Report: Prisoner's Constitutional Right to Religious Exercise

Religious Rights of Prisoners 1

Correctional Law Review:

Prisoners’ Constitutional Right to Religious Exercise

Prepared for St. Louis County Executive Charles A. Dooley

***

Prepared by Ameena Mohyuddin, Office of the County Executive

St. Louis County Government, St. Louis, Missouri

July 2012

This review highlights the primary issue of religious freedom within the

constraints of the correctional administration and regulations; it attempts to

understand the prisoners’ rights v. security of correctional facilities debate (by

analyzing court decisions through the years); and it reviews legislation (to

understand the importance of religion in the prison systems as a means of

rehabilitative measure). Upon examining different aspects of the issue, this review

supports the necessity and the importance of fostering un-obstructive and un-

prohibited religious environment within corrections system and the need for

prison-religion friendly attitude and policies embracement by prison

administrations.

Prisoners struggle with the ability to practice their

own belief while under the supervision of prison


administrators and correctional facility guidelines. In the

recent years, many have filed claims against the police

facilities arguing that their rules and policies suppress

their constitutional religious freedom of practicing their

belief (originally protected under the First Amendment1). It

is argued that “prisoners’ constitutional rights have been

restricted due to concerns for federalism, separation of

powers, restrictions resulting from incarceration of

inmates”2 and as a result, “courts have recognized that

balancing the precious constitutional liberty rights of

prisoners and needs for necessary restrictions in the prison

setting, coupled with concerns for separation of powers and

federalism is a task of inordinate difficulty”3. This makes

it necessary to recognize the importance of a detailed

review of the issue regarding prisoner’s constitutionality

right to hold and practice religious beliefs as it is

1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”. 2 Mayu Miyashita, ‘City of Boerne v. Flores’ and its Impact on Prisoners’ Religious Freedom, 25, New England Journal on Crime and Civic Confinement, 519, 519 (1999).3 Id. at 519.


balanced with the need for securing autonomy for the

correctional system. In understanding the issue, it is the

role of religion in the society and its implications for

incarcerated individuals be outlined; the standards and case

law in place over the years be reviewed; and the pertinent

court cases and their outcomes be discussed.

Issue of Constitutionality of Religious Freedom for

Prisoners

Prior to 1960s, the idea that “prisoners were slaves of

the state”4 and “upon conviction, criminals lost virtually

all legal rights…any rights they had were not the rights

shared with other citizens, but those rights which the state

chose to extend to them”5 dominated most of the Court

approaches towards the prisoner’s rights at large.

Similarly, correctional administrators claimed that

prisoners lost all of their constitutional rights after

4 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 790, 796 (1871). The case commented that a prisoner "has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the state."5 Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and prisoners’ rights, 59, Federal Probation, 36, 36 (1995).


conviction. Prisoners had privileges, not rights, and

privileges could be taken away arbitrarily6.

Research indicates that as late as the mid-1960s most

of the complaints drawn from prisoners (in regards to their

prison conditions and constitutional rights) were ignored by

the courts systems due to policy that established a deferral

pattern “in all matters of treatment of prisoners to the

presumed administrative expertise of prison officials”7 The

courts detached themselves from the rules, regulations, and

policies of the correctional system which made dealing and

handling of convicted individuals difficult and “required

considerable expertise that they did not possess”8 and

therefore, it was best to allow correctional administration

the authority to monitor, treat, and deal with prisoners and

the prison systems under their own independence. It was

noted clearly that “what happened to the convicted after

sentencing was not a matter of judicial or, indeed, public

6 William C. Collins, Legal Responsibility and Authority of Correctional Officers, American Correctional Association, Laurel, Maryland, 1982.7 William Bennett Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners’Rights Litigation, 23, Stanford Law Review, 473, 473 (1971). 8 Id. at 473


concern”9 and therefore, provided opportunities for

lawlessness due to immunity from judicial scrutiny.

Although the courts did begin to recognize the

importance of prisoners’ retention of constitutional rights,

they did not, however, feel it was their role to intervene

in order to allow the prisoners the protection of their

rights. Researcher concludes that courts perceived the

preservation of prisoner’s rights as legislative and

executive duty rather than judicial responsibility. A change

in judiciary’s views surfaced in the 1964 U.S. Supreme Court

case Cooper v. Pate10 highlighted that the Civil Rights Act of

187111 provides prisoners protection stating that:

“Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

of Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

9 Id. 10 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). 11 Civil Rights Act of 1971, 42 U.S. Code 21 §§1983. The Act was a federal statute originally enacted in order to protect the blacks in theSouth from the Ku Klux Klan by ensuring civil remedies for abuses committed.


to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for

redress”12.

Scholarship claims movements by Black Muslim

prisoners13 swept across the country during the 1960s and

1970s which led to the led to the examination, filing, and

review of “legal actions to obtain judicial recognitions and

enforcement of a limited range of constitutional rights for

incarcerated offenders”14 with a focus on religious

discrimination. Analysts point out that during the mid 1960s

and late 1970s, movements within the prison systems

regarding the protection of constitutional rights was a

result of a compilation of societal pressures, shift in

values, and awareness. Analysts outline these precursors as:

(1) the militant and aggressive behavior of prisoners to12 Id. 13 “The Muslim prisoners are widely recognized for their important role,as evidenced by commentators characterizations of them as the major catalyst, those who carried the torch of Black protest, and the fuse to this legal explosion” (Smith, 1993, Pg. 132). 14 Christopher E. Smith, Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoners’ Rights, 24, Journal of Black Studies, 131, 132 (1993).


assert their rights; (2) the emergence of the public

interest lawyer concept that allowed lawyers to work pro

bono or with financial support from the government or other

private grants; (3) the shift in the judiciary’s view of

becoming more responsive to politically disadvantaged

groups; and (4) the situations where “judges were often

presented with cases that involved such horrible conditions

of confinement that they cried out for some sort of remedial

action”15

Court cases that led to the empowerment of prisoners

rights include Cooper v. Pate16, ruling that prison’s must allow

inmates certain religious materials; Lee v. Washington17 ordered

Alabama prisons to desegregate its correctional facilities;

15 Call, at 474 (1995). 16 Cooper v. Pate, 84 S. Ct. 733. Also, see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). It followed Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) which allowed prison inmates to utilize the writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge the legality of their sentencing and their imprisonment conditions. 17 Lee v. Washington, 88 S. Ct. 994. Also, see Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) stated “prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and jails…we are unwilling to assume that state or local prison authorities might mistakenly regard such an explicit pronouncement as evincing any dilution of this Court’s firm commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial discrimination (Black, J.; Harlan, J.;and Stewart, J., concurring).


and Young v. Gilmore18 required prison facility to provide its

inmates with an adequate law library. Similarly, one of the

important court cases revolving the constitutional

provisions for religious freedom was the 1972 case Cruz v.

Beto19. In the case, the “Court held that a prison could not

prevent a Buddhist inmate from using the prison chapel, from

corresponding with religious advisors, and from distributing

religious materials to other inmates, if the prison

permitted inmates of other faiths to engage in these same

activities”20.

In the past couple decades, there has been an increase

in complaints against correctional institutions for the

violation of prisoners’ freedom of religion in regards to

their diet, grooming, worship services, religious jewelry,

and access to chaplains. It is claimed that incarcerated

individuals have limited or no access to practice non-

Christian religions due to the strict and unsympathetic

administrative policies of prison systems. As a result,

18 Young v. Gilmore, 92 S. Ct. 250. 19 Cruz v. Beto, 92 S. Ct. 1079. 20 Call, at 476 (1995).


prisoners of minority religious needs (such as Muslims and

Jews, among others) resort to the judicial system for the

protection of their constitutional rights21. As the Courts

filled with complaints of suppressing prisoner’s rights, the

judiciary did not favor the plaintiffs in most cases. The

Courts held that legitimate constitutional rights of

prisoners did not outrank the importance of the maintenance

of security, the control of inmate behavior, and the attempt

at their rehabilitation.

Established Standards Regarding the Issue

Case law and literature claim that “little guidance in

establishing a uniform standard by which to assess the

religious free exercise claims of inmates”22 had led to a

disarray in court rulings regarding the issue. Through the

years, various court cases have defined and redefined the

standards of prisoners’ constitutionality in context of

prison rules and administration. In the renowned case

21 The first amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” U.S. Constitution, Amendment I. 22 Joseph C. Hutchinson, Analyzing the Religious Free Exercise Rights of Inmates: The Significance of ‘Pell, Jones, and Wolfish’, 11, N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change, 413, 413 (1983).


Procunier v. Martinez23, the Supreme Court noted that it had never

ruled on the question of whether inmates could claim their

first amendment freedoms and did not address the issue24. In

the case, “though the question was framed as whether the

First Amendment applied in prison, the Court found it

unnecessary to answer that question because it found the

regulations impinged unconstitutionally on the rights of

those not imprisoned”25. However, a few months following the

Martinez case, the Supreme Court concluded in Pell v.

Procunier26that inmates were entitled to invoke the first23 Procunier v. Martines, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). It stated, “traditionally, federal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude towards problems of prison administration…this attitude springs from…perceptions about the nature of the problems and efficacy of judicial intervention…But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take organizance of valid constitutional claims…” , at 404-405. 24 Id. At 406-408. 25 Wimsatt, at 1214 (2008) (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)). Furthermore, the case also stated that “whatever the status of a prisoner’s claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter’s interest is grounded in the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter…” at 408. Also, the case claimed that “the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government”, at 404-405. 26 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). In Court ruled that the prison policy in California that prohibited face to face media interviews with prisoners was unconstitutional due to the fact that


amendment to protect their rights and declared that “a

prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are

not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the

legitimate penological objectives of the correctional

system”27. Although the courts recognized the importance of

not infringing upon prisoner’s constitutional rights, they

did however, place limitations on those rights as long as

they did not compete with the interests of institutional

security of the correctional facilities, allowing the prison

administration with autonomy in their approach to exercising

their own measures in the context of security. The

appropriate degree of latitude was measured by reference to

the constitutional standard applied to time, place, or

manner regulations”28 and “the Court held that paramount

security interests, combined with the deference owed to

prison officials, dictated placement of a stringent burden

of proof on the inmate plaintiffs: in the absence of

substantial evidence in the record to indicate that thethere were alternative measures present for the prisoners to exercise both their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to communicate, at 821-822. 27 Id. At 823. 28 Id.


officials have exaggerated their response to rehabilitative

and security considerations, courts should ordinarily defer

to the expert judgment of prison officials in such

matters29”.

Analysts argue that the standard of determining time,

place, and manner evaluation cannot apply to the freedom of

religious right of the Constitution. Although “Courts may

rely on common sense and experience to assess the adequacy

of alternate methods of exercising rights of speech, they

are forbidden by the establishment clause to determine

whether one religious practice may be substituted for

another or altered without infringing on religious

beliefs”30. Prisoners’ constitutional rights are limited by

the right of penological objectives, such as the deterrence

of crime and institutional security, and fall on the 1987

standard outlined in Turner v. Safley case outlining measures

for reviewing prison policies in the context of

Constitutional rights31. It claims that “when a prison

29 Id. 30 Hutchinson, at 433 (1983). 31 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).


regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the

regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests”32, and therefore, Courts

must consider four distinct factors when determining the

existence of a rational relationship. These include: (1)

determining if the regulation legitimizes government

objectives and is neutral in concept; (2) deciphering if

alternative means of attaining the information of the

publications are present; (3) and analyzing the larger

affect on the prison environment, individuals, and resources

if censorship was not administered; (4) and reviewing

whether there are relative alternatives to the policy and

the response to the problem at hand is an exaggerated

response.

With the increasing number of prisoners’ rights cases,

in 1993 Congress pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(RFRA)33 in attempts to establish protection for

incarcerated individual’s religious liberties and to provide

it with strict judicial scrutiny. It is important to note

32 Id at 89. 33 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994).


that RFRA was a response to the 1990’s case Employment Division

v. Smith34 which declared the refusal of applying strict

scrutiny review to religious practices35. The case is

significant because the Supreme Court not only “denied an

exemption from Oregon’s drug laws for the religious use of

peyote by two members of the Native American Church”36, but

also “altered the language of free exercise jurisprudence”37

in its ruling. Prior to this ruling, the “government could

not pass or enforce a law that burdened the exercise of

religion unless the law was the least restrictive means of

attaining a compelling social interest” (Pg. 1408), which

was initiated by the court in the 1963 Supreme Court case

Sherbert v. Verner38. As the Court ruled the compelling interest

test inadequate with a 5-4 vote39 claiming that the “right

of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the34 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 35 Id. at 886 n.3. 36 James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78, Virginia Law Review, 1407, 1408 (1992). 37 Id. at 1408. 38 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The case upheld the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and maintained that the government must demonstrate a compelling government interest before denying compensation of unemployment to an individual on the basis of his/her firing from the job as a result of his/her religious beliefs or commitments. 39 Id. at 905-07 (O’Connor, J., concurring).


obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general

applicability on the grounds that the law proscribes (or

prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or

Proscribes)”40.

With the RFRA, Congress expressed the importance of

religion in prisons and enacted it essentially to

reestablish the compelling interest test. According to Utah

Senator Orrin Hatch (R), religion is one of the best

rehabilitative influences for prisoners and therefore, its

presence in the correctional facilities across the nation

must be preserved41. The federal law is aimed at preventing

laws that prohibit or violate an individual’s constitutional

right to freedom of religion belief and practice, and was

struck down as unconstitutional in 1997 as a result of City of

Boerne v. Flores42.

Congress enacted the Religious Land Uses and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)43 claiming that “no

40 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 41 139 CONG. REC. S14, 367 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 42 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 43 Pub. L 106-274, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.


government shall impose a substantial burden on the

religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

institution that receives federal funds, unless the burden

is absolutely necessary to meet a compelling government

purpose”44. Justice Ginsburg stated in Cutter v. Wilkinson case45

that the Courts find the federal law’s provisions compatible

with those of the Constitution, however, she pointed out

that the law will not “elevate accommodation of religious

exercise “over an institution’s need to maintain order and

safety”46. It is therefore analyzed that prisoners’

constitutional rights are placed on the backburner

consistently with court rulings and federal laws when

contrasted against the security implications of correctional

facilities. Furthermore, “religious minorities would suffer

if left to rely solely on the political process”47.

Similarly, Justice Scalia expressed “that leaving

accommodations to the political process will place at a

44 Charles Lane, Prisoners’ Religious Rights Law Upheld, The Washington Post, 1, 1(2005). 45 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 46 Lane, at 1 (2005). 47 Lane, at 1 (2005).


relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not

widely engaged in…”48

Importance of the Role of Religion in Prisons

Religion is a fundamental platform for human beings.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine its role and meaning

in contemporary society. Religion provides a sense of

commitment, belonging, and faith that helps in

rehabilitating incarcerated individuals of society. Research

in the field indicates a strong correlation between religion

and morality which aids in rehabilitating individuals in

correctional facilities that find them fragmented and

disengaged towards the path of repentance of their criminal

tendencies and the ability to assimilate in mainstream

society. It is noted that “religious conviction and

commitment have roots in natural impulses and in the natural

existence of man”49 including the human tendencies to

“wonder and repentance”50. The moral and spiritual guidance

of religion allow room for the individual to adhere to

48 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. (1990) at 890 (Scalia, J., writing on majority). 49 Miyashita, at 525 (1999). 50 Id. at 522 (1999).


positive social behavior. Furthermore, “it is suggested that

through religion, inmates may reclaim their dignity and

reassert their individuality51…and religion plays an

especially important role in the prison program because it

represents a rich resource in the moral and spiritual

regeneration of mankind52”. In the 1974 Teterud v. Gillman, a

psychiatrist claimed that the prisoner’s self esteem and

pride would have a positive impact on his well-being if he

was allowed to practice his religious right to grooming his

hair according to his Native American beliefs53. In

addition, a former correctional official contended that

allowance of religious practice would also prove beneficial

and productive towards his rehabilitation54.

Religious piety and practice have historically been

viewed by the prison administrators as a powerful tool of

corrective measures, and therefore, religious exercise

should be fostered and maintained rather than regulated and

51 Gutterman, supra note 43, at 911 (quoting Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 52 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 362 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 53 Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 155 (S.D. Iowa 1974).54 Id.


diminished from the system. In City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice

O’Connor noted in her dissenting opinion that the Religious

clause of the Constitution recognizes and commits to

religious liberty55 and expressed that religious freedom

should be respected and upheld56. It is important for

prisoners to experience positive guidance and support in

correctional facilities because it is upon these experiences

that will determine their chances of becoming law abiding

and productive citizens once they are released into society.

In St. Claire v. Cuyler57, the Courts established that it was

unconstitutional for the prison administration to prohibit

St. Claire from wearing a religious head covering and for

not allowing him to attend group religious services. The

rulings stated that the challenged regulations “were found

to infringe unnecessarily on the religious rights of St.

Claire in light of available less restrictive methods of

55 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 5047, 564 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 56 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 57 St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F. 2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980). The case noted that “the deferential review required by the Supreme Court’s decisions leaves no room for the requirement that prison officials choose the least restrictive regulation consistent with prison discipline. (at 114). Furthermore, it stated that “the first amendment values must give way to the reasonable considerations of prison management” (at 114).


effectuating the substantial state of interests at stake”58.

In regards to the security and safety concern, the Court

recognized the issue, but concluded that “the mere assertion

of a security interest can never be sufficient proof of its

existence”59 and therefore “dismissed as speculative and

dangers to security cited by officials in support of the

prohibition”60. However, in Rogers v. Scurr61 the Court asserted,

after applying the least restrictive measures analysis,

those prison regulations that prohibited inmates from

wearing prayer caps and robes outside of the prayer service

and the prohibition of personal visits from religious

leaders during emergency lockdowns was unconstitutional62.

The court of appeals reversed the holding stating that

“while in general we agree with the district court that

limitations on these rights should be no greater than

necessary to protect the governmental interest involved…we

believe that, especially when the maintenance of58 Id., 481 F. Supp. 739, 741. 59 Id., at 739. 60 Hutchinson, at 420 (1983). 61 Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F. 2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982). 62 Id., at 1213. “The court of appeals reversed these orders holding that the existing regulations were eminently reasonable, and therefore, constitutional” (Hutchinson, 1983, Pg. 422).


institutional security is at issue, prison officials

ordinarily must have wide latitude within which to make

appropriate limitations”63, and therefore, the prison

policies were held important to security.

Similarly, in Aziz v. Lefevre64, the district court ruled

that the plaintiff’s claim of infringement on his first

amendment rights to religious practice of offering group

prayer in an outside recreational area not unconstitutional.

There was, in fact, an established rational relation between

the security needs of the facility and the prison

administration’s ban on the prayer in the yard. It has been

noted that “given the repeated admonishments of the Supreme

Court discouraging federal court involvement in the

management of prisons, the court declined to consider the

63 Id, at 1215. 64 Aziz v. LeFevre, 642 F. 2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1981). The case noted that “to allow this prayer of movement and prostration with the group selecting inmate Sunni Muslim guards to be posted around the religious exercise and the laying out of prayer rugs by the groups in the open recreation yard, where usually 800 to 900 inmates are present at one time, would cause friction and physical confrontation among the inmates,and limit their common use of the yard for other recreational purposes”,at. 1111. Furthermore, Circuit Judge Meskill, in his concurring statement noted: “I do not understand the majority opinion to suggest that the prison administrators must justify the reasonableness of their regulation, whether by showing that it is the least restrict means to achieve a desired security goal, or by some other standard” (Meskill, J., concurring at 1112).


feasibility of less restrictive alternate regulations”65 and

“held the regulations constitutional, and granted summary

judgment for the defendants”66.

Courts claim, “Our cases have held that sentenced

prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and religion under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments,…and they are protected

against invidious discrimination on the basis of race under

the Equal Protection Clause”67. Furthermore, it maintained

that “prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison

inmates from the protections of the Constitution”68.

However, research indicates that issue of prisoners’

constitutional rights to religion is contingent upon the

security and safety of the correctional facilities. The

65 Id., at 728. 66 Id., at 729. 67 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). At 545 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964)). In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court stated that prisoners could receive hardcover books only from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores in orderto aboid security and administrative issues in the prison. (at 549). Id.At 545 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell,418 U.S. at 539).68 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Also stated in Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) and in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 *2003) (Steens, J., concurring). Also in Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Courts maintained that “there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisoners of this country”, at 555-556.


Supreme Court has fostered a balance in the past years

between the prisoners’ rights and the rights of prison

administrators. Analysts state that “in balancing these

ideals, however, the Court has refused to find that the

adoption of any particular penological theory is mandated by

the Constitution and has left the difficult task of dealing

with the complex and intractable problems of prison

administration to prison administrators themselves”69.

Perhaps, it would be important to outline measures that

would ensure a balance between the two: provide religious

freedom to prisoners while ensuring that the prison security

is not compromised as well. The Turner test provides a

reasonable measure ensuring the validity, rationality, and

fairness of all parties involved. However, the Turner test

is only administered in Court. It is necessary to place

measures on the individual level of the facilities so that

complaints are not issued into courts for constitutional

infringement.

69 Jennifer N. Wimsatt, “Rendering Turner Toothless: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Beard v. Banks”:, 57, Duke Law Journal, 1209 (`1213). (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404-05).


Conclusion

The debate surrounding prisoner’s rights has been a

hotbed for discussion around constitutional rights of

citizens, incarcerated or not, protected under the First

Amendment. The security of the ability to respect religious

establishment and its exercise, the freedom of speech,

press, the right to peacefully assemble, and the capacity to

petition for governmental redress of grievances, has

provided the prisoner’s in the United States to hold

correctional facilities accountable for the maintenance of

their constitutional rights. In the past years courts

systems have witnessed an increase in caseload regarding the

religious rights of practicing beliefs as they are impeded

on by the correctional facilities across the country. As the

defendants, the prisoners, petition to reclaim their right

to freedom of religion, they hold correctional facilities

and their administration liable for prohibiting them of

their constitutional authority. The argument regarding the

ability and freedom provided to prisoners by their

constitutionally held religious rights has managed to define


and redefine the decisions of the Supreme Court while

considering the security of the prisons.

The distant approach by the judiciary in history prior

to 1960s resulted in repressing the constitutional rights of

prisoners and provided full autonomy to the correctional

facilities to assert their own rules and regulations

regarding prisoners’ rights. According to an analyst, “this

absence of judicial scrutiny upon prison officials existed

despite the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and

unusual punishments, which clearly implies that there are

discernible limitations on the government’s ability to

punish convicted offenders”70. Research indicates “there is

an undeniable link between First Amendment rights, which

have been valued as expressional liberties and the serious

concern for protecting intellectual liberty”71. The

sensitivity and the importance of the issue deem it

necessary that “courts should carefully scrutinize

regulations that infringe upon inmate rights of religious

70 Smith, at 131 (1993). 71 Miyashita, at 525 (1999).


free exercise”72 as stated in the First Amendment. Due to

the nature of religion and its fundamental role in the lives

of human beings, it is imperative to provide and protect

individual religious freedoms for both free and incarcerated

members of society.

72 Hutchinson, at 413 (1983).

Report: Prisoner's Constitutional Right to Religious Exercise

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