(Re)Construction of Collective Identities after the Dissolutionof the Soviet Union: The Case of Estonia�

Triin Vihalemm and Anu Masso

Introduction

The paper will focus on the structures of collective identities of the Russian-speaking

population of Estonia.1 Particular cultural and political orientations held by indivi-

duals and frequencies of self-categorization as Russian, ex-Soviet, citizens of

Estonia, etc. have been discussed extensively.2 Much less attention has been paid to

the structures of self-identification, which draw out people’s thinking patterns. The

paper is based on the methodological premise that analysis and interpretation of the

disposition of different types of self-categorization is worth the effort, as it helps to

elucidate the general meta-structures behind people’s interpretation of different identi-

fication narratives and provides an opportunity to make prognoses about future

scenarios.

The first section discusses the different public identity narratives and social pre-

requisites for their internalization. The second and third sections provide an overview

of the methodology and data of the study. The fourth section presents the main find-

ings regarding the frequencies and structures of self-identification both today and 15

years ago.

Theoretical and Empirical Framework of the Study

This paper offers material for discussion about the development of the identity of the

Russian diasporas in post-Soviet successor states.3 This article builds on this current of

research by analysing the collective identities of the Russian-speaking population in

transitional Estonia. The researchers agree that no collective group consciousness

and mobilization has occurred in the Russian community, despite significant social

deprivation.4 However, the socio-historical and cultural context is somewhat unique

in relation to the further formation of political and cultural allegiances on the part

of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia because of the country’s radical

reforms, its EU membership and its rapid geo-cultural opening up. Thus, the Estonian

Triin Vihalemm, Associate Professor, and Anu Masso, Lecturer, Department of Journalism and Communication,

University of Tartu, Estonia. Email: triin.vihalemm@ut.ee and anu.masso@ut.ee

Nationalities Papers, Vol. 35, No. 1, March 2007

ISSN 0090-5992 print; ISSN 1465-3923 online/07/010071-21 # 2007 Association for the Study of Nationalities

DOI: 10.1080/00905990601124496

socio-cultural space is rich with different identification “templates”—Soviet, transi-

tional, “imported from the West.” We have adopted the term coined by Piotr

Sztompka, the well-known analyst of the post-Soviet transition, who defines “cultural

templates” as “collectively shared symbolic, mental resources used for filtering and

interpreting the facts of change.”5

In our analysis we assume that individually reworked “cultural templates” are

shaped partly in the structures of present-day and retrospective self-identification.

Analysing those mental structures helps to elucidate the logic behind people’s

interpretation of changes in their social status and provides an opportunity to make

prognoses about future scenarios.

Below we will introduce briefly the most significant identification templates

“circulating” in various forms in the public sphere of post-Soviet Estonia.

Individualization and Global Orientation

As is the case with many other East European countries, Estonia has quickly adopted

“Western” patterns—a privatized economy based on a neo-liberal ideology and

advances in information technology. The local culture provided resources—the

narratives of regained sovereignty and of a return to the West—which allowed the

changes to be interpreted in a positive light. The political and economic pathfinders

(and later winners) of transition quickly utilized the economic rationality and

liberal ideas as a legitimizing ideology.

The well-known notion of the “risk society” is well suited to a description of the

social conditions in post-Soviet Estonia:

Risks and contradictions go on being socially produced but the duty and the neces-sity to cope with them is individualized. The complexity of a social condition doesnot justify collective mobilization and formation of group consciousness on the basisof “common causes of troubles”, but to “seek biographical solutions to the systemiccontradictions.”6

Along with it came an individualistic, liberal ideology that dominates the Estonian

public sphere; ethnic relations were no exception. Media texts which deal with the

problem of the integration of the Russian-speaking population represent mainly a

liberal-democratic thinking pattern with its strong emphasis on individual choices

and rights.7 Also, the Integration programme launched by the government is carried

mainly by liberal-individualistic ideology (to be discussed further below).

Various authors point out that this meta-level discursive pressure, coupled with the

acculturation policy adopted by the Estonian Republic, could motivate the seeking of

collective solutions and lead to the group mobilization of the Russian-speaking

members of the population.8 However, it is also probable that the perceived complexity

of the new conditions will not produce sufficient reason for collective mobilization and

the formation of group consciousness around the existing social structures. Indeed, the

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

72

empirical evidence reveals that during the first decade of transition, the Russian-speak-

ing population has employed mainly individual adaptation strategies.9

In this situation, supra-national identification narratives could become attractive.

Kennedy highlights the tension between global and national ideas in the transition

culture and concludes that, as the transition culture is nationalistic by nature, the pros-

pect of global development and dissolution of national differences is less likely in the

public narratives of transition societies.10 Thus global identification may also carry

connotations of resistance. The rapid geo-cultural opening up of Estonia and its EU

membership have given the country an opportunity to construct a positive self-

determination within global and supra-national symbolic frameworks. Some research-

ers have pointed out that, even before Estonia had become an EU member state, the

Russian-speaking population may have worked out a new positive self-identification

via EU citizenship and multilingualism.11 Qualitative studies of Russian youth reveal

that youngsters build a European identity through the Internet, television, and personal

contacts with Western countries. They see English as important capital which may

offer an alternative to Estonian.12 Empirical analysis has revealed a connection

between emancipatory depreciation of social structures and supra-national global

self-identification (we-ness with Europeans, humankind).13 Thus one dimension we

will follow in the analysis is the pattern of global, supra-national identification.

State-Led Identification Ideologies

According to most scholars, the identity of Russian speakers in Estonia as well as in

other Soviet republics was previously a Soviet one. The Soviet identity construction

followed the logic of the so-called legitimizing identity, introduced by the dominant

institutions of society and whose aim was to extend and rationalize their domination.14

Today, the legitimizing, state-led identity pattern has been realized in two conflic-

ting ideologies: (a) the ideology of compatriots in the near abroad of the Russian Fede-

ration and (b) the integration ideology of the Estonian Republic.

The “Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007” programme was launched in the

mid-1990s,15 the stated aim of which was to decrease the isolation of the Russian-

speaking community that posed a potential threat to social stability. Ideologically,

the programme conforms to the liberal-democratic interpretation of nationalism and

multiculturalism in treating integration as a matter of individual choice, and empha-

sizing the individual’s freedom of choice in determining his/her group affiliation

and cultural identity: “Languages, ethnic traditions, religious beliefs, family traditions

and personal lifestyles are not necessarily common to all members of society, as they

belong to the area of the private interests of each individual, where opportunities for

their advancement are to be found.”16 The public sphere is perceived as functioning on

the basis of dominating common values—the Estonian language and culture:

The common core connecting members of society consists of general human and demo-cratic values, a common sphere of information and Estonian-language environment, as

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

73

well as common state institutions and values based on the knowledge of Estonianhistory and awareness of the nature of Estonian citizenship and the multiculturalnature of Estonian society.17

We agree with Kouts, who concludes her analysis of the discourse of the integration

programme with the following words:

Putting the Estonian language and culture first is an attempt to alleviate the Estonians’“existential” fears related to the preservation of their culture and as a nation. Thenon-Estonians are a subject of the programme, although a message is communicatedto them which should encourage them to adapt to society. The purpose of emphasisingindividual choices is to prevent the reproduction of a homogeneous community of thenon-Estonians.18

Thus we can conclude that the ideology of the integration programme does not offer

simply a “replacement” for the previous Soviet state identity, but seeks individual

acculturation, especially in the acquisition of the Estonian language (the language

requirement will be discussed further below).

An alternative means of restoring one’s self-esteem is offered by the Russian

Federation. Albeit more vague and unsystematic in comparison with the Estonian inte-

gration programme, the Russian Federation counter-project constructs diasporic iden-

tity by offering political identity (Rossijane) and the newly invented “Russianness” as

a unifying ideology. This ideology constructs all Russian speakers as one group19 and

offers rights and protection at a group level. The diasporic ideology—in both its

manifest and latent forms—is supported by Russian television, which is watched

extensively by the Russian-speaking community in Estonia.20 The significance of

Russian television consist not so much in construction of political allegiances to

Russian state institutions, but in the construction of cultural and mental diaspora.

We propose that the diasporic identification narratives and their internalization

could be interpreted in a more generic way than as one commanding loyalty to

Russian state institutions.

The near-abroad and integration ideologies paradoxically help to maintain each other.

They stimulate mutual reconstruction, serving as opposites to each other and stimulating

the construction of alternative identities at a grassroots level. Below, we provide an over-

view of the main alternative identity-building patterns at the grassroots level.

Soviet Nostalgia as Identification Narrative

Researchers of post-Soviet societies (including Estonia) have mentioned nostalgia as

one of the characteristic features of transitional culture. For example, both Kennedy

and Vogt have pointed out nostalgia (narrative of loss) for Soviet-type egalitarianism,

welfare and warm relations between people as the reflection of a need for spiritual

encouragement. This nostalgia has taken various forms—from the worship of Soviet

power symbols (monuments, flag, etc.) to consumer entertainment (soviet-style bars,

clubs, etc).21

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

74

Russian television is an important source of material that feeds this nostalgia, in its

various forms, for all things Soviet. Here, it is appropriate to use the term

“mediascape,” as proposed by Appadurai: “. . . produced by private or state interests,”

mediascapes offer “. . . a series of elements (characters, plots, textual forms) which can

and do get disaggregated into complex sets of metaphors which help people to consti-

tute narratives of the Other and protonarratives of possible lives, fantasies that could

become prolegomena to the desire for acquisition and movement.”22 Russian televi-

sion provides an extensive framework for Soviet nostalgia via old movies, interviews,

biographies, etc. as vox populi. Several present-day movies and documentaries have

been created which show aspects of life in Soviet times in a positive, warm manner

and with “soft” humour. Thus nostalgic Soviet narratives may also become an

attractive tool for the construction of present identities, both as “biographical

solutions” to the ambivalence of the present situation as well as a new sub-cultural

identity referring to reworked forms of the Soviet narrative (goods of nostalgia,

fashion style, thematic artefacts, etc.).

Regional and Ethno-Cultural Identification

Earlier research has shown that local self-identification (i.e. inhabitant of the Baltic)

may be “picked up” in order to maintain one’s positive distinctiveness when one

feels ambiguously, or weakly, related to the new states—both the Estonian Republic

and the Russian Federation. Even in Soviet times, some authors were speaking of

“Balticization.” Melvin interprets this label as an adaptation to regional behaviour,

manners, and values.23 More importantly, it allows self-differentiation from those

Russian speakers in other republics. Both Melvin and Kolstø argue that settlers

from other republics have also adopted the local identity—they too have “Balti-

cized.”24 The symbol of Pribaltika, used in Soviet times, is actively reconstructed

today via Russian television channels (Pervoi Pribaltiiski and others). Analysis

should shed some light on the question as to whether the local pan-Baltic self-

identification is either a “soft” form of diasporic identity or an independent form of

self-determination, a phenomenon that Bhabha has introduced as locality: “a form

of living that is more complex than ‘community’, more symbolic than ‘society’;

more connotative than ‘country’; less patriotic than patrie.”25

The other path of identity development among Russian-speaking Estonians is in the

formation of an ethno-linguistic collective identity. Several Russian authors have

noted a rise in the importance of ethnic allegiances for those Russians settled in

different titular republics.26 The development of ethnic identity among Russian-

speaking Estonians may gain support from the historical identity construction patterns

of Estonians. In the course of their history Estonians have practised so-called resistant,

defensive minority identity construction patterns27 based on ethnic traits such as

language.28 In many ways this defensive minority construction pattern is combined

with the individualistic-liberal thinking pattern present in public texts (e.g. the

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

75

integration programme, language regulations and other rules), almost conflating the

integration and minority identification narratives.

Qualitative studies29 indicate that language learning by the Russian-speaking popu-

lation might mean for Estonians not so much national security but a so-called new

ideological loyalty—the adoption of the liberal-emancipatory mentality that has

come to predominate. For Russian-speaking Estonians, the language requirement,

combined with the individualistic-liberal pathos dominating the Estonian public

sphere, may raise a dilemma, as highlighted by David Laitin: whether to conform

to the language requirement, thus giving rise to competition within the group, or to

reject it and convert one’s linguistic distinction into a collective resource that

would enable one to restore one’s self-esteem and to demand special treatment.30

Empirical research suggests that some Russian speakers may “take over” the pattern

of resistance shown historically by Estonians and construct a new collective identity as

an ethnic minority group.31 In addition, Russian television may help to maintain the

communicative border and contribute to the formation of cultural group allegiances

based on “common language and cultural cues, common agreement ‘about what is

funny, what is politically correct, what is outrageous or sacrilegious.’”32 Schopflin

has also claimed that for the local Russian-speaking population the other capital—

cultural capital—is Moscow.33

The range of identity options for Russian-speaking Estonians is therefore wide. In

the following analysis, we will discuss over the scenarios of identity development for

Russian-speaking Estonians and provide evidence to show the prevalence of the

various identity construction strategies and discuss their significance in a larger

social context.

Methodological Considerations

For further analysis we need to specify that, in the context of this paper, a person’s collec-

tive self-identification is understood as a feeling of attachment, or allegiance in relation to

certain groups. It is generally argued that the process of identification involves a publicly

offered external definition, known as social categorization, and an internal process or a

(partial) acquisition or rejection of identities, known as internalization.34 Thus, one possi-

bility for exploring identity is via self-categorization, a process that has been used in several

empirical studies of political and cultural identity of minority groups and is also utilized in

our study.35 There are, of course, diverse groups and communities, but the dynamism and

multilayered nature of social relations may give rise to the need for certain hierarchies—the

emergence of dominant and peripheral solidarities. Some groups and communities domi-

nate and are “cross-situational,” while others are peripheral. Constructions in group solida-

rities vary in their degree of rigidity. Thus we assume that the categories more frequently

selected are more rigid and vice versa—those identification categories that carry symbols

that are insufficiently are not internalized.

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

76

However, we agree with Giesen, who argues that self-images gain their persua-

sive power not only because of their usefulness for members of a community but

also because of their position in the general cultural context and worldview.36 Hall

postulates the importance of interpretation of the past in the identity process:

“identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned and pos-

ition ourselves within the narratives of the past.”37 Thus the interpretation of the

past is important in identity studies. We assume that when people start to assign

a meaning to what has happened to their group solidarities, society becomes less

turbulent and the “crystallization” of certain identity patterns and trajectories has

begun. Thus we have switched the questions about present-day self-categorizations

as well as about (perceived) self-categorizations 15 years ago into our measure-

ment tool.

In the study, we will look at how people construct their change in status and options

for (new) cultural and political allegiances during the transition period. How they

explain—in terms of identification categories—changes in the social environment.

Which identifying categories—local, global, ethnic, linguistic, civic—are considered

to be appropriate for self-designation? How are the retrospective and the present-day

identity structures interrelated in people’s minds?

We do not assume that the retrospective categories echo the situation prior to the

transformation process. Neither do we assume that this method covers the identity

topic fully. The study of identifying categories is only one way to address the

problem that can at best “scratch the surface.” The findings are interpreted by

bearing in mind that the respondents might share the category but do not necessarily

share its meaning. However, we assume that a general overview of the reception of the

most commonly used categories will uncover the most general lines for further

ethnographic and other type of research on identity development.

Data Source

Empirical analysis is based on a representative survey entitled “Me, the Media and the

World” that was undertaken by the Department of Journalism and Communication of

the University of Tartu in co-operation with Faktum (a research company) in

December 2002 and January 2003. The survey covered a variety of topics such as

media, personal interests, values, identities, attitudes to the changes in Estonia

during the past 10–15 years, lifestyle and life conditions. The sample was composed

of 15–74-year-old inhabitants, according to a territorially representative population

model of Estonia. The sample comprised 1,470 individuals, with 969 answering in

Estonian and 501 in Russian.

Internalization of various identification categories was utilized in the empirical

research. Some of the identification categories were first analysed in the course of

prior qualitative in-depth interviews.38 The willingness of individuals to use a specific

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

77

category for self-designation today and 15 years ago was measured in the question-

naire. The respondents were asked two questions:

1. There are various ways of answering the question “Who are you?” With which

groups do you identity yourself? Respondents had to indicate whether they felt

themselves to be a part of a particular category “certainly,” “at times, partly” or

“not at all.”

2. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the regaining of independence, the

Republic of Estonia has witnessed many societal changes. Please try to recall how

you used to feel, and describe yourself 15 years ago, at the time of the Soviet Estonian

Republic. Respondents had to indicate whether they felt they were a member of a

particular category “certainly,” “at times, partly” or “not at all.” In addition, the vari-

able “do not know, do not remember” was available.

The following categories were presented to respondents: Estonian/Russian, Estonian-

speaking/Russian-speaking person, inhabitant of the (former) Soviet Estonian

Republic, citizen of the Republic of Estonia, inhabitant of Estonia, Baltic inhabitant,

Soviet person, northerner, European, world citizen.

The question concerning self-designation 15 years ago was not asked of respondents

who were under 30. Thus the analysis including past self-designations and strategies

of combining the self-identification in the past with present-day self-identification was

performed on the sub-sample of individuals aged 30–74. This sub-sample is supposed

to express the tension between two cultures most vividly. Their active socialization

period falls partly in the Soviet era, their having been aged 15 years or older at the

time of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we provide an overview of how

frequently the above-mentioned present and retrospective identification categories

were internalized or rejected by Russian-speaking Estonians. On the basis of

answer frequencies we discuss how widely the different identification narratives

“circulating” in the public sphere might be “picked up” by people, also comparing

the retrospective and present-day self-categorizations.

In the second part we analyse the structures of self-identification and make use of a

multidimensional scaling technique (MDS). The MDS set of data analysis techniques

allows us to represent graphically the grouping of a large number of variables and to

describe the hidden dimensions on the basis of which groups are formed. In the MDS

distances are calculated on the basis of all inter-point distances. As a result, the MDS

represents the data as a geometric picture on a coordinate grid. In the multidimensional

space thus created the variables are represented as points so that those variables with a

shorter Euclidean distance are located closer to each other and those variables with a

longer Euclidean distances are located far from each other. The grid, on which the

objects are located, can have a minimum of one and a maximum of six dimensions

that are interpreted as hidden structures, according to which the variables are

positioned and grouped. Thus, the MDS enables us to conduct two types of

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

78

analysis—(1) to describe the structure of the variables located in the MDS space

(i.e. the location and interrelations), and (2) to show the hidden structures that form

the basis of the multidimensional space.

In this paper the 19 variables (excluding retrospective self-identification as an

Estonian citizen) of retrospective and present self-identification, the standardization

of values ranging from –1 to 1, and a two-axis solution were used as statistically

most relevant. We will interpret both the grouping of identification variables as

patterns of identification and the two dimensions which organize the grouping of

variables.

Results

The Internalization and Rejection of Identity Categories

This section presents the data on frequencies of self-identification today (see Appen-

dix A) and retrospective self-designations 15 years ago, thus prior to dissolution of the

Soviet Union (see Appendix B).

Among the options available for retrospective self-determination, most of the

Russian-speaking Estonians selected the Soviet identification categories—either

Soviet person or inhabitant of the Soviet Estonian Republic. The category

“Soviet person” was one of the prevailing self-designations among Russian-

speaking Estonians in Soviet times and the category maintained its importance in

retrospective self-designations. Media analysis indicates that the main markers of

identity during Soviet times were politics and ideology; these created a sense of

civil and political unity with the state and prescribed certain rules and qualities

for citizens.39 In addition to the Soviet identity, the local Russian-language press

constructed a civic identity with the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and an

Estonian identity as the identity of an ethnographic group.40 Besides Soviet affilia-

tion, the respondents also marked (significantly often) the feeling of affiliation with

Estonian Soviet society.

We can see the high response rates for the categories Russian and Russian language

speaker. This corresponds to the findings of Yadov, Kosmarskaya and other Russian

scholars who have reported a rise in ethnic solidarities.41 The relatively frequent retro-

spective internalization of the category Baltic inhabitant likely corresponds to the

symbol of Pribaltika. There was also a relatively significant proportion of Russian-

speaking Estonians who retrospectively identified themselves during Soviet times as

inhabitants of Estonia.

In characterizing themselves “today,” a considerable proportion of Russian-

speaking Estonians chose local identity categories. Eighty-four per cent picked the

local territorial category inhabitant of Estonia as a self-designation. This shows that

the concept of locality described above is worth discussing as one possible path of

future identity development for Russians in titular republics.

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

79

Also, our data support the ethnicization thesis. Seventy-nine per cent of Russian-

speakers identified themselves today as Russian and 74% as Russian language

speaker.

An important proportion (i.e. 48%) was made up of respondents who certainly feel

themselves now to be citizens of the Estonian Republic. Also, Kolstø admits that, in

political terms, members of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia seem to iden-

tify more with their country of residence than do members of any other Russian dia-

sporic group in the sample from his survey of Russians living in former Soviet

republics.42 According to Poppe and Hagendoorn, the average proportion of those

Russians who identify themselves exclusively as citizens of their state of residence

was highest in culturally and linguistically “close” countries such as Belarus and

Ukraine.43 Our findings indicate that local self-identification can also develop when

the culture and language are different from those of the titular group. However, the

share of those who identified themselves as “citizens of Estonia” was relatively

small compared with those who chose the category “inhabitant of Estonia.” According

to the results of in-depth interviews, for Estonians state affiliation presumes acqui-

sition of some Estonian cultural traits, but Russian speakers associate it with formal

citizenship, which offers some sense of social security.

A considerable proportion of respondents (52%) certainly felt themselves to be

inhabitants of the Baltic. In-depth interviews indicate that the bases of this affiliation

nowadays are common social problems, a shared past, a common place of residence

and ethnic affiliation. The content of this category is essentially neutral and hence it

is a convenient unifier of Russian-speaking Estonians.

Some of the respondents also chose to designate themselves “today” using territo-

rially expansive categories—northerner, European and world citizen. These cate-

gories were chosen by only about one-fifth of the respondents.

The survey results indicate that the so-called “nostalgic categories”—”Soviet

person” and “inhabitant of the Soviet Estonian Republic”—are not utilized by

Russian-speaking Estonians very often. However, this category, derived from the

past, is reported to be quite popular in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Kazakhstan.44

When comparing the changes in identification with various categories the data

reveal that the greatest decline appears in relation to the Soviet category—Soviet

person and inhabitant of the Soviet Estonian Republic. The ethno-linguistic cate-

gory, however, is stable, as witnessed by the relatively large proportion of those

who reported having felt this kind of togetherness in Soviet times. The category

of Baltic inhabitant has also been relatively stable. Although the acceptance of

the Estonian-centred category has increased, the proportion of this category was

also significantly frequently selected for self-designations 15 years ago. The

same tendency is valid in the case of the global category. Thus, many identity

options are perceived as having already been “in place” in Soviet times. We can

conclude that people tend to “harmonize” the transition period, as reflected in

the identity options.

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

80

Identity Structures—Results of the MDS Analysis

In order to study the structures of self-designation in more detail, an MDS statistical

procedure was used (see the “Data Source” section above), the results of which are

shown in Figure 2.

We can distinguish three quite clear groupings of positions of self-identification, as

marked with circles. The present and retrospective self-identifications are marked as

“today” and “before” in parentheses, respectively

The first group of self-identification variables can be labelled “supra-national, global

identification pattern.” The variables of present-day and retrospective self-identification

as European, World citizen and Northerner are placed near to each other, thus indicating

strong correlations between these variables. Thus, the international or global narrative

can be distinguished in the public sphere as well as at the “grassroots level,” internalized

by (a proportion of) people into their ways of thinking about themselves.

The second group of variables can be labelled “post-Soviet identification pattern,”

which captures present-day self-identifications as a Soviet person or an inhabitant of the

former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. Despite the fact that the internalization of

the nostalgic Soviet narrative was infrequent (see above), this pattern of nostalgia never-

theless exists in the “pool of cultural templates” used by Russian-speaking Estonians.

The large group of variables to the right of the vertical axis enfolds two sub-groups

of identification variables. The upper sub-group of variables can be labelled

FIGURE 1 Changes in present-day and retrospective self-identifications. Accumulatedpercentage of “certainly” and “sometimes” answers

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

81

“local-territorial identification pattern,” which includes present-day and retrospective

self-designation as an inhabitant of Estonia or the Baltic. This pattern enables us to say

that both the Balticization narrative and concept of locality discussed above are really

reflections of people’s thinking patterns at a “grassroots level.” One can conclude that

the former local affiliation—either in the form of (Soviet) Estonian or Baltic inhabi-

tant—has maintained its place-centred nature in today’s self-identification patterns

of (a proportion of) Russian-speaking Estonians.

This sub-group is in quite close proximity to the other sub-group of variables of

ethnic and linguistic identification as Russian speaker and Russian. Also, the retro-

spective self-identification as a Soviet person has strong correlations here. These cate-

gories were most frequently marked in self-categorization (see above). Thus the

transformation of previous state-led ideological identity as a Soviet person into an

ethno-linguistic identification seems to be one amongst many strategies, labelled

also as “ethnization.”45 The sub-group of variables in general can be labelled

“ethno-linguistic patterns of identification.”

However, the distances between the groups of territorial and ethno-linguistic identi-

fication are smaller compared to the distance between the other groups of variables,

which means that in the thinking patterns the two types of references are intertwined,

used in parallel. As such they might also be viewed as one territorial and ethno-

linguistic meta-pattern.

FIGURE 2 MDS analysis of present and retrospective self-categorization of Russian-speaking Estonians

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

82

The identification as “citizen of the Estonian Republic” is placed quite separately in

the multidimensional space. Thus, despite the relatively high degree of internalization

(see Figure 1 and Appendix A) of this identification category, the new state identifi-

cation lacks a deeper cultural-historical context and links with other identification

narratives.

It is located closest to the territorial identification pattern and is positioned furthest

from the post-Soviet identification pattern.

Thus it might be proposed that the post-Soviet self-identification indicates ideologi-

cal and political protest rather than nostalgic lifestyle-related longings in the mental

make-up of Russian-speaking Estonians.

In Table 1 the highest-value co-ordinates (presented in Figure 2) and thus also the

greatest variances in the variables are brought within the two dimensions. This enables

us also to interpret the latent framework of organization of the data (quite analogously

with the interpretation of factor and cluster analysis outputs).

The horizontal dimension describes the process of localization with a strong ethno-

linguistic basis. The characteristic variables here are retrospective self-identification

as a Soviet person and inhabitant of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, and

TABLE 1 Dimensions of identifications. Values of two-dimensional MDS space co-ordinates.The higher positive value in the row is indicated in bold

Dimension 1(horizontal)

Dimension 2(vertical)

Russian (today) 1.7982 0.3640Russian (before) 1.1802 0.3836Russian speaker (today) 1.6719 0.3353Russian speaker (before) 0.4222 0.5011Inhabitant of the former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic –1.9203 0.8291Inhabitant of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (before) 1.2667 0.2669Citizen of the Estonian Republic (today) 0.6424 21.328Citizen of the Estonian Republic (before) 21.1606 20.0088Inhabitant of Estonia (today) 1.9394 20.021Inhabitant of Estonia (before) 0.8142 0.0182Inhabitant of Baltic (today) 0.8047 20.659Inhabitant of Baltic (before) 0.5281 0.0422Soviet person (today) 2 2.0181 0.798Soviet person (before) 1.1291 0.3601Northerner (today) –1.4112 20.6648Northerner (before) 21.0057 0.0779European (today) 20.993 20.9063European (before) 21.0153 0.548World citizen (today) 2 1.5988 20.5227World citizen (before) 21.074 0.0795

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

83

both retrospective and present self-identification as Russian, inhabitant of the Baltic

and inhabitant of Estonia. This dimension thus displays cognition of the replacement

of Soviet identification with local-cultural identification and/or perceived stability of

one’s territorial and ethno-linguistic allegiances.

The vertical axis represents identification as a Soviet person and inhabitant of the

former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. In addition, this dimension displays the

acknowledgement of a certain loss—the international (European) and linguistic

(Russian-speaker) references for self-identification are projected to Soviet times but are

not considered to be a relevant basis for self-identification today. Thus the post-Soviet

identification can be interpreted as a symbol of socio-historical bitterness and protest.

Conclusions

Russian-speaking Estonians have tailored themselves different identification narra-

tives from the relatively “rich” pool of historical-cultural “templates” of transforma-

tional Estonia. Frequency analysis revealed the possible internalization of several

historical-cultural narratives of identity construction at the grassroots level, but struc-

tural analysis (MDS) allowed three more distinct cultural patterns to be identified. A

Local-cultural pattern, “new” supra-national and global patterns, and nostalgic post-

Soviet patterns were able to be identified as separate mental structures. Structural

analysis revealed that the new category offered by the state integration programme,

namely “citizen of the Republic of Estonia,” lacks deeper cultural-historical context

and links with other identification structures.

The connotatively most “rich” identification structure is the local-cultural one,

which could constitute a symbolic and cognitive basis for place-centred sub-cultural

identity. We propose that the pattern represents mobilization of the existing cultural

resources in coping with transition. The ethnic and linguistic categories are bound

into the same structure as the territorial and regional categories. This structure reflects

the “localized” version of ethno-cultural self-designation. Under certain circum-

stances this thinking pattern might also form a symbolic basis for the collective mobil-

ization of part of the Russian-speaking Estonian population. Data from other studies46

show that, among Russian-speaking Estonians, the language-centred collective iden-

tity construction pattern has developed mainly during the transition period and is prob-

ably derived from Estonians. We agree here with Kennedy, who argues that Estonian

culture is not only attractive to Estonians but also to Russian-speaking Estonians who

can then translate the global transition and Estonian national identity into a discourse

on Estonian-Russian rights and victimization.47 It seems that the local-territorial

pattern has formed at the imagined crossroads of influences of different state-led iden-

tity narratives, grassroots-level narratives and media flows.

Comparing our results with empirical surveys undertaken in different former Soviet

republics we can state that the linguistic, cultural and territorial options are tightly

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

84

intertwined in Estonia, which could reflect the symbolic adoption of historical mino-

rity identity construction patterns of ethnic Estonians. The “russkokulturnost”

described also in other former Soviet republics48 has strong territorial affiliation in

Estonia, which most likely has a historical bond with the phenomena of “Balticiza-

tion” in Soviet times.49

The post-Soviet pattern is likely to remain a marginal identification structure in

Estonia, compared with the situation in many other republics. However, as it carries a

meaning of ideological and political protest rather than nostalgic lifestyle-related long-

ings in the mental structures of Russian-speaking Estonians, it can also be employed as a

symbolic framework in the process of collective ethno-linguistic mobilization.

The opening up of the geo-cultural space of Estonia has created a supra-national,

global pattern of self-designation. This way of thinking has some connotations with

the territorial and civic self-designation as an inhabitant and a citizen of Estonia but

weak ethno-linguistic connotations. It seems to be an outcome of the rapid adoption

of modern, individualistic-emancipatory identity with weak group affiliations. This

tendency corresponds with Laitin’s notion of a dual integration process in which

Russian-Estonians assimilate into Estonian cultural practices and in which Russian-

Estonians and Estonians jointly assimilate into English-speaking European cultural

practices remain the dominant trends.50

In general, the self-designation of the Russian-speaking Estonian population shows

no absolute distancing from the social solidarities and patterns of collective identifi-

cation of the past, but rather a readiness to rework the previous symbols into the

new context. Thus people tend to see the transition period as harmonious within

certain identification “paradigms”—they have reworked old patterns to fit new

circumstances.

NOTES

� Research for this article was funded by the Estonian Science Foundation (ETF), projectgrant no. 5845. The authors would like to thank Professor David D. Laitin (StanfordUniversity) for his useful comments on earlier versions of this article.

1. In this paper, the term “Russian-speaking population of Estonia” with respect to all ethnicgroups means not only those people with a Russian ethnic or linguistic origin but alsoUkrainians, Byelorussians and other ethnicities whose mother tongue or everydaylanguage is Russian. There are about 406,700 individuals—29.7% of the population ofEstonia—whose mother tongue is Russian, among them about 351,200 ethnic Russians(Population and Housing Census 2000, http://www.stat.ee/files/eva2003/RV200102.pdf; INTERNET (accessed 16 June 2006)). The National Minorities CulturalAutonomy Act and numerous other strategic programmes have facilitated the activitiesof minorities’ societies in the Republic of Estonia and boosted the national self-esteemof the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other minorities. In this study the analysed groupwas determined on the basis of language rather than ethnicity because the number ofnon-ethnic Russians in the sample was too small for a separate analysis. Based on theresults of previous empirical studies, it was not practicable to leave them out of the analy-sis. Migrants to Estonia had already experienced the Soviet civic assimilation several

(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

85

generations previously and therefore about half of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians inEstonia consider the Russian language as their mother tongue. A significant proportionof Estonian Republic legislation is exclusionary in terms of language, not ethnicity,which brings into focus linguistic distinctiveness as a possible basis for collective identity.Indeed, integration-monitoring and other studies have shown that in Estonia language is animportant factor for interpreting minority–majority relationship and collective self-desig-nations. Thus, in the context of this study, it was necessary to use a sample representing thewhole community of Russian-speaking Estonians.

2. Kolstø, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, 1995; idem, Political ConstructionSites; Laitin, Identity in Formation; Kirch and Laitin, 1994, Changing Identities inEstonia; Hallik, “Mitmerahvuslike uhiskondade integratsionistrateegiad ja Eesti kohane-mine etniliste uusvahemustega”; Subbotina, “Russkije v estonii”; Zhuryari-Ossipova,“The Criteria of Good Neighborhood versus Russia’s Policy Protecting Diaspora inEstonia”; Smith, “Russia, Estonia and Ethno-Politics.”

3. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Chinn andKaiser, Russians as the New Minority; Aasland, “Russians outside Russia”; Melvin,Russians beyond Russia; Pilkington, Migration, Displacement and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia; Kolstø, 1995; idem, Political Construction Sites; Danilova and Yadov,“Social Identification in Post-Soviet Russia”; Lebedeva, “Russkije v stranah bilzhnegozarubezhja”; Brady, “Categorically Wrong?”; Poppe and Hagendoorn, “Types of Identifi-cation among Russians in the ‘Near Abroad.’”

4. Kirch and Laitin, 1994, Changing Identities in Estonia; Kirch et al., “Vene noorte etniliseja kultuurilise identiteedi muutused” 1997; Hallik, “Mitmerahvuslike uhiskondade inte-gratsionistrateegiad ja Eesti kohanemine etniliste uusvahemustega”; Laitin, Identity inFormation; Smith and Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora”; Smith,“Russia, Estonia and Ethno-Politics”; Vihalemm, “Formation of Collective Identity”;Vihalemm, “On the Perspectives of Identity Formation”.

5. Sztompka, “Cultural Trauma: The Other Face of Social Change” 176.6. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization, xxii.7. Kouts, “Riikluse tolgendusmallid eesti ajakirjanduses enamuse-vahemuse suhete taustal.”8. Hallik, “Mitmerahvuslike uhiskondade integratsionistrateegiad ja Eesti kohanemine etni-

liste uusvahemustega”; Laitin, Identity in Formation.9. Kirch and Laitin, 1994, Changing Identities in Estonia; Kirch et al., “Vene noorte etnilise

ja kultuurilise identiteedi muutused” 1997; Jakobson, “Role of Estonian Russian-LanguageMedia in Integration of Russian Minority into Estonian Society and Forming its ‘CollectiveIdentities’”; Smith and Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora”; Vihalemm,“Formation of Collective Identity”; Vihalemm, “On the Perspectives of IdentityFormation”.

10. Kennedy, Cultural Formations of Post-Communism, 188–89.11. Smith, “Russia, Estonia and Ethno-Politics”; Laitin, “Three Models of Integration and the

Estonian/Russian Reality.”12. Vihalemm et al., “Eesti Kujunev keeleruum”.13. Kalmus and Vihalemm, “Distinct Mental Structures in Transitional Culture.”14. Castells, The Information Age.15. “Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007.”16. Ibid.: Introduction.17. Ibid.18. Kouts, “Riikluse tolgendusmallid Eesti ajakirjanduses”.19. Kosmarskaya, “Russkije Diaspory.”

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

86

20. Vihalemm, “Identity Formation in the Open Media Space.”21. Kennedy, Cultural Formations of Post-Communism; Vogt, Between Utopia and

Disillusionment.22. Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 36.23. Melvin, Russians beyond Russia.24. Kolstø, Political Construction Sites; Melvin, Russians beyond Russia.25. Bhabha, “DissemiNation.”26. Kosmarskaya, “Russkije Diaspory.”27. Castells, The Information Age, 6–7.28. See, for example, Lauristin and Vihalemm, “Recent Historical Developments in Estonia,”

74–75; Vihalemm, “Group Identity Formation Processes among Russian-SpeakingSettlers of Estonia,” 18–39; idem, “Estonian Language Competence, Performance andBeliefs on Acquisition among the Russian-Speaking Inhabitants of Estonia,1989–1995,” 69–85.

29. Source: focus group interviews by Triin Vihalemm within the PHARE Estonian LanguageTeaching Programme, June 2004.

30. Laitin, Identity in Formation, 23–25.31. Vihalemm, “Group Identity Formation Processes”; Vihalemm and Masso, “Ejoanjla

jefotjyopstj russljy 4stpojj c qfrjpe qpstspcftsljy traosvprnaxjk.”32. Appadurai, Modernity at Large.33. Schopflin, “Estonians Need the Russian Elite.”34. Jenkins, Social Identity.35. Abrams and Hogg, Social Identity Theory; Hopkins and Reicher, “The Construction of

Social Categories”; Brady, “Categorically Wrong?”; Haslam et al., “Social Identity,Self-Categorization, and Work Motivation.”

36. Giesen, Kollektive Identitat.37. Hall, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.”38. Masso, “Venelased Eestis.”39. Jakobson, “Role of Estonian Russian-Language Media.”40. Ibid.41. Danilova and Yadov, “Social Identification in Post-Soviet Russia”; Kosmarskaya,

“Russkije Diaspory.”42. Kolstø, Political Construction Sites.43. Poppe and Hagendoorn, “Types of Identification among Russians.”44. Ibid.: Kosmarskaya, “Russkije Diaspory.”45. Kosmarskaya, “Russkije Diaspory.”46. Vihalemm and Masso, “Identity Dynamics of Russian-Speakers”; idem, “Ejoanjla

jefotjyopstj russljy 4stpojj c qfrjpe qpstspcftsljy traosvprnaxjk.”47. Kennedy, Cultural Formations of Post-Communism, 188.48. Kosmarakaya, “Russkije Diaspory.”49. Melvin, Russians beyond Russia.50. Laitin, “Three Models of Integration and the Estonian/Russian Reality.”

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Appendix A

TABLE A1 Present-day internalization and rejection of identification categories amongRussian-speaking Estonians in 2003

Today I feel that I am . . . CertainlySometimes,

partlyNot

at allNon-

answer

an inhabitant of Estonia N 410 35 13 29% 84 7 3 6

Russian N 383 54 29 21% 79 11 6 4

a Russian language speaker N 360 69 28 30% 74 14 6 6

a Baltic inhabitant N 252 131 74 30% 52 27 15 6

a citizen of the Estonian Republic N 236 83 128 40% 48 17 26 8

European N 109 148 191 39% 22 30 39 8

a northerner N 95 118 243 31% 20 24 50 6

a world citizen N 69 114 263 41% 14 23 54 8

an inhabitant of the SovietEstonian Republic

N 62 57 304 64% 13 12 62 13

a Soviet person N 39 71 322 55% 8 15 66 11

T. VIHALEMM AND A. MASSO

90

Appendix B

TABLE B1 Retrospective internalization and rejection of identification categories amongRussian-speaking Estonians in 2003

I felt 15 years ago that I was . . . CertainlySometimes,

partlyNot

at allDon’t

rememberNon-

answera

an inhabitant of the SovietEstonian Republic

N 264 25 12 17 169% 54 5 2 3 35

Russian N 261 31 19 12 164% 54 6 4 2 34

a Soviet person N 251 29 15 18 174% 52 6 3 4 36

an inhabitant of Estonia N 206 36 33 28 184% 42 7 7 6 38

a Russian language speaker N 192 38 60 21 176% 39 8 12 4 36

a Baltic inhabitant N 182 61 32 33 179% 37 13 7 7 37

a citizen of theEstonian Republic

N 47 16 175 56 193% 10 3 36 11 40

European N 43 48 157 51 188% 9 10 32 10 39

a world citizen N 42 37 163 57 188% 9 8 33 12 39

a northerner N 38 52 161 50 186% 8 11 33 10 38

aThe question about self-designation 15 years ago was not asked of respondents who wereunder 30.

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91