Resolving Rohingya Crisis: Obstacles and Prospects

AdvancesinSocialSciencesResearchJournal–Vol.5,No.12PublicationDate:Dec.25,2018DoI:10.14738/assrj.512.5697.

Uddin,M.J.(2018).ResolvingRohingyaCrisis:ObstaclesandProspects.AdvancesinSocialSciencesResearchJournal,5(12)1-13.

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ResolvingRohingyaCrisis:ObstaclesandProspects

M.JashimUddinPh.D.,AnAssistantProfessor,

DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandSociology,NorthSouthUniversity,Dhaka,Bangladesh.

ABSTRACT

Despite having geographical proximity and age-old commercial and cultural ties,Bangladesh andMyanmar have failed to develop ameaningful bilateral relationshipdue to the Rohingya crisis. Nations have long witnessed numerous crimes againsthumanityinRakhine,whichbrutallykilledalotofRohingyaandforcedabout1millionofthemtofleefromthelandtheyhavelivedonforcenturies.ToescapefromdeathandtorturetheyhaveenteredBangladesh,andarenowleadingamiserablelife.Rohingyaare themostpersecuted andhelpless ethnicminority in today’sworld.The futureoftheseill-fatedpeopleistrulyuncertain.TheindifferenceoftheMyanmargovernmentin the matter of the safe repatriation of Rohingya refugees generate doubts andapprehensioninthecivilizedworldaboutwhetherornottheseunwantedpeoplewilleventuallyreturntotheirhomeland.MyanmarhasalwaysdisregardedtheRohingyaasanethnicminorityofMyanmar.Inaddition,thegeo-politicalinterestsofthelargeAsianpowers,e.g.ChinaandIndia,military’sengagementinpoliticsinMyanmar,andfinally,the lack of regular exchange of top leaders and people to people contact betweenBangladesh and Myanmar have been the key obstacles for a reliable solution of theRohingya crisis. Although the neighbors have geo-economic significance and hugepotential for cooperation, the analysis of the past record, existing policies and theresponseoftheMyanmargovernmenttotheRohingyacrisisrevealthatprospectsforasaferepatriationof theRohingyarefugees toRakhineareslim.Thestudyargues thatthecarrotandstickpoliciesofthemajoractorsincludingtheUN,theWesternpowers,andChinaarevitaltopersuadeMyanmartocreateapeacefulenvironmentinRakhineforensuringthesaferepatriationoftherefugeesandaswellastheirrightstolivewithdignityintheirownland.KeyWords:Rohingya,Genocide,Myanmar,Bangladesh,Repatriation, theAsianPowers, theWesternDemocracies,Geo-politicalInterests,Humanity

INTRODUCTION

Rohingya, the ethnic minority of Rakhine state of Myanmar, are widely recognized as theworld’smostpersecutedandoppressedminority.AccordingtoareportpublishedinProthomAlo,theleadingBengalidailynewspaperinBangladesh,since25Augustof2017,theMyanmarArmyhas started creatinghavoc in order to remove theRohingya from themapofRakhineforever.Atleast24thousandRohingyahavelostlives,whilethenumberofrapevictimshoveraround18thousandasaresultofthehatefulandbrutalactsoftheMyanmarArmy(ProthomAlo, 18August, 2018). Because of the genocide and ethnic cleansing, about amillionpeoplehavebeenforcedtoleavetheirownland.RohingyaareanethnicMuslimminoritywhodifferfromMyanmar’sdominantBuddhistgroupsethnically,linguistically,andreligiously.Ascholararguedthattoconstituteanethnicgroup,sixcriteriamustbemet(Brown,1993).ThisauthorarguesthatRohingyamoreorlessmeettherequiredcriteriatoformanethniccommunity:thegroup has a name (Rohingya); they believe in a common ancestry; the group has sharedhistoricalmemories,theyhaveasharedculturebasedoncommonlanguageandreligion;thegroup feels an attachment to a specific land (Arakan/Rakhine); and finally they think ofthemselvesasagroup.


2 URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.512.5697.

According to theUNHumanRights Commission, Genocidewas evident inRakhine. (TheUNHumanRightsCommissionReport2018).Renewedviolence,includingreportedrape,murder,andarson in2017, triggeredamassiveexodusofRohingyaamidchargesofethniccleansingagainst Myanmar’s security forces. Nevertheless, the military have denied the charges andcounter-claimedthattheycarriedoutacampaigntorestorepeaceandstabilityintheWesternregion of Myanmar (Albert, Foreign Affairs, 2018), due to which, the Rohingya have beenfleeingMyanmarinlargenumberstoBangladeshtoavoidconflictandpersecution.Thefactsandevidenceofthecrimeagainsthumanitymakesusquestionwhetherwearelivinginthe21stcenturyorinthemiddleage.WhyhastheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(UNSC)inparticularfailedtotakeanystrongmeasure,oratleasteconomicsanctions,againsttheso-called democratic government of Myanmar and its army responsible for the genocide? TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights1948and theResponsibility toProtect (R2P), that is,thetwovitalinternationalinstrumentstoprotecthumanrights,havewithoutadoubtfailedtoprotecttheill-fatedRohingya.Foritsnarrowgeo-politicalandstrategicinterests,itisclaimedthatChinanotonlyjustifiestheatrocitiesinRakhine,butalsodetersanysanctionsagainstit.TheRohingyacrisis is thekey impediment to theextensionofbilateralrelationshipbetweenBangladesh-Myanmar, two neighbors sharing both land and maritime boundaries. The twocountriesshare314.40km(207.20landboundary,68.20NafRiver,and39.00kmMaritimeupto St.Martin) of commonboundary.Myanmarwas one of the first neighboring countries torecognize Bangladesh on 13 January 1972 and the countries established their diplomaticmissions on 21 March 1972. President Ne Win was the first Asian Head of State to visitindependentBangladesh inApril 1974. FromBangladesh side, PresidentZiaurRahmanpaidthefirststatevisittoMyanmarinJuly1977.Sincethenalltheheadsofthestate/governmentof Bangladesh visited Myanmar. In the recent past, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visitedMyanmarinDecember2011.ThereturnvisitofMyanmarPresidentortheirprimeleaderAungSanSuuKyitoBangladeshisyettoberealized.Despitehavingalltheseexchangesofhighprofilevisits,time-honoredcommercialandculturalties and unlimited potential in reciprocal cooperation in trade and connectivity, the twoneighbors failedtobuildameaningfulbilateralrelationship.Asofpresent, theexistingtradeandpeople-to-peoplecontactbetween themarealmostnil.Undoubtedly, theRohingyacrisishas had spillover impacts on the other bilateral issues, e.g., leading to, cross border fire,killings, and transnational crimes. The issue has already emerged as a national securityconcernforBangladesh.TherefugeesareahugeburdenforacountrylikeBangladeshwhereagood number of people still live under poverty line. Although it is noted that the outsidesourcesprovidesubstantialfundingfortherefugees’foodandmedicine,Bangladeshstillhasaheavyweighttobear(Fink,2009;Solomon,2017).ThepeacefulpowertransitionfromamilitaryregimetoademocraticgovernmentinMyanmarwasconsideredtobringopportunitiesfordevelopingbetterrelationsbetweenMyanmarandtheneighbors to solve theRohingya crisis (Hlaing, 2012).However, the power transform inMyanmarborewitnesstooneofthemostbrutalmasskillingsinhistoryin2017(UddinM.J.,2017).AungSanSuuKyiandtherulingNationalLeagueforDemocracy(NLD)areconcernedwiththesameissuesastheirpredecessors,themilitarygovernments;perceivingtheRohingyaissue as deeply security-dominated. Apparently, it seems that the terms humanity, humanrights, peace and civil society are absent from the dictionary ofMyanmar government. TheMyanmarmilitary is involved inconflictswithmanyotherminoritygroups.Concerning this,Brown noted, “the Burmese military’s repression of Karen, Kachin, Naga, and Rohingyainsurgentsisanethnicconflict”(Brown,1993,p.5).

AdvancesinSocialSciencesResearchJournal(ASSRJ) Vol.5,Issue12Dec-2018

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ResearchObjectivesandResearchQuestions:TheobjectiveofthispaperistoexaminethekeyobstaclestoresolvetheRohingyacrisisandidentifythepotentialareasofcooperationbetweenBangladeshandMyanmar.Italsoattemptsto explore the prospects of a peaceful and lasting solution of Rohingya crisis. This paperattempts tosearch theanswers to the followingquestions:Whatare thekeyreasonsbehindthe Rohingya crisis? What are the obstacles to resolve this crisis? Are Bangladesh andMyanmar geo-economically significant for each other? Do they have potential areas forcooperation?Finally,whataretheprospectsforasaferepatriationofRohingya?ThispaperconsistsofsixsectionsincludingSectionone,Introduction.SectionTwofocusesonthe key obstacles to resolvingRohingya crisis including the debate on the ethnic identity ofRohingya.SectionThreebrieflydiscussesabout thespillover impactsofRohingyacrisisoverthe other bilateral issues. Section Four explores the geo-political significance of BangladeshandMyanmar,andthescopesforpotentialareasofcooperationformutualbenefit.TheFinalSectionprovidesananalysisofprospectsofapeacefulanddurablesolutionof theRohingyacrisis.

KEYOBSTACLESTORESOLVINGROHINGYACRISISRohingya refugee issue has been the prime blockade to building a smooth and meaningfulBangladesh-Myanmar relationship. The refugee issue seems to continue to be anunmanageablebarinestablishinganysustainablerelationsbetweenthetwoneighbors.Inthisregard, Christina Fink noted, “Bangladesh has been extremely frustrated by the Burmeseregime’s refusal to take back all the Rohingya refugees and its continued harsh policiestowards theRohingya.” (Fink,2009).Finkstated thisalmostonedecadeago,butstill to thisveryday,theMyanmarregimecontinuesitsharshpolicyandshowsreluctancetoensureasafeand friendly environment for the safe repatriation of Rohingya. Before analyzing the keyobstacles toresolving thecrisis, it isnecessary toshed lighton theoriginofRohingya issue.Whoarethey?WhydoMyanmargovernmentandpeoplehatethemsomuch?OriginofRohingyaCrisisWhoare theRohingya?Are theyMyanmarnationalsorBengaliMuslims?Are theystateless?TheMyanmargovernment/elitesrepeatedlyallegedthatRohingyaareBengalesewhileithasbeenwidelyrecognizedandassertedby theeasternandwesternscholars that theRohingyaarebasicallyArakanisMuslimsinhabitinginRakhine(newnameofArakan),ageographically-isolatedarea inWesternMyanmarconsistingofcoastalplainsandanetworkofstreamsandrivers,forcenturies.ItisarguedthatRohingyahavebeenlivinginRakhineforcenturies;somearguedsincethebeginningofthe7thcenturywhenArabMuslimtraderssettledinArakan,ontheotherhand,someotherarguedthatthisethnicminorityhasbeentheresince1500century(Albert,TheRohingyaCrisis,2018).AccordingtoWorldBank,morethan78%ofRohingyaarenowlivingbelowthepoverty line(Albert, 2018). They have been denied their civil, political, economic, and social rights inparticular since the military took the power in Myanmar in 1962, which were ultimatelylegalizedthroughthecontroversial1982CitizenshipAct(AhmedI.,2010).RohingyaMuslimsareamongtheworld’smostpersecutedandignoredminorities.Theseill-fatedpeoplebecamestatelessintheirownland.WhytheBuddhistMajorityHatetheRohingyaSoMuch?Why this level of discrimination or hatred against Rohingya Muslims? It is viewed thathistorically, ethnic Burmese political leaders— whether in government or in oppositionparties—have tended to deny or ignore the diversity of interest, background, language and



concernsofthe‘nationalminorities.’Moreover,Myanmarpeoplerarelyrecognizesuchdenialasproblematicatall.This isevidentwhenconsideringthat thepersecutionandexpulsionofRohingya Muslims that have been going on at the Bangladesh border received widespreadsupportinMyanmar. Accordingtoonescholar,themilitarydrewonpopularprejudicesthatMuslimsdominatedbusinessandusedtheirprofitstobuildmosques,buyBuddhistwives,andspreadIslamicteachings.ThesenegativelabelsagainsttheMuslimminoritieshavelaterfueledanti-Rohingyahatepropaganda.TheconstitutionofMyanmarhasbecomeafictionasitfailstoprotectthebirthrightsofitsownpeople.ElitesinMyanmarhaveanextremenegativesensitivityabouttheethnicandreligiousidentities, color or appearance of Rohingya and thus deny their birthrights. For instance, in2009,YeMyintAung,Myanmar’sthen-consulgeneralinHongKong,sentalettertolocalmediaandfellowdiplomats inwhichhementionedthat“theRohingyaareasuglyasogres”anddonot share the “fair and soft” skin of other Burmese ethnic groups. Thus, he concluded thatRohingya are neither Myanmar people nor Myanmar’s ethnic group but the interlopers inBurmaanddonotdeservecitizenshiprights(Tharoor,2015).OriginofRohingya:TheDebateMyanmarclaimsthatRohingyaareBengaliMuslimswhooriginallycametoRakhinefromtheSoutheast of Bangladesh although they have not provided any concrete evidence to supporttheir claims. But, Rohingya activists counter claim that theRohingya are descendants of theMuslimssettlerswhohadsettled inArakan longbefore theBritish’sannexationofMyanmarwhich is also supported by the historical document by Francis Buchanan in 1799,whereby‘Rooinga’(today’sRohingya)isreferredasMuhammedans,theMuslimsettlersinArakanState.In 2013, this author interviewed some Rohingya refugees in two registered and makeshiftcampsinTeknaf,whoclaimedthattheirancestorslivedinArakan(Rakhine)forcenturies.ItisallegedthattheBritishannexedArakanin1824,whichencouragedasteadymovementofpopulationfromBengalorBritishIndiatotheArakan.Atestimonyofthisliesinthefactthatthe population of Maungdaw Township (Rakhine) increased from 18,000 in 1831 to about100,000 in 1911 (Ahmed I. , 2010). This author argues that even if itwas a fact that somepeoplemovedfromSouthernpartof theBengalofBritishIndiatoArakaninMyanmarmorethan 100 years back and settled there as some people moved from Arakan to Bengal andsettled in Southern part of today’s Bangladesh, does it justify to raise question of theircitizenship after a century? During the British era, many people moved from one place toanotherandlivedaccordingtotheirconvenience,so, ifquestionisraisedwhythisparticulargroupofpeople(Rohingya)shouldbegivencitizenship,isitacceptable?Infact,thefateandpoliticalpositionoftheArakaneseMuslimsthenbecamecloselytiedwiththe British colonial power.When the Japanese Imperial Armywho occupied Burma in1942expelledtheBritish,considerablesectionoftheArakaneseMuslimsfledBurmaandtheArakantotakeshelterintheBengalofBritishIndia.Duringthisperiod,thepoliticalaffiliationsoftheArakanese became clear; when the Arakanese Buddhists supported the Japanese ImperialArmy,theArakaneseMuslimssupportedtheBritish.Suchpoliticalaffiliation,however,provedfatalfortheArakaneseMuslims(Rohingya)later.TheaffiliationofRohingyaduringtheBritisherahasbeenoneofthekeyreasonsbehindthehatredofMyanmareliteandordinarypeopletowardstheRohingya.



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Map1:MapofRakhineMyanmar

ObstaclestoResolvingRohingyaCrisisMyanmar’sUnwillingnesstoTakeBacktheRohingyaRefugeesMyanmarisreluctanttotakebacktheRohingyarefugeestotheirhomeland.Unfortunately,theMyanmar government has refused to accept the identity of Rohingya as an ethnic group ofMyanmar. It has always been reluctant to use the term “Rohingya” in any bilateral andmultilateralofficialmeetingsordialogues(Marszal,2016).IntheForeignOfficeConsultation(FOC)ofBangladeshandMyanmar,thelatteralwaysdemandstheBangladeshdelegationsnotto use the term “Rohingya” but “Bengalese.” Hence, the question arises, if themajority of acountrydoesnotevenaccepttheexistenceofaminoritygrouplivingthereforcenturies,howcouldoneaddressandresolvetheproblem? To justifytheethniccleansingandexpulsionofthislargenumberofill-fatedpeople,whoarenotpoliticallyorganized,thetyrannicalMyanmargovernmentwantstodestroytheirethnicname.Inthisregard,thecurrentSecretaryGeneraloftheUNsaidwhilevisitingtherefugeecampsinCox’sBazaarinJuly2018itwasnotedthatUNandMyanmarofficialshadmajordifferencesoveradealtoallowtheRohingyatoreturn.“We disagree with the final status of the Myanmar government. They call them BengaliMuslims, we call them Rohingya. We believe citizenship should be granted, but they arereluctantonthis.”(Prentis,2018).MostoftheBangladeshipeoplearedeeplyconcernedwhethertheRohingyarefugeescaneverreturn to their homeland. Although it is difficult to predict, given the strong internationalpressureonMyanmar,and thebilateralagreementsignedbyBangladeshandMyanmar, it isviewed by some that a segment of the Rohingya populationmay be taken back in the nearfuture(Choudhury,2018).ThevisitofaMyanmardelegation ledbytheForeignSecretaryofMyanmar,MyintThu,totheKutupalongRohingyarefugeecampinCox’sBazaaron31October2018gotattentionlocallyandglobally.Agroupofabout60Rohingyacommunityleadersmetthe delegation and raised their apprehensions for a safe repatriation to their homeland andtheir citizenship rights in Myanmar. Myint Thu listened to the refugees and said that theMyanmargovernmenthadverifiedabout5,000namesofrefugeesandthatrepatriationwouldbeginwithafirstbatchof2,000returneesinmid-November.Nevertheless,theRohingyasaidthattheywerenotveryhopefulabouttheproposedrepatriation.MohibUllah,ARohingya,saidRohingya leaders wantedMyanmar to recognize them as an ethnic groupwith the right toMyanmarcitizenshipbeforetheyreturn.“Whenweaskedaboutourcitizenshiptherewasnoanswer,” said Abdur Rahim, another Rohingya at the meeting. (Myanmar officials try toconvinceRohingyatoreturn,acceptIDcards,2018).However,becauseoftheirdeepconcerns,the UNHCR and Human Rights Watch denounced the recent bilateral decisions by bothBangladeshandMyanmargovernmenttostarttheproposedrepatriationwithoutensuringthesecurityoftheill-fatedrefugeesinRakhine.Geo-politicalInterestsofBig/RegionalPowersHumanityiscryinginMyanmar,theworldobservessilently.Nonetheless,theUNSC,theapexbody of the UN, failed to implement the Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 or Right toProtect(R2P).However,becauseoftherepeatedappealfromtheBangladeshgovernment,theUN General Assembly, and conscious world, and the Security Council has eventually



condemned the Myanmar government for the ongoing ethnic cleansing in Rakhine.Nevertheless, it isnot surewhether theMyanmararmyreallybothersUNSC’sconcerns. It iswellknownthatthiscountryalwayshasChina,oneofthepermanentmembersoftheUNSC,tohinder any sanctions against it. For its narrow geo-political and strategic interests, China isreadytojustifyorbacktheMyanmararmy’scrimeagainsthumanityinArakaninthenameofcombating terrorism. China usually seems reluctant to get involved in the internal affairs ofanothercountrybutBeijingseesRohingyacrisisasanopportunitytoregainitslostchanceinMyanmarandonceagainbringthecountryintoitstrack.Atthispointquestioncanberaised:WhatarethespecificinterestsoftheChineseinRakhine,thecoastalregion?In2004, SouthKoreancompanyDaewoodiscovered4.5 trillion cubic feetof gas reserves inthat coastal area. This has ignited a spark in China to expand its oil sources and extend itsinfluence in the region for immense profits (Heugas, 2017). From 2008, China’s state oilcompany, the “China National Petroleum Cooperation”, was granted permission by theMyanmarmilitarygovernmenttobuygasfromtheShwereservethatisinRakhine’soffshorebasin. The gas was transported from Kyaukpyu to China’s Yunnan Province through theMyanmar-China Gas Pipeline. The pipeline, whose construction began in 2010, is said todeliverupto12billionm³ofgasperyear.OilisanotherofRakhine’spreciousnaturalresource.TheMyanmarmilitaryagreedtoletChinaworkontheconstructionofacrudeoilpipelinealongwiththegaspipeline.Afteratwo-yeardelay, the China-Myanmar pipeline began transporting oil from Rakhine’sMade Island porttowards Yunnan Province in April 2017, four months before the escalation of the crisis inRakhine. China, being the second largest economy in theworld is always looking to expandtheirmarketinternationally.As a part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinawants tomake a seaport in Kyaukpyu(Dhaka Tribune, 2017). With the aim of an industrial base the two countries - China andMyanmar-areplanningtobuildupatradezoneinMyanmartowidenuptheirtradechannels.Theprojectwillbedevelopedwithin1700hectares.7.3billiondollarswillbetheapproximatecostof thisproject.ThreeChineseandoneThai companyarewilling to take70-85%of thisdevelopmentandrestwillbetakenandmonitoredbytheMyanmargovernment.A port already exists in that site. It is usedmostly to export local goods and thecapacity isrelativelyverysmall.Oncethisbecomesa“deepseaport”,anditisdevelopedaccordingtotheplans,thenitsfacilitieswillincrease(Gupta,2017).Theannualcapacitywillbeof7.8milliontonsofbulkcargoand4.9millionofTUE(standardunitofmeasuringthecapacityofcontainerships). The port will be an addition to themarine infrastructure for China’s Belt and RoadInitiative(BRI)andwillconnectChittagonginBangladesh,GwadarinPakistan,andColomboinSriLanka(Islam,TheDailyStar,2017).Thiswillalsopresumablybecomeoneof thebusiestshippingroutesintheentireworld,byhelpingChina’soilimportsandalsobyconnectingChinatoalmostallthecountriesintheworld(TheStarOnline,2017).This ambitious project also known as One Belt One Road (OBOR) project, if executedsuccessfully,will also enhance new trade routes and networks fromChina to the European,African and Asian continents. China currently carries most of its import throughout theMalacca Strait. However, Malacca Strait is also a prime target for piracy. China fears thepossibilityofanavalblockadehappeningintheeventofaconflict.ItwouldbecatastrophicforChina,as80%ofitsoilimportsfromtheMiddleEastaretransportedthroughthestrait.WithapipelinecrossingRakhine,oilfromAbuDhabi,Iraq,IranandSaudiArabiawouldreachChinamoresafely.



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ChinaplanstoinvestUS$10billionintotheKyaukpyuSpecialEconomicZone(SEZ),inadditionto theestimatedUS$2.5billion invested in theChina-Myanmaroil andgaspipelineprojects.Thedualpipelinesknownasthe“ThelongMyanmar-ChinaOilandGasPipelineProject”,runsupto771kmfromRakhinetosouthwesternChina.Thedeep-seaportandan industrialparkaroundthecityofKyaukpyuinRakhine,asplannedoutwillhaveanimmenseimpactuponthecountries.Itaimstoturnthearea,whichextendsover17km²,intoamaritimeeconomichub.All thiswillhavean immeasurablepositiveeffectontheeconomyofChina.That iswhytheyhavedecidedtotakeatoughstandwiththeMyanmargovernmentandsaidtheyhavearighttoprotect their sovereigntyandcombat terrorism.When theWesterndemocraciesparticularlytheUK,theUSAandFranceinsistedtoensurea“transparentinvestigation”bytheUNintothehumanrightsviolationsinRakhine,Beijingsaiditwasagainstanysuchinvestigation.Ontheotherhand,theroleofIndia,thelargestdemocracy,inthiscrisisisalsonotdesired.KYhomeoftheObserverResearchFoundationsaidthatIndiaconsidertheRohingyacrisisasaninternal affair ofMyanmar (Ja, 2017). According to one report, “Myanmar is rich in naturalresourcesandNewDelhiandBeijingarealreadylockedincompetitioninexploitingitspetroresources”(Joshi,2017).ThetwoprojectsofutmostimportancetoChinaandIndiaarelocatedintheRakhineStatewherethehelplessRohingyalived.MyanmarservesasthecentralhubforIndia’s Act East Policy (AEP), which is implemented as a strategy to cultivate extensiveeconomic relations with the nations of South East Asia. India’s intention is the “Tri lateralHighway”whichwilllinkIndia,MyanmarandThailand.Itisbudgetedaround1200Crrupeesandwillincludeconstructionofover69bridgesontheTamu-Kyigone-Kaluwasection(Thiha,2018).Oncethisiscompleted,thethreecountrieswillbeconnectedfromManipurinIndiatoMaeSotinThailandviaMyanmar.Thisconnectivitywillgreatlyimprovecommunicationsandtourismandwill have significant impact on the Indian economyprovided thehighwayhavepossibilitiesforfurtherenhancementsintocountrieslikeVietnam,CambodiaandLaos.MyanmarMilitary’sInvolvednessinPoliticsandGriponPowerThe UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has claimed that Rohingya persecution iscontinuingundertheauspicesofMyanmarArmy,whichremainsthemainobstacletoendingthe Rohingya refugee crisis (Prentis, 2018). He accused the military who is mainly still inchargeforgenocideandethniccleansinginRakhineandurgedtheinternationalcommunitytoput pressure on themilitary in order tomake things to change. He noted, “It is crucial thegovernment in Myanmar and more importantly the military fully understands that thesepeoplehavetherighttogobackandliveinMyanmarwithoutdiscrimination.”WhenpushedifthisincludedAungSanSuuKyi,Guterressaid“yes,butIamnotajudge.Itisclearthemilitaryisstillincharge.”An Independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar in a report released on 27August 2018 said therewas evidence indicating “genocidal intent” by theMyanmarmilitaryagainst Rohingyaminority and that crime against humanity andwar crimes appear to havebeen committed. The UN investigators also named six top army generals, including thecommander-in-chief of the Myanmar Army, whom they said must be investigated andprosecutedfortheabovecharges.Bachelet,theUNHumanRightscommissioner,welcomedadecisionbythePre-TrialChamberoftheInternationalCriminalCourt’s(ICC)findingthatithasjurisdiction over the alleged deportations of Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh as apossiblecrimeagainsthumanity.LackofVisitofTopLeadersandPeopletoPeopleContactForapeacefulsolutionoftheRohingyacrisis,aconstructiveengagementbetweenBangladeshandMyanmarisvital.Withmutualsuspicion,dialogues,whateverthenumberstheyshallnot



bring light at the end of the tunnel. Hence, it is observed that a major hindrance for aconstructive engagement is the lack of trust and confidence in each other between thegovernments,thusresultinginthelackofexchangeoftopleadersandlackofpeople-to-peoplecontact.Mutualvisitsoftopleaderscanbringopportunitiesforthenations,reducesuspicion,andbuildconfidence.Peopletopeoplecontactcanhelptheneighborsknoweachotherbetter.Interactions between the ordinary people of both countries, such as exchange of studentsprograms,culturalprograms,touristscanhelptoreducesuspicion.Alingeringtrustdeficitisovershadowingapositivedialoguemind-setandhindering institutional collaborationamongpertinent bodies of different ministries of the two countries. Due to the lack of regularinteractionsandjointventures,bothcountrieshavefailedtocurbillicitnetworksintheborderareasandothertransnationalsecurityproblems.Amongstallthereasonsbehind,someofthekeyobstaclestobringingapermanentsolutiontotheRohingyacrisisareanalyzedinthispaper.Theremovaloftheseobstaclesorthestrategiestoresolvethislong-standingconflictremainasaprimeconcern.However,beforefocusingonthe potential areas of cooperation and examining the prospects of a durable solution of thecrisis, it is important to consider the spillover impacts of this refugee crisis on the otherbilateralissuesbetweenBangladeshandMyanmar.

SPILLOVERIMPACTOFROHINGYACRISISONCONNECTIVITYANDTRADELackofConnectivityLack of connectivity is one of the key obstacles to construct a better relation betweenBangladesh and Myanmar. The stability and security of Teknaf and Maungdaw, the twobordering cities of Bangladesh and Myanmar, is affected by the influx of Rohingya fromMyanmartoBangladesh.Thesecurityintheborderareasisprerequisiteforenhancingtradeand connectivity between the countries (Syeda NaushinParnini, 2012). In the era ofglobalization,whennationsarereapingbenefit fromtheirrelationseventhoughtheyare farfromeachother,thesetwocloseneighborsdonothaveevenroadlinksorsealinksfortrade,commerce and people-to-peoplemovement. Historically these linkswere there, but fell intodisusefordecades.In2007,BangladeshsignedanagreementwithMyanmartodeveloparoadfromCox’sBazartoKyauktow.BangladeshproposedMyanmartobuild25-kilometerroad(2kminBangladeshand23kminMyanmar)at itsowncost.Themainobjectivewastoconstruct2kmlongBalukhali-Gundumroad within Bangladesh and 23 km long Gundum-Bawlibazar road within Myanmar forestablishingdirectroadlinkbetweenthetwocountries.However,Myanmardidnotshowanyinterestlater(UddinM.J.,2014).TheBangladeshgovernmentisalsointerestedinsettinguparailwaynetworkbetweenKunmingcityinYununprovinceandChittagongviaMyanmar.A130kmrailwaytrackwillbe laid fromDohazariofBangladeshtoGundumintheArakanstateofMyanmar via Ramu of Cox’s Bazar. The route would also strengthen connectivity betweenBangladesh and Myanmar. Nevertheless, Myanmar has fear that the Rohingya insurgencyproblemmightescalateifanydirectroadlinkistobeestablishedbetweenthetwocountries.InsignificantBilateralTradeThe Bangladesh-Myanmar bilateral trade figure is insignificant compared to Bangladesh’stradewithotherneighboringcountries.Thebilateraltradereachedaround$100millioninFY2012-13. That year, Bangladesh’s exports stood worth of $13.67 million and imports $84million. The balance of trade was heavily in favor of Myanmar. However, in FY 2015-16,Bangladesh’s export increased to $38.23 million while imported goods fromMyanmar wasworthUS$ 38.10million in the same fiscal year.i (Bangladesh Export PromotionBureau, FY2015-2016).Duetolackofconfidenceandconnectivity,thebilateraltradeisinsignificant.



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Fig1:ExportfromBangladeshtoMyanmarfromfiscalyear2011-12to2015-16

Export to Myanmar from FY 2011-12 to FY 2015-16

Source:BangladeshExportPromotionBureau

Fig2.TradebetweenBangladeshandMyanmarinFY2015-16

TradebetweenBangladeshandMyanmarinFY2015-16

Export Import

Source:BangladeshExportPromotionBureau

GEO-POLITICALSIGNIFICANCEANDPOTENTIALAREASOFCOOPERATIONFORMUTUAL

BENEFITFORBANGLADESHANDMYANMARAretheseNeighborsSignificantforEachOther?Bothgeo-strategicandgeo-economicsperspectivesjustifythenecessityofstrongBangladesh-Myanmar relations. Friends or alliesmay be changedbut not neighbors. They are linked byhistory,cultureandgeographyandmustliveandprospertogether.Anyincidentinonecountrycandefinitelyhavespilloverimpactsonneighbors(sheikh,1998). Importance of Myanmar to Bangladesh is: i) Myanmar, the largest country of mainlandSoutheastAsia,withanareaofsome678,500kilometers liesatthejunctureofthreeregionswithinAsia:East,Southeast,andSouthAsia.Itoccupiesacriticalgeostrategicpositionbetweenthe two Asian Giants China and India. ii) It is located in a region, which has experiencedtremendous economic growth over the last few decades. The huge reserves of naturalresourcesand itsgeostrategic locationbetweenSouthandSoutheastAsiasuggest that ithasthepotential tobeamajorSoutheastAsianplayer(MortenB.Pedersen,2000). iii)Myanmarcan be the potential gateway for an alternative land route opening towards China and



Southeast Asia for Bangladesh boosting her trade and connectivity. The geopoliticalimportanceofBangladeshwillremainintacttoIndia,ChinaandotherSouthAsiancountriesifitcanbecomeabridgebetweenSouthAsiaandtheSouthEastAsianCountries.iv)Bangladeshcurrently produces enough food grains for its people; yet, it needs to protect itself againstdrought, flood or other natural disasters. By 2025, its population will be over 200 million.Myanmar isblessedwithhugenatural resourcesandcanbeamore reliable source for foodgrain than any other country (Ethirajan, 2012). v)Myanmar has now become amagnet forforeign investment.AreportbytheMcKinseyGlobal InstituteestimatedthatMyanmarcouldattractasmuchas$100billioninFDIoverthenexttwodecades(WilsonK.,2013).On the other hand, significance of Bangladesh to Myanmar is: i) Bangladesh can also be agateway for Myanmar to connect to eastern India and other parts of South Asia. Certainly,bridgingBangladeshwill increaseMyanmar’s importance to China andASEAN countries forenhancing connectivity. ii) Chittagong-Kunming connectivity could bring enormousopportunities forMyanmar especially earning huge transshipment fee from the countries ofthethreesub-regionsofAsia(East,SouthandSoutheastAsia).iii)Withtheriseofmiddleclass,Bangladesh can become a potential market for Myanmar. (Rahman, Ashfaqur Rahman,“Bangladesh-MyanmarRelationCentre forForeignAffairsStudies (CFAS),AshfaqurRahman,“Bangladesh-MyanmarRelations:TheEconomicDimension,”CentreforForeignAffairsStudies(CFAS),availableathttp://www.muslimpo2014).iv)ApeacefulsolutionoftherefugeeproblemisvitalforthegrowthofRakhinestate.Hence,Bangladesh’s cooperation is crucial forMyanmar. v) Bangladesh has a global reputation forpeacekeeping and microcredit activities. Myanmar can receive cooperation and gainexperience from its neighbor in the respective fields, in particular, Bangladesh can helppromotehumanresourcedevelopmentinbackwardareaslikeRakhinestate.PotentialAreasofCooperationforMutualBenefitsFor reducingmisperceptions and building confidence, Bangladesh andMyanmar can extendcooperation in some potential areas. Several areas have been identified in this section forcooperation:CooperationinEnergySectorbetweenNeighborsBangladeshisanenergyhungrycountrywhereasMyanmarisrichinit.ThereareprospectsofcooperationintheenergysectorthroughimportinggasfromMyanmar.Applyingthebuybackpolicy, a joint venture canbe initiated in theborderdistrict ofBangladesh as suchbyusingMyanmar’s gas; Bangladesh can produce urea fertilizer and export to Myanmar for itsagriculturalneeds.Bangladeshhasalreadyshowedinterests for importinggas,butMyanmarhas been reluctant as it always said that after meeting their domestic needs, if there weresurplus, thenitwouldexporttoBangladesh.However, inSeptember2010, itwasannouncedthatthetwocountrieswouldsignaMoUtobuildtwodamsinArakanstate.Thedamswouldsupply575MWtoCoxBazaar.However,thereisnoconcretetimeframeandadvancementfortheproject.CooperationinPromotingHumanResourcesThe neighbors can cooperate on various socio-economic issues including microcredit,education and women empowerment. Bangladesh is proud to have two globally reputedmicrocreditorganizationslikeGrameenBankandBRAC.ModelofGrameenBankisadaptedbyother countries. BRAC, on the other hand, has experience to expand its activities in manycountries in the world including several African countries and Afghanistan. It has alreadystartedactivitiesinMyanmarinasmallscale.Itcanplaysignificantroleforpromotinghumanresources in the remote or backward areas like the Rakhine state in Myanmar. Vocational



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training could be another area,where they can helpMyanmar. If theMyanmar governmentshowsinterest,Bangladeshgovernmentcanproceedinthisregard.iiPeopletoPeopleContactDespite being neighbors, both nations have hardly known about each other’s culture, foodhabits, geography, and famous places. Therefore, people-to-people contact is the key forattaininganewheight inBangladesh-Myanmarrelations. Itcanbeattainedthroughtourism,student exchange, organizing sports events etc. (Rahman,ChangingContoursofBangladesh-Myanmarrelations ,2016).Everyyearalmost3milliontourists fromallovertheworldvisitMyanmarasithasmanyattractivetouristspots.iiiOntheotherhand,everyyear,thenumberofBangladeshi tourists visiting Thailand andMalaysia is about six hundred thousand, but thenumberof touristsvisitingMyanmar isalmostnil.Bothcountrieshaveseveral religiousandhistoric places to explore and have vast opportunities for promotion of tourism. Studentexchange, on the other hand, can be another way to boost up the idea of people-to-peoplecontact.Forboostingstudentexchange,theMinistryofHealthoftheBangladeshgovernmentplannedinOctober2013toprovidefinancialsupport/scholarshipstofiveMyanmarstudentswhoareinterestedinstudyingmedicalscienceinBangladesh.ivCooperationonPeacebuildingTrainingBangladeshishighlyexperiencedandgloballyreputedinprovidingtrainingforpeacesupportoperations and the country has been the second largest contributor at UN peace missions.Therefore,MyanmarcanbebenefittedfromsendingitspersonneltoBangladeshtobetrainedin those.TheBangladesh InstituteofPeaceSupportOperationTraining (BIPSOT)canbe theleadinginstituteforprovidingnecessaryeducationtothoseofficials.Chittagong-KunmingConnectivityviaMyanmarChittagong-Kunming connectivity including highway and railroad among Bangladesh,Myanmar, and China is imperative for greater cooperation. The connectivity can bringenormousopportunitiesnotonlyfortheabovethreecountriesbutalsoforthewholeregion.(Uddin M. J., 2014) A direct road link would help lessen transportation cost and increasesmoother and timely delivery of products in trade. The traffic of transportation fromBangladeshtoChinathroughMyanmarcanprovidethecountrywithahugeamountoftransitandtransshipmentfeesandotherassociatedrevenues.Throughthisroadlink,acorridorcanbeextendeduptootherASEANnations.InvestmentinMyanmarIt is a fact that Myanmar is more resourceful and endowed with more natural resourcescomparedtoBangladesh.Myanmar isalmost6 times larger thanBangladesh.Butbecauseofthe policy ofMyanmar, the resources have remained largely unexplored. If the country hadmaintainedtheopendoorpolicytotheBangladeshipeople,itcouldbebenefitedeconomically.Bangladeshi entrepreneurs are interested to invest in Myanmar, particularly in agro-processingindustries.

CONCLUDINGREMARKSDespitehavinggeo-economicsignificanceandpotentialareas forcooperation, the immediateneighborshavefailedtoadvanceameaningfulbilateralrelationshipduetotheRohingyacrisis.AnobjectiveanalysisoftheobstaclestotheresolutionoftheRohingyacrisisrevealsthatthenarrowperspectives andexistingpoliciesof theMyanmargovernment concerningRohingyaethnicminorityclearlydenyhumanrights,disregardhistoricalfactsandcontradictthediversecultureofthesociety.Perhapsitwouldnotbeinappropriatetoraisethefollowingquestions:Doesthecountryhaveacivilsocietyorhumanrightsactivists?Howdoesademocracytolerate



theseatrocitiesinthis21stcentury?Isitreallyademocracy?It isevidentthatthemilitaryofMyanmar is responsible for the genocide and ethnic cleansing. The UN Human RightsCommissionformallyaccusedthehighermilitaryofficialsincludingtheArmyChiefforcrimesagainsthumanity.Simultaneously,theroleofAungSanSuuKyiandherdemocraticallyelectedgovernmenthavebeenhighlycriticizedfornotsafeguardingtheRohingyaminority.Thus,theycannot deny the responsibility of genocide, and must be brought to International CriminalCourt(ICC).ThegovernmentofMyanmarisanidealexampleintoday’sworldofatyrannyofbrutalmajorityelecteddemocratically.Myanmar is reluctant to start the repatriation process of the refugee although it signed anagreement with Bangladesh in January 2018. Despite having geo-strategic and geo-politicalsignificance and potentials for cooperation in different areas, because of the stereotypicalmindset and lack of politicalwill of theMyanmar government, prospects for a peaceful andlastingsolutionof theRohingyacrisis lookbleak.Realizationof theMyanmargovernmentoftheiratrocitiesandbrutalities is so farunlikely. Inaddition,Chinese support to this countrywillremainforitsgreatergeo-politicalandgeo-economicinterests.Chinaseemswillingtogainits strategicandeconomic interestsat thecostofhumanity.Nevertheless, in reality,ChineserolewillremaincrucialinmanagingthecrisisasithasstrongeconomicengagementwithbothBangladeshandMyanmar. Ithas“carrotandstick”tocontrolMyanmar. It isstronglyviewedthatChinawasandhasbeenbehindthescreentopushMyanmarandBangladeshtosignthebilateral agreement in January 2018.Nonetheless, by doing this Chinamight try to shift theattentionfrommultilateralapproachtobilateralonethatultimatelyChinathinks,willreduceinternationalpressureonMyanmarandChina.Howeffectiveisorwouldbethecurrentbilateralmechanismtoresolvethisethnicconflictisagreat concern. With analyzing the past historical record, bilateral agreements signed indifferenttimesinhistoryandtheiroutcomesuntilnow,itcanbearguedthatwithoutcreatingmounting pressure on Myanmar including strong economic sanctions on the Myanmargovernment and Myanmar Army in particular, there will be no permanent solution to theRohingyacrisis.While the Western World particularly the US, Canada and EU have severely criticized theMyanmargovernment,therehavebeennomajorsanctionsplacedonMyanmarcompellingthegovernmenttoensurehumanrightsoftheRohingyaminorityincludingtheircitizenshiprightandasafereturntotheirhomeland.Nevertheless, it isarguedthatwhiletheWesternWorldtime to time, takes somemeasures towarn theMyanmar government, theWestern touriststurnawayfromMyanmar;MyanmarcontinuestoreceivefirmeconomicsupportfromitsAsianpartners, led by China and Japan, but also including Thailand, India, Singapore, and others.Whether they are acting purely out of economic self-interest or for geopolitical reasons, orboth,theseregionalgovernmentsaregivingMyanmarcrucialsupportinthisstressfulperiod(Wolf,n.d.).Underthismilieu,theWesterndemocracieshavetoplayacriticalroleinresolvingtheRohingyacrisis(anAsiancrisis)in‘theAsianCentury’.__________________________________iBangladeshExportPromotionBureau,FY2015-2016.iiItisanoteherethatinanInformalTrackIIdialoguebetweenBangladeshInstituteofInternationalandStrategicStudies (BIISS) and Myanmar ISIS (MISIS) held in Singapore on 21 January 2014, the delegation from MISISrequestedtheBangladeshidelegationtohelpMyanmarpromotehumanresourcedevelopmentparticularlyinthebackwardregionsofthecountry.Theauthorwasinvolvedinthedialogue.iiiInformationcollectedfromtheSoutheastAsianDesk,MinistryofForeignAffairs,BangladeshGovernmenton25March2014.ivIbid



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Resolving Rohingya Crisis: Obstacles and Prospects

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