Reactionary Nationalism and Museum Controversies: The Case of "Peace Osaka"

Reactionary Nationalism and Museum Controversies: The Case of “Peace Osaka”Author(s): Akiko TakenakaSource: The Public Historian, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May 2014), pp. 75-98Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the National Council on Public HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/tph.2014.36.2.75 .

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Making Museums

Reactionary Nationalismand Museum Controversies:The Case of ‘‘Peace Osaka’’

Akiko Takenaka

Abstract: Using Peace Osaka (an exhibit facility known for its portrayal of the Japanesemilitary’s aggressions during the Asia-Pacific War) as a case study, this essay examines theshift in ways that the war has been portrayed in Japanese museums. Echoing the neo-revisionist turn, a trend that is increasingly apparent in various venues including culturalproduction and policy making, the exhibit at Peace Osaka will soon be changed in itsentirety to erase any traces of aggressive behavior by the Japanese military. The essayargues that the recent shift to neo-revisionism is an example of ‘‘reactionary nationalism’’:a response to earlier acknowledgements of war responsibility that was not based ona historical understanding of the past.

Key words: Peace Osaka, victim’s history, peace museums, Asia-Pacific War, museumcontroversy

On april 6, 2013, ‘‘Peace Osaka’’ (Osaka International Peace Center), anOsaka municipal facility known for its exhibit on Japanese aggression in Chinaduring the Asia-Pacific War (1931-45),1 announced a plan to completely

The Public Historian, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 75–98 (May 2014).ISSN: 0272-3433, electronic ISSN 1533-8576.

© 2014 by The Regents of the University of California and theNational Council on Public History. All rights reserved.

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1. Japan’s military conflict spanning the fifteen years from 1931 to 1945 has been variouslynamed over the years. The term Pacific War (Taiheiyo� Senso� in Japanese), coined by theOccupation forces in place of the official Japanese name ‘‘The Greater East Asian War’’ (Daito�aSenso�), fails to include the invasions in East Asia. Cultural critic Tsurumi Shunsuke proposed the

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redesign its display contents. The goal of this overhaul was to create a newexhibit that would ‘‘memorialize the victims of the Osaka air raids and func-tion as a prayer for peace.’’2 Included in the plan was the removal of displaypanels and film footage associated with Japan’s war against China, its colonialrule in Asia, and the Battle of Okinawa. This plan resulted from externalpressures spanning over two decades since the museum’s inception. PeaceOsaka has been embroiled in various controversies such as numerous attacksfrom neo-revisionist groups, as well as financial difficulties precipitated bycuts in the municipal budget that were enacted by conservative lawmakers.3

These controversies are symptomatic of the conflicting ways that the Japaneseremember the war, which have manifested in other, better known, avenuesincluding debates surrounding Yasukuni Shrine and the depiction of the warin history textbooks.4 Although the series of official apologies and acknowl-edgements of military aggression by lawmakers in the mid 1990s providedhopeful indications that a significant majority in Japan was ready to face thecrimes and violence committed during the fifteen-year war, the trend in theyears since suggests a reactionary move back towards the revisionist denial ofJapanese complicity.5 A close examination and analysis of this recent incidentat Peace Osaka contributes to a better understanding of a generational shift inpopular perception of the war in Japan that simultaneously influences, and isaffected by, how history is presented in public venues.

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term the Fifteen-Year War (Ju�gonen Senso�) in order to include the Japanese aggressions inChina. Tsurumi, An Intellectual History of Wartime Japan (London and New York: Sydney andHenley, 1986), 124. More recently, Japan scholars have tended to use the term Asia-Pacific War(Ajia Taiheiyo� Senso�) to represent Japan’s wars both in Asia and the Pacific. The term initiallyonly covered the years 1941 to 1945, but have since taken on a wider coverage sometimes from1937 and at others, from 1931. I use Asia-Pacific War to cover the entire period of Japan’s militaryengagement from September 1931 to August 1945. On the naming of the Asia-Pacific War, seeKisaka Jun’ichiro�, ‘‘Ajia Taiheiyo� Senso� no kosho� to seikaku,’’ Ryu�koku ho�gaku 25, no. 4 (March1993): 386-434. Throughout this article, I follow the Japanese convention of placing surnamesbefore given names.

2. Juridical Foundation Osaka International Peace Center, ‘‘Peace Osaka tenji renyu�al ko�so�:Osaka Ku�shu� giseisha tsuito� no ba, heiwa gakushu� no ba toshite sara naru hiyaku o,’’ April 6, 2013.www.peace-osaka.or.jp/news/pdf/pdf20130406.pdf (last accessed July 23, 2013).

3. By neo-revisionist, I refer to the renewed trend since the mid-1990s to deny wartimemilitary aggressions, such as the Nanjing Massacre and the organized sexual slavery system. Somepeople and institutions (such as Yasukuni Shrine) had consistently supported the deniers since1945, but there have been renewed attempts at popularizing the view that considers the Asia-Pacific War as an act of self-defense in the recent decades. Conservative historian FujiokaNobukatsu and the Liberal View of Japanese History Group can be considered the trail-blazers of this attempt. See Aaron Gerow, ‘‘Consuming Asia, Consuming Japan: The New Neo-nationalist Revisionism in Japan,’’ in Laura Hein and Mark Selden eds., Censoring History:Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (New York: M.E. Sharpe,2000), 74-95.

4. John Breen ed., Yasukuni, the War Dead, and the Struggle for Japan’s Past (New York:Columbia University Press, 2008); Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: TheTextbook Controversy and Japanese Society (Munich, Germany: IUDICIUM Verlag, 2005).

5. For a sophisticated analysis of the mid-1990s apologies, see Norma Field, ‘‘War andApology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After,’’ positions 5 no. 1 (Spring 1997): 1-50.

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Memorializing the national experience of a war has become an increasinglycomplicated matter, whether in the form of a museum exhibit or as a memo-rial. In particular, museum exhibits of histories of war are often mired incontroversies raised by factions that take issue with the political views of theexhibits. This is not a problem unique to Japan. For example, the attempt tomemorialize the World War II experience in the United States, which seemedto have a simple, straightforward narrative at one time, has resulted in tensedebates around creating memorials (as was the case with the National WorldWar II memorial in Washington DC, 2004) and museum exhibits (as was thecase with the Enola Gay controversy of 1995).6 But the situation becomeseven more complex in a country with as troubled a relationship with legaciesof war as Japan.

In Japan there are currently over two hundred museums and exhibitspaces that deal with some aspect of the Asia-Pacific War.7 Many suchfacilities assert that their goal is the promotion of peace through the collec-tion and display of objects and testimonies associated with the war experi-ence. And although some facilities, such as those dedicated to the tokko�pilots,8 showcase material from the battlefields, the vast majority are devotedto the homefront experience, most of which focus on local air raids. In manyof the sixty-six cities that were subject to Allied bombings from late 1944onwards, volunteer groups devoted numerous hours to recording air raidexperiences and collecting relevant artifacts, and later established exhibitrooms or archives based on their collections.9 Thus, material exhibited inmost facilities place a heavy emphasis on the suffering and loss experiencedby Japanese civilians.

Among these museums, Peace Osaka, which opened its doors on Septem-ber 17, 1991 in a corner of the Osaka Castle Park, is considered one of themost progressive in terms of its presentation of the Japanese military’s

6. See, for example, Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhard eds., History Wars and OtherBattles for the American Past (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1996); Philip Nobile,Judgment at the Smithsonian: The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Washington DC:Marlowe and Company, 1995).

7. The most comprehensive guidebook of Japanese war and peace museums lists 112 suchfacilities. Rekishi Kyo�ikusha Kyo�gikai, ed., Shinpan heiwa hakubutsukan senso� shiryo�kan gaidobukku (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2000). In addition, the Self Defense Forces own and operate 131exhibit facilities. For an analysis of the Self Defense Forces exhibit facilities, see Andre Hertrich,‘‘A Usable Past? Historical Museums of the Self-Defense Forces and the Construction of Con-tinuities,’’ in Sven Saaler and Wolfgang Schwentker, eds., The Power of Memory in Modern Japan(Kent: Global Oriental Ltd, 2008), 171-88.

8. The most famous museum dedicated to the tokko� pilots is located in the city of Chiran,Kagoshima Prefecture. Kagoshima is also home to Kaseta City Peace Memorial Museum,a smaller private museum dedicated to tokko� pilots located on a former base. Kanoya Air BaseMuseum, operated by the Maritime Division of the Japan Self Defense Forces on its base, alsofeatures tokko� pilots.

9. For an overview of the volunteer activities to record Japanese air raid experience, seeNihon no Ku�shu� Henshu� Iinkai, ed., Nihon no ku�shu� 10 (Tokyo: Sanseido�, 1981). For a collec-tion of digitized archival material associated with the air raids, see http://www.japanairraids.org(last accessed August 12, 2013).

REACTIONARY NATIONALISM AND MUSEUM CONTROVERSIES & 77



aggressions during the war.10 The curatorial choice to depict Japanese aggres-sions resulted from a collaborative and carefully thought out process andreflects the museum’s founding principle, which emphasizes the importanceof educating the public on the suffering and death inflicted upon not only theJapanese but also the rest of East Asia. Consequently, its exhibit includesdepictions of violence and war crimes committed by the Japanese Army inChinese cities. Also highlighted is the military significance of the museumsite—a former munitions factory during the war—and visitors are encouragedto explore the Osaka Castle Park for remnants of its military past.11 Asa museum operating almost entirely on public funds, and which presentsa narrative of history that not all taxpayers agree with, Peace Osaka has beensubject to numerous criticisms, protests, and threats of funding cuts. Themost recent manifestation of these tensions is the upcoming change underthe heavy-handed guidance of conservative lawmakers.

This essay first introduces the controversies that have surrounded PeaceOsaka, and then provides a close analysis of the current exhibit with a focus onthe overall narrative that is presented. From material currently available, it

Entrance to Peace Osaka. (Photo courtesy of the author.)

10. The only museum that is more comprehensive in exhibits of Japan’s war crimes is theKyoto Museum of World Peace, which is owned and operated by Ritsumeikan University. Thefacility receives less attention and criticisms from neo-revisionist groups due to its private status.

11. A map, ‘‘Fieldwork: Scars of War Remaining in the Vicinity of Osaka Castle (O� sakajo�shu�hen ni nokoru senso� no kizu ato),’’ is available free of charge at the museum.



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also assesses plans for the renewal. The current exhibit, although commend-able for its depiction of aggressions committed by the Japanese military,nevertheless reinforces what Carol Gluck has referred to as ‘‘victim’s history’’:a narrative that places the blame for the war only on the political and militaryleaders of Imperial Japan, and consequently absolves all others from respon-sibility.12 Victim’s history, popular with the liberal leaning faction of Japanesesociety, has complicated the issue of war responsibility, for, although thesupporters of this view acknowledge Japan’s war crimes, according to thisview no Japanese currently alive bears responsibility for the Asia-PacificWar.13 As a consequence, tensions persist between Japan and the rest of EastAsia over the unresolved issues from the war, but few Japanese are willing totake on the task of reconciliation themselves. The neo-revisionist narrative,supported by the museum critics, and which many expect for the new exhibit,seeks to ‘‘rectify’’ the situation by erasing traces of Japanese war crimes. Thisdemand for erasure of inconvenient components from the exhibits alsofollows a trend that can be concurrently observed elsewhere, including ineducation, popular culture, and political platforms of elected lawmakers. Thisessay argues that this shift is a reaction to the period of apologies of the mid1990’s—apologies that were, in the words of historian Yoshida Yutaka, ‘‘notbacked by a solid understanding of the wartime history,’’ but rather, presentedto support a necessary shift in Japan’s international policy.14 Just as the apol-ogies were a political move in response to international pressure, the neo-revisionist trend of recent years can be considered a reactionary move on thedomestic level. Peace museums have been a central battleground for the neo-revisionists’ attempt to ‘‘rectify’’ history.

12. Carol Gluck, ‘‘The Idea of Showa,’’ in Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, eds., Showa: TheJapan of Hirohito (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company), 13. See also James Orr,The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu:University of Hawai’i Press, 2001). The shaping of war memories—and the concurrent con-struction of victim consciousness—in postwar Japan is a complex topic that has been addressedby many. Representative works that cover the immediate postwar years include John Dower,Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1993); Yoshikuni Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in PostwarJapanese Culture, 1945-1970 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Lisa Yoneya-ma, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space and the Dialectics of Memory (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1999); and Okuno Hiroko, Genbaku no kiroku: Hiroshima/Nagasaki no shiso�(Tokyo: Keio� University Press, 2010). It is also possible that interest groups who mobilized warmemory to promote their agenda further popularized the ‘‘victim’s history.’’ See FranziskaSeraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005 (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity, 2006).

13. Although scholarship that addresses people’s responsibility exists, it has yet to makea major impact on popular opinion in Japan. For example, in a 2005 Yomiuri newspaper survey onthe allocation of war responsibility, 67.3 percent of the respondents pointed to military leaders,followed by prime ministers at 33.3 percent and politicians at 27.2 percent. A mere 5 percentlocated significant responsibility on the general public. Yomiuri Shinbun Senso� Sekinin Kensho�Iinkai ed., Kensho� senso� sekinin vol. 1 (Chu�o� ko�ronsha, 2006), 208-9.

14. Yoshida Yutaka, Nihonjin no senso�kan: sengoshi no naka no hen’yo� (Tokyo: IwanamiShoten, 1995), 7.




The crisis that Peace Osaka now faces also results from the absence ofcritical reflection and analysis of the current exhibit, allowing for few improve-ments or updates in over a decade—a consequence of the highly politicizednature of the exhibit that prevented museum supporters from voicing anycritique of exhibit content or methodology. For many, the museum, ratherthan offering the opportunity to interact with artifacts and narratives from theOsaka air raids (as was the original goal of the institution), currently merelysymbolizes a political position. The case of Peace Osaka, then, provides a use-ful opportunity for exploring many important issues associated with historymuseums in general and peace museums in particular. Using Peace Osaka asa case study, I examine issues associated with exhibiting a historical narrativeof war in a publicly funded museum. Topics addressed include the role of andaudience for peace museums, and the difficulties that arise when materialexhibited involves a difficult history such as the Asia-Pacific War. This studyalso provides an example of what may be called ‘‘reactionary nationalism’’ inJapan today: nationalism as a political position and a revisionist move, and onethat responds to the earlier, official acknowledgements of war responsibilitythat were not based on a historical understanding of the past.15

Peace Osaka Controversies

Osaka International Peace Center, or ‘‘Peace Osaka,’’ as it is commonlycalled, evolved out of long term efforts by local citizens groups and newsmedia to memorialize the impact of the war on Osaka—activities that startedin 1975, which included collecting, recording, and exhibiting the air-raidexperience of local residents.16 In 1983, the prefecture and the city of Osakajointly announced they would split the cost of establishing a permanent, free-standing structure for an exhibit on local air raids. They have since continuedto share its operating costs.17

15. My understanding of nationalism is derived from scholars such as Ernest Gellner andBenedict Anderson, who argue that nationalism is a modern, political construct. All nationalism isreactionary to some extent, and almost always involves the reinterpretation of the past for thestrengthening of a sense of community. But in the case of reactionary nationalism, the staking ofa political position supersedes interpretations of the past.

16. Asahi shinbun started an annual exhibition in August 1975, as did Yomiuri shinbun. Alsoin 1977, groups such as The Group to Record War Experiences (Senso� Taiken o Kirokusuru Kai),the Osaka branch of the Japan China Friendship Association (Nitchu� Yu�ko� Kyo�kai), and theOsaka History Educators’ Association (Osaka Rekishi Kyo�ikusha Kyo�gikai) collaborated to mountan exhibition series entitled ‘‘War and Ourselves.’’ Osaka air raid exhibits acquired a semi-permanent home in a rented space in the Osaka Prefectural Social Welfare Hall in 1981. Forthe efforts leading up to the mounting of this exhibit room, see Kazuyo Yamane, GrassrootsMuseums for Peace in Japan: Unknown Efforts for Peace and Reconciliation (Saarbrucken: VDMVerlag Dr. Muller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. KG, 2009), 138-44.

17. The planning committee included scholars, journalists, and members of a variety ofcitizens groups such as the Association of Osaka Prefecture War Bereaved Families, OsakaPrefecture Alliance for Military Pension, Osaka Prefecture Wounded Veterans Association,Osaka Branch of Alliance for Buraku Liberation, and Liaison Committee for Osaka Mothers’




Attentive to the public nature of the institution as well as the potentiallycontroversial content of the exhibits, the planning committee made the con-ceptualization process transparent from start to finish by hosting numerouspublic briefings and meetings along the way.18 They also distributed bookletson the facility’s basic planning scheme along with a questionnaire to localpublic elementary and middle schools in preparation for visits by schoolchil-dren. The committee provided opportunities to receive feedback from bothlocal residents and survivors, many of whom donated their mementos fromthe war. Public participation was welcomed for the building design as well inthe form of an open competition.19 The resulting museum houses threeexhibit rooms: Room A dedicated to the experience of Osaka air raids, RoomB that covers wartime atrocities, and Room C that offers lessons for a peacefulsociety.

The early years of Peace Osaka were a success. Room B, which dedicateda large portion to the Japanese military’s aggressions in East and SoutheastAsia, received high acclaim from communities involved in preserving memoriesof war experience. The tone of the museum, acknowledging the war crimes ofthe Japanese military, was in accordance with the position of key lawmakers atthe time, as evidenced by the ‘‘Ko�no Statement’’—a statement issued in 1993by then Chief Cabinet secretary Ko�no Yo�hei, which acknowledged governmentcomplicity in the so-called ‘‘comfort women’’ system (a euphemism for thesystematic sexual slavery imposed by the Japanese military during the war)—and apologies by prime ministers Hosokawa Morihiro (1993) and MurayamaTomiichi (1993, 1994). The care with which the planners proceeded with themuseum operation seemed to have yielded success. The number of visitorssteadily increased, exceeding 100,000 by 1994.20 But the museum came to beembroiled in public protests and attacks soon thereafter.

In 1996, less than five years after opening, protest groups commencedattacks on Peace Osaka. In June, the conservative Nihon Yoron no Kai (JapanAssociation of Public Opinion)21 presented a written protest in which theyargued that ‘‘perpetrator theory (kagaisha-ron) [such as one that is presentedat the museum] is harmful to youth.’’22 In October, Liberal Democratic Party

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Assembly. Koyama Hitoshi, ‘‘Peace Osaka eno uyoku no ko�geki,’’ Kikan senso� sekinin kenkyu� 19(Spring 1998), 42-49.

18. The initial conceptualization process is detailed in Osaka City Building Department, ed.,Osaka Kokusai Heiwa Senta� kensetsu kiroku (Osaka: Osaka City, 1991).

19. The winning entry selected out of a total of 253 was by a collaborative group namedCoelacanth.

20. Document obtained from the museum during interview with Peace Osaka BusinessOfficer O� tsuki Kazuko, February 5, 2005.

21. Nihon Yoron no Kai is a conservative organization established in 1990 as a media watchgroup whose objective is to correct what it considers biased reporting. The current leader is MiwaKazuo, activist and commentator for Channel Sakura, a conservative satellite television networkfounded in 2004. It focuses on media reports on the imperial family, the textbook controversy,and the comfort women issue.

22. Nakakita Ryu�taro�, ‘‘Heiwa hakubutsukan eno ko�geki o ikani hanekaesuka: Peace Osakajiken no shinso�,’’ Sekai 674 (May 2000): 231-35.




members of the Lower House published ‘‘The Research Report on WarMuseums in Japan,’’ in which they criticized Peace Osaka for its ‘‘exhibitsbased on biased ideology.’’23 Criticisms escalated in conservative media out-lets that accused the museum of conducting a ‘‘criminal act using tax money’’and ‘‘presenting a parade of masochism and anti-Japanese sentiments.’’24

Attacks on Peace Osaka intensified when, in March 1997, various conser-vative citizens groups formed Senso� Shiryo� no Henko� Tenji o Tadasukai(Group to Correct the Biased Exhibits of War Material; Tadasukai hereafter)solely for the purpose of ‘‘correcting’’ exhibits at the museum, and demandedchanges.25 The group, which is affiliated with the Osaka branch of Japan’slargest nationalist group, Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), characterizedPeace Osaka exhibits as a typical example of ‘‘masochistic view of history(jigyaku shikan),’’ a term popularized by another nationalist group, JapanSociety for Textbook Reform, which attempts to eliminate descriptions of theJapanese military’s aggressive behavior from Japanese textbooks. AlthoughPeace Osaka personnel assessed strategies for response through a newly cre-ated project team, another group presented, in June 1997, a written protestnoting that some photographs on display lacked credibility.26 Attention wascalled to photographs mounted in Room B in a section on Japanese aggressionin China. In response, the museum removed one photograph and changedthe captions of two others.27 Further, eleven more displays were eitheraltered or removed in March 1998.28 Also in the same month, Tadasukaipresented to the Osaka City Council a petition to stop public subsidies to themuseum.29

The following year, Tadasukai launched a very different kind of an attack:the use of Peace Osaka itself to propagate a narrative that ran counter to onepresented in the exhibit. The venue was the auditorium space in the museumbuilding. Using an item in the Local Autonomy Law that prohibits publicfacilities from rejecting residents’ use of its space without adequate reason,Tadasukai secured the right to show a revisionist film entitled Pride: TheFateful Moment (To�ei, 1998) in March 1999.30 The film depicts To�jo� Hideki,

23. Despite its name, the Liberal Democratic Party is a conservative party that secureda dominant position through a political platform that catered to the war bereaved families.

24. Sankei shinbun, Tokyo edition, October 22, 1996.25. For the founding principles of this group as well as their view of Peace Osaka, see http://

osaka.nipponkaigi.com/katsudo/p-osaka/ (last accessed August 12, 2013).26. Yomiuri shinbun, July 1, 1997.27. The removed photograph, which depicted several severed human heads, was accom-

panied by a caption ‘‘Korean farmers and soldiers killed by Japanese troops.’’ But a Sankeishinbun reader owned the same photograph on which was inscribed, ‘‘heads of Koreans mas-sacred by local rebels (dohi).’’ Sankei shinbun, June 20, 1997.

28. Sankei shinbun, evening edition, March 30, 1998.29. Yomiuri shinbun, March 11, 1998. For this petition, the group identified a total of 113

problematic displays in Room B. Yoshida, ‘‘‘Peace Osaka’ no mondaiten.’’30. Local Autonomy Law Clause 244 Item 2 stipulates that, ‘‘Local public organizations

cannot refuse residents’ use of public facilities without adequate reason.’’ Osaka City PersonnelLabor Union and Osaka City Employees Labor Union, ‘‘For the Protection and Development of




who held positions as both Army Minister and Prime Minister during the waras a patriotic figure who single-handedly took on the fight against the Alliedforces (portrayed as attempting to place all war responsibility on the defeatednation) and presents the Tokyo Trials as victor’s justice.31 In January 2000,Tadasukai held another event in the same space: ‘‘The Biggest Lie of theTwentieth Century: A Comprehensive Examination of the Nanjing Massa-cre.’’32 The event quickly escalated into an international dispute when news ofthis symposium was reported in China. Fearing an international crisis, theChinese ambassador personally visited both city and prefectural governmentsto request cancellation of the event, to no avail. On the day of the symposium,approximately two hundred people surrounded the museum building ina silent protest, demanding that the participants apologize to the citizens ofNanjing. Inside the auditorium, lecturers set the tone by arguing that ‘‘thenumber of deaths following the fall of Nanjing in 1937 was approximately15,000’’ (a fraction of the 300,000 which is the official number from theChinese government). The keynote speaker was historian HigashinakanoShu�do�, who had earlier published the book The Nanking Massacre: Factversus Fiction, a Historian’s Quest for the Truth, in which he argued that allhistorical evidence supporting the massacre had been fabricated.33 The eventmade waves in China: approximately 500 people gathered in Nanjing fora protest meeting; Shanghai—sister city of Osaka—sent a written complaintto the museum. People’s Daily reported daily on the symposium and its largerimplications.34 Japanese lawmakers tried to distance the national governmentfrom the Osaka controversy. Foreign Minister Ko�no Yo�hei issued a statementto the Chinese media that ‘‘the opinion of those who hosted the gatheringdiffers from the stance of the Japanese government. Their opinion is notsupported by the majority of Japanese.’’35

Three months after the showing of the film Pride, the museum staff, withthe backing of a citizens group ‘‘Peace Osaka Citizens’ Network,’’ launcheda counter-offensive by hosting in the same auditorium a symposium ‘‘To ThinkSeriously about Peace: Historical Examination of Pride,’’ with keynote lecturesby historian Akazawa Shiro�, journalist Nishino Rumiko, and activist and scholarLin Boyao.36 On April 8, 2000, three months after the neo-revisionist sympo-sium on the Nanjing Massacre, the citizens group hosted another symposium-

‘Peace Osaka’ (Osaka International Peace Center)’’ http://www.jichiro.gr.jp/jichiken/report/rep_yamagata28/jichiken_hokoku/heiwa05.htm (last accessed July 16, 2013).

31. The museum could not refuse the airing of the film as it was presented as an opportunityto ‘‘contemplate the importance of peace.’’ Report by Osaka City Personnel Labor Union andOsaka City Employees Labor Union.

32. Nakakita Ryu�taro�, ‘‘Heiwa hakubutsukan e no ko�geki o shimin no tede hanekaesou:Peace Osaka o meguru uyoku to shimin no kobo,’’ Senso� sekinin 2 no. 4 (June 2000), 64.

33. The English translation was published by Tokyo Sekai Shuppan in 2005. The original title‘‘Nankin gyakusatsu’’ no tettei kensho� was published in 1998 by Tentensha.

34. Key excerpts are available in Report cited in note 30.35. Yoshida, ‘‘‘Peace Osaka’ no mondaiten.’’36. Sorano, 53. Akazawa’s analysis of the film is available as ‘‘Eiga ‘Puraido’ hihan,’’ Kikan

senso� sekinin kenkyu� 21 (Fall 1998): 50-54.



http://www.jichiro.gr.jp/jichiken/report/rep_yamagata28/jichiken_hokoku/heiwa05.htm

http://www.jichiro.gr.jp/jichiken/report/rep_yamagata28/jichiken_hokoku/heiwa05.htm


in the auditorium: ‘‘What the Nanjing Massacre Asks of Japan: Correcting theApproach of Peace Osaka.’’37 The event included a keynote lecture by historianYoshida Yutaka, who offered a thorough rebuttal of Higashinakano’s claims inthe ‘‘Biggest Lie’’ event, as well as a talk by the director of the Nanjing MassacreMemorial Hall, that included a report on the local reactions to that earlierevent.38

But neo-revisionist groups continued their attempt to utilize the audito-rium space, which led to the ultimate ‘‘freezing’’ of the Peace Osaka exhibit.On August 25, 2000, partially in response to protests from Shanghai and inorder to prevent further controversy, Peace Osaka announced that its audi-torium space would no longer be available for use by outside groups.39 Fur-thermore, administrators agreed not to make any changes to the permanentexhibits to prevent additional controversy. With the exception of minorchanges such as a correction to an English translation and the addition ofphonetic annotation to assist young children read through the wall texts, nochange has been made to the exhibits since 1997.40

On the surface, protests seemed to have ceased. The lack of change in theexhibits or opportunity for any outside organization to use the auditoriumspace left little to attack. But Tadasukai as well as the conservative faction oflocal lawmakers had not given up. Their chance arrived with the inaugurationof Osaka prefectural governor Hashimoto To�ru in February 2008, who imme-diately announced an extensive budget reduction plan that included a proposalto shut down or reassess numerous public facilities in the prefecture.41 Seiz-ing this opportunity, Tadasukai on April 11 sent a written request to Hashi-moto to cease prefectural funding for three municipal facilities—PeaceOsaka, Liberty Osaka (Osaka Human Rights Museum), and Hurights Osaka(Asia-Pacific Human Rights Information Center)—arguing that they are‘‘nothing but promotion facilities for anti-Japanese ideology.’’42 In September2011, representatives from the city assembly began investigative visits to thefacility to examine the exhibits.43

The museum currently faces a new challenge precipitated by formergovernor Hashimoto, who took office as Osaka city mayor in December2011. On May 11, 2012, Hashimoto announced a plan for a new historymuseum in which ‘‘young people can learn the modern and contemporary

37. Nakakita, ‘‘Heiwa hakubutsukan eno ko�geki o ikani hanekaesuka,’’ 64.38. Sorano, 54-5.39. Yomiuri shinbun, August 25, 2000. For a full report of the deliberations see Report cited

in note 30.40. Author interview with O� tsuki Kazuko, February 5, 2005.41. A former lawyer, Hashimoto was the prefectural governor of Osaka from February 2008

to November 2011, and currently serves as the Osaka city mayor. After gaining popularity as the‘‘tweeting mayor,’’ Hashimoto established the neo-revisionist Japan Restoration Party in Septem-ber 2012. He gained international notoriety in May 2013 for his insensitive comments on the‘‘comfort women’’ issue.

42. Document is available on the Osaka Prefectural Government website http://www.pref.osaka.jp/fumin/dantai/200411sensou-yobo.html (last accessed July 15, 2013).

43. Sankei shinbun, September 13, 2011.



http://www.pref.osaka.jp/fumin/dantai/200411sensou-yobo.html

http://www.pref.osaka.jp/fumin/dantai/200411sensou-yobo.html


history of Japan,’’ arguing that education on modern and contemporary his-tory was important in order to ‘‘correctly understand why China is so critical ofJapan’s understanding of history.’’44 According to newspaper reports, the newmuseum was to present various disputes including the domestic textbookcontroversies as well as views from China and Korea; however, since Hashimotohas openly criticized the ‘‘depressing views of history’’ presented at PeaceOsaka, it is anticipated that the exhibits will place an emphasis on presentingneo-revisionist views as the ‘‘correct’’ version of the past.45

The new museum plan has profoundly affected Peace Osaka. The city andprefecture announced on October 12, 2012, that Peace Osaka would gothrough a comprehensive overhaul to prevent any overlap with the substanceof exhibits in the new history museum.46 This overhaul also included museumpersonnel: On April 1, 2013, the beginning of the new fiscal year, the museumunderwent a complete re-staffing from the director to administrators andspecialists. Five days later, the museum announced the ‘‘Peace OsakaRenewal Plan.’’47 According to this plan, the new exhibit was to be comprisedof two functions: memorial and education. In addition to memorializing thevictims of Osaka air raids, the plan included exhibits that would convey the‘‘misery of war’’ and ‘‘importance of peace’’ to the next generation using theOsaka air raids as a case study. The stated goal was to nurture loving beingswho desire peace. The target audience was to be children of elementary andmiddle school age, who currently comprise 60 to 70 percent of the visitors.

Peace Osaka and Progressive History

Peace Osaka is not the only target of such controversies. Several otherpublic museums, built as a result of citizens movements to preserve home-front memory of the final years of the Asia-Pacific War when Japanese citieswere under constant attack by Allied air raids, follow a similar format andincorporate exhibits that are critical of the wartime Japanese state andacknowledge Japan’s role in the Asia-Pacific War as that of the aggressor.Most use a strategy similar to that of Peace Osaka and attempt to contextu-alize homefront suffering in Japan’s war of aggression.48 And as a result, mosthave experienced some criticism and interference with operation. But in myview, even these perpetrator narratives—the kind that are the target of revi-sionist attacks—reinforce the victim consciousness of the visitors.

44. Yomiuri shinbun, May 12, 2012.45. Yomiuri shinbun, August 22, 2012.46. Yomiuri shinbun, October 12, 2012.47. The document is available on the museum website. http://www.peace-osaka.or.jp/news/

pdf/20130524_itaku.pdf (last accessed July 16, 2013).48. For example, the exhibit at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum begins its narrative

with the description of Hiroshima as a major military base and also touches upon the aggressionscommitted in China by the Japanese military.



http://www.peace-osaka.or.jp/news/pdf/20130524_itaku.pdf

http://www.peace-osaka.or.jp/news/pdf/20130524_itaku.pdf


In his study of war responsibility among the Japanese in the mid 1990’s—a time when Japanese lawmakers had made a series of public apologies—historian Yoshida Yutaka argued that such apologies in particular, and popularopinion on Japan’s war crimes more generally, were not so much a result ofchanging historical consciousness as they were a reaction to internationalcriticism.49 The apologies, then, were merely a strategy for improving Japan’sforeign relations with China and South Korea, rather than a bona fideacknowledgement of wrongdoings in the wartime past. Yoshida further pointsout that a feeling of ‘‘being tricked (damasareta)’’ by the wartime governmentpermeated the immediate postwar period, and allowed the general publicto not only embrace democracy, but also leave issues of their own war

Central courtyard with the Memorial for Victims of Osaka Air Raids. (Photo courtesy ofthe author.)

49. Yoshida, Nihonjin no senso�kan, 7.



http://www.jstor.org/action/showImage?doi=10.1525/tph.2014.36.2.75&iName=master.img-001.jpg&w=252&h=336


responsibility unquestioned.50 In this scenario, in which the apologies hadoccurred as more or less a superficial measure, it is possible that the persis-tence of international criticism has resulted in yet another reactionaryresponse—a climate of denial of war crimes more generally.

The Peace Osaka website states the principles of the exhibit as follows: ‘‘Atthe end of the Second World War, Osaka received much damage from over50 air raid attacks that flattened the city. Many Japanese lost lives or experi-enced tremendous suffering elsewhere—including in Hiroshima and Naga-saki, upon which atomic bombs were dropped, and in Okinawa, whichbecame the site of a land war. But we will also not forget the fact that, dueto the fifteen year war that ended on August 15, 1945, much suffering wascaused for the people of the Asia-Pacific area including China as well as of theformer colonies Korea and Taiwan.’’51 This statement has been widely laudedby museum supporters and the intellectual left for its public acknowledge-ment of military aggression. But there is no human agency in this narrative: itwas the air raids, the atomic bombs, and war in general that caused thesuffering and loss. This is due, in part, to the structure of the Japaneselanguage that allows for complete sentences without explicit active subjects.But it also conveniently supports the ‘‘being tricked’’ sentiment shared bya large component of the survivor generation. And this style and the resultingambiguity of agency are typical of the ways in which the war has been narratedin museum exhibits, first person narratives, peace promotion booklets, etc.The war happened, the bombs dropped; war is bad because people suffer asa result. This kind of narrative places the blame on war and weapons, ratherthan on the people who made the decisions. Victim consciousness thus pre-vails. A visit to Room A, which displays photographs and objects from theOsaka air raids with little contextual information of the fifteen year war,reinforces the impression of war as an event that suddenly engulfed the localresidents.

This is not to say, however, that there is not an identified agent behind thewar and weapons in the Peace Osaka displays. Room B in particular—whichdisplays photographs as evidence of Japanese military aggression in Asia—makes obvious who the agents were. The planning committee’s goal was topresent the aggression as one reason for the intense bombing of Osaka. Theexhibit that included a portrayal of Japan as aggressor was meant to explainwhy the city was attacked so many times: that although the air-raids and theatomic bombs caused tremendous suffering, they were the consequence ofJapan’s assaults in Asia. Museum staff (prior to the recent overhaul) empha-sized the importance of viewing both rooms A and B ‘‘in order to fully under-stand the war.’’52 Depiction of Japan’s aggression was an important and

50. Yoshida, Nihonjin no senso�kan, 55.51. http://www.peace-osaka.or.jp/welcome/ (last accessed July 15, 2013). Over 15,000 people

died in these raids; 344,000 homes were destroyed.52. Author interview with O� tsuki Kazuko, February 5, 2005.




necessary component of the exhibit, according to the creators; the combina-tion of Rooms A and B was meant to create a kind of ‘‘result and cause’’sequence. In Room A, visitors learn about the suffering and losses of Osakaresidents that resulted from the Allied air raids. In Room B, they then learnthe reason for these attacks: aggression by the Japanese military. The messagehere, then, is that Japanese people suffered and died due to the atrocious actsthe Japanese military committed in China. Other municipal museums, includ-ing those in Kawasaki and Saitama, address Japan’s role in the Asia-PacificWar as the aggressor. Renovations at the Hiroshima Peace MemorialMuseum (1994) and the Nagasaki Prefectural Peace Museum (1996) incor-porated narratives that explained why those cities were targeted for theatomic bomb. And neo-revisionists have attacked them all.53

But these museums that acknowledge war crimes committed by the Jap-anese state would, for many visitors (including those that acknowledge Japan’saggression), only reinforce the victim’s history that they are already familiarwith. These narratives consistently fault the Japanese wartime state as the soleperpetrator of all wartime aggressions and crimes. They thus absolve theindividuals that committed the crimes, as well as the homefront populationthat (willingly or unwillingly) fully supported the war. More importantly, bypresenting a parallel narrative that highlights the suffering and loss experi-enced by the local residents as a result of Allied bombing, the exhibits asa whole also suggest that it was the Japanese state that caused tremendoussuffering and loss not only to its wartime foes, but also to the Japanese people.The drive to set a clear distinction between the victim and perpetrator ab-solves all except the top leaders (in both civilian and military roles) from anyresponsibility associated with the Asia-Pacific War. This kind of war respon-sibility, where blame is limited to a select few that have already been tried ina war crimes tribunal, is not difficult to accept by those with little informedconsciousness of the past. Neither does such a representation of the past pushpeople to think responsibly about war crimes. The exhibits that have been thetarget of right wing attacks ironically reinforce the narrative that interfereswith improving Japan’s relations with China and South Korea, which havesoured in recent decades due to unresolved reparations.

The current exhibit has many other shortcomings, which can justify the callfor renewal. Many of the items displayed in room B have been under heavyscrutiny, but the room as a whole has not. Viewed in its entirety, the materialexhibited here does not present a coherent narrative of the fifteen wartimeyears. Items associated with the war in China occupy a significant area in theroom, but they do not clarify the reason the Japanese military was in Chinain the first place.54 Without a historical context, the impression given is that

53. The Nagasaki revisions in particular have caused controversies. See, for example, KamataSadao, ‘‘Nagasaki genbaku shiryo�kan no kagai tenji mondai,’’ Senso� sekinin kenkyu� 14 (Sep-tember 1996), 22-31.

54. The only reason presented for the war was that the Japanese government was attemptingto divert popular attention away from the ongoing economic depression by waging war.




members of the Japanese military haphazardly committed atrocious acts inChina, and in retaliation, Osaka residents were harmed. But since evaluationof this room has become so politicized, few who take the side of Peace Osakaon its understanding of the war have ventured to criticize the methodology.55

Items that have been under attack by the critics comprise only one segment ofthe exhibit. Also portrayed in the room are other kinds of tragedies that werecaused by war. But the incessant attacks by the revisionists have ironicallyhighlighted the presentation of the Japanese atrocities in the exhibit.

One important objective of these local air raid museums is to preserve andrelay memories of wartime experiences to future generations. To do this, theymust grapple with an important issue: how to present the past in ways that arerelevant for today’s youth, and how to connect the past to the future. Typi-cally, tactics employed to meet this objective are in the final segment of theexhibit, which deal with a peaceful future. In most museums, this section hasan atmosphere markedly different from the dark and oppressive quality of therooms depicting the air-raid experiences. In Peace Osaka, for example, thisroom (Room C), which is brightly lit, addresses ongoing global issues includ-ing dangers of nuclear weapons, genocide, and environmental degradation.These are important topics to address, and yet, in the context of the entireexhibit, the narrative framework, which fast-forwards from 1945 and expandsto developing countries, has little relevance to the first two rooms where theoverwhelming emphasis is on suffering and loss created by a particular kind ofwarfare. With little transition in scale from local to global, the poverty andfamine in Africa, for example, seem remote, with no connection to where theviewer is standing.

Further, the jump from 1945 to the future misses the opportunity forvaluable lessons. There is no space to reflect on the past injustices and theatrocities witnessed in Room B. And the impact of Japanese suffering repre-sented in Room A allows for the framing of the exhibit around the victimizedJapanese. ‘‘Witness all the suffering we Japanese have experienced as a resultof war,’’ the exhibit calls out. ‘‘Let this be a lesson to you; war should beprevented because this is what will result from it.’’ Missing from the discourseare important questions such as: How did we allow this tragedy to happen?What can we do differently the next time? (Or even the question of who isresponsible for the wartime events displayed in rooms A and B.) These arepoints that could have been addressed had there not been such controversiesover content and perspective in the mid 1990s. There also should have beenopportunities to revise and adapt the exhibit to respond to new trends inscholarship, both in history and museum studies, in the over two decadesof the museum’s existence.

55. The only such criticism that I have come across was written by a reporter for the Asahinewspaper, who added an editorial onto an article on the new renovation. Asahi shinbun, June 7,2013.




The new proposal takes advantage of these shortcomings to rationalizechange. According to the proposal announced on April 6, 2013, the newexhibit will target the younger generation as its main audience. In additionto popular ‘‘experiential’’ displays including an air raid shelter and a wartimeresidence that can be explored, as well as wartime clothing that can be worn,the proposal includes ideas such as simplified wall texts (more detaileddescription of exhibits will be available in a separate pamphlet), rewritingprimary sources with contemporary language, and strategies to encourageinteraction among young visitors. The proposed exhibit is comprised of threecomponents: past, present, and future. The first part utilizes the Osaka airraids as a case study to promote an understanding of the misery of war, as wellas the events that led to the air raids and the description of Osaka as a militarycity. In the second part, visitors learn about the efforts by local residents torecover from ashes and build the Osaka that exists today. The lesson here isthe importance of peace in the process of reconstruction. The last sectionfocuses on the meaning of peace in today’s society, as well as the activities ofOsaka residents to create and maintain peace. Through these three steps, thevisitors are meant to realize that war is not something horrible that occurredin the distant past, but that ongoing efforts are needed to maintain peace.

Atlhough little information is available in the proposal on parts two andthree, the portrayal of a combination of the wartime experience and postwarefforts seems quite similar to the exhibit at the Sho�wa Hall, a public museumthat had undergone prolonged controversies in its planning stage.56 TheSho�wa Hall covers the period between 1935 and 1955 with a focus on thehardships of homefront life precipitated by the war. Also in the Sho�wa Hall,little context is provided as to why people were forced to live in such a manner,and, as Kerry Smith has pointed out, ‘‘uncritical presentation of key tenets ofvictim consciousness as a unifying theme makes it almost impossible to por-tray subjects/citizens (including agents of the state) as knowingly deceiving,suppressing, or otherwise injuring one’s fellow subjects/citizens.’’57 This kindof presentation emphasizes the victim’s narrative in the Sho�wa Hall. But inthe revisionist framework (such as the anticipated new exhibit at Peace Osaka)in which there is no deception or suppression, in which injury is reframed assacrifice for a good cause, there is not even the need for subjects/citizens todeceive or suppress in the first place. The emphasis on the optimism ofpeaceful reconstruction also echoes the redemptive themes presented at theSho�wa Hall: because of the wartime suffering, and because of the resultingefforts, Japanese today can enjoy peace and prosperity.

56. Kerry Smith, ‘‘The Sho�wa Hall: Memorializing Japan’s War at Home,’’ The Public His-torian 24 no. 4 (Fall 2002): 35-64; Ellen Hammond, ‘‘Commemoration Controversies: The War,the Peace and Democracy in Japan,’’ in Laura Hein and Mark Selden eds., Living with the Bomb:American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997),100-121.

57. Smith, ‘‘The Sho�wa Hall,’’ 60.




The proposal presents the goal of the new exhibit as enabling the visitor tothink about peace as one’s individual challenge. The suffering and loss expe-rienced on the homefront is to serve as evidence for the importance of peace.This overwhelming focus on the homefront and the importance of peacepresents two problems. First, there is little room to discuss issues of warresponsibility (or actions that resulted in the need for such discussions in thefirst place). Second, it presents a simplistic formula: war is bad (because itcauses suffering), peace is good (since it does not cause suffering). The simpledichotomy does not nurture in the younger generation more sophisticatedways of thinking about war and global conflicts. In addition, a focus ondomestic suffering can lead to an argument that supports the use of militaryforce to prevent war on the homeland.58

Reactionary Nationalism, Postwar Responsibility

It is premature to speculate on the detailed contents of the new exhibits.But the renewal plan has already been politicized. Concerned citizens quicklyformed the Liaison Group to Think About Peace Osaka’s Crisis (Peace Osakano Kiki o Kangaeru Renrakukai) in late April 2013 and solicited petitions torequest of the museum director an information session about the renewal.A Facebook page, ‘‘We Do Not Need a Yu�shu�kan in the West: Let’s ProtectPeace Osaka for the Peace of Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean Chil-dren,’’ was launched on April 29.59 A meeting took place on May 10, duringwhich the director assured the group that their concerns would be conveyedto the renewal committee. On June 29 the Liaison Group hosted a symposiumfeaturing museum directors, educators, scholars, and survivors, and solicitedcitizen participation.60 Although the symposium was useful and necessary tocapture public opinion regarding the renewal, the flyer announcement andupdates on the Facebook page indicate that the cause has already beenpoliticized.

The case of Peace Osaka illustrates a profound shift in Japanese viewstowards the wartime past. According to a former Peace Osaka staff member,the majority of the protestors who criticized the current exhibits had neverpersonally experienced the Asia-Pacific War, while the voices of the survivors

58. This is a particularly troublesome development in Japan today, which is under theleadership of Abe Shinzo�, a neo-revisionist prime minister whose goal is to revise the pacifistConstitution. Judith Butler makes a similar argument in her critique of the American govern-ment’s handling of the post 9/11 affairs. Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning andViolence (London and New York: Verso, 2004).

59. Yu�shu�kan is a museum annexed to Yasukuni Shrine that portrays Japan’s modern wars asself-defense.

60. For reports on the symposium, see Tanaka Harumi, ‘‘‘Peace Osaka no renyu�aru ni shiminfumin no koe o! shinpojiumu’ sankaki,’’ and Nishimura Ken, ‘‘‘Peace Osaka no renyu�aru ni shiminfumin no koe o! shinpojiumu’ to ‘Peace Osaka kengakukai’ ni sanka shite,’’ Chiho�shi kenkyu� 63,no. 5 (October 2013): 67-75.




had been consciously incorporated into museum displays.61 The planningcommittee had included representatives from survivor groups. Museum staffhad continued to request and receive feedback from these groups on anannual basis. Overall, feedback from the survivor generation has been posi-tive.62 The disparity between the voices of the survivors and those of theprotestors reflects a larger trend in generational difference in the historicalunderstanding of the Asia-Pacific War. For example, those who experiencedthe war as adults (almost all of whom are now deceased) tended to be moreopen to admitting Japan’s wrongdoings in the postwar years. Those whoexperienced the war as young children, on the other hand, are more likelyto argue that, although the Japanese state waged a war of aggression, Japanesepeople were victims of their wartime state.63 Many from this generation havebecome vocal and often influential writers, teachers, and activists, which hasresulted in the dominance of the ‘‘victim’s history’’—the kind of narrative thatis presented in Peace Osaka. They have also pushed for, and applauded, theofficial apologies of the mid 1990s. But more recently, many of those borndecades after 1945 have begun to participate in the process of memory workwith a revisionist voice. Many members of this younger generation show littleinterest in issues of war responsibility, or the reasons why Japan becameembroiled in an extended military conflict. Rather, their narratives attemptto reimagine an idealized past that is eerily reminiscent of state-initiatedpropaganda of the war years. Most critics of the current Peace Osaka belongto this group.64

In Japan, the process of representing the past has seen a dramatic turn tothe political right, particularly after the mid-1990s apologies, concurrent withthe attacks on Peace Osaka. The new narratives produced by these neo-conservatives align with what the critics of the current museum exhibit arguedfor: a history of modern and contemporary Japan that is devoid of any wrong-doing by the Japanese state. The proponents of this historical revisionismmaintain that Japanese youths should be taught a history of their home coun-try that they can be proud of. There are several pertinent examples. In 1996,several neo-revisionist scholars founded the Japanese Society for HistoryTextbook Reform that sought to promote a nationalistic view through historyeducation. Their version of Japanese history was cleansed of Japan’s war

61. Author interview with O� tsuki Kazuko, February 5, 2005.62. Author interview with O� tsuki Kazuko, February 5, 2005.63. This is the generation that was most likely to have been indoctrinated at a young age by

the thoroughly nationalistic education curriculum that started in 1941.64. This ‘‘group’’ is by no means one coherent entity. Key constituents include lawmakers

such as Hashimoto To�ru, revisionist scholars such as Higashinakano Shu�do�, activist groups suchas the Tsukurukai and Tadasukai, members of the younger generation influenced by culturalproducers such as Kobayashi Yoshinori and internet culture, and conservative media outlets suchas the Sankei newspaper and Sakura Channel. But they too are interrelated, as lawmakersbecome involved in activist groups, conservative media outlets support the lawmakers, etc.Although liberal media often calls these groups a ‘‘vocal minority,’’ they currently have the powerto place revisionists such as Hashimoto and Abe into positions of power.




crimes and situated wartime Japan as the liberator of Asia from Westernimperialism. The popularity of publications by ultranationalist cultural pro-ducers such as the graphic novelist Kobayashi Yoshinori, commentators KoBunyu and Sakurai Yoshiko, and writer Hyakuta Naoki is telling of the kind ofnarratives appreciated by many Japanese today. Mainstream popular culturesuch as films typically do not go so far as to justify the war itself, but they oftenaestheticize sacrifice and honor without specifically making much reference tothe political implications of the war or crimes and atrocities committed. Anunderlying theme is Japan as a nation that all Japanese can be proud of—a narrative that presumably appeals to many who have grown tired of criti-cisms from the rest of Asia.

This all suggests a kind of reactionary nationalism: the reinterpretation ofthe past as a political position. If the apologies of the mid-1990s came asa result of international pressure, the succeeding turn to the right can beconsidered a response by frustrated domestic voices. By the 1990s, individuals(rather than states for whom issues of responsibility and compensationseemed to have been settled through war crimes tribunals) had begun tomake claims in court for apologies and compensation.65 Further, the ongoing,persistent criticisms from China and South Korea have had a particularlystrong impact on the generation born after 1945, who feel that they shouldnot have to be responsible for what happened before they were born. Forexample, in 1995 Takaichi Sanae, a member of the Lower House born in1961, publicly argued that she was under no obligation to contemplate Japan’swar responsibility since she was not even alive at the time.66 Takaichi’s state-ment drew a variety of responses. Liberal media outlets, including the Asahinewspaper, condemned her point of view as woeful (totemo kanashii).67 Atthe same time, many Japanese from her generation—including those whoacknowledge Japan’s wartime crimes—admit to holding similar sentiments.68

This latter response suggests a trend more complex than that of a generationrefusing to bear responsibility for something that had happened before theywere born.69 Those who do acknowledge Japan’s war crimes feel that theJapanese state has an obligation to pay for wartime injustices, but feel noneed to take responsibility for the actions themselves as individuals. Suchsentiments fuel victim’s history.

65. Carol Gluck, ‘‘Sekinin/Responsibility in Modern Japan,’’ in Gluck and Anna LowenhauptTsing, eds., Words in Motion: Toward A Global Lexicon (Durham and London: Duke UniversityPress, 2009), 97.

66. Nihon keizai shinbun, March 17, 1995.67. Tokyo Asahi shinbun, March 18, 1995.68. ‘‘Editorial,’’ Kikan senso� sekinin kenkyu� no. 11 (Spring, 1996), 2-9.69. Norma Field has recently made an astute observation on the conservative turn of

Japanese youths. The post-bubble generations have never benefited from the postwar peace orprosperity that many Japanese argue had been built on the war experience, but at the same time,grew up in a society that is often criticized internationally for the inadequate nature of reparation.They therefore have tended to make a reactionary turn towards revisionism. Asahi shinbundigital, March 1, 2014.




In the absence of those who are willing to act on reconciliation, interna-tional views—particularly from China and South Korea—have shiftedtowards vocal disapproval of Japan’s inadequacies. These sentiments havemanifested themselves in new controversies including disputes over islands,lawsuits against Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese government, as well asconstruction in the United States of memorials for comfort women. Thecurrent shift towards revisionist history seems to be a reactionary move bythe generation born after the war for whom it seems impossible to get out ofthe war responsibility quagmire. Denial of the past becomes an attractiveoption for many. The fact that key political leaders claim that certain warcrimes did not happen does not help the cause. Current Prime Minister Abe,for example, has proposed reexamining the Ko�no Statement—the 1993 apol-ogy issued to the comfort women by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Ko�noYo�hei.70 The Abe proposal suggests that the highly organized sexual slaveryby the Japanese military did not happen, and that the victimized womentherefore need no apology from the Japanese state. Although Abe has re-tracted the proposal in March 2014 in order to stabilize international relationsamong Japan, the United States, and South Korea, this too follows earlierpatterns of statements and apologies, where words were uttered for the sakeof diplomacy.

The concept of ‘‘postwar responsibility’’ offers some possibilities for escap-ing this reactionary trend.71 This concept is concerned not so much withaccepting responsibility for the war and its associated crimes, but rather, forthe postwar responses. The ‘‘responsibility’’ in this approach is therefore notfor the acts committed during the war, but for ending the present interna-tional tension resulting from the unresolved issues from the war, which canonly be successfully executed through reconciliation. Of course the issue ofwho is responsible still remains and scholars differ on this point. Renownedhistorian and activist Ienaga Saburo� has argued for a collective responsibilitythat transcends experience or age groups: that since the postwar generationshave benefited from the peace and prosperity built on the Japanese warexperience, it is necessary for all Japanese to bear responsibility.72 Othersargue that responsibility is not based on nationality, but should be foundedupon a critical assessment and understanding of Japan’s imperial past: thatpostwar generations should not be forced to inherit war responsibility without

70. Many conservative scholars have since presented rebuttals to the Ko�no Statement.Historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki, whose archival research resulted in the Ko�no Statement, is currentlyinvolved in a defamation lawsuit against conservative lawmaker Sakurauchi Fumiki.

71. The phrase ‘‘postwar responsibility’’ has existed since the 1970s, but it has been mobilizedin the last two decades to result in a flurry of publications that use the term in order to findinnovative ways of achieving reconciliation between Japan and its wartime adversaries. For recentdiscussions on postwar responsibility, see, for example, O�numa Yasuaki, Tokyo saiban, senso�sekinin, sengo sekinin (Tokyo: To�shindo�, 2007); Takahashi Tetsuya, Sengo sekinin ron (Tokyo:Ko�dansha, 2005); and Ko�ketsu Atsushi, Watashi tachi no senso� sekinin: ‘‘Showa’’ shoki 20 nen to‘‘Heisei’’ ki 20 nen no rekishi teki ko�satsu (Tokyo: Gaifu�sha, 2009).

72. Ienaga Saburo�, Senso� sekinin (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2002).




rational reasoning or acceptable explanation.73 Although many scholars haveactively, and often transnationally, contributed to the discourse on Japan’s warresponsibility in the recent years, it seems that the concept of people’s respon-sibility has yet to take hold among the general public in Japan.74 Further,there is no safe public space for education on war responsibility since the topicis always heavily politicized. War responsibility has become a political positionrather than a problem that needs to be understood, acknowledged, andresolved.

Peace Museums as a Forum for Education

In today’s cultural climate of increasing revisionism, it is important tosituate issues of war responsibility as a central component of peace educationin Japan. Local peace museums throughout Japan have the potential tobecome ideal spaces for such initiative. But as the collections of most mu-seums (including Peace Osaka) focus on the preservation of war memories,space for critical engagement with issues of responsibility is limited. I con-clude with observations of the Peace Osaka controversy within a larger trendof Japanese peace museums and present some thoughts for future possibili-ties. These observations take inspiration from the fruits of research and col-laboration by the national and international networks of museums for peace,as well as existing and ongoing research by scholars of museum studies.75

Both International Network of Museums for Peace (established 1992) andJapan Conference of Museums for Peace (Nihon Heiwa Hakutsukan Kaigi,established 1994) engage in research and discussion on various topics associ-ated with peace.76 The definition of peace presented by these networks issubstantially wider than the anti-war position that most Japanese museumsfocus on. The international network in particular has actively engaged in wid-ening the scope to institutions that deal with structural and cultural violence.77

73. See, for example, Ko�ketsu, Watashi tachi no senso� sekinin and Takahashi, Sengo sekininron.

74. Examples of transnational scholarship include Daqing Yang et al. eds., Towards a HistoryBeyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 2012); Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, East Asia’s Haunted Present:Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Westport: Praeger Security Interna-tional, 2008); Kawakami Tamio et al. eds., Kaikyo� no ryo�gawa kara Yasukuni o kangaeru: hisen,chinkon, Ajia (Tokyo: Oruta Shppanshitsu, 2006).

75. I have relied the most upon Ritsumeikan heiwa kenkyu� (Ritsumeikan Peace Study)published annually by the Kyoto Museum for World Peace, Ritsumeikan University, whichinclude research articles by scholars and curators as well as reports of meetings held by thesenetworks.

76. For histories of these networks, see International Network of Museums for Peacewebsite, http://inmp.net/index.php/history (last accessed March 4, 2014) and Fukushima Ariyukiand Iwama Yu�ki, ‘‘‘Heiwa hakubutsukan kenkyu�’ ni mukete: Nihon ni okeru heiwa hakubutsukankenkyu�shi to korekara’’ in Ritsumeikan heiwa kenkyu�, supplement (October 2009): 1-77.

77. Anzai Ikuro�, ‘‘‘Heiwa no tame no hakubutsukan’ no jo�ken: Nicchu� ryo�koku no heiwatekikyo�seiteki kankei no hatten no tameni,’’ Ritsumeikan heiwa kenkyu� 9 (2008): 11-20.




Many Japanese peace museums, including Peace Osaka, are involved in thesenetworks. But as most Japanese peace museums developed out of grassrootsefforts to prevent the disappearance (fu�ka) of war memories, the central goalfor most has been to convey the ‘‘miserable nature (hisansa) of war’’ throughoral history narratives so that the ‘‘preciousness of peace’’ may be re-acknowl-edged.78 Their central achievement has been to provide spaces in which acts ofnarrating are supplemented with objects.

There exists a difficult balance between grassroots activities (predecessorto many Japanese peace museums) and the role of the museum as a space foreducation. An important question here involves ownership and audience:whose history is being presented, and for whom is it being presented? Mostpublic peace museums in Japan are owned and operated by local municipal-ities. It is a natural outcome of the grassroots effort to collect and presentmemories of local war experience, but at the same time, the focus on the localhas often allowed the resulting museums to circumvent, to some extent, thedifficulty of streamlining a message that a substantial number of taxpayers canagree to. But Peace Osaka, although developing out of local grassroots activ-ities, has upheld as its founding principle the contribution to internationalpeace through the promotion of communication between Osaka residents andthe rest of the world. The wide recognition it has enjoyed both domesticallyand internationally—from China in particular—has also created the impres-sion that the museum presents the official narrative of Japan at war to aninternational audience. But an exhibit of war memories through objects andnarratives (including Peace Osaka) does not automatically become an effec-tive tool for education. Possible ways to develop the missing link between thetwo might include skilled curatorial interventions, museum’s collaborationwith outside research institutions, or creative new ways to use the museumspace.79

The object-based approach of museums presents both strengths and weak-nesses for peace education. Although similar controversies have existed inother areas such as government-approved textbooks, museums are consid-ered by many to be a more powerful medium because of the objects dis-played. Viewed uncritically, the objects seem to stand as undeniable proof forthe narrative presented in museums. At the same time, we know too well thatthese objects have been taken out of their original context (often the personalone that involved the owner of the object), and into a new context that istypically the larger, collective narrative of the war. Former curator KanekoAtsushi argues that such unstable relationship between the object and thenarrative has not received due attention in the ideology battles surrounding

78. Iguchi Kazuki, ‘‘Senso�ten no kyo�teki igi,’’ Rekishi hyo�ron 556 (August 1996): 1-11.79. Most Japanese peace museums started without professionally trained curators. Although

Peace Osaka has since established a curatorial position, there was no curator available to respondto the controversies in the 1990s.




war exhibits in Japan.80 In Japanese peace museums, such possibilities forambiguity are often crowded out by conflict of ideologies: is it a display ofaggression, or is it one of revisionist history? The objects in such a contextcease to maintain their original significance only to serve as proof for thenarrative presented, inviting the critics to scrutinize the accuracy of the cap-tions. Further, objects cannot always effectively present abstract messagessuch as peace and reconciliation that are typically central to peace museums.

These challenges posed by object-based peace education can provide newopportunities for museums as educational space, however, and I conclude bypresenting some possibilities for Peace Osaka. For example, Peace Osaka cantake advantage of the wealth of objects and personal narratives available onlyat the institution and create a powerful display of local memories. These localmemories can then be contextualized by narratives of the fifteen-year war, notthrough recycled photographs with occasionally unclear origins (as was thecase with Room B), but by emphasizing the plurality of narratives availabletoday, and, more importantly, observations on why it has been difficult for theJapanese to agree on one national narrative. The museum’s own history ofpast controversies would be useful here for demonstrating, through example,the difficulties associated with presenting a narrative of the past that noteveryone agrees upon.

At the same time users can also take the initiative in transforming the spaceof Peace Osaka. Rather than simply accepting or rejecting the narrative pre-sented, discussions can take place on various ways that the past can be por-trayed. Taking advantage of the objects and personal narratives in themuseum’s collection, study sessions that examine topics such as the relation-ship between objects and memory, between memory and history, andbetween objects and larger historical narratives, can be held in the museumspace. The auditorium can be utilized once again to hold lectures and sym-posia on the history that is on display. The museum can become a forum fordiscussions, disagreements, and debates about both the past and the future,rather than a space in which the ‘‘correct’’ version of the past is to be exhib-ited. Precisely because of the difficulties it has encountered in the past, PeaceOsaka has the potential for transforming itself into a space for education andactivism that can be utilized for discussions of war responsibility, of possiblepeace initiatives, as well as of the consequences of disagreements over a dif-ficult past.

Akiko Takenaka is an assistant professor in the Department of History at theUniversity of Kentucky. She specializes in the social and cultural history of modernJapan with a research focus on memory and historiography of the Asia-Pacific War.Trained as an architect and an architectural historian, she is particularly interested in theintersection between memory and space, and has examined a variety of memorial spaces

80. Kaneko Atsushi, ‘‘Senso� shiryo� no riaritii,’’ in Yoshida Yutaka et al. eds., Nichijo� sekatsuno naka no so�ryokusen (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006).




broadly conceived, including memorials, museums and urban spaces, as well as virtualspaces of memory. Her first book entitled Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’sUnending Postwar is forthcoming from the University of Hawaii Press. She is currentlyworking on a book manuscript entitled War, Trauma and Postwar in Japan and East Asiain which she investigates the effect of trauma on war, as well as the influence of suchrepresentations on international relations in Japan. She has received her PhD in ArtHistory from Yale University (2004), and a MS in the History, Theory and Criticism ofArchitecture and Art from MIT (1997).

I am indebted to Joanne Melish, Karen Petrone, Doug Slaymaker, and three anonymousreferees for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts of thisessay.




Reactionary Nationalism and Museum Controversies: The Case of "Peace Osaka"

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