John F. Finamore· Robert M. Berchman

Conversations Platonic and Neoplatonic: lnteHect9 Sou1 9 and ature

Papers from 6th annual conference of the lnternational Society for Neoplatonic Studies

Academia Verlag Sankt Augustin

Image at the front cover: the Temple of Olympian Zeus, Athens, photo by first editor shot in March 2009.

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Contents

Contents

1. Introduction John F. Finamore and Robert M. Berchman

2. Method and Decisions in Plato's Phaedo Andre Archie

5

7

9

3. The return of the exile: the benefits of mimetic art in the Republic ........... 23 Miriam Byrd

4. Three Forms of Freedom in Plato Siobhan McLoughlin

5. Destinee (lvfoira) et naturel (phusis) chez Platon: quelle place pour

39

la liberte humaine? ............................................................................................. 49 Laetitia Monteils-Laeng

6. The relevance of soul: how and why the soul comes up for discussion in Plato's Phaedo, Meno, and Phaedrus ......................................................... 63 Aron Reppmann

7. Do Plato and Aristotle agree on self-motion in souls? Sebastian Gertz

8. The Place of Chance or Fortune in Platonic Fate Marilynn Lawrence

9. The Tripartite Soul in Middle Platonism: Plutarch, Apuleius, and

73

87

Alcinous ............................................................................................................... 103 John F. Finamore

10. Becoming a part: The case of attachment in Plotinus Bernard Collette-Ducic

115

11. Action and Intellection in Augustine's De Trinitate ..................................... 131 Brian Keady

12. Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria's Doctrine of Categories Anna Zhyrkova

13. "Lovers of The Body:" The Platonic Primacy of Soul vs. the Christian Affirmation of the Body Enrica Ruaro

14. Neoplatonic Influence in the Writings of Robert Grosseteste John Hendrix

145

155

171

Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria's Doctrine of Categories

Anna Zhyrkova

Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria; s Doctrine of Categories

145

Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150-215/17) was one of the very first Christian authors who fully acknowledged the legitimacy of the Greek philosophy.! Clement not only assumed, like Philo did? that Plato knew and imitated Mo­ses' doctrine, but also emphasized the importance and usefulness of Plato's doctrine for Christian philosophy and theology.3 Moreover, one may find an account of the Aristotelian categories in Book VIII of Clement's Stromata. There is a need to say that this Book differs from the other ones in the treatise.4 It seems that the text of Book VIII is not complete. It looks rather like a set of notes made for private use than a systematic exposition5 In these notes Cle­ment records a kind of scholastic account of epistemology and logic, in the vein of the eclectic tradition, probably tracing back to Antiochus. 6 However, the text differs from the extant handbooks by representatives of this tradition, such as Galen, Apuleius and Alcinous 7

Book VIII discuses the issue of how scientific knowledge (tmu'l:llf1ovlKtl 8c:wQla) is achieved.s Knowledge is based on and reached through scientific

1 On life and works of Clement of Alexandria see S.Re. Lilla (2005). 2 As a matter of fact, Philo regarded Moses as the very father of Greek philosophy. See Philo

Lef-All. 1, 108, QG 4,152, Heres. 214; Prob. 57, Act. 18-19. See for instance Str. I, 25, 165, 1, Iff. In Str. L 22, 150, 4 Clement even slats that: "'([ YO:Q

i:GH TIAo:'(wv i] Mwumlc; cnHK[(wvt 4 Book VIII itself is very problematic. Its authorship and character are disputed. See RE.

Witt (1971, 31-41), E. Osborn (1980, 148-153), J. Danielou (1961, 127-128), G. Apostopoulou (1977,16-17), P. Nautin (1976, 291).

5 See J. Pepin (1980, 270). Note 1 suggests that Book VIII may contain parts of a possible work, which Clement was going to present as seven former books of Stromata.

6 Pepin also suggests as a possible source Aristokles from Messina. See J. Pepin (1980, 270). Witt, in contrast, claims that this book contains the doctrine of Antiochus of Ascalon. See RE. Witt (1971, 32-41). But, Clement does not mention Antiochus, unlike Cicero in his works quoted above. Therefore the content of Str. VIII is attributed to Clement. However, the possi­bility that it is related to the doctrine of Antiochus is not denied.

7 According to Silke-Petra Bergjan, that what roughly corresponds to Book VIII are the subdivisions of logic listed by Alcinous and Sextus Empiricus, i.e. division, definition, analy­sis, induction and syllogism. Whereas the most striking difference is that in Clement, in con­trast to Galen's Institutio Logica and Apuleius' Peri Hermeneias, the exposition of the syllo­gism is missing. See S.-P. Bergjan (2007).

S Str. VIII, 1, 1,3, Hf.

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demonstration (En' em 0 i'd/; CC.tJC; EmCJ'Cll~loVLKf]C;), 9 while demonstration (arrobn/;lC;) is a discourse (i\oyoc;) that directs from what is disputable to what is a commonly accepted belief (6f10i\OyOl)~ltVWV 'CT]v rrLCJ'Clv).10 Clement, then, deals with various problems associated with the method of proof and demon­stration, definition and classification. This brings him to questions of semantics, such as the distinction between sound and the meaningful language; between words, their meanings and the things signified by them. In this way the entire content of the book assumes a predominantly semantic character. In this se­mantic context, Clement recalls the Aristotelian categories, which are mentio­ned in the chapters 6 and 8 of the book. In these two chapters, he apparently, presents divergent accounts of the categories.

In chapter 6,H Clement deals with issues related to Induction, Definition, Division and Demonstration, which seem to be elements of dialectic,12 under­stood as the process of acquiring knowledge.13 Division14 is considered by Clement as the means of defining the essence and what the thing is. According to him, Division leads consistently step by step to that which is simple, more elementary and incapable of further division. Still, this relates to the division of a genus into species only. Successive divisions begin with a genus and end

9 Cf. Str. VIIt 1, 2, 5. 10 Str. VIII, 3, 5, 1, Iff. 11 Part 6 of Book VIII, discussing the issues of syllogism and demonstration, seems to de­

pend on Aristotle's teaching, see Topica 100, AnPost. 72a 30; d. Alexander Phil. in AnPrior. 7, 5-9; 292, 32-34. See S.-P. Bergjan (2007). In opposition, Witt convincingly claims that, although in Chapter 6 Aristotle seems to have great influence, he is not directly Clement's source. Witt based his opinion on the fact that neither Aristotle nor the Old Lyceum had shown interest in a theory of Division. In fact, it is Plato who had devoted attention to the theory of OLCtLQWLC; in the Sophist, the Politicos and the PhiJebus. This theory was upheld by Speusipius and the Old as well as Middle Academy generally. The mode of division used by Carneades was adopted by Antiochus (Fin V.16). Stobaeus preserves Philo's OLCXLQI'GLC; 'W0 l(c(Ta ¢u\OOO¢Lc(V A6you, as reported by Arius Didymus (2, 39, 23). But, it seems that Antio­chus was the first Academic to link with the traditional aLc(LQwLC; the Aristotelian theory of Definition by the aid of Demonstration. See. RE. Witt (1971, 36-37).

12 On the elements of dialectic cf. Alcinous, Did. 5, 1, 1ff = 156, 25-34: "Dialectic, according to Plato, has its fundamental purpose first the examination of the essence of every thing what­soever, and then of its accidents. It enquires into the nature of each thing either 'from above', by means of division and definition, or 'from below', by means of analysis. Accidental quali­ties which belong to essences it examines either from the standpOint of individuals, by induc­tion, or from the standpOint of universals, by syllogistic. So, logically, dialectic comprises the procedures of division, definition, analysis, and in addition induction and syllogistic." (Trans. J.M. Dillon 1993)0

13 According to Clement, whereas Induction shows only the fact that something exists, De­finition, as well as Division, explains its essence and what it is. Demonstration, in tum, proves the existence, the essence and the cause of something. Induction starts from sensation and aims at Universal and Definition. Clement mentions the Definition that contains the cause and the Definition by differences. In his opinion, Definition by differences is incapable of accurate­ly comprehending the nature of something. This is explained by the fact that differences added to the definition are only the signs of the properties of things and do not reveal their nature. See Str. VIII, 6, 21,1,1-6,5. Definition also can be an effect of the summation of results of Division. See Str. VIII, 6, 17, 4, 1-18, 4, 1.

14 On the issue of Division in Clement see the interesting notes of RE. Witt (1971, 37-38).

Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria's Doctrine of Categories 147

with infimae species. In these species, the subject of an investigation finds its ultimate elucidation.15 And it is in this context that Clement brings in the ten categories, associating them with species.

It is best, then, to divide the genus into two, and if not, then into three species. The species then being divided in a more generic way, are characteristically dif­ferentiated by sameness and difference (m.l)'[CfJ KCtt 8Ct'CEQ<{J), and thereafter they receive a characteristic by being divided through an application of the ge­nerically signified [differences] (ccov yEVl1CcOC; OT]f.lCtlVO~lItvWV). For each of the species (i'lCCXCHOV yaQ ccOV dacov) is either a substance (as when we say: "some of entities are corporeal and some incorporeal") or a quantity, or a quality, or a relation, or where, or when, or an action, or a suffering. (Str. VIII, 6, 20, 1, 2-3, 1) 16

In the larger definitions the multitude of the species that are discovered by the ten categories (aLa cCOV atKCt KC(LT]YOQLcOV); and in the least ones, the principal points of the nearest species, conceived of, signify the substanc.!= and nature of the thing (cT]v OUOLcxV KC(t ¢00LV aLC(OT]f.lC(lVEL cOU nQCinLCtWc;).l! (Str. VIII, 6, 21, 4,1-5,1)

In the first passage Clement presents the initial division of genus, which is a division according to sameness and difference. This Clement's "more gene­ric" (YEVlKCO'CCQOV) division seems to be derived from Plato's Sophist18 The subsequent divisions, which eventually may reveal the essence of the subject being investigated, are produced in accordance with generically marked diffe­rences. To be sure, in the quoted texts, the term difference (buxcpoQa) does not occur. But, in the two previous sections (i.e. Str. VIII, 6, 18 and 19) Clement points that the division of genus by the succession of differences leads to "what it is" ('Co 'Cl), i.e. to the essence.19

This process of divisions according to subsequent differences leads to the species that are already located in their respective categories. As far as the cate­gories themselves are concerned, they surface with the division of genus into species. Consequently, they are not genera by themselves. On the other hand, they comprise the species that signify the essence and nature of things. Since species each fall under one of the ten categories, the identification of the Aristo­telian categories with species can hardly be accepted. Therefore, the categories as sLlch rather constitute the ten classes under which species are classified, but these classes cannot be identified with genera. It is clear that the categories

15 StT. VIII, 6, 18, 4, 1-19,3,1 (19,5,2). 16 In this paper I base my rendering on the translation of Wilson in Ante-Nicene Fathers 2.

Fathers of the second cenhlry: Hermas, Tatian. Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (1995). In several places I have made essential corrections to Wilson's translation.

17 This text is translated differently by Wilson, as "in the ten categories" (aLa. ccOv atKc( KCtcllYOQLcOV) with the probable meaning of "being sorted according to the ten categories."

18 Soph. 254d14-e1, repeated in Tim. 39b7-c1, while in Philebo 16c5-17a5 it occurs as a di­stinction between nEQCtc; and Ci.nCLQov.

19 Str. VIII, 6, 18, 1-19, 8. See especially VIII, 6, 18, 1£ : "Accordingly we must first take the genus, in which are the points that are nearest those above; and after this the next difference. And the succession of differences, when cut and divided, completes the 'what it is' (co TL)."

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reveal somehow the essence of things and can be used in the process of acqui­ring knowledge. But on what they are, Chapter 8 sheds more light.

The 8th Chapter of Book VIII of the Stromata is devoted to the method of classifying things and names.20 The terminology used here by Clement bears the mark of Antiochus' epistemology21 Clement says that there are three things in language: Names (TeX 6v6~lCnCt), Conceptions (TeX VOf]~lCtTCt) and Things that are their subjects (TeX UTWKc:L~lEVCt TCQanlCtTCt). Names are primarily the sym­bols of conceptions (m)~l~oi\.Ct oV'w TCOV v01waTwv), and inferentially also of things. Conceptions are likenesses and reflections of the subjects (OflOLWflCt'W KCtl EKTUTCWflCt'W TWV VTCOKHI_lEVC0V).22 Subject-things, in turn, are that by which conceptions are impressed in us (acp' COy T]~liv TeX VOf]~lCtTCt

EVTUTCouVTCtL)23 Clement points out that since the same impressions are produ­ced by the same subjects, people have the same concepts of things, whereas the names of the same things can be different due to the difference of languages.24

He also follows the Platonic postulate that there is no knowledge (tmuTllflTJ) of particulars because of their infinity. Therefore the infinity of names as well as of subject-things is reduced to a determined number of general elements (TeX KCt8oi\lKeX UTOLXElCt). Accordingly, the names are reduced by grammar into the twenty-four elements, i.e. twenty-four letters,25 while particular things are reduced to universals (de; TeX KCt86i\ou CtvCryETCtL). In Str. VIII, 6, Clement, discussing Induction, states that universals are summed up from particulars according to sensation.26 It appears, thus, that universals are described only in

20 This part seems to show some traces of Plato's conception of language. Cf. Soph. 244d 6-9,261-262.

21 Mental concepts of things come about, according to Antiochus, as a result of sensible co­gJ.'lition (Antiochus ap. Cicer. Lue. 21- 22). These concepts correspond to the Stoic's "natural concept" (¢UGlK~ EvvOla) or "common concepts" (KolvaL EVVOlCll) (Antiochus ap. Cicer. Tusc. Disp. IV, 53: "they expound common concepts [declarant communes notiones]"). However, in contrast to Stoic doctrines, concepts are inchoately innate. According to Cicero, concepts are implanted by nature, but in an inchoate state. They are inchoate and are developed or unfol­ded through illumination by other concepts, the understanding of which has already advan­ced to a later stage. Moreover, concepts are created by a constructive comparison of similar percepts. The concepts of things are neither innate Ideas nor pure forms of things, abstracted from the object in perception. They rather seem to be universally applicable mental contents produced in the way of comparison between percepts according to their likeness. (See Antio­chus ap. Cicer. Lue. 30-31. See also J.M. Dillon (1977, 63-69), cf. S. Gersh (1986,132-145).

220. Plato's description of logos as expressing of dianoia in Theaet. 206dl-5. 23 Cf. Antiochus ap. Cicer. Lue. 21-22. 24 Str. VIII, 8. 25 Cf. Phileb. 18b3-d2. 26 Str. VIII, 6, 17,4,1-18,4,1: "And by Sensation the Universal is summed up from the Par­

ticular. For the starting point of Induction is Sensation; and the end is the Universal (Ka'CCt 'CY]v ato8T]OlV bE EK 'COU Ka8' ihmam KEcpa;\Cllou'CCll 'Co KaS6;\ou. cXQXY] yaQ 'Cfie; i:naywyije; 1'] atoST"jOlC;, nEQae; bE 'Co KaS6Aou)."

Witt sees here parallels with Antiochus' doctrine according to which the Mind, being the source of the sensation and being Sensation itself, systematizes analogically (Sextus E. AM. XI, 250) all those sense-perceptions which it neither makes use of immediately nor stores up as

Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria's Doctrine of Categories 149

respect of their epistemological functions. Clement explains the need of such a universal element by claiming that, due to the infinity of particulars, there have been discovered some elements of them according to which every subject of investigation is to be considered.27 This seems to be an echo of Antiochus' theo­ry of concepts understood as universals. In Antiochus, reality is apprehended according to these universals, which themselves result from perception.28

These universal elements correspond to the ten categories. Clement passes to their description in this role immediately after having mentioned universal elements in the context of classification of things and names.

Of things stated, some are stated with combination (-IC0V Acyo~u'vwv 'Co. ~lEV ~lna oU[-inAOlCf]e; Atyc'Ccu); as, for example, "man runs", and some without combination ('Co. bE avEU OU~mAOl(f]e;); as, for example "man" and "runs," and whatever does not complete a sentence, which cannot be characterized as either true or false. And of things stated without combination ('Ccov bE ~l~ ~lETa ou~mAOlCije; /\EyO~lEVWV), some signify "substance" ('Co. ouoLav OIwalVEl), some "quality," some "quantity," some "relation," some "where," some "when/' some "position/' some "possession," some "action/' some "suffe­ring," which we call the elements of things that are in matter and [which are] after the first principles (IX bY] Kat O'ColXEla 'C(OV OV1:COV cpa[-iEv 1:C0V icv 0/\1~ KaL [-iETa 'Cae; cXQxcXe;). For these are capable of being contemplated by reason. But immaterial things are capable of being apprehended by the mind alone, by primary application.

And of those things that are classed under the ten categories, some are predi­cated by themselves (as the nine categories), and others in relation to so­mething ('Ccov bE uno 'Cae; bEKa Ka'CfjyoQLae; unmaoooflEvWV 'Co. ~lEV KaS'mJ'Ca MYE'CCU, we; al EvvEa ](a'CfjyoQLa.l, 'Co. bE nQae; n). (Str. VIII, 8, 23, 6-24,2)

Following the Aristotelian tradition, Clement accepts the division of "what is said" (TeX i\.Ey6flEVCt), in other words expressions, into composite and non­composite expressions. The ten "items" characterized by Clement as non­composite expressions obviously correspond to the Aristotelian categories. He even lists them in almost the same order as they are listed in fourth chapter of the Categories. The one exception is, of course, the "Eudorus-Pythagorean" sequence: substance, quality, quantity.29 Clement claims that some things, which are subordinated to the ten categories, are said by themselves, as it oc-

the source of memory - and thence they are formed Universals (Cic. Lue 30; Top. 30). See R.E. Witt (1971, 38).

27 Str. VIII, 8, 23, 2, 1-3, 1. 28 See note 21. 29 In contrast to Eudorus ap. Simplicius in Cat. 206, 10-15, the sequence according to Cat.

Ib, 25-29 is the following: substance, quantity, and quality. Eudorus sees substance as closely connected with the category of quality. The sensible substance is perceived as a substrate for qualities and, simultaneously, as something always qualified. This view was mostly accepted by his Platonic successors.

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curs in the nine categories, while other things are said in relation to something, as it is in the category of relation30

The statement that the ten categories are called "the elements of things that are in matter and which come after the first principles" (& aT] ](ed U'IOlXEL[,( ,[cOv QV'[wv ¢['(~u~:v ,[cOv EV uA\] K[,(L ~lC'[a '[ae; aQxae;) resembles, to a certain extent, the statement of Philo that the categories are in nature. 31 Thus, the Aristotelian categories seem to relate to the sensible domain only. It may seem that there is a certain adequacy between the categories and the physical world. One can even conclude that the categories are to be perceived as corresponding to or identical with elements of sensible things, in the meaning of the completive element of sensibles. But the treatment of the categories as non-composite expression seems to be incoherent with this claim. A completive element of sensible things cannot be something of "what is said." I will try to solve this problem through an elucidation of the meaning of the basic terms used in the passage, noticeably "elements" and "principles."

Clement also uses the term "elements" (0'COLXcL[,() a few lines before the quoted passage begins, when discussing the issue of cognoscibility of particu­lars. Following the Platonic tradition on this subject, he claims that since the particulars are infinite ('[a K['(8' £K[,(0,[[,( anCLQ['(), there is no scientific know­ledge of them. Therefore, as the property of science is to be based on general and defined principles, "particulars are resolved into universals" ('[a ](['(8'

£](['(0'[['( de; '[a ](['(86Aou avayC'[['(L). Clement also states that some elements (0'[OLX£La nv['() have been found for particulars. It is in respect to these ele­ments that particulars are considered.32 Consequently, the elements of particu­lars, i.e. of sensible things, are not elements in the sense of completive parts of things. They rather correspond to kinds of universals, according to which par­ticulars are apprehended.

30 This statement is considered by some scholars as a trace of the Old Academic division. See J. Pepin (1980, 270), R.E. Witt (1971, 38). The context, however, indicates clearly, as it will be shown below, that Clement does not discuss the fundamental ontological division, but a difference among expressions.

31 Philo Dec. 30, 1-31, 11. Philo's claim that the ten categories are "in nature" (tv '(1] cpUUEL) suggests that the categories do not pertain to the intelligible realm, but to the sensible domain. The categories, then, are about physical things. Moreover, according to Philo, everything of this physical realm participates in them. But this raises a question on the nature of categories themselves and on the nature of the participation of physical things in the categories. The claim that the categories are "in nature" might be an echo of the Pythagorean conception, according to which names are attached to things by nature. See Dexippus in Cat 16,33-17,5. In other words, there is a natural adequacy between things and names that signify them. Therefore, the participation of things in the categories might be interpreted as a kind of such natural adequacy. Cf. Aritotle's remark in Met. A 987b 10-14, according to which Platonists m~~ely replaced the Pythagorian concept of imitation (~l(~IT]O'LC;) with participation (I-lE8£~IC;).

Stl. VIII, 8, 23, 2, 1-3, 1.

Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria's Doctrine of Categories 151

In turn, Clement's term" first principles" (aQX['([), in its philosophical use,33 relates either to the four material elements, i.e. fire, water, air, earth;34 or to the principles of demonstration (,[cOv anoaELi;£wv aQx[,([).35 The latter are episte­mological principles, on which, according to Clement, every proof or demon­stration is to be based in order to prevent it from going on ad infinitum. Those principles should be true, evident, commonly accepted, relevant, and previous­ly known. 36

The use of aQX['([ in meaning of material principles would imply that the analyzed elements of things, i.e. the ten categories, are material elements of the sensibles. But this seems to be hardly possible, for the term "elements" is rela­ted by Clement in philosophical contexts only to universals. Moreover, it is also rather impossible to regard all of the ten categories, including relation, action, and passion, as the material elements sensu stl'icto. Here there is a need to point out that throughout Book VIII, Clement uses aQX['([ in the meaning of the principles of demonstration.

This use of terms occurring in the semantic context of Book VIII of Stroma­ta suggests an epistemological and semantic interpretation of the categories. The categories as "what is said" are not things, either in the meaning of '[a nQaY!-l['('[['(, or in the meaning of elements of material things. In other words, according to Clement, the categories cannot be subject-things. Such things are subjects of categories and cannot be predicated or said of Instead, the catego­ries refer to the elements, in the meaning of universals, according to which particulars are comprehended. These elements are placed after first principles of proof and demonstration. In the light of the 6th chapter of the same Book, it may be said that they are universal elements in the epistemological sense: they serve as basic classification of things that allows us to construct a complex de­tailed picture of the sensible particulars. Because this cognition refers to sensi­ble reality only, it possible to say that these elements are in "matter." This "being in matter" seems to be analogous to how Aristotle's universals are in matter. It may also suggest that there is an adequacy between the categories and what is material.

However, it is difficult to settle whether the categories are names or con­cepts. On the one hand, as "what is said of", understood as signifying expressi­ons, they can be names. On the other, taken as universal elements, according to which particulars are considered, they correspond rather to concepts. If one takes seriously the remark of Clement on philosophical research, namely that it is occupied with Conceptions and Real Subjects7 then it can be assumed that

33 There is also the theological use, according to which the term "principles" are applied to God, Trinity, angels, church etc. But this use is irrelevant in our context.

"4 . o SIT. VI, 2, 17, 3f; d. Protrept. V, 64, 2, 1£. 35 SIT. II, 2, 9, 5, 1- 6,1; 4,13,4,1-3; VIII, 2-3. 36 SIT. VIlt 2-3. See S.-P. Bergjan (2007). 37 Str. VIII, 8, 2.

152 Anna Zhyrkova ••• "·".M""·"".M"

his interpretation of the categories inclines toward perceiving them as concepts. It is also important to point out that Clement's account of the categories shows visible traces of Antiochus' theory of concepts understood as universals. In fact, Clement, describing such terms as "subject-thing," "concept/' and "universal," uses very similar terminology to that used by Cicero to describe Antiochus' account of concepts. Moreover, as it has been pOinted above, Clement's treat­ment of universal as such strongly resembles Antiochus' interpretation of con­cepts. In Antiochus, reality is apprehended according to the universal concepts, which themselves result from perception.38 Therefore, if in Clement the catego­ries are universal elements according to which particulars are apprehended, one may presume that, in analogy to Antiochus' universals, they constitute a type of concepts?9

It is worthwhile mentioning that both Clement's texts analyzed in the pa­per show a certain commonality with passages concerning epistemological issues in several Plato's dialogues.4o Yet in Clement, Plato's epistemological insights are combined and completed with Aristotelian categorical scheme. Therefore, it possible to say that, whoever was the original author of the analy­zed fragments, this person had a good acquaintance with the Academic traditi­on, while on the other hand he showed a strong inclination to eclecticism. Thus, one may speculate that Antiochus of Ascalon was the ultimate source for Clement's treatment of the categories.41

To be sure, in general, Clement's account of the categories is of a rather compilatory scholastic character and very probably was based on a reading of Antiochus of Ascalon. Clement's attempt to separate the categories from the genera as well as from the subject-things and to connect them with conceptual classes of universals seems to be one of the first signs of a new interpretation of the Aristotelian categories in the Platonic tradition. Accordingly, Clement treats the categories not as real genera of sensibles but as kinds of universal elements or epistemological classes of things, according to which sensibles are considered. Therefore, the categories appear to be moved from the ontological domain to the epistemological, and consequently, to the semantic one. This seems to announce the Neoplatonic attempt to interpret the Aristotelian cate­gories as related first and foremost to logic. However, it is hard to decide

38 See note 21. 39 Cf. RM. Berchman (1995). 40 Cf. Soph. 244d 6-9, 261-262; 254dI4-el; Tim. 39b7-c1; Theaet. 206dl-5; and especially

Phileb. 16c5-17a5; 18b3-d2. 41 Antiochus is well known from his achievement of incorporating philosophical develop­

ments of the New Academy into the dogmatic Platonic philosophy of the ancient Academy. Also, since he believed that Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics do not diverge essentially in their doctrines (Cicer. Acad. Post. 18, 1-6; Oe Fin IV, 3, 1-6), he integrated different philo­sophic traditions in his system as making up one doctrine. See Cicer, Acad. 17-18 and 43; De Fin. V, 7ff.; De Nat. Deor. 1, 16-17 and 33. See also J.M. Dillon (1977, 56-58), and S. Gersh (1986, 61, 66).

Reconstructing Clement of Alexandria's Doctrine of Categories 153

whether the text reflects Clement's own ideas or is just a testimony of such ideas already existing somewhere around him. It is also quite difficult to eva­luate a possible importance of Clement's interpretation for further develop­ment of Neoplatonic analysis of the categories. Clement's works can hardly be considered as an important source for such philosophers as Plotinus, Porphyry and other Neoplatonists. At least, there is no evidence of Neoplatonic use of Clement's account of the categories. What seems to be of a greater importance is the fact that Clement's views bear witness to the intellectual currency of those ideas before the Neoplatonic generation. It shows a certain continuity in the treatment of the Aristotelian categories in the Platonic tradition.42

Bibliography

Ante-Nicene Fathers 2. Fathers of the Second Cenhzry: Hermas, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (2nd pI. ed.). (1995). Peabody, Mass.: Hen­drickson.

Apostopoulou, G. (1977). "Die Dialektik bei Klemens von Alexandria. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der philosophischen Methoden". Europaische Hochsc1mlschriften, 20(29), 16-17.

Berchman, R M. (1992). Origen on the Categories. In Origeniana quinta (pp. 231-252). Berchman, R M. (1995). The Categories of Being in Middle Platonism: Philo, Clement,

and Origen of Alexandria. In J. P. Kenney (Ed.), The School of Moses 5hz dies in PhJ10 and Hellenistic Religion (pp. 98-140). Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Bergjan, S.-P. (2007). Logic and Theology in Clement of Alexandria. The Purpose of the 8th Book of the Stromateis, XV International Conference on Patristic Studies. Oxford.

Danielou, J. (1961). Histoire des doctrines chnitiennes avant Nicee. 2, Message evangeli­que et culhzre helJenistique au2e et 3e siecies. Tournai,.

Dillon, J. M. (1977). The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Gersh, S. (1986). Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: the Latin tradition. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Lilla, S. R C. (2005). Clement of Alexandria: a Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosti­cism. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock.

Nautin, P. (1976). "La fin des Stromates et les Hypotyposes de Clement d'Alexandrie". Vigiiiae Christiane, 30, 268-302.

Osborn, E. (1980). The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univer­sity Microfilms International.

42 Robert Berchman claims that, according to Clement' 5 successor Origen, the categories relate to all levels of the threefold division of reality. These are: Being (One and the noetic realm), Becoming (material and physical realms), and Non-Being (the material substrate). They have no referential efficacy to the first theological level, but they do to the second and the third, and to all created things. Foremost, the categories pertain to secondary created substances, which concern genera and species predicated of the primary substances. Cf. RM. Bercrunan (1992, 239-240). However, Origen does not mention the categories in logical or philosophical senses, but only in the legal sense of the word, i.e. accusation. There is also no list of the ten categories in bis work.

154 Anna Zhyrkova

Pepin, J. (1980). Clement d' Alexandrie, les categories d' Aristote et Ie fragment 60 d'He­rac1ite. In P. Aubenque & R. Brague (Eds.), Concepts et categories dans la pensee an­tique (pp. 271-284). Paris: J. Vrin.

Witt, R. E. (1971). Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

Lovers of the Body 155 "-------~---,---,---

Enrica Ruaro

"Lovers of the Body:" The Platonic Primacy of Soul vs. the Christian Affirmation of the

Body. *

The starting point of this paper is a definition of the Middle Platonic phi­losopher Celsus, who in his anti-Christian work The True Discourse surpris­ingly accuses Christians of being 'lovers of the body' (cplA,OcrOO/lU1:0V yEVOCY. My aim will be to analyze how Celsus uses the alleged love for the body as a dep­recatory argument against Christians, highlighting the role this move plays in his polemical strategy. Then I will try to find out if Celsus' words are true, if in early Christian thought there is a tendency, subsequently for the most part neglected, towards a positive appraisal of the body. Celsus' accusation was in fact based on the Christian doctrines of the creation, of the incarnation and of the resurrection, which, as he seemed to be aware of perhaps more than Chris­tians themselves, should firmly imply the substantial goodness of the body and matter. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body in particular entails that the body is not a temporary accident, but a precious and essential constituent of the human being, therefore is to be reunited with its soul, with which it cre­ates a binding unity, and is to be gifted with eternal life.

In order to illustrate the Christian standpoint, I will not focus as expected on Origen's treatise Against Celsus (for reasons that I will explain later), but I will use as the key text Tertullian's De resurrectione (esp. chapter I to X), in which he, arguing against the 'flesh-haters' (Hellenistic philosophers and Gnostics), provides us with what looks like the most thorough philosophical account of the body/soul everlasting bond and the related positive valuation of the human flesh.

1. Celsus' deprecatory argument

It is noteworthy that the specific allegation of being particularly devoted to

I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Professor Giuliana Lanata, scholar of Celsus and author, among other works, of Ceiso, n Discorso Vero, Adelphi Edizioni, Milano 1987 (reconstruction, Italian translation and accurate commentary of Celsus' The True Dis­course).

1 C. C. VII, 36.