Redefining the Game in Local Water Management Conflict: A Case Study

Water Resour Manage (2010) 24:4307–4316DOI 10.1007/s11269-010-9660-6

Redefining the Game in Local Water ManagementConflict: A Case Study

Suman Ranjan Sensarma · Norio Okada

Received: 5 May 2009 / Accepted: 27 April 2010 /Published online: 21 May 2010© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract The article intends to bring a new perspective on conflict and cooperationanalysis addressing a case study of Yoshino river weir conflict (Japan) by the useof drama theory approach. The confrontation arose when the Governmental agencyproposed to remove and replace the old weir by a movable modern dam (kodazeki)to prevent future flooding. The Opposition group’s main arguments were that thenew weir may not be as effective as compared to the cost of constructing the newrenewal project and damage of water quality and ecosystem. Thus, both playersare playing the game where their interests are different. Rather than adopting theconventional approach of modeling the conflict using game theory, we propose thealternative approach to describe how the situation evolved and how game can bechanged in the context of player’s threats and promises. This also emphasizes thatfuture can be created cooperatively by a group, rather than by way of confrontationin the conflict. This model may bring an effective methodological leverage in conflictand cooperation analysis where we can change the game.

Keywords Conflict · Cooperation · Game · Drama theory

1 Introduction

Conflict over water resources is a critical issue across the globe where many stake-holders are involved having conflicting interests. Game theory has been widely used

S. R. Sensarma (B)Integrated Development Division, The Louis Berger Group, Inc., Gurgaon, Indiae-mail: [email protected]

S. R. SensarmaRMSI Private Limited, Noida, India

N. OkadaDisaster Prevention Research Institute, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japane-mail: [email protected]

4308 S.R. Sensarma, N. Okada

to model the water related conflict to find out the equilibrium states. Furthermore,in classical game theory, it is assumed that players act rationally and have fixed pref-erences between outcomes: indeed the whole structure of the game is taken as fixed.Due to its very strict assumption of the reality, the intellectual climate of game theoryhas moved more on to the behavioral aspects of decision making process whereplayers no longer accept the payoff matrix as fixed. They try to change opponent’spreferences through threats and promises. Players are assumed to redefine the gameand start to redefine what they want and can do and how they are led to behaveirrationally and to change the frame. This approach may bring an effective methodo-logical leverage in conflict and cooperation analysis.

2 Drama Theory

To overcome the limitations of ‘rational choice model’, Howard et al. (1993) postu-lated a new decision model called drama theory incorporating ‘non rational’ aspectsof decision making process such as crisis, emotion, and self realization. Drama theoryis further developed by Howard et al. (1993), Bennett and Howard (1996), Howard(1999, 2007), and Bryant (2003). This approach addresses how players (characters)apply rational emotional-pressure on each other to redefine the game prior to itbeing played (Stubbs et al. 1999). The fundamental difference between the gametheory and drama theory is that a drama allows for the possibility of the game itselfchanging even though the environment remains informationally closed; that is, itconsiders the possibility of endogenous changes, arising from interactions withinthe game itself (Howard 1994). The elements of a frame which corresponds to thegame theoretic concept of a game include a set of characters that have optionswhich collectively generate futures. Characters interact through a series of episodes.A dramatic episode is an interaction between parties in which a set of issues is atstake. It ends when some of the issues are decided, so that there is now a new set ofissues (Howard 2007). Character’s choices influence the outcome of each particularepisode, and also what episodes happen next. Within each episode, the phases arereferred to as scene setting, buildup, climax and denouement, a structure repeatedon a large scale for the drama as a whole. In buildup stage, characters communicate,each pressing for a particular position-a scenario that they wish to have createdand in the climax of the episode, the frames themselves come under pressure. The‘moment of truth’ occurs, in a drama–theoretic model, at the end of the build upand they move on to the climax. It is a point in an interaction where each party hascommunicated a position and stated intentions, it regards as “final”. When playersare in confrontational mode, a moment of truth is defied as a triple (F, p, f ), whereF = (h,>) is a frame (the common reference frame), p = (pc|c ∈ C) is a familyof positions, one for each character in the cast C, and f is the fallback (Murray-Jones and Howard 2001). The paradoxes of rationality create specific forms ofemotion and preference change, as well as generation of new options, involvement ofother characters etc. The characters then take actions that move them onto anotherepisode.

Howard (1999) developed a technique to analyze conflict and cooperation tosolve the real world problems which is called Confrontation Analysis. This is alsocalled the Dilemma Analysis. This is derived from the drama theory. This technique

Redefining the Game in Local Water Management Conflict 4309

allows card table model to analyze the conflict. A card table model of moment oftruth consists of:

I A set of characters, each holding a number of cards, for each of the characterhas a position. This is a specification of each card (belongs to all the characters)whether it should be played or not played.

II Fall back positions/threatened future. (A character’s fallback consists of thecards it is threatening to play if its position is not accepted. The character may notintend to carry out its threat; that is, it may be bluffing. In any case threatenedfuture is the scenario that would result from implementation of everyone’sdeclared fallback

Howard (1994) mentioned that there are only six dilemmas that the characterfaces during the confrontation phase. Later he again modified it as three dilemmas(Drama Theory 2). In Drama theory 2 (Levy et al. 2009), is that all dilemmas aredefined in terms of doubts. It is simpler and also more insightful. Instead of asking“Is this whole future preferred to this one?” it asks “Which option choices in thisfuture are preferred to those in this one?”

If B’s intention flouts A’s position on this option and A does not doubt it, A has apersuasion dilemma with B.

If B’s intention flouts A’s position on this option and A does doubt it, B has arejection dilemma with A.

If B’s intention meet A’s position on this option and A does doubt it, A has a trustdilemma with B.

The metaphor of drama describes the interaction of different characters andhow they change their preferences, develop and perceive the new outcomes. Whennone of the dilemmas exist, then the characters have an agreement that they fullytrust each other to carry out the action. This is the fundamental theorem of dramatheory. A strict, strong equilibrium as a point from which there are no potentialimprovements, that is, S is a strict, strong equilibrium.

If and only if

Impc(s) = ∅ for all C ⊆ N

This means that any group able to move from a strict, strong equilibrium toa nonequivalent outcome contains at least one member who would lose by themove. Hence, a strict, strong equilibrium is ‘honesty-reinforcing’; that is, no subsetof characters will want to deceive others into believing, it intends a strict, strongequilibrium (Howard 1994).

3 Conflicts Over Yoshino River Weir and Modeling

About 250 years ago during the Edo period (1603–1867), the existing Daijuzekidam on the Yoshino River-14 kilometers upstream from the Kii-sudio, a channelbetween Shikoku and the mainland-was built of stone masonry by the local farm-ers. According to the Ministry of Construction (MOC) officials, to prevent futureflooding, the present fixed dam (koteizeki) made of piles of stones must be removedand replaced by a movable modern dam (kodazeki) to prevent the future flooding.Since the weir has become old, it has become an obstacle to river flow in case of


flood. That increases the risk of inundation upstream. The total estimated cost forconstructing the movable dam on the Yoshino is over 100 billion yen (US $1 billion),with an annual maintenance cost of 700 million yen (US $7 million). In 1993, the localpeople came to officially learn about the proposal and they established a study group(benkyokai) to gather information and raise the question of validity of replacementof the old weir. The Opposition group with the support of local leaders began to startanti-dam movement in Tokushima. Their main arguments were as follows:

I The new weir may not be as effective as compared to the cost of constructing thenew renewal project.

II Inferior of water quality and ecosystem.

But despite the people protest, in 1997 the prefectural government and theassemblies of two cities and seven towns in Tokushima prefecture voted in favorof the new dam which triggered the Opposition group to demand a referendum onthe project. By the Japanese law, the result of a referendum in a municipality doesnot have any formal binding on the decision of the national government. At first, theTokushima municipal assembly rejected to legislate a local ordinance for introducinga referendum. However the political groups supporting the referendum successfullyobtained a majority in the election in April, 1999. The new assembly approved theinstitution of referendum, and this was carried out finally on January 23, 2000. Inthe referendum, 90% turnouts (almost a half of voters) voted for ‘Opposition forthe project’ (http://www.topics.or.jp/daijyuzeki/). After the referendum, the mayorof Tokushima expressed his position to oppose the project. In August, 2000, thegovernment declared suspension of the project, and called for establishing dialogueswith the Opposition group. However, communication did not work well becausethe Opposition group complained that the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure andTransport (re established in 2001 from the former Ministry of Construction and theMinistry of Transport) would still not exclude the originally proposed project fromthe prospective alternatives. In 2002, the governor of the Tokushima prefecture whowas constantly been supporting the project was arrested for bribery and forced toleave office. Thereafter a new governor was elected declared his position in supportof complete abortion of the project. But this conflict is not yet fully resolved till thedate. Both of those supporting and opposing have been trying to stay in dialogue, thusit has been undergoing successive stages of conflict and cooperation respectively.

To model and analyse this ongoing conflict the information is synthesized fromdifferent sources like official reports (The Yoshino River—Its Outline and Conserva-tion, 1990), news paper clippings (http://www.topics.or.jp/daijyuzeki/) etc. The wholeprocess of the conflict is modelled into three phases using ‘Drama theory II’ to ana-lyze how parties gradually find their cooperation ground over a series of interactions.

3.1 Phase I (1982–1999)

The role of player’s position is somewhat neglected in game theoretic analysis ofconflict resolution. A character’s position, as the drama theory puts it is whateverit is trying to convince the others to accept. It is specifying a selection of cards tobe played, typically including the both, i.e., one’s demands on other characters, andsome commitments of one’s own. As in the everyday sense of the world, a positionrefers to a public stance: the character may or may not be sincere in intending to

http://www.topics.or.jp/daijyuzeki/



carrying out its commitments. A common position may be held by two or morecharacters (Bryant 1998, 2003). The drama theoretic analyses now discuss how bothparties’ position has changed over a period of time. This also emphasizes that futurecan be created cooperatively by a group, rather than by way of confrontation in theconflict. Figure 1 illustrates the components of Card Table Model (Options Board).

Figure 1 illustrates the card table for phase I of the conflict. This is the pre-play sit-uation. A filled-in shape signifies that the character has taken this option and emptyshapes means that character has not accepted this options, and ‘—’ represents ei-ther/or, meaning the option may or may not be adopted. The frame of this confronta-tion shows the dilemmas faced by each of the characters. The Governmental agencyis a powerful party in this confrontation. At least in the beginning, they seemed tohave little intention to change the current frame. They like to reinforce their positionto the Opposition group to accept it. The Opposition group faces a persuasiondilemma with the Governmental agency. To eliminate the persuasion dilemma, theOpposition group can choose a new fallback position. This indicates the necessityto change the game. Later the local environmentalists put the public referendumissue which was to turn the confrontation in different episodes eventually adopteddifferent options and preferences.

In drama theory, players (rather say, characters) communicate each others andredefine their game in terms of either changing their strategy or trying to changeopponents’ options and preferences. Drama theory also refers to the need to ‘thinkoutside the box’, i.e., what is happening around the modeling. The externalities affectthe character’s behavior. Thus parties use emotion and tension to redefine theirinitial position. During this phase, the anti-dam movement led by local environmen-talists had a great impact on the Yoshino river weir controversy. Political partiesand other organized groups gave strong support to this movement. Citizen groupsheld several symposiums at which conservationists and scholars spoke and amassed

Fig. 1 Confrontation card table (episode I)


a thick sheaf queries and fears that had been voiced by other members of the public.Thus this episode is transferred to another episode (Fig. 2). In the next episode, theGovernmental agency changed their attitude, they suspend the project, but in orderto revitalize the project they propose partial change of the plan. Figure 2 shows thenew card model at the ‘moment of truth’ in this phase. In this episode, the Oppositiongroup still has a persuasion dilemma with the Governmental agency. Neither of thetwo parties achieved its position.

A distinct shift in the nature of the conflict began as a result of public referendum.But it was not a random event. In Tokushima, local environmentalists, includingMasayoshi Himeno who later became the leader of the movement for a public refer-endum took a strong role to stop the dam project. During this period, the proposedconstructions of Nagara River Barrage in Gifu prefecture became a national debateissue. Awareness of anti-dam movement has further enhanced by wide range ofmedia coverage. Yoshino river project faced this trend against dam. This contextualexternal event forced the conflict to move on to the second phase of the conflictwhere the focus shifts towards whether the project is completely aborted or not.

3.2 Phase II (2000–2002)

Both character’s positions can represent as another ‘moment of truth’ where theGovernmental agency was not ready to abort the project and more interested to

Fig. 2 Confrontation cardtable (episode II)


revitalize the project by changing the partial plan. Figure 3 shows that each of thecharacters faced persuasion dilemma—each found the threatened future palatablethan the other character’s position. As a result of their dilemma, the Oppositiongroup started to raise their voice to abort the project via the media, attempting toturn the public opinion against the Governmental agency’s position. Thus they try tomake the fall back position unattractive to the Governmental agency.

As a means of continuous communication and result of anti-dam movement, theGovernmental agency again changed the frame-they created and came up with a newfall back position where they abort the project and propose partial change of the plan(Fig. 4). The positive emotion insisted to do so. But the Governmental agency likedto carry out the partial change of the plan, thus Opposition group’s position wasflouted. The Governmental agency faced a rejection dilemma with the Oppositiongroup. In May, 2002, the Opposition group established a NPO to strengthen theirvoice. The increasing demand for referendum in Japan also moved the citizens toestablish the Opposition group to register their voice in the corridor of power. Thus,the Opposition group represents the interest of citizens in this confrontation. In May,2003 the new governor was elected and decided to abort the project.

As mentioned above, drama theory allows the continuous change of optionsand preferences unless the parties find their satisfactory option on which they canagree. In 2003, Government of Tokushima prefecture heard opinions of mayorsfrom 25 municipalities in the Yoshino river basin. Some mayors supported theconstruction, some of them opposed the construction and others insisted that it wasnot fair to consider the result of referendum of Tokushima city because Tokushimamunicipalities is just one of the municipalities in Yoshino river basin. We may alsoinfer that some political climate change such as a new governor being elected couldhave also contributed to a quantum jump in the structure of the conflict to enforcethe conflict to move on to another phase. The new governor stated, “If a new weirplan is an obstacle for participation that will be excluded from the alternatives forflood control.” As a result of this interaction, both characters came together with anew option board which marked the start of the third phase of the conflict.

Fig. 3 Confrontation cardtable (episode III)


Fig. 4 Confrontation cardtable (episode III)

3.3 Phase III (2003–2008)

Figure 5 shows the new episode in this phase. The Opposition group faces a trustdilemma with the Governmental agency. In this phase, more emphasis is placedon the flood control measures. They are, however, not able to find their commonground. The aim of drama theoretic approach is not merely to find a resolution; but

Fig. 5 Confrontation cardtable (episode V)


Fig. 6 Possible collaboration

it gives more emphasis on how characters find way to eliminate their dilemmas as acontinuous communication process. They can only reach a strong equilibrium pointwhen they do not find any potential improvement from their stated positions. Butsometimes they fail to implement their resolution if someone breaks the promisesor discards threats. Thus the dénouement is the last phase of the confrontationresolution if resolution is implemented.

So, in another way, the drama theory can address much of the real world imple-mentation question rather than it simply describes the actual process in retrospect, orpredicts the future in a very robust way. In the last phase of this conflict, since boththe parties have a common interest on the flood management issue, by giving morefocus on it, parties can negotiate each others. If they cannot reach an agreement, areferendum can be exercised as an effective countermeasure (as mentioned above inthe model consequences). The following trade-off would seem to be in the interestsof both parties (Fig. 6).

4 Conclusions

The argument of this case study is to manifest a methodology of conflict resolutionwhich has an emphasis on collaboration. Drama theory asserts that full conflictresolution generally requires players to be engaged in rational–emotional processof re-defining both the game and their ‘positions’ until there is a fully satisfactory


resolution on which they all agree. In re-defining the game the player (de)constructstheir subjective reality in their objective frame. Threats and promises are the inherentproperties that control player’s position. Thus, it can capture the transition phases ofthe conflict and its driving forces as an episodic transformation in a dynamic process.In this Yoshino river weir conflict now both players’ preferences gradually appearto be shifting towards more integrated flood management issue. But within the samegroup some of the members still prefer the construction of a new weir. In order toresolve the further conflict, referendum can be taken as a direct democracy. In thiscase, the present episode may further transfer to another episode with new agendas.

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Redefining the Game in Local Water Management Conflict: A Case Study

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