Russian amendment directed mainlyagainst the non-Jewish political refugees from the easternEuropean countries. This amendment would have entitled tointernational protection and assistance only refugees and DP'swho left their countries of origin before the end of hostilities.Adoption of this amendment would have operated to thedetriment of the Jewish "infiltrees." It was, however, defeated.

Also defeated was an Egyptian amendment proposed inthe General Assembly directed against Jewish immigration toPalestine. This amendment proposed that resettlement should"in no case be imposed on a sovereign nation or run counterto the freely expressed wishes and aspiration of a majority ofthe indigenous population of a trust or non-self-governingregions or territories." In its stead, an American-sponsoredcompromise amendment was adopted calling upon the IROto "give due weight, among other factors, to any evidence ofgenuine apprehension and concern" felt in regard to resettle-ment plans, "by the indigenous population of the non-self-governing country in question." This compromise largelydiluted the danger contained in the Egyptian amendment.

Operation

The Economic and Social Council at its September 1946session decided on an IRO budget, for the first year of itsoperations, of $160,860,000, divided as follows: administra-tion: $4,800,000; operations: $151,060,000; and large scaleresettlement: $5,000,000. However, governments could volun-tarily supplement their contribution to the resettlement partof the budget. The United States quota was fixed at 45.75per cent or about $71,024,670 and the British, second largestat 14.75 per cent or $22,280,000.

At the time of writing, 16 governments had signed theconstitution. However, only five nations, (Australia, China,Iceland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom), whosebudget quotas totaled only 19.47 per cent, had done so un-


conditionally. The signatures of the other eleven (Belgium,Canada, Dominican Republic, France, Guatemala, Hon-duras, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, andthe United States), with quotas totaling 56.05 per cent, wasconditional upon ratification of the constitution by their gov-ernments.

However, the constitution contained a clause allowing theestablishment of an IRO Preparatory Commission as soon aseight governments had signed it. It was decided that, sincemonths might pass before the formal establishment of theIRO, a Preparatory Commission should be set up to makesuch preparations as were necessary in order that no timemight be wasted in starting operations when it became clearthat the IRO was to come into being.

The IRO Preparatory Commission held its first meetingin Geneva, Switzerland, on February 11, 1947. At this meet-ing it was decided to request an advance contribution fromthe United Nations so that the Preparatory Commissionmight commence its operations. The Preparatory Commis-sion named as its Executive Secretary, Arthur J. Altmeyer,former Commissioner of the Social Security Administrationof the United States Federal Security Agency. The ExecutiveSecretary was authorized to make preparations for the opera-tion of the IRO, including the taking over of UNRRA'sCentral Tracing Bureau for Missing Persons; and the prepara-tion of draft agreements with military authorities, the govern-ments of the ex-enemy countries where the refugees werelocated, and the governments of the countries of resettlement.

A second meeting of the Preparatory Commission was heldin Lausanne, Switzerland, on May 1. At this meeting, thePreparatory Commission voted to assume formal responsibilityfor refugees and DP's in Europe and Asia as of July 1, 1947,despite lack of the full quota of acceptances of the constitution.As of this date, the Preparatory Commission was to take overthe assets and functions of the UNRRA and the IGC. Guidingprinciples of the IRO program were formulated at this meet-ing. The IRO was to be responsible for the selection anddirection of its operating and supervisory staff. It was todetermine which individuals were eligible for assistance and

THE IRO 539

standards of care to be provided them. Food and other basicsupplies were to be made available without cost from indig-enous sources by the occupation authorities.

The UNRRA and IRO had had agreements with oversixty voluntary societies providing relief and specializedservices of various sorts to the refugees and DP's. Theseagreements were to terminate on June 30. The PreparatoryCommission was authorized to make new ones with thoseorganizations which wished to continue similar associationswith the IRO.

The IRO was to aim at the same standards of living theUNRRA had tried to achieve. Its emphasis, however, wasto shift from relief to rehabilitation, with a view to renderingthe refugees and DP's fit for repatriation or resettlement. Thediet of the refugees and DP's was not to be lower than that ofthe local population among whom they dwelt. Where thelocal diet was sub-standard, IRO was to supplement the refu-gee and DP standard.

The IRO was to try to provide useful employment foras many DP's as possible, using them wherever feasible incamp maintenance, IRO administrative work, and projectssponsored by the occupation authorities.

IRO was to reorganize and expand the tracing servicespreviously conducted by UNRRA in cooperation with theoccupation authorities. This service was of great importancefor many reasons. It was used to help in reuniting familiesand in tracing the civil status of children. The IRO was alsoto provide quasi-consular services for certain categories ofrefugees, such as those carrying Nansen passports.

The original budget fixed by the Economic and SocialCouncil was $151,060,500, based on the assumption of 100per cent UN membership. In the light of the limited accept-ance of membership, the Preparatory Commission reducedthe budget to a little over $112,000,000, seventy-five per centof that of the Economic and Social Council. However, shouldsufficient funds be pledged or made available, the 100 percent basis might be restored. It was estimated that, whendivided among an average number of about 750,000 DP'sexpected to be cared for during 1947-1948, the per capita


expenditure would come out to be only about $150 per yearfor all forms of assistance. Some predictions anticipated thata considerably larger number of DP's would be eligible forIRO assistance. In that event, the per capita expenditurewould be reduced in proportion. The prospect appeared tobe that in the coming year the DP's would receive less inter-national assistance than in the previous year.

The Commission passed a resolution expressing a preferencefor Geneva as the future headquarters of the IRO.

The Commission estimated on the basis of a fiscal yearcommencing July 1, 1947, and ending June 30, 1948, thatthere would be at least 750,000 refugees and displaced personseligible for care and maintenance on the first day of theoperating year and 450,000 on the last day. The withdrawalof 300,000 was expected to be made up as follows: 150,000through repatriation, 30,000 through settlement overseas,70,000 through settlement in countries in Western Europeand 50,000 increase in the number of self-sustaining refugeesand displaced persons no longer requiring care and main-tenance. These figures allowed for a small amount of infiltra-tion or temporary increases in the population eligible forcare.

As far as the Jews were concerned, resettlement, chieflyoutside of Europe, was the main aspiration. The estimatethat only 30,000 refugees and DP's would be resettled over-seas during the next year did not augur well for the realizationof the aspiration. Even with the 70,000 expected to be reset-tled in Western Europe, the DP problem in general, and itsJewish aspect in particular, was still expected to remain ofserious proportions at the end of the year.

IMMIGRATION PROSPECTS 541

IMMIGRATION PROSPECTS-

By Sidney Liskqfsky—

The problem of finding places of resettlement for the Jewsof Europe, those in the DP centers as well as large numbersin their native countries, was greatly complicated after thewar by the fact that there was a similar search for resettle-ment opportunities on the part of non-Jews in almost everycountry of Europe.

A survey of emigration pressures in the various countriesin Europe, published in The New York Times January 22, 1947,indicated that, had it not been for immigration restrictions,the world would have been living through one of the greatmigrations of history. The reasons for these pressures includedeconomic difficulties, scarcities of various kinds of goods anda general loss of hope in the future of Europe. The surveyshowed, for example, that apart from the DP's in Germany,there was intense desire on the part of a large part of theGerman population to escape from Europe. In Poland,apart from the Jewish emigration pressures, were it not thatthe government granted no exit permits, a large number ofnon-Jews would have emigrated. A large part of the Italianpopulation wished to emigrate, and the post-war government,in fact, unlike its fascist predecessor, favored such emigrationas a safety valve. More than one quarter of the Finnish popu-lation was reported wishing to emigrate. In the United King-dom, too, the desire to leave was strong and the governmentwas erecting no barriers to emigration. Britishers had greateropportunities for emigration than any other people in theworld, due to the preference of the Dominions for Britishimmigrants and to the large British quota in the UnitedStates immigration law. Hundreds of thousands of Britisherswere reported waiting to emigrate to these countries.


Thus, the various non-European countries which werecapable of receiving immigrants had a large choice from whichto select. Only humanitarian and liberal convictions couldbring them to accept Jewish and other DP's in preference to,or on a basis of equality with, these other potential immi-grants. Unfortunately, however, when faced by the choicebetween presumed self-interest, and between humanitarianand liberal considerations, the actions of few countries weredetermined by the latter. It was for this reason, in part, thatthe general, and especially the Jewish DP problem, wasfound to be so difficult of solution.

The restrictive policies of most of the overseas countriesdid not originate with the end of World War II. They evolvedover the last two or three decades, beginning in some coun-tries after World War I and in others as a reaction to thedepressions of the early 1930's. In some countries, restric-tions were imposed in the form of laws fixing numericalquotas, as well as of other statutory regulations. In others, theexecutive branch of the government was granted broad dis-cretion to determine immigration policy within the frameworkof certain broad flexible principles and in accordance withthe political and economic exigencies of the time.

While in no countries were any restrictions based officiallyon religion, almost all overseas immigration countries dis-criminated on the basis of race or nationality. On the otherhand, some countries did discriminate unofficially on thebasis of religion. The various discriminatory techniques usedincluded geographical quotas, financial requirements, literacytests, occupational priorities, etc. Most of these techniquescontinued to be applied in many countries after World War II.

However, after the end of this war, a change seemed to takeplace in the attitude toward immigration in many countries,both in Europe and overseas. This change was reflected inofficial and semi-official statements of intention to inauguratein the near future large-scale immigration programs.

The optimism which these statements generated at thetime of their issuance with regard to possibility of a rapidsolution of the pr®blem of the Jewish DP's was dissipated inthe months following the end of the war. The recognition


soon crystallized that two obstacles lay in the way of Jewishimmigration. One was the principle of "selective" immigra-tion, whereby preference was to be given to persons withparticular occupations or skills. In most cases, these occupa-tions and skills referred to agriculture, mining, lumbering, andcertain others in which Jews were not adequately represented.The other important obstacle was the unofficial anti-Semitismwhich lingered in the immigration policies of many countries.

The present account will review briefly the Jewish immi-gration situation in various parts of the world, as of the sum-mer of 1947. Although the situation in many countries wasin flux and the sources of information were in many casesconflicting and ambiguous, the general picture presented isaccurate in broad outline.

BRITISH DOMINIONS

Australia

Australian law did not fix any geographical quotas. Theimmigration authorities possessed virtually full discretion indeciding the numbers and types of immigrants to be admitted.

At the time of writing, public sentiment in the countryclearly favored British immigration, though opinion wasdivided regarding the advisability of admitting non-Britishimmigrants. The opposition derived partly from strongnationalism and a sense of racial purity, and partly from theuneasiness among organized workers lest immigration threatenthe high standard of living. At the same time, influentialelements in the country favored increased immigration. Amongthese were certain industrial groups who argued the need ofincreasing the labor population, not without the hope ofcheapening the cost of labor. In the labor movement, too,with the end of the war, opinion veered in favor of Europeanimmigration. One of the influential promoters of general, aswell as Jewish, immigration, was the Minister of Immigration,Arthur A. Galwell.

On August 2, 1945, Mr. Calwell outlined to the AustralianHouse of Representatives a future immigration program for


the country, setting as a goal the annual admission of 70,000Europeans. He emphasized, however, that this program wasto be subordinate to the overriding requirements of demobili-zation, re-employment and rehousing of veterans, and main-tenance of the standard of living. Until these conditionsexisted, preference would be given to relatives and certainclasses of skilled workers.

According to official figures given by Mr. Calwell inMarch 1947 to the House of Representatives, 2,023 Jewishimmigrants had been admitted into the country since theend of the war. Of these 1,115 had come from Europe, 781from Shanghai and 37 from Manila. In addition, landingpermits had been granted for several thousand others whosearrival was being held up by the shipping shortage. Apartfrom these figures, Mr. Calwell also showed that the Aus-tralian immigration record fell considerably below the 1938Evian Conference commitment to admit 15,000 refugees. Forfrom 1938 till the outbreak of the war, only 5,080 refugeeswere admitted; during the war only 482 entered, except for913 refugee internees allowed to remain out of 2,542 sent fromBritain on a temporary basis in July 1940. This made a totalof 6,475 from 1938 till the end of the war, plus 2,023 since thattime, an overall total of 8,498. Of these, moreover, many werenon-Jews.

These figures were presented by Mr. Calwell as a replyto accusations that too many Jews were being admitted.Among the attackers were such prominent figures as formerPrime Minister and leader of the Liberal Party, Robert K.Menzies, as well as the head of the Returned Servicemen'sLeague.

During the past year, there crystallized in Australia anawareness of the need for enlarging the population throughimmigration, as a defense against the possibility of revivedJapanese imperialism. However, this immigration had atthe same time to solidify the British character of the popula-tion. Thus, Mr. Calwell was reported to have announced inLondon on July 1, 1947, that he hoped to arrange for theemigration to Australia of 400,000 British subjects in the nextfew years. He estimated that whereas there were ten to fifteen


million too many people in the British Isles, Australia hadto increase its population from 7,137,000 to 20,000,000.

There was reason to hope that if this program should getunder way in the course of the next few years, increased num-bers of non-British Europeans might manage to enter on thetide of the British immigration, including numbers of Jews.Unfortunately, however, the Jewish refugee and displacedpersons problem was too urgent to await such a long-rangedevelopment. The program of admitting 12,000 DP's,announced on July 20, 1947, by Mr. Calwell, specified thatpreference was to be extended to heavy workers, notably thosefrom the Baltic countries. This preference implied feweropportunities to Jews.

Canada

In Canada, as in the other Dominions, broad discretion wasgranted to the executive authorities to regulate the immigra-tion standards and procedures, within the framework ofbroad legislative principles. Since World War I, and espe-cially after 1931, immigration policy discriminated againstpersons from Eastern Europe while granting preference tothose from Western Europe, especially from the United Statesand the British Commonwealth. It also gave preference toagriculturists.

After the depression of 1931, Jewish immigration to Canadafell considerably. Between 1931 and 1937 only 4,487 Jews,constituting about 4.75 per cent of the total immigration,entered Canada. From 1937 to 1943, 4,381 Jews, or 5.76 percent of the total, entered. During 1945, only 347 Jews wereadmitted.

Since the end of the war, public opinion regarding immi-gration has been divided. Strong elements of the populationoppose immigration. Particularly in the Province of Quebecis immigration opposed, especially of Jews, for fear that thenew immigrants would add to the strength of the Englishelements in the country.

Few significant changes in the restriction policies were madeafter the end of the war as a contribution to the solution of


the refugee and displaced persons problem. Only to a minordegree were recommendations repeatedly urged upon thegovernment by the Canadian Jewish Congress and otherliberal immigration groups, accepted by the government.

A measure adopted early in 1947 made eligible for admissionmore distantly related kin than heretofore. This measure didnot, however, go as far as the recommendation of the CanadianJewish Congress. A HIAS survey indicated that only about800 to 1,000 more Jewish displaced persons were thereby madeeligible.

The government also accepted in part the petition of theCanadian Jewish Congress that certain occupations, in whichJews were represented, such as tailoring, should be givenfavorable treatment. On June 12, 1947, the governmentannounced the grant of permission for the entry of 5,000displaced persons skilled in certain trades, 2,500 of whomwere to be tailors. The plan to admit the latter was workedout by the Garment Manufacturers' Association, the I.L.G.W.U. and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, incollaboration with the government authorities.

At the time of writing, comparatively few Jewish displacedpersons had immigrated to Canada. It was anticipated thata few thousand might arrive during the coming years as aresult of the recent government liberalization decrees. How-ever, the Canadian post-war immigration program was clearlyoperating less favorably in relation to the Jewish displacedpersons that to the non-Jewish displaced persons.

South Africa

The basic laws governing immigration in South Africa werethe Acts of 1913 and 1937, which gave preference to native-born British subjects and a wide measure of discretion to anImmigrants' Selection Board. The selection criteria given tothis Board included the assimilability of the immigrants, theneed for their skills, and the ambiguous criterion of unlikeliness"to be harmful to the welfare of the Union."

The Jews who came to South Africa before 1933 werechiefly of East European origin. In 1930, an effort was made


by the anti-Semitic Nationalist Party, which was then inpower, to curtail the entry of East European immigrants andto give preference to German and West European immigrants.To this end, it passed the Quota Act of 1930. However, thislaw failed to achieve its purpose of drastically reducing theentry of Jews. For, following the rise of the Nazis to powerin 1933, substantial numbers of Jews entered under thecomparatively large German quota. To close this loophole,a new immigration law was passed in 1937 abolishing thequota system and enlarging the powers of the Immigrants'Selection Board to regulate the entry of immigrants. There-after, the number of German Jews admitted annually fellfrom a few thousand to a few hundred.

With the outbreak of the war in September, 1939, the entryof Jews was reduced to a trickle. In the four years from Jan-uary 1, 1940 to December 21, 1943, only 196 Jews entered.In 1944, a mere 20 Jews entered. Since then, only a very smallnumber of Jews, mainly aged parents and relatives, have beenadmitted.

Public opinion regarding the admission of Jews becameincreasingly antagonistic during the past year. The chiefopposition stemmed from the Nationalist Party whose officialprogram, adopted in 1941, contained the following plank onJewish Immigration: "The Party favors in general the immi-gration of suitable assimilable white European populationelements . . . the Party recommends the immediate cessationof all further immigration of Jews and of all elements whichcannot be assimilated by the South African nation or whichare a hindrance or dangerous to society."

Since the end of the war, the immigration policy of theUnited Party, under the leadership of Jan Christian Smuts,has vacillated. Prior to August 1946, the United Partystressed the various obstacles to immigration. However, onAugust 14, 1946, Prime Minister Smuts, leader of the UnitedParty, announced before the Head Committee of the Party anew policy of increased immigration. As reasons for thenew policy, he cited the need for strengthening the proportionof the white population to the colored and the need forincreased manpower for the development of the country. The


goal of this program was reported to be 50,000 immigrants,with emphasis on those with desirable skills. To implementthis program, immigrant selection committees were subse-quently set up in Rome, the Hague and London.

However, the locations of these committees were an indica-tion that they would be concerned not mainly with DPimmigration, but chiefly with immigration from the UnitedKingdom, Holland and Italy.

The program of the United Party was criticized by theNationalists on the ground that the new immigrants wouldinterfere with the housing and employment of native SouthAfricans. The real clash was not, however, over the virtues ofimmigration in general, for the Nationalists in fact favoredthe admission of immigrants who would tend to add to theirinfluence, such as Dutch and Germans. The United Party, onthe other hand, favored British immigrants and was morefavorably disposed to immigrants of East European origin.Thus the real controversy was over the type of immigrants tobe preferred. It was hoped by the Jewish community thatsome numbers of Jews would be able to enter as part of thenew program.

In the early part of 1947, however, the government immi-gration policy appeared to shift again, apparently with theintention of winning over the support of part of the verysubstantial anti-immigration element in the country. PrimeMinister Smuts, in a statement in the Senate on March 27,1947, declared that it would be impossible to take a largesection of DP's from the European camps.

A month earlier, General Smuts stated, with specific refer-ence to Jewish immigration, that South Africa was not thesolution to the Jewish problem. No country should be over-loaded with Jews, he stated, because to do so created anti-Semitism. South Africa, however, favored the establishmentof the Jewish National Home in Palestine as a solution totheir problem. This statement was protested by a delegationof the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, whom GeneralSmuts assured that his remarks had been misunderstood.Subsequently, in a speech in the Senate on May 27, 1947, hereassured the Jewish community that: "It is not the policy of


the government to differentiate in respect to Jews, and I hopethat South Africa will ever remain free of this taint of anti-Semitism." Although this statement had a reassuring effecton the Jewish community, he gave little encouragement forhope for significant Jewish immigration.

New Zealand

New Zealand, like the other Dominions, had no quotasystem, but granted wide discretion to the executive author-ities. It also granted preference to British immigrants. From1933 to 1939 an average of only 252 immigrants annuallyentered the country. The reason was partly that during theseyears few persons wished to immigrate to so remote a country.More recently, the chief reason for the minimum of immigra-tion was the restrictive policy of the government.

Almost no immigrants entered during the war years andvery few since. At the time of writing, a limited scheme ofimmigration from the United Kingdom was being planned.Virtually no DP's or refugees were expected to find their wayto New Zealand in the immediate post-war years.

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina

Argentine immigration laws placed no numerical restric-tions upon the entry of immigrants. Neither did they formallyrestrict immigration on the grounds of race, religion, ornationality. Until 1933, Argentina pursued a policy of encour-aging European immigration. In that year the first of a seriesof restrictions was introduced. With the outbreak of WorldWar II, immigration was even more rigidly restricted.

After the conclusion of the war, many declarations weremade by high government officials regarding the intention tolaunch a large-scale immigration program. These declarationsand the manner of their implementation made it clear thatJews were not to be admitted in any meaningful number. Asignificant statement was the following made on August 14,1946, by the then director of immigration, Santiago Peralta,


during a discussion of a 50-year plan to increase the country'spopulation to 100,000,000: "Under this plan, the superiorArgentine people of tomorrow" will evolve from the "techni-cally superior people of the world," selected carefully fromthe "best racial types." Sr. Peralta explained that the bulk ofthe immigrants were to be Italians, Scandinavians, Irish andArabs. With clear reference to the DP's and refugees, hestated: "The misery that is left of war-torn Europe mustremain there. Argentina cannot put up with that uselesshuman wreckage." Cynically alluding to accusations that hisselective immigration theories were anti-Semitic, he noted thathe had just allowed 5,000 Arabs from Syria, North Africa andArabia to settle in Argentina, which showed that he was notan anti-Semite.

In December 1946, the Argentine government made publica decree providing for the establishment of two immigrationoffices in Europe: one in Italy and one in Spain. The decreespecified that immigrants were no longer to enter freely andspontaneously as in the past, but in accordance with principlesof selectivity and assimilability. The location of these officesindicated clearly that the emphasis in the selection was to beon immigrants from Italy and Spain rather than on DP's andrefugees, or persons of East European nationality. Thelocation of the offices was interpreted by observers as anindication of close collaboration between the immigrationauthorities and the Catholic Church.

On the other hand, on several occasions, President Peronhimself indicated a more friendly attitude to Jewish immigra-tion. On November 7, 1946, he promised an ArgentineJewish delegation to take action in all cases of discriminationagainst Jews in immigration. In February 1947, he orderedthe admission to the country of 47 Jews turned away from thethe shores of Brazil because their visas had lapsed shortlybefore their arrival. This presidential action was in responseto a petition submitted by the DAIA, the representative bodyof Argentine Jewry.

However, the significance of these favorable presidentialstatements was outweighed by the statistics of Jewish immi-gration. During 1946, it was estimated, fewer than 300 Jews


were admitted, of whom more than half came from othercountries in Latin America, and all of whom were closerelatives of Argentine citizens or residents. Moreover, someof these immigrants were in transit to other Latin Americancountries. Of the total of 800 immigrants who arrived inJanuary 1947, only 27 were reported to be Jewish. Of the2,000 immigrants admitted in March 1947, only 24 wereJewish, apart from the 47 mentioned above who were admittedby special dispensation from President Peron.

Though there were no formal restrictions against Jews assuch, persistent reports indicated that the Argentine consulsin Europe were functioning on the basis of instructions fromthe central authorities in Argentina not to issue visas to Jews,either permanent or transit. At the same time, the entryof Italians and Spaniards was facilitated in every possibleway.

Brazil

Unlike most of the other countries of Latin America, Brazilhad an immigration quota system, introduced in 1935 inimitation of the U. S. Quota Law. This system fixed theannual quota of any country to two per cent of the totalnumber of immigrants from that country who arrived inBrazil between 1884 and 1933. However, the quota of anycountry could be increased to 3,000, and could carry over tothe following year. Portuguese and natives of the Americaswere exempt from the quotas, which gave preference toItalians and Spaniards, and discriminated against East Euro-peans. Within the framework of the quotas, the law assigned80 per cent of the annual quota of each country to agriculturalimmigrants.

However, the Brazilian quota system, unlike that of theU. S., did not bind the government too narrowly, for aliensbrought into the country under planned immigration schemeswere exempted from the quota limitations. Such schemescould be sponsored by the national government, the states orby private agencies.


Before 1936, it was easy for Jews to immigrate to Brazil.The quota system and other restrictions, introduced as aconsequence of the considerable influx of Nazi refugees andthe economic depression of the early thirties, brought abouta decline in Jewish immigration. With the outbreak of WorldWar II, Jewish immigration fell progressively from 4,600 in1939, to 2,416 in 1940, 1,500 in 1941, 108 in'l942 and 11 in1943. Very few Jews entered during the next two years.

It was hoped, however, that with the end of the war, Brazilwould embark upon a large-scale immigration program fromwhich Jews as well as non-Jews would benefit. Numerousdeclarations to this effect were made by high governmentofficials. For example, in July 1946, Joao de Barros, chairmanof the Brazilian Immigration Council, stated that from 100,000to 800,000 DP's in Europe might be permitted to enter Brazilwithout question as to religious or political affiliation. Thestatement submitted by Brazil to the UN Special Committeeon Refugees and DP's, in May 1946, mentioned a figure of100,000 to 200,000 immigrants to be admitted each year. Thisstatement, however, did note that emphasis would be placedon "assimilable" immigrants, and on agriculturists andtechnicians.

In practice, Brazil fell far short of her declarations. The1946 agreement of the Brazilian Government with the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees provided for the admis-sion of only 35,000 refugee immigrants during the followingyear. At the time of writing, the actual number of arrivalsappeared to be falling short even of this goal. According toIGC reports, there were no Jews on the first two boats whichbrought over 1,700 DP's to Brazil in May and June 1947 underthis agreement. Of the 1,000 Jews who entered in 1946, onlytwo-thirds came as permanent immigrants. In the first threemonths of 1947, 1,069 Jews entered, but only 40 per cent aspermanent immigrants. In April, immigration restrictionswere "tightened" up to such an extent that a group of 47Jewish immigrants who arrived with visas that had lapsed bya few days, due to unavoidable technical delays, were notpermitted to land. Few Jews entered in May and June.

Tn brief, the prospects were that the two largest, richest and


most powerful countries in Latin America, Argentina andBrazil, were not likely to make any meaningful contributionto the solution of the Jewish DP problem.

Mexico

Aside from Brazil, Mexico was the only country in LatinAmerica with a quota system. This system, introduced in1935, charged the Ministry of Interior with issuing each yeara schedule of quotas for the following year. The schedule for1947 allowed unlimited immigration from countries in theWestern Hemisphere, the Philippines and Spain; a maximumof 1,000 immigrants from the countries of Western Europe,Sweden and the Soviet Union, and a maximum of 100 fromall other countries. The basic law which established thissystem favored the entry of agriculturists and restricted thatof merchants, professionals and industrial workers, exceptthose with specified skills.

With the end of the war much discussion took place inMexico regarding the revision of immigration policy. Inthese discussions it appeared that, except for Spanish Repub-lican refugees and Italian farmers, anti-immigration sentimentin the country prevailed over that of pro-immigration. During1946 Mexico was virtually closed to Jewish immigration, only300 to 400 persons, mostly relatives of residents, havingmanaged to enter the country. However, Mexico did makea generous offer to grant visas for Jewish war orphans.

Other Countries in South America

The immigration situation in the other countries of LatinAmerica varied. In some, where Jews could settle and liveon a fairly adequate standard, both culturally and economi-cally, the governments were not very sympathetic; in others,where the governments had expressed willingness to receivenumbers of immigrants, Jews included, the conditions of lifewere such that few immigrants, Jewish or other, were willingto give up the possibility of some day getting to Palestine, the


United States or some other more developed country, even ifthis meant waiting in the dreary DP camps.

The chief obstacle to Jewish immigration in almost all ofthese countries was the emphasis on agricultural immigration,and the preference for Catholic and Latin immigrants.

In all, immigration laws existed only on paper, the realfactors of importance being the confidential decisions adoptedperiodically by the governments on the basis of the politicalexigencies of the time.

Bolivia, which after the revolution of the summer of 1946,had become more favorable to immigration, offered immi-grants such primitive living conditions that few were interestedin settling there.

Chile, on the other hand, a country where immigrants wouldbe more anxious to settle, and where until 1939 Jews wereable to enter in considerable numbers, was practically closedto Jewish immigration after that time. Thus, while from 1933to 1939, approximately 13,000 Jews were estimated to haveentered Chile, since 1939 only a few hundred more wereadmitted, and these mainly relatives of residents. From July1946 until January 1947, about 147 Jews were reported byHIAS to have entered the country, and an average of about50 monthly during the first half of 1947. The agreementsigned by the Government of Chile with the IGC in February1947, providing for the admission during the remainder of theyear of 2,000 DP workers and their families, was believed tocontain no specification that Jews had to be included amongthem. The expectation was that very few Jews would be ableto enter under this agreement.

The statement of Colombia, submitted to the Special Com-mittee on Refugees and DP's in May 1946, listed a widevariety of immigrant skills that the country was prepared towelcome. This statement, however, expressed an officialpreference for persons of the Catholic faith and an unwilling-ness to receive persons whose chief activity was trade. Sincethe war, the government on several occasions, expressed itselfin favor of Jewish immigration. There were reported to bepossibilities of entry for Jews on the basis of labor contracts.


However, since the end of the war, few Jews had actuallyentered.

One of the most liberal in its attitude towards Jewish immi-gration of all the Latin American countries, was Ecuador,headed by President Velasco Ibarra. The Government ofEcuador made several generous offers of visas for Jewish DP's.According to a HIAS report, 729 visas were granted to Jewsin 1946, and 418 during the first half of 1947—a total of about1,150 since the end of the war. The number of actual arrivalsappeared, partly on account of transportation shortages, tobe considerably lower. Only 60 Jews were reported to haveactually entered in 1946 and about 150 families during thefirst months of 1947.

The political situation in Paraguay was confused during thepast few years, and became even more so during the springof 1947. Few immigrants were therefore interested in enteringthat country, and many of those who arrived wished to leave.In 1946, the government granted to HIAS entry permits for100 Jewish families, most of whom arrived in the country.

The possibilities for Jewish immigration to Peru were re-ported to be very slight. The country was strongly RomanCatholic, and the agreement signed with the IGC in March1947, for the admission of 1,000 DP workers and families, wasreported to contain a clause providing that 75 per cent of theDP's had to be Roman Catholic. During 1946, few Jews en-tered the country and it was not expected that any would beadmitted in the immediate future. Aside from anti-Semitism,an additional factor in limiting opportunities for Jews was thetype of worker sought. By order of preference, these werechiefly domestic servants, farmers, technicians, and otheroccupational categories, among whom Jews were not ade-quately represented.

Although Uruguay was a genuinely democratic country, itsimmigration policy with regard to Jews was not liberal. Onereason was reported to be the government's fear of antagoniz-ing the fascist elements in the country through admission ofJews. The HIAS reported that during the second half of 1946,111 Jews entered the country, and during the first three monthsof 1947, 130. There was a possibility that small numbers of


skilled Jewish DP workers might be able to enter the countryunder labor contracts. Uruguay also made an offer of visasfor Jewish war orphans.

Although in March 1946, Venezuela informed the UNRRACouncil Session that it was interested in receiving DP's, itstressed the principles of selectivity and assimilability. Despitethe fact that early in 1947, a Socialist Government took officelegally, no steps were taken to encourage Jewish immigration.The agreement signed with the IGC on Feb. 17, 1947, for theimmigration of 15,000 Europeans during the coming year,provided, according to reports, that 40 per cent had to befarmers, and the rest artisans, technicians and skilled laborers.The first boatload of 814 DP's who arrived under this agree-ment on June 26, 1947, consisted predominantly of GreekOrthodox and Roman Catholics.

Central America and Caribbean Countries

Virtually no Jews entered the countries of Central Americaduring the past year. Pue to their general cultural andeconomic backwardness, little consideration was being givento the possibilities of Jews immigrating there.

The legal provision that 80 per cent of all jobs had to befilled by citizens discouraged the Jewish immigration or-ganizations from advising Jews to try to immigrate to ElSalvador.

Immigration possibilities to Guatemala were reported to bescarce, except for capitalists and relatives. Even the latter hadto undertake to engage in agriculture or to secure licenses toestablish small industries. No merchants were wanted. How-ever, at the time of writing, a report from the country indicatedthat the government was considering the possibility of admit-ting small numbers of Jewish immigrant craftsmen.

No Jews were reported to have entered Honduras duringthe past year.

In Cuba, complete discretion as to the number and qualifi-cations of immigrants to be admitted was in the hands of theimmigration officials, and was exercised rather arbitrarily.


Small numbers of Jews succeeded in entering the countryduring the past year.

The Dominican Republic reiterated its offer to receive largenumbers of Jewish immigrants. This offer was made originallyat the Evian Conference in 1938. Repeating it before theUN Special Committee on DP's, in May 1946, the Dominicandelegate urged Jewish organizations and international agen-cies to participate in financing such immigration. However,with the experience of the Sosua Settlement in mind, and thefact that most of the Jews already in the country were anxiousto leave, Jewish organizations did not encourage furtherJewish immigration to that country.

Another country discussed in Jewish circles as a possibleplace for Jewish settlement was Dutch Guiana. The FreelandLeague, whose interest was the finding of a comparativelyuninhabited territory where a compact Jewish settlement couldbe established, secured permission from the Government ofDutch Guiana, as well as of the Netherlands whose colony itwas, for the settlement of 30,000 Jews in one of the unpopulatedareas of the country. There was considerable disagreementover the suitability of this territory from the geographic andeconomic point of view. There was also doubt within theJewish community whether an adequate number of Jewswould care to begin pioneer lives in so undeveloped a terri-tory, and whether adequate financing would be forthcoming.

EUROPE

Europe was a continent of emigration. In most of its coun-tries, large parts of the population were anxious to start lifeanew overseas. At the same time, in some of them, the needsof post-war reconstruction had given rise to pressures forincreased immigration.

France

One of the most important of the latter was France, wherethe need for labor was desperate. On October 9, 1946, PaulRobert Prigent, Minister of Population, characterized the


rebuilding of population as "one of the main problems facedby France today" and explained that the country was planninga ten-year immigration program aimed at securing 3 millionnew citizens, 50 per cent of whom were to be laborers withtheir families.

It was within the framework of this policy that on March21, 1947, France signed an agreement with Italy providingfor the immigration to France of 200,000 Italian workerswithin a year. These workers had to agree to work mainly inthe mining, building and steel industries. For the same reason,France was interested in retaining as permanent settlers a partof her German prisoners of war.

The problem of permitting the entry of DP's was compli-cated by the Soviet insistence that they should be persuadedto return to their native land rather than be resettled in newcountries. The influence of the Communist Party in Francemay have been a factor in the Government's reluctance to as-sume a clear-cut official position regarding the DP's.

At the time of writing, no figures were available regardingthe number of Jews who had entered France since the endof the war. The number officially accepted was very small.However, it was reported, unofficially, that the entry ofsome numbers was being tolerated. In June 1947, it wasreported by Moses A. Leavitt, the Executive Vice-Presidentof the JDC, that approximately 1,500 Jews were enteringFrance each month. These were admitted partly in theexpectation that they would eventually emigrate elsewhere.

The government also authorized the entry of 2,000 Jewishwar orphans from Eastern Europe. Part of these had arrived,and the rest were expected to arrive by the end of the year.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was also suffering from an extremeshortage of labor in her mining, building, agriculture, andother industries. To fill the labor shortage, the Governmentdecided to allow a considerable number of German prisoners-of-war working on British farms, and former soldiers ofGeneral Anders' Polish army, to remain in the country per-


manently. It also embarked upon a DP immigration scheme,labelled "Westward Ho." About the middle of June 1947,it had admitted a total of about 11,000 DP's under thisscheme; most of these were, however, Ukrainians and Baitsfrom the British Zone of Germany. Further DP arrivals, itwas reported at the time of writing, were expected to con-tinue at the rate of 1,000 a week for some time. These arrivalshad to agree to work in jobs as directed by the Minister ofLabor. There appeared to be few Jews among the DP'salready arrived and few were expected to be included amongthe new arrivals.

However, a considerable numder of relatives of residentBritish Jews entered the country during the past year underthe so-called "Distressed Relatives Scheme," a program basedon a declaration of the Home Secretary in the House of Com-mons on November 13, 1945.

Belgium

Belgium, too, was experiencing a shortage of labor, particu-larly in her coal mines. To help solve this shortage, it agreedwith the IGC, on January 22, 1947, to permit the entry of20,000 DP coal miners and their families, mostly of Balticorigin. No Jews were expected to be included among theseDP's, since very few were coal miners. However, a few thou-sand Jewish DP's entered the country unofficially after theend of the war. Some were granted the right to remainpermanently, while others were tolerated pending theiremigration.

Norway

The first group of 399 Jewish DP's to enter Norway afterthe end of the war arrived under a government-sponsoredscheme in May 1947 from Germany. They were selected bya Norwegian Commission that toured the DP camps in theU. S. Zone of Occupation in search of Jewish skilled artisansand craftsmen. A second group of 200 Jews was expected toarrive in the following weeks.


Sweden

One of the most liberal records in regard to assistance tovictims of Nazism was established by Sweden. More Jewishrefugees were admitted to that country than the total Jew-ish population of about 7,500 (according to the census of1930). Thus, 3,000 refugees were admitted before the war;in 1942, 700 were admitted from Norway; in 1943, 8,000from Denmark; and in 1944, 250 from Finland. Most of thesereturned to their countries of origin after the war. About10,000 Jewish refugees, who had been released from con-centration camps in Germany, were admitted to Sweden in1945. About 1,000 of these left the same year after regainingtheir health, and about 2,000 more left the following year,while a number of new refugees were admitted to join closerelatives residing in the country. All of these refugees weretreated with the utmost sympathy and good will by the Swed-ish Government. However, only small numbers of newJewish immigrants were expected to settle in Sweden in thecoming year.

In summary, all the Jews resettled after the war, plus thoseexpected to be resettled in the year following the date of writ-ing (summer 1947), added up to a dismal figure. The prob-lem of Jewish refugees and DP's remained largely unsolved.The hopes of these Jews were focused chiefly upon the develop-ments in Palestine and the United States. The situation inboth these countries is described elsewhere in the AmericanJewish Year Book. However, to round out the world picturea brief summary is included at this point.

PALESTINE

The Palestine White Paper of 1939 was an attempt tofreeze Jewish immigration to that country after 1944. Follow-ing the end of the five year period specified in the WhitePaper, during which 75,000 Jews were to be admitted to thecountry, immigration was to cease. Between 1939 and 1946


about 100,000 Jews entered Palestine, mostly from EasternEurope, but also in considerable numbers from Oriental coun-tries. As a result of Jewish resistance, the only concession madeto this policy was the quota of 1,500 a month. In the year1945-1946, about 15,296 Jews entered the country, of whom48.8 per cent were "illegals." The future of Jewish immigra-tion, as well as the Jewish political status, was being consideredby the UN at the time of writing.

UNITED STATES

Immigration to the United States was governed by theImmigration Act of 1924, which introduced a system oflarge quotas for immigrants from Western and CentralEurope, and narrowly restricted immigration from Easternand Southern Europe. The Truman Directive of December1945, governing the entry of DP's to this country, had tooperate within the framework of this system and was there-fore unable to contribute substantially to the solution of theDP problem, for the countries of origin of most of the DP'swere in Eastern Europe.

The first DP's to enter under the Truman Directive arrivedin the United States in May 1946, and from that date untilApril 1947, about 12,400 of them arrived from the U. S. Zoneof Occupation. Of these about 8,000, or 65 per cent of thetotal, were Jews.

During this same period, it was estimated that about 20,000Jews, all told, arrived in the United States. This figure com-prised, aside from DP's from Europe, 2,000 Jews from Shang-hai, and 10,000 from other countries, especially Sweden, theUnited Kingdom and France. Not all of these were quotaimmigrants, many having entered on non-quota, temporaryand transit visas.

During the past year, numerous bills were introduced inboth houses of Congress calling for the relaxation of restric-tions on immigration. Few of these passed. At the time ofwriting, hope for the solution of the DP problem was centeredupon the Stratton Bill in the House of Representatives and


the Ferguson Bill in the Senate. The former provided for theadmission of 400,000 DP's during the next four years overand above the normal quotas and without regard to theircountries of origin. The latter bill resembled the Stratton Bill,except that it did not specify the numbers to be admitted.Support for these bills came forth from virtually every segmentof American public opinion—the churches, the labor move-ment, civic groups, and the highest government officials,including Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman.

Although hearings were held on the question of DP immi-gration during the last session of Congress, no action was taken.Instead, a Sub-committee of the Senate Judiciary Committeewas appointed to conduct an investigation of the entireimmigration system and the problem of entry of DP's intothe United States.

- 5 . PEACE TREATIES-

By Milton Himmelfarb—

IN FEBRUARY 1947, in the city of Paris, the foreign ministersof the Big Four—France, Great Britain, the Soviet Unionand the United States—approved the definitive versions ofthe treaties of peace with the former satellite and vassal alliesof Nazi Germany. These numbered five in all: Bulgaria,Finland, Hungary, Italy and Rumania. The United Statesdid not sign the treaty with Finland', not having been at warwith that country.

Human Rights

In each treaty a clause provides for the protection ofhuman rights. It reads as follows:

Bulgaria [Finland, Hungary, Italy, Rumania] shall takeall measures necessary to secure to all persons under Bui-

PEACE TREATIES 563

garian [Finnish, Hungarian, Italian, Rumanian] jurisdic-tion, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamentalfreedoms, including freedom of expression, of press andpublication, of religious worship, of political opinion andof public meeting.

This constitutes Article 2 of the Bulgarian treaty; Article 6of the Finnish treaty; Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Hun-garian treaty; Article 15 of the Italian treaty, and Article 3,paragraph 1, of the Rumanian treaty.

In addition, the Italian treaty (Article 19, paragraph 4)provides that, in the transfer of Italian territory to otherstates (Yugoslavia and France),

The State to which the territory is transferred shall, inaccordance with its fundamental laws, secure to all per-sons within the territory, without distinction as to race,sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rightsand of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom ofexpression, of press and publication, of religious worship,of political opinion and of public meeting.

Abolition of Discriminatory Measures

All the treaties except the Italian include an undertakingto abolish discriminatory measures (Bulgarian treaty, Arti-cle 3; Finnish, Article 7; Hungarian, Article 3; Rumanian,Article 4). The master clause reads:

Bulgaria [Finland, Hungary, Rumania] which in accord-ance with the Armistice Agreement has taken measures toset free, irrespective of citizenship and nationality, all per-sons held in confinement on account of their activities infavor of, or because of their sympathy with, the UnitedNations or because of their racial origin, and to repealdiscriminatory legislation and restrictions imposed there-under, shall complete these measures and shall in futurenot take any measures or enact any laws which would beincompatible with the purposes set forth in this Article.


This was stressed more explicitly in the treaties with Hun-gary and Rumania (Hungarian treaty, Article 2, paragraph 2;Rumanian, Article 3, paragraph 2). The clause reads:

Hungary [Rumania] further undertakes that the laws inforce in Hungary [Rumania] shall not, either in theircontent or in their application, discriminate or entail anydiscrimination between persons of Hungarian [Rumanian]nationality on the ground of their race, sex, language, orreligion, whether in reference to their persons, property,business, professional or financial interests, status, politicalor civil rights or any other matter.

Restitution of Expropriated Property

The Hungarian and Rumanian treaties contain provisionsfor restoring to its rightful owners property extorted underthe racist dispensation, and for communal use of propertiesbelonging to communal institutions or to exterminated fami-lies. The relevant clauses are Article 27 in the Hungariantreaty and Article 25 in the Rumanian:

1. Hungary [Rumania] undertakes that in all cases wherethe property, legal rights or interests in Hungary [Ru-mania] of persons under Hungarian [Rumanian] jurisdic-tion have, since September 1, 1939, been the subject ofmeasures of sequestration, confiscation or control onaccount of the racial origin or religion of such persons, thesaid property, legal rights and interests shall be restoredtogether with their accessories or, if restoration is impos-sible, that fair compensation shall be made therefor.2. All property, rights, and interests in Hungary [Rumania]of persons, organizations or communities which, individuallyor as members of groups, were the object of racial, religiousor other Fascist measures of persecution, and remainingheirless or unclaimed for six months after the coming intoforce of the present Treaty, shall be transferred by theHungarian [Rumanian] Government to organizations inHungary [Rumania] representative of such persons, organi-zations or communities. The property transferred shall beused by such organizations for purposes of relief and re-habilitation of surviving members of such groups, organiza-

PEACE TREATIES 565

tions and communities in Hungary [Rumania]. Suchtransfer shall be effected within twelve months from thecoming into force of the Treaty, and shall include property,rights and interests required to be restored under para-graph 1 of this Article.

The Peacemakers

The treaty-making process had begun more than a yearbefore the final treaties were signed in Paris, subject to ratifi-cation in due course. The deputies of the Big Four foreignministers had been in almost constant session drawing up thedraft treaties until the summer of 1946. Then they weresubmitted, for discussion and recommendations only, to a confer-ence of seventeen allies and the great powers in Paris.

After bitter procedural wrangling, the principle was thereaccepted that a recommendation for change approved bytwo-thirds of the states voting would be considered a strongrecommendation in subsequent meetings of the Big Four toestablish the final texts of the treaties, while a recommenda-tion by simple majority would not carry equal weight. TheSoviet Union was a zealous supporter of the two-thirdsprinciple, for the simple reason that she could count on thesupport of more than one third of the states at the conference,and would thus be in a position to prevent the adoption ofrecommendations not to her liking. Both the Soviet Unionand the Anglo-American bloc used rhetoric that ran entirelyin terms of immutable justice, not of voting strength. Froma realistic point of view it was hard to understand the So-viet Union's motives for insistence on recommendation bya vote of two-thirds, unless she considered her "prestige" atstake. All the seventeen victorious states that had not attainedthe eminence of great-power status felt that their being con-sulted at all was a farcical formality; the few articulate onesamong them said so. That they were right was proved inJanuary 1947, when following the Paris conference, the BigFour foreign ministers or their deputies in New York com-pleted the drafting of the peace terms with no apparent


regard to the size of the majority by which any given recom-mendation had been adopted in Paris.

A perceptive wit, of those who have been uttering memo-rable and disillusioned mots about peace conferences for manycenturies, said of the Paris conference that its greatest achieve-ment was that it had not caused a new war. Another remarkedthat, in comparison with the proceedings in 1946, the peace-making of Versailles in 1919 had been a triumph of enlightenedand far-sighted statesmanship. Peace conferences notoriouslyare cursed by dissension among the victors and by the maneu-vering of selfish nationalisms for positions of influence andpower. The peacemaking of 1946-47, however, was dis-tinguished by unprecedentedly overt expressions of hostilitybetween the Anglo-American and Russian recent allies, aswell as by astonishingly coarse and vulgar recriminations.

This was the atmosphere in which Jews had to seek toachieve a firm guarantee of human rights in the defeatedcountries, and a measure of justice for the surviving Jews ofEurope.

The Jews and Power Politics

Before the Jews could hope to influence the peacemakingpowers, peace had first to be made among the various bodiesin which they were organized and through which they ex-pressed their views on what was desirable for themselves andfor their fellow Jews throughout the world. Peace was ulti-mately made among them, but it was no easy task. Thejoint recommendations submitted to the Paris conference inAugust 1946 were signed by the Agudas Israel World Organi-zation, the Alliance Israelite Universelle, the American Jew-ish Committee, the American Jewish Conference, the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, theConseil Representatif des Juifs de France, the South AfricanJewish Board of Guardians and the World Jewish Congress,the last named organization allowing separate signatures forthe Canadian Jewish Congress and the (Palestinian) VaadLeumi.

PEACE TREATIES 567

The combination of organizational rivalry and ideologicaldifference represented by this group of bodies was formidable,and it speaks well for them and for Jewry as a whole thatagreement was finally reached, in the face of innumerabletemptations for each organization to act separately or forseveral blocs to form. What finally prevailed over thesetemptations was the clear realization that conditions were atbest not propitious for the acceptance of the demands ofjustice and decency put forward by nearly all Jews, and thattheir cause would be utterly hopeless if each organization orbloc of organizations were to act on its own, duplicating oropposing the activities of the others. The harmony that wasfinally established among these groups was rendered uneasyby memory of past and fear of future strife, but it was greatlysuperior to the armed truce prevailing among the powersthey sought to influence.

The document embodying the joint recommendations ofthe Jewish organizations is entitled Statements Submitted to theParis Conference . . ., Paris, August 20, 1946. Both for whatit says and for what it does not say, it is an impressive docu-ment. Compromise and a spirit of realism excluded from ita number of recommendations put forward by one or theother of the cooperating Jewish organizations; on the otherhand, some recommendations were included pro forma, as itwere, either to keep the record clear or to satisfy one or an-other of the cooperating organizations, without any real hopeof acceptance or sustained effort to secure it.

Minority Rights

The most striking feature of the proposals put forward inthese Statements is a demand they do not include the demandfor minority rights. Twenty-seven years after the Comite desDelegations Juives had been very largely instrumental in hav-ing the celebrated minorities clauses incorporated in thetreaties concluded at Versailles, even the formal Jewish re-quests in 1946 did not go much beyond recommending thatthe human-rights clauses of the Hungarian and Rumaniantreaties should include recognition of freedom of religious


"practice" as well as of religious "worship," freedom of "asso-ciation," and "freedom . . . to preserve and develop theircultural entity." The difference Between 1919 and 1946 is notto be explained by any alleged domination of Western or"assimilationist" thinking in the latter year, as against adomination of Eastern or "nationalist" thinking in the former;Louis Marshall was not a minor figure in the Comite* desDelegations Juives in 1919, and "nationalist" ideologies werenot conspicuously weak among the Jewish groups in Parisin 1946. The explanation must be sought elsewhere.

The grim prime reason was the brute fact that Hitler'sexterminations had left Eastern Europe, the traditional seatof an intense Jewish group life outside of Palestine, with atragically reduced Jewish population. Minority rights canbe effectively exercised only by minorities of a certain size.Equally important was the complete triumph of the ideal ofthe unitary state over the ideals of Wilson's era. A distastefor minority rights was one of the few ideas shared in com-mon by the Eastern and Western blocs of powers. Althoughthis did not prevent Yugoslavia from urging a guarantee ofthe language rights of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary,there was general approval of the American representative'scomment: "It is difficult for a citizen of the United States tounderstand the desire to perpetuate racial minorities ratherthan to absorb them." A third reason was the clear historicallesson of the years between the wars: the rights and interestsof the European Jewish population had not been protectedto any significant degree by the inclusion of minorities clausesin the Versailles peacemaking.

Many must also have felt that an effort to guarantee mi-nority rights is a kind of luxury, permissible and even admir-able when human rights in general seem to be firmly estab-lished, but frivolous at a time when the rights of the individualhuman being are themselves everywhere being overthrownor challenged. Finally, the tension between East and Westwas too critical, and the fear that minority issues would beexploited by the other camp was too keen, to allow any reason-able hope to be sustained that minority rights could be con-firmed in the treaty-making.

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Restitution and Indemnification

The most important recommendations included in theStatements, if we are to judge by the actual efforts of the Jewishorganizations to obtain their incorporation in the peacetreaties, were concerned with the Hungarian and Rumaniantreaties, some relating to the guarantee of human rights andothers to restitution and indemnification. Of the first sortwere the requests that among the enumerated rights shouldbe included "equality before the law" and "freedom topursue their economic activities and to preserve and developtheir cultural identity"; that the United Nations be em-powered to supervise and enforce the fulfillment of the obli-gation to respect human rights, and that incitement to racial,ethnic, or religious hatred be prohibited. The recommenda-tions dealing with restitution and indemnification were thatRumanian and Hungarian victims of racial or religious perse-cution be given the status of United Nations nationals withrespect to the restoration of property or proper indemnificationtherefor, and that heirless Jewish property be transferred tothe Jewish community for the rehabilitation of the survivors.

Of these recommendations, only the last was incorporatedin the Hungarian and Rumanian treaties. This does notmean, however, that the efforts of the Jewish organizationsshould be rated as unsuccessful. For the Jews of the world,the narrow margins in which their representatives were con-strained to act were a condition that they could not hope tochange for the better. In 1919 the area between the marginshad been greater, and consequently the apparent success wasmore impressive. In each case, what could be done was done.

Nor should it be overlooked that it would be fallacious tojudge the effectiveness of Jewish action in 1946 only by theimprovement in the final texts of the treaties over the draftspresented to the Paris conference for discussion. The draftsthemselves included human-rights provisions largely becausethese had come to be accepted almost as a matter of coursefollowing the precedent of the human-rights provisions in theUnited Nations Charter, adopted at San Francisco in the sum-mer of 1945. The fact that Jewish organizations had been


largely instrumental in achieving the incorporation of thoseprovisions in the U. N. Charter a year before spared themthe necessity of waging an uphill, probably impossible, fightfor including similar provisions in the treaties; instead, it en-abled them to ask for more. That more was not granted wasnot their fault, but the fault of the evil times on which theworld had fallen only a short year after the promise of SanFrancisco.

Non-Discrimination Safeguards

The difficulties under which the Jewish organizations werelaboring can be vividly illustrated by the case history of oneclause. The draft treaties were relatively uniform in theirimposition of obligations to respect human rights and avoiddiscriminatory treatment on account of race, etc. The Jew-ish organizations wanted the non-discrimination clausestrengthened in the Hungarian and Rumanian treaties. Atfirst none of the great powers was willing to introduce thismodification, since they had agreed among themselves tosupport the drafts they had so laboriously worked out forjoint submission at Paris. It was not long, however, beforethe thin veneer of unanimity cracked under the pressure ofcontroversy over the disposition of Trieste and similar con-tentious issues, on which the great powers had been unableto secure common agreement for the draft treaties.

It was then that the United States and Great Britainagreed to propose the additional safeguards asked by theJewish organizations. Great Britain, however, went farther,and proposed that the modification apply to Bulgaria as well.Her reasons were transparent: to put the Russians on thedefensive, and to prove by this concern with human rightsin Europe that her Palestine policy was not the vicious thingit had been pictured to the world as being. The Jewishgroups were embarrassed, because they had not asked for theclause, the Bulgarian Jews themselves did not want it, andthe Communist press throughout the world started to de-nounce the organizations as "lackeys of the imperialists."

The Paris conference approved the additional non-dis-

PEACE TREATIES 571

crimination clause for Hungary and Rumania by a vote of 14to 6 (two-thirds) and for Bulgaria by a vote of 12 to 7 (justshort of two-thirds). The definitive text of the Bulgariantreaty does not include the clause in question. In the monthsfollowing the conference a compromise on Trieste was arrivedat, and the British casually let the Bulgarian clause go.

The Russians, too, after the Trieste compromise, ceasedto make a power-politics issue of the clauses by which theJewish organizations hoped to see a minimum of justice doneto the surviving communities in Hungary and Rumania. TheSoviet Union accepted the restitution provisions affectingJews, after making certain that the International RefugeeOrganization would be given no recognition, and after insist-ing on the deletion of the adjective "full" before the noun"compensation" in the passage dealing with property restora-tion or indemnification for victims of Axis persecution.

While the Trieste agreement was a necessary condition forthis relatively satisfactory decision on the Jewish clauses, itmight not have been sufficient. It is impossible to say howmuch "credit" should be imputed to the Jewish organizations,which continued their activities in New York in an attempt toinfluence the deputies of the Big Four after the adjournmentof the Paris conference. It is probably not an exaggerationto say that in this instance, too, the Jewish effort was justabout as effective as it could possibly be, in the given politicalconditions.

AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

Not even draft treaties for Austria and Germany had beenagreed on by the summer of 1947. The chronology of failurewas as follows: in January and February 1947 the deputiesof the Big Four foreign ministers discussed the Austrian andGerman treaties in London, in preparation for their subse-quent meeting in Moscow on the same subject; in March andApril the foreign ministers and their deputies met in Moscow,and produced nothing but an exchange of animosities in aninternational atmosphere that made the Paris conference ofthe year before look almost amicable by comparison; in May


the deputies resumed meeting on the Austrian treaty inVienna. There was no sound reason to believe that either anAustrian or a German treaty would be jointly signed in theforeseeable future.

Starting in the spring of 1947 substantially the same Jew-ish organizations that had been in Paris in the summer of1946 came together in New York to work out joint recom-mendations for these treaties. By July the great bulk of theirtechnical work had been completed. None of them wasoptimistic about their chances of success. They realized thatthe international situation had continued to deteriorate sinceParis. Furthermore, in the Austrian and German treatiestheir chief, almost exclusive, concern was with restitution,and the Russians had shown very clearly that they wanted theNazi spoils to go to themselves, not to revert to the despoiled.

It was at this time that great vogue was given to the obser-vation of yet another peace-conference wit, to the effect thatmankind would have to stop waging wars if it wished to avoidthe horrors of peacemaking.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS-

~By Sidney Liskojsky '

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, ratified on June 26, 1945,included among its purposes the achievement of "internationalcooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect forhuman rights and for the fundamental freedoms for all with-out distinction as to race, language, sex or religion" (Article 1,section 3). To this end, the Charter made it mandatory uponthe Economic and Social Council to "set up commissions inthe economic and social fields and for the protection of humanrights. . . ." These commissions were to serve as advisorybodies to the Economic and Social Council.

HUMAN RIGHTS 573

Economic and Social Council Recommendations

On February 29, 1946, at its first session, the Economicand Social Council adopted a resolution providing for theestablishment of a "nuclear" Commission on Human Rightsto work out a set of recommendations concerning the composi-tion, powers and program of a permanent Commission. The"nuclear" Commission met from April 28 to May 20, 1946,and prepared its recommendations for submission to thesecond session of the Economic and Social Council.

The Council, which held its second session from May 25 toJune 21, endorsed most of the recommendations of the Com-mission, but modified them in many important respects. Itrecommended, among other things, that the Commission onHuman Rights should consist of 18 members, serving, not intheir individual capacities as experts, but as representatives oftheir governments; that the Commission should prepare anInternational Bill of Rights and devise means for its imple-mentation; and that it should establish three sub-commissions:on the Protection of Minorities; on the Prevention of Dis-crimination; and on Freedom of Information and the Press.(The permanent Commission subsequently decided to com-bine the latter two.) It recommended that the Secretariatpublish a Year Book on Human Rights, and that memberstates of the United Nations "be invited" to set up localCommittees on human rights.

In addition, it adopted a resolution concerning the peacetreaties with the former enemy countries, recommending that"pending the adoption of an International Bill of Rights, thegeneral principle shall be accepted that international treatiesinvolving basic human rights, including to the fullest extentpracticable treaties of peace, shall conform to the funda-mental standards relative to such rights as set forth in thisCharter." These treaties (not including those with Germanyand Austria), completed in the summer of 1946, containedclauses whereby these states undertook to secure to all personsunder their "jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex,language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights andfundamental freedoms. . . ."


General Assembly Recommendations

All of the above recommendations were before the Com-mission on Human Rights when, on January 27, 1947, itopened its first regular session in New York, as well as severalothers adopted by the General Assembly during the secondpart of its first session held in the Fall of 1946.

One " of the recommendations of the General Assembly,originally proposed by the Egyptian delegation, and unani-mously adopted on November 19, 1946, asserted that "it isin the higher interests of human rights to put an end to reli-gious and so-called racial persecutions and discriminations,"and therefore called upon the Governments "to conform bothto the letter and to the spirit of the Charter of the UnitedNations and to take the most prompt and energetic steps tothat end."

Another Assembly resolution, with a direct bearing on theproblem of human rights, dealt with the treatment of Indiansin South Africa. On November 21, 1946, the Indian delega-tion introduced a resolution stating that "the Union Govern-ment's discriminatory treatment of Asiatics in general, andIndians in particular, on grounds of their race, constitutes adenial of human rights and fundamental freedoms and iscontrary to the Charter," and that this policy had "impairedfriendly relations between the two member states, and unlessa settlement is arrived at immediately, these relations arelikely to be further impaired." Therefore, the Union Gov-ernment is requested to revise its policies affecting Asiaticsin South Africa, "so as to bring them into conformity withthe principles and purposes of the Charter . . . and to reportat the next session of the General Assembly the action takenby them in this behalf." This resolution was fought withgreat vigor by the South African delegation on the groundthat the Charter did not authorize the United Nations tointervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of anystate (except in the case of enforcement measures called forby the Security Council in relation to threats to the peace).South Africa also argued that as yet there did not exist anyinternationally recognized formulation of human rights and

HUMAN RIGHTS 575

fundamental freedoms, and that therefore whatever moralobligation they had, they had no specific obligation. It there-fore proposed instead that the matter be submitted to theInternational Court of Justice for an interpretation of the"domestic jurisdiction" clause of the Charter.

Although the South African proposal was favored by theUnited States and Great Britain, it was defeated by theGeneral Assembly which, on December 8, passed a Frenchand Mexican proposal. This proposal, though somewhatweaker than the Indian resolution, had the same effect. Itrequested the Indian and South African Governments toreport to the next session of the General Assembly the mea-sures adopted to the end that "the treatment of Indians inthe Union should be in conformity with the internationalobligations under the agreements concluded between the twoGovernments, and the relevant provisions of the Charter."

Despite the fact that the main basis of the dispute betweenthe two countries was the alleged violation by South Africaof treaty agreements with India, the adoption of this resolu-tion was significant in that it specifically alluded to the humanrights provisions of the Charter. Moreover, the emphasis inthe discussions from the outset was on the violation of theseprovisions. In addition, the resolution obstructed the attemptto sidetrack Assembly action through bogging the matter inthe International Court. Thus was established a precedentfor similar resolutions in the future in relation to other stateswhere discriminatory practices are widespread.

Although the Egyptian resolution on "discrimination" andthe resolution on South Africa did not call for further actionby the Economic and Social Council or the Commission onHuman Rights, the General Assembly passed several otherresolutions which did. Thus, it adopted a resolution, pro-posed jointly by Panama, India and Cuba, on "Genocide,"which it denned as a crime denying "the right of existence ofentire human groups . . . ," the punishment for which is "amatter of international concern." This resolution invitedmember states to enact necessary legislation for preventionand punishment of this crime, and recommended that "inter-national cooperation be organized between states with a


view to facilitating the speedy prevention and punishment ofthe crime." It requested the Economic and Social Councilto undertake the necessary studies with a view to drawing upa draft convention to be submitted to the next regular sessionof the Assembly.

The General Assembly also discussed a draft of the Inter-national Bill of Rights submitted to it by Panama, which itreferred to the Commission on Human Rights for considera-tion in formulating the International Bill.

Commission on Human Rights

Thus, at its first regular session, the Commission on HumanRights had before it many matters of grave importance. Ithad before it the question of the contents of the InternationalBill of Rights. To guide it in this matter, aside from the draftof Panama, it had before it other important drafts. In addi-tion to the substance of the Bill of Rights, it had to decidewhat form the Bill was to take: whether it should be a declara-tion of the General Assembly, a multi-lateral convention oran amendment to the Charter. This was a crucial problem,for the binding character of the Bill was dependent upon itsform. As a declaration of the General Assembly, its bindingcharacter would be highly questionable. As a multi-lateral,convention, its binding character would be clear, but itsprospects of ratification would involve great delay. As anamendment to the Charter, it would become integratedinto the fundamental law of the United Nations and couldnot be denounced by member nations without expulsionfrom membership in the organization, as might be done inthe case of a convention.

In addition to the problems of the content and form of theBill, the Commission had to suggest ways and means for itseffective implementation. It had also to decide what to dowith communications on the subject of human rights receivedeither by the Commission or by the Secretariat. Finally, ithad to establish and define the terms of reference of its sub-commissions.

During the session of the Commission on Human Rights,

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held January 27 to February 10, 1947, many views wereexpressed concerning the contents of the Bill. These viewsreflected in large measure the difference in basic philosophybetween the nations in the Soviet sphere and those in the"western" sphere. For, while the former placed their mainemphasis on economic rights and on the obligation of theindividual to the community, the latter stressed politicalliberty and the primacy of the individual as against the state.

However, the Commission finally recognized that it wasnot in a position to formulate the precise contents of the Billof Rights and delegated the task to a special temporary sub-commission which it instructed to be guided by the viewsexpressed during the session. This sub-commission was alsoto explore the problem of enforcement and to examine inparticular the Australian proposal for the establishment ofan International Court of Human Rights. (The Australiandelegate had proposed that such a court be established todetermine disputes concerning the rights provided for in theBill. This court was to be open to any person or groups ofpersons, and all states accepting the Bill would be bound tocomply with its judgment.) It was, however, the consensusof almost all members of the Commission, with the exceptionof India and Australia, that it was premature to think seri-ously of enforcement. Thus, the United States proposal thatthe Bill be adopted in the form of a declaration of the GeneralAssembly was accepted with little dissension by the Com-mission.

The Commission decided to establish a Sub-commissionon Freedom of Information and the Press and a combinedSub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and onthe Protection of Minorities.

The functions of the former were to be the examination of"what rights, obligations and practices should be includedin the concept of freedom of information . . . ," and the per-formance of "any other functions which may be entrusted toit by the Economic and Social Council or by the Commissionon Human Rights." It was also to prepare a draft agendafor the forthcoming International Conference on Freedom ofPress and Information. (The Economic and Social Council


subsequently decided to fix the date and place of this Confer-ence at its next session.)

The second permanent sub-commission was "to examinewhat provisions should be adopted in the definition of theprinciples which are to be applied in the fields of preventionof discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, language orreligion and the protection of minorities, and to make recom-mendations to the Commission on urgent problems in thesefields." It was "to perform any other functions which maybe entrusted to it by the Economic and Social Council or theCommission."

The Commission also agreed on a procedure for handlingcommunications addressed to it. This was an exceedinglycomplex problem. For the United Nations had already re-ceived more than 1,000 human rights petitions from aggrievedprivate citizens, agencies and minority groups. Basic con-siderations were involved regarding the authority of theUnited Nations, freedom of the press and the danger of"reprisals" to petitioners if their identities became known.The Commission decided to instruct the Secretary General tocompile an annotated confidential list of communications fordistribution to members. Any item in the list would be madeavailable to members on request. Prior to each session, thechairman or vice-chairman of the Commission would meetwith one or two of the members to review the communicationsand to bring to the attention of the Commission any whichmight assist it in its work.

The Commission on Human Rights reported its views andrecommendations to the fourth session of the Economicand Social Council, which met from February 28 to March 29,1947. With a few modifications, the Council endorsed mostof the recommendations of the Commission. It decided toenlarge the membership of the sub-commission assigned to pre-pare the preliminary draft of the Bill from three to eight, anddesignated as members the representatives of the governmentsof Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, U. S. S. R.,U. K., and U. S. A. The resulting draft was to be submittedto the Commission on Human Rights at its next session, afterwhich it would be reviewed by all members of the United

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Nations. Following this step, it would be returned to theCommission for review. Finally, the Economic and SocialCouncil would examine it with a view to recommending anInternational Bill of Rights for submission to the GeneralAssembly in 1948.

In addition, it instructed the Secretary General to submitto its next session, after consultation with the General Assem-bly Committee on the Development and Codification ofInternational Law, and after reference to member govern-ments for comment, a draft convention on the crime ofGenocide.

It deferred until its next session consideration of the part ofthe report of the Commission on Human Rights dealing withthe handling of communications concerning human rights.

At the time of writing, the nature of the role to be playedin matters of human rights by the United Nations during theforeseeable future was taking shape. The crux of the entireproblem was the principle of state sovereignty. This principlehad emerged almost unqualified from San Francisco and itssupremacy was evident at every U. N. meeting where theproblem of human rights was raised. The United Nationswas manifestly to be only a clearing house for the airing ofgrievances and a stage whereon the glare of world moralopinion might light up threats to or violations of humanrights and fundamental freedoms. Enforcement was to re-main in the background until the achievement of a muchgreater measure of trust, and of agreement on basic socialvalues, among the nations of the world.

But even with the decision to postpone enforcement to anindefinite future, there was significance in the fact that theUnited Nations had during the first two years of its existencefocused so much attention on the problem of human andfundamental freedoms.


-7. WAR CRIMES-

By Maurice J. Goldbloom—

THE INITIAL TRIAL OF NAZI leaders at Nuremberg, whichcommenced on October 18, 1945, with the indictment oftwenty-four top figures in the Nazi hierarchy and seven Naziorganizations, lasted just under a year. Of the originaldefendants, three never came to trial in person. Robert Leycommitted suicide before the trial began; Alfred Krupp wasdropped from the list of defendants because he was too senileto stand trial; and Martin Bormann, although tried in absentiaand sentenced to death, was generally believed to have diedin the last days of the fighting in Berlin. Of the twenty-oneindividual defendants actually brought to trial, eleven weresentenced to death, seven to varying terms of imprisonment,and three were acquitted. Of the seven organizations indicted,four were convicted and three acquitted.

The evidence presented against the various defendants bythe prosecution varied in nature according to their positions.In the case of SS, Gestapo, and occupation officials, it was notdifficult to establish a direct responsibility for various types ofterror and crimes against humanity. Similarly, the guilt ofHermann Goering, as the second figure in the Nazi hierarchy,was easy enough to demonstrate, since so large a part of thecriminality of the Nazi regime was a matter of deliberategeneral policy. In some cases, however, the connection wasless direct, and was established only by presenting proof thatthe defendants had participated in particular decisions.

Superior Orders as Defense

The defenses offered were, for the most part, based on thedoctrine of superior orders. With the exception of Goering,none of the defendants accepted full responsibility for those

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acts of the Nazi regime in which he had participated. Gtoering,however, not only admitted his responsibility; he proclaimedit. He used the witness-stand as a rostrum from which todefend Nazism before the world, and neither apologized forhis crimes, denied them, or attempted to shift the respon-sibility for them. (He did, however, deny direct personalresponsibility for any murders.) At the other extreme Schachtand Von Papen claimed that they had always been opposedto the policies of the Nazi regime, had joined it only in thehope of exerting a moderating influence, and had suffered fortheir opposition to its excesses. The former Governor-Generalof Poland, Hans Frank, both admitted and condemned hisacts, but assigned the responsibility for them to Hitler. Hedeclared: "Hitler's road was the way without God, the wayof refusing to believe in Christ and, in its final point, the wayof political foolishness, the way of disaster and the way ofdeath." Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler Youth andGauleiter of Austria, denied that he was guilty of the specificcrimes against humanity with which he was charged. But hedid admit his political guilt, particularly insofar as anti-Semitism was concerned. He declared: "I t is my guilt thatI educated the German youth for a man who committedmurder a million-fold. I believed in that man. That is all Ican say as an explanation of my attitude. That guilt is minealone. The young generation is without guilt. It grew up inan anti-Semitic state. It saw nothing wrong in this policy.But if on the basis of anti-Semitism Auschwitz is possible thenAuschwitz must become the end of racial politics . . . . He whomaintains racial politics after Auschwitz is guilty." He char-acterized Hitler's policies as "a crime that led to disaster forfive million Jews and all Germans."

Ribbentrop's Defense

Several of the defendants sought to mitigate their guilt byciting the complicity in or approval of the crimes of Hitlerismby Allied nations or their citizens, or by showing that Alliedgovernments had followed similar policies. Thus Ribbentropsucceeded, over the strenuous objection of the Soviet prose-


cutor, in introducing evidence in regard to the secret agree-ment for the partition of eastern Europe which accompaniedthe Hitler-Stalin Pact, and in his final plea he declared:"When I went to Marshal Stalin in Moscow in 1939 he did notdiscuss with me the possibility of a peaceful settlement of theGerman-Polish conflict on the basis of the Kellogg-BriandPact. Rather he let me see that if, in addition to half ofPoland and the Baltic countries and Lithuania, he did notreceive the harbor of Lithuania, I might as well return."Schacht justified his part in the assimilation of the Sudeten-land's economy to that of Germany on the ground that theWestern Powers had handed that territory to Hitler "on asilver platter." Admiral Doenitz claimed that the same meth-ods of unrestricted submarine warfare with which he wascharged had been used by the United States Navy. AdmiralRaeder defended his adherence to the Nazi regime by quotingfrom Winston Churchill's "Great Contemporaries," publishedin 1937, statements which indicated that Churchill had atthat time not yet made up his mind whether Hitler's historicalrole was good or bad. (On the other hand, the attorney forthe SS was not allowed to introduce into the record allegedpro-Nazi statements by William Randolph Hearst.) Baldurvon Schirach claimed that he had been converted to anti-Semitism by the writings of Henry Ford. Goering declaredthat if the archives of other countries were opened, they couldbe made the basis of charges of plotting aggressive warfaresimilar to those leveled against him, and he defended theNazi violations of the laws of war by declaring: "If today theGeneva Convention so far as the Germans are concerned doesnot have any validity any longer, if today in all parts ofGermany industry is being dismantled and other great assetsof all spheres can be brought to other states . . . then measureslike that taken by Germany in the countries above mentioned[France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Yugoslavia, andGreece] cannot have been criminal on the part of Germany."In its verdicts, the court did not feel it necessary to deal withthese points, since they obviously had no direct bearing on theguilt of the defendants from a legal standpoint.

In its decision and its sentences, the Nuremberg Tribunal

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sought to act strictly within the terms of its charter and of theevidence before it. This meant that it could not consider anyaspects of the guilt of the defendants other than those coveredby the four counts of the indictment. These were:

Count 1: Conspiracy to commit acts named in the otherthree counts;

Count 2: Crimes against the peace, namely, planning,preparing, initiating, or waging aggressive war;

Count 3: War crimes, namely, violations of the laws orcustoms of war;

Count 4: Crimes against humanity, namely, murder,extermination, enslavement, deportation or other inhumaneacts against any civilian population, before or during thewar; or persecutions, political, racial, or religious.

This limitation raised no serious problem in the case ofGoering, whom the Tribunal easily found guilty on all fourcounts and condemned to death. Of him, the court declared:"From the moment he joined the party in 1922 and tookcommand of the street fighting organization, the SA, Goeringwas the adviser, the active agent of Hitler and one of theprime leaders of the Nazi movement. As Hitler's politicaldeputy he was largely instrumental in bringing the NationalSocialists to power in 1933 and was charged with consolidatingthis power and expanding German armed might. He de-veloped the Gestapo and created the first concentrationcamps In 1936 he became plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, and in theory and practice was the economicdictator of the Reich In the Austrian Anschluss he wasindeed, the central figure, the ringleader Even if heopposed Hitler's plans against Norway and the Soviet Union,as he alleged, it is clear that he did so only for strategicreasons After his own admissions to this Tribunal, fromthe positions which he held, the conferences he attended andthe public words he uttered, there can remain no doubt thatGoering was the moving force for aggressive war second onlyto Hitler."


Goering's Guilt

The court went on to discuss Goering's guilt in connectionwith war crimes and crimes against humanity, declaring:"The record is filled with Goering's admission of his complicityin the use of slave labor . . . As Plenipotentiary Goering wasthe active authority in the spoliation of conquered terri-tory . . . Goering persecuted the Jews, particularly after theNovember 1938 riots, and not only in Germany, where heraised the billion-mark fine, as stated elsewhere, but in theconquered territories as well. His own utterances then and inhis testimony show this interest was primarily economic—howto get their property and how to force them out of the economiclife of Europe. As these countries fell before the German army,he extended the Reich's anti-Jewish laws to them; the Reichs-gesetzblatt for 1939, 1940 and 1941 contains several anti-Jewish decrees signed by Goering. Although their exter-mination was in Himmler's hands, Goering was far fromdisinterested or inactive, despite his protestations in the wit-ness box. By decree of July 31, 1941, he directed Himmlerand Heydrich to bring about 'a complete solution of the Jew-ish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.' "

Hence the court concluded that "Goering was often, indeedalmost always, the moving force, second only to his leader.He was the leading war aggressor; both as political and asmilitary leader, he was the director of the slave labor programand the creator of the oppressive program against the Jewsand other races at home and abroad. All of these crimes hehas frankly admitted. On some specific cases there may beconflict of testimony but in terms of the broad outline, hisown admissions are more than sufficiently wide to be conclu-sive of guilt. His guilt is unique in its enormity. The recorddiscloses no excuses for this man."

Death Penalties and Life Sentences

The Tribunal also decreed the death penalty for ForeignMinister Joachim von Ribbentrop; Dr. Alfred Rosenberg,

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philosopher of Nazism and Minister for the occupied Easternterritories; SS Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst Kaltenbrunner,Chief of the Security Police and SD; Generals Wilhelm Keiteland Alfred Jodl; Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick; HansFrank, Governor-General of Poland; Julius Streicher, NaziJew-baiter No. 1; Fritz Sauckel, organizer of the system ofslave labor; Arthur Seyss-Inquart, betrayer of Austria andReichs-Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands; and, inabsentia, Martin Bormann. All of these had been convictedof crimes against humanity, all except Streicher of war crimesas well. Ribbentrop, Keitel, Rosenberg, and Jodl had alsobeen convicted on the first two counts; Frick and Seyss-Inquart on the second.

Of Ribbentrop, the court said: "He played an importantpart in Hitler's 'final solution' of the Jewish question. InSeptember, 1942, he ordered the German diplomatic repre-sentatives accredited to various satellites to hasten the depor-tation of Jews to the East. On February 25, 1943, Ribbentropprotested to Mussolini against Italian slowness in deportingJews from the Italian occupation zone of France. On April 17,1943, he took part in a conference between Hitler and Horthyon the deportation of Jews from Hungary and informedHorthy that the 'Jews must either be exterminated or takento concentration camps.' At the same conference Hitler hadlikened the Jews to 'tuberculosis bacilli' and said if they did notwork they were to be shot It was because Hitler's policyand plans coincided with his own ideas that Ribbentropserved him so willingly to the end."

Rosenberg, the tribunal declared, "helped to formulate thepolicies of Germanization, exploitation, forced labor, exter-mination of Jews and opponents of Nazi rule, and he set upthe administration which carried them out, . . . . His directivesprovided for the segregation of Jews. Ultimately, in ghettoshis subordinates engaged in mass killings of Jews and his civiladministrators in the East considered that cleansing the East-ern occupied territories of Jews was necessary. In December1941 he made the suggestion to Hitler that in a case of shooting100 hostages, Jews only be used."

"During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was head of


the RSHA (Reich Security Head Office)", the court said, "itwas engaged in a widespread program of war crimes andcrimes against humanity Jews, commissars and otherswho were thought to be ideologically hostile to the Nazisystem were reported to the RSHA, which had them trans-ferred to a concentration camp and murdered . . . . The RSHAplayed a leading part in the final solution of the Jewishquestion by the extermination of the Jews . . . . Under itsdirection approximately 6,000,000 Jews were murdered, ofwhich 2,000,000 were killed by the Einsatzgruppen and otherunits of the Security Police The murder of approximately4,000,000 Jews in concentration camps has heretofore beendescribed. This part of the program was also under thesupervision of the RSHA when Kaltenbrunner was head ofthat organization, and special missions of the RSHA scouredthe occupied territories and various satellites, arranging forthe transportation of Jews to these extermination institutions.Kaltenbrunner was informed of these activities." Atrocitiesagainst Jews also were charged to the other defendants whoreceived the death sentence. In the case of Julius Streicher,such atrocities formed the principal basis of condemnation.

Life sentences were meted out to Rudolf Hess, who—some-what surprisingly, in view of his high position in the Naziparty—was found innocent of war crimes and crimes againsthumanity; Walther Funk, President of the Reichsbank, whowas convicted on all counts except the first; and GrandAdmiral Erich Raeder, who was acquitted of crimes againsthumanity but convicted on the other three counts. Baldur vonSchirach, convicted only of crimes against humanity, wassentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, as was Dr. Albert Speer,convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity but ac-quitted on the first two counts. Baron Constantin von Neurath,a member of Hitler's government from 1933 on but generallyregarded as one of the "conservatives" who attempted torestrain the "excesses" of Nazism, was convicted on all fourcounts but sentenced to only 15 years' imprisonment. GrandAdmiral Karl Doenitz, convicted on counts 2 and 3, wassentenced to 10 years.

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Lesser Sentences

Perhaps the most controversial of the tribunal's decisionswas its acquittal of Hans Fritzsche, Franz von Papen, andDr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht. Fritzsche, a radiocommentator, was a relatively unimportant figure. But Papenand Schacht had been among the principal architects ofHitler's Reich. Neither had been indicted for war crimes orcrimes against humanity, although both had played prominentroles in the regime at a time when it was notoriously engagedin the latter. Describing Papen's part in the annexation ofAustria, the court declared: "He engaged in both intrigueand bullying, but the charter does not make criminal suchoffenses against political morality, however bad they maybe." Discussing Schacht's leading part in Hitler's rearmamentprogram, it said: "Rearmament in itself is not criminal underthe charter. To be a crime against peace under Article 60 ofthe charter, it must be shown that Schacht carried out thisrearmament as part of the Nazi plan to wage aggressivewar . . . . The Tribunal . . . . comes to the conclusion that thisnecessary inference has not been established beyond a reason-able doubt."

Reactions to the Verdict

The verdict of the Tribunal provoked widely varyingreactions. On the one hand, it evoked praise because it hadestablished and set down for posterity the full record of theNazi crimes and because, by its distinction among the defend-ants, it showed a genuinely judicial character. Thus, HansonBaldwin wrote in The New York Times: "The conduct of theNuremberg trials, acquittal of three defendants and partialacquittal of others and refusal of the International MilitaryTribunal to indict the German General Staff and someGerman organizations as criminal have greatly increased theprestige of Anglo-American and Allied justice. Here, clearly,was no mock trial, no foregone verdict; the justice was militaryand severe, but it was justice . . . . Nuremberg was in partic-ularly refreshing contrast to the trial of Lieutenant General


Tomoyuki Yamashita." And the deputy American intelli-gence chief in Europe expressed the sentiments of most Ameri-can Army officers when he hailed the refusal of the Tribunalto declare the German General Staff a criminal organization,declaring: "It is very encouraging to any staff officer that thecourt has not set a precedent under which he might some daybe prosecuted just for doing his job in helping plan themilitary defense of his country. This phase of the trial affectsall members of the military profession in all countries whomight be on the losing side some time and be prosecuted forit." (The other Nazi bodies declared not criminal per se werethe SA and the Reich Cabinet, while the Gestapo, SS, SD,and Nazi Leadership Corps were convicted.)

But these very aspects of the Tribunal's verdict also pro-voked widespread criticism. Thus, Harold Ickes wrote:"Quite aside from questions of policy and procedure, I am ata loss to understand the result of the Nuremberg trials excepton the theory, which I would deplore, that the court wantedto give an impression of judiciousness and so varied thesentences for the same or equivalent crimes. To me the mostshocking result of Nuremberg was not the sentence of 'hanging'against Hermann Goering and others but the acquittal ofHjalmar Schacht." And the New York Post, after ridiculingthe acquittal of Schacht and von Papen, added: "If Keiteland Jodl were guilty, then so is the German General Staff . . . .The verdict exonerating that body may cause uniformed menin Washington and London to breathe more easily; it is nosolace to the millions of Europeans who suffered the criminalityof Germany's organized war-planners and makers. How theGerman Cabinet can be exonerated while its members go tothe gallows or to jail remains another mystery." (Not all themembers of the German Cabinet were defendants in the firstNuremberg trial; among the trials scheduled to take placesubsequently were those of other Cabinet members, who wereto be judged on their individual guilt.)

On the other hand, criticism of the trial persisted on thegrounds (voiced by Senator Robert Taft, among others) thatit was a trial of the vanquished by the victors, and that thecharge of aggressive warfare represented ex post facto legis-

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lation. Indeed, the court itself appears to have been somewhathesitant in regard to the latter question (it must be remem-bered that this charge was included originally only at theinsistence of Justice Jackson and against the wishes of the otherthree powers), since it imposed no death sentence on anyperson not adjudged guilty of crimes against humanity—thatis, acts criminal according to the laws of all civilized nationsand the common conscience of mankind. As we have seen,atrocities against Jews figured importantly in this categoryof crimes.

In Germany itself, the impression made by the trial seemsto have been rather less than had been hoped; the impressionmade by the verdict was, however, considerable if not alto-gether fortunate. Public opinion studies made by MilitaryGovernment, as well as the observations of press represent-atives, indicated that more than three-quarters of the Germanpeople felt that the sentences had been too lenient, while lessthan two per cent thought them too severe. The acquittal ofSchacht and von Papen, in particular, aroused widespreadindignation. This was not decreased by the action of Americanauthorities in protecting them, at first, against the efforts ofPrime Minister Wilhelm Hoegner of Bavaria to arrest themfor trial under the German denazification law. Nor wereGermans favorably impressed when, after Schacht's acquittal,almost the entire Allied press corps lined up to exchangechocolate and cigarettes for his autograph. But Fritzsche,Schacht and von Papen were not to escape punishment alto-gether. After their release by the Tribunal, the Americanmilitary authorities eventually agreed to permit the Germansto bring them to trial, and they were sentenced to prisonterms for their part in the Nazi regime.

Other War Crimes Trials

The Nuremberg trials of top Nazi leaders, while by far themost spectacular of the trials of war criminals, were by nomeans the only ones. As of December 1, 1946, the UnitedNations War Crimes Commission announced that 24,365persons had been tried for war crimes by Great Britain, the


United States, France, Greece, Norway, Czechoslovakia, andPoland. Of these, 1,432 were sentenced to death, 16,413 toprison, and 6,520 acquitted. In addition, there were numeroustrials and executions in Russia and Russian-occupied territory,as well as many thousands of trials under the German denazi-fication laws. These trials have continued subsequently, andmay be expected to continue for some time to come. Amongthose executed as a result of trials other than those at Nurem-berg are Ion Antonescu, the former dictator of Rumania;Arthur Greiser, former Gauleiter of Danzig and Posen (whomPoland executed despite a Papal plea for mercy); KurtDaluege and Karl Hermann Frank, former Protectors ofBohemia-Moravia, and numerous SS generals and other topadministrators convicted of crimes in occupied countries.Trials of officials and guards of the various concentrationcamps were also conducted by the various powers withinwhose jurisdiction they fell, and resulted in numerous sentencesof death and imprisonment.

The Nuremberg Tribunal itself began, after disposing of thetop Nazis in the first trial, to try Nazi military and civilianleaders who had not been included in the first trial. First ofthe Nazi military leaders to be brought to trial in theseproceedings was Field Marshal Erhard von Milch, Com-mander of the Luftwaffe and member of the Nazi War Cabi-net. Milch, an "honorary Aryan," was convicted of warcrimes and sentenced to life imprisonment. Prosecutions werealso initiated against officials of the Nazi Ministries of Justiceand Foreign Affairs. Perhaps the greatest potential signifi-cance, however, is attached to the prosecution begun againsta number of leading industrialists, including the steel magnateFriedrich Flick and a number of the officials of IG Farben.Convictions in these cases might perhaps serve to counteractthe impression, produced on many Germans by the acquittalof Schacht and von Papen, that the Western powers wereinterested in prosecuting only the Nazi political leaders andnot their more respectable backers.

Review of the Year: International - AJC Archives

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