http://www.realpolitik.tv/2014/11/interview-with-dr-marko-babic-for-realpolitik-tv/

Questions about Poland. Interview with Dr. Marko Babić

Publié par Gilles-Emmanuel Jacquet le 11 novembre 2014 dans Articles

Brief biographical notice – Senior Researcher (Adiunct) at the Institute of European Studies,

University of Warsaw. His research and teaching covers contemporary Western Balkans region

– geopolitical position, state building processes, ethnic conflicts including such determinants as

history, religion, civilizations (axiology/culture). Interview by Gilles-Emmanuel Jacquet for

Realpolitik.tv

Dr. Babić, as a witness of the Polish society, after 10 years of UE membership what is the result of EU policies in Poland and what is the current feeling of the population toward the European Union?

Dr. Marko Babić, Ass. Professor at the University of Warsaw,

Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, Institute of European Studies.

It would be unfair to say that the last decade was not a decade of success for Poland. Public opinion polls show

that 63% of Poles are convinced that EU membership brings more benefits than costs, only 13% are openly

against Polish membership in the EU. Furthermore, Poles have been among the most enthusiastic pro-EU

Europeans for years, currently 80% of Poles claim to be pro-EU. No wonder Poles feel that way: the recent

decade brought one of the biggest economic growths and an unprecedented modernization in Polish history. On

the other hand, more than 1,5 million Poles has left the country since 2004 showing that they obviously have not

found their place in this new Polish reality. Another growing problem is demography – Poland’s population keeps

declining due to falling birth rates and very small net immigration. This will be one of the biggest challenges in the

upcoming years. But, this issue should not be discussed within the story of Polish membership in the EU. Would

have this demographic situation been different had not Poland joined the Union? The answer is – no. It is an all-

European demographic tendency and Poland is not an exemption.

Poland joined NATO in 1999. Is Poland enjoying benefits from this membership? How is perceived NATO in the Polish population?

We need to remember Poland’s complex history in order to understand how the Polish society and elites think

and feel today not only in regards to the NATO issues, but international reality as well. The years of lost

independence (from the late 1700’s to 1918) and unfortunate geostrategic position between German and Soviet

dictatorships in the twentieth century, convinced a new Polish elites after 1989 that NATO is the only authentic

and effective defense community which is able and willing to secure Poland’s national security. It seems that a

great part of the Polish society also believes that this is the case. Political and intellectual elites of today’s Poland

originate from the 1980s’ Solidarity, an anti-communist and mostly Russophobe movement. They have set the

tone of the public discourse in the recent 25 years. Due to tragic experiences of 1939 and a complete failure of

the treaties system of security, Poles today believe this NATO formula of collective security is the right answer to

various security challenges of the today’s world.

After the Ukrainian civil war broke out, old historical traumatic memories and fears of generations of Poles have

returned, enabling the elites to further underline the closest possible military cooperation with the United States

throughout the NATO framework. For them, NATO remains the key element in ensuring the security for Europe

and Poland. But as an old proverb goes: “He that has been bitten by a serpent, is afraid of rope”. The real threat

will only reveal the true value of such alliances.

Nevertheless, in this part of Europe, history of the twentieth century denies to become a past – it still is a reality

which we live today.

What is your opinion about the current Ukranian civil war? The role of Poland in this conflict?

I think that the problem of the civil war in Ukraine should be viewed in a wider prospectus. 25 years ago, the

collapse of the communist ideology and internal multilevelled crisis did minimize Russia’s geopolitical importance

at the international political and economic scene. Western strategic thought convinced of the Brussels normative

institutionalisms’ triumph and American geostrategic management over the “territoriality” of the Russian

geopolitical discourse, mistakenly assumed that Russia lost its global relevance of geopolitical and regional

imperialism. It also assumed that Russia can be controlled by a financial ultimatum or the formation of a new

security architecture in this part of the World. The democratization of Russia, no matter how we define it (but

certainly deeply needed), is not contradictory to the continuation of the imperial consciousness in the post-

imperial Russia, which implies first and foremost the implementation of its own national interest. The development

of democracy did not mean the disappearance of imperial appetites in the World’s most developed democratic

countries (the USA for example), so why should Russia resign from that principle?

On the other side, when we seriously think about the Ukrainian EU aspirations it seems unbelievable that a

country twice of the size of Spain, and with the population close in numbers to Poland’s, could even dream of

becoming a member. If someone thinks that the country that is the most corrupt in Europe, with uncompetitive

economy concerning the EU market, with double-digit inflation rate, a large decline in output and gross national

income, with high unemployment and poverty and with a population of 46 million may be set for the EU

membership, one obviously does not understand the current situation in the EU and its key Member-States. The

saddest thing though is that as much as Brussels pretends in public to be supportive of the Kiev’s pro-European

aspirations, behind the scenes works hard to ensure that Ukraine never arrives to the EU harbor. The time for

enlargement has been completed, the consolidation of the Union will last for decades (with probable exemption of

a few tiny little Balkan states such as Montenegro [around 600,000 population] and Serbia [around 7 million

population].

From the very beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Poland was among few European countries that have

continuously supported anti-Russian tendencies in the deeply divided Ukrainian society. The EU as well remains

divided over the situation in Ukraine: on one side we have Poland, Great Britain and the Baltic Republics, which

strongly advocate for signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement of Ukraine and even press for promises

for membership of the country in the EU. By the way, there is a comical position of Great Britain planning a

referendum to leave the EU but at the same time advocating of further EU enlargement (including even Ukraine!).

On the opposite side, we have cautious Germany, which more or less continues its “Ostpolitik” presenting decent

relationships with the Russian Federation. It also includes avoiding Russophobe attitudes and preventing its

European partners to take economic measures only to harm Russia not caring about their own economic and

state interests. (this unreasonable approach to harm Russia at its own cost is presented by, first of all, Poles and

Lithuanians). France still cultivates strong traditions of political Gaullism craving for the “United Europe” and

rational policy of rapprochement with Russia. This would be a good platform for a new issue of the old de Gaulle’s

project “Grand Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals”. The bottom line though is to determine to what extent the

EU policy towards Ukrainian civil war is really “European” and to what extent is an American concept. Does

“Europe/European Union” really have political power to regenerate its own independence and sovereignty in

international relations? It seems that European crucial strategic dialogue with Russia is needed – but is it currently

achievable? I think that Mark Mazower in his “Dark Continent: Europe’s Twientieth Century (1998) was right

deploring over “… Europe’s inability to plan its own affairs with long-term vision”. I am afraid that by simply

following American concepts in international relations the EU would lose its relevance as a serious global political

player in long-term time frames.

What is your analysis of Russian-Polish relations? Is Russia still considered as a threat by the Polish population?

Poland and Russia are two countries with different status and potentials. Nevertheless, the history of their rivalry

ipso facto conflictuality and persistant mutual distrust is very long. Poles particularly remember the tragedy of

partition of their country (between 1792 and 1918 Poland disappeared from political maps of Europe – Russia

was among three of the Partition Powers aside with Austria and Prussia), another partition in 1939 by the

Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Katyn massacre of more than 10,000 Polish officers conducted by NKVD in 1940,

and, last but not least, Soviet domination in the region after World War II.

Poland and Russia are also neighboring countries. This indicates a conflict of interests, for example, in relation to

the different visions of European security (Polish accession to NATO and its support of the NATO expansion

towards the East). Poland also supports different aspirations of former Soviet republics which leads to a collision

of the two political systems and philosophy of power (Western versus Russian type). Recently, there has been a

conflict or, it is better to say, a spatial competition mainly over the territories of Ukraine and Belarus. Poland and

Russia have competed over these territories for centuries aiming to strengthen their influence in the region

(nowadays Poland uses its membership in the EU through European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern

Partnership). This competition includes a struggle for political and military influence (for example, Polish support

for Ukraine’s NATO aspirations during Yushchenko’s presidency and just recent open pro-Western Ukrainian and

anti-Russian attitudes in the Ukrainian civil war). This strong Polish involvement in encouraging Ukraine’s pro-

Western orientation has undoubtedly imposed a negative impact on relations with Russia.

Poland over last ten years has imposed itself as a key factor within the EU regarding the European East

throughout the Eastern Partnership. Polish Foreign policy has especially been focused on Ukraine, a country

Poland has had cultural, political, linguistic and historical contacts with for a long time (primarily with Western

Ukraine, which at one time was part of the Second Polish Republic – Druga Rzeczypospolita 1918-1939).

Unfortunately for Ukraine and counterproductive for Poland, the political leadership in Warsaw have used these

contacts to encourage those who bring divisions among the Ukrainian people. For example, Polish political elite

has given unreserved support to Victor Yushchenko in 2004 only to realize that he decided to establish Stepan

Bandera a national hero which was in fact a policy of ethnic exclusivity deeply dividing western and eastern parts

of Ukraine. (Interestingly, Bandera is seen as a war criminal both by Russian and Polish authorities – who says

that both countries are not about to agree over some issues in the Ukrainian context!).

For Russians there are two “Wests”. A “West” identified with the European Union and another “West” identified

with the NATO and the USA. While the former finds acceptance both in Russian society and among authorities,

the latter causes decisively negative feelings. In this context, the Polish situation is unique and generally

beneficial, as it remains a member of two organizations perceived by Russia in two ways. For its benefits Poland

can play and win throughout memberships in both structures. In addition, Poland has good relations with the

countries that also are important for Russia – France, Germany and the USA. Therefore, I find astonishing a

political blindness of majority of Polish politicians and mainstream media who are usually malicious or ironic

towards Russia and Putin, but they have no problem in continuous understanding of American motives of actions.

How cannot they realize that instead of permanent alliances more important are permanent NATIONAL interests?

Placing the former in the first place means the antithesis of an effective policy.

On the other hand, Polish-Russian contradictions and controversies can also be associated with geopolitics

including cultural issues. Russia’s culture is an European culture largely formed on the basis and achievements of

the Byzantine Empire. Poland throughout its history maintained close ties with the civilization and culture of the

Western Europe. Despite of that and at the same time, Poles treat Russians as someone very similar and close to

them in many ways (and vice versa). But, Poles make clear distinction between Russians and the Russian State.

The latter perceive as a threat, not the Russians as a people.

As an expert of the Europeanization process of the Western Balkans, what is your assessment of this process?

The main features of the Europeanization pattern in the region show that it is basically a technical process

focused on institution-building – the civic approach towards citizenship; it puts a lot of pressure on local elites and

it creates high expectations form endogenous factors – the responsibility is theirs, although the values are ours;

failure or delay in fulfilling the formal criteria of state-building and EU conditionality produce disappointment and

doubt regarding the future evolution of the process.

Moreover, it is a process of both defining and applying rules, so the interaction between the structure (the EU as a

representative of the international community) and the agent (local representatives in the region) is fundamental

for explaining the outcome. In the context it is worth mentioning another element in the Europeanization process

in the Western Balkans – the ever increasing and more demanding integration agenda. When compared with the

criteria and rules of previous enlargements, the current agenda is colossal (the best example is the most recent

case of Croatia). The countries of the region are up against a moving target that runs faster and becomes more

demanding by the day.

The Europeanization issue in the region can be also treated through the fact that the priority for the EU from the

beginning was stabilization at the cost of democratization. In connection with the EU’s conviction that the situation

in the region in many ways is fragile (that functioning in the region is like walking in the proverbial minefield), there

was (and still exists) a tendency to tolerate many undemocratic social phenomena, immaturity and irresponsibility

of the political elite in the region, their pressure and blackmail carried out against EU policies. ‘Soft’ EU approach

to these phenomena legitimizes and reinforces them socially. The European principles of compromise and

consensus due to a sui generis erosion of criteria compromised the conditionality and seem to be devoid of

content.

In the societies of the Western Balkans there is no awareness that the EU accession is a process of a historical

nature, which involves complex changes in society. The fault partly lies with the EU and its policies in the Western

Balkans. By changes in priorities, crisis of its own identity, vision for the development and errors in judgment and

activities in the region, the EU has failed to present itself as the preferred project development of societies of the

region, in the same way as in the 1990s. This is the reason why one of the highest rate of Euroscepticism in the

EU can be found in the most recent member of the EU – Croatia.

What is the future of EU expansion in the Balkans and what are the challenges posed to this process or by this process? Especially with regard to the candidacy of Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Albania?

It is obvious that the non-EU member states in the Western Balkans still remain outside the EU political space

and have a weak position vis-à-vis the Union. There is a noticeable patronizing nature of the accession process,

due to asymmetrical power and position of the EU towards the Western Balkan countries. The EU dictates the

rules of the game, but the countries of the region have very limited or no ability to influence these rules. Countries

that indicated accession to the EU as their foreign policy priority ipso facto agree to accept the EU conditions,

objectives and criteria. In general, this is the case of all countries of the region.

The EU accession process might have treated the Western Balkan countries in two ways: a) as a single block of

countries or b) individually on the basis of achievements in the process.

The approach according to the scheme of one bloc would have been a mistake. There are too many differences,

diversity and barriers both in geographical space and mentality, for this approach to be effective and feasible. The

second approach – currently implemented by the EU, the approach of the individual achievements of each

country paradoxically contributed to the differences and disagreements between Member States of the EU

(Slovenia and Greece) and the EU candidate countries (Croatia which was under dispute with Slovenia, and

Macedonia still being in dispute with Greece). The case of the Slovenian-Croatian conflict clearly shows how

bilateral problems can lead to blocking the accession process of countries aspiring to membership (Croatia) by a

Member State (Slovenia). Slovenia was abusing the veto right in the EU in order to blackmail Croatia fearing

(correctly or not) that might lose its influence on other countries in the region to Croatia, after the latter becomes

an EU member. Similar unresolved bilateral issues still exist between Serbia and Croatia, Croatia and Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Greece and Macedonia. They threaten the prospects of EU integrations for these countries resulting

in possible slowing down the process of necessary reforms. Unfortunately, the enlargement “à la Balkans” cannot

repeat the positive experience of the Višegrad Group countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary)

which contributed largely in accelerating the process of European integration in the countries of Central and

Eastern Europe.

Today, this integration “engine” is clearly losing momentum and is at an alarmingly low rate. After the Croatia’s

accession in 2013, the rest of the region begins the trend of creating “two speeds” enlargement groups. The “first

speed” group consists of Montenegro, Serbia and possibly Albania. The “second rate” group make Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo (alarmingly, in both the Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina cases,

reversing trends of the integration process are more than obvious).

Although very unlikely, the complete halt of the integration process in the region would have led to a wide range of

consequences, in both political and economic developments in the countries of the region. Being almost in the

center of Europe but remaining outside the EU they would be forced to seek partners outside the EU. This would

be an opportunity first for Russia, Turkey, China, as well as some Third World countries to further impose its

presence in the region. Some countries of the region would treat such presence as an economic opportunity,

while others would rather see it as a chance to change its strategy and geopolitical priorities. Old geostrategic

appetites in the world – if we just want to see them – are guided increasingly to the East, but also in the direction

of the Balkans. In global terms, our times are times of a strict national logics serving as the fertile soil for the

exclusive political constitution and growing pressure of religious feelings and historical resentments.

The European Union is a natural target for the Western Balkan countries and societies of these countries share

this opinion. Unfortunately, the EU enlargement policy (using sometimes double standards due to its particular

interests) balances between political conditionality and strictly technical criteria for accession. This weakens the

EU’s global influence on the whole region. I think it is not impossible to imagine a situation when a country without

a clear perspective of accession to the EU would turn to someone who will offer relevant political, economic and

military assistance.

How would you describe the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 years after the war?

Is Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) a political organism that can survive? Today certainly is not the case. According

to the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, which only stopped the war but never finished it, this country is divided

to 51% for Muslim-Croat Federation of BiH and 49% for Serbian Republic of Srpska.

The crucial problem remains in the fact that the people of BiH is not the Sovereign. In addition, there is a very

specific role of the international community in this country, which, through its representative, the so-called High

Representative, has the ability of decisive influence on the political order – being, sui generis, the Sovereign. At

the same time he is not responsible for the consequences of its actions. This is something Giorgio Agamben in

his “Homo Sacer” recognized as the “paradox of sovereignty” consisting in the fact that Sovereign is at the same

time, inside and outside the juridical order.

BiH meets the formal conditions of democracy, particularly the regulatory framework and relatively stable

institutions, but it is still far from the democratic substance: active participation of citizens, the horizontal and

vertical accountability, true freedom of media, open public discourse and political dialogue. Democracy is not

consolidated.

After the civil war (1992-1995) teared up the country in legal, political and ethnic sense, today under the slogans

of political integration, BiH is subjected to artificial institutional resuscitation by the auspices of the international

community. Furthermore, Serbs categorically demand adherence to the “original” Dayton Peace Agreement and

reverse of the trend of “creeping” loss of their own competence. Keep in mind that from 1997 to 2006, at the

expense of the Republic of Srpska, some federal institutions have been strengthened, including the joint army set

up. This was due to so called the 1997 “Bonn’s Powers” of the High Representative in BiH by which he had a

possibility to dismiss elected officials, to impose or annul laws or take any other measures he deemed

appropriate. Croats, in turn, want to “federalize” the Federation of BiH, which in their understanding should lead to

a greater autonomy of cantons with Croatian majority. Such an idea Bosnian Muslims perceive as a threat to the

creation of the third entity. The problem is serious due to the fact that Bosnian Muslims are the majority in BiH

(according to the unofficial data from the last census of October 2013 Muslims claim over 50% of the total

population of BiH) claiming at the same time only around 1/4 of the country’s territory. The rest belongs to the

Republic of Srpska (49%) and the cantons with the dominant Croatian majority within the Federation of BiH

(around 25%).

No doubt that BiH is a protectorate of the international community that will decide about the future of the country.

The tragedy not only of that country, but the whole region, is that throughout its entire modern history has always

been the object and almost never the subject of international politics. The last 25 years clearly confirms that fact.

Is there a phenomenon of Islamist radicalization in the Western Balkans? What are its causes?

This phenomenon is strictly related to the issues of Muslim identity in the context of the interaction of religious,

ethnic and national identity within the complex ethnic and religious networks in the Balkans. No doubt that the

starting point of the phenomenon was the fall of communism and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

After the years of a relative isolation within a communist system, the Balkans’ Muslims were unprepared to deal

with a variety of Islamic ideas, ideologies, sects and other social phenomenon introduces to them during early

1990s. Another words, their position towards a wealth of various ideological interpretations of Islam was weak

which resulted in failing to form a clear attitude vis-à-vis pluralism within the Islamic thought. If we add to it poor

socio-economic conditions of the newly born post-Yugoslav countries (unemployment and poverty, inadequate

infrastructure, migration from rural to urban areas – especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and

Macedonia, demographic growth within the Muslim population) then we have favorable conditions for rebel and

political and religious radicalization.

In this context the influence of the Salafi movement (also called the Wahhabis) in the region should not be

underestimated in any case. Wahhabism in its early days started as a theological reform movement of

revolutionary jihad. This movement’s goal was to urge (da’wa) people to restore the tawhid (ones of God, or

monotheism) and disregard other practices. Today it is a very conservative religious movement radically opposing

to all innovations in the Muslim practice and teaching. Sources sponsoring this type of radical Islam such as

various Islamic transnational associations are mostly the same in the entire region. Nevertheless, the today’s

situation has changed to a certain extent comparing to the 1990s. The breaking point for the Wahhabis and other

radical Islamist groups was the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, where most actors with even

the faintest connection to transnational Arab Islamic networks and Salafi forms of Islam were progressively

“squeezed out” of the Balkans. Although this operation has not been done with particular solicitude, the “glorious

days” of such movements have gone. Some scholars (for example Kerem Öktem in his “New Islamic Actors After

the Wahhabi Intermezzo: Turkey’s Return to the Muslim Balkans, University of Oxford Press 2010) even talk

about the “Wahhabi intermezzo” in the history of Islam in the region. Today Turkey enters the scene as a political

and economic regional power. Regardless of the specific influence and penetration of Wahhabi (Arabic) and

Iranian Islam in the Balkans during and after the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Turkey remained the “first to call“

neighbor in the Islamic world to the Balkan Muslims. It is viewed, not only by its American and European allies but

also states with major Muslim population such as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and (partly) Macedonia, as a

country capable of promoting ‘European type’, ‘moderate Islam’ in the region.

Since few years some scholars and journalists have been increasingly speaking about a “Yugonostalgia” phenomenon. How could you define it? Is it a strong feeling among ex-Yugoslav citizens?

There is a fundamental difference between historical memories of non-nationalistic citizens of former Yugoslavia

(a great majority of them) and other post-communist nations. In the case of the latter, memories of the communist

past are memories of material deprivation, isolation from the Western world (Western Europe) and pro-Soviet

vassal government policies of their countries. In the transition period, despite the difficulties, societies of these

countries clearly felt improvement and finally stopped being afraid of their own state. On the other hand, majority

of former Yugoslavs when thinking of the communist past, remember material welfare (keeping in mind the type of

the regime), ability to freely travel without any visa limitations and the total independence of their country.

“Memories of a better past” is what most former Yugoslavs think of when talking about former Yugoslavia. It is a

reaction to a difficult and disappointing reality, which replaced the socialist times. This is a peculiar construct of an

idyllic past. It stirs both negative and positive reactions, but certainly it is not a longing for the reconstruction of the

former state.

Interestingly, the process of democratization of former Yugoslav countries, which has accelerated since 2000

(conditioned by the European integration process) opened up the possibilities of cultural and economic

cooperation and has directly led to a confrontation with the historical absurdity of nationalist projects. Along with

the disappearance of the Yugoslav state, a Yugo-nostalgic “moved” to the civic, non-institutional and spheres of

spontaneous contacts aiming to underline similarities not differences. In short, their priorities are markets for

goods, services and ideas, but remain completely uninterested in politics or the state institutionalization. Ironically,

it is a victory of Yugoslavia and its idea from beyond the grave.

À propos de l'auteur

Gilles-Emmanuel Jacquet

Titulaire d’un Master en Science Politique de l’Université de Genève et d’un Master en Études Européennes de

l’Institut Européen de l’Université de Genève, Gilles-Emmanuel Jacquet s’intéresse à l’Histoire et aux Relations

Internationales. Ses champs d’intérêt et de spécialisation sont liés aux conflits armés et aux processus de

résolution de ces derniers, aux minorités religieuses ou ethnolinguistiques, aux questions de sécurité, de

terrorisme et d’extrémisme religieux ou politique. Les zones géographiques concernées par ses recherches sont

l’Europe Centrale et Orientale, l’espace post-soviétique ainsi que l’Asie Centrale et le Moyen Orient.