Pulling Toward or Pulling Away: Deliberation, Disagreement, and Opinion Extremity in Political...

Pulling Toward or Pulling Away:Deliberation, Disagreement, and OpinionExtremity in Political Participationn

Magdalena Wojcieszak, IE University

Objective. Evidence supports two somewhat contradictory notions: deliberation is toencourage engagement, but disagreement may decrease participation. This study aims toprovide a common denominator in the debate. It distinguishes between deliberation andpolitical disagreement that emerges during deliberation to test which factors advance orthwart participatory goals. This study also accounts for opinion extremity, which maymoderate the tested relationships. Methods. This study draws on quasi-experimentaldata from participants in structured, moderated, and heterogeneous face-to-facedeliberations on sexual minority rights in Poland (N 5 181). Results. Relative tothe pretest, deliberation discouraged moderates from active engagement and pulledthem away from communicative participation. As predicted, extreme participantswho perceived high disagreement intended to be more active than their counterpartsin like-minded groups. Conclusions. Research on deliberative versus participatorydemocracy should differentiate between deliberation and political disagreement aswell as account for individual characteristics that affect responses to deliberation anddisagreement. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

The debate on deliberative versus participatory democracy has beenreceiving increased attention from communications scholars and politicalscientists alike (e.g., Mutz, 2006; McClurg, 2006a, 2006b). It is thus aplatitude to say that some researchers see deliberation as a panacea tocitizens’ political apathy, a panacea that will increase interest, knowledge,information seeking, and ultimately pull citizens into the democratic process(Fishkin, 1995). It is also widely known that other researchers argue thatdeliberation and participation may be mutually exclusive because encoun-tering opposing views may increase ambivalence, issue complexity, and/orentail negative interpersonal consequences that turn citizens away frompolitics (Mutz, 2006). Both views remain prevalent and each has its merits.

At the same time, studies that inform this debate conceptualize deliberationand political disagreement in several distinct ways (see Scheufele et al., 2006).

nDirect correspondence to Magdalena Wojcieszak, IE University, Cardenal Zuniga, 12,40003 Segovia, Spain [email protected]. The author thanks Dr. Michael DelliCarpini, Dr. Vincent Price, and Dr. Michael Hennessy from the Annenberg School forCommunication as well as Konrad Maj and a research team from the Warsaw School ofSocial Psychology. The author will share data and coding with those wishing to replicate thework presented here.

SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume 92, Number 1, March 2011r 2011 by the Southwestern Social Science Association

mailto:[email protected]






Some scholars focus on structured citizen-to-citizen deliberations; others analyzecross-sectional reports on whether respondents think that their interpersonaldiscussants have divergent political views or voting preferences; and yet othersassess network heterogeneity, defined as talking politics with people who areperceived as demographically and ideologically different. The deliberative stud-ies, however, generally do not account for disagreement that may arise whendiverse individuals are brought together, instead focusing on aggregate pre- toposttest effects. Evidence for disagreement breeding apathy, in turn, largelycomes from survey reports that are several steps removed from citizen delib-eration. So is the survey-based evidence on network heterogeneity, which mayalso—by combining demographic and ideological differences—obscuring theeffects produced by political disagreement (see Feldman and Price, 2008; but seeScheufele et al., 2004:331–32)? In addition, all these studies do not closelyexamine the role played by opinion extremity, an individual-level factor thatmay influence reaction to opposing views as well as political engagement.

Addressing these two perspectives on the role deliberation and exposure todisagreement play in political participation, especially among extreme cit-izens, is crucial for theoretical and practical reasons. Accounting for theeffects produced by disagreement during deliberation provides a commondenominator for the aforementioned studies that tend to focus on one or theother phenomenon. Doing so may help reconcile some inconsistencies inexisting evidence by shedding light on the specific factors that advance orthwart participatory goals. Accounting for opinion extremity, in turn, mayshed light on whether citizens differently respond to disagreement, in thatsome are mobilized and others demobilized by opposing views. This iscrucial because polarization around contentious political issues has beenrising, especially among ideologues and party activists (Evans, 2003).

Addressing these issues, however, requires a design that creates citizen-to-citizen deliberations, converges diverse individuals, exposes them to dis-agreement, and assesses intended political participation. Toward this end,this analysis draws on quasi-experimental data from 182 young Polish cit-izens who discussed sexual minority rights in face-to-face, heterogeneous,structured, and moderated groups. These data are used toward two specificgoals. First, this study tests the effects produced by deliberation and also byperceived disagreement on individual intention to take part in issue-specificpolitical actions ranging from discussing sexual minority rights (COMMUNI-

CATIVE PARTICIPATION) to rallying or protesting (ACTIVE PARTICIPATION).Second, this study accounts for opinion extremity to test whether deliber-ating, as well as perceiving disagreement, motivate extreme citizens to actionor, rather, pull them away from the democratic process.

Because recent articles have comprehensively reviewed the research oncross-cutting networks, discussion heterogeneity, and political participation(Scheufele et al., 2006) and have also clarified the mechanisms leading fromencountering disagreement to civic competences (Feldman and Price, 2008),this article does not aim to ‘‘replow ground already well turned by others’’

Pulling Toward or Pulling Away 207

(Fiorina and Abrams, 2008:565). Instead, this study first focuses criticalattention on conceptual issues, explicating that the various approaches tostudying deliberative versus participatory democracy may have resulted inthe inconsistencies outlined above. In the second step, this study incorpo-rates public opinion scholarship to show that accounting for opinion ex-tremity may offer additional explanatory insight into the tested processes.

Deliberation, Political Disagreement, and/or Participation

Because the debate on deliberative versus participatory democracy should log-ically focus on deliberation, this is where this review begins. Although theoristshave not agreed on one definition, there are some features that make a citizen-citizen discussion deliberative. Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw (2002) have pro-posed that these are: (1) a decision-making element, which includes participantsoffering competing arguments when analyzing a problem and identifying so-lutions; (2) a democratic element, such as considering one another’s argumentsand demonstrating respect for dissimilar views; and (3) a dialogue element, orfacilitating debate among participants whose listening and speaking skills may beincommensurate. Deliberation conceptualized this way appears to encourageparticipation. Jury deliberators were more likely to vote (Gastil, Deess, andWeiser, 2002; Gastil and Weiser, 2006) and participants in structured andmoderated online debates were more likely to engage in community activitiesthan were nonparticipants (Price and Cappella, 2002). Deliberative polls (Fish-kin, 1995) and National Issues Forums (Gastil, 2000), settings that additionallyoffered informative materials, which asked participants to consider underlyingvalues and emphasized substantive argumentation, also increased political activity.Deliberation may also promote issue-specific engagement. Those who discussedSocial Security intended to lobby officials and express their views on the issuemore than those who did not deliberate (Cook, Delli Carpini, and Jacobs, 2003),and participants in group debates about peace and social justice reported in-creased volunteering and donating money to organizations that advocate for theseissues (Wuthnow, 1994). Imagine a family expressing concerns about immigrantrights during dinner. Although not deliberative in the strict theoretical sense, sucha conversation may encourage a son to volunteer in a local integration center.

So far so good. Other scholars, however, argue that deliberative and partic-ipatory democracy may be mutually exclusive (Mutz, 2006). This is because inorder to be deliberative, a debate should expose participants to dissimilar views.1

1The focus on disagreement is due to the recognition that ‘‘[i]f one limits the politicalcommunication phenomena worthy of study to those conversations that meet the necessaryand sufficient conditions invoked by democratic theorists, then one is left with a near-emptyset of social interactions to study’’ (Mutz, 2002:111). Researchers thus analyze exposure todissimilar views as the central tenet that makes an ordinary talk deliberative, noting thatespecially beneficial is a debate about ‘‘political alternatives in a genuine effort to clarify andrefine public policy’’ (Berelson, 1952:323) and that disagreement is a ‘‘specific necessary

208 Social Science Quarterly

Such exposure, in turn, could pull citizens away from the democratic process.Thus, when the aforementioned dinner entails clashing perspectives, the son—afraid to offend the family or to challenge group norms—would choose not toadvocate for immigrant rights. Evidence on this effect has come not from groupdeliberations, but from cross-sectional surveys that analyze citizens’ reports onwhether their interpersonal contacts provide opposing views during political talk.Seminal studies have been conducted by Mutz (2002, 2006), who used a five-item index on the extent to which respondents perceive that up to three dis-cussants prefer an opposing presidential candidate, have different party affili-ation, and hold dissimilar views more generally. Such cross-cutting exposure wasrelated to indecision and decreased participation. McClurg (2006a) similarlycontrasted the self-reported vote preferences with the perceived preferences es-poused by a respondent’s discussant and also aggregated this measure across upto five discussants (McClurg, 2006b). He also found that political disagreementmeasured in these two ways was negatively associated with electoral activity.

Yet other studies, which are oft cited in the debate on deliberative versusparticipatory democracy, have found that discussion heterogeneity may in-crease participation. These studies have also relied on surveys that probeabout demographic and ideological diversity within respondents’ networks,conceptualizing heterogeneous talk as one that occurs with people fromdiverse backgrounds. For example, McLeod et al. (1999) accounted for age,gender, ideology, and political awareness, subtracting respondents’ reportson their discussants’ characteristics from respondents’ own characteristics.Similarly, Scheufele et al. (2004, 2006) used discussion frequency withindividuals different by gender, age, and ethnicity, as well as by party andideology. Talk with such heterogeneous networks was associated with anincrease in traditional and nontraditional participation, both directly andthrough knowledge, awareness, and news media use.2

It is time to pull these diverse conceptualizations together. On the one hand,discussing politics in diverse groups is supposed to encourage citizen engage-ment. On the other hand, encountering people who express opposing views—which deliberation is to entail—may pull citizens away from the democratic

criterion’’ (Thompson, 2008:513) and ‘‘a core requirement’’ in deliberation (Mutz,2008:535).

2Other measures have also been used to inform the debate. The Erie County Study(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968) tested the conflict among political and sociode-mographic factors that simultaneously pull a voter toward the Republicans and the Dem-ocrats (e.g., being white collar and Catholic), finding that opposing pressures were related todelayed voting decision. Similarly, Nir (2005) tested network ambivalence, or exposure toconflicting candidate preferences, finding that it did not predict voting and decision timing.Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004) used a network diversity measure based on whetherthe respondent’s discussants supported the same candidate, finding that disagreement amongdiscussants was negatively related to interest and unrelated to turnout. Another measure usedby Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004), the difference between the respondents’ pref-erence and their report on the discussant’s vote, was not related to engagement. Finally,Leighley (1990) used respondents’ reports that a friend tried to convince them to vote for theopposing candidate, finding that such disagreement predicted voting and campaigning.


process. How do we reconcile these findings? Central to these inconsistencies isthe fact that the studies on political engagement enhanced by formal delib-eration have not systematically assessed disagreement that arises when groupsmeet, instead focusing on aggregate effects produced by deliberation per se.Evidence on the demobilizing role played by disagreement, in turn, has pri-marily come from cross-sectional data on perceived political dissimilaritywithin a network and/or self-reported disagreement during interpersonal talk, adesign that does not account for the processes that transpire in deliberativesettings. Further, the cross-sectional studies that show the motivating roleplayed by heterogeneity have not differentiated between demographic diversityand exposure to political disagreement. In other words, insufficient differen-tiation between deliberation and disagreement, as well as the divergent ap-proaches to measuring disagreement, diversity, and/or heterogeneity, may haveled to the outlined inconsistencies. Because these are not competing perspec-tives, as deliberation is to involve disagreement, and interpersonal talk withdiverse people may have deliberative features, it is essential to bring theseperspectives together and assess whether deliberation and also encounteringdisagreement encourage or discourage participation.

Opinion Extremity

This study’s second main goal is to address the role opinion extremity playsin the analyzed processes. The cited studies have generally not tested whetherindividual factors affect the extent to which deliberation, cross-cutting expo-sure, and heterogeneity increase or decrease engagement. Although somescholars have noted that ‘‘variables like opinion perceptions, group member-ship, media use, or interpersonal discussion’’ may ‘‘have an influence on po-litical participation that will only emerge if it is examined for differentsubgroups’’ (Scheufele and Eveland, 2001:42), this notion has not been closelyexamined in the debate and the moderating effects remain insufficiently tested.

Here, public opinion research proves especially useful. It suggests thatdisagreement may be inconsequential for extreme individuals, while it mayturn moderate citizens away from engaging in the political process. One mayimagine that the aforementioned son, when strongly dedicated to immigrantintegration, joins the local center despite the opposing views expressed by hisfamily. In fact, ideological extremity and attitude strength predict partic-ipation and individual willingness to voice opinions publicly (Scheufele,Nisbet, and Brossard, 2003), and such factors as opinion intensity or issueinvolvement influence reactions to oppositional opinion climate. Specifi-cally, although perceived opinion climate influences participation, this in-fluence is lower among people with firm views and strong candidatepreferences (Kaplowitz et al., 1983; Krassa, 1988; Lasorsa, 1991; Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Moreover, people with extreme views are willing to ex-press these views in ‘‘hostile’’ circumstances (Horner, Conners, and Daves,


1998; Moy, Domke, and Stamm, 2001), perhaps because partisanshipstrength and political interest are negatively related to conflict avoidance(Ulbig and Funk, 1999).

Moreover, perceiving opinion climate to be unfavorable or—by exten-sion—encountering political disagreement can mobilize extreme individuals.That is, the son could become yet more engaged in the local immigrantintegration center because the family attacks the cause and challenges hisviews. Indeed, voters with strong candidate preferences intensify their com-mitment and increase financial contributions when public support for theircandidate declines. By contrast, those with weak preferences follow majorityopinion and decrease their donations (Mutz, 1995, 1998). Similarly, whenperceiving their views to be in the minority, voters with strong preferencesexpress their views publicly, while those not firmly committed to any can-didate withdraw from politics (Scheufele and Eveland, 2001). More ger-mane here, nonambivalent people form their voting decisions earlier whenfaced with cross-pressures than those whose networks do not offer compet-ing preferences (Nir, 2005). Taken together, the reviewed research suggeststhat encountering disagreement during deliberation will encourage extremedeliberators to increased political activity around the discussed issue.

Method

The data for this study come from the Polish Dialogue Project, a quasi-experiment organized in Warsaw, Poland in 2007, which involved heter-ogeneous, structured, and moderated face-to-face deliberations on sexualminority rights. This project focused on two aforementioned features iden-tified as central to deliberation (Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw, 2002): thedemocratic element, emphasizing civility and mutual attention, and thedialogue element, facilitating debate among dissimilar people and offeringthem equal chances to air diverse views.3

Sexual minority rights were chosen for this study because this issue entailsstrong views and is socially consequential, as it relates to prejudice andintergroup stereotyping. Sexual minority rights are especially pertinent inPoland, where a recent shift in public discourse has moved this issue ‘‘fromcomplete silence . . . to almost daily headline news’’ (Graff, 2006:1), makingexplicit the polarized debate. On the one hand, minority voices are increas-ingly visible. Proliferating clubs, publications, film festivals, and publiccampaigns have led to ‘‘certain de-exoticisation of the topic’’ (Zablocki,2007:2) and to an increase in the number of people who ‘‘tolerate’’ ho-mosexuality, even though they see it as ‘‘abnormal’’ (from 47 percent in

3The decision-making element was not included, in that participants were not obliged tomake a decision. Asking them to decide on several parliamentary proposals would createpressures, artificial to the extent that participants could not influence the actual process.


2001 to 55 percent in 2005) (Graff, 2006). Conservative forces have alsogrown, with far-right groups breaking up Equality Marches and with somemedia arguing that ‘‘it’s okay to be a homophobe’’ as a response to theactivists’ slogan ‘‘it’s okay to be gay’’ (Graff, 2006:13).

Also, the rights of sexual minorities have often been challenged. In 2007, thegovernment proposed legislation to censor all debates about homosexuality inacademic institutions and officials have repeatedly sought to ban EqualityMarches. Right-wing rhetoric highlights this intolerance. Some officials talkabout an alleged ‘‘propaganda about homosexuality’’ (Giertych, former Ministerof Education), stating: ‘‘If deviants start to demonstrate, they should be bashedwith a baton’’ (Wierzejski, League of Polish Families), or claiming: ‘‘If that kindof approach to sexual life were to be promoted on a grand scale, the human racewould disappear’’ (Kaczynski, President: see Human Rights Watch, 2007).Further, in Poland, where the transformation to a liberal democracy requiresthat the public addresses such issues as abortion or immigration, sexual minorityrights might serve as an exemplar that could inform other debates. In sum, theselected issue is not only socially important, but also pertinent to analyzing thefactors that mobilize strongly opinionated individuals to action.

The goal for this study was to assemble heterogeneous groups and recruitparticipants whose views on sexual minorities varied from strong to mod-erate. The recruitment process had four stages: (1) administering a recruit-ment survey that gauged respondents’ opinions, (2) creating databases withopponents, proponents, and moderates who left their contact information,(3) contacting those respondents, and (4) randomly assigning those whoagreed to participate to discussion groups with two strong opponents, twostrong proponents, and two moderates.

Recruitment centered on universities and nongovernmental organizationsto assure variance in prior opinion. Participants were recruited from orga-nizations working toward sexual minority rights (e.g., LAMBDA, EqualityFoundation, Polish Campaign Against Homophobia), from conservative,religious, and far-right organizations (e.g., Young Conservatives, All-PolishYouth), and from three universities in Warsaw. The paper survey was dis-tributed to students during lectures and to organization members duringmeetings. The questionnaire was also placed on a server and disseminatedonline, targeting issue-specific forums and message boards known as favor-able or unfavorable toward sexual minorities.

Recruitment

The recruitment questionnaire contained the Heterosexual Attitudes To-ward Homosexuality (HATH) Scale (Larsen, Reed, and Hoffman, 1980).Respondents rated 20 items (e.g., ‘‘Homosexuality is a sin’’ or ‘‘Homosex-uality is a mental disorder’’) on five-point scales ranging from 1 (stronglydisagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The survey also included information about


deliberations, asking respondents to leave their contact information. A da-tabase was created and was periodically updated by adding new respondentswho completed the questionnaire. Overall, 273 respondents to the onlinesurvey and 576 respondents to the paper survey left an email or a telephonenumber (total N 5 849).

Responses provided by those who left their contact information weresummed, after reverse scoring when necessary, so that scores on the HATHscale ranged from 20 (unfavorable) to 100 (favorable). Respondents werecategorized as proponents, opponents, and moderates such that opponentswere in the lower 25 percent of the distribution (range 5 20–47, n 5 132),proponents were in the upper 25 percent (range 5 73–100, n 5 439), andmoderates were in the middle 50 percent (range 5 48–72, n 5 278). Threedatabases were created, from which 599 supporters, opponents, and mod-erates were contacted. Those who agreed to take part in the study wererandomly assigned to discussion groups. Overall, 31 six-person groups withtwo strong proponents, two strong opponents, and two moderates wereorganized and 182 individuals participated in deliberations.4

Procedure and Materials

Deliberations were organized in a focus-group laboratory at the WarsawSchool of Social Psychology. After a pretest, moderators introduced delib-erative procedures, stating that the debates did not aim at confrontation,reminding participants to keep an open mind, listen to others, consider thereasons behind dissimilar views, and address each other politely (democraticelement), and also asking participants to let the speaker finish and refrainfrom uncivil behavior and monopolizing the discussion so that everyonecould express their opinions (dialogue element).

Deliberations were structured around five topics that were introduced forparliamentary review by a right-wing political party, League of Polish Fam-ilies. The party proposed (1) banning homosexuals from teaching, (2) bar-

4Using AAPOR (2006) Response Rate 1 (RR1), the participation rate for people initiallyrecruited is 31 percent. Although this is relatively low, three things need to be kept in mind.First, of the 599 people who were contacted, for many cases no response was received, theemail was returned, the phone number was not in service, or the recipient was not based inWarsaw (at least 107 contacts involved a number or an email that was not in service). Thesecases were not tracked and the above calculation classifies them as unknown eligibility. Thesecases, however, should be excluded as ineligible, which would increase the RR by decreasingthe denominator. Also, many people who were contacted wanted to join deliberations.Because the PI’s stay in Poland was short, those potential participants were thanked for theirinterest. Third, a majority of individuals who were contacted did participate. Also, it needs tobe noted that the reported RR reflects the prerecruited respondents, without the multipli-cation by the RR for the recruitment survey. Because the recruitment process was purposive,it is not possible to determine how many people were exposed to the questionnaire and thisRR cannot be determined. Further, due to logistic difficulties some groups had four or fiveparticipants.


ring parades organized by sexual minorities, (3) imposing restrictions onbars or clubs where sexual minorities meet, (4) imposing restrictions onorganizations that promote sexual minority rights, and (5) introducing psy-chological treatment for homosexuals. A moderator introduced a new topicevery seven to eight minutes and discussions lasted roughly 50 minutes. Atthe end, participants were handed a posttest questionnaire and receivedfinancial compensation (10PLN or about $5).

Measures

Intended Participation. Pre- and posttest questionnaires contained nineitems each that tapped intended political participation. On a scale from 1(very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) participants assessed the likelihood that, inthe next year, they will engage in various actions related to sexual minorities.Factor analysis with varimax rotation found that the items loaded on twofactors and the principal component analysis pointed to two constructs.Hence two pre- and posttest measures were created. PRETEST (r 5 0.54,po0.000, M 5 6.83, SD 5 2.57) and POSTTEST INTENDED COMMUNICATIVE

PARTICIPATION (r 5 0.79, po0.000, M 5 6.61, SD 5 2.80) averaged inten-tion to talk with friends, family, and acquaintances about sexual minorityrights and to attempt to persuade others. In turn, PRETEST (a5 0.91, onefactor, variance explained 66 percent, M 5 3.44, SD 5 2.40) and POSTTEST

INTENDED ACTIVE PARTICIPATION (a5 0.92, one factor, variance explained 70percent, M 5 3.40, SD 5 2.59) averaged protesting, contacting media andpoliticians, petitioning, distributing information, taking part in actions, andjoining an organization.

Opinion Extremity. At the pretest, participants rated their feelings towardsexual minorities on a Feeling Thermometer that ranged from 0 (very unfa-vorable) to 100 (very favorable), with 50 being neutral (M 5 63, SD 5 33). TheOPINION EXTREMITY measure was created by subtracting each participant’s scorefrom the neutral midpoint and taking the absolute value, so that higher valuesrepresent greater extremity (M 5 31.97, SD 5 16.38, range 0–50).5

Issue Support. The models controlled for prior position, favorable orunfavorable, toward sexual minorities. At the pretest, participants indicatedtheir agreement, on 10-point scales, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (stronglyagree), with 16 statements about the debated sexual minority rights (e.g.,limiting employment options or banning protests) and about issues gen-

5One person did not complete the Feeling Thermometer; thus one case is missing on theOPINION EXTREMITY measure.


erally related to sexual minorities (e.g., homosexuality being a sin or im-moral or sexual minorities threatening the traditional family institution).The items were reverse coded when necessary so that higher values indicategreater support. The final measure averaged the items (a5 0.97, one factor,variance explained 67 percent, M 5 6.98, SD 5 2.64, range 1–10).

Perceived Disagreement. Mobilization among extreme participants is ex-pected to result from disagreement that they perceive during deliberation. Atthe posttest, respondents estimated the frequency with which they disagreedwith the views expressed by other group members (from 1, never, to 10, always)(M 5 5.02, SD 5 2.36).

Results

Studies on formal deliberations suggest that the deliberative experience itselfshould have a mobilizing effect. Yet, survey research on cross-cutting networksindicates that disagreement, which deliberation is to generate, could discouragecitizens from political participation. This study accounted for disagreementduring deliberation and also for opinion extremity. The analysis tested whetherdeliberation per se and also perceived disagreement encourage or discourageparticipation and whether—as hypothesized—extreme deliberators are moti-vated to issue-specific actions by perceiving challenges to their opinions.

It is first of interest to assess deliberators’ intentions to take part in thepolitical process around sexual minority rights. On average, participants in-tended to be quite active. They intended to talk about minority rights andpersuade others to their own position (COMMUNICATIVE PARTICIPATION:Mpre 5 6.83, Mpost 5 6.61) and were somewhat likely to petition or take partin protests related to sexual minorities (ACTIVE PARTICIPATION: Mpre 5 3.44,Mpost 5 3.40). Addressing the main effects produced by deliberation, pairedsample t tests found that—on average—intended active participation was sta-ble (t(1, 181) 5 0.55, ns) and that intended communicative participation de-creased from pre- to posttest (t(1, 181) 5 2.00, po0.05).

Did deliberations mobilize extreme participants? One-way ANOVA pro-vides insight into the main effects produced by deliberation among mod-erate (with an OPINION EXTREMITY score above the median) and extreme(whose score was above the median) deliberators. It found that relative tomoderates, whose intention to petition or protest decreased (Mpre 5 2.57,Mpost 5 2.39), such intention increased among extreme participants(Mpre 5 4.42, Mpost 5 4.54; F(1, 180) 5 3.66, p 5 0.06). Both groups alsoslightly differed with regard to their willingness to discuss sexual minorityrights (F(1, 180) 5 2.60, p 5 0.11), with the moderates becoming substan-tially less willing to engage in this activity (Mpre 5 6.18, Mpost 5 5.80) andwith this willingness being relatively stable among extreme participants


(Mpre 5 7.58, Mpost 5 7.55). All in all, participating in structured andmoderated citizen-to-citizen deliberation did little to encourage politicalengagement among this sample.

To directly test the hypothesis according to which perceived disagreementmobilizes extreme participants to action, hierarchical regression models wereconstructed. The models predicted INTENDED COMMUNICATIVE (first model) andINTENDED ACTIVE PARTICIPATION (second model) assessed after deliberations.Both models entered the parallel pretest measures, PERCEIVED DISAGREEMENT

and OPINION EXTREMITY and ISSUE SUPPORT, followed by the interaction (OPIN-

ION EXTREMITY � PERCEIVED DISAGREEMENT) formed from centered maincomponents variables. These models were apt for testing whether perceiveddisagreement affects participation, whether extreme deliberators and those whosupport minorities express greater intentions to be active, and whether theseintentions are yet greater if deliberations are seen as contentious.

As detailed in Table 1, both models explained substantial variance incommunicative (Column 1) and active participation (Column 2). Unsur-prisingly, prior intention to be active strongly predicted such intentionexpressed after deliberations. As the first column shows, perceived disagree-ment negatively, albeit slightly, predicted communicative participation, in-dicating that—on average—the more disagreement participants reported,the less likely they were to talk about sexual minority rights. The marginally

TABLE 1

OLS Regression Predicting Posttest Intended Political Participation

Communicative Active

Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2

Pretest Intended Participation 0.88 n n n 0.89 n n n 0.96 n n n 0.96 n n n

(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)Prior Opinion 0.01w 0.01w 0.01w 0.01wOpinion extremity (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)Issue support 0.06 0.06 � 0.00 � 0.00

(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)Perceived Disagreement � 0.06 � 0.08w 0.02 � 0.00

(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)First Block R2 (%) 73 n n 84 n n n

Interactions 0.01w 0.01 n n

Opinion extremity � Perceiveddisagreement

(0.00) (0.00)

Incremental R2 (%) 1w 1 n n

R2 (%) 74 n n n 85 n n n

NOTE: n n np � 0.001; n np � 0.01; np � 0.05; wp � 0.10. Entries are before-entry unstan-dardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.


significant coefficient for extremity, in turn, suggests that extreme deliber-ators were more likely than moderates to discuss minority rights or persuadesomeone. Support for sexual minorities did not exert significant effects.

Further, the interaction between opinion extremity and perceived dis-agreement was positive and approached significance. This finding is illus-trated in Figure 1, which plots predicted means based on all the variables inthe model broken down by extremity and perceived disagreement. Asshown, the intention to discuss sexual minority rights or persuade someonewas greater among those extreme deliberators who perceived high disagree-ment, relative to their counterparts who saw deliberations as like-minded. Incontrast, moderates were less willing to discuss minority rights when per-ceiving high disagreement. As the predicted values indicate, ‘‘moving’’ fromdeliberations seen as like-minded to disagreeable ones decreased the like-lihood that the moderates will talk about this issue (6.43 to 6.05 for the leastextreme participants, with the likelihood ranging from 0—very unlikely to10—very likely), and had an opposite, and a more substantial, effect amongthe most extreme participants (6.36 to 7.27).

The second column of Table 1 details the estimates for a parallel modelpredicting INTENDED ACTIVE PARTICIPATION. The positive coefficient for opin-ion extremity again indicates that among extreme deliberators, the intentionto rally or petition slightly increased from pre- to posttest relative to mod-erates. A notable difference between the two models regards the insignificantcoefficient for perceived disagreement, which suggests that whereas exposureto dissimilar views decreased intended communicative participation, thewillingness to engage in more public and confrontational actions was un-affected by disagreement. Further, the significant interaction supports the

FIGURE 1

Communicative Participation by Opinion Extremity and Perceived Disagreement

NOTE: Predicted values based on all the variables are plotted. Low and high dis-agreement was created by subtracting and adding one standard deviation to themean.


hypothesis. As illustrated in Figure 2, extreme participants were mobilized topublic and potentially confrontational actions by dissimilar views. Howimportant is this effect? Looking at the predicted means shows that thelikelihood that those participants will rally or protest was substantiallygreater in groups seen as entailing high (4.20) than low (2.80) disagreement.This is a notable difference, especially when compared to the average in-tended active participation in the sample (3.39), and suggests that encoun-tering challenges may indeed be a mobilizing factor for extreme individuals.No such difference emerged among moderates, who were unaffected bydisagreement perceived during deliberations (predicted means being 3.05and 3.04 for the least extreme).

Discussion

Existing evidence supports two somewhat contradictory notions. Delib-erative settings that assemble dissimilar people are said to elicit interest,make politics relevant, and encourage engagement. However, exposure todissimilar views, which should occur within such settings, may make citizensambivalent or confused and decrease their participation. This study aimed tocontribute to the debate in two ways. It argued that some inconsistenciesmay result from the fact that the research informing the debate differentlyassesses deliberation, cross-cutting exposure, and network heterogeneity.This study thus took the necessary step back and bridged the seeminglyinconsistent findings by differentiating between participating in deliberationand encountering disagreement during deliberation to examine which factor

FIGURE 2

Active Participation by Opinion Extremity and Perceived Disagreement

NOTE: Predicted values based on all the variables are plotted. Low and high dis-agreement was created by subtracting and adding one standard deviation to themean.


advances or thwarts participatory ideals. Second, this study proposed thatopinion extremity may affect the relationship between deliberating or en-countering disagreement and political participation.

First, the aggregate effects show participation in heterogeneous, struc-tured, and moderated face-to-face deliberations on sexual minority rightsdiscouraged participants—especially the moderate ones—from engaging insuch communicative actions as discussing the issue or trying to persuadeothers. Deliberations also pulled moderates away from such public andconfrontational activities as rallying or petitioning, while slightly mobilizingextreme participants. These results run counter to some studies, according towhich citizen-to-citizen deliberation incites democratic engagement. Al-though these results may be due to the cultural context, the contentiousissue, or the particular sample, they are nevertheless noteworthy for theirimplications for theory and practice. If long and moderated face-to-facedeliberations among educated young people turn those people away frompolitical talk in more private settings and from fully taking part in thepolitical process around a given issue, how do we reconcile deliberative andparticipatory democracy?

At the same time, accounting for additional factors suggests that encoun-tering dissimilar views during deliberation may be mobilizing for someparticipants. As expected, extreme deliberators who perceived high dis-agreement became more willing to engage in the various activities related tosexual minority rights than their counterparts who perceived less disagree-ment. This was the case for communicative actions and for such more publicand confrontational acts as rallying or protesting. Moderates, in turn, werepulled away from communicative participation when seeing deliberations ascontentious. These patterns suggest that some firmly committed individualsmay be not only unaffected by hostile surroundings but may actuallyexperience the motivating anger or injustice and also realize that takingaction is necessary to protect the cause in which they believe (see Gamson,1992).

Another finding is noteworthy. Perceived disagreement slightly decreasedcommunicative participation. This result indicates that—on average—partic-ipants may emerge from contentious deliberations feeling that talk and per-suasion are not viable means to influence others. Alternatively, becausedisagreement was not manipulated, those who were introverted or conflictadverse might have reported more contentions than the more communicativeparticipants. Although the underlying process is not clear and the detectedassociation may well be bidirectional, disagreement may affect communicativeparticipation because people may realize that an issue is too complicated to bediscussed, fear that they will fail to convince others, or simply view deliber-ations as upsetting (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). Inasmuch as people donot enjoy having their views challenged, disagreement may lead them to avoidpolitical talk (Eliasoph, 1998; Holtgraves, 1997). More research is needed notonly to address the mechanisms underlying the differential effects on various


participatory acts but also to shed light on how to design deliberative inter-ventions that do not entail negative outcomes.

The fact that deliberation and disagreement affected communicative butnot active participation also suggests that it may be beneficial for researchersto differentiate between items used to measure various outcomes (e.g.,opinions, attitudes, and behaviors), and to avoid summing these items tocreate aggregate scales. Although measurement simplicity is a virtue whenconstructing parsimonious theories, overlooking particularities may obscuresome subtle effects and important patterns. Even if statistical diagnosticsfind that analyzed items can be combined into a reliable and valid scale,theory-driven distinctions between constructs should sometimes be made.

Although this study reveals important relationships, the Polish DialogueProject has several limitations. First, the findings may not generalize to otherpopulations. Participants were not selected from a representative sample, butwere recruited from educational and nongovernmental institutions in Warsaw.As with many experimental designs, it is thus unclear whether similar resultswould emerge among different samples. Nevertheless, the sample was morediverse than the typical college sophomores relied on in many experimentaland quasi-experimental studies, and included students and activists. Also, thepurposive recruitment allowed oversampling extreme individuals who wouldnot have been effectively sampled from a representative panel, thus allowingcreating truly diverse groups apt for testing mobilization among people withextreme views on a contentious issue (see Gunther et al., 2001).

It also needs to be remembered that because the study relied on self-reporteddisagreement rather than on transcripts or manipulated exposure, the causaldirection between seeing that others express opposing views and intendedparticipation is not clear. It is plausible that activists perceived more conten-tions than actually arose (Sherif and Hovland, 1961) and that intentions to beactive were related to perceived disagreement. Additional analyses addressedthese concerns. One-way ANOVA found that whereas extreme participantsexpressed greater intentions to be active than moderates (F(1, 180) 5 39.44,po0.000, the two measures combined), they did not report more disagree-ment (F(1, 180) 5 1.54, ns). Also, multivariate models predicted perceived dis-agreement from opinion extremity, issue support, and posttest intendedparticipation. Neither extremity (b 5 0.01, ns) nor intended participation(b 5 0.11, ns) was associated with perceived disagreement. That is, extreme andparticularly active participants did not report greater disagreement, a findingthat offers some validation that the influences run from encountering opposingviews to political engagement. In any case, although manipulating disagree-ment would assure that individual characteristics do not confound the rela-tionship, using perceived disagreement had some benefits (Mutz, 2002) andmade deliberations realistic.

Concerns may also arise about the extent to which the dependent variableis correlated with selection differences (see Merkle, 1996), in that thoseindividuals who left their contact information and joined deliberations could


have been more participatory to begin with. This scenario cannot be ruledout because the data on intended participation and perceived disagreementare available only for those who deliberated. Even if plausible, this scenariowould not explain away the central finding that intended participation isgreater among those extreme deliberators who perceived high rather thanlow disagreement.

To address these issues, it would be beneficial to replicate the findingswith a random sample as well as to do this experimentally so as to determinethe causal relationship. Both goals could be achieved by conducting thestudy online and recruiting participants from a nationally representativepanel maintained by Polimetrix or Knowledge Networks. Several weeks afterreporting their opinions and political participation, respondents would beexposed to counterattitudinal information on issues such as abortion, im-migration, or healthcare (to also assess whether similar results emerge forother topics) and their postexposure views and behavioral intentions wouldbe measured to determine whether counterattitudinal information had aneffect and whether the effect was contingent on attitude extremity. It wouldalso be worthwhile to replicate the findings in naturalistic situations, byinterviewing activists before and after debates or political protests, so as toassess whether encountering dissimilar views from oppositional groups fur-ther mobilizes them to action. Although extending and supplementing theresults presented here, these two designs would not entail naturalistic face-to-face deliberations, which are rarely done among representative samplesand cannot manipulate disagreement.

Further, because the Polish Dialogue Project lacks over-time observations,it cannot determine whether participants followed up on their intentionswith factual engagement around minority rights. Participants may have alsooverreported their intended engagement, relative to both their subsequentbehaviors and their true intentions. Because attitudes and intentions predictbehavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and because desirability biases wouldresult in overreports before and after deliberations, the detected patterns aretelling in their own right. Longitudinal studies with follow-up measures areneeded to establish whether deliberation and disagreement indeed affectengagement around various issues and in various cultural contexts. Similarly,this study relies solely on participants’ survey responses. Contextualizing theanalyses with discussion transcripts would shed light on the deliberativedynamics and the tested relationships.

Despite these limitations, this study offers findings with theoretical andpractical implications. It shows that in order to meaningfully talk aboutdeliberative versus participatory democracy, research should differentiatebetween citizen-to-citizen deliberation and political disagreement that oc-curs during deliberation. Because some studies examine group discussionsand other research uses survey data on exposure to dissimilar views frominterpersonal discussants, it may not be warranted to conclude that delib-eration is incompatible with participation. Deliberation and disagreement


are certainly intertwined, but it is research that simultaneously attends toboth and isolates their unique effects within one context that will helpadvance the debate by capturing the factors that promote or thwart par-ticipatory goals.

This study further suggests that the question ‘‘Does disagreement increaseor decrease engagement?’’ is more complex than generally acknowledged, inthat individual characteristics matter in the process. In addition to affectingpeople’s reaction to opinion climate, opinion extremity influences the effectsthat deliberation and disagreement have on participatory behaviors. To-gether, these findings show that it is scholarship that integrates group pro-cesses with individual factors that stands to reveal the various influences onpolitical participation.

The results also have practical implications. The finding that exposure toopposing views mobilizes people who are firmly invested in a contentious issuemay be evaluated as optimistic or problematic. On the one hand, people willtake active part in politics. On the other, such mobilization may also create asituation in which extreme views are disproportionately represented in thedemocratic process (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2005). More importantly,encouraging extreme citizens to more vehement action could prove sociallydisadvantageous by exacerbating conflicts between opposing factions. Withinold democracies, there are cases in which civil society contains elements that arean anathema to democratic values and whose activation may undermine thosevalues, such as groups promoting hatred or xenophobia. Within young de-mocracies or unstable societies, mobilization might be problematic when agiven system lacks traditions that channel conflicts or has elites that are notcommitted to civil rights (see Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). Avoiding suchpitfalls and ensuring that deliberation generates individually and socially ben-eficial outcomes is a critical task for deliberative researchers and practitioners, atask that may be more challenging than advancing the debate on deliberativeand participatory democracy.

REFERENCES

AAPOR. 2006. Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates forSurveys. Available at hwww.aapor.org/uploads.standarddefs_4.pdfi.Abramowitz, A., and K. Saunders. 2005. ‘‘Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality ofPolarized America.’’ Forum 3:1–22.

Berelson, B. 1952. ‘‘Democratic Theory and Public Opinion.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly16:313–30.

Burkhalter, S., J. Gastil, and T. Kelshaw. 2002. ‘‘A Conceptual Definition and TheoreticalModel of Public Deliberation in Small Face-to-Face Groups.’’ Communication Theory12:398–422.

Chambers, S., and J. Kopstein. 2001. ‘‘Bad Civil Society.’’ Political Theory 29:837–75.


http://www.aapor.org/uploads.standarddefs_4.pdf

http://www.aapor.org/uploads.standarddefs_4.pdf

Cook, F., M. X. Delli Carpini, and L. Jacobs. 2003. ‘‘Who Deliberates? Discursive Capital inAmerica’’. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.Philadelphia, PA.

Eliasoph, N. 1998. Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, J. 2003. ‘‘Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An Update.’’ SocialScience Quarterly 84:71–90.

Feldman, L., and V. Price. 2008. ‘‘Confusion or Enlightenment? How Exposure to Dis-agreement Moderates the Effects of Political Discussion and Media Use on CandidateKnowledge.’’ Communication Research 35(1):61–87.

Fiorina, M., and S. Abrams. 2008. ‘‘Political Polarization in the American Public.’’ AnnualReview of Political Science 11:563–88.

Fishbein, M., and I. Ajzen. 1975. Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction toTheory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Fishkin, J. 1995. The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy. New Haven, CT:Yale University Press.

Gamson, W. 1992. Talking Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gastil, J. 2000. By Popular Demand. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Gastil, J., E. P. Deess, and P. Weiser. 2002. ‘‘Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test ofthe Connection Between Jury Deliberation and Political Participation.’’ Journal of Politics64:585–95.

Gastil, J., and P. Weiser. 2006. ‘‘Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing theCivic Value of Institutionalized Deliberation.’’ Policy Studies Journal 34:605–27.

Graff, A. 2006. We Are (Not All) Homophobes—A Report from Poland. Available at hhttp://www.kph.org.pl/czytaj/raportyi.Gunther, A., C. Christen, J. Liebhart, and S. Chia. 2001. ‘‘Congenial Public, Contrary Press,and Biased Estimates of the Climate of Opinion.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 65:295–320.

Hibbing, J. R., and E. Theiss-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs About HowGovernment Should Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holtgraves, T. 1997. ‘‘Yes, But . . .: Positive Politeness in Conversation Arguments.’’ Journalof Language and Social Psychology 16:222–39.

Horner, L., J. Conners, and R. Daves. 1998. ‘‘Interest in Elections and Public Expression ofOpinion.’’ Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Association for PublicOpinion Research. Chicago, IL.

Huckfeldt, R., J. M. Mendez, and T. Osborn. 2004. ‘‘Disagreement, Ambivalence, andEngagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks.’’ Political Psychology25:65–95.

Human Rights Watch. 2007. Poland: School Censorship Proposal Threatens Basic Rights.Available at hhttp://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/16/poland15512.htmi.Kaplowitz, S., E. Fink, D. D’Alessio, and A. Blake. 1983. ‘‘Anonymity, Strength of Attitude,and the Influence of Public Opinion Polls.’’ Human Communication Research 10:5–25.

Krassa, M. 1988. ‘‘Social Groups, Selective Perception, and Behavioral Contagion in PublicOpinion.’’ Social Networks 10:109–36.


http://www.kph.org.pl/czytaj/raporty



http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/16/poland15512.htm

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/03/16/poland15512.htm

Larsen, K. S., M. Reed, and S. Hoffman. 1980. ‘‘Attitudes of Heterosexuals Toward Homo-sexuality: A Likert-Type Scale and Construct Validity.’’ Journal of Sex Research 16:245–57.

Lasorsa, D. 1991. ‘‘Political Outspokenness: Factors Working Against the Spiral of Silence.’’Journalism Quarterly 68:131–40.

Lazarsfeld, P., B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet. 1968. The People’s Choice, 3rd ed. New York:Columbia University Press.

Leighley, J. 1990. ‘‘Social Interaction and Contextual Influences on Political Participation.’’American Politics Quarterly 18:459–75.

McClurg, S. 2006a. ‘‘Political Disagreement in Context: The Conditional Effect of Neigh-borhood Context, Disagreement and Political Talk on Electoral Participation.’’ PoliticalBehavior 28:349–66.

———. 2006b. ‘‘The Electoral Relevance of Political Talk: Examining Disagreement andExpertise Effects in Social Networks on Political Participation.’’ American Journal of PoliticalScience 50:737–54.

McLeod, J., D. Scheufele, P. Moy, E. Horowitz, R. Holbert, W. Zhang, S. Zubric, andJ. Zubric. 1999. ‘‘Understanding Deliberation: The Effects of Discussion Networks onParticipation in a Public Forum.’’ Communication Research 26:623–54.

Merkle, D. M. 1996. ‘‘The Polls—Review—The National Issues Convention DeliberativePoll.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 60(4):588–619.

Moy, P., D. Domke, and K. Stamm. 2001. ‘‘The Spiral of Silence and Public Opinion onAffirmative Action.’’ Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 78:7–25.

Mutz, D. C. 1995. ‘‘Effects of Horse-Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Con-tributing in Presidential Primaries.’’ Journal of Politics 57:1015–42.

———. 1998. Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political At-titudes. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2002. ‘‘The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation.’’American Journal of Political Science 46:838–55.

———. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative vs Participatory Democracy. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

———. 2008. ‘‘Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?’’ Annual Review of PoliticalScience 11:521–38.

Nir, L. 2005. ‘‘Ambivalent Social Networks and Their Consequences for Participation.’’International Journal of Public Opinion Research 17:422–42.

Noelle-Neumann, E. 1993. The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion—Our Social Skin. Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press.

Price, V., and J. Cappella. 2002. ‘‘Online Deliberation and its Influence: The ElectronicDialogue Project in Campaign 2000.’’ IT and Society 1:303–29.

Scheufele, D., and W. Eveland. 2001. ‘‘Perceptions of ‘Public Opinion’ and ‘Public’ OpinionExpression.’’ International Journal of Public Opinion Research 13:25–44.

Scheufele, D., B. Hardy, D. Brossard, Il Waismel-Manor, and E. Nisbet. 2006. ‘‘DemocracyBased on Difference: Examining the Links Between Structural Heterogeneity, Heterogeneity ofDiscussion Networks, and Democratic Citizenship.’’ Journal of Communication 56:728–53.


Scheufele, D., M. Nisbet, and D. Brossard. 2003. ‘‘Pathways to Political Participation?Religion, Communication Contexts, and Mass Media.’’ International Journal of PublicOpinion Research 15:300–24.

Scheufele, D., M. Nisbet, D. Brossard, and E. Nisbet. 2004. ‘‘Social Structure and Cit-izenship: Examining the Impacts of Social Setting, Network Heterogeneity and Informa-tional Variables on Political Participation.’’ Political Communication 21:315–38.

Sherif, M., and C. Hovland. 1961. Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects inCommunication and Attitude Change, New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

Thompson, D. 2008. ‘‘Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science.’’Annual Review of Political Science 11:497–520.

Ulbig, S., and C. Funk. 1999. ‘‘Conflict Avoidance and Political Participation.’’ PoliticalBehavior 21:265–82.

Wuthnow, R. 1994. Sharing the Journey: Support Groups and America’s New Quest for Com-munity. New York: Free Press.

Zablocki, K. 2007. Surviving Under Pressure: Working for ‘‘Days of Tolerance’’ in Poland.Available at hhttp://www.kph.org.pl.czytaj/raportyi.


http://www.kph.org.pl.czytaj/raporty

http://www.kph.org.pl.czytaj/raporty

Copyright of Social Science Quarterly (Blackwell Publishing Limited) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and

its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's

express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.

Pulling Toward or Pulling Away: Deliberation, Disagreement, and Opinion Extremity in Political...

Documents

Transcript of Pulling Toward or Pulling Away: Deliberation, Disagreement, and Opinion Extremity in Political...