Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order: Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East

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Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order: Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East

Gulf Research Centre CambridgeGRM PAPERS


Emma Soubrier

September 2014

Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order:Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East

Emma Soubrier

Gulf Research Centre Cambridge

© Gulf Research Centre Cambridge 2014

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,

without the prior written permission of the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge.

This paper is part of a series which brings together views on Gulf political, economic, security and other issues as presented at the annual Gulf Research Meeting. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone

and do not necessarily state or reflect the opinions or position of the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge.

This paper was presented at a workshop titled

“Saudi Arabia and the Arab Uprisings: National, Regional and Global Responses”

organized as part of the Gulf Research Meeting (GRM) 2013

in Cambridge, UK, by the Gulf Research Centre Cambridge.

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Emma Soubrier

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The Arab uprisings which started in early 2011 from the Maghreb to the Mashreq have rightfully provoked an incredible burgeoning of research projects and fuelled existing ones with new energy. Among the issues the

so-called “Arab Spring”1 has put the focus on is the question of its impact on the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).2 Here, narrowing the focus to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the international research community faced two

1. While this expression has been widely used to describe the events occurring within the Arab World for more than two years, it is sometimes seen as controversial. For such arguments, see: Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, “Al-rabī‘ al-‘Arabī: wijhāt nazar min al-Khalīj al-‘Arabī” [The Arab Spring: A View Point from the Arabian Gulf], Al-mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, no. 391 (September 2011): 117-128. Being a reference to the Spring of the People, that is the European Revolutions of 1848, it is ideologically loaded. Interestingly enough, in the French frame of reference, the term ‘Arab Spring’ was coined by Jacques Benoist-Méchin in 1959 (Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Un printemps arabe, Paris: Albin Michel, 1959). There, it evoked the Arab grandeur, as the author witnessed it, especially in Saudi Arabia. This paper uses the more neutral term “Arab uprisings,” which concurs with the title of the workshop at the 2013 Gulf Research Meeting, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Uprisings: National, Regional and Global Responses” where a draft paper of the work was presented.

2. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

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main questions. First, would the wave of Arab uprisings submerge the Kingdom or stop on its shores? Second, it appeared that Saudi Arabia had proven rather resilient to the regional disturbances, but how could one analyze its response to the ambient disorder? This paper aims at answering the latter question.

An in-depth understanding of Saudi Arabia’s reaction to recent regional events calls for an examination of their impact on its security issues and interests. Indeed, Saudi foreign and security policies have always been interlinked to such a point that some argue they are merged,3 especially since the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the consolidation of the “regional security complex.”4 The Arab uprisings, which came as an accelerated evolution of this regional context, are all the more likely to redefine Saudi security strategies as broader geo-economic factors also push the Kingdom to rethink its strategic stance. The theme explored in this paper is that the evolving strategic environment faced by Saudi Arabia presents new security challenges as well as a window of opportunity to adopt more assertive foreign and security policies. This provides one with a grid of analysis for Saudi initiatives, helping in turn to analyze and assess the impact of these new dynamics on the regional balance of power and global issues.

First, this paper looks at the security implications of the regional turmoil and shows that the Arab revolts are pressuring Saudi Arabia into adopting a new strategic stance. Then, it shows how recent events within the Arab world combined with broader geo-economic considerations explain the Kingdom’s growing assertiveness. Finally, the paper offers an outlook on the regional and global repercussions that these renewed Saudi strategies towards its security challenges could have.

Regional Turmoil: New Security Challenges and OpportunitiesThe Arab uprisings deeply impacted global security5 issues and presented new risks for the whole of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. From the Saudi perspective, these uprisings were a matter of concern from many angles, including

3. Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy,” Orbis (Winter 2013): 5.4. This concept was theorized by Barry Buzan as follows: “A group of states whose primary security

concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be con-sidered apart from one another.” See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fears (Boulder: Lynne Rien-ner, 1991), 190. There is a high degree of interdependence (both negative and positive) between the members of these regional systems, which “spend most of their time and effort worrying about each other and not other states.” See Gregory Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

5. This concept takes into account all relevant factors threatening peace, stability, prosperity, devel-opment, and security. It encompasses national security and meets all risks and threats that could undermine the state and nation’s life.

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the security angle. Yet, these events also opened a window of opportunity for Saudi Arabia to take a new regional lead, as shown by the country’s recent initiatives. Confronted with new security challenges and opportunities, Saudi Arabia appears to have adopted more assertive policies. This new approach needs to be assessed, including whether it should be read as a hegemonic move, a defensive move, or some variation in between.

Revived Risks and Threats in an Unstable EnvironmentThe current turmoil within the Arab world has been characterized as “the most severe test for the Kingdom since its creation.”6 The Arab uprisings indeed challenge Saudi Arabia on several levels, as they put pressure on its internal stability, national security, and interests in the region. It is important to explore this multi-layered impact and to underline the interdependence of all risks in order to understand just how burning an issue this regional unrest is for Riyadh.

The unrest in Tunisia and Egypt from early 2011 onwards led many observers to talk of a domino effect which could overthrow other regional regimes that appeared as deeply rooted as these two. In Riyadh, the possibility of an unstoppable wave of revolts raised genuine concern. This fear seemed reasonable given the demographic challenges and social circumstances in the Kingdom: “a disproportionally young, literate, and informed population – in short, the drivers of the revolutions elsewhere in the Arab world,”7 high underemployment, and an increasing gap between rulers and people’s aspirations.

The immediate threat to internal stability came from the revolt that started in neighboring Bahrain on February 14, 2011. Despite the aforementioned similarities between Tunisia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, there were still vast differences, especially in terms of wealth distribution, which kept the risk of a Saudi uprising at bay. The possibilities of a contagious spillover were altogether much stronger, however, with the outbreak of protests in Bahrain. In view of their common monarchical system, there was an instant fear of the galvanizing effect these could have on oppositional politics in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Bahraini uprisings and the effect it had, especially on the Kingdom’s Shia population in the Eastern province,8 revived fears

6. Bruce Riedel, “Revolution in Riyadh,” Memorandum, Washington, Brookings Saban Center, January 2013.

7. Fatima Ayub, Introduction, in “What Does the Gulf Think about the Arab Awakening?” Gulf Analysis, London, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), April 2013, 2.

8. In addition to three major petitions calling for reform published by Saudi activists. See Ahmed Al Omran, “Saudi Arabia: A New Mobilization,” in “What Does the Gulf Think about the Arab Awakening?” 5-8. The first Saudi “Day of Anger” occurred on March 11, 2011 and there have been regular demonstrations in the Eastern Province ever since.

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that Saudi Arabia’s regional rival Iran could take advantage of the discontented Shia populations within the Gulf monarchies to weaken the GCC’s internal stability and gain greater power on the regional stage. This concern was voiced in April 2011 when the GCC meeting in Riyadh criticized “flagrant Iranian interference and provocations aimed at sowing discord and destruction” among them. Time did not soothe their fears, as evident from the 33rd GCC Supreme Council Meeting held in December 2013, during which the GCC urged Iran to immediately stop these provocations and refrain from policies and acts which increase tension or threaten regional security and stability. The linkage of events within the GCC to Iranian policy highlights how interrelated the risks faced by Saudi Arabia are today. Meanwhile, in terms of overall internal stability, the regime was able to quiet popular unrest through vast investments in social infrastructure and the financing of religious institutions.9 Moreover, it can be argued that most Saudi citizens, unlike Tunisians and Egyptians, have no intention of overthrowing their regime.10 While many of them sharply criticize political disenfranchisement, corruption, and state abuse, they seem to go by the idiom “better the devil you know (than the devil you don’t).”11

Another Saudi concern is that the Arab uprisings are likely to threaten national security by allowing violent groups to unleash terror in the MENA region. In this regard, it may be noted that political unrest and instability have given way to extremist armed groups in the Libyan and Syrian crises. These issues are, however, left aside in this paper as they do not represent immediate territorial threats to Saudi Arabia – although this could change in the short term considering how the ongoing Syrian conflict threatens to spill over into Iraq and worsen the situation there.

From the Saudi perspective, the main risks lie on its Southern border, that is, in Yemen. Yemen has often been described as the Saudi “soft spot” because the Kingdom always had complicated relations with the Yemenis, before and after the unification of their two states in 1990. The possible threats coming from there have certainly not reduced. In fact, “the political vacuum in Yemen continues to weaken Saudi counter-terrorism endeavours.”12 While these have been successful in the Kingdom itself, members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who fled

9. This comes as the achievement of a cooptation process which began about ten years ago. See Stéphane Lacroix, Les islamistes saoudiens, une insurrection manquée (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010).

10. There are some exceptions to this, as shown by slogans on the walls calling for the “Fall of the House of Saud” in Qatif, for example.

11. Jean-François Seznec, “La révolte arabe et le vide géopolitique en Arabie saoudite,” Outre-Terre, no. 29 (2011): 492.

12. Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring: Opportunities and Challenges of Security,” Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea, 2:2 (December 2012): 152.

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Saudi Arabia found a safe haven in Yemen. This represents a direct challenge to Saudi national security, just as the militarized Houthi movement in north Yemen, which is seen as having taken advantage of the inability of the Yemeni government to maintain territorial integrity.13 Although uprisings in Yemen revived the Saudi distress, Saudi Arabia managed to diminish the threats coming from its southern border by facilitating the political transition and deploying consolidated security systems there. It is also important to remember that terrorism and violent extremism are hardly a new challenge to Saudi stability – it dates back to the struggles between Ibn Saud and extremist factions in the tribal forces or Ikhwan that began in the 1920s.

While Yemen is the most important direct threat at the moment, the greatest challenge to Saudi security today actually comes from the political transitions in the MENA region and the shifts in dynamics and alignments that the Arab uprisings allowed. In this regard, Saudi Arabia was particularly concerned about the stance of post-Mubarak Egypt. In the first months after the overthrow of the regime, there were signs that the new leaders might want to re-evaluate the terms of the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This bore the seeds of a possible revived Arab-Israeli war and hence threatened regional security and stability. For now, the sequence of events has pushed this possibility into the background.

Another aspect of the evolving Egyptian stance which a great source of concern for Saudi Arabia was their restoration of diplomatic relations with Iran. A rapprochement between revolutionary Iran and post-Mubarak Egypt presented the risk of dramatic change in the regional dynamics against Saudi strategic interests. While such reconciliation could have a great impact on the whole region, recent developments in Egypt again make this quite unlikely. The continued regional turmoil makes it difficult to foresee how events will evolve, and it is in fact safe to say that the main security issue posed to Saudi Arabia by the Arab uprisings comes from the regional political vacuum it has provoked. The Saudis fear that this vacuum could be filled by their regional adversaries. In this respect, the Kingdom’s greatest security challenge would be the consolidation of a new geopolitical ensemble bringing together Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, within which Sunnis would be excluded from power. But it can also be argued that this regional political vacuum could precisely be filled by Saudi Arabia.

13. An illustration of this occurred in January and February 2014: the fighting in Yemen allowed Houthis to expand their control over some northern areas.

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Opening a Window onto New Regional Assertive PoliciesWhile Saudi activism was evident prior to this (a key moment here being the US-led invasion of Iraq, as will be discussed later on), the Arab uprisings accelerated a shift of the Saudi leaders towards more assertive foreign and security policies. In a context where the long-established regional actors – namely, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – are isolated or unable to take on their traditional role due to domestic constraints, Saudi Arabia seems to want to enhance its status at the head of the regional order. The Kingdom recently reasserted its position of prominence and leadership both within the sub-regional context of the Arabian Peninsula through the GCC and within the broader MENA region.

The GCC was created in February 1981, leaving Iran, Iraq, and the two Yemeni states on the outside. On paper, it formalized the union of six equal states. But it has been argued that in reality, it officialized Saudi sovereignty over most its neighbors, as proved by the location of its headquarters in Riyadh. This Saudi pre-eminence has been regularly challenged ever since, mostly by Qatar and the UAE but also, to a lesser extent, or more quietly, by Oman. Now, the beginning of the Arab uprisings and the regional unrest have somewhat reduced this opposition.14 In fact, the reassertion of Saudi leadership within the GCC can be seen as one of the most important changes brought about by recent events.15 Here, it may be noted that the preference Saudi Arabia has shown for the GCC rather than the Arab League as a frame for its foreign and security policies reflects a certain suspicion towards the latter because of its vulnerability to Iranian influence through three members: Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. What has sometimes been described as the Saudi rediscovery of the instrumentalist utility of the GCC to project its influence on the regional stage has taken various forms within the sub-regional complex of the Peninsula.

The most important Saudi initiative pointing to a new assertiveness and a will to assume a revived regional leadership role was the sending of troops to Bahrain on March 14, 2011. This intervention sent a clear signal that the Saudi-led GCC would not tolerate any event or movement threatening the regional status quo and the stability and security of the region. It has been read as the clearest sign of an evolution in the strategic stance of the Kingdom because it rarely used to adopt a

14. This was particularly true in the two first years of the so-called “Arab Spring” – with notable exception of Qatar, which will be assessed later on. However, the end of 2013 witnessed events undermining this statement. The Omani sponsoring US-Iran talks without telling any of their neighbors including Saudi Arabia can be mentioned as well as the Omani criticism against the Gulf union concept of the Saudis, voiced by Yusuf Bin Alawi at the Manama Dialogue.

15. Mehran Kamrava, “The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution,” Orbis (Winter 2012): 98.

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hard power approach before. Another less dramatic, soft power initiative was the aforementioned political mediation between the Yemeni government and opposition that the Kingdom undertook, yet again “under the informal clout of the GCC.”16 Finally, and still within the framework of the GCC, the Kingdom’s ability to be so assertive relied on its riyal politik – that is, the use of oil money as a foreign policy tool. As has been argued, in the context of the Arab uprisings and within the Gulf region, it mostly ensured that no direct contestation of the status quo came to threaten regional stability – as shown by the Saudi-dominated GCC pledge of $20 billion in financial aid to Bahrain and Oman.

Apart from these GCC initiatives, Saudi Arabia used its riyal politik in the broader MENA region. While the $1.4 billion aid to Jordan also aimed at preserving the status quo, aid to Egypt and Syria might be seen in a different way. There, financial and logistic support was given to certain movements whose political views concurred with the specific interests of the Kingdom. The same interests drove other efforts such as creating a unified Syrian opposition front. In this regard, the election of Nofal Al-Dawālibi, a Syrian-Saudi based in Riyadh, as the head of the Unified Syrian National Council came as a sign that these efforts were efficient. In this regard, one can underline the specific activism of Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi intelligence chief and former ambassador to the US (1983-2005), which underlined the Saudi shift to a more assertive foreign policy.17

The New Saudi Strategic Stance: Hegemonic or Defensive?There is no consensus amidst the Gulf research community on how one should read the redefinition of the Kingdom’s strategic stance on the regional stage: should it be seen as a hegemonic or a defensive move? We will present arguments on both sides before trying to formulate an opinion on evolving Saudi foreign policy.

Saudi Arabia’s reaction to regional events, using both soft power and hard power, reflected an evolution of its foreign policy from a “consensual pattern” to a “confrontational assertive” one.18 This has been interpreted as a hegemonic move

16. Marco Pinfari, “Nothing but Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts,” Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, London School of Economics (LSE), March 2009, 17.

17. On Saudi assertiveness, see Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Arabia Shifts to More Activist Foreign Pol-icy Doctrine” (op-ed), Al Monitor, October 17, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi-nals/2013/10/saudi-shifts-foreign-policy-doctrine.html (accessed February 22, 2014); Moham-med Bin Nawaf Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud [Saudi Ambassador to the UK], “Saudi Arabia Will Go It Alone” (op-ed), The New York Times, December 18, 2013.

18. Saud Mousaed Al Tamamy, “Hegemonic or Defensive? Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy in the Era of the Arab Spring,” ORIENT, no. IV (2012): 14.

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because Saudi Arabia took the lead and somehow imposed its prominence in the revived GCC to undertake a ‘counterattack’ against the regional turmoil. Of all Saudi endeavors, its intervention in Bahrain, under the banner of the GCC, was interpreted as the main proof that Saudi Arabia was willing to go to any length to impose a counter-revolutionist agenda in the sub-regional complex of the Peninsula. According to this perception of Saudi Arabia as an aspirant hegemon, not only did the Kingdom try to prevent political change within the GCC but it tried to contain the ‘democratic surge’ by expanding the axis of counter-revolution within the broader MENA region. This idea was echoed in the proposition that GCC membership be extended to the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies, “against all geographic logic.”19

Other scholars have argued that Saudi Arabia has never aimed at becoming a regional hegemon while its increasing international weight and domestic capabilities allowed it. Hence, its current assertive foreign policy should be read as a defensive move. In this context, Saudi Arabia has regularly been described as a ‘risk-averse player’ in the regional and international arena because it usually avoids open confrontation with its adversaries and rather tries to accommodate them. Another important pattern of the Saudi foreign policy is that it is mostly driven by the felt necessity of preserving the stability of the regime. The riyal politik appears as a combination of these two points, Saudi Arabia using its wealth as an “accommodating instrument” to shape the external environment to secure its internal one. In order to protect its domestic status quo, the Kingdom tries to secure the regional status quo. This is as a priority in its foreign policy. According to some observers, its shifting policies should thus be seen as a defensive reaction and not as an attempt to rise as a regional hegemon. In fact, “the promotion of a revolutionary rhetoric and emerging democratic regimes in the region are perceived as an existential threat in Riyadh.”20 Saudi Arabia’s active foreign policy could thus be seen as a survival strategy. This was also put forward as one of the factors contributing to the Saudi decision to use hard power, particularly in Bahrain. The hard approach was used when Saudi Arabia decided that the developments in a specific country were too direct a threat to the Peninsula’s political landscape including its own internal security. In other words, it was “merely” aimed at securing the Kingdom’s interests rather than expanding them. Suspicions of an Iranian influence in the events in Yemen in 2009 and in events in Bahrain from 2011 onwards as well as the possibility that Iran might take advantage of the current turmoil in the MENA region arguably further legitimized this new

19. Alain Gresh, “Séisme géopolitique au Proche-Orient,” Le Monde diplomatique, no. 693 (Decem-ber 2011): 8.

20. Stéphane Lacroix, “L’Arabie Saoudite au défi du printemps arabe,” in “Les monarchies du Golfe face au printemps arabe,” Les dossiers du CERI, Paris, Sciences Po, September 2011.

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assertiveness. This “defensive rather than hegemonic” pattern of action points to the “highly developed encirclement syndrome”21 which resulted in the merger of Saudi foreign and security policies. This is a good starting point to try and formulate a balanced analysis of the evolving Saudi stance.

A country’s foreign policy is defined by external circumstances and the capacity of an internal system to address them according to its specific characteristics.22 Within the context of the Arab uprisings, Saudi foreign policy is linked to its perception of its own regime’s survival and regional rivalries. The increasing polarization of its geopolitical environment represents a real challenge for a country which has traditionally opted for a quiet, behind-the-scenes approach as a political resource. While the regional turmoil has forced the idea of change into their domestic environment – as seen in the regime’s response through some rather cosmetic reforms these past two years –, it appears that Saudi Arabia aims at securing a sub-regional status quo to buy itself some time and witness change through “evolution, not revolution.” Hence the efforts to keep revolutionary frenzy at bay. It has to be stressed that “this is consistent with GCC ruling families’ track record of pursuing pragmatic strategies of survival, designed to manage the transformational shifts in their domestic and international circumstances in recent decades.”23 In fact, the shared interests of the GCC members, which are to survive the revolutionary forces threatening them and to resist a supposed “comeback” of Iran as a regional power allows a reading of current events as a combination of the hegemonic and the defensive patterns. Hence, it could be argued that Saudi Arabia is not imposing its hegemonic view on its neighbors but is leading an alliance of “consenting monarchies” against too dramatic a change.

In view of the current “Arab Shifting Sands of Politics,”24 the Gulf countries have adopted common assertive foreign policies as a collective survival strategy. Interestingly enough, the fact that Saudi Arabia took the lead in this revived “hegemonic cooperation” might be a sign of change in the articulation of its foreign and security policies. While the consensual foreign policy was merged with security policy through accommodating policies toward the regional protector that the US is,

21. David Long and Sebastian Maisel, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2010), 144-146.

22. Frédéric Charillon, “La diplomatie saoudienne à l’épreuve de la turbulence,” Etudes, no. 400 (2004): 154.

23. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power,” Oc-casional Paper No. 6, Doha, Center for International and Regional Studies, 2010, 6.

24. Elham Manea, “Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring and the Regional Context,” ORIENT, no. IV (2012): 8.

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it has indeed been argued that “no one can guarantee Saudi Arabia’s future stability in a time of turmoil.”25 It has to be stressed that, in itself, the regrouping of the GCC may open a new era in international relations of the Middle East – assuming it lasts, which is very much open to discussion. Taking this one step further, could it be that Saudi Arabia sees the GCC and the new collective confrontational pattern adopted as a viable security strategy and an alternative guarantee to the “guardian angel” role of the US?

In order to test this hypothesis, we need to explore two other issues. First, will the geo-economic trends, associated with a perceived shift in traditional alliances and interests, strengthen the new strategic stance of Saudi Arabia and the GCC? Second, how will this possible GCC “hegemonic cooperation” work within what has been labeled as the ‘Arab Gulf Moment’ and what will be the consequences in the regional and international arena?

Security and Geo-economics in the Gulf Region: Evolving Paradigms

As was discussed, it seems that the regional context and the combination of strategic challenges and opportunities it presents might have pushed Saudi Arabia to take further control of its security and stability. Its assertiveness not only translates into evolving foreign and security policies but also into what appears to be a new Saudi security strategy. We will now study the impact of global geo-economic trends on Saudi security issues and the strategy developed to address them. Moving on to this broader focus, we will see that new dynamics there also point to an increasing independence – or empowerment – of Saudi Arabia and of the other GCC countries. We will first go through the security challenges faced by Saudi Arabia in view of the uncertainty about the future US position towards the Gulf region. Then, we will point out the opportunities that the evolving global geo-economic context presents for Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries to adopt more assertive security strategies. Having assessed this change in traditional paradigms, we will explore the scope of new possibilities it opens up for Saudi Arabia and its partners.

Uncertain Future of Traditional Logics and PartnershipsThe “oil for security” pact between the US and the Gulf countries is not the only paradigm defining the regional security complex. However, it is enough of a factor

25. Anthony Cordesman, “Saudi Stability in a Time of Change,” Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2011, 2.

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for sub-regional security issues to be impacted by any US repositioning. Today, evolutions with regard to both the ‘security’ and ‘oil’ ends of this pact are issues of great concern for the GCC countries and particularly for Saudi Arabia. Economic imperatives and other factors may lead the US to re-evaluate its presence in the Gulf. Moreover, the challenge to traditional logics this represents emerges in a context of growing mistrust between KSA and the US that the Arab uprisings heightened. As one should always refrain from “reading too much in too little,” we will try and offer balanced hypotheses of what can be expected regarding the changing Saudi-US partnership.

As a result of the global recession, all Western countries instituted major cutbacks in their security budgets. A study published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in April 2013 shows that these budgets have decreased in the US, Europe, Australia, Canada, and Japan. In fact, 2012 witnessed the first decline in global military spending since 1998. In the case of the US, cutbacks were linked to the economic crisis and other factors such as the end of military operations in Iraq and withdrawal of its armed forces from Afghanistan. The US, thus forced to rationalize its defense spending, may also have to re-evaluate its military presence in the Gulf. Concern about this prospect grew stronger when the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a shift in focus towards the Asia-Pacific region. The US efforts to become as independent as possible from foreign sources of oil supply further put a question mark on the strategic priority it would give to the Gulf region in the future and the relevance of its role in the “oil for security” pact with the Gulf monarchies. These dynamics raise important security challenges for the GCC, particularly for Saudi Arabia. Having relied on the US military umbrella to ensure its security, especially since the collapse of the monarchical state in Iran in 1979, Saudi Arabia is concerned that it could become increasingly vulnerable to the Iranian threat because of what it perceives as a lesser US commitment to preserving stability and security in the region. While this may be rather unlikely in the near future, it can be argued that those fears on the part of the Kingdom have a lot to do with the growing mistrust between Saudi Arabia and the US.

The Saudi-US relationship took a hit subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, as 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens. Besides, Saudi leaders, along with other GCC leaders, see the US as having handed Iraq to Iran on a platter in 2003 – although they see this not so much as perfidy as an act of political naiveté.26 Today, it can be argued that these tensions and suspicions have been revived in light of the Arab uprisings. Saudi Arabia was critical of the US for its support to the Egyptian uprising

26. Bernard Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,” Washington, CSIS, February 2013, 5.

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and what the Saudi regime perceived as treason towards their long-time ally Hosni Mubarak. And as the US voiced concern over human rights violations in Bahrain and elsewhere, “half-hearted as they may be,”27 Saudi Arabia appears to have decided that their traditional US ally cannot be fully counted on: “the US isn’t exactly the god that failed, but its divine powers are certainly suspect in Riyadh.”28 The differences between the US and the Kingdom may in fact be growing rather than shrinking, as the two sides are taking or have taken different positions “on basically every issue of strategic importance and concern at the moment.”29 While this further questions the Saudi perception of the US as a reliable guarantor of its security, this relationship is still regarded as very valuable on both sides.

In spite of the aforementioned tensions, Saudi Arabia and the US do cooperate to create more effective forces to deal with Iran, al-Qaeda and instability in Yemen. The Gulf remains a vital American national security interest and Saudi Arabia is very important in this regard.30 Thus, the alleged tensions in Saudi-US relations lately may just mean that a page is indeed turning in the security paradigms of the Gulf region and a new chapter of greater Saudi autonomy and empowerment is opening. This may precisely be what the US wants – which in turn reactivates the suspicions of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Former US defense secretary Leon Panetta’s speech at the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies Research (ECSSR) in Abu Dhabi in April 2013 is rather telling in this regard. While praising the relationships between the US and the Gulf countries, he was quick to add that they are evolving. He also voiced the US hope that “the GCC can play an important role in the future providing security for this region.”31 While Saudi fears that a reduction of US interest in the region might translate into increased security risks are understandable, the Kingdom and the GCC have the means to tackle these challenges – new global dynamics present them with emerging opportunities to shape new security paradigms as they want, through their procurement strategies.

27. Mark Lander, “Amid Unrest in Bahrain, U.S. Tends a Friendship,” International Herald Tribune, June 11, 2011, 5, quoted in Mehran Kemrava, “The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counter-revolution,” 98.

28. David Ignatius, “Saudi Arabia Expands its Power as US Influence Diminishes,” The Washington Post, November 18, 2011.

29. Abdulaziz Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?” Arab News, March 29, 2013.30. Anthony Cordesman, “Understanding Saudi Stability and Instability: A Very Different Nation,”

Washington, CSIS, February 2011; Cordesman, “Saudi Stability in a Time of Change,” 4; Riedel, “Revolution in Riyadh.”

31. Elizabeth Dickinson, “US Looks to Allies to Secure the Arabian Gulf,” The National, April 24, 2013.

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Emerging Opportunities for a Rising AssertivenessThe Western economic downturn and the emergence of new international actors have turned the Gulf region into an even more important ‘magnet’ for defense manufacturers and the national economies they contribute to. While the GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, indeed remain some of the world’s biggest spenders in this area, a change in their procurement strategies is to be noted. In fact, current global geo-economic trends offer them an opportunity to move forward into new foreign and security dynamics.

Cutbacks in Western security budgets, especially in the US, might represent one of the current security challenges of the Gulf region but it also pushes both governments and defense manufacturers to look for opportunities to protect their defense industrial base. As this is only possible through the export market, the Gulf has become an even more important magnet than before. This is true for traditional powers which have been present in the region for a long time, that is the US and European Union (EU) members – particularly France and the United Kingdom (UK) – but it is also true for emergent powers: today, the BRICs,32 having experienced remarkable economic growth for a decade, have started to focus on their interests in the region, adding complexity to the regional competition. The export race for the Gulf market comes as no surprise since the GCC states are some of the only countries which have increased the share of military spending in their economies between 2003-2009 and 2009-2012. In 2012 alone, Saudi defense spending has increased by 12 percent, to $56.7 billion.33 However, it is important to underline that the Kingdom is likely to make changes in the logics of its military expenditure – the old practice mainly consisted in keeping its head down and relying on the US military umbrella, secured by the oil flow and regular investments in the American military-industrial complex.

Until recently, Gulf monarchies hardly expressed their own views on their security challenges. Western actors thus tended to interpret them through the lens of their own interests and “defense manufacturers were able to sell virtually what they wanted in the Gulf region, often taking advantage of, and profiting from, their clients’ lack of knowledge.”34 Moreover, because of a deficiency in indigenous military-industrial

32. This acronym points to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and they have all (except for Brazil) tried and developed their commercial and strategic relations with the Gulf countries in the recent decades.

33. Edouard Pflimlin, “Baisse des dépenses militaires mondiales en 2012, une première depuis 1998,” Le Monde, April 15, 2013.

34. Nadim Hasbani, “The Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States,” Defense and Security Analysis 22, no. 1 (March 2006): 81.

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production capabilities, the Gulf defense market was mostly characterized by imports of off-the-shelf products and platforms. Now, the Gulf countries increasingly express specific needs and demand technologies and competencies that will enable them to take independent control of their own security. Moving away from the “oil for security” paradigm, they have shifted their focus to “sustainable and mission-oriented procurement and force development, rather than the ‘glitter factor’ competition to buy the most advanced weapons system possible regardless of mission priority and the ability to operate and sustain an integrated mix of systems and forces in combat.”35 This has to be linked to the new generation of military personnel which has reached senior command and has been educated at universities and military colleges in the West. “These new decision-makers are aware of the needs of their respective states as well as the range of equipment available. They also know, above all, how they can profit by playing the competition off one against another.”36 To put it another way, while Saudi Arabia mostly used to ensure its security and stability by throwing money to get a deal with Western countries and more particularly the US, when the latter were the main shapers of regional security strategies, the new geo-economic order allows the Saudis to move forward into new dynamics where their incredible economic weight is utilized to shape not only new foreign and security policies but also a security strategy of their own.

Global geo-economic trends and the regional turmoil both push Saudi Arabia to have more assertive policies and organize a specific security strategy. It has been argued, for example, that the Saudis are planning to spend their money more aggressively as a regional power broker – by roughly doubling its armed forces over the next 10 years, which is a signal of the country’s confidence. Moreover, this will allow Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies to enhance their international status by rescuing struggling Western economies through the use of their sovereign wealth funds. This could represent a bargaining chip in the organization of new security strategies, along what has been described as “a new dynamic in the middlepower and superpower relations.”37 While Saudi Arabia still regards its relationship with the US as valuable, it has been argued that it is no longer seen as a guarantor of its security. Assuming Saudi Arabia has room for maneuver in this respect – which is in fact questionable, we would like to go through the different options the new context presents in terms of security strategies. The concepts of “perception and

35. Anthony Cordesman, “Securing the Gulf: Key Threats and Options for Enhanced Cooperation,” Washington, CSIS, February 2013, 48.

36. Hasbani, “The Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States,” 81.37. Al Tamamy, “Hegemonic or Defensive?” 17.

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misperception”38 really come in handy when studying the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi fears that their traditional ally the US can no longer be fully counted on might indeed seem unrealistic – just as their existential concern about the “Iranian threat.” However, these (mis)perceptions do impact the decision-making processes. In the face of the multiple security challenges they experience today, both real and perceived, it is thus important to review some of the possible strategies they could adopt to address them.

A Scope of Possibilities to ExploreIt appears that there are three different paths Saudi Arabia could choose. First, it could decide that it still needs to bet on the US and, to a lesser extent, European powers such as France and the UK, as its ultimate security guarantors. Second, it could decide that its best interests lie in a diversification of partnerships beyond the traditional Western allies to increase its security. Third, Saudi Arabia could push its regional initiatives further and, as a leader of the revived GCC, guide its members into the development of an integrated regional system. These different options are not mutually exclusive.

While their views diverge on several regional issues, especially in light of the Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia and the US still have too many common security interests to seriously consider jeopardizing this relationship.39 One could argue that their partnership would only become more pragmatic than before. Indeed, the “oil for security” pact already represents a “marriage of convenience” which is regularly criticized by some observers on both sides. From the Saudi perspective, it is a decisive means of “omnibalancing” between Iran and its regional security and political ambitions on the one hand, and their own and the US interests on the other. According to Steven David, omnibalancing “incorporates the need of leaders to appease secondary adversaries, as well as to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power.”40 This practical Saudi-US alliance should then be reorganized in coherence with the new Saudi self-confidence that has been noted in its procurement strategies. On the other hand, it is possible to suggest that the continued disagreements between the two regarding several issues could at some point become too dramatic for their relations to be restored to an even keel. As some have argued, their ties are changing to such an extent that “the GCC states have no

38. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1976).

39. The renewal of the Quincy agreement in 2005, in the middle of an alleged trust crisis, is a good sign of this.

40. Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics 43, no. 2 ( January 1991): 236.

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choice but to act on their own and without consideration of US interests and concerns.”41 The GCC states and particularly Saudi Arabia have been critical of the US stance on the continuing Syrian crisis and the Iranian nuclear program. Of the two, the latter represents the real “red line” in the eyes of Saudi Arabia. The view of some observers that the US could, down the road, decide it is better off with Iran as an eligible partner to protect the security of the strategic Gulf region only adds to these fears. Such a development would be Saudi Arabia’s worst nightmare come true. In fact, such fears may prompt the Kingdom to look for other partners for its security strategy.

The idea of multi-balancing alliances is not new. It has represented a pattern of Saudi foreign policy for a long time: while the US was acknowledged as the only power capable of providing an ultimate security guarantee, “there has always been a Saudi desire to establish and enhance ties with other global powers.”42 Today, as the very idea of the US as a guarantor of Saudi security is challenged, the relevance of creating new security ties with other powers seems to be rising. These new partnerships would be in line with increasing political and economic relations and accelerating interdependencies between the Gulf and Asian states such as India, China, South Korea, and also Russia.43 Recent defense contracts and security agreements have pointed towards this option as a viable new security strategy. In this respect, the fact that a pragmatic foreign policy with emphasis on non-intervention and state sovereignty is especially attractive to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states is worth mentioning.44

However, there are several obstacles to adopting this strategy. First, Saudi Arabia may buy its security systems and products from a new set of partners, these partners seem unwilling and unlikely to offer security guarantees as reliable as the Western ones.45 Second, tensions have appeared between some of these alternative

41. Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?”42. Gerd Nonneman, “Determinants and Patterns of Saudi Foreign Policy: ‘Omnibalancing’ and

‘Relative Autonomy’ in Multiple Environments,” in Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (London: Hurst, 2005), 328 and 334.

43. Ulrichsen, “The GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power”; Al Tamamy, “Hegem-onic or Defensive?” 14-15.

44. This remark particularly describes emerging partnerships with China. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen argues that “The differing experience of trade negotiations with the EU and those with Asian states raises the possibility of global realignments between compatible groups of states sharing a skeptic view of international criticism focusing on Western-centric norms” (“The GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power,” 18-19).

45. On this specific issue, one can nevertheless underline that Saudi Arabia arguably has “an instant deterrent ready in the form of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal that [it is] widely believed to have helped finance” (Ignatius, “Saudi Arabia Expands its Power as US Influence Diminishes.”)

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partners and Saudi Arabia in light of the Arab uprisings. This is particularly true with China and Russia, as the Kingdom has strongly criticized their position in the Syrian crisis. Hence, Saudi repositioning of its security strategy may remain limited due to these factors.

Since it appears that “no one can guarantee Saudi Arabia’s future stability in a time of turmoil,” Saudi Arabia may, in fact, decide that its best option is to guide the GCC members towards an integrated regional system. As has been pointed out in the first part of this paper, the GCC members share many security interests and Saudi Arabia would not be imposing its hegemonic view on the Arabian Peninsula but rather helping the “regrouping” of compliant monarchies within the GCC against immediate security challenges and too dramatic changes. The idea of this “hegemonic cooperation” would be consistent with the increasing coherence of the GCC as a collective power – as shown by their defense agreements and joint exercises, which will be discussed later on. This cooperation relies mostly on their felt existential need to contain the Iranian threat. However, on this specific issue, their deterrence power is questionable and it has been noted that “the GCC will always find itself dependent on external defense assistance.”46 Hence, while a greater degree of integration within the GCC and an increased alignment in terms of foreign and security policies seems adequate, this option probably has to be combined, in the short term, with the other two. Since this “hegemonic cooperation” in the making under an assertive Saudi leadership is one of the most important changes brought about by recent events to the GCC states’ collective foreign policy, we will assess it further.

New Saudi Security Strategies: Regional and Global ImplicationsThe new security strategies of Saudi Arabia are linked to three intermingled factors: the increasing polarization within its geopolitical environment, its decreasing confidence in the US commitment towards the region, and its growing self-confidence in its domestic capabilities.47 While it has been argued that Saudi Arabia is not pursuing a hegemonic agenda through this new assertive stance, it could be organizing a “hegemonic cooperation” under its lead to become stronger and more resilient in the face of adversity and have better chances of securing the regional status quo. We will examine how this “hegemonic cooperation” and its security prospects are articulated with the “Arab Gulf Moment,” an idea which needs to be defined. Then, we will go through regional antagonisms and rivalries which are likely to jeopardize

46. J.E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: Croom Help, 1986), 147.47. Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring,” 148.

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this cooperation. Finally, we will try and assess the consequences of the new Saudi security strategies on the broader region, and internationally.

Prospects of a Saudi-led “Hegemonic Cooperation” within the Arab Gulf Moment

The “Arab Gulf Moment” is an expression pointing to the idea of a new era when the Arab Gulf States are able to “reshape the geo-economics and geo-politics of the region, and to set in motion a process for the Gulfanization of the Arab world.”48 In fact, they even have the means to have their voice heard on the international stage and to possibly restructure international paradigms at a broader level. In this context, is the Saudi-led “hegemonic cooperation”, through the GCC, viable and could it be the most relevant response to their common security challenges? We will first see that both the Saudi initiatives and the global positive attitude towards the GCC make a case for this “hegemonic cooperation.” We will then further explore the security prospects of the GCC. Finally, we will try and assess the feasibility of such a security entity.

The confidence Saudi Arabia has shown recently as a leader of the GCC “hegemonic cooperation” may strike a promising note for this regional entity. For instance, the Saudi idea that the GCC should be turned into a “single entity” shows that it wants to take institutionalization a step further. However, it is difficult to evaluate the potential of such a project. The relevance of the GCC “hegemonic cooperation” may be better seen through its alliances with an increasing number of other international organizations. There are many workshops and research projects today about the relations between the EU and the GCC. Also to be noted are the talks about a new impulse in cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the GCC. Their partnership was greatly enhanced in 2011, in light of the NATO intervention in Libya. This could allow further institutionalization of the security alliance between the West and the GCC members.49 Furthermore, this

48. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, “Contemporary Sociopolitical Issues of the Arab Gulf Moment,” Research Paper No. 11, LSE Kuwait Programme, Center for the Study of Global Governance, September 2010, 1. “[The six Arab Gulf States] are taking the lead, influencing events, assuming greater financial responsibilities, projecting socioeconomic confidence, and becoming increasingly con-scious of their newly acquired status as a regional power that far transcends the rest of the Arab countries.” Although he includes Saudi Arabia in the Arab Gulf States (AGS) system, Abdulla singles it out, arguing that socio-political issues he discusses are applicable to it but more relevant to the smaller AGS (11).

49. Isabelle François, NATO and the Arab Spring, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 2011, “Transatlantic Current”, no. 1, 2, quoted in Mohammad-Reza Djalili and Clément Therme, “Iraniens et Saoudiens à l’épreuve des révoltes arabes,” Politique étrangère, no. 1 (2012): 114. On the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and its developments,

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cooperation agreement would send a clear message to Iran. One could argue that this renewed cooperation would also prove that Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC countries need not entirely rely on themselves to ensure their security and stability. But it can also point to the fact that security is arguably the best way for the GCC to develop further cooperation towards becoming a “single entity” since the monetary union project is still blocked today.

The “collective GCC survival strategy” which is unfolding today under the leadership of Saudi Arabia could rely on a certain number of previous initiatives and cooperation efforts in this domain. The GCC plans for military cooperation have included the establishment of a Military Committee, which first met in September 1981, the creation of the ‘Peninsula Shield’ joint strike force, formed in 1984, mutual defense agreements, and an increasing number of joint exercises. Finally, the idea of further cooperation in the area of arms acquisition has been raised from the time of the establishment of the GCC. The GCC, it has been argued, has the potential to become a far more effective security structure, improving every aspect of Arab Gulf state security and that this would not require a sacrifice of sovereignty. It does, however, “require the Arab Gulf nations to act upon what they have already said they should do. (…) There is no future in relying on deterrence and defense by declaration, conference, or Diwaniya.”50 Recent actions, such as the “‘Belt of Cooperation’ air space monitoring network” and the 2004 agreement on intelligence-sharing, as well as declarations of the GCC countries show that the will to build a more united entity is real. Yet, this consolidation, while effective, would need a “large set of friends.”

Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries are wealthy and this allows them to buy highly sophisticated weapons and invest in integrated systems and rationalized capabilities in line with new procurement strategies, as suggested by some analysts. However, there remain obstacles to their possible attempt at self-defense such as “the small base of indigenous manpower and serious training problems, the intensive competition for skilled manpower, and the lack of combat experience.”51 Some observers have even argued that this “lack of quantitative and qualitative trained human resources to operate and maintain the new, technologically advanced equipment effectively”52 might be the reason why Jordan and Morocco were invited to ‘join the club’ in 2011. Indeed, these two countries have professionally trained

see Jean-Loup Samaan, NATO in the Gulf: Partnership Without a Cause? Roma, NATO Defense College, October 2012 and Matteo Legrenzi, “NATO in the Gulf: Who is Doing Whom a Fa-vor?” Middle East Policy 14, no. 1(2007): 69-75.

50. Cordesman, “Securing the Gulf,” iii.51. Peterson, Defending Arabia, 177.52. Hasbani, “The Geopolitics of Weapons Procurement in the Gulf States,” 76.

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armed forces, with combat experience and could give the guarantee the GCC lacks. The fact that this decision to invite these two countries was purely53 Saudi points to another potential obstacle: different outlooks and policy goals among the six GCC member states and the associated and continuing regional antagonisms and rivalries.

Continued Regional Antagonisms and RivalriesWhile the need to consolidate the GCC in the face of revived threats is felt by all six member countries, there is likely to be a lack of unanimity on the issue of Saudi leadership of the bloc. One must not overlook the potential crises which could arise from the rivalry for regional influence between Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well as with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Recent signs also seem to question the viability of the aforementioned “hegemonic cooperation.”

There is a history of antagonisms and rivalries among the GCC countries especially between Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf States. In terms of military forces, one can underline the continuing tension between Saudi Arabia and Oman linked to the fact that the latter is regularly acknowledged as the only GCC state which represents a real competitor for the Saudi armed forces. This is probably the reason why Saudi Arabia did not support the proposition of Sultan Qaboos when, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he advised that an army of 100,000 men be constituted to reduce the GCC dependency on foreign forces. As has been noted, besides Saudi Arabia, only Oman would have been able to offer sufficient manpower, which would have weakened the Saudi leadership. Today, Oman’s search for an enhanced role in the GCC and desire to prevent Saudi domination of the bloc are to be noted. Yusuf Bin Alawi’s statement against the Saudi proposal to move from cooperation to union at the 2013 Manama Dialogue is telling.

There is also a history of border disputes between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar which recently led to some discussion on border revisions. In this regard and in others, the main alleged rival to Saudi Arabia is Qatar which, like Oman, resists any Saudi effort to lead the GCC. For this purpose, it has been using the Doha-based Al Jazeera network to increase its status and sometime criticize its neighbor indirectly. In the beginning of the 1990s, it also took advantage of a border dispute to seriously question the leadership of Saudi Arabia. While the Arab uprisings and the resulting regional turmoil had apparently soothed these antagonisms at first, the subsequent unfolding of events is possibly reviving them. It is thought that these rivalries and

53. Saudi Arabia arguably wants to rely more on itself or on the GCC for its security. This project is necessarily middle to long term because of the mentioned obstacles; so relying on friendly Sunni monarchies in the meantime seems a fair idea, concurring with the suspicions with regard to the US.

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the reluctance of some smaller states towards accepting a Saudi dominance have sharply limited the effectiveness of the GCC, its military integration, and its level of interoperability. Nevertheless, the current crisis situation and the serious security challenges it presents might annul these obstacles. The GCC seems to have the capacity to rise from the ashes of crises.

The GCC was created in reaction to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and its Peninsula Shield “collective defense force” was established after Iran went on the offensive in the Iran-Iraq War. While there was initial talk of a broader cooperation project for the Gulf region – that is, with Iran and Iraq, it appears that the threat the six Arab Gulf States perceived was coming from the other two states made them wary of such wider cooperation. Indeed, there was arguably little progression in the GCC from the time it was created in 1981 until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which lends weight to the idea that the GCC is kept together by the shared security challenges of its member states. While sporadic initiatives were taken, mostly through declarations, it was not until the 1990s that anything was done to inject new energy in it. Today, there are growing pressures for unity – although the idea was distinctively voiced by Saudi Arabia. Iran’s actions, political upheavals in the region, and the threat of terrorism and internal extremists encourage the GCC countries to build up their military capabilities and further consolidate their regional entity. One could suggest that the revived GCC will only last as long as the regional turmoil. Beyond the fact that this disorder is unfortunately unlikely to come to a close soon, it can also be argued that this may provide chances to really launch the GCC as a durable and viable entity. Initiatives to reinvigorate the GCC were indeed taken before the Arab uprisings, in the wake of the global economic crisis, the impact of which the GCC members did not feel as much as the rest of the world and which, on the contrary, helped enhance their international status. One should resist the temptation of formulating prophetic analyses on what will happen in the long run. The current initiatives to revive the GCC might fall flat like a failed soufflé or it may be “here to stay and flourish for a long time to come.”54 Should the GCC stand, the Saudi attempts to take on a leadership mantle may, however, be challenged.

While the Iranian threat and, to a lesser extent, the Iraqi threat, come as cement for the GCC55 and encourage the revival of its security initiatives, the “democratic threat” that has been put forward by many analysts is arguably less efficient. It has

54. Abdulla, “Contemporary Sociopolitical Issues of the Arab Gulf Moment,” 32.55. Even the Iranian issue as cement for the GCC might be questioned today, as shown by recent

developments on this matter such as the aforementioned Omani sponsoring of US-Iran talks but also the alleged negotiations between Iran and the UAE to settle their dispute on the status of three islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb).

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been noted that before the beginning of the Arab uprisings, other GCC countries had gone further than Saudi Arabia in terms of political liberalization.56 This liberalization should not yet be overestimated. Indeed, it has been noted that “the prevailing political stagnation associated with entrenched Gulf monarchies may yet prove to be the Achilles heel of the Gulf moment in history.”57 Recent events tend to show that as long as an immediate Iranian threat is perceived, the priority will remain on securing the status quo by all means judged necessary. Another important reality threatening a continued Saudi leadership of the GCC – and the cohesion of the whole entity – is the growing rivalry with Qatar and, to a lesser extent, with the UAE and Oman. These countries are unlikely to be content to let Saudi Arabia take a GCC leadership role in regional affairs, “especially once the dust of the Arab Spring is settled.” Differences in their respective positioning towards the Arab uprisings58 indeed question the viability of the Saudi leadership within the hegemonic cooperation of the GCC. In reality, this is linked to “the continuing relevance of state-centric approaches as the dominant frame of reference in the GCC states [which leads to] myriad cross-cutting obstacles to regional and global governance.”59 Finally, we would like to study the crucial impact the new Saudi assertiveness is likely to have on the reshaping of the MENA region, for this could lead to additional security challenges at both regional and global levels.

Evolving Paradigms of the Regional Chessboard and Global Security ImpactThe Saudi security initiatives mentioned in this paper may represent new challenges for the region and its balance of power. The new assertive confrontational pattern of Saudi security policy is often deemed to be mainly defensive. However, these endeavors might in fact generate more instability and insecurity within the broader

56. Olivier Da Lage, “L’Arabie et ses voisins : la revanche des vassaux,” Outre-Terre, no. 14 (2006): 302 – “Saudi Arabia, which largely contributed to put an end of Kuwaiti and Bahraini experiences of parliamentary systems in 1975-1976, had to witness throughout the 1990s the proliferation of elected assemblies in its neighboring countries.” For example, Da Lage points to the reestablish-ment of the parliamentary system in Kuwait in 1992, the first municipal elections in Qatar in 1999 as well as the municipal and legislative elections in Bahrain in 2002.

57. Abdulla, “Contemporary Sociopolitical Issues of the Arab Gulf Moment,” 3.58. Kemrava, “The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution,” 104: “Already, the [Qatari

and Emirati] involvement in the Libyan civil war on the side of the rebels, and their invest-ments in Tunisia and Egypt, signal their intentions to remain very much involved in the political economy of North Africa. Similarly, Oman is unlikely to fundamentally reorient its doggedly in-dependent foreign policy toward Saudi preferences, even though the GCC promised the sultanate $10 billion over ten years.”

59. Abdullah Baabood, “Dynamics and Determinants of the GCC States’ Foreign Policy, with Spe-cial Reference to the EU,” in Gerd Nonneman, Analyzing Middle Eastern Foreign Policies (Lon-don: Routledge, 2005), 148.

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MENA region. This would impact the positioning of numerous actors on the global chessboard. In this respect, there are three important – and interlinked – issues we would like to explore: the Syrian crisis, the widened sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shia, and the question of Egypt.

In Syria, uprisings which appear to have begun in a similar way as elsewhere in the Arab world have inexorably deteriorated into civil war. This crisis comes as a great security challenge for the entire region, because of the devastating consequences it could have on it. It has been noted that “every day that the Assad regime is able to survive, the chances increase of a dangerous spillover effect in neighboring countries including Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and the influence of the extremist elements within the Syrian revolution grows.”60 The crisis also had consequences on the eroding relationship between the Gulf and the West, as has been pointed out, especially with regard to the issue of lifting the arms embargo and of supporting the armed resistance. Syria has also become an arena in which Saudi Arabia is waging a proxy war against Iran, with the support of most GCC countries which agree that “Iran represents a mortal enemy and is to be resisted on all fronts.”61 This is one area, however, where Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, while opposed to one another on different issues, adopt the same stance.62

It is not our intention to further discuss the role of Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Syrian humanitarian crisis but it can be pointed out that what has been labeled as the “New Cold War” between Saudi Arabia and Iran accelerates the polarization of the regional environment and could, for example, harden the Saudi position towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia could want to “secure Pakistan and Afghanistan on its side” to counterbalance the perceived “Iranian support to Shi‘ite unrest in its backyard, particularly in Bahrain.”63 In addition, it is important to underline a related issue: the Syrian crisis widened a sectarian divide between the Sunnis and the Shia that the new assertive confrontational Saudi security strategy might somehow be fuelling.64

The danger of increasing sectarian tensions inherent in the continuing Syrian crisis has been repeatedly mentioned. It is a threat not only to the security and stability of the MENA region but also a global security challenge because of all the

60. Sager, “Whither GCC-US Relations?”61. Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,” 5.62. However, they do not agree on whom to sup¬port, which could keep the Syrian op¬position

divided and weak.63. Ahmed Rashid, “How US Intends to End War with Taliban,” Financial Times, April 18, 2011.64. On this matter, see Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring

That Wasn’t (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

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other places where this dramatic example could fuel pre-existing sectarian divides. The most fertile soil in this regard is Iraq. Hence, the recent events there sadly come as no real surprise: after four months of demonstrations in Sunni areas of this Shia-majority country, a huge wave of violence began at the end of April 2013 when security forces moved against Sunni anti-government protesters near the northern Sunni Arab town of Hawijah, provoking an ever-increasing death toll. While it seems clear that this revived Iraqi unrest is linked to the situation in Syria, it was argued in 2011 that “Saudi and GCC intervention in Bahrain and the deployment of Saudi security forces is almost certain to create added tension between KSA’s dominant Sunni puritans and its Shi’ites.”65 This was likely to have an impact not only on the security of the Eastern Province where most of the 1.1-2 million of the population that are Shia live but also on the broader regional security since it would arguably contribute to a mounting antagonism between Sunni and Shia communities.

The revived sectarian divide between the Sunnis and the Shia can be considered as one of Saudi Arabia’s main future security challenges. This is acknowledged in recommendations made by Saudi scholars that, alongside the pursuing of a more representative foreign policy decision-making process, Riyadh should continue “domestic reforms that target education, enhance the rule of law, assimilate minorities in a comprehensive national framework, and increase the number and the role of elected institutions.”66 This issue is very tricky to address in the sub-regional context of the Arabian Peninsula for any security challenge involving Shia falls, in the Saudi and broader GCC rhetoric, under the assumption that Iran is using the Shia to revive its regional hegemony.

Another issue that became a huge source of concern for Saudi Arabia was the hypothetical restoration of diplomatic ties between post-Mubarak Egypt and Iran. If this had materialized in the form of a real alliance, it would have impacted the traditional regional paradigms and would have antagonized Saudi Arabia on the regional stage. In this context, three geopolitical issues must be mentioned. The most obvious one is the antagonism between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which needs no further development. The second one is the mutual resentment between Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood. There are historical67 as well as practical

65. Cordesman, “Saudi Stability in a Time of Change,” 15.66. Al Tamamy, “Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring,” 154 (here, stressed by the author).67. Haykel, “Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a Time of Revolution,” 5-6: “Riyadh will never forgive the

Muslim Brotherhood for what it considers to be a dual betrayal. First, members of the Brother-hood were welcomed and employed in the Kingdom during Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s and Hafiz al-Assad’s brutal and successive repression of the movement. But the Brothers responded by educating and mobilizing two generations of radicalized Saudi subjects, called the Sahwis, who sought to end Saudi rule. Second, the Brotherhood betrayed the Saudis by siding with Saddam

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reasons – both competing ideologically on the same terrain, namely the politics of Islam – for this animosity. The final one, which has also been mentioned, is the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar for regional influence. In the context of Egypt, this latter issue translated into the support of different political movements, Saudi Arabia supporting the Salafis and Qatar the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence, what was at stake in the uncertain future stance of the “New Egypt,” beyond the – unlikely – possibility of a renewed Arab-Israeli war, was the emergence of a new regional alliance which would isolate Saudi Arabia. The purely theoretical hypothesis of a geopolitical triangle between the Muslim Brotherhood, Iran, and Qatar would in fact have dramatic consequences on global security paradigms. The recent developments in Egypt might have put an end to such Saudi concerns, at least for now. In fact, observers reading regional events through the prism “Saudi Arabia vs Qatar” may be tempted to say that the latter lost its “advantage” in Egypt. The same observers also ought to mention recent Saudi efforts to take the lead in Syria and Qatar’s acquiescence to let the Saudis do so.

The impact of the change in Qatari leadership is a question of great interest. Indeed, “the transition was initially interpreted as recognition of failure in Egypt and Syria.” However, while having “ceded place to Saudi Arabia as the main Arab power guiding the Syrian opposition abroad and funding and arming rebel groups inside Syria,”68 it appears that Qatar has not voiced its last say in terms of supporting Islamist groups. Less than a year into the reign of Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, it might be too soon to determine the future course of Qatari foreign policy – and whether the different policies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well as the competition between the two could translate into local tensions between their respective clients.

ConclusionWhile it has sometimes been considered that the shock wave of the Arab uprisings somehow stopped at the shores of Saudi Arabia, this paper shows that reality is slightly different. The regional turmoil combined with global economic trends and the strategic positioning of international actors at the regional level, impacts Saudi security issues and might push the Kingdom to re-evaluate its foreign and security policies. There may be three options under consideration: a continued reliance on the West as ultimate security guarantor, a diversification of partnerships looking East, and the development of an integrated regional security system.

Hussein in 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait.”68. The two quotes are from Andrew Hammond, “Qatar’s Leadership in Transition: Like Father,

Like Son,” Policy Brief, London, ECFR, February 2014, 1 and 8.

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Although the GCC has indeed consolidated in the face of the Arab uprisings, the solidity and viability of this “hegemonic cooperation” under the revived leadership of Saudi Arabia can be questioned. The situation in the region remains in flux, making it difficult today to predict how the regional security paradigms might evolve. Among other things, this depends on the development of the crises in Egypt and Syria, on the future fallout of numerous antagonisms and rivalries within the GCC, especially between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and on the Saudi capability to change “through evolution, not revolution.” Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Saudi endeavors may in fact generate more insecurity and instability even as it tries to secure the regional status quo to protect the stability of its regime. This paper aimed to draw a picture of the complex background for future regional security games.

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About the Author

Emma Soubrier is a French Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Auvergne Uni-versity and attached to the Strategic Research Institute (IRSEM), Paris. She has been acquiring expertise on Middle Eastern issues since 2008, thanks to research, field experience, and a good command of Arabic. During her Master’s degree in In-ternational Relations at the Sorbonne University in Paris, she lived for a year in the Middle East. In addition, she worked for a year and a half for the French Ministry of Defense, which allowed her to specialize in defense and security issues.

Ms. Soubrier graduated with honours as her class’s valedictorian from her Mas-ter’s program in 2011. Her research projects include “The British Commitment to the Iraq War, at the Crossroads of New Global Issues,” “International Law and the Palestinian Question” and “The Civil Resistance to the War during the War of Leba-non.” Her Ph.D. dissertation focuses on the evolving defense policies and procure-ment strategies of the Gulf countries. This research is co-funded by the French Min-istry of Defense and the company Airbus Defence & Space (ex Cassidian), where she works as a Junior Analyst. In 2013, Ms. Soubrier was one of the Young Strategists selected by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Johns Hop-kins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

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Regional Disorder and New Geo-economic Order: Saudi Security Strategies in a Reshaped Middle East

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