Reason and Social Change in Durkheims Thought

Pacific Sociological Association

Reason and Social Change in Durkheim's Thought: The Changing Relationship betweenIndividuals and SocietyAuthor(s): John B. HarmsSource: The Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct., 1981), pp. 393-410Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1388775 .

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REASON AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN

DURKHEIM'S THOUGHT

The Changing Relationship Between

Individuals and Society

JOHN B. HARMS University of Kansas

The purpose of this essay is to facilitate an understanding of Durkheim's conception of social change. While the issue of social change is present in Durkheim's thought, it is ancillary to his concern with the relationship between the individual and society. It is suggested that Durkheim's conception of social change can be understood properly only by viewing it as part of his larger sociological concern with the changing relationship between individuals and society. Special attention is focused on the much neglected issue of Durkheim's conception and use of reason, which is pivotal to the linkage between individuals and society. It will be demonstrated that, from Durkheim's perspective, change in the social structures through which individuals associate affects the faculty of reason and the formation of "collective consciousness," and thus the moral and normative regulation of social action.

Interpretations of Durkheim's conception of social change abound in the sociological literature. Parsons (1968), Coser (1960), Nisbet (1974), Hinkle (1976), LaCapra (1972), Lukes (1972), and Giddens (1972) have all addressed this issue in one form or another. Yet despite these several interpretations, substantial confusion remains concerning Durkheim's conception of social change. For example, Parsons (1968: 448) notes "how conspicuous by its absence from his thought is any clear-cut

AUTHOR'S NOTE: An earlier version of this essay was presented at the meet- ing of the Midwest Sociological Society, April 1980. I wish to thank Robert J. Antonio, Herbert Haines, Gary Howe, Michael Lacy, Joane Nagel, and Alan Sica for their indispensable comments and suggestions.

PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 24 No. 4, October 1981 393-410 @ 1981 Pacific Sociological Assn.

393



394 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW / OCTOBER 1981

theory of social change"; and Coser (1960: 221) states that "he did not duly appreciate the import of social innovation and social change." In contrast, Hinkle (1976: 336) concurs with Giddens (1972: 41), who insists "the central issue informing his writings was that of change." Such confusion suggests that another analysis of Durkheim's conception of social change may be warranted.

The purpose of this essay is to facilitate an understanding of Durkheim's conception of social change by locating it within his larger concern with the changing relationship between the individual and society. Like other classical sociologists, Durkheim was deeply concerned with the relation of the individual to an increasingly complex and expanding society. According to Durkheim, changes in the structure of society precipitated a "crisis" in the normative or moral system that linked individuals and society. My suggestion is that his conception of social change can be understood properly only by framing it with his larger concern with the "moral crisis" and the problematic relation between the individual and society. By examining Durkheim's analysis from this perspective, it can be shown that his conception of change is supported largely by a neo-Kantian conception of reason and that for him reason is the foundation for the normative system which links individuals and society. The analysis of Durkheim's assumptions concerning reason will show the reciprocal relationship between individuals and society and clarify not only how society affects individual life (which is the dominant focus in the sociological literature) but also the indispensable role individuals play in the creation and recreation of society. With the exception of Lukes (1972: 54-57), Durkheim's assumptions concerning the faculty of reason have been ignored in the sociological literature. I shall attempt to demonstrate the centrality of reason in Durkheim's sociology by applying it to his analysis of social change and its effects on the relationship between individuals and society. It is my contention that previous interpretations that have neglected Durkheim's use of reason have missed an important hermeneutical key to his sociology and, as a result, have not appreciated fully his analysis of social change



Harms / REASON AND SOCIAL CHANGE 395

or the full extent of the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the individual and society.

THE MORAL CRISIS

That Durkheim's sociology (and analysis of social change) was inspired by a deep concern for the "moral crisis" of Europe and France is supported by the fact that in all his major works (The Division of Labor in Society, The Rules, Suicide, and The Elementary Forms) and the majority of his published lectures (Education and Sociology, Moral Education, The Evolution of Educational Thought, Socialism and Saint-Simon, and Profes- sional Ethics and Civic Morals) the issue of a "moral crisis" is presented. In The Division of Labor Durkheim states his conception of the crisis and reveals his concern for the normative or moral system which mediates the relationship between individuals and society:

It has been said with justice that morality-and by that must be understood, not only moral doctrines, but customs-is going through a real crisis. What precedes can help us to understand the nature and causes of this sick condition. Profound changes have been produced in the structure of our societies in a very short time; they have been freed from the segmental type with a rapidity and in proportions such as have never before been seen in history. Accordingly, the morality which corresponds to this social type has regressed, but without another developing quickly enough to fill the ground that the first left vacant in our consciences. Our faith has been troubled; tradition has lost its sway: individual judgment has been freed from collective judgment. But, on the other hand, the functions which have been disrupted in the course of the upheaval have not had the time to adjust themselves to one another; the new life which has emerged so suddenly has not been able to be completely organized, and above all, it has not been organized in a way to satisfy the need for justice which has grown more ardent in our hearts [1964a: 408-409].

From Durkheim's perspective, changes in the social structures through which individuals associate affect the faculty of reason




and the formation of "collective consciousness,"' which is the base for normative and moral action. Before proceeding to Durkheim's conception and analysis of change, it is necessary to delineate briefly his conception of morality, for it is the concern with morality that frames his analysis of social change.

MORALITY, CHANGE, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR: THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

The fulcrum of Durkheim's sociology is morality, by which is meant existence that is directed (constrained) by consciousness of something above, beyond, and external to individuals. As Durkheim states:

Acting morally is conducting one's self according to those maxims which can be extended without contradiction to all wills... morals imply that the individual is capable of raising himself above his own peculiar point of view and living an impersonal life [1965: 494].

One of the central facets of his sociology is that of demonstrating both the moral and normative base of society and the social base of individual moral and spiritual existence (1974: 28, 33, 34; 1973a: 123). All of Durkheim's major works are concerned with this issue. For example, The Division of Labor in Society focused not on the productive, economic aspects of the division of labor, but rather on its effects on human relations and social consciousness. Similarly, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life attempted to demonstrate "an essential and permanent aspect of humanity" (1965: 13), that is, the religious and moral foundations of all social existence. It is on the basis of the essential and universal conception of the moral linkage between individuals and society that Durkheim approached social phenomena such as suicide, education, and social change.

In the introduction to Socialism and Saint-Simon, Durkheim's nephew and student, Marcel Mauss, points out that for his




doctoral thesis Durkheim "had fixed upon the relationship between the individual and society as his subject" (1958: 1). What was originally titled "The Relationship of Individualism and Socialism" became Durkheim's thesis and first major work, The Division of Labor in Society (The Division of Social Labor). In this work he analyzed how the transition from traditional to modern society affected "collective consciousness" and morality, and thus the relationship between the individual and society. It is possible to examine Durkheim's conception of social change by reviewing his treatment of the transition from traditional to modern society in The Division of Labor and relating this to his conception of a morally regulated society and his underlying conception of reason and the genesis of "social facts."

Durkheim commences his analysis of the transition by present- ing the characteristics of traditional "mechanical" society. Ac- cording to him, this type of society is characterized by little social complexity and differentiation, and its members are very similar in their actions and beliefs. In fact, one of the most salient features of this type of society is a strong "collective consciousness" (1965: 492) or shared conception of the world that provides solidarity for society and its members. Durkheim calls these societies "mechanical" because the patterns of social action, based on the "collective consciousness," are very regular and operate with little varia- tion-much like the "cohesion which unites . . . the molecules of inorganic bodies" (1964a: 130). In brief, these societies are distinguished by the "likeness" of their members and the environ- ment in which they exist.

In contrast to traditional "mechanical" society is modern, complex, "organic" society. According to Durkheim, this type of society is larger and has greater social complexity and differentiation. This greater complexity of society facilitates the weakening of the "collective consciousness," which results in individual differences and a division of social labor. Instead of solidarity based on a strong "collective consciousness" and individual similarity, "organic" society's solidarity is based on individual differences and specialization resulting in mutual interdependence. Durkheim calls these societies "organic" (1964a: 131)




because they are analogous to an organism composed of specialized organs coming together to form a dynamic whole. The crucial issue is: What causes the transition from "mechanical" to "organic" society? For Durkheim the answer is increasing "dynamic or moral density" (1964a: 257). Before explicating this notion, Durkheim's conception of a "normal"2 morally regulated society must be described.

COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS AND DURKHEIM'S "NORMAL" SOCIETY

One of the key assumptions underlying all of Durkheim's sociology is that individuals need a "constraining" mental "framework" (1965: 22, 411-412) to guide action meaningfully (1951: 210, 248-254). Furthermore, for society to operate "nor- mally" there needs to be a collective consciousness or shared world view that provides a normative framework for collective action and co-operation (1965: 484-485, 492). Durkheim's conception of a "normal" society is one that interrelates the moral and spiritual needs of the individual with the normative needs of society. In brief, collective consciousness serves two functions: It provides a framework that meaningfully orders the individual's sensations and experiences, and it supports a common view or "collective representation" of the external world or "milieu" which makes collective action possible.

In The Elementary Forms Durkheim discusses the nature of conceptual thinking, which is really a treatise on collective representations and consciousness for, as Durkheim asserts, "concepts are collective representations" (1965: 483). This presentation is instructive because it explains how collective consciousness is able to serve its dual function. In other words, the presentation in The Elementary Forms is illuminating because it exposes the factors which affect the genesis and operation of collective consciousness and thus brings into focus the necessary elements of a "normal" society and how change can affect it.




According to Durkheim, conceptual thinking (and thus collective consciousness) is a "natural" and "spontaneous" result of collective association (1965: 470; 1964b: 124). It is a "synthesis sui generis3 of particular consciousness (1965: 471), which "brings about a state of collective effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity" (1965: 469). Durkheim reveals the nature of "the concept" and how collective consciousness is able to serve its dual function.

That is what makes conceptual thought so valuable for us. If concepts were only general ideas, they would not enrich knowledge a great deal. . . . But if before all else, they are collective representations, they add to that which we can learn by our own personal experience all that wisdom and science which the group has accumulated in the course of centuries. Thinking by concepts is not merely seeing reality on its most general side, but it is projecting a light upon the sensation which illuminates it, penetrates it and transforms it. Conceiving something is both learning its essential elements better and also locating it in its place; for each civilization has its organized system of concepts which characterizes it [1965: 483-484].

In other words, when individuals associate with each other, the contents of their "particular consciousnesses," derived from their experience with the external world, combine to form a conception which is able to frame and order meaningfully the diversity of individual experience (it is thus the basis for collective action). Being the product of a sui generis creative synthesis, concepts belong to no one personally and are impersonal (1965: 482). Furthermore, because concepts are able to frame diverse sensations and experiences, they are universal (1965: 481-482). And finally, because concepts abstract from a variety of particular, individual experiences, they are general (1965: 482fn, 483). Because concepts and collective consciousness are impersonal, universal, and general, they are able to function as the moral and spiritual base for the individual. They are "forces"4 (1965: 408) above and beyond the individual. Being derived from the association of different individuals' experiences, these concepts, which




taken together form the collective consciousness, provide an awareness of the external world which constrains and meaningfully directs individual action. At the same time, because they are collectively created and shared, concepts provide a common ground for collective action. In this way concepts and collective consciousness fulfill their dual function and link the individual and society.

REASON IN DURKHEIM'S SOCIOLOGY

For Durkheim, the "natural" and "spontaneous" process which results in the genesis of concepts and collective consciousness is based on the innate human faculty of reason which is "awakened" in collective association (1965: 307, 362, 469, 470). Durkheim describes the faculty of reason:

Reason is that which is most impersonal within us. For reason is not my reason; it is human reason in general. It is the power which the mind has of rising above the particular, the contingent and the individual, to think in universal forms [1965: 306; emphasis added].

Thus, reason is very similar to conceptual thinking and collective consciousness. In fact, in the closing remarks of The Elementary Forms, Durkheim informs the reader "that impersonal reason is only another name given to collective thought. For this is possible only through a group of individuals" (1965: 494). His use of "awakened" in reference to "superior forms of psychical activity" (1965: 307) and his claim that reason is equivalent to collective thought provide a key to his conception of how collective thought (and thus the individual/ society relationship) is affected by social structure. Previous generations of social thinkers, influenced by Kant, conceived of reason and the categories of thought as a priori. Under such a conception it was difficult to conceive of collective thought as being affected by society because of the a priori nature of thinking itself. Durkheim, probably under the influence of his neo-Kantian teacher Renouvier (see




Lukes, 1972: 56-57), made a switch in the a priori conception of reason and thought. Instead of it being a priori, it was "awakened" in social activity, that is, reason and collective thought were affected by the nature of the association of individuals. In short, reason became a sociological concept, influenced by the social structures in which individuals associated.

Durkheim's conception of "the dualism of human nature" demonstrates succinctly how reason underlies his assumptions about the linking of the individual to society. According to Durkheim, human nature consists of two distinct analytical elements. One element is composed of individual sensations, feelings, images, and passions which arise from the individual's organic experience. The other element consists of social categories and concepts which are impersonal, universal, and general and which emerge from social experience. Durkheim presents this view in his article "The Dualism of Human Nature."

Our intelligence, like our activity, presents two very different forms: on the one hand, are sensations and sensory tendencies; on the other, conceptual thought and moral activity. Each of these two parts of ourselves represents a separate pole of our being, and these two poles are not only distinct from one another but are opposed to one another. Our sensory appetites are necessarily egoistic: they have our individuality and it alone as their object. When we satisfy our hunger, our thirst, and so on, without bringing any other tendency into play, it is ourselves and ourselves alone that we satisfy. Conceptual thought and moral activity are, on the contrary, distinguished by the fact that the rules of conduct to which they conform can be universalized. Therefore, by defini- tion, they pursue impersonal ends. Morality begins with disinterest, with attachment to something other than ourselves [1973b: 151]. ... We possess both a faculty for thinking as individuals and a faculty for thinking in universal and impersonal terms. The first is called sensitivity, and the second reason . . . they exist in a single and identical being [1973b: 158].

So, individual organic experience, in the form of sensations, feelings, and passions, provides the contents or the "substratum" (1965: 307) for collective association which "awakens" the faculty of reason and results in a "creative synthesis sui generis" (1965:




467, 475), that is, conceptual thought and moral activity. It is clear from this conception why the individual and society are mutually dependent. The individual needs concepts and representation to provide a framework which meaningfully directs action. Society needs individuals because they provide the "substratum" for the formation of collective consciousness. It is only through individuals' feelings and sensations that society's collective consciousness can become aware of the external, material world in which its members exist. The degree of collective consciousness's universality, generality, and impersonality is directly affected by the number of individuals who interact to create it. Therefore, the individual and society are interdependent and the universal faculty of reason mediates this interdependence, which is to say that reason is the foundation for the linking of society and the individual.

This reveals the grounding of Durkheim's sociology: Because the innate potential for reason-which is present in the structure of the human mind-is "awakened" by collective association, the individual is linked to society, and society is linked to its individuals. Neither could exist without the other (1965: 388-389). Durkheim's conception of a "normal," morally regulated society is based ultimately on his conception of the faculty of reason and its potential for creating collective consciousness which accurately represents the diversity of collective and individual experience. "I say that it [morality] is a human creation, and that it is entirely the product of reason" (1979: 34). So for Durkheim, this is one of the universal or essential features of all societies, and, as such, it provides a grounding for an analysis of any society at any time. If all "normal" societies-those which meet both individual and societal needs-require collective consciousness, and collective consciousness depends on society, or the way individuals associate, it becomes clear that a problematic equilibrium5 is present that affects both the normative regulation of society and the spiritual existence of the individual. This is the equilibrium between social consciousness and external "milieu" or between collective consciousness and the social structure of association.




DYNAMIC OR MORAL DENSITY

Having noted Durkheim's philosophical anthropology, which is the foundation for his conception of the reciprocal relationship between the individual and society, it now seems appropriate to return to the issue of social change. It will be recalled that for Durkheim increased "moral or dynamic density" was the cause of the transition from traditional to modern society. What this concept refers to, though, is not at all clear in the sociological literature. For example, Parsons (1968: 323), Benoit-Smullyan (1967: 214), Sorokin (1928: 480), Alpert (1939: 91), and more recently LaCapra (1972: 121-122) have all claimed in one form or another that this concept is essentially biological, referring to population pressure, and is not properly sociological. Another reading of The Division of Labor (1964a: 256-282) reveals that "moral density" is not the same as "social volume" or "material density" (1964a: 260-262). Durkheim defines "dynamic or moral density":

As there are more individuals sufficiently in contact to be able to act and react upon one another . .. we agree to call this relation and the active commerce resulting from it dynamic or moral density [1964a: 257].

It is evident that Durkheim's conception of dynamic or moral density is a manifestation of his assumptions concerning the human faculty of reason and its "awakening" in collective association. Dynamic or moral density,6 thus refers to the amount of interaction or the rate at which particular consciousnesses come into contact with each other. As Durkheim's assumptions concerning reason indicate, this increased interaction results in a sui generis synthesis of particular consciousness-new "social facts." According to Durkheim's The Division of Labor, increasing moral or dynamic density prompts differentiation and specialization (the division of social labor) to develop because the "struggle for existence" is more acute (1964a: 266; later it will be shown that this idea is a bit confused). Here Durkheim's evolu-




tionism7 and debt to Darwin is clearly evidenced. From the evolutionary perspective "the struggle between two organisms is as active as they are analogous" (1964a: 266). As long as resources are sufficient there is little struggle between similar organisms. But, if the number of organisms increases so that not all appetites can be satisfied, war breaks out. The division of labor is one solution to the struggle for existence.8 In short, the transition from "mechanical" to "organic" society is one solution to the increased struggle for existence that developed as a result of increased dynamic or moral density.

What I want to emphasize is the mechanism or process whereby specialization and the division of labor develop and to relate this to Durkheim's philosophical anthropology. It will become clear that Durkheim's presentation of the transition in The Division of Labor is a manifestation of his concern with the relationship between the individual and society, and not the fully developed theory of social change that sociologists have been trying to discover for so long.

The equilibrium between collective consciousness and the objective and external world of "social facts" has been noted; and it was demonstrated that the faculty of reason (which for Durkheim is social) is the foundation for the mediation of this equilibrium. This conception of equilibrium can be applied to Durkheim's conception of the transition presented in The Division of Labor. Mechanical societies are characterized by a strong collective consciousness which assures a "likeness" of its individual members and provides cohesion of society and its members. But increased interaction or dynamic density weakens the collective consciousness by creating new "social facts" which are beyond the attention of collectively shared consciousness (1964a: 298). This weakening of the collective consciousness facilitates the development of individuality and specialization (1964a: 299-300), which is the base for the division of labor. At the same time, however, the problematic equilibrium between collective consciousness and external social reality (essential for both society and the individual) is disturbed, resulting in a "crisis" (1964a: 408-409). Thus, dynamic density affects the operation of a




"normal" society by changing the relationship between social consciousness and external "social facts."

Having explicated the essential characteristics of dynamic or moral density and its relation to the vital Durkheimian equilibrium, it is necessary to consider those factors that affect density. The first factor Durkheim presents is "condensation," or population concentration, which can be prompted by certain modes of production such as the movement from the "industry of nomads, hunters or shepherds" to agriculture-which "necessitates a sedentary life and presupposes a certain tightening of the social fibre" (1964a: 256)-or "industrial life" which also necessitates social condensation (1964a: 257). "The formation of cities and their development is an even more characteristic symptom of the same phenomenon" (1964a: 258).

Another factor that can increase dynamic density is technology, such as "the number and rapidity of ways of communication and transportation" that "diminish the gaps separating the social segments" (1964a: 259-260). By bringing particular consciousnesses together, technology increases social density. A final factor that Durkheim identifies, and one that has attracted the most attention from the sociological community, is the "total number of members of society" (1964a: 260), that is, population size or what Durkheim variously called "social volume" (1964a: 260), "physical density" (1964b: 115-116), and "material density" (1964a: 260fn). Thus, if the number of members of society is great, it is logical to expect an increase in interaction or moral density. But, in order to avoid making the common error of assuming that this so-called biological factor is the primary one, it is necessary to point out that for Durkheim, mere population density is not sufficient to accelerate dynamic density. Durkheim, wanting to avoid confusion on this issue of population size, presented concrete empirical cases (a rare event in The Division of Labor), those of Russia and China (1964a: 261-262), where population was great but where the division of labor was undeveloped. According to him, Russia and China are cases that demonstrate that it is possible to have a voluminous society with a "segmental"




structure that inhibits dynamic density. Thus Durkheim con- cludes:

It is not enough that society take in a great many people, but they must be, in addition, intimately enough in contact to act and react on one another. .... The increase in social volume does not, then, always accelerate the advance of the division of labor, but only when the mass is contracted at the same time and to the same extent. Consequently, it is only an additional factor, but when it is joined to the first, it amplifies its effects by action peculiar to it, and therefore is to be distinguished from that [1964a: 262].

Through the concept of moral/ dynamic density and physical/ material density, Durkheim has shown factors of social structure which, if changed, would affect the normative functioning of society and the spiritual existence of the individual. It is clear that Durkheim views social change from a perspective concerned primarily with the equilibrium between social consciousness and the external "milieu" of social facts. The concepts of moral and physical density illuminate elements in the structure of association that affect collective consciousness, and thus he shows that much of what appears in man to be personal and individual is really social.

Durkheim's conception of change, as presented here, is supported by his assumptions about the faculty of reason and its social facet. Change in the social structures through which individuals associate affects the ability of the human and social faculty of reason to form collective representations (concepts) that can regulate individual and social action. Durkheim's density concepts refer directly to those social structural factors that affect the association of particular consciousnesses and therefore the faculty of reason.

CONCLUSION

It has been demonstrated how central Durkheim's conception of reason is to his analysis of social change and the problematic linkage between individuals and society. It seems appropriate at this point to assess critically Durkheim's conception of the transition and point out the weaknesses and limitations of his analysis.




If Durkheim's assumptions about the faculty of reason led him to useful sociological insights, they also had the effect of drawing attention away from other equally important sociological issues. For example, if, as Durkheim assumes, the coming together of particular consciousnesses creates "impersonal" suigeneris social facts, it seems obvious that the degree of "impersonality" is not the same for all individuals. The process of the coming together of individuals is a political process in which some individuals have more input and power to influence the situation than do others. To claim that the final product of association-collective consciousness-is "natural" and "spontaneous" obscures the crucial social and political nature of the structures of association.

Similarly, concerning the process whereby individuals associate: When is moral density or the rate of interaction high enough to trigger differentiation? Unfortunately, Durkheim offers no clue at all by failing to provide concrete examples from which one could abstract a useful conception of rates of moral density. As it stands, the concept of moral density is so vague that it can be used only in a very limited manner. This precipitates another damaging question about Durkheim's conception of the transition. Accord- ing to him, increased social density (how much?) caused competition for scarce resources, thereby heightening the struggle for survival. This supposedly facilitated differentiation and the development of the division of labor. It is clear how increased interaction could generate more social facts than collective consciousness could keep abreast of, and therefore facilitate the development of individual differences and specialization. But what is not clear is why increased density or interaction should result in competition and increase the struggle for survival. If Durkheim meant that increased population pressure caused competition, there would be less of a problem, but he states quite clearly that population pressure is not sufficient in itself to cause the division of labor to develop. The question as to why increased moral density should lead to competition is not dealt with sufficiently and vitiates Durkheim's analysis of the transition.

Despite these problems, Durkheim's analysis of the transition and conception of social change is not without merit. As noted earlier, Durkheim's sociological focus concerns the social base of individual moral and spiritual existence and the normative and moral base of social existence. His conception of social change




can be understood properly only by relating it to his broader sociological concern with morality and the changing relationship between the individual and society. Viewed from this perspective, Durkheim's conception of change is illuminating and useful because it provides a broad framework for understanding how changes in the structure of society-brought on by factors that increase moral and material density-can affect collective consciousness and therefore the spiritual nature of the individual and the normative regulation of society. Certainly one of the major contributions of sociology is the illumination of how apparently individual phenomena-for example, suicide and crime-are affected by extraindividual factors. In this respect Durkheim's analysis of social change and its concern with the individual/ society relationship is a worthwhile contribution to sociology. But, if Durkheim's presentation in The Division of Labor is viewed as an attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of social change, his contributions toward understanding the relationship between individuals and society are obscured; and one is left with a quite unsatisfactory "theory of social change." As Jones (1977: 279- 319) correctly suggests, in order to "understand a sociological classic" it is necessary to take into account the author's intentions in writing his work; only then is it possible to understand correctly. Durkheim's intentions in The Division of Labor were not to develop a theory of social change, but rather to demonstrate how structural changes in society affected the relationship between individuals and society.

NOTES

1. The French term conscience collective can be translated as either collective conscience (the more common) or collective consciousness. For the purposes of this essay, collective consciousness has been chosen over collective conscience because the latter is more limited, referring primarily to the faculty of recognizing the distinction between right and wrong. The former is broader and more in line with Durkheim's intentions, referring to the totality of attitudes, beliefs, and opinions.

2. Durkheim's explicit discussion of a "normal" society (1964b: 47-75) is one of the most confusing and least successful of his presentations. Nonetheless, even though his presentation in The Rules of Sociological Method leaves much to be desired, his implicit conception of a "normal" society is one which is normatively regulated by a "collective consciousness" that reasonably represents the nature of external social reality. It is only through regulation by "collective consciousness" that both society's and the individual's needs can be fulfilled. For his discussion of how society should be regulated by awareness of external "forces," see Durkheim (1973a: 120).




3. The literal meaning of sui generis translates as "of its own birth." Durkheim's use of this phrase differs from the literal meaning and therefore needs clarification. Durkheim uses sui generis to mean unique, having its own distinctive characteristics and laws. Most often Durkheim uses sui generis in the context of the creation of a new phenomenon from a combination of elements. For example, the coming together of certain mineral particles results in the formation of a new phenomenon-the living cell-which has properties which are different from the sum of its component parts. In this context, the coming together of mineral particles produces a synthesis suigeneris-the living cell. The notion that "a whole is not identical with the sum of its parts [but] is something different, and its properties differ from those of its component parts" (1964b: 102) is central to Durkheim's sociology. The pivotal characteristic of this conception is that of a creative synthesis. Nowhere is this more evident than in his conception of the genesis of society; "a synthesis suigeneris of particular consciousnesses is required [ 1965: 471]... society is a synthesis of human consciousnesses" (1965: 479). Here the distinction between the literal and Durkheimian meaning of sui generis is most evident. Certainly Durkheim does not mean that society is formed of itself, that is, without individuals. Instead, he means "society is not a mere sum of individuals. Rather the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics" (1964b: 103). Likewise, reason is a sui generis faculty which combines component sensations into unique concepts (1974: 87).

The agent endowed with reason does not behave like a thing of which the activity can be reduced to a system of reflexes.... External stimulation, instead of resulting immediately in movements, is halted in its progress and is subjected to a sui generis elaboration [1974: 3]. 4. For a useful discussion of Durkheim's use of the concept of "force," see editor

Pickering's comments in Durkheim's Essays on Morals and Education (1979: 9-12). 5. The term equilibrium is used quite often by Durkheim. Usually, it refers to the

balance or tension that exists between consciousness (individual or social) and the external "milieu." For example, see Durkheim (1964a: 365-368, 383-384; 1951: 250).

6. It is interesting to note the similarity between Durkheim's concepts of "effervescence" used in The Elernentar " Forms of the Religious Life (1965: 241, 249, 250, 445, 469, 475) and "dynamic or moral density" used in The Division of Labor in Society (1964a: 257). Both are a manifestation of Durkheim's assumptions concerning the faculty of reason; namely, that the coming together of individuals results in a suigeneris synthesis-"collective consciousness." An awareness of the similarity of these two concepts-found in Durkheim's first and last works-contributes to an understanding of the degree to which Durkheim's thought underwent a change. For a discussion of the issue of the change in Durkheim's thought, see Pickering's comments in Durkheim's Essays on Morals and Education (1979: 21-26).

7. For an analysis of "Durkheim's Evolutionary Conception of Social Change," see Hinkle (1976: 336-346).

8. The division of labor is only one solution to the "struggle for survival." Durkheim also mentions "emigration, colonization, death" (1964a: 286).

REFERENCES

Alpert, H. 1939 Emile Durkheim and His Sociology. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.




Benoit-Smullyan, E. 1967 "The sociologism of Emile Durkheim and his school," pp. 205-243 in H. E.

Barnes (ed.), An Introduction to the History of Sociology. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Coser, L. 1960 "Durkheim's conservatism and its implications for his sociological theory," pp.

211-232 in K. Wolff (ed.), Emile Durkheim. Columbus: OhicrState Univ. Press. Durkheim, E.

1951 Suicide (J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson, trans.). New York: Free Press. 1956 Education and Sociology (S. D. Fox, Trans.). New York: Free Press. 1957 Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (C. Brookfield, (trans.). London: Rout-

ledge and Kegan Paul. 1958 Socialism and Saint-Simon (C. Sattler, trans.). Antioch, OH: Antioch Press. 1964a The Division of Labor in Society (G. Simpson, trans.). New York: Free Press. 1964b The Rules of Sociological Method (S. A. Solovay and J. H. Mueller, trans.).

New York: Free Press. 1965 The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (J. W. Swain, trans.). New York:

Free Press. 1973a Moral Education (E. K. Wilson and H. Schnurer, trans.) New York: Free

Press. 1973b On Morality and Society. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1974 Sociology and Philosophy (D. F. Pocock, trans.). New York: Free Press. 1977 The Evolution of Educational Thought (P. Collins, trans.). London: Routledge

and Kegan Paul. 1979 Essays on Morals and Education (H. L. Sutcliffe, trans.; W.S.F. Pickering, ed.).

London: Routledge and Kegal Paul. Giddens, A.

1972 "Introduction: Durkheim's writings in sociology and philosophy," pp. 1-50 in Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Hinkle, R. C. 1976 "Durkheim's evolutionary conception of social change." Soc. Q. 17: 336-346.

Jones, R. A. 1977 "On understanding a sociological classic." Amer. J. of Sociology 83: 279-319.

LaCapra, D. 1972 Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press.

Lukes, S. 1972 Emile Durkheim: His Life and Works. New York: Harper & Row.

Nisbet, R. A. 1974 The Sociology of Emile Durkheim. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Parsons, T. 1968 The Structure of Social Action (Vol. 1). New York: Free Press.

Sorokin, P. 1928 Contemporary Sociological Theories. New York: Harper & Row.

John B. Harms is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Sociology at the Uni- versity otf Kansas. His areas of interest include the sociology of education, devi- ance and criminal justice, and classical sociological theory.



Reason and Social Change in Durkheims Thought

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