Rethinking the Moral Permissibility of Gamete Donation
Transcript of Rethinking the Moral Permissibility of Gamete Donation
RETHINKING THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF GAMETE DONATION
Melissa Moschella
Abstract: The dominant philosophical view of gamete donation as
morally permissible (when practiced in the right way) rests on
two premises: (1) parental obligations are triggered primarily by
playing a causal role (as agent cause) in procreation, not by
genetic ties, and (2) those obligations are transferable—that is,
they are obligations to make adequate provision for the child's
needs, not necessarily to raise the child oneself. Thus while
gamete donors are indeed agent causes of the children that their
donation helps to bring into existence, most think that donors'
obligations are discharged insofar as they know that competent
others intend to care for those children. In this article, I call
into question this dominant view by challenging both of its
premises. Challenging the first premise, I argue that genetic
parenthood is what primarily triggers parental obligations.
Challenging the second premise, I claim that those obligations
are non-transferable—i.e., that they are obligations not simply
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to ensure that someone will raise one's genetic child, but to
raise that child oneself (unless one is incompetent). The
implication of my argument is that gamete donation is inherently
wrong insofar as it involves acquiring non-transferable
obligations that one has no intention of fulfilling.
Note: The final version of this article has been published in
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics and can be found at:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11017-014-9314-4
Is there anything inherently wrong with gamete donation,
understood as allowing one’s gametes to be used in order to
procreate children whom one has no intention of raising oneself?
The dominant view among moral philosophers—and in society more
generally—is that gamete donation, at least when practiced in the
right way, is morally unproblematic.1 This view rests on two
1 The most notable exception is David Velleman, who argues that the obligationto raise one’s biological children is non-transferable because when children are estranged from their ancestry, their “lives [are] truncated or damaged in ways that seriously affect the prospects for personhood to be fully realized within them” [1]. My argument is similar to Velleman’s, though I disagree withhis claim that it is agent causality that triggers parental obligations. Rather, I think that progenitors have obligations to their genetic children
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premises about the nature and sources of parental obligations:
(1) parental obligations are triggered primarily by playing a
causal role (as agent cause) in procreation, not by genetic
ties,2 and (2) those obligations are transferable—that is, they
are obligations to make adequate provision for the child’s needs,
not necessarily to raise the child oneself.3 Thus while gamete
donors are indeed agent causes of the children that their
even in the rare cases where they had no agent causal role in procreation. My case also differs importantly from Velleman’s in that I try to construct an argument from moral principle, whereas Velleman explicitly admits that he is unable to do so. James Nelson [2] and Daniel Callahan [3] also view gamete donation as morally problematic. Nelson argues that parental obligations are too important to transfer to others, but he does not give a satisfactory explanation of why gamete donors have any greater responsibility than doctors or other proximate agent causes of the child’s existence. Callahan emphasizes the importance of biological fathers, but fails to give an account of why biological parenthood as such triggers non-transferable parental obligations. Alexander Pruss presents an argument for the wrongness of gamete donation which is similar to mine but is primarily theological in nature [4].2 While the causal account is not the only one, it seems to be the dominant view. In addition to Velleman [1], Nelson [2] and Callahan [3], see [5-10]. Ofcourse, in some instances, parenting obligations can also be taken on voluntarily by those who did not play a causal role in the child’s existence, as in the case of adoption. Here, I am interested not in the question of who counts as a parent or who has a right to raise a particular child, but rather,in the separate question of who, even in the absence of a desire for parenthood, has obligations to care for a child. 3 Weinberg questions the claim that a sperm donor can transfer parental responsibility, arguing that children need to be loved and that the obligationto love is inherently non-transferable. However, since Weinberg’s underlying account of parental responsibility only shows that sperm donors are initially responsible for the children conceived with their sperm, it is not clear why that responsibility cannot be discharged by ensuring that others will love thechild. What is missing in Weinberg’s account is an explanation (such as the one I offer below) of why or in what sense the specific love of the sperm donor himself is important for the child’s well-being [11].
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donation helps to bring into existence,4 most think that donors’
obligations are discharged insofar as they know that competent
others intend to care for those children.5
In this paper, I call into question this dominant view by
challenging both of its premises. Challenging the first premise,
I argue that genetic parenthood is what primarily triggers
parental obligations. This argument is based upon the claim that
genetic parenthood in itself constitutes a personal relationship
between genetic parent and child that is the source of special
obligations.6 Challenging the second premise, I claim that those 4 Tim Bayne [7] argues that no moral responsibility flows from gamete donors’ causal role because one is only responsible for the gametes that are under one’s control. On this view, since donors alienate control over their gametes,all procreative responsibility falls only on those who use the donated gametes. For a critique of this view, see [10]. My account differs from both because I deny that playing an agent causal role in procreation is the key basis for the acquisition of parental obligations. It also explains why one ought not to alienate control over one’s gametes either directly (through sperm or egg donation) or indirectly (as in the hypothetical case of a gonadaltransplant).5 David Benatar [12] and others [10, 13] argue that most “donors” (most are paid for their “donation”) take even this responsibility too lightly, since inmost cases, donors do not know whether the would-be social parent or parents of their genetic children are competent to raise a child. I agree with this point, but here, I ask the further question of whether donating gametes would be morally problematic even if one were assured that one’s genetic child wouldbe raised by excellent parents. 6 This view implies that it is possible to acquire parental responsibility even without playing an agent causal role in procreation, as in cases of purloined sperm. (Several such cases are discussed in Hubin [9].) I accept this implication, and do not consider it implausible, given that injustices can often change one’s moral situation in ways that result in the acquisition of new obligations. If, for instance, I had a seven-year-old sister and all ofmy family members except for her were murdered, I would acquire prima facie
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obligations are non-transferable—i.e., that they are obligations
not simply to ensure that someone will raise one’s genetic child,
but to raise that child oneself (unless one is incompetent). The
reason why the obligations are non-transferable is that children
are personally dependent on their genetic parents for the ideal
fulfillment of their developmental needs. The implication of my
argument is that gamete donation is inherently wrong insofar as
it involves acting in a way that is highly likely to result in
the acquisition of a non-transferable obligation to another
person, without being willing to fulfill that obligation should
it arise.
My argument rests on two crucial premises. First, in
claiming that the genetic parent-child relationship is itself a
personal relationship, I assume that a human embryo is
substantially the same entity as the human person into which that
embryo will mature (in the normal course of events), and that the
person into which the embryo will mature is a human animal. I
assume, in other words, the truth of some version of animalism as
responsibility for my sister’s upbringing. This burden would simply be one aspect of the injustice done to me by the murder of my family members.
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an account of personal identity.7 Second, in claiming that
genetic parents have non-transferable obligations to their
genetic children, I assume that personal relationships that
create personal dependencies trigger special, non-transferable
obligations that correspond to those dependencies. While I cannot
undertake a full defense of these premises here, I do offer a
brief explanation and defense of them in the first two sections
of the paper.8 In the remainder of the paper, I build on these
premises to explain why genetic parents have non-transferable
obligations to raise their genetic children, and conclude by
applying this analysis to a moral evaluation of gamete donation.
Before continuing, I must clarify my definition of genetic
parenthood.
7 While the most prominent defense of animalism is Eric Olson’s The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology [14], in this article, I do not commit myself to any specific version of animalism. Olson’s version, however, would be sufficient for my purposes here. 8 Although it is impossible to fully defend all of one’s premises in any givenarticle, it seems preferable to at least spell out those premises and offer a brief account of them than to proceed as if one’s premises were non-controversially true. Those who argue for the moral permissibility of gamete donation tend to presume the truth of a psychological view of identity and a voluntarist account of moral obligation, usually without ever even identifying—let alone defending—those premises. Thus, my aim in the first two sections ofthe article is simply to clarify what my premises are and to show that, at thevery least, they are no more controversial than those that underlie the opposing view.
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Genetic Parent: A is a genetic parent of B if (i) A passes on genetic information to B, (ii) A’s physical genome is passed on to B, and (iii) A’s physical genomewas reshuffled once (usually mixed with the genome of adifferent individual) to constitute B. 9
The first condition is straightforward. The second and third
conditions are necessary because they enable us to explain why
the children of one’s identical twin are not one’s own genetic
children, even though genetic information identical to one’s own
was passed on to them, and why, in the case of twinning, the
“elder” twin (the original embryo) that passes on genetic
information and a physical genome through fission (thus meeting
the first two criteria) is not the parent of the “younger” one
[15].
Animalist account of identity
My argument relies on several assumptions about personal
identity. I assume (1) that a human being is a living animal, (2)
that, in the normal case, for at least most of its life, the
living human animal is a person, and (3) that the identity
conditions of a human being, both over time and at any one time,
9 This definition is a slightly modified version of the one offered by Heidi Mertes and Guido Pennings [15].
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are the same as the identity conditions of the living animal that
human being is—i.e., that continued existence of the same human
organism is a necessary and sufficient condition for continuity
of identity. The third assumption implies that when, in the
normal course of events, a human animal develops to the point of
being able to engage in characteristically personal activities
like deliberation and conceptual thought, it remains
substantially the same entity—the same human animal—that it was
prior to acquiring that ability. While some animalists claim that
every living human animal is a person [16], the argument in this
paper requires only the weaker claim that human animals capable
of engaging in characteristically personal activities are
persons. This claim, together with my account of personal
relationships in the next section, is sufficient to ground my
argument that in acquiring a relationship of biological causality
with the human animal conceived through his or her donation, a
gamete donor acquires a relationship with an entity that will
become a human person in the normal course of events.
A full argument for the animalist account of identity that
my overall case relies upon goes beyond the scope of this paper,
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but here, I offer a few considerations in its defense. First,
without this view some of the most basic moral judgments cannot
be explained. We think that assault is a more serious crime than
vandalism (more serious in kind, not just in degree) because it
is a crime against oneself, not just one’s property, and that rape
is a personal violation, even if the victim is unconscious and
never finds out about it later. The best explanation for these
judgments is that I and my organism are the same thing.
Second, the main alternative to animalism—a psychological
view of identity in which personal identity, or at least what
matters about personal identity, is based upon psychological
features and psychological continuity—has significant flaws even
aside from being unable to account for common moral judgments
like those mentioned above. Most notably, psychological views
face the intractable problem of “branching” cases—cases in which
one person is psychologically continuous with two future persons
as a result of a brain state transfer, brain bisection operation,
or some other similar hypothetical scenario.10 In such
10 Even in non-branching cases, the psychological view suffers from what Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan [17] call the “too many subjects” problem—i.e., thatevery conscious state has two subjects: oneself and one’s organism. Campbell and McMahan argue that the psychological view may be able to overcome this
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duplication cases, one person would be identical to two others
who are not themselves identical to each other—a clear
contradiction.11
Personal relationships, personal dependence, and special
obligations
problem but that animalism faces an even worse problem—what they call the “toomany organisms” problem. Campbell and McMahan believe that this problem occursin the rare case of cephalopagus conjoined twins, in which there appear to be two bodies (usually partially fused in the torso) and one head. In such cases,the authors argue that there is only one person, but two organisms. Their critique is flawed, however, because they fail to recognize that organisms canbe one in some respects and distinct in other respects. Like other types of conjoined twins, despite having real organic unity in some respects, twins conjoined at the head are also individual organisms with an inherent active disposition to complete independence, including the formation of fully independent brains and heads (for more on this point, see Patrick Lee and Robert George [16]). Indeed, cephalopagus twins usually have not only their own brain stems and cerebella, but also two distinct faces as well as distinct(but conjoined) cerebra [18]. It is also worth noting, in this regard, that evidence of consciousness has been found in children who have a functional brainstem but lack a functional cerebral cortex [19, 20]. Cephalopagus twins can thus be understood as two distinct human animals who are extremely disabled (and unable to survive long after birth) due to severe developmental abnormalities. The case therefore need not present difficulties for an animalist account of identity.11 Derek Parfit responds to this problem by arguing that in duplication cases,while I cannot be identical to both of the resulting persons, strictly speaking, I survive in both in every sense that actually matters [21]. Yet is that really true? If I were married prior to the operation, would both (or either) of the persons psychologically continuous with me be married to my husband? Who would have a right to my property, or to my job? Who would be responsible for raising my children? Answering those questions requires determining which (if either) of the resulting persons is actually me. Since Parfit’s view cannot tell us that, it is not satisfactory even as an account of what matters about identity.
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Having explained my first premise—that human beings are
animals, that the diachronic identity conditions of a human being
are the same as the diachronic identity conditions of a human
animal, and that most human animals are persons for at least most
of their lives—I now move on to my second premise regarding the
connection between personal relationships and special
obligations. I define relationship as follows.
Relationship: union or interconnection with another
human being at the intellectual, volitional, emotional
and/or bodily levels.
The degree of one human being’s relatedness to another depends on
the intensity (at any one level) and the comprehensiveness
(across levels) of that union. Yet not every relationship—i.e.,
not every union or connection between persons—is a specifically
personal one.12 What makes a relationship specifically personal is
that the ties that bind one person to another are unique
characteristics, things about the parties that are not equally
true of others. 12 For instance, in the broad sense, I have a relationship with everyone who shares my view that gamete donation is morally impermissible because that shared conviction constitutes a union at the intellectual level. But there is nothing specifically personal about such a relationship because that conviction is not in itself a unique characteristic.
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Personal relationship: a relationship in which the
parties relate as unique and irreplaceable individuals,
not merely fulfilling a function which anyone with the
relevant competencies could fulfill.13
My relationship with a bank teller as such, for instance, is not
personal insofar as it is not based on any unique characteristics
of that person, and any other equally competent teller (or a
well-functioning automatic teller machine) could meet my needs
equally well. By contrast, my relationship with a friend is
personal insofar as it is based on unique personal
characteristics proper to that person, which means that there are
things that person, and only that person, can “do” for me (in the
broad sense of the term).
Because in personal relationships individuals are bound
together based in part on unique personal characteristics, it is
proper to these relationships that they involve personal
dependence because they create needs that can only be fulfilled
by the person in relation with whom those needs arose. The reason
they create such needs is that when and insofar as Person A and
13 Hugh LaFollette offers a similar characterization of personal relationships in Personal Relationships: Love, Identity and Morality [22].
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Person B have a personal relationship, the contribution that A
and B make to each other’s lives is, by definition, unique and
irreplaceable. Of course, the level of personal dependence that
exists in any given personal relationship varies according to the
nature and circumstances of the relationship. A casual friendship
involves a much lower level of personal dependence than a
marriage.
To illustrate more concretely the connection between
personal relationships and personal dependence, I analyze a
simple example that will serve as a paradigm for understanding
the general features of personal relationships and how they
trigger special obligations. That example involves a confidante-
confider relationship: Amy is the only person in whom Clare has
confided about a number of sensitive personal matters. Clare is
therefore personally dependent upon Amy with regard to needs
related to those matters: the need for privacy, for advice
related to those matters, for encouragement in dealing with them,
and so forth. Note that while Clare’s need for advice and
encouragement exists independently of her relationship to Amy,
the fact that Amy is now uniquely capable of helping Clare is
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what makes the dependence personal. There could also be other
unique characteristics of Amy—for instance, that she has proven
her trustworthiness to Clare through her loyalty on previous
occasions, or that she is a particularly good listener—that make
their relationship genuinely personal (based on unique personal
characteristics) and that make Clare personally dependent on Amy.
(For the sake of simplicity, I only consider one side of the
relationship in this case.)
Of course, human relationships are usually based on a mix of
unique and non-unique, or at least not completely unique, traits
and characteristics. Thus Clare appreciates, trusts, and relies
upon Amy in part because Amy is a good listener—a not fully
unique characteristic—and in part because of fully unique
characteristics, like the shared experiences in which Amy has
proven her loyalty. It is the latter, and the unique blend of the
latter with the former, that make the relationship properly
personal, and that make Clare personally dependent on Amy.
The fact that Amy is Clare’s confidante, and that Clare is
personally dependent on her as a result, creates a special,
personal obligation on Amy’s part to meet the needs that have
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arisen out of this relationship. By qualifying the obligation as
“special,” I mean that it is a specification of Amy’s general
obligation to foster the well-being of others, giving her a
reason to prioritize Clare’s well-being over the well-being of
others toward whom her obligations are weaker or less
important.14 By qualifying the obligation as “personal,” I mean
that it is non-transferable—it must be carried out personally.
When Clare wants advice about the subject of her confidences, she
wants advice from Amy, not from some third party that Amy sends
on her behalf.
If my analysis is correct, then it is a general feature of
personal relationships that each person in that relationship will
have special, non-transferable obligations to meet the needs of
the other insofar as those needs have arisen out of the personal
relationship as such. This obligation is, of course, only a prima14 Assuming that the needs of others always have some general moral claim on us, there must be some way of distributing the work of caring for those in need, of determining whose needs we are primarily responsible for attending to, by establishing an order of moral priority among the competing claims thatthe neediness of all human beings makes upon us. In other words, there has to be a way to specify the general obligation to contribute to the good of others. One’s degree of responsibility for another’s well-being depends on theextent to which one has a morally relevant connection with that person [16, p.147]. One way of establishing such a connection to another person could be through consent or some other voluntary act—for example, making a promise or establishing a contract. Here, however, I argue that even non-voluntary relationships can trigger special obligations.
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facie one which may be overridden by other, weightier
obligations.
Some needs may arise in the context of a personal
relationship that do not arise out of the personal relationship
as such. For example, imagine that after a long consultation with
Amy, Clare is hungry. The fact that Amy has a personal
relationship with Clare does give her a greater responsibility to
alleviate Clare’s hunger than to alleviate the hunger of a
stranger (all other things being equal). However, Clare’s hunger
is not a need that arises out of their personal relationship as
such; Clare has no specific need for Amy to alleviate her hunger,
and therefore, while Amy has a special obligation to contribute
to Clare’s well-being in general, her obligation to attend to
this particular need is transferable, meaning that she does not
have to do so personally. As long as Amy has reason to believe that
Clare has the means by which to get herself something to eat, she
need not get directly involved in the matter.
It is important to note that while Amy’s relationship to
Clare at least to some extent involves the voluntary assumption
of commitment on Amy’s part, as well as an extended history of
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interaction between Amy and Clare, the relationship’s nature and
weight and Amy’s obligations to Clare do not essentially depend
on either of these features of their relationship. Rather, on my
account, it is the mere fact that Clare is personally dependent
upon Amy—i.e., that there are benefits that Amy is uniquely
capable of providing for Clare—that is the source of Amy’s
personal (non-transferable) obligation. Likewise, it is the mere
fact that Amy has a relationship with Clare that gives Amy a
special obligation to prioritize Clare’s needs over those of
others toward whom her special obligations are weaker. In this
case the relationship clearly includes a volitional dimension,
but it is possible for a relationship to exist in which that
dimension is absent at least initially.15 This point will become
important later when examining the genetic parent-child
relationship.16 15 Though my non-voluntarist associativist approach to obligation has some elements in common with that of Raymond Belliotti [23], my focus is less on the point that our relationships (including biological relationships) are partially constitutive of who we are, but more on the personal dependencies that personal relationships create. In this way my account avoids some of the shortcomings of Belliotti’s while still explaining (in ways that other theorists have not yet done) the common sense belief that biological relationships create some form of special obligation. For a critique of Belliotti’s view, see Jeske [24]. Jeske believes that the parent-child biological relationship in and of itself generates no special obligations.16 This point is important for the claim that genetic relationships as such (even in the absence of agent causality) trigger non-transferable parental
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These reflections point to three key features about the
connection between personal relationships and obligations. First,
having a personal relationship with someone grounds a special
obligation to promote that person’s well-being in general, an
obligation which lasts as long as the relationship continues.
Second, the weight of that special obligation depends on the
closeness (in terms of intensity and comprehensiveness) of the
relationship, and the importance of the need that one is
obligated to meet. Since many relationships are asymmetrical in
terms of both closeness and neediness, it is important to point
out that it is the closeness of Person B to Person A and the
importance of Person B’s needs that determine the weight of
Person A’s special obligations to Person B, and vice versa.
Third, there is a special personal (non-transferable) obligation to
meet the needs that arise from the personal relationship as such,
which are needs that, by definition, cannot be met by anyone
else.
While only a sketch, this account of special obligations
offers a principled way of prioritizing our obligations to others
obligations. However, in the standard gamete donor case, the donor does in fact do something voluntary that leads to the initiation of the relationship.
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in a way that makes sense of many common intuitions and
practices. It explains, for instance, why most people consider it
not only acceptable but obligatory to use a greater proportion of
their limited resources for the benefit of their family members
and close friends than for the benefit of strangers, but also why
meeting the dire need of a stranger (stopping to help a stranger
who was hit by a car) can take priority over meeting a less
important or urgent need of a family member (as when stopping to
help the stranger makes one arrive late to a daughter’s soccer
game). It also explains why we think that there is no injustice
to the students involved when a professor asks another professor
to proctor an exam in her stead (assuming that there is no reason
to think that her students will need her there to clarify what
the questions mean), but that there is an injustice to students
if the professor asks another professor to fill in for her at
advising meetings. The differences in the weight and type
(transferable or non-transferable) of one’s obligations in each
of these circumstances is not explainable with reference to
voluntary actions and commitments alone, but rather, is based
primarily on the closeness of each relationship, the importance
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of the need in question, and the extent to which that need is one
that cannot be met by anyone else because it arises out of a
personal relationship.
Genetic parents have special, non-transferable obligations to
their genetic children
In this section, I build on both premises outlined above to
show that the genetic parent-child relationship is in itself a
personal relationship, and then analyze the characteristics of
that relationship to determine the strength of the special
obligations that flow from it, and the extent to which those
obligations are non-transferable.
Assuming that a living human organism is or was or will be
(in most cases) a human person in the sense I explained earlier,
and that a personal relationship is one in which the individuals
are related based on unique personal characteristics, it follows
that a genetic relationship is in itself a personal relationship
(when both parties are persons), because it is indeed a
relationship, and this relationship is based on unique
characteristics. The genetic parent-child relationship is a
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relationship because it involves an interconnection of
individuals on the biological/bodily17 dimension of their being.18
This claim sounds counterintuitive when applied to the case of a
gamete donor because it is rare for a human relationship to be
merely biological. Yet, the claim that even merely biological
relationships are truly relationships is not so strange if one
considers that actions like seeking out lost relatives or trying
to get to know a particular set of people rather than another
just because they are one’s relatives are intuitively
intelligible at least to most people.19 It could be argued that
we do these things and find them intelligible for cultural
reasons, yet the persistence of such attitudes and behaviors
across times and cultures gives reason to be skeptical of a
purely cultural explanation.
17 I use the word “body” in this paper to refer only to a living body.18 Even if the initial relationship is established with a human organism that is not yet a person, that does not matter for my account; all that is necessary for my account is that a relationship be established with a human organism who will foreseeably become a person.19 Note that I am using this example simply to show the plausibility of a factual premise—that genetic relationships are personal relationships—not to make any direct claim about obligations. The nature and degree of one’s obligations to any particular person (relative or not) will depend on the criteria laid out in the previous section. It seems plausible, however, that one would be obligated to respond in a more courteous and welcoming manner to a phone call from a lost relative than to a similar call from a complete stranger.
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Not only do genetic parents have a relationship to their
children, but that relationship is personal because the
interconnection of genetic parents and children is based on
unique characteristics. Genetic parents (via their combined
gametes) relate to their children as biological causes20 of their
existence and identity. The zygote is the union of the genetic
parents’ gametes. All of the biological material that initially
make up the zygote come from the parents’ gametes, and the
biological information contained in the combined gametes,
especially in the genome that results from the parents’ combined
genetic material, is the source of the zygote’s integrated
organic functioning. The genetic parent-child relationship is
therefore one in which the persons are connected to each other as
unique individuals—to have different parents is, necessarily, to
be a different person. If, as I have argued above, our identity
conditions are identical to the identity conditions of the
organisms that we are, then genetic parents and their genetic
children have an extremely intimate personal relationship,21 even20 I use the term “biological cause,” as distinct from efficient cause, to indicate a combination of material and formal causality in the Aristotelian sense.21 In this section, I use the term “personal relationship” in a loose sense toinclude relationships between human organisms in which one or both of the
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if their only “interaction” is via the gametes of the genetic
parents.22
Given the premise that personal relationships create special
obligations, the fact that the genetic parent-child relationship
is itself a personal relationship already implies that genetic
parents have a special obligation to their genetic children. More
needs to be said, however, to determine the strength of the
obligation and the extent to which it is non-transferable. As
discussed earlier, the weightiness of a special obligation
depends on the closeness of the relationship that gives rise to
it, as well as the importance of the need that one has the
obligation to meet. The non-transferability of an obligation
depends on the extent to which that obligation arises from a
personal dependence created by the personal relationship.
parties to the relationship may not (yet or currently) be a person. My accountof the wrongness of gamete donation only requires that the donor have a personal relationship with a genetic child who in the normal course of events will become a person.22 To be more precise, from the child’s perspective, the relationship is intimate and comprehensive, whereas from the parent’s perspective, the relationship is intimate but not comprehensive. In other words, the child, not the parents, comes to be through the relationship with her genetic parents, and the child, not the parents, receives her genetic and initial overall biological identity through that relationship.
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To determine the weightiness of genetic parents’ special
obligation to their genetic children, one needs to know how close
the relationship is from the child’s perspective, as well as the
importance and degree of the child’s neediness. The child-genetic
parent relationship is initially the most intense and
comprehensive—and therefore the closest—of that child’s human
relationships. This gives us reason to think that the special
obligations of parents to their genetic children are among the
strongest of any human relationship, particularly considering the
extreme neediness of human beings in the early years of life and
(as I will argue below) the unique capacity of genetic parents to
meet their children’s developmental needs fully.
Another important feature of the genetic parent-child
relationship is its permanence. The relationship is permanent in
the sense that, unlike relationships based on circumstantial or
changeable characteristics (of which the relationship between Amy
and Clare would be one example), the genetic parent-child
relationship is based on essential identity-constituting
characteristics. It is a permanent and identifying feature of my
being that I came to be through the union of my genetic parents’
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gametes. Not to be related to my genetic parents in this regard
is, simply, not to be me—indeed, it is not to exist at all. I am
and always will be the genetic child of my genetic parents, and
my genetic parents are and always will be my genetic parents,
regardless of what happens to our relationship at the affective,
volitional, and intellectual levels.
Since, therefore, the special obligation of genetic parents
to their genetic children is based on a personal relationship
that is permanent by its very nature, the special obligation is
itself likewise permanent. For as long as they and their genetic
children are alive, genetic parents have a special obligation for
the well-being of those children. The weight of the obligation
will vary, of course, as children gradually become more
independent and as they form intimate relationships with others.
But since initially (at conception)23 the genetic parents are the
ones with the closest relationship to that child, they are the
ones with the strongest special obligation to ensure that the
child’s developmental needs (including developmental needs in
23 “Initially” means “at conception,” since this is when a new human organism begins to exist.
25
utero) are met.24 As I have not yet established the non-
transferability of this obligation, though, what I have said so
far shows only that genetic parents initially have the strongest
obligation to make sure the child’s needs are met by someone. And
if others become the child’s primary caregivers, those social
parents will likely form a personal relationship with the child
that is closer, overall, than the relationship of merely genetic
parents to their children. Still, the permanence of the child-
genetic parent relationship means that the genetic parents always
have some level of special obligation to their genetic children,
and that is incompatible with completely washing their hands of
the child’s fate once others take on primary parenting
24 In cases of gestational surrogacy, the emotional bonds that the fetus formswith the gestational mother in utero also create a close relationship that rivals the closeness of the child’s relationship with her genetic mother. Here, I remain agnostic about which relationship is closer, although the genetic bond is more permanent. For an analysis of the moral relevance of gestational parenthood, see Gheaus [25]. However, since one’s special obligations to one’s genetic children begin as soon as those children begin toexist, the (prima facie) obligation to raise one’s genetic children would arguably include the obligation to gestate the child and/or support the motherwho is gestating the child.
26
responsibilities.25 I will come back to this later, as it is the
basis for the weak version of my conclusion.
First, though, it is necessary to consider to what extent
that initially very weighty special obligation of genetic parents
to their children is non-transferable. In the example of Amy and
Clare, while Amy has a special obligation for Clare’s well-being
in general, she only has a non-transferable obligation to meet the
needs that arose from the personal relationship—that is, to
provide the benefits that only she is able to provide. So to
determine the content of genetic parents’ non-transferable
obligations to their children, one needs to determine which of
the children’s needs flow from their personal relationship to
their genetic parents; that is, one needs to determine which are
the benefits that can be provided only by the genetic parents
themselves.26 25 Imagine that teenage parents incompetent to raise their genetic child give that child up for adoption, and that closed adoption is the best or only possibility in the circumstances. On my view, the genetic parents should nonetheless maintain a life-long concern for that child’s well-being such thatif, for example, one of them unexpectedly became extremely wealthy, he or she would have a prima facie obligation to use some of that wealth for the child’sbenefit (assuming it is possible and not prejudicial to weightier obligations).26 A gamete donor (as opposed to cases in which gametes were procured or used without permission) is, additionally, an agent cause of the child’s coming into existence in a state of neediness, though as agent cause, his or her relationship to the child is less unique and personal, and thus, the
27
This is difficult because the genetic parent-child
relationship is sui generis. It is the only human relationship in
which one party is related to the other as biological cause of
that person’s very existence and identity. Given the nature of
the genetic parent-child relationship, it would seem that all of a
child’s initial set of developmental needs flow from that child’s
(potentially) personal relationship with his genetic parents,
insofar as the child’s very existence flows from that
relationship. I say “potentially” personal, because in this
paper, I remain agnostic about exactly when a human being becomes
a person.27 As will become clearer in the next section, the
potentially personal nature of the relationship is sufficient to
ground a non-transferable obligation. If I am right that needs
that flow from a personal relationship as such are needs that can
be fully met only by the person in relation with whom those needs
arose, then only genetic parents can be28 fully competent to meet
relationship of agent causality is not what specifies gamete donors’ obligations to their genetic children as non-transferable.27 As will become clearer in the next section, the potentially personal natureof the relationship is sufficient to ground a non-transferable obligation.28 Obviously, being a genetic parent is not a sufficient condition for being a fully competent parent. A parent who is ideal in other ways may, all-things-considered, be a better parent than a genetic parent, but there is still some objective loss to the child in not being raised by his genetic parents, as explained below.
28
their children’s developmental needs because, as explained below,
there are benefits that only they can provide. It would mean, in
other words, that only genetic parents can be fully competent to
raise their children, and thus have a non-transferable obligation
to do so.
Obviously, though, the word “fully” is an extremely
important qualifier here. In the case of Amy and Clare, the claim
that only Amy could fully meet Clare’s need for advice does not
mean that, in a situation when she cannot get a hold of Amy,
Clare could not call on Jane, another trusted person, quickly
filling her in on the essential background information. Since no
one knows all of the relevant background as well as Amy, Jane
would be less than ideal, but in a bind, she could meet Clare’s
need for advice reasonably well. Further, it might even turn out
that, given some relevant expertise that Jane happens to have,
Jane actually does an all-things-considered better job of helping
Clare in this situation. Likewise, when genetic parents cannot or
will not raise their children, others can step in and do an
29
excellent job, even an all-things-considered better job than the
genetic parents would have done.29
Nonetheless, just as Amy could fail in fulfilling her non-
transferable special obligation to Clare by, for instance,
deliberately ignoring a message from Clare indicating that Clare
urgently needed her advice, and this would be a failure to
fulfill her obligation even if Jane ended up giving better advice
than Amy could have. Likewise, genetic parents can fail in their
non-transferable special obligation to raise their children even
if others end up doing an all-things-considered better job. In
both instances, the wrongness of such failures would depend on
whether or not there were sufficiently weighty countervailing
reasons for not fulfilling the obligation in question. Here,
however, my point is simply that recognizing the ability of non-
genetic parents to raise children successfully is perfectly
compatible with my claim that genetic parents have a non-
transferable obligation to raise their genetic children
themselves.
29 Strictly speaking, no transfer of parental obligations is involved in such cases. Rather, the genetic parents leave their obligations unfulfilled, but a third party in need of care remains, and others voluntarily assume the obligation to meet that need.
30
How are children personally dependent on their genetic parents?
It is this point in my argument—the non-transferability of
genetic parents’ obligations based on the personal dependence of
children on their genetic parents—that is likely to meet with the
most skepticism, particularly given my admission that non-genetic
parents can indeed raise children very well. In the relationship
between Amy and Clare, the connection between Amy’s non-
transferable obligations and Clare’s personal dependence on Amy,
though limited, was obvious. The specifically personal nature of
child-genetic parent dependence, however, is less obvious because
the unique benefits that genetic parents, and only genetic
parents, can provide for their children are less obvious.
Empirical evidence does indicate that, in comparison with any
other family structure, children tend to fare best when raised by
their own genetic parents.30 Yet though this evidence helps to
30 A research brief prepared by Child Trends, for instance, concludes: “Research clearly demonstrates that family structure matters for children, andthe family structure that helps children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a low‐conflict marriage. Children in single‐parent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships face higher risks of poor outcomes.” The brief emphasizes that “it is not simply the presence of two parents ... but the presence of two biological parents that seems to support children’s development” [26]. While it may be argued that the problems with stepparents are due to
31
make plausible my claim that there are unique and important
benefits to children in being raised by their genetic parents,
such evidence is inherently limited. It only shows that by and
large and in general children do best when their genetic parents
raise them, and it can only establish correlation, not causation.
Perhaps, as Sally Haslanger has argued, there is a specific
benefit to children in being raised by their genetic parents only
or primarily because that situation is viewed as normal in our
current cultural context [30].
Nonetheless, there is at least one unique and important
benefit that, regardless of cultural context, genetic parents and
factors other than the lack of a biological connection to the child—the fact that the stepparent did not choose to have the child, or that the child is a reminder of one’s spouse’s previous relationship—these factors are not sufficient to explain the well-documented phenomenon of discriminative parental solicitude, also known as the “Cinderella effect” [27-28]. The fact that the stepparent did not choose to have the child does not seem to be a sufficient explanation for the (on average) lower levels of parental solicitude in stepparents, since stepparents do choose to become parents when they choose to marry someone with a child from a former relationship, and thisis often a more deliberate choice to become a parent (particularly on the partof the father) than the choice of many biological parents who find themselves with an unplanned pregnancy. It is also true that the child is a constant reminder of the previous relationship of the partner, and that this is a partial explanation of the “Cinderella effect,” but in cases of donor conception, for the non-genetic parent the child is a constant reminder of his/her own infertility, which can be extremely painful. Research also shows that, particularly for men, parental investment depends in part on resemblance, which makes perfect sense from an evolutionary perspective because it is only men who deal with the issue of uncertain parentage. These studies therefore lend further plausibility to the evolutionary theory of discriminate parental solicitude based on genetic relatedness [29].
32
only genetic parents can give to their children. That benefit is
the benefit of being loved in a special way—in a way that takes
priority over most other loves—by one’s genetic parents, by those
who are the biological causes of one’s existence and identity,
and to have the opportunity to respond to that love. Further,
since love requires knowledge, the ability of children to love
and be loved by their genetic parents also implies the ability to
know and be known by them. Knowing one’s genetic parents (and the
larger genetic family that one usually has access to via one’s
parents) is itself an important benefit for children insofar as
it facilitates their own self-knowledge [1], but since it is
possible to provide one’s genetic children with that knowledge at
least in part without raising those children oneself, I do not
focus on this benefit here.
Most fundamentally, then, what genetic parents, and only
genetic parents, can provide for their children is to know and
love their children themselves, and to let their children know and
love them. No one else can love my genetic children for me, or
receive their love in my stead. Others can, of course, love those
children very deeply, and be loved by them very deeply in return.
33
But no amount of love from others can replace my love for them,
and no one else, no matter how lovable, can replace me as a
specific object of my children’s love. It is because genetic
parents stand in a unique and intimate relationship to their
children as biological cause of those children’s biological
existence and identity that they are irreplaceable to their
children in this way. Of course, strictly speaking, everyone’s
love and care is irreplaceable to everyone else, but the lack of
any particular person’s love and care is only harmful to the
extent that one has a personal relationship with that person.
Thus an adopted or donor conceived child that attempts to contact
her genetic father is likely to be hurt if he responds rudely or
refuses to speak to her, much more than if similarly rebuffed by
a complete stranger.
Since love has many different meanings, most of which
involve a strong emotional component, I should note that I use
the word here in the primarily non-emotional sense in which
Aristotle uses it when speaking of philia (love of friendship, of
which Aristotle considers family relationships to be a special
case) to denote a high-priority personal commitment to the well-
34
being of another. In other words, in saying that children need to
be loved by their parents in order to flourish, I mean that
children need to experience their well-being as a priority to
their parents, and they experience this through frequent
interactions in which parents are reliably sensitive and
responsive to their genuine needs. While loving feelings cannot be
obligatory because they cannot be directly commanded (although
they can be fostered), loving actions, or the care for another that
is an essential aspect of love, can be commanded, regardless of
how one feels. Thus a mother with postpartum depression who does
not feel affection—and who may even feel hostility—for her child,
can nonetheless love her child in this respect. In this sense,
Matthew Liao is correct to claim that being loved is a “primarily
essential condition” for children to lead a good life [31].31 I
agree with Liao that what is essential for children’s well-being is
that they be loved in this way by someone, and that children can
lead a good life without being loved by their genetic parents.
Yet, the absence of genetic parents’ love is still a significant 31 He cites extensive empirical research to support this claim. Liao does not consider whether there might be a unique benefit to children in being loved by their genetic parents. Since, unlike Liao’s, my own argument does not rely on an emotional conception of love, Mhairi Cowden’s critique of Liao’s view does not apply to my account [32].
35
loss to children because once children begin to understand the
facts of how they came into the world, they can miss the specific
love of their genetic parents, and the absence of that love can
harm them. Children do not miss being loved by those with whom
they have no personal relationship, but with their genetic
parents, they do and always will have a personal relationship.
Children can therefore be hurt by their genetic parents’ failure
to love them, even when they are well-loved by their social
parents, just as being spurned or ignored by a friend can harm
one even if one has many other friends who are appropriately
attentive to one’s needs.
Psychological research shows that this does in fact happen,
and that the resulting wounds can run very deep. It is a constant
theme in studies on adoption outcomes that those not raised by
their genetic parents often suffer from feelings of rejection or
abandonment. According to psychologist James Garbarino, the
“inevitable, often silent question” of those not raised by their
genetic parents is, “What’s wrong with me that my parents don’t
want me?” Garbarino goes on to observe that “adults who were
adopted as young children often cannot even ask this question
36
without the aid of counseling” [33-35]. Further, this question,
and the hurt that it expresses, would still be intelligible,
though perhaps less acute, even in a society where it is normal
for children not to be raised by their genetic parents, because
the intelligibility of the question is based not on cultural
factors, but on the fact that children come into existence
through their relationship (at the bodily level) to their genetic
parents.
One may question the parallel between donor conception and
adoption, arguing that feelings of abandonment are not present in
the context of donor conception. Yet, adopted children feel
abandoned or rejected not only by their birthmothers, with whom
they formed a psychological bond in utero, but also by their
biological fathers who may have never actually seen them. Knowing
that my genetic father decided ex ante that he would not raise me
even before taking steps to bring about my conception seems no
better than knowing that he made that decision after the fact
(indeed, the former seems worse, since at least in the latter
case I could think that it was not indifference, but rather, a
37
desire to give me a better future, that led my biological father
to choose not to raise me himself).32
Assuming, then, that knowing themselves to be loved by their
genetic parents is, at the very least, a more-than-trivial
benefit that only genetic parents can give their children, and
thus that genetic parents do have a non-transferable obligation
to provide that benefit, I now consider whether genetic parents
can love their children adequately without actually raising those
children themselves. It is important to remember, in this regard,
that the love genetic parents owe to their children is a love
that is special and prioritary. To say this is simply to
rephrase, in the language of love, the claim that genetic parents
have uniquely weighty special obligations to their children,
obligations which take priority over most other obligations. For
genetic parents to appropriately prioritize their love for their
32 In fact, according to the largest study that has so far been conducted on donor conceived children, comparing a representative sample of over 500 donor conceived persons to about the same number of adopted persons and persons raised by their biological parents, donor conception may in some respects involve even greater psychological risks to children than adoption. The study found, for instance, that “nearly half of donor offspring (48 percent) compared to about a fifth of adopted adults (19 percent) agree, ‘When I see friends with their biological fathers and mothers, it makes me feel sad.’” Similarly, more than half of donor offspring (53 percent, compared to 29 percent of the adopted adults) agree, “It hurts when I hear other people talk about their genealogical background” [36, p. 8].
38
genetic children, they need to situate themselves in the best
position (within the limitations of possibility and competing
obligations) to love their children. To cede that “best position”
to someone else is to fail to do what their special obligation
requires. Due to their physical and psychological proximity,
those who actually raise a child are the ones best placed to love
that child. Therefore, genetic parents can only love their
genetic children adequately by raising those children themselves.
The exception to this is the case in which the choice to
cede that “best position” is made for the sake of the child’s
well-being—i.e., the case of genuine incompetence. The test of
such a case is whether or not the genetic parents could later say
honestly to that child, “It was because we loved you that we let
others raise you instead of raising you ourselves,” and provide
an explanation of why they judged themselves incompetent that can
pass muster in the child’s own reasonable judgment of the matter
even as he or she matures. In such a situation, the genetic
parents can love their genetic child in a special and prioritary
way without raising the child themselves. They can thus at least
fulfill the most strictly non-transferable aspect of their
39
special obligation. Further, given the permanence of their
special obligation more generally, insofar as possible, they
would ideally continue to develop their relationship with that
child to some degree, albeit in a limited way since others have
taken on the direct and primary responsibility for raising the
child. Indeed, research indicates that “open adoption” is a
viable model with significant benefits for the children, among
which is the benefit of being able to come to understand that
their genetic parents do love them and that the decision to give
them up for adoption was motivated precisely by love, rather than
rejection or indifference [35].
Note, however, that a necessary feature of such cases is
that the decision of the genetic parents to allow others to raise
their genetic child is made after the child exists. The ex ante
intention to conceive a child (or contribute to a child’s
conception) that one has no intention of raising is clearly
incompatible with the special and prioritary love that one will
owe to that child, even if one in fact happens to be incompetent
to raise the child. This is, of course, precisely the situation
of the gamete donor. The decision to act in a way that will
40
foreseeably lead to one’s becoming a genetic parent, and to do so
precisely on the condition that one will not be called upon to
raise one’s genetic child, is not the sort of decision that can
later be explained to the child as an expression of special and
prioritary love. One might counter this claim by arguing that
bringing the child into existence is itself such a great benefit
to the child that donors’ special love for their children is
sufficiently shown precisely by making the child’s existence
possible, or that the unique benefit donors intend to withhold
from their genetic children—the benefit of their parental love—is
much less important than the benefit of existence itself. 33 Yet,
bringing a child into existence cannot be intended as a benefit
to the child because before the child existed, there was no child
to benefit. The donor, therefore, can only be acting for the
benefit of someone other than the child—perhaps for his or her
own benefit (monetary or otherwise) or for the benefit of an
infertile couple. In that situation the child-to-be can only be
looked upon with indifference or as a mere means to the benefit
33 It might be objected that my view implies that it would be better if donor-conceived children did not exist. Yet, the same objection could be made against anyone trying to prevent teenage pregnancy. Such objections confuse the wrongness of an action with the goodness or badness of its effects.
41
of someone else. Yet, both indifference and treating as a mere
means are incompatible with love.
Conclusion
My argument offers reasons to rethink the dominant moral
approval of gamete donation because it calls into question the
premises upon which that approval rests. I have shown that
genetic parenthood in itself gives rise to parental obligations
and that those obligations are non-transferable. I have done so
by showing that the genetic parent-child relationship is, in
itself, an intimate personal relationship that grounds weighty
and permanent special obligations to one’s genetic children.
Further, I have argued that genetic parents have a non-
transferable obligation to raise their genetic children because
those children are personally dependent on them for the
fulfillment of important developmental needs, especially the need
to know themselves loved in a prioritary way by those who are the
biological cause of their existence and identity. Gamete donors,
therefore, cannot discharge their parental obligations simply by
ensuring that others will provide their genetic children with
42
adequate care.34 This conclusion follows both from the permanence
of genetic parents’ special obligation to their genetic children—
which is incompatible with taking no interest at all in how those
children are faring—and also from the fact that, barring
situations of incompetence, genetic parents cannot love their
children adequately without raising those children themselves.
Thus the conclusion has both strong and weak versions. The
weak version is based only on the permanence of genetic parents’
special obligation, which—even apart from my claim about
children’s need to be loved by their genetic parents—is in itself
sufficient for establishing the wrongness of gamete donation in
almost all instances. The rare exception would be the case in
which the donor plans to have some involvement in the child’s
life, and has made arrangements for this with the infertile
couple that will use his or her gametes to conceive. This
arrangement, of course, would have its own difficulties and
tensions analogous to open adoption situations, the tensions 34 Note that on my account, it is not agent causality, but the existence of a personal relationship, that is the source of the non-transferable obligation. It is obviously not always wrong to play an agent causal role in the procreation of a child whom one has no intention of raising—doctors, nurses, and many others rightfully do so all the time. What is wrong is to perform an action that will foreseeably lead one to become a genetic parent when one is not ready or willing to raise one’s genetic child.
43
inherent in negotiating the relative authority and influence over
the child of the custodial parents versus the non-custodial
genetic parent(s). Open adoption is importantly different,
however, because this non-ideal arrangement is not intended ex
ante, but as the best that can be done for the child in an
already non-ideal situation. I think that intending such an
arrangement ex ante would in itself be morally problematic, but
further argument would be required in order to defend that claim.
Thus the weak conclusion of my argument is that the permanence of
genetic parents’ special obligation to promote the well-being of
their genetic children makes it impermissible to donate one’s
gametes unless one is willing to maintain some degree of contact
with one’s genetic children and does something to ensure that
this will happen. Other considerations—such as the interest
children have in knowing their genetic family as a source of
important medical information and of self-knowledge more
generally—would likewise support this weaker conclusion [1].
The strong conclusion of my argument is that gamete donation
is inherently wrong, and thus always morally impermissible, because
it necessarily constitutes an injustice with respect to the child
44
that one’s donation helps to bring into existence. It does so
because there is a strictly non-transferable obligation to love
one’s genetic children, which, except in cases of incompetence,
cannot be adequately fulfilled without raising those children
oneself. One could object that if, as I argued earlier, bringing
into existence as such cannot be a benefit, then it cannot be a
harm either. How, then, could it constitute an injustice? The
injustice of gamete donation, however, does not lie in helping to
bring the child into existence as such. The injustice is not
even, initially, an injustice to the child. Initially, the
injustice lies in an inadequate respect for the value of persons
in general, shown in one’s willingness to perform an action that
will foreseeably result in the acquisition of a non-transferable
obligation to another person, without at the same time intending
to fulfill that obligation should it arise. Thus the act of
gamete donation is unjust even if a child is never actually
conceived with one’s gametes, just as (in a more minor way) it
would be unjust for one to agree to meet someone for lunch while
having no intention at all of showing up, even if it turns out
45
that the other person cancels the plan at the last minute.35 It
is unjust because it involves a conditional plan not to fulfill
one’s non-transferable obligations. And since a conditional plan
to leave one’s non-transferable obligations unfulfilled is
equivalent to a conditional plan to harm that person by depriving
him or her of a benefit that one is obligated to provide, the
specific injustice of gamete donation lies in a conditional plan
to harm one’s genetic child.
The seriousness of the injustice depends on the seriousness
of the harm that will foreseeably result from one’s failure to
fulfill the obligation in question, as well as on the strength of
one’s special obligation for that person’s well-being more
generally. In gamete donation, the seriousness of the harm is at
least partially a debatable empirical question, but the
experiences of adopted children, as well as other research
indicating that children fare best when raised by both of their
genetic parents, makes it plausible to claim that the harm is, at
the very least, not a trivial one. With regard to the strength of35 This is why, for the purposes of the current argument, it does not matter whether or not every human organism is a person. The conditional willingness to harm requires only the reasonable possibility, not the certainty, that (1) a new human organism will in fact come to exist as a result of the donation, and (2) that organism will be a person at least at some point in her life.
46
genetic parents’ special obligation to promote their children’s
well-being, my analysis shows that it is one of the strongest
special obligations a person can have because of the uniquely
intimate nature of the relationship from which it flows. Thus
having a conditional plan to harm one’s genetic child is much
more seriously wrong than a conditional plan to harm a stranger.
Gamete donation, therefore, is inherently wrong, and seriously
so, because it involves a conditional plan to harm another
person, and not just any person, but one’s own genetic child.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to Princeton’s James Madison Program in American
Ideals and Institutions for the post-doctoral fellowship during
which I began working on this article, and to the James Madison
fellows, along with Robert George and members of Princeton’s
Philosophy Department, who offered helpful feedback at my
presentation of an early draft. I would also like to thank
Michael Gorman for his assistance in reworking the first section
47
of the paper, as well as two referees for their detailed comments
on the penultimate draft.
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