Journal of Management HistoryRationality revisited: An alternative perspective on reason in management and planningRichard S. Bolan

Article information:To cite this document:Richard S. Bolan, (1999),"Rationality revisited", Journal of Management History, Vol. 5 Iss 2 pp. 68 - 86Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13552529910260082

Downloaded on: 09 April 2015, At: 08:48 (PT)References: this document contains references to 35 other documents.To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.comThe fulltext of this document has been downloaded 1019 times since 2006*

Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:Mark R. Rutgers, (1999),"Be rational! But what does it mean?: A history of the idea of rationality and its relation tomanagement thought", Journal of Management History, Vol. 5 Iss 1 pp. 17-35

Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by 402805 []

For AuthorsIf you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors serviceinformation about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Pleasevisit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.

About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio ofmore than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of onlineproducts and additional customer resources and services.

Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on PublicationEthics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.

*Related content and download information correct at time of download.Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

68

Rationality revisitedAn alternative perspective on reason in

management and planningRichard S. Bolan

Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University ofMinnesota, USA

Keywords Management theory, Public administration

Abstract This paper is concerned with enlarging the traditional view of rationality that hasdominated management and planning in modern times. The inquiry begins by re-examiningWeber’s discussion of rationality as interpreted by contemporary analysts. Weber saw rationalityas multi-faceted and included notions of a social rational ity involving more than simpleinstrumental or “practical” rationality. Habermas’ ideas concerning communicative action arethen introduced as the basis for parsing out Weber’s differing conceptions of rationality based onthe dual underlying motivations of pursuing social agreement along with technical or instrumentalgoals. In dialectical fashion, the paper introduces the concept of adaptive rationality involving asynthetic form of reason that mediates between substantive, or social, rational ity andinstrumental, or technical, rationality. This adaptive form of reason is seen as the heart ofmanagement and planning and requires a combined technical, political and moral imagination inthe service of creating new forms of social practice and marshaling both the collective will andresources for their fulfillment. Thus, the paper argues for a wider conception of rationality thatexplicitly acknowledges social norms and the distribution of power and concludes with the hope ofa renewed focus of research for a richer understanding of rational action.

IntroductionModels of administrative action, in both theory and practice, have beenpredicated on a model of reason that epitomizes the Aristotelian ideal ofrational logic, one that puts a primary emphasis on an optimum fit betweendesirable ends and effective or efficient means. In seeking to imitate theapparent success of the natural sciences, the social science-based model simplyhas not stood the test of application over time. Theoreticians are now concernedthat the “rational paradigm” has broken down and that the policy-making,administration and planning disciplines have been left in the uncomfortableposition of no longer having a foundation in reason so as to anchor theirfunctions or purposes (Alexander, 1984).

The goal of this paper is to argue that concepts of administrative action havebeen operating under a limited and truncated concept of rationality, and thatthere is a more comprehensive and inclusive approach with greater scope forpractical utility. The idea of rationality has been too narrowly drawn and,consequently, fails to account for the multi-dimensional nature ofrationalization processes. The broader view offered here will be based onscholarship concerned with Weber’s writings about rationality. This expanded

Journal of Management History,Vol. 5 No. 2, 1999, pp. 68-86.© MCB University Press, 1355-252X

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

69

sense of rationality will then be examined for its implications for both planningtheory and planning practice.

After the varied dimensionality of rationalization is developed, a model issketched embracing three distinct communicative motives giving rise to threedifferent forms of rationalization. From this, a typology of salientcharacteristics of reasoning processes is drawn from these forms ofrationalization. Finally, a tentative exploration of how the model might impactplanning processes is presented; with particular attention given to therecognition that management, administration and planning are practiced incomplex, multi-organizational social settings.

Being rational in a real worldInstrumental rationality would appear to be the Achilles’ heel of the rationalmodel. Modern analysts in numerous disciplines have come to see that thesocial context in which humans reason is of vital concern. Simon (1947) was anearly observer of the contingent character of reason and concluded thatrationality was “bounded” as a result. His concept of boundedness, however,placed most stress on the limits of information, skill, and coping withuncertainty; in short, real-life thinkers are fallible and limited. Simon at thattime did not fully stress the potential pitfalls stemming from interaction orinterference from other human thinkers in social circumstances. Simon wasfollowed by a number of observers arguing the further entailments of humanfallibility including the often competitive or conflicting rationality of acommunity of thinkers. Among the most notable was, of course, Lindblom(1959, 1965) (Braybrook and Lindblom, 1963).

Forester (1984) notes the limitations arising not only from the process ofthinking itself but also the inevitable distortions arising from the communicationof such thought. He suggests that specific political structures can create what heterms “socially unnecessary distortions”. These structures create inequalities inthe distribution of environmental resources such as information, power, etc.,thereby limiting the capacity of real-life thinkers to be truly rational.

Wildavsky (1966), in a critique of benefit-cost analysis, made reference to thelimiting influences of a vague, mysterious “political rationality”. This notiontriggered conceptual thinking in both organization theory and political science.Today, current notions of political rationality recognize that reason in a politicalcontext is a complex joining of “diverse streams of problems, solutions,participants and perceived opportunities of choice” (Levine, 1985). Hence wehave such metaphors as “garbage-can” decision making (where no singleproblem can truly be thought about in isolation without being linked to one ormore other problems, often totally unrelated (Cohen and March, 1986; Cohen etal., 1972)); or “policy communities” (where experts, specialists, and interestlobbies simultaneously collaborate, compete or maneuver to influence agendasetting and problem solving (Polsby, 1984)). More generally, the idea ofrationality being divided into particular realms of social action has led to the

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

70

term becoming characterized by adjectives representative of the realms:“political rationality”, “economic rationality”, etc. But social problems neverexist in a vacuum and some form of “rational” thinking lies behind thejuxtaposition of two or more issues.

In short, rationalizing is broader and more complex than single-mindedmeans-ends calculations. The thinking behind the choice of ends, behind thecreation of normative structures and codes of behavior, behind the creation ofinstitutions and structures of social order all entail rational reason in somesense. The argument below suggests that these forms of reason areinappropriately overlooked in the purely instrumental focus of the present“rational model”. This oversight, I submit, is crucial for both the development oftheory and the practice of administration, management and planning.

A multi-faceted view of rationalityThe analysis here begins with Weber’s interest in rationalization. This hasreceived the attention of scholarly inquiry, and I will begin from a selection ofprominent studies that will help in suggesting an approach to understandingrational processes in a complex social field. I draw on two works that explicitlyanalyze Weber’s ideas about rationality: the first is by Kalberg (1980), thesecond from the work of Habermas (1984). Additionally, the work of a thirdtheorist, Giddens (1979), rounds out the foundation for constructing mysubsequent model of rationality.

Weber’s primary question, it will be recalled, was why did capitalism andindustrialization occur only in the Occidental societies of Europe and America(Watzlavick et al., 1967, p. 25)? Marx’s thesis that these developments evolvedfrom the conditions of economic production failed to satisfy Weber, who sawmore fundamental clues in religion, law and other social institutions. In doingthis, Weber focussed on rationalization processes. His scope was rather broadand, while he never systematically articulated the concept, Kalberg andHabermas have attempted to piece together the various senses in which Weberapplied the term “rational”. Emerging from their work is a concept of rationalitythat contains, in Kalberg’s terms, “multivalent embodiments”.

Kalberg’s analysis of Weberian rationalityKalberg (1980, pp. 1151-9) suggests that Weber identified four distinct types ofrationality, two of which focus on the practical interests of securing the needsand wants of life while the other two are focussed on value and meaningspringing from the problems of human association. These four can be describedas follows:

(1) Practical rationality pertains to the thought processes associated withthe pursuit of pragmatic and egoistic interests. It is the means by whichindividuals take account of the world as it exists and calculate the mostexpedient means of dealing with it.

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

71

(2) Theoretical rationality is the process in which humans seek mastery overthe world through the attribution of causality developed by increasinglyprecise abstract concepts. While we generally associate this with scienceand philosophy, Weber also saw this as a critical element in theologicalreason.

(3) Substantive rationality is a form of rationalization that embodies not apurely means-ends calculation but rather the development of patterns ofaction based on value postulates or clusters of values. Substantiverationality is that reasoning through which values, in and of themselves,come to be accepted. As Weber states:

Something is not of itself “irrational”, but rather becomes so when examined from aspecific “rational” standpoint. Every religious person is “irrational” for everyirreligious person, and every hedonist likewise views every ascetic way of life as“irrational”, even if, measured in terms of its ultimate values, a “rationalization” hastaken place (quoted in Kalberg (1980, p. 1156)).

Thus, in Weber’s terms, differing life styles or life worlds defend theirown values as “rational” and label others “irrational”. Weber also arguesthat there is, thus, no absolute standard for substantive rationality.

(4) Formal rationality relates to those thought processes which seek tocodify practical rationality with reference to a substantively rationalizedworld view of value. The result is formal laws, rules, regulations, andformally structured patterns of domination and administration.

Kalberg also notes that all four types are manifested in rationalizing at all levelsof collective processes. Thus, the reference points for the mental processesassociated with rationalization include: interests, abstractions about the world,values and world views, and laws and regulations. Purely means-endscalculations are but a single manifestation of these multiple processes.

Habermas’ analysisHabermas (1984, Ch. 2) views Weber’s accounts of rationality in somewhatprogressive, developmental terms. Rationality, in the first instance, emergesfrom experience. It is thus rooted in practical rationality. It begins with“techniques” for dealing with the world, ways of doing things honed byexperience. Thus, there are techniques of building, techniques of prayer,techniques of making love, techniques of making war, and so forth. Over time,alternative techniques to meet the same purpose are devised, so that techniquesthereafter are qualified by introduction of varied and more likely prospects ofsuccess where subjectively purposeful-rational schemes are contrasted withtraditional, customary action.

Further articulation of rationalization occurs not only when alternativemeans are more or less rational, but ends can be deliberately chosen as well.Habermas terms this the “rationality of choice” or the process of choosing endsto be sought in accord with values. He then argues, somewhat differently than

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

72

Kalberg, that the Weberian notion of formal rationality is the combination of theinstrumental rationality that specifies technique and the rationality of choicethat specifies ends. Thus, formal rationality, in Habermas’ view is embedded insubstantive rationality. This latter form of rationality is the evaluation of valuepostulates or clusters or systems of value that underlie the preferencesexpressed in the “rationality of choice”.

Even though the views of the two authors are slightly different, two basicaspects of rationality are evident from this discussion. First, rationality takesplace at many levels and, second, the various levels are correlative. Practicalrationality, theoretical rationality, and formal rationality all presuppose andderive from substantive rationality. Lest this structure become too confusing, itis important to come to grips with the term “rationality” itself and its verb form,“to rationalize”[1].

The giving of reasons for an action, either before or after the fact, isessentially a linguistic action. Habermas argues that being rational is primarilyembedded in what he terms “communicative competence”. Indeed, Weberoriginally held this view in conceiving of rationality as the formal organizationof symbol systems, and where religion provided the historical, primordial basisfor such formal organization. Schlucter, quoted by Habermas, seems especiallypertinent to our concerns here:

Rationalism means … systematizing of meaning complexes, intellectually working throughand consciously sublimating the “aims of meaning.” It is a consequence of the “innercompulsion” of civilized beings not only to grasp the world but also to take a position on it; itis thus metaphysical-ethical rationalism in the broadest sense (quoted in Habermas (1984, p. 176)).

To be rational, in these terms, is to take a willful action; to take a stance,principally through the medium of the primary human symbolization system-language. Rationalization involves conscious (or subliminal) thought processesthat in some manner weigh values, ends, means, likely outcomes, and the like.Such thought patterns may become very complex as in a formal, elaboratedbenefit/cost analysis. At bottom, however, the thoughts and their manifestationoriginate in language, speech and other forms of symbolic expression.

Habermas argues that Weber’s focus of rationality (explaining or “givingreasons for” different forms of social action) is not wholly adequate and theeffort to be rational is, more correctly, the effort of mutual participants incommunicative interaction seeking to reach a fundamental understanding thatwould provide a normative framework of agreement for mutual coordination ofplans and actions.

Thus, for Habermas, rationality is less a reason for individual behavior thanit is a basis for the establishment of interpersonal relations. For him, rationalityis something more than the ability of individuals to “utter well grounded factualbeliefs and to act efficiently” (Habermas, 1984, p. 15). Habermas points to a four-fold array of validity claims:

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

73

(1) the truth of propositions;

(2) the rightness of norms of action implied by propositions;

(3) the adequacy of standards of value; and

(4) the sincerity or truthfulness of the speaker.

Thus, he concludes that the concept of rationality extends beyond the abstractstandard rules of logical inference or a means-ends calculus and entails a broadarray of legitimating forms of argument that are, at bottom, normative.

Habermas also distinguishes between communicative action and strategicaction. While communicative action is oriented toward achievingunderstanding, strategic action, in the Habermas scheme, is oriented towardachieving success. Strategic action does not give rise to validity claims, as justdescribed, but rather to claims of power or mastery. Habermas does not fullyfollow through with this distinction but, in his view, strategic action is rooted inrationalization processes which are technical and practical and which tend topresuppose the normative background of prior communicative action on whichthey rest.

A medical protocol, for example, is strategically rational in that its outcomeresults in a cured patient. However, its fundamental rationality is not solely itstechnical efficacy but also implicated is the rationality of the terms, conditionsand agreements under which medicine is practiced in a given community.

Habermas’ sharp distinction between communicative action and strategicaction would seem to be problematical. Watzlavick et al. (1967) argue that thetwo cannot be separated; while every speech act implies validity claims asHabermas outlines, so does it also imply performative or quasi-performativedimensions, and hence, implicates relational claims; that is, implicit claimsconcerning the speaker’s relation to the listener. Such claims are not confined tostrategic action but are embedded in communicative action as well. Thus, thenormative rationalization of validity claims are intertwined with the normativerationalization of claims to power. Indeed, Habermas’ validity claims ofrightness and legitimacy imply a sense of social obligation and privilege and,hence, a tacit understanding of power.

Giddens’ approach to rationalityGiddens (1979, Ch. 2) also stresses the primary grounding of rationalizationprocesses in language. The work of Derrida is the beginning point of Giddens’analysis. Derrida argues that speech and language (the signifier and thesignified) are not separable and that they are “two sides of one and the sameproduction” (Giddens, 1979, p. 30). From this, Derrida claims that allsignification, or all human processes of creating meaning, imply constantprocesses of mutation, through the play of identities, differences anddistinctions in our descriptions of the world and in the positions we take in theworld. Thus, meaning can be construed as a successive process of linguisticgenetic mutation advancing toward higher thresholds of complexity (much as

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

74

suggested by Piaget; see Los (1981, p. 73)). The interaction of speech andlanguage becomes repetitively or iteratively implicated in the production andreproduction of social practices. These linguistically grounded processes of “thestructuring of structure” can be conceived as processes of rationalization.Rationalization is itself a linguistic performance; simultaneously a description,an explanation and a justification; rooted in the play between what Giddenscalls “a virtual world of differences”. Rationalization is thus a process ofdifferentiation that is recursively dynamic.

Seen in this way, rationalization is a form of social practice; a mode of socialaction. Rationalization is deeply embedded in social structures (i.e. the divisionof labor, the configuration of institutions; themselves the products of reified,reproduced social action). Yet new rationalizations have an impact onpreviously rationalized social structures involving the transformationalcapacities cited in the previous paragraph. Rationalization in these broaderperspectives, then, extends far beyond mere logical calculation. The canons oflogical reasoning are themselves the products of rationalized social action inthis view.

SummationFrom examining the work of these three scholars, we more clearly see the limitsof what has been construed as the traditional model of rationality. The stress onthe efficacy of calculated, instrumental action is an ego-centered model. Itpresupposes no resistance, or at best a benign indifference, on the part of othersocial actors. It is a view that takes for granted a homogeneous and highlystable normative backdrop for action. This model of rationality is a practical,technical or economic model rather than a substantive, social, legal or politicalmodel[2]. It is inclined toward transforming the physical world, all the whileassuming individual autonomy. When the concern is the transformation of thesocial world, such a model falls short.

Thus, theories about administrative and policy decision making would bebetter served by a communicative, multivalent social rationality in the sensethat Kalberg, Habermas and Giddens suggest; a rationality that takes accountof the production and reproduction of social action in its broadest sense.

An expanded social model of rationalityFrom these varying perspectives of rationality, Figure 1 is presented as a sketchframework from which a new model of rationality might be derived. Thediagram depicts the interplay of language and speech embedded in asituational context of social institutions. Speech acts are manifested in threeforms. From Habermas, there is communicative action oriented towardreaching understanding in the sense of reaching agreement on meaning, value,and the guidance for human association. An example might include theactivities of a group of people forming a new organization and their actions arecommunicative in the sense of reaching agreement not only on their goal as a

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

75

group but also on the ways in which they will reach further ongoing decisionssuch as whether by hierarchical or coordinative relationships (and thespecification of those relationships), majority rule or unanimous consensus.

Figure 1 also utilizes Habermas’ concept of strategic action; action orientedtoward success in the sense of reaching mastery over both the physical andsocial world. Strategic action is action seeking control over the environment.The group forming a new organization in the example above may have cometogether to manufacture a new product or invention. Strategic action would bethat action aimed at producing the product and getting it to customers. Thisdistinction has a long history in the group dynamics literature beginning withBales’ (1950) differentiation of the two basic problems of a group:

(1) social-emotional maintenance (understanding); and

(2) task achievement (strategic action).

The model adds a third category of social action. Characterizing an actionpurely as either seeking understanding (agreement) or seeking mastery(control) would really only work, if at all, in quite small, undifferentiated socialstructures. Understanding or mastery can be viewed, in effect, as two ends of acontinuum. Social action in general, and certainly that in elaborated, large-scalesocial systems, would more commonly entail complex combinations of thesetwo motivations. I simultaneously seek both the understanding of the personsin my immediate social world as well as success or mastery in that world; eventhough these dual motives can be, and often are, antithetical and contradictory.The pursuit of mastery may entail a breach of understanding; the pursuit ofunderstanding may compromise mastery.

In this sense, I suggest a distinct form of social action that, in dialecticalfashion, mediates between communicative action and strategic action. OnFigure 1, this is identified as marshaling action. This term suggests action, inthe context of an interactive, intersubjective social framework that is orientedtoward mobilizing cooperative and coordinative effort. The term intersubjectiverefers to those agreements, values, norms, customs, etc., that are shared;implied in all interaction without being explicitly stated.

Marshaling action seeks both understanding and success. Its focus is actionoriented toward bringing together multiple, socially-based – as distinct fromindividually-based – actions. In concurrently seeking both understanding andsuccess, marshaling action acknowledges potential contradictory facets ofthese two motivations; hence, the vision of marshaling action as mediational incharacter. Its motivation is “resolution” of these contradictory facets. Itsvalidity claims – its “rationalizations” – focus on the legitimacy, rightness andeffectiveness of mutual action.

Each of the three forms of social action is subject to public scrutinypertaining to their respective validity claims in the manner suggested byHabermas (as noted above; truth, rightness, adequacy, sincerity). Each, as well,is simultaneously subject to scrutiny of their relational claims, or claims of

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

76

Figure 1.A framework of socialrationality

SO

CIA

L IN

ST

ITU

TIO

NS

(R

eifie

d S

ocia

l Pra

ctic

es)

CO

MM

UN

ICA

TIV

EA

CT

ION

(Und

erst

andi

ng)

SO

CIA

L A

CT

ION

MA

RS

HA

LLIN

GA

CT

ION

(Med

iatio

n)

ST

RA

TE

GIC

AC

TIO

N(S

ucce

ss)

SPEECH

LANGUAGE

VALIDITYCLAIMS

CLAIMS RELATIONAL

INS

TR

UM

EN

TAL

RA

TIO

NA

LIT

Y

AD

AP

TIV

ER

AT

ION

ALI

TY

SU

BS

TAN

TIV

ER

AT

ION

ALI

TY

FO

RM

AL

RA

TIO

NA

LIT

Y

NO

RM

AT

IVE

RA

TIO

NA

LIT

Y

TH

EO

RE

TIC

AL

RA

TIO

NA

LIT

Y

PR

AC

TIC

AL

RA

TIO

NA

LIT

Y

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

77

status and power. Such claims can be seen as the intersubjective exchange ofmeaning concerning the obligations and privileges associated with reachingunderstanding. They are claims of one actor on the values, understandings, andactions of one or more other actors. Thus, every social action is subject tosimultaneous scrutiny from the viewpoints of validity, status and power.

The different forms of rationalization as laid out by Weber, I argue, arederived from these three fundamental motivations of social action. The searchfor understanding, success and the mediation between them as they counter oneanother can be viewed as the ontological base from which the different forms ofrationalizing arise. These linkages are depicted in Figure 1. The kind ofreasoning or justification found in substantive rationality flows fromcommunicative action – the primordial need for understanding. Substantiverationality, in turn, embodies both normative rationality (or the rationalizationof values) and formal rationality (the rationalization of laws, rules, andregulations). These forms of reason, in turn, act back and impact the very socialinstitutions and practices from which they derive; either in justifying theirreification or reproduction, or in providing a rationale for modifying or alteringthem.

Similarly, instrumental rationality is derived from strategic action andmanifests itself both in practical or technical rationality and in Weber’stheoretical rationality. These forms of reason similarly feed back both toexisting technical and social practices.

A third form of rationality is presented in Figure 1 deriving from mysuggested primordial motive of marshaling action. This I have labeled adaptiverationality. It is that form of explanation or justification that expressly mediatesbetween substantive rationality and instrumental rationality. It consciouslystruggles with the dialectical friction between instrumental and substantiverationality and articulates justifications that reconcile the conflicting claims ofboth. It is, moreover (with normative and formal rationality), an explicitly socialdetermination (in contrast with the underlying assumption of instrumentalrationality of individual means-ends calculations).

The model can be illustrated by an example of technological change. Imaginethe problems faced by a hospital administrator with the introduction ofmagnetic resonance imagery (MRI) technology into a hospital. This is no merechange in hardware. While introducing a new level of sophistication in medicalcare (instrumental rationality), it simultaneously triggers a new socialconfiguration of the hospital as a community of workers (substantiverationality) and thus a host of new challenges for the hospital administrator. Inthe first instance, it impacts the division of labor by requiring new activitiesembodying new skills (thereby implicating both theoretical and practicalrationality). These, in turn, generate the need for new understandings ofprivilege and obligation (e.g. power and authority) because of the need for newpatterns of coordinating old and new activities within the hospital (and thusreaching new agreements implicating both normative and formal rationality).

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

78

Hence, the new machine does not merely serve the strategic, instrumental aimsof better patient care; it also challenges the substantive or normative nature (orthe prior agreements) of the previous level of communicative understanding.Since these aims are not necessarily complementary and may indeed becontradictory, there is need to mediate between them in an effort to reachresolution or synthesis as to how both might be simultaneously pursued.

Another illustration lies in the profound effects that computers have had onorganizational life. Contemporary computer usage (including the use ofdesktops, local area networks, e-mail, etc.) has had penetrating impacts onorganizational arrangements through changes in deployment of human andmaterial resources, in communication methods and patterns, in shifts in skillsand roles, and resulting shifts in power and control.

These examples also embody the pluralistic character of such mediation; theneed for widespread acceptance of new patterns of coordination andcooperation deriving from the required new behaviors and relationships.Directly flowing from this is the necessity to create new arrangements formanagement and administration. Because of this, in many social settings,resistance to new technology has been a frequent experience, not only by lineworkers but also by administrators[3]. Strategic, or instrumental, advantages ofinnovations can often be planned and predicted with reasonable accuracy, buttheir impact on the necessary new agreements and relationships is often moredifficult to evaluate (not to mention the individual psychological problems ofshelving old skills and learning anew).

Entailments of the modelThe foregoing argument raises interesting questions about many of ourassumptions and world views as we pursue tasks of management, planning,coordination and control. Most of these assumptions can be argued to be basedon an implicit preoccupation with instrumental rationality. Thus, it is useful tosurmise how many of these assumptions might be characterized when madeexplicit and how they contrast with substantive rationality and what I havetermed adaptive rationality. By making these underlying characteristicsexplicit, the interrelationship between instrumental, substantive and adaptiverationality becomes clearer and helps clarify the unique dialectical role ofmanagers.

This is set forth in Table I where I present a beginning typology of differingcharacteristics associated with the various fundamental elements outlined inFigure 1. Table I conveys the idea that rationality is simultaneouslydevelopmental and dialectical in character. It springs first from an ego-centered calculating process where to be rational is defined in terms of asingle autonomous agent, seeking mastery over the physical world (thesecond column in Table I). This is countered by an orientation stemming froma sense of social obligation as, for example, in Rousseau’s Social Contract(1954) (the fourth column in Table I). Individual needs, and the capacity to

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

79

Characterizing Instrumental Adaptive Substantive element rationality rationality rationality

(practical/theoretical) (mediating) (normative/formal)Model of human Descartes: solitary Dialectical Rousseau: socially

consciousness thinking ego adaptive ego obligated egoAttitude of Ego-focussed intentionality Ego-alter Alter-focused

consciousness Cognitive objectivating struggle intentionalityinteractive conformative

World view Naturalistic objective Combined objective/ Socially world intersubjective intersubjective

world worldEthical base Utilitarian calculus of Socially contingent The social contract

optimization optimization optimizing obligatory commitments

Attitude toward Individualistic Social interactive Social interactive power absolute freedom open to contingent

total autonomy development freedom partial and change autonomy

legal/regulativeCommunicative Success in achieving Success based on Understanding

orientation individually formulated understanding in and social goals achieving socially formulation of

formulated goals rules of association

Validity claims Effectiveness Mutually shared Truthfulness/ effectiveness within sincerity/ agreed upon rightfulness/ legitimacy legitimacy

Method of evaluating Objective quantitative Pluralistic bargaining Axiomatic claims calculation application of

agreed principle and/or precedent

Type of knowledge Technically and Knowledge of Moral/practical dominant strategically useful particularistic knowledge

arrangements of Legal shared power in representations moral/legal context Aesthetic in face of technical knowledgeneeds

Themes of speech Speaker’s intentions Eliciting needs, Speaker’s values acts Descriptions intentions, values and sentiments

Predictions Evolving shared Interpersonal intentions in a relationscontext of shared power

Tone of speech acts Imperative Negotiative Regulative

Source: Adapted from Habermas (1979, 1984)

Table I.Sketch of

a comprehensive model of rationality

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

80

meet those needs, are inextricably bound up with those of a social community.Rational action, in this counter-view, is embedded in a network of socialexpectations and social values.

The dialectical thrust of synthesis in rationality is bound up in an adaptiveapproach to social action that mediates between autonomous instrumentalrationality and communal normative rationality and seeks mechanisms forsocial collaboration that furthers both understanding and mastery (the third,and bold-faced, column in Table I). Thus, we can envision a Gestalt of rationalaction where all three elements are dynamically intertwined. The pursuit of anygiven form of rationality falters if the others are not taken into account.Diesing’s (1962) argument of the relation between what he terms economic andsocial rationality states the case well:

Because the economic and social rationality areas are so completely opposed to one another, itwould seem that an organization which becomes more economically rational must inevitablybecome less socially rational, and vice versa. And yet each of these forms of reasonpresupposes the other and is completely dependent on it. Neither can exist without the other;economic rationality is possible only in a socially rational organization, but a socially rationalorganization cannot survive unless it is also economically rational to a considerable extent(Diesing, 1962, p. 95).

For Diesing, the resolution of this dilemma occurs through what he termsintegration; a structural-functional concept that focusses on thecomplementarity of social roles so that obligations, expectations, beliefs andideals of each role fit together and support one another moving toward a socialequilibrium. For me, this fails to capture the dynamism of what I have termedadaptation, wherein the solution in any given situation is not whollypredetermined by prior agreements but, rather, is negotiated in dialecticalfashion in specific, yet ambiguous, contexts. Yet, in either case, the process ofresolution is at bottom a social process.

In the left hand column of Table I is shown the key elements that form theassumptions and orientations of each of the three types of rationality. Theserange from the implied “model of ‘man’” to the ethical and communicative stancesthat each model implies. Included are the claims of each, the approach toevaluating claims, the kinds of knowledge that dominate each, and thecharacteristic themes and tones of speech that comprise the linguistic styles ofeach. The remaining columns round out a matrix that depicts the particularfeatures of each form of rationality with respect to each of the key characteristics.

Instrumental rationality, in Column 2, stresses the Cartesian ego-centeredcast of mind appropriate for successful mastery of the world where the primaryorientation is that of the calculating individual, seeking autonomous goals.Contrasting this is the quite different character of substantive rationality shownin Column 4. Reasoning processes in this form of rationality begin from thenotion of a socially-obligated ego where interactive, intersubjective meaningsand understandings seek to establish the conditions for effective humanassociation. The emphasis in substantive rationality is the social world.

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

81

Finally, Column 3 outlines the key features of adaptive rationality,highlighting the dialectical synthesis that arises from mediating between theother two. The dialectical “model of ‘man’” recognizes a continual strugglebetween the needs of the individual and the world of social obligation; betweenthe demands of the objective, natural world and those of the intersubjectivesocial world; between effectiveness and legitimacy. The mediating role ofadaptive rationality features an openness to development and change in boththe material world and the social world. The dialectical character emerges fromthe recognition that the understandings and rules of human association are notfixed for all time but need to be continually renegotiated to take account of adynamic and changing social or collective consciousness.

Implications The management of large-scale social arrangements calls forth the synthesizingfacets of adaptive rationality. Management in complex social settings involvesthe fusion of both instrumental and substantive rationality in ways thatrecognize the dynamic processes of change occurring within each while beingsensitive to the contradictory and often conflicted intermixing of each.

A focus purely on instrumental rationality is one-dimensional in the sensethat Marcuse (1964) noted in the 1960s; it is technocratic and obscures the valuedilemmas inherent in all social processes. To return to the previous examplefrom the medical field, it is seldom sufficient for hospital administrators to“rationalize” the installation of an MRI unit solely on the grounds of itssuperiority or efficiency in patient care without also “rationalizing” what theinnovation implies for the hospital both as a social entity in its own right and asa social entity embedded in the fabric of a larger community. In the same vein,urban transportation planners need to justify a new highway on grounds moreelaborate than its projected traffic-carrying capacity. Also involved is the likelyimpact in terms broader than transport efficiency; such as the region’s economicinteractions, the health of its physical environment, its associational andaffective networks, and its lifestyles.

On the other hand, by focussing unduly on substantive rationality, one caneasily fail to take account of resource limitations or technical feasibility.Moreover, concentration on formal rationality can give administration its imageof “by-the-book”, unfeeling rigidity and coercion. At best, concentration onformal rationality casts the administrator in the role of “official”; a rule-makeror regulator or one who wields a police power rather than a progressive orbeneficent problem-solver.

Thus, developing a synthetic model of adaptive rationality is important formanagement and planning in settings of complex multi-organizational systems.The synthetic, adaptive model incorporates both instrumental and substantiverationality and adds the dimensions of creating new meanings and new thrustsof achievement through a communicative process that concentrates on

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

82

understanding the interstices of power and their potential for creation andmobilization of social and political as well as material resources.

This dialectical model of rationality requires a communicative skill that cansuccessfully integrate validity claims and claims for power in a manner thatevokes the mobilization of collective social action. It suggests not only thecalculation of means and ends within cost accounting frameworks but also theidentification and balancing of claims of legitimacy, morality and social power.It embraces not only the mobilization of resources but the mobilization ofsentiment and will as well. It ordains seeking to reveal the distribution of goodand harm in any policy. The dialectical model of rationality, in sum, requiresconcurrently a technical, political and moral imagination in the service ofcreating new forms of social practice which can be responsive to newexpression of needs.

Thus, what is implied is neither radical abandonment nor conservativedefense of the traditional rational model. On the contrary, the call is for anexpansion of the model; an expansion based on a deeper, more fundamental andinclusive view of what it means to be rational. Such a view of rationality hasimplications on the level of methodology, procedural theory and, mostfundamentally, at the level of language; that is, how management,administration and planning are talked about and thought about.

Social rationality in concrete termsStating this in a practical sense, administrators and organizational plannersneed to strive for approaches which expand their perceptive acuity in dealingwith the distribution and diffusion of power within and between organizedsocial entities and the social norms and conventions that typically mobilizepower and/or change the distribution of power.

In a broader vision of rational reasoning, developing understanding of themanagement of an organized social entity’s goals and mission not only wouldembrace its technical means-ends relations but would also explicitly includeintimate understanding of its social and political culture. This implies“knowing” the nooks, crannies and niches of associational understandings,agreements and interactions, both formal and informal, together with theirunderlying patterns of privilege and obligation – i.e. social power – and howthese are manifest in the mobilization of human resources.

Following from arguments of Argyris and Schön (1978) about barriers toorganizational learning, a manager’s explorations would expand to include howinterorganizational networks “learn” and what forms of both formal and tacitnorms help to shape and influence the manner in which associational problemsare identified and taken up. How are sentiments and motivations enlisted? Howare resources mobilized? How are actions coordinated? How are these differentmobilization processes explained or justified (rationalized)? What languages, orlanguage “games”, are employed and under what circumstances?

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

83

Within the social context of social goals involving interorganizationalrelations, the particularistic, idiographic features of this broader social terrainare important aspects to investigate especially developing awareness of theaccommodations which shape and form the articulation of role ininterorganizational rationalizing processes. Who is sought in a giveninterorganizational network for instrumental analysis or judgment? Whospecializes in normative judgment? Who is effective in mobilizing sentiment?What language do such people offer in justifying a position? What implicit orhidden rationalizations are involved? Who focusses on the integration andsocial control of networks in collective terms? What is the linguistic style ofthese communications? Most significantly, who plays the mediational, adaptiverole? Who is capable of mediating across networks? What words and symbolsseem to be effective in this?

Answers to these questions can point to both individuals and organizations,to visible leaders and to seemingly monolithic institutions. As an illustration, ina constellation of community hospitals, what leads to the emergence of one asdominant and another subservient? How does the configuration of influenceshape and form approaches to the management and allocation of healthresources? How openly are the distribution and sharing of power talked about?How does the pattern bear on the division of labor in rationalization processes?For example, how might it happen that one hospital treats most of the poor andindigent patients while another seems to monopolize those patients whoseillnesses contribute to “interesting” medical research (Milner, 1980)?

Our tendency is to approach such questions subjectively or intuitively.However, systematic understanding of the full array of rationalizationprocesses in the management of large-scale social arrangements and thedivision of labor in carrying them out is as important as that of their technicalmeans. The themes of communicative action and multi-dimensionalrationalization occurring within a social context of shared power diffused ininterorganizational webs provide a promising lens with which to construct theheretofore intuitive social influence maps. These offer an action-orientedtheoretical guide for both qualitative and quantitative research tasks thatunderlie urban planning efforts[4].

ConclusionIn this paper, I have sought to explore the central issues that underlie theseeming failure of the traditional rational model. On the contrary, I would urgethat the problem of the rational model is far from dead; rather it is still an openand critical challenge for future research and scholarship[5].

In many ways, the greatest danger in increasingly complex configurations ofinterorganizational networks and large-scale social systems lies in the potentialfor rigidified institutions that work to resist change or inadvertently produceunwanted results. It is in seeking to overcome these problems that thetraditional truncated view of rationality most fails us. Instrumental rationality,

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

84

dominating in the age of science and modernism, offered the promise of “total”solutions to society’s problems. The recognition that this is a truncated andlimited conception opens up critical avenues for further exploration fortheoreticians and practitioners alike.

The real hope, in my view, for coping with increasing organizational andsystem differentiation lies in research focussed on the development of a morefully articulated dialectical model of rationality that recognizes and takesaccount of the multiple forms of reasoning and the Gestalt qualities of theintermixture of instrumental and normative dimensions. One avenue of inquirystemming from the arguments stated lies in a more explicit recognition of thelinguistic, communicative base of all rationalization processes. Herein, I believe,lies the foundation for conceiving a more effective and more creative model ofrationality.

Notes

1. Standard dictionary definitions beg the question. To rationalize is to reason, to calculate,to cause something to seem reasonable. Interestingly, the term “rationalization” has alsodeveloped a negative, deceptive connotation; to provide plausible but untrue reasons. Forexample, “He ‘rationalized’ that the failure of his team to win the game was due toincompetent officiating”. Each of these definitions, of course, begs the question: What isreason, or what are the characteristics of being reasonable? To reason properly, or to bereasonable, invokes standards or norms and thereby implicates a value stance.

2. Diesing (1962) also analyzes what he refers to as the “multiple forms of reason”. Heidentifies five forms of rationality: technical, economic, social, legal and political formsthat closely parallel the analysis here. Diesing acknowledges the conflicts that may arisealthough he takes more of a functional approach in their resolution as distinct from thedialectical view taken in this paper.

3. This was graphically and historically illustrated in Schön’s (1971) discussion of what hecalls “dynamic conservatism”, wherein he relates the difficulties encountered in the latenineteenth century trying to persuade the US Navy to install gun sights on shipboardcannons.

4. A number of techniques for developing such maps in a formal fashion are emerging in theinterorganizational literature. Noteworthy among these are the studies of Galeskiewicz(1979) and Boje and Whetten (1981). While the elaborate research methods these studiesrepresent may not be feasible in every situation, they do offer perspectives that can alertmanagers to particular features of the dynamics of interorganizational relations that are ofcentral concern in the administrative process. Of more immediate practicality for planningpractice, perhaps, would be the inclusion of more specific training in qualitative research aspart of the education of professional managers, administrators and planners, withparticular emphasis on linguistic and symbolic interactions that shape and influenceconcrete episodes (Bolan, 1980; Forester, 1980, 1982). Tools of research that would offerguidance in the analysis of linguistic acts include:

• examination of the structure of argument such as the work of the logician Toulmin(1958; Toulmin et al., 1979) or the application of Toulmin’s ideas to policy analysisby Dunn (1981); and

• the techniques of content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980). An excellent illustration ofresearch that strongly hints at some of the overall themes of my argument is foundin Allison’s (1971) study of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Rationalityrevisited

85

5. One area of future research that would be important is the role of power in rationalreason. Adaptive rationality is besieged by claims that spring both from the needs ofindividuals and from the needs of collective entities. Both formal hierarchicalarrangements and informal assertions of power shape and influence decision makingand the work of Foucault (1980) would seem a promising point of beginning.

ReferencesAlexander, E.R. (1984), “After rationality, what? A review of responses to paradigm breakdown”,

Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 62-9.Allison, G.T. (1971), Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and

Company, Boston, MA.Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1978), Organizational Learning, Addison-Wesley Press, Reading, MA.Bales, R.F. (1950), Interaction Process Analysis, Addison-Wesley Press, Cambridge, MA.Boje, D.M. and Whetten, D.A. (1981), “Effects of organizational strategies and constraints on

centrality and attributions of influence in interorganizational networks”, AdministrativeScience Quarterly, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 378-95.

Bolan, R.S. (1980), “The practitioner as theorist: the phenomenology of the professional episode”,Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 46 No. 3, pp. 261-74.

Braybrook, D. and Lindblom, C. (1963), A Strategy of Decision, Free Press, New York, NY.Cohen, M. and March, J. (1986), Leadership and Ambiguity, Harvard Business School Press,

Boston, MA.Cohen, M., March, J. and Olsen, J. (1972), “A garbage can model of organizational choice”,

Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, pp. 1-25.Diesing, P. (1962), Reason in Society, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL.Dunn, W.N. (1981), Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs,

NJ.Forester, J. (1980), “Critical theory and planning practice”, Journal of the American Planning

Association, Vol. 46 No. 3, pp. 275-86.Forester, J. (1982), “Planning in the face of power”, Journal of the American Planning Association,

Vol. 48 No. 1, pp. 67-80.Forester, J. (1984), “Bounded rationality and the politics of muddling through”, Publ ic

Administration Review, Vol. 44, pp. 23-31.Foucault, M. (1980), in Gordon, C. (Ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other

Writings, Pantheon Books, New York, NY.Galeskiewicz, J. (1979), Exchange Networks and Community Politics, Sage Publications, Beverly

Hills, CA.Giddens, A. (1979), Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in

Social Analysis, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.Habermas, J. (1979), Communication and the Evolution of Society, Beacon Press, Boston, MA. Habermas, J. (1984), The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of

Society, Volume One, translated by T. McCarthy, Beacon Press, Boston, MA.Kalberg, S. (1980), “Max Weber’s types of rationality: cornerstones for the analysis of

rationalization processes in history”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 85 No. 5, pp. 1145-79.Krippendorf, K. (1980), Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, Sage Publications,

Beverly Hills, CA.Levine, C. (1985), “Where policy comes from: ideas, innovations and agenda choices”, Public

Administration Review, Vol. 45, pp. 255-8.

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

Journal ofManagementHistory5,2

86

Lindblom, C. (1959), “The science of muddling through”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 19,pp. 79-88.

Lindblom, C. (1965), The Intelligence of Democracy, Free Press, New York, NY.Los, M. (1981), “Some reflections on epistemology, design and planning theory”, in Dear, M. and

Scott, A.J. (Eds), Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society, Methuen, London.Marcuse, H. (1964), One-Dimensional Man:Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society,

Beacon Press, Boston, MA.Milner, M. Jr (1980), Unequal Care: A Case Study of Interorganizational Relations in Health Care,

Columbia University Press, New York, NY.Polsby, N.W. (1984), Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation, Yale

University Press, New Haven, CT.Rousseau, J.J. (1954), The Social Contract, Gateway Edition, Henry Regnery and Company,

Chicago, IL.Schön, D. (1971), Beyond the Stable State, Random House, New York, NY.Simon, H. (1947), Administrative Behavior, Macmillan Company, New York, NY.Toulmin, S. (1958), The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.Toulmin, S., Reike, R. and Janik, A. (1979), An Introduction to Reasoning, Macmillan Publishing

Company, Inc., New York, NY.Watzlavick, P., Beavin, J.H. and Jackson, D. (1967), Pragmatics of Human Communication, W.W.

Norton and Co., New York, NY.Wildavsky, A. (1966), “The political economy of efficiency: cost-benefit analysis, systems analysis

and program budgeting”, Public Administration Review, Vol. 26, pp. 292-310.

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)

This article has been cited by:

1. Doris M. Merkl-Davies, Niamh M. Brennan. 2011. A conceptual framework of impression management: new insights frompsychology, sociology and critical perspectives. Accounting and Business Research 41, 415-437. [CrossRef]

2. Sofia Nilsson, Misa Sjöberg, Gerry Larsson. 2010. A civil contingencies agency management system for disaster aid: atheoretical model. International Journal of Organizational Analysis 18:4, 412-429. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

3. Mark Murphy. 2009. Bureaucracy and its limits: accountability and rationality in higher education. British Journal of Sociologyof Education 30, 683-695. [CrossRef]

4. Mona Ericson. 2007. Strategic HRD and the relational self. Human Resource Development Quarterly 17:10.1002/hrdq.v17:2,223-229. [CrossRef]

Dow

nloa

ded

by U

nive

rsity

of

Min

neso

ta T

win

Citi

es A

t 08:

48 0

9 A

pril

2015

(PT

)