Responsible government and representation in the Eurocrisis.

V. 21.10.2014

Wordcount: 7065

Caterina Froio (European University Institute) and Conor Little(University of Copenhagen)1

AbstractPeter Mair argued that increased demands for governments to work within

constraints imposed from outside the formal chain of delegation, in

conjunction with the declining strength of parties, were compromising

the representative process. He recognised that the conditions of the

economic crisis had increased these constraints and, in one of his last

papers, he used the extreme case of Ireland between 2008 and early 2011

to explore this. More than three years on from his case study of

Ireland, what has the unfolding crisis told us about Mair’s observations

and about the political face of that crisis? This chapter examines the

politics of the economic crisis and, more precisely, the relationship

between representative politics and responsible government in a number

of ‘extreme’ cases of constrained governments: Portugal, Ireland, Italy,

Greece and Spain.

1 We thank Camille Bedock, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and the participants in the international workshop held in February 2014 in Leuphana Universiteit Lüneburg for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.

1

Much of Peter Mair’s later work focussed on the tension between

representative politics and responsible government which, he claimed,

was becoming more difficult to manage in contemporary democracies (Mair,

2006, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2013). Additional constraints on governments

were reducing the capacity of parties to represent citizens. Mair

recognised that the economic crisis and its consequences had increased

these constraints and he used the extreme case of Ireland between 2008

and early 2011 to illustrate this (Mair, 2011a, 2011b). More than three

years on from this case study, what has the unfolding crisis told us

about Mair’s observations, the trajectory of European democracy and the

political face of the Eurocrisis?

We adopt a case selection strategy similar to Mair’s (2011a), examining

the relationship between representative politics and responsible

government in a number of ‘extreme’ cases of increased demands for

responsible government: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. This

chapter examines how the representative relationship between voters and

parties has been shaped by changes in parties’ relationships with

government and society that have stemmed from the Eurocrisis and the

2

constraints associated with it. We draw out differences and similarities

between the countries and we situate them in relation to pre-crisis

trends. We find that several of the developments that Mair expected to

occur under conditions of increased external demands for responsible

government have been accentuated during the crisis: government has been

depoliticised by policy constraints and by significant instances of

cross-party cooperation; trust in politics has declined; retrospective

voting and the punishment of incumbents has increased; electoral

volatility has increased and major challengers have emerged. Many of

these developments are not new, but are extensions of existing trends

observed by Mair.

Democratic politics under strainThe growing tension between representation and responsible government

and the declining capacity of political parties to manage that tension

was an important theme in Peter Mair’s later work. The stakes of parties

successfully performing their dual role as representatives and governors

were high: it was “the key to the legitimation of representative

government in democratic political systems” (Mair, 2009, p. 5). Without

their representative function, “it is difficult to make the case for

privileging parties above administrators and experts” (Mair, 2009, p.

10). Mair pointed to three developments that made the relationship

between parties and citizens increasingly problematic.

First, governments increasingly had responsibilities to principals

outside the formal chain of delegation and accountability.

Responsibilities, in this sense, resulted from the expectation that

governments conform to established procedural norms and practices, as

well as honouring prior commitments (Birch, 1964; Mair, 2009).

Contemporary government has involved abiding by the “rulings and3

procedures” of multiple new principals to which governments have

obligations, such as non-majoritarian and supranational institutions

(Mair, 2009, p. 13, 2013, Ch.4). Demands for responsible government were

also partly a function of the increased complexity of governing and,

drawing on Rose (1990), were a cumulative problem: governments’

“inheritance” – membership of international organisations, adherence to

international treaties, domestic law and domestic policy commitments –

was becoming more weighty. Therefore, these demands were “congenital in

any modern democracy” (Mair, 2011a, p. 6).

Second and related, Mair argued that representative relationship between

voters and parties, founded on responsiveness and accountability, was in

decline (Mair, 2009, pp. 13–15, 2011a, p. 1). This was, in part, a

direct effect of increasing demands for responsible government: the

narrower policy field within which parties operated left them with fewer

tools with which they could represent voters (Mair, 2011a). The

depoliticization of governing that accompanied demands for responsible

government meant that parties had to justify their choices, and at the

same time it made this task more difficult, as the public was less

accepting of their role in government.

Changes in parties and changes in wider society were also contributing

to the decline of the representative relationship. Society was more

fragmented, volatile and disengaged from conventional politics (Mair,

2011a, p. 9, 2013 Ch.1). Parties were withdrawing from society into an

‘official world’ (Mair, 2013 Ch.3), which in turn made them more

vulnerable to capture by special interests (Mair, 2011a, p. 12). They

embraced their role as governors, leaving “little room for listening to

voters” (Mair, 2009, p. 16, 2011a, p. 8, p.10). On the part of voters,

the decline of the representative relationship carried the potential for

4

abstention, increased retrospective voting and electoral volatility

(Mair, 2009, p. 8) and at the level of the party system, increased

retrospective voting and parties’ focus on governing was fuelling

bipolarism (Mair, 2009, p. 8, also 2011c, pp. 78–79).

Third, Mair pointed to parties’ reduced capacities to manage the tension

between demands for responsible government and demands for

representation. With few members (see also Van Biezen et al., 2012), few

strong identifiers, little control over the means of political

communication and little public trust, parties were weak in society

(Mair, 2009, p. 15, 16). Their reduced capacity to manage their dual

role was leading to the bifurcation of party systems between “parties

which claim to represent but don’t govern and those which govern but no

longer represent” (Mair, 2009, pp. 16–17). Moreover, the role of the EU

as the source of many governmental constraints meant that challengers

were “very likely” to be Eurosceptic (Mair, 2009, p. 16).

Case selectionIn a paper written in early 2011, Mair began to pursue these themes with

a focus on the economic crisis. His case selection rationale involved

focussing on parliamentary democracies due to their ideal-typical

singular chain of delegation. It was also motivated by problems of

representation faced by contemporary parliamentary democracies and by

the exceptionally high levels of external demands for responsible

government in the case of Ireland in particular. He explored the Irish

case in order to draw out observations concerning the effects of the

crisis on representative government (Mair, 2011a; subsequently published

in Schäfer & Streeck, 2013).

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In this paper, we follow a similar strategy. We aim to provide a

comparative description of the politics of Portugal, Ireland, Italy,

Greece and Spain, drawing out differences and commonalities among the

cases.2 All five of the countries that we examine have been subject to

sharply increased external pressures for responsible government that

have tended to be at odds with their citizens’ demands (Mair, 2011a, p.

6). Like Mair’s study, the selection of ‘extreme cases’ of countries

subject to increased demands for responsible government provides a basis

for exploratory work (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, pp. 301–302). Drawing

on Mair’s observations, we set out with the expectation that the

representative relationship will have weakened in these countries due to

sharply increased demands for responsible government. We also expect

that these demands will have had indirect effects through stimulating

party and societal changes, which both weaken the representative

relationship and parties’ capacities to manage this relationship. The

analysis focuses on parties’ relationship with government, on the one

hand, and society (especially voters), on the other. We use indicators

suggested by Mair’s account, and we set this evidence in context using

longitudinal (pre-crisis) data on each country.

The five countries that we examine, while they are similar in respect of

the sharply increased constraints on their governments, also provide a

diverse range of contexts in which to explore the political dimension of

the Eurocrisis. Their economic problems have not been homogenous. Blyth

(2013, pp. 62–71) contrasts Spain and Ireland’s problems with Portugal

and Italy, and contrasts both sets of economies with Greece. Although

their budget deficits were high, Italy’s was still below the EU average

in 2010, as was its unemployment rate; Ireland and Spain had debt-to-GDP

2 We do not systematically compare them to cases in which demands have been less extreme, although we do acknowledge that this approach may render further insights intothe effects of the crisis.

6

ratios below the EU average; the internationalisation of their banking

sectors, bank losses and bank bailout costs also varied; and two of the

countries (Ireland and Spain) had major housing bubbles (Barreiro &

Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012, p. 282; Grossman & Woll, 2014, pp. 580–583;

Hardiman et al., 2013; The Economist, 2010). They are also politically

diverse: two of the countries (Greece and Italy) rank low on the World

Bank’s measure of the rule of law and control of corruption (Sklias &

Maris, 2013); levels of patronage in government varied (Afonso et al.,

2013); and they differed in their initial policy responses to the

crisis, with Spain most notably adopting an expansionary policy until

2010 (Hardiman & Dellepiane, 2012).

Increased demands for responsible governmentEach of the five countries that we examine has faced sharply increased

demands from principals outside the formal chain of delegation (Table 1;

Figure 1). Perhaps the most explicit of these demands was – in four

cases – to comply with the conditions attached to non-market loans.

These conditions include structural reforms aimed at growth, jobs and

competitiveness, a fiscal consolidation strategy and financial sector

reforms (e.g., European Commission, 2011). To draw some examples from

reviews of the Greek programme, the June 2013 payment was conditional on

the appointment of anti-corruption officials, the passage of legislation

on household debt resolution and the presentation of a detailed plan for

the introduction of a competitive electricity market (European

Commission, 2013a). The December 2013 payment was conditional on the

preparation of state utilities for privatisation (including through

government agencies paying their outstanding bills), making 12.500

employees mobile within the public service and passing new law

regulating the legal profession (European Commission, 2013b). These

demands were far-reaching. Ireland’s loan terms, for instance, included

7

the following catch-all condition: that the government would “Consult

ex-ante with the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF on the

adoption of policies that are not included in this Memorandum but that

could have a material impact on the achievement of programme objectives”

(European Commission, 2013c).

8

Table 1. External pressures on five peripheral European countries

Greece Ireland Portugal Spain Italy

Non-marketloan

May 2010:€110bnplus, inMarch2012,€130bn

until end2014

December2010:

€67.5 overthreeyears

May 2011:€78bn over

threeyears

June 2012:up to

€100bn over18 months(€41.4bnused)

None

Deficit reduction to 3% GDP (deadlines current at time of writing, except Italy)

2016 2015 2015 2016

2012(under Excessive Deficit Procedure, 2009-2013)

Public debt (% GDP, selected years)

2008:112.8

2012:157.22013:175.1

2008: 44.2

2012:117.42013:123.7

2008: 71.7

2012:124.1

2013: 129

2008: 40.2

2012: 86.02013: 93.9

2008:106.1

2012: 1272013:132.6

Other new sources ofdemands for responsible government

Financial markets (see Figure 1, below) and demands relatedto ECB supports

(e.g., Spain from May 2010, Italy in 2011)

‘Six-Pack’ of Regulations and Directives from December 2011Deficit reduction requirements under the Fiscal Compact from

January 2013‘Two-Pack’ Regulations for enhanced monitoring and

surveillance from May 2013

Post-Programme Surveillance

9

Sources: European Commission (2014); ECB (2014); case studies cited in text.

Figure 1. Ten year bond yields

Data: ECB (2014). Germany is included due to the importance of the ‘spread’ to its rates.

The implementation of austerity measures in advance of these loans

(e.g., in Ireland from 2008-2010, in Spain after May 2010, in Portugal

before the 2011 election) and in the absence of any such loan (in Italy

10

from mid-2011) shows that explicit conditionality was not the only

source of increased demand for responsible government. Indeed the very

pressure to request a loan was clear at certain points (e.g., in Ireland

in November 2010 and in Portugal in March 2011). Upon the expiry of the

period covered by the loans, governments have faced both a return to the

international financial markets and Post-Programme Surveillance until

they repay 75% of their loans. In Portugal and Ireland’s case, this is

expected to last until 2030 and 2031, respectively (European Commission,

2014). Other demands included those of actors that offered assistance

outside of the terms of non-market loans, such as the ECB through its

bond-buying activities. During this period, each of the five countries

became party to the European Fiscal Compact, which binds the signatories

to keep a balanced budget and commits them to introduce legal

dispositions that automatically activate measures of financial

correction in case the objective is not achieved.

Thus, governments in the five countries have been subject to sharply

increased constraints and they will continue to be constrained for the

foreseeable future. As in the account of contemporary government

presented by Mair, “in certain areas and in certain procedures, the

leaders’ hands will be tied” (Mair, 2009, p. 12), complementing the

effects of developments (e.g., economic globalisation, the increased

complexity of policymaking, Europeanization) that have been longer in

the making.

Representation in the EurocrisisIn the remainder of the chapter, we examine developments in these five

countries that help to illustrate aspects of Mair’s argument concerning

how these demands for responsibility relate to the representative

relationship and parties’ capacities to manage their dual role. Some of

11

the indicators that we examine are significant for more than one element

of Mair’s account. We organise our descriptive account around changes in

government (the nature of government decisions during the crisis; the

narrowing of policy choice; and the depoliticization of government) and

changes in society (declining trust in parties; further disengagement

from politics; the rise of challengers; the punishment of incumbents;

and parties’ responses to these changes).

Parties in governmentChanges in parties’ relationships with government during the crisis have

challenged the representative relationship. In the first instance, the

nature of some decisions taken during the crisis has made representation

more difficult. The urgency with which some important decisions have

been taken; the necessary secrecy in which they have been prepared

(e.g., pending ‘bailout’ loans); and the technical complexity of

decisions concerning government finance have made them less open to

influence from within or beyond parties, while the supranational level

at which many important decisions have been taken can only have

accentuated the executive bias that Europeanization has created within

parties (see Poguntke, 2008).

Parties have had fewer policy tools with which to represent their voters

(see above). In some instances, the resulting tension between party

promises and supranational obligations observed by Mair in Ireland

(Mair, 2011a, p. 5) was repeated elsewhere. In Greece in 2009, PASOK

promised a €3bn stimulus package, but in government it had to seek aid

and pursue austerity policies instead (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou,

2013, p. 528). During the Spanish general election campaign in 2011, the

Partido Popular did not detail the austerity plans that it was, at the same

time, promising to EU partners (Molina & Godino, 2013, p. 117). In

12

Portugal in 2011, the clash between democratic choice and the restricted

policy field in the presence of external pressures was illustrated by

the negotiation of the country’s multilateral loan while the election

campaign was effectively ongoing. Mainstream parties' manifestos were

"to some extent subsumed" by the bailout (Fernandes, 2011, pp. 1297–

1298) and prospective voting became less important (Magalhães, 2014).

The crisis has quite visibly accentuated the depoliticization of

government in two important respects. First, it has prompted

considerable cooperation between mainstream parties. In Ireland, the

coalition resulting from the 2011 election was the largest in the

country’s history, involving the two largest parties. Mair (2011a, p. 4)

also points to the state guarantee of the Irish banks’ debts (supported

by two of the three main opposition parties) and the approval of

austerity measures prior to the 2011 election (also facilitated by two

of the three main opposition parties) as instances of cooperation

between mainstream parties. In Spain, the main parties’ facilitation of

the constitutional amendment introducing debt and deficit limits was

another brief but important instance of cross-party cooperation that

ensured little debate on the issue. In Greece, the crisis forced

traditional rivals to form coalitions in 2011 (the Papademos government)

and from 2012 (the Samaras government) (Afonso et al., 2013, p. 21, 22).

In November 2011, the Monti national unity government took office in

Italy with 556 votes in favour and 61 against in the lower house of

parliament (Garzia, 2013, p. 1096). Following this, the constitutional

amendment in April 2012 was supported by the main parties (Ignazi, 2013,

p. 120) and Enrico Letta’s government likewise received cross-party

support. As Mair suggested in relation to Ireland, this type of

cooperation in governing “shows… that parties matter and make a

13

difference… [but]… it does not show that party differences make a

difference” (Mair, 2011a, p. 4, emphasis in original).

Second, the crisis appears to have sidelined party politicians in

cabinet,3 heralding a marked shift towards the appointment of

technocratic ministers. Already after the 2009 election in Greece, there

was a shift towards the appointment of experts with international

experience (e.g., the Minister for Finance) (Pappas, 2010, pp. 282–283).

In November 2011, Papademos (a technocrat) replaced Papandreou (PASOK)

as Prime Minister. After the June 2012 election, in the Samaras

government, the Minister for Finance was again an economist and

technocrat and junior partners DIMAR and PASOK opted to appoint

technocrats rather than career politicians to the cabinet (Vasilopoulou

& Halikiopoulou, 2013, p. 526, p.536, p.538). In Portugal in 2011, Prime

Minister Coelho selected an 'elite government' of 12 and, in an

extension of a pre-existing trend, some positions were filled by non-

partisan technocrats (Fernandes, 2011, pp. 1300–1301). In Italy, the

Monti government was entirely technocratic and unlike previous

technocratic governments (those of Ciampi and Dini), its appointments

did not have regard to party nominations. According to Ignazi (2012, p.

166) this was a symptom of parties’ weakness and the “low esteem in

which political parties are held…: in other words, parties no longer had

the strength to impose their will.” In this respect, parties backed away

from governing, at least temporarily.

Parties in societyDuring the crisis, parties – and especially mainstream parties – in the

five countries have become weaker in society. Consistent with this,

3 The exception here is Ireland, where there is little scope for marginalising parliamentarians (and thus parties) in government due to constitutional provisions on ministerial appointments (O’Malley, 2009).

14

studies of crisis elections note problems of mobilisation, low levels of

party attachment and late decision-making by voters (Field & Botti,

2013, p. 6 on PSOE; Garzia, 2013, p. 1100 on PD and PdL; e.g., Kennedy,

2012, p. 678; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013, p. 534 citing a Metron

exit poll). Trust in conventional politics, including trust in parties

and government, declined markedly with the onset of the crisis in 2008

(Figure 2). The countries that received non-market ‘bailout’ loans

(Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece) show particularly large declines

in trust in parties and in trust in parties in Italy fell to a new low

in November 2011 with the appointment of the technocratic Monti

government. Declining trust in governments and large increases in

mistrust (not shown) also coincided with the beginning of the crisis

(although they pre-date the first ‘bailouts’). In Greece in in November

2012, only five months after the parliamentary elections, only eight per

cent of respondents indicating that they trusted their government.

Further, these sharp declines marked a departure from the levels of

trust that are apparent in other West European countries (European

Commission, 2012).

These declines in trust may be partly explained by awareness of crisis-

era corruption problems, such as New Democracy’s corruption scandals

prior to the 2009 elections in Greece (Freedom House, 2013; Pappas,

2010, p. 275); the report of a judicial tribunal of inquiry into

planning corruption in Ireland (Mahon Tribunal, 2012); a large

corruption trial of public officials and politicians in Spain between

2010 and 2012 (Field & Botti, 2013, p. 9) and a party funding scandal in

2013; and increasing corruption in Italy (Freedom House, 2013; Vannucci

& Della Porta, 2011). However, some of the decline in trust can be

attributed more directly to the crisis: individual-level analyses of

changes in trust and satisfaction with democracy have shown that

15

experiences of economic vulnerability are associated with lower levels

of trust (Polavieja, 2013) and trust in the EU has also fallen, partly

as a function of declining trust in national government (Armingeon &

Ceka, 2014).

Figure 2. Trust in political parties and in governments (2003-2012)

010

2030

4050

60Le

vels

of trus

t (%)

2003

/420

04/3

2004

/10

2005

/620

05/11

2006

/420

06/10

2006

/12

2007

/520

08/4

2008

/11

2009

/720

10/5

2010

/12

2011

/11

2012

/520

12/11

Greece IrelandItaly PortugalSpain Average (W estern Europe)

Parties

010

2030

4050

60

2003

/420

04/3

2004

/10

2005

/620

05/11

2006

/420

06/10

2006

/12

2007

/520

08/4

2008

/11

2009

/720

10/5

2010

/12

2011

/11

2012

/520

12/11

G reece IrelandItaly PortugalSpain Average (W estern Europe)

G overnm ent

Source: Eurobarometer 59-78.

Mair suggested that increased demands for responsible government would

lead to electoral volatility and withdrawal from conventional politics.

One indicator of withdrawal is voter turnout at general elections.

Figure 4 below illustrates voter turnout in the five countries between

1970 and 2013. At crisis elections in Spain (2011), Italy (2013),

Portugal (2011) and Greece (2009 and both elections in 2012) the turnout

was lower than at the previous election. This is not the case in Ireland

where turnout, although lower than in the 1980s, rose slightly in 2011.

In Italy, Greece and Portugal, these new record lows were an extension

of a medium-term trend. This occurred despite the mobilising effects of

16

new parties and protest movements (e.g., Barreiro & Sánchez-Cuenca,

2012, p. 284).

Figure 4. Voter turnout in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain(1970-2013), %

5060

7080

90100

VoterTurnout

1977

1979

1982

1986

1989

1993

1996

2000

2004

2008

2011

Year

Spain

5060

7080

90100

VoterTurnout

1972

1976

1979

1983

1987

1992

1994

1996

2001

2006

2008

2013

Year

Italy

5060

7080

90100

VoterTurnout

1975

1976

1979

1980

1983

1985

1987

1991

1995

1999

2002

2005

2009

Year

Portugal

5060

7080

90100

VoterTurnout

1974

1977

1981

1985

1989

1990

1993

1996

2000

2004

2007

2009

2012

Year

G reece

5060

7080

90100

VoterTurnout

1973

1977

1981

1982

1987

1989

1992

1997

2002

2007

2011

Year

Ireland

Source: http://www.idea.int/vt/, accessed 06/09/2013. Legislative elections.Note: Where there are two elections held in a year, we average the values. Voting iscompulsory by law in Greece but this is not enforced and the legislative provision tosanction abstention was removed in a revision of the constitution in 2001.

Another classic indicator of the weakening of the relationship between

parties and citizens is electoral volatility and it is represented in

17

Figure 5 below.4 Electoral volatility is more dramatic starting from

2007. The only exception is Italy where 1994 and 1996 elections that

followed Tangentopoli exhibited (unsurprisingly) the higher volatility

score in the series. Those indicators offer some support for the idea

that the voters’ party linkage has become weaker, and that a long-run

trend has become particularly visible with the most recent crisis.

Figure 5. Electoral volatility in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and

Portugal (1990-2013)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Volatility

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

G reece Ireland Italy Spain Portugal

Source: Döring and Manow (2012) (own calculations). For Italy 2006, 2008, and 2013 we

use the data from De Sio et al. (2013).

4 To measure volatility we use the Pedersen index (Pedersen 1979). It is constructed bysumming up the absolute difference between the percentage of votes for each party in election t and the percentage in t+1. Subsequently, the sum is divided by 2 to avoid double counting and to make the index vary between 0 and 100.

18

Mainstream parties have been more and more challenged by myriad other

parties that have mobilised against them. Consistent with Mair’s

suggestion, the crisis has seen the emergence and success of parties

that represent (in the sense that they give voice to voters’ demands)

but do not govern. Electoral support for challenger parties (those that

have not participated in government) has increased with the crisis in

each of the five countries, with the partial exceptions of Ireland and

Portugal, both of which had pre-crisis traditions of centrist politics.5

Increased support for challenger parties is particularly evident in the

case of Greece and Italy where elections in 2012 and 2013 have been

characterised by the electoral success of new challenger parties: Syriza

(21.8% vote share) and Golden Dawn (6.9%)6 in Greece and the Movimento 5

Stelle (M5S) (24.6%) in Italy.7 They are a substantial challenge to the

electoral base of mainstream parties: two-thirds of M5S voters, for

example, came from among those who previously voted for the two main

parties of government (De Sio et al., 2013).8

What is also striking is the diversity in challenger response. For

instance, the Golden Dawn entered parliament in Greece, but there was no

similar movement in Spain and Ireland remains without a radical right

party (Field & Botti, 2013, p. 7; O’Malley, 2008). The diversity in the

challenge to mainstream politics from beyond parties has also been

diverse. Some protest movements (e.g., the Indignados) with a significant

political reform and anti-party dimension have garnered considerable5 Note that in Ireland a challenger party (the Green Party) joined government in 2007 and is thus not classified as a challenger in 2011. 6 Average of the electoral scores obtained in May 2012 and June 2012. Source: Greek Minister of Interior, accessed 22/09/2013.7 Average of the electoral scores obtained for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in 2013. Source: Italian Minister of Interior, accessed 22/09/2013.8 There have also been instances within parties of the ‘bifurcation’ of representation and governing that Mair suggested was emerging at the systemic level. In Spain, for example, Prime Minister Zapatero did not consult the new leader of his party, PSOE, on agreeing a constitutional amendment on debt and deficit limits with the opposition in the months before the 2011 election (Kennedy, 2012, p. 676).

19

sympathy among the public (Barreiro & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012, p. 283;

Field & Botti, 2013, p. 8; Molina & Godino, 2013, p. 112). In Ireland,

on the other hand, the crisis has been notable for its relative lack of

public protest (Pappas & O’Malley, 2014).

Figure 3. Electoral scores of the challenger parties in five countries(1970-2013), %

20

0510

1520

2530

3540

Challen

ger P

artie

s (%)

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2013

Year

Spain

0510

1520

2530

3540

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2013

Year

Italy

0510

1520

2530

3540

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2013

Year

Portugal

0510

1520

2530

3540

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2013

Year

G reece

0510

1520

2530

3540

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2013

Year

Ireland

Source: Döring and Manow (2012).Parties. Spain: IU-PC, CiU, UPyD. Italy: PCI, MSI, M5S. Portugal: PCP, BE (UDP, PSR,PXXI). Greece: Synapismos/Syriza/SRA, KKE, LAOS, Golden Dawn LS-CA. Ireland: SF, Greens(until 2007). Note: The figure refers to legislative elections. Where there are two elections held ina year, we average the values. We do not consider Forza Italia as a challenger at theItalian elections of 1994 since it was founded only few months before the generalelections in the same year.

Voters have sanctioned incumbent parties heavily. Placed in context,

four of the five postincumbency electoral results set out in Table

2Error: Reference source not found are among the ten largest defeats (in

terms of absolute vote share lost) experienced by parties in

parliamentary democracies since 1945. Such is the disruptiveness of

these elections that they may in time be seen as “critical” if they lead

to durable change (Norris, 2005, p. 224). Unsurprisingly, anti-incumbent

voting also extended to local and regional elections (e.g., in Ireland

in 2009, in Spain in 2010, in Portugal in 2013). At voter-level, the

crisis has increased the influence of retrospective performance voting,

especially in relation to the incumbent (Bosco, 2013, p. 28; Field &

Botti, 2013, p. 6 on Spain; Magalhães, 2014 on Portugal; Marsh &

21

Mikhaylov, 2012 on Ireland). In several cases, these defeats have

occurred despite incumbent parties not having been led by the incumbent

prime minister (Zapatero, Cowen, Papandreou and Socrates) or despite

them having left cabinet some time before the election (Berlusconi’s PdL

in Italy).

Table 2. Large postincumbency losses during the crisis

Country Incumbent Party Previouselection

Electionresult

Difference(pct. pts.)

Greece2012 PASOK 3.012.373 794.775* - 31.2(43.9%) (12.7%)

Ireland2011 Fianna Fáil (FF) 858.565 387.358 - 24.2(41.6%) (17.4%)

Italy2013

The People ofFreedom (PdL) 17.063.874 9.923.100 - 17.7

(coalition) (46.8%) (29.1%)

Portugal2011 Socialist Party (PS) 2.077.238 1.566.347 - 8.6(36.6%) (28.1%)

Spain2011

Socialist Party(PSOE)

11.289.335 7.003.511 - 18.4(43.7%) (25.3%)Source: Percentages calculated from the absolute numbers provided by the relevantministry of each country (parliamentary elections). *Average number of votes between May and June 2012. PASOK’s decline to May 2012 was -30.7 pct. pts.

The public in these countries perceives the policy constraints imposed

by other states and by the EU (on Spain: Field & Botti, 2013, p. 9;

Molina & Godino, 2013, p. 112). Magalhaes’ (see also Lobo & Lewis-Beck,

2012; 2014) study of the Portuguese general election of 2011 shows that

22

anti-incumbency voting occurred despite the crisis blurring

responsibility by introducing new actors to the policy process (see

Table 1, above). More generally, evaluations of the ‘job performance of

the leadership of the European Union’ has fallen between 2008 and 2013

in Greece (from 60% to 19%), Ireland (from 70% to 47%), Portugal (34% to

31%) and Spain (59% to 27%). (In Italy, it has risen (34% to 43%)).

Greece, Ireland and Spain registered the three largest declines in the

EU and these declines were particularly pronounced among young people

(Manchin, 2014).

Parties have responded to these developments in diverse ways. For

example, at the time of the 2009 general election, PASOK moved towards

the ‘business-firm’ party ideal type as it professionalised,

personalised its politics and shed some ideology in order to deal with a

more volatile and less loyal electorate (Pappas, 2010, p. 284). Parties

have also sought more control of the media, with negative effects on

press freedom at times (Dunham & Csaky, 2013).9 On the other hand, some

parties have held open primary elections in recent years to mobilise the

public and give stronger legitimacy to their leaders at the national

and/or at the local level in Italy (the DS-PD), in Greece (the self-same

PASOK) and in Portugal (PS), perhaps suggesting that parties are

actively responding to their declining legitimacy. Others have

undertaken fundamental reviews and reforms of their organisation upon

postincumbency defeat, with the effect of making their internal

organisation somewhat more democratic (see e.g., Little & Farrell, 2013

on Fianna Fáil in Ireland). The same has not happened among the most

successful challenger parties (that quite on the contrary, they

9 Note that this calls into question the idea that parties’ control of the means of communication has declined over this period, as Mair suggested.

23

sometimes openly reject internal democracy: e.g. the Movimento 5 Stelle,

Golden Dawn).

DiscussionThis descriptive overview describes the sharp increase in the

constraints placed on governments during the crisis in the shape of

demands from outside the chain of delegation and accountability.

Further, it provides some indications that increased demands for

responsible government in these extreme cases have been accompanied by

several of the developments in the representative process that Mair

expected. In government, these constraints have ensured substantial

policy continuity despite partial partisan turnover and full alternation

in government composition. Parties’ (and governments’) capacity for

responsiveness has evidently been reduced and ‘grand coalitions’, either

on important individual issues or for government formation and

maintenance, have emerged. Government has been depoliticised further due

to external policy constraints, but also due to important instances of

cooperation between mainstream parties and, in some cases, the

abandonment of key ministries or entire governments by parties.

In society, parties have become weaker and trust in conventional

politics has declined, reducing their capacity to provide leadership and

to bridge the wide gap between their external obligations and domestic

demand for representation. Challenger parties, which “represent but do

not govern” (Mair, 2009, pp. 16–17), have grown in strength, turnout has

declined further and the costs of incumbency have increased, while

volatility is on the rise. Voters have placed more emphasis on

retrospective accountability at a time when governments cannot meet

their demands. 24

Longitudinal and descriptive indicators of the voters-parties linkage in

the countries most affected by the Eurocrisis indicate the fading of

this relationship over time that has become more evident in the most

recent years. In this sense, we may say that the crisis has not started

a new trend of delegitimation of the link between voters and parties. It

would be more appropriate to say that the crisis has exacerbated an

already weakening relation by exposing the inability of governing

parties to cope with different demands: those coming from supranational

institutions and market forces, and their voters’ will.

At the same time, while the representative relationship has become

weaker, parties have not moved inexorably towards their governing

function. Indeed, one of the notable developments has been parties

keeping their governing functions at arms-length. Nor has their movement

away from society been unambiguous or uniform. In some cases, they have

made organisational changes to strengthen their legitimacy. Thus, some

mainstream parties are responding and they are not about to leave the

electoral arena – or the representative relationship – without making

some efforts to rebuild that relationship. At the same time, the

prospects for alternative institutional channels for democracy in these

countries are not particularly bright. Greece is characterised by weak

civil society, and parties have monopolised the access to government

(Pappas, 2010); in Italy, there are few established channels to

influence government for civic groups, NGOs and organised social

movements (Vannucci & Della Porta, 2011; Zamponi 2012) ; in Ireland, the

social partnership process has been set aside; in Spain, the centre-

right government did not consult social partners on its reform plans.

25

The effects of these disruptions in political life are likely to last

long beyond the present economic crisis, not just in the introduction of

new parties and protest movements, but also in shaping the attitudes and

behaviour of future generations of voters (and, indeed, non-voters). In

Greece in 2012, New Democracy received least support from students and

the unemployed and protest parties were supported by younger voters

(Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013, p. 536); in Italy in 2013, the M5S

was the only party with less than 50% of its support from over-45s

(Garzia, 2013, p. 1001 citing Vezzoni 2013); in Spain, unemployment was

50% among under-25s at the 2011 general election (Kennedy, 2012, p.

284). Insofar as turning out to vote – and voting for specific parties –

is a matter of habit, the present crisis may be establishing bad or

different habits for future decades. At the same time, it makes some of

the new entrants on the supply side of the electoral market potentially

vulnerable, as their voters, while weakly attached to mainstream

parties, should also be weakly attached to these newer organisations.

While it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, these observations

indicate that the ‘big picture’ of tension between demands for

responsibility and demands for representation in times of crisis that

Mair described is worth pursuing further in greater depth and with

greater comparative rigour than has been possible in this chapter.

Future comparisons with countries less affected by the crisis are

needed, as well as analysis of further data on the adaptation of party

organisations (Scarrow & Webb, 2013) and policy. The crisis has opened

up new territory in the study of representative government.

26

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