Radical Democracy’s Blind Spot: The Deliberative Potential of Initiative & Referendum Mechanisms

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Arjen M.R. BerghouwerEconomics (M.A.), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Political Science (M.A.), Universiteit van AmsterdamLatin America Studies (M.A.), CEDLA Amsterdam

[email protected]

Radical Democracy’s Blind Spot:The Deliberative Potential of Initiative & Referendum Mechanisms

Resumen:

Este artículo cuestiona la visión sobre el conflicto entre participación ciudadana y la calidad de deliberación en el actual pensamiento sobre democracia radical. El énfasis en la ignorancia de la gente y su sentimiento emocional (es decir: irracional) subestima la capacidad del ciudadano promedio en desarrollarse su opinión propia por medio de los medios de comunicación y olvida que el debate político en esencia no consiste en un conocimiento detallado de información experta pero por definición se trata de una lucha ideológica que intenta construir una visión compartida de la sociedad ideal. El rechazo absoluta de una participación masiva dentro de las innovaciones democráticas entonces es criticado por dejar inexplorada la potencial deliberativa de los mecanismos de iniciativa y referéndum (I&R).

En línea con las ideas de Amartya Sen y John Stuart Mill sobre la necesidad de criticas sociales para crear una confrontación equilibrada entre ‘verdades parciales’ en el debate público, se plantea el argumento que el involucramiento democrático de los ciudadanos prohíbe una gobernación dogmática por medio dela comunicación de conocimientos sociales y las perspectivas alternativas de los intelectuales. Históricamente la implementación de elecciones libres y confiables permitió aquella comunicación de concretizarse – y por eso puede servir como ejemplo que participación y deliberación no siempre están en conflicto. Esto plantea la pregunta por qué esta compatibilidad entre el voto y el debate público no sería aplicable en la utilización de I&R entre elecciones.

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Desde la punta de vista de que para formarse una opinión sobre asuntos públicos ciudadanos relacionan sus experiencias de día al día con las ponencias ideológicasen la esfera pública, una mejor inclusión de enfoques alternativas dentro de los medios de comunicación vuelva crucial. Mientras I&R de hecho no puede realizar utopías deliberativas, un acceso más fácil de voces marginalizados a los principales debates públicos – debido a la influencia de un voto popular – podría estimular un pensamiento más reflexivo en las deliberaciones del mundo real. Así, la participación popular formalmente institucionalizada paradójicamente podría instigar la competitividad de los conocimientos expertos en las discusiones sobre las políticas públicas, y por esta vía guardar la cualidad del debate democrático.

Abstract:

The paper contends that present thought under the label of radical democracy is strained by an exaggerated and misinterpreted notion of the conflict between citizen participation and the quality of deliberation. The alleged citizen’s ignorance of facts and impassioned (i.e. unreasonable) sentiment underestimates the capacity to make sense of expert knowledge by mass media consultation and forgets that democratic debate is not primarily about irrefutable facts, but fundamentally consists of ideological struggles tryingto construct a shared vision of the good life. As such, the narrow focus on small-scale experiments prevents the field to exploit the deliberative potential of initiative and referendum mechanisms (I&R).

Following the insights of Amartya Sen and John Stuart Mill on the necessity for societal criticism to allow for an honest confrontation of ‘partial truths’ in public debate, it is argued that democratic citizen involvement prevents dogmatic rule via the communicationof socially dispersed wisdom and alternative expert outlooks. While historically the installation of free and inclusive elections has served to render such communication effective – and shows that participation and deliberation do not always conflict –the question is raised why this vote-debate compatibility might not be applicable to the utilization of I&R in between elections.

In the thought that in their judgment on public matters citizens relate their life experienceswith ideological elite claims expressed in the public sphere, a better inclusion of

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alternative cues within mass media discourse becomes vital. While I&R will certainly not live up to deliberative utopias, the easier access of marginal voices to mainstream debatesdue to the influence of a popular vote might cause real world deliberations by political actors to become more responsive to critical thinking. So paradoxically, popular participation might foster the competitiveness of expert knowledge in public policy discussions, and thereby safeguard the quality of democratic debate.

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Contents:

The Problem with Liberal Democracy___________________________4The Blind Spot of Radical Democracy________________________________________________6

Why Democracy?_______________________________________________________________________9

Hegemony, the Mass Media and the Deliberative Potential of I&R_________________________________________________________19

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The Problem with Liberal Democracy

Radical democracy is about arbitrary (‘oppressive’) power.1

It is concerned that a natural difference in opinions on ‘the goodlife’ is not sufficiently dealt with in a democratic way. Whilenot consisting of an outright rejection of liberal democracy –with its basic pillars of freedom (individual rights) and equality(popular sovereignty) – it might best be seen as an attempt tobring about a radical change in the political culture guiding theconstruction of public policies – in ‘doing politics’. In liberaldemocracy, this political culture is foremost driven by the logicof vote aggregation. With democracy primarily understood as atransfer of self-interested individual and group preferences toformal political institutions the notion of a (continuous)normative debate on the common good is restricted. Although in theperiodic election of political representatives vote aggregationfunctions reasonably well in fomenting debate under the pressureof public opinion, in day-to-day governance vote aggregation showsserious drawbacks in terms of creating meaningful discussion.Voting majorities in legislative assemblies are to a significantdegree fixed according to the distribution of seats amongpolitical parties and only strategic bargaining or non-controversial issues can usually bring about any substantialchange in the pre-established partisan positions. With theadditional arbitrary influences stemming from unequal economicresources, social ties, prestige, organized popular pressure oraccess to mass media channels or other public forums, politicaldecisions in between elections seem consequently more based on anoutplay of powerful interests and dogmatic truths than independentthought and critical judgment.

We can thus say in radical democratic terms that as a systemof governance, liberal democracy does not sufficiently guaranteefreedom, because citizens have no equal status in the constructionof reasonable compromises in public policy debates – i.e. there isno sufficient guarantee for the individual right to differ from theaggregative consensus view in the sense that deliberation is notfostered. Liberal democracy neither sufficiently guaranteesequality, because citizens do not have the required freedom toinfluence political decisions in between elections – i.e. there is1 Laclau, E. & C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Verso.

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no sufficient guarantee for popular voices to unite in a commonvision in the sense that citizen involvement is deterred. In otherwords: the levels of arbitrary power within liberal democracy puta strain on both freedom and equality.

For a long time in the 20th century the restricted democraticnature of liberal democracy did not come along with seriousrepercussions for its governance function. Liberal (mass)democracy closely equaled representation as to a great extent itwas able to carry away the hearts and minds of citizens. A hugepart of the populace could effectively identify with the ideologyof one of the available political parties and interpreted theactions of their representatives principally as contributing to ashared vision on a better future. Nevertheless, several societaldevelopments – the most important ones being individualization andglobalization causing the disintegration of social networks withincountries – have rendered mere vote aggregation non-sustainable asthe primary source of democratic legitimacy. As individuals,people do not easily relate anymore to the ‘buy-all’ ideologicalpackages of political parties and tend to differ in opinion withtheir preferred political party on various issues. As members of apolity or other loosely integrated social networks, people demandan equal treatment and tend to object to the different forms ofarbitrary power influencing collective decision-making processes.

The gradual rupture of a reality in which societal groupswithin one and the same nation-state experienced a more or lesstight mutual dependence in the construction of their life-projectsis essential in this process because by and large it explains theloss of a widespread popular identification among all socialstrata with the development trajectory of their country as closelyresembling their own future. Liberal nationalism2 meant thatcitizens of all social layers were more or less locked in a commondestiny in the pursuit of happiness. In present times, however –whether as a result of free international capital flows, the out-sourcing or off-shoring of labor services, general emancipationtrends stressing the individual autonomy and own responsibility,immigration and advanced urbanization with its growth indifferentiated living cultures, less social time-availability dueto an increase in working hours and dual income-earning couples,or a personalized identification with cross-border mediaconsumption patterns – societal groups feel themselves both inmaterial prosperity and cultural identity ever more disconnectedfrom each other. Where liberal nationalism did put a check on mere2 Tamir, Y. (1995) Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press.

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vote aggregation to resolve its public policy disputes, anunchecked aggregation today does not allow for consideratecompromises anymore. Unbridled aggregation due to significantlylower levels of social interdependence is therefore a maincontributor to contemporary symptoms as political cynicism,polarization, ballooning electoral swings based on protest votesand an overall trend towards citizen disengagement with (if not ahostile attitude to) formal politics.

Dahl points out that the creation of a civic culture inpresent-day democracies requires to re-connect societal groups,nurturing “an empathic understanding of the ‘anonymous others’, who seem strangeand threatening, and who moreover compose the great bulk of one’s fellow citizens.”3 Theradical democratic attempt consists of finding new democraticinstitutions to include citizens and societal groups around thebargaining table in a context favorable to deliberation. In thewords of Mouffe:

“[T]he aim of democratic politics [to softening hostile partisanship, AB] (..)requires providing channels [i.e. ‘democratic designs’, AB] through whichcollective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues,which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will notconstruct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary.”4

In practice, the ‘radical democratic project’5 occupiesitself accordingly with erecting institutional experiments thatprovide for inclusiveness and reciprocal debate in the publicpolicy making process. In this, radical democracy is hardlydifferent from other brands of innovative democratic thought likedirect democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracyor civic democracy. Despite their different emphasis and differentlabels6 they all try to overcome the arbitrary aggregation of3 Dahl, R.A. (1992) The Problem of Civic Competence, Journal of Democracy #3(4),pp. 45-59.4 Mouffe, C. (2000) Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, Political Science Series #72, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, p. 16.5 Cohen, J. & A. Fung (2004) Radical Democracy, Swiss Political Science Review #10(4), pp. 169-180 6 Direct and participatory democracy tend to focus relatively more on equality and inclusiveness – with attention for labels as ‘popular participation’, ‘citizen involvement’ and ‘representation’ – and stressesa communal (emotional) sense of belonging of citizens. Deliberative and civic democracy tend to focus relatively more on freedom and reciprocal debate – with attention for labels as ‘civic culture’, ‘deliberation’ and‘empathic understanding’ – and stresses the individual (rational)

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preferences or narrow interests by injecting the process ofpolitical consensus formation with an active citizen involvementand a reasonable degree of deliberation – hereby hoping to accountfor the common interest. Despite their particular focus, alldifferent brands of innovative democratic thought will agree thatto function well, an active citizen involvement (aimed atequality, inclusiveness) cannot go without deliberation. Andinversely, to function well, more deliberation (aimed at freedom,reciprocal debate) cannot go without an active citizeninvolvement. As a whole, innovative democratic thought is thusdirected to the creation of a more rational and inclusive (whichboth should lead to a more just) consensus on public policy inday-to-day politics. The unique insight of radical democracy isthat consensus formation can never be fully rational, making thatemotions deserve a legitimate place in democratic politics. Aboveall, it stresses the importance of alternative thought outside ofthe (reasonable) consensus view in the search for ‘truth’ orbetter understanding.

The Blind Spot of Radical Democracy

A look at the actual experiments on the ground coming out ofinnovative democratic thought learns that they are difficult toclassify under a single banner. Whether we are talking about theparticipatory budget in Porto Alegre or the neighborhoodgovernance councils in Chicago, both are interchangeablycategorized under the body of either participatory or deliberativedemocracy literature– and are referred to as ‘radical’ experimentsinciting ‘civic’ traits while giving citizens a sense of ‘direct’control over their livelihoods. On a general note we can thus saythat the lines between the labels are very thin and one can noticea blending of thoughts into one common ‘radical democratic’project. Nevertheless, at the same time a vital rupture is to befound between the insights of direct democracy7 and the otherbrands of innovative democratic thought. By and large, radical

autonomy of citizens.7 Direct democracy in this paper solely refers to the institutional attempts to complement contemporary representative (mass) democracy – i.e. initiative, referendum and recall mechanisms. It should therefore beseparated from Athenian democracy and probably could be better referred to as semi-direct democracy.

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democratic thought focuses on small-scale experimental projects.And this is not only for practical purposes, but follows from atheoretical divide. While reciprocal debate and inclusiveness areboth at the center of the radical democratic project, a majorityof the innovative scholars sees an inherent tension between thetwo leading to an inevitable restriction on citizen participationin their democratic designs.

Main proponents of the radical democratic project share thefirm belief within mainstream liberal democratic thought that anincreased popular participation inherently diminishes the qualityof deliberation guiding political decisions. With citizens that donot pay an awful lot of attention to the ins-and-outs of specificpolicy debates – whether out of an intrinsic disinterest or a lackof expertise on the specific topic under discussion – scholarsperceive a general ignorance of the populace at large. And, in thewords of Mansbridge: “(..) great ignorance does not usuallyproduce good deliberation.”8 Additionally to the lack of basicinformation, citizens at large are attributed with a highlyimpassioned, less reasonable sentiment.9 To answer Mouffe, manyradical democrats are thus not that convinced that ‘collectivepassions’ can claim a legitimate institutionalized role in theirinnovative democratic designs. Opening the floodgates to ignorantemotions would in this view only lead the new democraticconstructions to resemble a Tower of Babel: meaningful debatewould be obstructed by a cacophony of impassioned voices relyingon different dictionaries and not listening to any basic form ofreason. It is for this reason that radical democrats largely focustheir thought on small-scale experiments: their innovative designsconsist of small numbers of citizens discussing on issues that areof a highly administrative – that is: less conflictive (e.g.efficiency in distribution of resources in existing publicprograms) – nature, extensively guided by expert knowledge andfrequently leading to non-binding advices. It is for this veryreason that both radical and conservative scholars clearlyrenounce direct democratic institutions – like initiative &referendum mechanisms (I&R) – in deciding political outcomes.Luskin & Fishkin et al. see referendums as a threat todeliberation as too often low levels of political information8 Mansbridge, J. (2004) in: A. Fung, Deliberation’s Darker Sides, National Civic Review #93(4): pp. 47-54. 9 Cohen, J. & A. Fung (2004) Radical Democracy, Swiss Political Science Review #10(4), pp. 169-180.

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render a “sensible vote” by citizens impossible.10 Sartori bringsthe no-deliberation view under words when he talks about theinherent conflictive nature of referendums: “It is very doubtful if highlyintense citizens (impassioned and active) that remain highly misinformed and incapablewould produce a better democracy (in any sense).” [translation, AB]11

While most supporters of radical democracy clearly do notshare the conservative view that sees citizens inherentlyincapable of reaching wise conclusions in public policy debates,the overly restricted popular participation in their thinking oninstitutional engineering raises the question of what theexperiments aim to achieve. With the limited scope it isdifficult to see a radical change, balancing the unbridled andarbitrary aggregation in the liberal democratic political culture,coming about. How could a handful of citizens deliberating ontopics with a limited scope ever form a counter-balance to thestiff oppressive power that radical democracy wants to confront?On the contrary, the experiments have stumbled on a host ofdemocratic critiques, of which the most essential are that thesmall-scale settings prove highly favorable toelite/expert/official dominance in terms of its initiation,design, attendance and cultural etiquettes. Offe in this respectwarns that the creation of new spaces for societal debate shouldgive an opportunity to participate “(..) not just to reflective elites with aninherited taste for deliberation, but to the citizenry as a whole.”12

Having said this, it is beyond doubt that many small-scaleprojects – Porto Alegre and Chicago are good examples – havedemonstrated a benign effect on turning around parts of an adversepolitical culture. There is also awareness among radical democratsof the dangers that elitism and official framing pose to suchprojects. Young, for example, points to the need for popularpressure out of civil society to counter elitist tendencies in theformation of the experiments.13 Nevertheless, the critique – apartfrom the point that ‘small-scale’ is not able to reach its radicalaims – is that with a view of citizens as impassioned and

10 Luskin, R.C. & J.S. Fishkin, et al. (2000) Deliberation and Referendum Voting,paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., August 31 – September 3.11 Sartori, G. (1993) Apatía, Participación, Referéndum, Etcétera, February 11th.12 Offe, Claus (1997) Micro-aspects of Democratic Theory: What Makes for the Deliberative Competence of Citizens? in: Axel Hadenius (ed.) Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, Cambridge University Press, p.100.13 Young, I.M. (2004) in: A. Fung, Deliberation’s Darker Sides, National Civic Review #93(4): pp. 47-54.

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irrational, the call for civil society pressure to (indirectly)regulate the experiments is not convincing. After all, in thisline of thought, why not see social movements that oppose theofficial framing or the particular expert knowledge guiding thesmall-scale citizen forums as a passionate and irrationalinfluence jeopardizing the quality of public deliberation? Tryingto push away such (conflictive) collective emotions in the attemptto reach a rational consensus, deliberation for radical democratsseems only possible on highly administrative (pre-framed andrelatively less important) topics when the governance function isconcerned, leaving society-wide debate to an autonomous (butinstitutionally detached) civil society or to an improveddeliberation within the electoral function of liberal democracy –see for example the ‘deliberative poll’ experiments of Fishkin.14

Apart from limiting deliberation to relatively ‘technocratic’(non-contentious) issues, Mansbridge aptly recognizes that thedeliberative conclusions of small-scale forums lack a democraticlegitimization to directly influence formal politics: “[P]otentialproblems in authorization and in non-responsiveness to sanctions [in the way thatelections allow citizens to punish ‘wrong-doing’, AB] ought to make us wary for a while ofanything other than an advisory role for deliberative assemblies drawn by lot.”15 Thevery moment small-scale experiments would include contentious(i.e. political) topics for discussion, the framing, choice ofexperts guiding the process and its very conclusions would be(rightly) questioned. This would be no problem if you envision theexperiments as yet another voice in the mass media guiding publicopinion. Nevertheless, radical democratic thought sees publicopinion in itself as insufficient to challenge the arbitraryaggregative power of liberal democracy; hence the initiative todevelop formal institutional links that should exercise asignificant influence on the coming about of political decisions.

The argument is in consequence that much of present radicaldemocratic thought faces a blind spot, as it cannot adequatelyaccount for the citizen involvement in its designs. The familiarjustification by radical democrats to increase popularparticipation is to unite citizens as ‘democratic numbers’ tocounter the influence of arbitrary power. According to Cohen &Fung, citizen involvement is required “because shifting the basis of politicalcontestation from organized money to organized people is the most promising antidote to

14 Fishkin, J.S. (2009) When the People Speak, Oxford University Press.15 Mansbridge, J. (2004) in: A. Fung, Deliberation’s Darker Side,, National Civic Review #93(4): pp. 47-54.

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the influence conferred by wealth.” 16 However, as argued above, the numbersin the small-scale projects do neither add up to form anyantidote, nor set up a legitimate influence when truly politicalissues are in play. This strangely leaves us with the idea of acivic education class as the prime justification for the focus oncitizen involvement in the radical democratic project. But, whilecivic education is a sympathetic aim, if radical democrats want tomake political decisions more reasonable, then why bother the timeand energy it takes to educate a handful of ignorant citizens in amaximum time-span of two to three days to (fully?) understandexpert knowledge? Corporatism17 in this sense would be by farbetter able to match the radical democratic desire to isolateexpert deliberation from public sentiment and to bring abouteffective change. In other words: if radical democracy rejects‘large numbers’ for making political decisions emotionallycharged, and the solution of ‘small numbers’ does not provide aviable democratic route to influence political decisions, thelogic outcome would be to isolate political representatives betterfrom popular pressures, and by doing so to give them more leewayin letting expert knowledge (e.g. in corporatist forums) guidethem in their task to find the common interest of all.

Not denying the genuine motivations to amplify democracy withmore participation and deliberation, the blind spot unwillinglyfosters an elitist argument equivalent to the reasons used overtime to disqualify unpropertied masses, women or ‘backward’ peoplefor reasonable debate in the political sphere.18 The onlydifference being that the average citizen is now not whollyexcluded, but taken in small numbers by the hand of eliteofficials and experts to be educated in what they cannotunderstand independently. With their basic view of citizens asignorant and overly emotional, radical democrats cannot escape theconclusion that citizen involvement beyond elections is simply notnecessary to create well-considered public policies – an improvedelite debate would suffice for this! Radical democratic thought inthis way indirectly promotes an utmost strange legitimization oftechnocratic governance. To justify citizen involvement in their

16 Cohen, J. & A. Fung (2004) Radical Democracy, Swiss Political Science Review #10(4), p. 171.17 See: Schmitter, P.C. (1974) Still the Century of Corporatism? The Review of Politics #36(1), pp. 85-131.18 See: Calhoun, C. & M. McQuarrie (2007) Public Discourse and Political Experience in: A. Benchimol & W. Maley (eds.) Spheres of Influence: Intellectual and Cultural Publics from Shakespeare to Habermas, Oxford: Peter Lang.

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projects, radical democrats therefore first need to take a stepback, and formulate an answer to skeptical theorists like Sartori,who cites Rousseau in saying that: “[i]t is against the laws of nature (..) for animbecile to lead a wise man.” [translation, AB]19

Why Democracy?

Why democracy? Why allow citizens missing solid knowledge toparticipate in a debate with a purpose as substantial as trying tobring about a well-considered approximation of the interest ofsociety at large? Apart from a self-evident natural right todecide over one’s own future and a sound philosophical defense ofequality, we need something more to fully embrace the idea ofdemocracy. This in the belief that if enlightened expert rule(Plato’s philosopher kings) would bring us unimagined prosperity,a majority of us would not bother to get involved in politics andgladly would hand over the hard work of deliberation on endlessamounts of information and alternative insights to intellectualelites. What benefits offers democracy to justify an adherence toits models? The classic argument in favor of giving citizens a sayin politics holds that democracy protects against the arbitraryuse of power – against tyrannical rule. Experiences withdictatorships, revolutionary vanguards and bureaucratic ruleprovide sufficient evidence that the ones seizing power over aparticular territory are not always necessarily bestowed with allknowledge – or even the desire – to rule in the interest of all.So, there is a strong argument in favor of democracy in the senseof selecting a benevolent ruling class. Next, there is ademocratic desire to institutionalize recurrent elections in thethought that power might either corrupt or hold on to outdatedversions of the common interest. Electoral competition opens up avigorous public sphere in which alternative elite groups inexchange for votes act as vigilantes of outright corruption andpresent us their view on the good life. The free speech ofinvestigative journalists, academic researchers, novel writers andthe likes – all those belonging to a discernable well informedelite strata of society – further fulfill their civic role inmaking sense of the competitive claims of political elites. Thedefense of popular elections can be seen as a negative19 Sartori, G. (1993) ¿Qué es la Democracia? Mexico-City: Editorial Patria, p. 113, original: Democrazia Cosa è (1993).

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justification of democracy: the ability to ‘throw out thescoundrels’ in case of tyranny or outright corruption consists ofa protection against the excesses of highly concentrated power.

Now, perhaps we have to come to the conclusion that this is‘all there is to democracy’. And Przeworski is certainly right inclaiming that the historic change of a situation of recurrentbloodily violence towards the recurrent throwing of ‘paper stones’between competing elite groups is a huge achievement of humandevelopment worth defending.20 Again: if people are highlymisinformed (even after a three-day civic education class) andtend to behave rather irrational with regards to politicalcontroversies, we should not look for any further citizeninvolvement beyond elections and rather rely on professionalpoliticians to safeguard a careful representation of societalinterests within today’s mass democracy. So: Why not improve elitedemocracy? Why not better work on the sophistication of theelectoral process of picking the brightest brains to rule in theshared interest of all – with as protection the electoral vote?

The crucial point for radical democracy thus becomes to seewhether a positive justification for democracy exists – whether togive citizens institutionalized power beyond elections mightactually improve the quality of deliberation and hence might leadoverall to more reasonable and socially accepted politicaloutcomes. In making the case for a positive justification ofdemocracy I argue that the conflict between participation anddeliberation is exaggerated and misinterpreted. Three aspectsrelated to the quality of deliberation are presented to sustainthe position that citizens are capable of making sound judgmentsand, more important, that it is in fact the pressure of a publicvote that brings the different arguments to a controversial publicpolicy issue into a debate with each other. The first aspect of deliberation revolves aroundconsciousness of the idiosyncratic nature of knowledge. Regularlydeliberation is conceptually reduced to an idealized process inwhich professional politicians bring together all expertknowledge, discuss on objective facts, take the various – andfrequently conflicting – societal interests into account, andrationally decide upon public policy proposals for theirimplications in terms of trade-offs between for example socialredistribution and efficiency aims. Nevertheless, this view on20 Przeworski, A. (1999) Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense in: I. Shapiro & C. Hacker-Cordón (eds.) Democracy’s Value, Cambridge University Press.

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deliberation tends to miss the point that democratic debate is notprimarily about irrefutable facts, but fundamentally consists ofideological struggles trying to construct a shared vision of thegood life. Strauss puts this insight into the following words:

“All political action has (..) a directedness towards knowledge of the good:of the good life, or of the good society. (..) Th[is] quest [for knowledge onthe good society, AB] would not be necessary if such knowledge wereimmediately available. (..) The distinctive trait of the philosopher [i.e. hewho searches for the common interest, AB] is that ‘he knows that heknows nothing’, and that his insight into our ignorance concerning themost important things induces him to strive with all his power forknowledge.”21

Strauss draws attention to the insight that in the presentstate of knowledge we actually know very little for sure (as afact) about the most important political issues. Acceptance of theabsence of solid knowledge on ‘the truth’ about conflictive issuesmeans that public policy deliberations by experts to a significantdegree are guided by arbitrary assumptions and beliefs. Arbitrarypower therefore not only refers to moneyed interests or socialties, but also to seemingly fully rational processes ofdeliberation. The deliberations themselves might follow a rationalcourse, but are based on arbitrary opinions on (multiple relationsbetween) public issues that hopefully someday will approximatetrue knowledge. Not the hard facts are thus what start politicaldebates off, but rather the contentious assumptions and beliefsforming part of (still shaky) ideological constructs of reality.

What does idiosyncratic knowledge mean when 300 to 500delegates deliberate in an assembly? The delegates would firstneed to obtain knowledge on the details of the subject matterunder discussion, which mainly should come from sources outside ofthe assembly. This is the ‘technical’ part, but is normallyreferred to as obtaining the expert knowledge. To decide whichtechnical information (the ‘facts’) is most relevant fordiscussion would surely lead to some controversy, but it shouldnot be a problem to gather sufficient diverse information. Butthen for a well-considered debate to occur also a selection shouldbe made concerning which non-technical (idiosyncratic, or call it21 Strauss, L. (1975) What is Political Philosophy? in: H. Gildin, Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss, Prentice Hall, pp. 3-5 – original: (1959).

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philosophical) knowledge is relevant to the issue at hand. Here itgets more difficult. For sure the 300 to 500 delegates combinedwould represent a great deal of philosophical knowledge, but it ismore than likely that also in this case frequently a call uponideological sources outside the assembly would be required. Andhow to objectively decide which philosophical expert knowledgeshould be relevant to include in particular deliberations?Academic philosophers? Area experts? Writers? The church? Businessplatforms? Organized citizens? The individuals possessing the mostrelevant philosophical knowledge on a particular issue will alwaysbe difficult to objectively identify, will always consist of arelatively tiny few and, as they are usually situated outside theassembly, will not have any formal power upon which the finaldecisions rest. There is consequently no guarantee that therational deliberations within the assembly will be guided by themost relevant knowledge as this depends on the choice of thedelegates to include or exclude such insights in theirdeliberations. In circumstances of uncertainty about the relevantinsights to a particular issue, the delegates will have to fallback to their deeply held beliefs for this choice. Mouffe in thisrespect talks about Wittgenstein’s notion of the different ‘formsof life’ inspiring the ideological views of the delegates.22 Thepower each delegate uses to include or exclude knowledge deemedrelevant to a discussion, though legitimately obtained inelections, will mainly consist of an arbitrary application of his‘life world’ to determine the framework that sets the limitswithin which rational debate can take place.

It might be objected that the ‘life world’ of a delegate ispart of the ideological platform that brought him his election toa seat in the assembly and as such is not arbitrary – which inprincipal is true. However, it is far from clear whether therelevance of a delegate’s beliefs – let alone their translationinto concrete political actions – with regards to each and everyparticular issue stands into a direct relationship with theelectoral vote. Even a delegate’s ideological preferencesthemselves might not form the ideally desired choice of theelectorate. Citizens might have chosen his beliefs overalternative visions of other candidates, but this says nothingabout their fondness of his individualized blend of a certainideological category. It neither tells us the degree in whichcitizens would like their delegate(s) to mix their beliefs with22 Mouffe, C. (2000) Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, Political ScienceSeries #72, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, pp. 11-13.

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the other delegates in the assembly in order to come to reasonablecompromises. The vote is simply a too poor mechanism to transmitrefined information to formal political actors. Ultimately, in thechoice of a delegate a citizen needs to consolidate a host ofconsiderations, in which ideological beliefs are just one – andnot always the most important – factor. Electoral outcomestherefore do not convey refined information that unequivocally canprovide a clear-cut guidance for delegates in their deliberationsand final votes on particular policy issues. Rather than tonarrowly stick to the particular desires of the citizens thatelected him, it might therefore be better to visualize theelection of a delegate as granting a mandate to independentlycompromise with other delegates in the interest of all.Nevertheless, in either case the resultant is that, although weelect wise men to decide on issues of collective concern, theywill not possess all of the required knowledge to start theirdeliberations, and in determining which outside expert knowledgeis relevant they will rely on arbitrary deep feelings and beliefsin accordance with their life worlds.

If the aim is thus to come to wise decisions that are bestable to approximate the common interest of all, it is thus not atall that obvious that merely appointing the 300 to 500 wisestpersons to an assembly suffices for this. We have to acknowledgethat the most appropriate sources of knowledge to guide thedeliberations on a particular public policy issue might not bediscovered by the delegates, or might be ignored as irrelevantfrom the perspective of their life worlds. If we accept that weknow near to nothing for sure about what precisely the commoninterest consists of, and how numerous factors and policies mightcontribute to it in their interaction, then we cannot but concludethat even the wisest 300 to 500 men are busy arranging wobblyideological building blocks on which to sustain their rationaldeliberations. In such a situation, the best we can hope for isthe institution of a reciprocal debate in which politiciansrecognize the feeble state of their ideological constructs and forthat reason ‘strive with all their power for knowledge’, takingalternative insights – inside and outside the assembly – seriouslyas they might contain missing pieces that improve our sight onreality. This is exactly what Mill writes about when he refers tothe existence of ‘partial truths’ in the different outlooks onlife and the need to scrutinize them with each other in order togain a better knowledge of the whole picture:

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“People (..) who (..) are not wholly unused to be set right when they arewrong, place (..) unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as areshared by all who surround them, or to whom they habitually defer; for(..) he usually repose[s], with implicit trust, on the infallibility of ‘the world’in general. And the world, to each individual, means the part of it withwhich he comes in contact: his party, his sect, his church, his class ofsociety (..) He devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being inthe right against the dissentient worlds of other people; and it nevertroubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerousworlds is the object of his reliance (..) [T]he majority of the eminent menof every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous(..) Why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance amongmankind of rational opinions and rational conduct?”23

“[The common] case [is thus one of] conflicting doctrines[:] instead ofbeing one true and the other false, [they] share the truth between them,and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of thetruth of which the received doctrine embodies only a part. (..) [O]nlythrough diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of humanintellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth. (..) The exclusivepretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole must and ought tobe protested against (..)”24

Note that Mill does not see a diversity of voices asenough for reciprocal debate to occur, as it is essentialto ensure that people also listen to each other:

[T]here is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it iswhen they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, andtruth itself ceases to have the effect of truth by being exaggerated intofalsehood. (..) Truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it,every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only findsadvocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.”25

23 Mill, J.S. (1975) On Liberty, edited by David Spitz, Norton, pp. 19-20 – original: (1859).24 Ibid. pp. 44-46.25 Ibid. pp. 49-50.

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Why would the 300 to 500 wise delegates not entersufficiently in reciprocal debate with each other and withknowledgeable sources outside the assembly? Apart from holdingdeep-seated beliefs pertaining to their life world, the answer isthat due to their relatively large freedom to maneuver (which willbe amplified by comfortable voting majorities for ruling parties)they do not face a strong incentive to do so. Delegates of amajority faction or coalition in the assembly – who will be in theposition to effectively execute public policy proposals – willinvest considerable time, energy, public resources and prestigeinto bringing their ideological visions into practice – somethingthey do not want to see in vain. And although there might be acertain conscience of their fallibility, in circumstances of basicuncertainty about right and wrong, and numerous alternative views(equally on built on feeble ground) on the common interest, theywill feel the urge to create some minimal sense of security byfirmly holding on to their genuinely felt truth. Enacted policieswill bring a kind of path dependency, as the majority delegateswill interpret their projects as something that they cannot permitto fail on the basis of erratic external factors infringing upontheir essential truth. They will for sure enter into discussionwith other minority delegates, but only to compromise if strictlyrequired. Their electoral mandate will be taken as a stronglegitimization to implement their vision. Subsequent electionswould have to rule a verdict on the correctness of the path taken,but in the meanwhile the majority delegates will see it as theirturn to build to the future; the minority factions being allowedto correct unforeseen fallacies, but only within the framework asset by the truth of the majority faction. Instead of a reciprocalelite debate between both politicians and other knowledgeablepersons outside the assembly we are thus confronted with shiftingelectoral majorities that do not necessarily relate to particularpolicy issues under discussion, but nevertheless grant a largearbitrary power to the temporary rulers to fully implement theirpartial truth without a substantial degree of critical reflectionon alternative visions or the compatibility of the underlyingbeliefs with the context they are applied to.

The levels of arbitrary power within liberal democracy –whether in the form of moneyed interests, social ties or lifeworlds – are thus distorting deliberation on the common interestof all. While representative democracy is a must in modernsocieties, the implication of arbitrary power influencing thedeliberations should be that the resultant consensus between

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formal political representatives should always be criticallyfollowed – i.e. oppositional views should not be pushed away butenforced and listened to, even after a consensus has materializedon a certain issue. With an eye to arbitrary power it seemslogical that if a decision by delegates in the assembly issufficiently contested within society at large it should bepossible to recall the power of delegates in favor of a society-wide discussion on the particular collective concern involved. Aformal mechanism (democratic design) preventing rulers fromreified ideological practices seems required for this.

A second aspect of deliberation allowing citizen involvementin policy debates beyond elections is the idea that social groups,intellectuals and also the average citizen are able to transmitsocial criticism26 capable of improving the quality ofdeliberation. On the one hand, social criticism consists of peoplebeing able to make reasonable judgments on controversial topics –even beyond elections on specific policy proposals full oftechnical details and difficult trade-offs. Citizens do notnecessarily need to know all detailed ins and outs of a policyproposal to contribute to the quality of deliberation – this canbe explained to them by the professional experts, the mass mediaand the politicians themselves – but rather need to come to a wisedecision with regards to the competing ideological constructs andthe way they are applied in a certain context to a particularissue. Saward, in making a similar claim about the preponderanceof ideological struggles over technical expert knowledge indemocratic debate, remarks that the absence of superior knowledgeabout the common interest of a society at large makes thatcitizens should be regarded as equally qualified in makingcollectively binding decisions that are mainly based on moralconsiderations:

“Non-contingent superior knowledge is superior knowledge ofappropriate ends; contingent superior knowledge is superior knowledgeof technical means to a given end. (..) Contingently superior knowledge,knowledge about how to achieve certain states of affairs that are given asdesirable, is widely accepted and acceptable. However, this is not the typeof knowledge that enters most importantly into calculations about thecommunity’s larger interests. The latter is a matter of ends, of moralchoices (..) The only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that

26 Sen, A. (2003) Freedom Favors Development, excerpts in: R. Dahl, I. Shapiro & J.A. Cheibub (eds.) The Democracy Sourcebook, MIT Press, pp. 444-446.

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those in political authority cannot rightly claim to know the betterinterests of any citizen, or any group of citizens, beyond narrowconsiderations with respect to a narrow range of issues.”27

On the other hand, social criticism consists of people beingable to provide valuable information on issues and to raiseforgotten areas of societal concern. Citizens might provide a deepconcern with social injustice in the distribution of economicausterity measures, a sense of urgency with regards to improvingpublic schools, transmit severe restraint in going to war or raiseattention to the negative effects of mass immigration. This inthe thought that – albeit representing different political colors– modern delegates as a group share a certain social life world inthe sense that for example in majority they (and their families)will be less affected by financial cuts, will attend privateschools, will not feel the pain of casualties in war and will notbe living in residential areas where mass immigration is showingits biggest drawbacks. It is not that elections cannot deal withthese issues – on the contrary. But as elections do not send anyrefined messages and usually revolve around just a couple of mainissues, in which some issues of concern might not even beincluded, social criticism on a particular issue might not findits proper way into formal political minds. A lack of reciprocaldebate on the issue concerned will lead to a selective blindnesson the (ideological) positions taken by politicians and will meanthat only when the problems and popular discomfort have reachedalarming levels they will be fully included in electoral campaigns– leaving again other issues lacking attention. Elections canaccordingly be seen as a kill-or-cure remedy for bad politics. Outof frustration about a specific case of political wrongdoing asperceived by citizens, a protest vote for another party may becast to make the responsible delegates change their mind. However,if the public opinion on the other policies of the responsibledelegates were generally favorable, such a protest vote would bequite a rough remedy to correct the tunnel vision on theparticular topic of public contempt. Sen points out that, whileliberal democracy in comparison to authoritarian regimes functionswell in quickly processing social criticism and “revealing facts that maybe embarrassing to the government (..)”, there is also a downside to itseffectiveness:

27 Saward, M. (1998) The Terms of Democracy, Polity Press, pp. 25, 27, 30.

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“Democracies have been particularly successful in preventing disastersthat are easy to understand, in which sympathy can take an especiallyimmediate from. Many other problems are not quite so accessible. (..)While the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize, these otherdeprivations call for deeper analysis, and for greater and more effectiveuse of mass communication and political participation – in sum, for afurther practice of democracy.”28

The two aspects of the idiosyncratic nature of knowledge andsocial criticism are situated at the boundary between a negativeand positive justification of democracy. The prevention ofselective blindness can be seen as one step further on thedemocratic path that started with the attempts to check tyrannicalrule and outright corruption. Citizens might prevent more negativesides of liberal democracy and also put a check on occultedcorruption in the form of interest groups ‘softly’ buying itsprivileges, or on dogmatic rule in the form of politicians blindedby a tunnel vision for policy failures not at the top of theelectoral agenda. Whether the argument for citizen involvementbeyond elections holds, however, finally depends on the degree towhich societal criticism by and large is able to bring a positivecontribution to the quality of democratic deliberations – on apositive justification of democracy. Critics might object thatwhile citizens can easily relate to issues that raise a strongsympathy or disdain (like the plight of famine victims or ablatant misappropriation of public resources), their influence onmore controversial and complicated issues should be seen asdetrimental to the quality of deliberation that exactly for suchcases is required. Moneyed interests could be curbed by campaignfinance reform, dogmatic rule by more proportional representationand outright corruption is already covered by a free press and theelectoral vote. Not negating the drawbacks of liberal democracycaused by arbitrary power in society, and perhaps evenacknowledging that the supposed incapacity of citizens to makesense of expert debate is exaggerated, the critics might sustainthat to bring in the popular voice would not consist of a cure butrather of a kill to a desired improvement in the quality ofdeliberation – if citizens already could come up with a reasonableopinion on complicated issues, the argument is that elite debate28 Sen, A. (2003) Freedom Favors Development, excerpts in: R. Dahl, I. Shapiro & J.A. Cheibub (eds.) The Democracy Sourcebook, MIT Press, pp. 444-446.

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in by far the most cases can simply come up with something muchbetter. How could citizens improve the quality of deliberation onparticular policy issues? Except for a more inclusive voice, howcould a formally institutionalized citizen involvement promote amore reciprocal debate? How could popular participation instillthat the different parties and insights to an issue are actuallylistening to each other?

A third aspect of deliberation in favor of citizeninvolvement in between elections is the awareness that it is thecompetition for the popular vote that provokes an improved qualityof elite debate. Apart from being exaggerated, it is here arguedthat the blind spot of radical democracy also consists of amisinterpretation of the tension between popular participation andthe quality of deliberations. A lot of studies into the effects ofcitizen involvement in new democratic designs focus on the verbaldiscourse of citizens in determining their contribution to thequality of policy debates. And the usual conclusion is that thepopular expressions do not match the eloquence and intellectuallevel of elite deliberations. However, these exercises miss thepoint that to assess the added value to the overall quality ofpolitical debate by including citizen involvement we should belooking elsewhere. The average citizen does not necessarily haveto make a verbal contribution to the deliberations and neither hasto (re-)invent the philosophical arguments sustaining his choicesconcerning public policies by himself. To reach a wise judgment heneeds to follow the elite debates and other cues relevant forcomparing and making sense of the various elite proposals. And thecrucial aspect is that in the fight to attract a majority of votesto their proposals, elite groups face the need to carefully payattention to opposing views and their accompanying discourses.

In his theory on collective action, Olson clarifies thatspecial interest groups are far better situated than large groupsfocused on society wide goals to exert an effective pressure onthe state apparatus to give in to their particular preferences.29

This explains why over time the state’s public resources to alarge extent get misallocated to favor the narrow interests ofrelatively small and homogeneous special interest groups at thecost of the interest of a society as a whole.30 Focusing oneconomic growth and the interest of the consumers at large, Olsonpleas for the opening up of (international) markets to outdo thenegative influence of special interest groups – as the entrance of29 Olson, M. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press.30 Olson, M. (1984) The Rise and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press.

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new competitors and the involvement of new(ly) (positioned)regulatory authorities will break down the detrimental privilegesof these societal groups. If the attention is shifted fromeconomic growth to the functioning of liberal democracy we can saythat, instead of the opening up of international markets, theopening up of politics to more citizen involvement will generate asubstantial mass of relatively independent individuals who basedon the one-man-one-vote principle are able to counter theinfluence of arbitrary power stemming from narrow interests anddifferent life worlds setting the political agenda. Theindependent ‘numbers’ allowed to enter into new democratic designsin between representative elections mean that societal groups willhave a far harder time exerting their arbitrary (oppressive) powerto get their preferences enacted. Lobby groups will not only haveto convince a handful of government officials and key politicianscontrolling the state apparatus of their cause, but now also themajority of a democratic public.

The competition for an encompassing majority in a democraticvote based on an ample citizen involvement makes that opposingelites are forced to enter in a reciprocal debate with each otherin front of an observing public. Although such debates for surewill not reach deliberative utopias, they will be an importantstep in the right direction to balance the dominance ofcalculative thinking in a reality of unbridled aggregation with amore critical thinking of democratic publics. Looking at thedisentanglement of cross-cutting social relationships in the late1950s, it was Heidegger who regretted the surge of what he calleda calculative thinking in society that left societal groups withno other inclination than to one-sidedly monitor the fulfillmentof their own preferences as opposed to other groupings on thepolitical scene. For a more critical thinking he pointed to thenecessity of creating a certain degree of resignation and opennessfor the unknown – called ‘the secret’ by him.31 On multiplecontentious issues – on which the competing discourses are morebased on ideological beliefs instead of hard facts – it willsimply not be possible to attain a 100% critical, fully rational,debate. Politicians searching to maintain their electoral powerand societal groups with close interests to a collective issueunder discussion will moreover always display a considerabledegree of calculative thinking in constructing their discourse.Nevertheless, there are several factors to discern why under the31 Heidegger, M. (1979) Gelatenheid, translated by Etienne van Doosselaere, Tielt: Lannoo – original: Gelassenheit (1959).

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influence of a popular vote they cannot stick anymore to just abrief airing of their views justifying the practical actions on aparticular issue. The threat of a popular vote contrary to theirviews or interests makes that elite groups first of all have toexplain (also to themselves) how exactly their proposals arerelated to the interest of society at large – the elite discoursesare widened. In addition, there is the need for alternative elitegroups to carefully listen and react to (the critics on) theiropposing views – the elite discourses are deepened. Politiciansand interest groups will still primarily apply a calculativethinking – in backing a certain proposal they after all want towin over a majority – but under the influence of popular(electoral) pressure more meaningful debates are rendered toconvince relatively independent citizens.

A substantial factor contributing to critical thinking in thepolicy deliberations is the raised importance of independentintellectual and expert knowledge – independent at least frompolitical power and to a lesser extent from ideologicalcommitment. In the face of a popular vote on a single publicpolicy issue inevitably independent knowledge will gain animportant place in the deliberations to the extent that they areable to change a citizen’s perception of what is at stake. Thismight even count for politicians in the case they do not have apre-defined position towards the policy proposal and when itconcerns a (forgotten or undervalued) topic that is relatively lowon the political agenda. In the end critical thinking should comefrom the large bulk of citizens that are relatively independent tothe particular policy proposal at hand; in the sense that theyshould critically weigh the ‘partial truths’ of the competingelite groups backing alternative proposals and the independentintellectual knowledge available in coming to a wise judgment.Citizens will of course rely on their own life world andcontingent experiences in forming their judgment, but willactively relate them to the competing (partisan and moreindependent) interpretations and information while trying to makesense of their electoral vote. Democratic numbers give influenceto relatively uninterested people prepared to listen before makingup their minds, give a space to independent knowledge to attractattention, give a pressure to the competing partisan groups toaccount for their proposals, and thus finally give an impetus forreciprocal debate between inclusive voices. It is therefore thecreation of a meaningful debate – in which an independent majority

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needs to be convinced – that will improve the quality of elitedeliberation.

A gradual broadening of democratic rights throughout history– from the unpropertied classes to black and female citizens – hasaccomplished that social criticism easier finds its way to formalpolitics. It is generally accepted that socially inclusiveelections have made public power holders more accountable and tendto generate a far more critical debate regarding alternativeoutlooks on the common interest than any authoritarian system candeliver. We can thus at least say that popular participation andthe quality of deliberation do not necessarily stand in aninherent tension to each other. It is therefore the question whythe possible benefits of an increased citizen involvement inbetween elections are so strongly rejected. Why would the vote-debate compatibility not hold for discussions on particular issuesbeyond elections for representative delegates? This is not tonegate that there is a tension. Critics are right in mentioningthat politicians and other intellectual elites by and largepossess more time, have a higher intellect and maintain more of anemotional distance to assess the multiple and interrelated effectsof public policies. Even though the tension is exaggerated, it isclear that in this aspect there is a certain loss in the qualityof deliberations taking place when citizens are brought in withtheir vote. But this is not the whole picture, as the blind spotof radical democracy also contains a misinterpretation of thetension. The argument is that the loss in the quality ofdeliberation in terms of a relative loss in dedicated time,intellect and emotional distance is offset by the deliberativegain of an increased competitiveness of elite debates that seesalternative political outlooks, independent expert knowledge andsocial criticism able to induce critical thinking. Compare it tothe parable of blind men touching an elephant: by touching only apart and yet drawing definite conclusions a blind spot is createdtowards the other parts making up the whole. Pushing citizeninvolvement in formal politics to ever-higher levels in betweenelections will at some critical point for sure have an overallnegative effect on the desired quality of democratic debate – themore so when issues of a more technocratic nature are involved.Nevertheless, it is far from obvious that with only representativeelections we have reached the limits of what citizen involvementcan add to the quality of democratic politics.

A final critique of a formally institutionalized citizeninvolvement beyond elections might consist of the point of view

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that, despite the benign influence of social criticism and despitethe acceptance of an improved quality of elite deliberations dueto an inclusive vote, people are intrinsically unfit to make awise judgment. The underlying arguments for such a rejection ofpopular participation will probably be grounded in the notion ofan easy manipulation of citizens that are guided by emotions andare incapable to see any benefits of policies that are to delivertheir positive effects over a longer time span than the short-sighted and self-interested average citizen can comprehend. Such acritique would come dangerously close to not only rejectinnovative democratic designs, but to seriously doubt the benefitsof an inclusive vote in representative elections altogether – orat least trying to significantly reduce the areas of public policywhich a popular vote might affect.32 This paper takes thehypothesis that, if given the chance by supportive politicalinstitutions, citizens have both the desire and the capability toconsider the interest of a society as a whole. It is thus arguedthat given the right circumstances, a political culture ofaggregation can be altered to a political culture guided byreciprocal debate. Such debate will not always be timid and mostof the times will be loaded with emotions. But the conviction isthat, taken as a whole, citizens will engage in critical thinkingout of a communal sense of belonging, instead of holding on to acalculative thinking on how to materialize self-interestedpreferences. In the words of Habermas:

"Does participation in democratic procedures have only the functionalmeaning of silencing a defeated minority, or does it have the deliberativemeaning of including the arguments of citizens in the democratic processof opinion- and will-formation?" (..) "Democracy depends on the belief ofthe people that there is some scope left for collectively shaping achallenging future."33

The experience of small-scale projects such as the

participatory budget in Porto Alegre shows that innovative

32 For views on popular participation – even when limited to elections forpolitical representatives – as leading to a societal over-demand of non-compromising and incapable citizens threatening democratic governability;and hence the need to partially insulate public policy making from popular pressures, see: Huntington, S. et al. (1975) The Crisis of Democracy, New York University Press; Zakaria, F. (2007) The Future of Freedom, Norton; Caplan, B. (2008) The Myth of the Rational Voter, Princeton University Press.33 Habermas, J. (2010) Leadership and Leitkultur, New York Times, October 28th.

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democratic designs can help to overcome a situation where politicsis perceived as an arena in which you have to fight for your owninterests, and to foment the development of a civic culture inwhich the separate interests of other societal groups aredeliberately taken into account by considerate citizens. There isno a priori reason why innovative society-wide designs could notdo the same. A change in (political) culture will take time andwill probably its adherence will only take root gradually.However, just like well thought out small-scale designs canbalance the risk of framing and elite domination, there existssufficient room in society-wide designs to counter the risk ofnarrow interests dominating mass-media debates via the attentionfor an equal access to resources, or the risk of a poor quality ofdeliberations via the stimulation of public forums disseminatingreciprocal debate and the inclusion of independent expertknowledge. Without a doubt the entrance of a more active citizeninvolvement within formal politics will come along with heightenedemotions – and the more so when the traits of the culture ofaggregation are still dominant. Certain partisan elements to thepublic debate might not moderate their voice, but instead will seethe opening up of participatory channels as an opportunity toradicalize their rhetoric. Mill nevertheless points out that thehope of a free public debate does not consist of convertingradicalized partisans but of the attention it is able to attractfrom the ‘disinterested bystander’:

“I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian isnot cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened andexacerbated thereby; the truth which ought to have been, but was not,seen, being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by personsregarded as opponents. But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is onthe calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision ofopinions works its salutary effect. Not the violent conflict between parts ofthe truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil (..)”34

If we look for practical experience with society-wide citizeninvolvement beyond elections there are hopeful signs to bediscovered. The political scientist Frey from Switzerland – a34 Mill, J.S. (1975) On Liberty, edited by David Spitz, Norton, p. 50 – original: (1859).

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country with a long tradition in the use of (semi-) directdemocracy institutions – claims on the basis of his research thatcitizen initiatives and referendums systematically raise citizentrust in government.35 Other research on this country and theEuropean Union indicates that citizens entangled in an initiativeor referendum debate tend to be better informed on the publicissues at stake.36 The knowledge available is still too scatteredand too fragile for any conclusions. But the hypothesis ofcitizens as disinterested bystanders that are willing and able tocontribute to the common interest shows at least sufficient roomfor more practical research. It is time for (semi-) directdemocracy mechanisms to be taken serious by scholars in the fieldof radical democracy, or innovative democratic thought in general.

Hegemony, the Mass Media and the Deliberative Potential of I&R

I&R do not aim at an unmediated, continuous popular voting oneach and every single issue. They accordingly have to be seen ascomplementary of representative institutions, as their goal is tohold delegates either accountable or to present them withalternative policy proposals. They will only be used when aconsiderable amount of citizens sign a petition to do so,signaling the existence of a significant controversy on aparticular public concern justifying their use. The fact that I&Rdo not place excessive time demands on citizens, in combinationwith the knowledge that the creation of a civic culture is rathersomething that is learned in actual practice than simply acquiredin civic education classes, should be welcomed with a view to thehigh levels of popular disengagement with politics.

In creating a society-wide debate, the use of theseinstruments allows alternative elites (inside and outside theassembly) a better access to the public sphere and let theirvoices be taken into account due to their possible electoralinfluence. The importance from the point of view of radicaldemocracy is that due to the influence of I&R minority opinionsare less being pushed away in favor of the majority consensusview. No matter the ultimate effect of an I&R campaign on an35 Frey, B.S. (2003) Direct Democracy for Transition Countries, Working Paper No. 165, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.36 Benz, M. & A. Stutzer (2004) Are Voters Better Informed When They Have a Larger Say in Politics?, Public Choice, #119(1-2): pp. 31-59.

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established public consensus, the ventilation of alternativeinsights in a reciprocal debate with ‘generally accepted truths’is important due to the raised consciousness a clash of ‘partialtruths’ generates. This does not mean that a hegemonic consensusview should be interpreted as something harmful to be attacked.Politics is all about constructing a shared vision of where to goas a society in the face of elementary doubt about the correctnessof ideological visions and practical actions that make an appealto the common interest. Hegemony in the form of a consensus viewis therefore inevitable and even a highly desired element in aculture of liberal nationalism that in a positive way seescollective emotions consciously guiding the self-determination ofa society. Nevertheless, the point to make is that, as hegemony isalways partly based on arbitrary social power and shakyideological constructs, it requires a continued reciprocal debatein which social criticism raises consciousness about thepossibilities to adaptations of its base or a switch to analternative construct altogether. I&R thus provides both the spaceand influence for alternative views and voices to criticallyreflect on the collective path taken in effective publicdeliberations.

For the critical mass of ‘passive bystanders’ I&R offers thepossibility to enlightened knowledge. The possible electoralconsequences of I&R proposals mean that marginal opinions will notonly feature in editorial pages or late hour televisiondocumentaries but will also enter the prominent pages and prime-time slots of the mass media. Under the banner of objectivity themost important mass media attention is normally reserved for arepresentation of the hegemonic consensus view. This is not somuch because the press actively seeks to copy the majorityconsensus, but because their professional principles leave them toreflect the actual power constellations in the assembly and tofocus on the possible impact of conflicts between the rival elitegroups. ‘Negative’ discussions on corruption or other publicabuses might attract a substantial amount of attention in the massmedia for opposition groups and independent knowledge due to theirlikely impact on established power. But in most of the ‘positive’discussions, on different views to approach a social issue, theattention in the front pages and prime-time slots of the massmedia is almost solely reserved for the visions of the two orthree biggest political parties. And this is also what in majorityour ‘passive bystanders’ are provided in terms of information toform themselves an opinion on the common good.

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Via critical discourse analysis37 popular opinion formationcan be investigated with a look at citizens who mix their personalexperiences in everyday life with the ideological frames offeredin the mass media to make sense of the world around them.Individual thoughts of mind (or: ‘models’) might lead to thecreation of shared attitudes by their fusion with explanatoryschemes available in the mass media. When shared attitudes basedon mass media consumption gain a significant weight, they becomerelevant for the political elite groups (established oralternative) in their fight for electoral power and their usemight affect the ideological base of a hegemonic view; leading toits alteration or its outright rejection. I&R renders the publicdebate on contentious ‘positive’ issues in front-page and prime-time mass media more inclusive as minority views might attractserious media attention due to their possible impact on the leversof power. And, additionally, as the discussions based on I&Rproposals are about specific issues there will be more mass mediaattention to expert knowledge (whether technical or ideological)that has no direct tie to political power. Even the fact thatpolitical parties are often internally split on a particular I&Rissue can stimulate critical thinking. Arguments will get moreimportant than the usual partisan cues citizens use in their votefor representative elections. The absence of easy cues isfrequently seen as making it more difficult for voters to vote onI&R proposals38, but this is not a problem to the extent that itfosters critical thinking. Voters can concentrate on a specificissue and the accompanying arguments related to it, instead ofhaving to indulge in the utmost difficult task of comparingbundles of party proposals, overseeing the psychology ofcandidates’ personal profiles including their historic trackrecords and pondering the strategic implications of theirjudgments in representative elections – which ultimately requiresto process all this information in just one single vote.

A common critique is that the process of deliberation will beendangered by interest groups using ample financial resources tocreate manipulative media campaigns with no other intention thanto influence public opinion by means of demagoguery. While thisproblem should be taken serious, it should be noted that37 Van Dijk, T. (1995) The Mass Media Today, Javnost/The Public (Ljubljana) #2(2): pp. 27-45.38 Luskin, R.C. & J.S. Fishkin, et al. (2000) Deliberation and Referendum Voting,paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., August 31 – September 3.

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inequalities in campaign finance can be tackled by proper rulesguiding the I&R process, like for example a minimum amount of freeairtime in the media for societal groups without the requiredfinancial resources, obligations to make financial contributionspublic, and foremost with the creation of an independent debateforum for the policy issue under attention. Research by Cronin39

shows that the electorate is mostly moderate in its vote on I&Rproposals. It appears very difficult for self-interested groups toget new ‘favors’ via I&R campaigns. Nevertheless, the threat ofmanipulation seems foremost to consist of the capacity of specialinterest groups to create confusion in attempts to preserve oldfavors or prevent reforms negative to their narrow side interests.These research findings stress the need for innovative elementsthat stimulate deliberation in the institutional setup of I&Rdesigns. Another critique is, however, that I&R cannot fulfill thisdemand for improved deliberation due to the inherent polarizingnature of their institutional formats. But, while it is true thatin the end the devices come down to a ballot vote requiring a‘yes’ or a ‘no’, also politicians finally have to cast a vote onpolicy proposals in the assembly. Discussions on I&R issues takingplace before a popular vote and possible political adjustmentsthereafter form an essential part of the whole process. In thepre-initiative/referendum stage, the issue at hand is discussed inpublic and the citizens’ level of information will be raised.Discussion on I&R proposals in the legislature, or betweensocietal groupings themselves, might even lead to an alteration ofpolicy proposals. In the post-initiative/referendum stage, nomatter the result of a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’, the preference of citizensregarding policy issues and the size of minorities will be moreclear on the political scene. This makes it more likely forpolitical parties to take this information in mind and to use itin future policy deliberation on the same issue.40 An innovativeway to structure I&R processes is proposed by Saward. He arguesthat institutional attention for the structuring of a sequence ofactions, in which several stages have to be passed before a finalvote is given, can give deliberation the upper hand overmanipulation by special interests. The table below gives anexample of such a sequence for an I&R procedure:39 Cronin (1990) Direct Democracy, Harvard University Press.40 Frey, B.S. (2003) Direct Democracy for Transition Countries, Working Paper No. 165, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich,pp. 12-14.

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Table: Sequence of initiative and referendum system

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Citizen Initiative Delay Deliberation ReferendumCitizens place aproposal on theformal politicalagenda with alist ofsignatures.

A period of opendiscussionfollows via themedia andvarious civilsociety forums.

Next, a periodof focuseddeliberation inmore formalsettings.

Finally, abindingreferendumresolves theissue.

Source: Saward, M. (2001) Making Democratic Connections, Acta Politica, 2001(4): pp. 374-375;Saward, M. (2003) Enacting Democracy, Political Studies, Vol. 51: 169-171.

In stage 1, citizens can place an initiative on thelegislative agenda if enough signatures are collected. Also, thecitizen initiative will be checked on its validity (to see if thepolicy area involved applies for an initiative and is addressed atthe appropriate political level), its subject circumscription (toprohibit the piling of subjects), and its proper wording (nodouble negations, clear language). In stage 2, a period of delaycan provide sufficient time to discuss the citizen initiative inbroad circles making use of free public spaces. Examples aretelevision debates, civil society meetings, and informationworkshops. In stage 3, a period of formal deliberation can enableto expose the citizen initiative and its underlying argumentationsto a more profound scrutiny. Examples are the use of adeliberative poll41, expert panels, and the treatment of thecitizen initiative in congress, which might lead to an alternativeproposal of the latter. In stage 4, the proposal is concluded by abinding vote of citizens in a referendum, where citizens can voteon the initiative and a possible alternative proposal of thelegislature.41 In the deliberative poll - an idea of political scientist Fishkin - randomly selected voters are invited to discuss specific issues, watch informational videos, question experts, and filling out surveys. It is the expectation that as the result of voters extensively deliberating in small goups and with expert support, people will gain a more profound knowledge on the issue, moderate their initial views, and can actually reach some mutual understanding. This instrument was for example used as an academic experiment before the 2004 presidential elections in the USA.(The New York Times, 20-10-04) The broadcasting of a deliberative poll on television might possibly use as a vote advise.

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The I&R sequence Saward presents is by no means an idealstructure. It serves more as an example to show that I&R can verywell be structured to improve the deliberative nature of theiractivation. There exist various other ways to refine theinstitutional design of I&R to ensure a more equal attention toalternative opinions and independent knowledge in the quest for abetter picture on the ‘truth’. An example is the existence ofjoint I&R systems that allow for more than one proposal to chosebetween on the ballot regarding a particular issue.42 In such asystem, the legislature can first decide to accept an initiativeor to make changes in a dialogue with the citizen collective. If,however, the citizen collective does not accept the changes, or arejection of the initiative follows by the legislature, thecitizen collective has the possibility to collect signatures toput their legislative proposal up for decision in a legislativereferendum. If they feel the necessity to do so, the congress cancontend in this legislative referendum by adding their alternativebill on the list. The final question-structure laid down beforevoters in the legislative referendum would then be: 1.) are youfor or against ‘initiative 1’? (citizen initiative); 2.) are youfor or against ‘initiative 2’ (alternative initiative congress)and; 3.) if both answered positively; which option has your firstpreference? The public debate would accordingly be deepened, asthe question would not only become if new legislation isnecessary, but also what this new legislation should consist of.Further research will need to reveal the appropriateness of eachdifferent system in unleashing the deliberative potential of I&R.

I&R surely is no panacea. Society-wide debate should go handin hand with small-scale forums and other institutionalinnovations to curb arbitrary power determining politicaloutcomes. Apart from politics, in order for citizens to engage inreciprocal debate and critical thinking, society would ideallybenefit from a higher popularity of literature, an improvedattention for civic education in school curriculums, moretraveling and cultural exchanges, a better division between hoursspent on work, household and social life or the creation ofsocially diverse public spaces to get to know the ‘anonymousother’ and to renew the bridging social capital by thereintegration of bowling leagues – or their 21st centuryequivalents. Still, the deliberative potential of I&R can make adifference in regaining the trust of citizens in their public42 See: City Council of Amsterdam (2004) Amsterdam Provision on the Citizen Initiative and Referendum, The Netherlands.

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institutions. Arbitrary (oppressive) power requires that in thesearch for the common interest philosopher kings are not installedin an ivory tower, but rather in a competitive debate with eachother act as guardians of a society-wide debate that sees amajority of passive bystanders engaging in critical thinking.

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Radical Democracy’s Blind Spot: The Deliberative Potential of Initiative & Referendum Mechanisms

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