Protectors or Predators? The Embedded Problem of Police Corruption and Deviance in Urban Nigeria

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Corruption and Deviance in NigeriaProtectors or Predators? The Embedded Problem of Police

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Administration & Society201X, Vol XX(X) 1 –38© The Author(s) 2013

DOI: 10.1177/0095399713513142aas.sagepub.com

Article

Protectors or Predators? The Embedded Problem of Police Corruption and Deviance in Nigeria

Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa1

AbstractThe Nigeria Police Force is widely perceived by the public as the most cor-rupt and violent institution in Nigeria in a way that is not evidently insincere. In light of the generalization and banalization of police corruption and devi-ance, it is surprising that few works have addressed this problem that most directly affects the aggrieved Nigerian public. This article critically examines the embeddedness and ramifications of police corruption and deviance in Nigeria. The article is historically anchored and foregrounds colonial and military administrative policies that inculcated a strategy of corruption by coercion in the Nigeria Police Force.

KeywordsNigeria police force, corruption, deviance, colonial, military

IntroductionGood policing is the bedrock for the rule of law and public safety. The long-term failure of the Nigerian authorities to address police bribery, extortion, and wholesale embezzlement threatens the basic rights of all Nigerians.

—Human Rights Watch (2010)

1University of Oxford, UK

Corresponding Author:Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, Queen Elizabeth House (QEH) Doctoral Scholar, Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford, St. Antony's College, Oxford, OX2 6JF, UK. Email: [email protected]

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2 Administration & Society XX(X)

Historically, cases of corruption and deviant conducts have punctuated the development of police institutions worldwide, but especially in developing countries (Ahire, 1991; D. Bayley & Perito, 2011; K. Rotimi, 2001). In 2010, a study by global anti-corruption institution Transparency International (TI) reported that police in 86 countries were judged the fourth most corrupt public institution, edged out by political parties, public officials generally, and parlia-ments and legislature (TI, 2010). The report further stated that corruption was particularly aplenty in sub-Saharan Africa, the newly independent states of the former Soviet bloc, the Middle East, and North Africa. In another survey that took place in three African countries—Nigeria, Zambia, and Kenya—the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) reported that the police were severely indicted by members of the public as the least useful law enforcement agency in combating corruption (ACBF, 2007). In the developing world, police corruption and excessive use of force is a generalized and banalized burden borne especially by people in the lowest quintile of income—the very poor and marginalized living in the periphery of society—who often report that they had paid bribes to police under duress or have been victims of police abuse (D. Bayley & Perito, 2011, p. 2; Oluwaniyi, 2011; Smith, 2007). In a study of 23 countries, the World Bank found that ordinary people saw the police not “as a source of help and security, but rather of harm, risk, and impoverishment” (World Bank, cited in Power, 2009, p. 52). This perception of the police is brought into sharp relief when we consider the case of Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and oil-rich hegemon (see Figure 1).

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF)—Africa’s largest—has a long and unen-viable history of selectively preying on the people it was established to pro-tect (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2010; Mwalimu, 2009; K. Rotimi, 2001). According to Alemika (1988), the legacy of the Nigeria Police Force is that of “arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism, incivility, low account-ability to the public, and corruption” (p. 161). Established in 1930, this unwieldy force has defied every attempt to democratically reform its unprofes-sional conducts (Hills, 2008; HRW, 2010; Smith, 2007, pp. 149-150). Today, the popular perception among many Nigerians is that the police force has failed woefully to fulfill its role as “guardians” of society (Alemika, 1988; Hills, 2008, p. 216; HRW, 2010; Oluwaniyi, 2011). In over 80 years of exis-tence, the Nigeria Police Force has become a symbol of unbridled corruption, mismanagement, and brazen human rights abuses, ranging from “arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention” to “threats and acts of violence, including physical and sexual assault, torture, and even extrajudicial killings” (HRW, 2010, p. 2). Visible levels of police corruption and brutality have severely undermined the legitimacy of the federal government in Nigeria and eroded public support for the police (Hills, 2008). In short, institutionalized




Agbiboa 3

extortion, a profound lack of political will to reform the force, and impunity has combined to make the Nigeria Police Force a deeply embedded problem.

Despite the pervasive and systemic nature of police corruption in Nigeria, there are, surprisingly, very few studies addressing this issue that most directly affects the aggrieved Nigerian public. The primary aim of this article is to explore the embeddedness and ramifications of police corruption and deviance in Nigeria, particularly its intersection with public safety and human rights. The article contributes to the current body of scholarly literature by conceptualizing police corruption as a historical and socially embedded prob-lem. It directly relates police corruption to societal conditions in Nigeria, particularly to the colonial and postindependence politics of the country, rather than seeing it as a purely managerial problem, whose solution lies in simplistic recommendations for internal reform or removal of corrupt indi-viduals (so-called “bad apples”).

Figure 1. A map of Nigeria.Source: OCMT and CLEEN (2002, p. 164).





The article is divided into four main sections. The first focuses on the meaning and typology of police corruption as well as the competing explana-tions for its existence. The second section provides a historical trajectory of corruption in Nigeria, with particular reference to the protracted military rule and its institutionalization of corruption in Nigeria. The third section looks closely at British colonialism and the (un)making of the Nigeria Police Force. The fourth section examines the corruptive and deviant conducts of the Nigeria Police Force, particularly their ramifications for public safety and human rights. The final section sums up the key points of the article.

What Is Police Corruption?

Any attempt to understand why police corruption occurs must first establish what it entails and who it implicates (Porter & Warrender, 2009). According to Roebuck and Barker’s (1974) “loose” definition, police corruption refers to any form of “deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behavior by a police officer.” Skogan and Meares (2004) articulate the intention behind corrupt practices: Corruption may be carried out for “personal gain,” includ-ing bribery and selective enforcement of the law. However, corruption may also involve “organizational gain” (or the notion of “noble-cause corrup-tion”), which describes extralegal actions undertaken to achieve laudable ends. This is what Klockars (1985) describes as the use of “dirty means” to achieve “legitimate ends.” Most discussion of police corruption goes further and includes reference to activities that are not necessarily criminal (the acceptance of gratuities or minor “kickbacks”), activities that do not involve the provision of services, and activities that do not involve the exchange of money. Thus, McMullan’s (1961 corruption definition appears to be suffi-ciently broad to include a range of such activities: “A public official is corrupt if he accepts money or money’s worth for doing something he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons” (pp. 183-184). This definition is broadened by Punch (1985) in two ways. He defines corruption as occurring

when an official receives or is promised significant advantage or reward (personal, group or organisation) for doing something that he is under a duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, for exercising a legitimate discretion for improper reasons, and for employing illegal means to achieve approved goals (p. 103).

Punch’s definition recognizes that the particular “ends” of corruption activity may not involve personal reward but, rather, may be undertaken for




Agbiboa 5

the benefit of a wider group or the police organization taken as a whole (Newburn, 1999). Second, Punch’s definition includes not only illegitimate but also “approved goals”—earlier described as “noble cause corruption.”

Perhaps the most inclusive definition of corruption comes from Kleinig (1996) who explains that “Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of fur-thering private or departmental/divisional advantage” (p. 166). According to Kleinig, the strength of this definition is that it enables “many acts and prac-tices that may never show themselves as corrupt—for example, doing what one is duty-bound to do solely for personal advancement” (p. 166) to be included within a definition of corruption. This would clearly cover activities that would come under the general rubric of “process corruption” (Wood, 1997, p. 183), as well as activities such as over-zealous policing with the aim of personal advancement. While such activities may not be what we typi-cally think of as corrupt, Kleinig (1996, p. 166) argues that they should be considered to be so because they “are motivated by the spirit of corruption” (cf. Newburn, 1999).

Roebuck and Barker (1974) offered a typology of police corruption that was later updated by Punch (1985). Nine different types of corruption are identified in the completed corruption typology: corruption of authority, “kickbacks,” opportunistic theft, “shakedowns,” protection of illegal activity, “the fix,” direct criminal activities, internal payoffs, and “flaking” or “pad-ding” (see Table 1). In a second review of the typology at the turn of the new millennium, Punch (2000, pp. 301-324) suggested adding to the typology certain important aspects such as extreme violence, evidence manipulation, sexual harassment, racism, and direct involvement in drug dealing. The com-plex acts identified with police corruption suggests that any investigation of causal factors should be open to the involvement of multiple factors—an approach adopted in the current article. According to Porter and Warrender (2009), “this allows identification not only of the most frequent occurring factors of corruption but, more importantly, how these factors combine” (p. 5). It also allows for “a more targeted, yet complex, approach to preven-tion and response” (Porter and Warrender [2009]).

The mélange of behaviors contained in the above typology led Punch (2000) to suggest the concept of “police deviance” as a broad heading for the study of police corruption. This broad heading subsumes three subsections: (1) Corruption (to take something against your duty as exchange for money or gifts from an external corruptor), (2) Misconduct (breaking internal rules and procedures), and (3) Police Crime (when officers break the law in serious ways such as using excessive violence). Attempts have also been made to draw distinctions between “internal” and “external” corruption. Miller





(2003), for example, identifies internally networked corruption, involving extralegal practices within a police department between members of the police force, while also recognizing the role of actors external to the police force, for example, extralegal acts between one or more police officers and members of the public. Skogan and Meares (2004) argue that corruption can be “proactive,” where the officer actively pursues the means to engage in cor-rupt practices, or “reactive,” where the officer is receptive to offered bribes (cf. Porter & Warrender, 2009).

Competing Explanations of Police Corruption

Roebuck and Barker (1974) list a range of competing explanations of police corruption including dishonest and criminal recruits (Lewis & Blum, 1964), faulty training and supervision (Tappan, 1960), political corruption (Gardiner, 1970), dearth of professional standards (Skolnick, 1967), societal demands for illegal services (Merton, 1958), and socialization of newer recruits into corrupt practices (Stoddard, 1968). Since the end of British colonial domina-tion, two explanations of police corruption and deviance have gained increased currency. First is the “rotten apple” thesis that views corrupt prac-tices as an individual pathological issue, thereby denying that police corrup-tion is an institutional problem (Knapp, 1972; Sherman, 1978; Tankebe, 2010. Subsequently, the panacea to the problem lies in “carefully screening

Table 1. Chronology of Nigerian Leaders Since 1960.

Nigerian leaders Leadership timeline

Tafawa Balewa (Northern People’s Congress) 1960-1966J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi (Military) 1966Yakubu Gowon (Military) 1966-1975Olusegun Obasanjo (Military) 1976-1979Shehu Shagari (National Party of Nigeria) 1979-1983Muhammaddu Buhari (Military) 1984-1985Ibrahim Babangida (Military) 1985-1993Ernest Shonekan (Military) 1993Sani Abacha (Military) 1993-1998Abdulsalami Abubakar (Military) 1998-1999Olusegun Obasanjo (People’s Democratic Party) 1999-2007Umaru Yar’Adua(People’s Democratic Party)

2007-2010

Goodluck Jonathan(People’s Democratic Party)

2010-present

Note. Author’s compilation.




Agbiboa 7

applicants for police positions, pursuing defective officers aggressively, and removing them from their police positions before their behaviour spread throughout the agency” (Klockars, 1999, p. 208). However, studies have shown that corruption is a pervasive and systemic phenomenon (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan, 2006; Granovetter, 2007; Smith, 2007), and therefore explanations based on the individual pathology or deviance of police officers are intellectually unsatisfying (Sherman, 1978, p. xxviii; Tankebe, 2010, p. 302).

Indeed, the history of policing is full of examples where this explanation could simply not be sustained in the face of overwhelming evidence of orga-nized corruption. The classic example is the hearings of the Knapp Commission in New York that “destroyed the police union’s argument that police corruption was confined to a few ‘rotten apples’ in an otherwise healthy barrel” (Sherman, 1978, p. xxviii). According to the Knapp Commission: “ . . . A high command unwilling to acknowledge that the prob-lem of corruption is extensive cannot very well argue that drastic changes are necessary to deal with the problem” (Knapp, 1972, pp. 6-7). The reform com-missioner, Patrick Murphy, supported and reinforced the Knapp Commission’s view that the idea that the barrel was “clean” could not be supported:

The “rotten apple” theory won’t work any longer. Corrupt police officers are not natural-born criminals, nor morally wicked men constitutionally different from their honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples—the organisation, not just the individuals in it—because corrupt police are made, not born. (Barker & Carter, 1986, p. 10)

Second, some studies have argued that traditional norms and values sanc-tion corruption in the sense articulated by scholars like Ekeh (1975), Le Vine (1975), and Nukunya (1992). The explanation offered by Ekeh (1975) is par-ticularly instructive. In analyzing post-colonial African Politics, Ekeh draws a distinction between a “primordial” and a “civic” public.1 The realm of the former is ruled by indigenous shared norms and customs, but the realm of the civic public—governed by the post-colonial state and its institutions, includ-ing the police—suffers from weak moral commitment. The reason for this detachment lies in the legitimacy deficits of the colonial state and the failure of many Africans to decouple the post-colonial state from its predecessor (Ekeh, 1975, p. 92; see also Karstedt & Farrall, 2006, p. 1011; Takebe, 2010, p. 301). Ekeh (1975, p. 91) further argues the dialectical relationships between the two publics are implicated in the unique political problems that have come to characterize postcolonial African societies. Corruption, says Ekeh (1975, p. 110), is the “acme of the dialectics . . . [and] arises directly from





. . . the legitimation of the need to seize largesse from the civic public in order to benefit the primordial public.” The moral economy of corruption within this civic public thus makes it a respectable crime—that is, crimes that “while being legally culpable and widely reproved, are none the less considered by their perpetrators as being legitimate, and often as not being [offences] at all” (Olivier de Sardan, 1999, p. 34). These crimes do not only occupy “a grey zone of legality and morality” (Karstedt & Farrall, 2006, p. 1011), but “the real borderline between what is [considered an offence] and what is not fluc-tuates, and depends on the context and on the position of the actors involved” (Olivier de Sardan, 1999, p. 34). As such, citizens who benefit from corrupt transactions are unlikely to express negative views about the police (Takebe, 2010, p. 301). Indeed, based on Ekeh’s analysis, police officers may risk loss of public confidence if they seek “to extend the honesty and integrity with which [they perform their] duties in the primordial public to [their] duties in the civic public” (Ekeh, 1975, p. 110).

But, while corruption certainly implicates cultural factors, they stop well short of explaining the biting corruption of the post-colonial state (Takebe, 2010, p. 302). More accurately, the displacement of traditional cultural values by what Assimeng (1986, p. 248) describes as “rugged materialism” explains the kind of corruption that plagues the Nigerian society. Rugged materialism refers to a condition of aggressive preoccupation with material accumulation without regard to values of probity and propriety (Assimeng, 1986, p. 249). Three decades ago, Brownsberger (1983, pp. 215-233) criticized studies that sought to explain corruption in the Third World (specifically Nigeria), by reference to anachronistic traditions and to the special pressures on officials in developing countries. He argues that the roots of corruption in Nigeria go deeper, to a materialism and political fragmentation that are the products of a moment in development (Brownsberger, 1983, p. 215). Brownsberger (1983) further argues that “the dazzling status of the white man (and the successor black élite) burned into the populace a desire to appear and act as did their dominators, and this led the most successful to corrupt excesses” (p. 215). In short, Brownsberger (1983, p. 228) suggests that a passion for, and sense of entitlement to, visible élite status is a major factor in the corruption of public officials (i.e., the police) in Nigeria, and he sees this concern as born of the vast status gap between the White colonialists (and their Black successor élite) and the average poor rural Nigerian.

On a broader note, Punch (2000) addresses the possibility that corruption is due to group behavior that is rooted within established practices in the police force into which officers have to be initiated. Punch’s suggestion addresses the fact that the problem extends beyond “bad apples” to group behavior, which may initially start with a few individuals but, as more and more officers become involved in the practices, the learnt behaviors would




Agbiboa 9

need to be addressed rather than simply removing corrupt officers. In a useful review, Porter (2005, pp. 143-169) summarized several factors of corruption into Organizational factors and Social factors. Organizational factors include organizational culture, particularly an emphasis on performance and clear-up rates, policy/rules, leadership, opportunities such as undercover work and informant handling and also ineffective investigation. The Social factors include social culture, for example, the social customs among officers that encourage solidarity and discourage reporting fellow officers, as well as col-league influence and external influence. Howitt (2002) discusses the factor of colleague influence. He identified the possibility that corrupt practices could be handed on by serving officers to new recruits. The introduction of new officers involves “on the job” training with experienced officers. Howitt sug-gested that more experienced officers may use practices that are unacceptable and these may be passed on to new recruits. Therefore, corrupt behavior in new police officers may have been learnt from colleagues (Porter & Warrender, 2009).

Porter’s (2005) review provides a detailed overview of the possible causes for the continuance of corruption and has different implications for preven-tion. She suggests that reasons for corruption are embedded in various aspects of the police force. So conceived, rather than removing individuals, it may be more productive to focus on changing the environment in which they operate and the ways in which certain police functions are managed and implemented. Porter suggested that implementing changes in the areas mentioned could be effective in preventing police corruption. These changes included strategies such as visible leadership, encouraging the reporting of corruption and stricter procedures for work prone to opportunities for corruption.

Approach of Study

In general, the term corruption will be used loosely in this study to describe the misuse of one’s position or authority for personal or organizational (or subunit) gain, where misuse in turn refers to departures from accepted soci-etal norms (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004, p. 40; cf. Nye, 1967, p. 419). In particular, the article adopts Roebuck and Barker’s (1974) wide definition of police corruption as “any form of deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal behaviour by a police officer” (p. 423). The corruption problematic will be approached in this article from the perspective of Olivier de Sardan’s (1999) sixth thesis on corruption in Africa, which states that “the real border-line between what is corruption and what is not fluctuates, and depends on the context and on the position of the actors involved” (p. 34). As such, the complexity of social experience is considered a necessary condition for explaining corrupt practices. Relatedly, the roots of corruption will be





conceived in this article as “grounded in a country’s social and cultural his-tory, political and economic development, bureaucratic traditions and poli-cies” (Kindra & Stapenhurst, 1988, p. 1).

The importance of the approach of this study is brought into bold relief when we compare police corruption in both developing and developed coun-tries. Actions that are considered corrupt in the United States, for example, may be viewed as social obligations or simply good manners in other cultures (D. Bayley & Perito, 2011). The Reports from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Council on Human Rights under-score widespread arrests without warrants and thefts from prisoners, both of which are hardly mentioned in Western investigations (D. Bayley & Perito, 2011). Also, most surveys, media accounts, and observer reports point to the fact that police corruption in developing nations is more visible than it is in developed nations. As articulated in a recent report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP),

Corruption in the developing world is an open fact of life for anyone who encounters a police officer, voluntarily or not. In the developed world, police corruption is out of sight, confined by and large to the shadowy world of vice regulation. It is concentrated among officers who commonly work undercover rather than among officers who are uniformed and visible. (D. Bayley & Perito, 2011, pp. 5-6)

The above variation in the form of police corruption impacts on public regard for the police and especially perceptions of legitimacy. As the USIP report again notes,

Corruption in Western countries may be as costly in the aggregate as in other places, but it is invisible to the public at large. For the most part, it victimizes people knowingly engaged in illegal activities. Hence, the public can write it off as a fringe activity, perhaps even as a righteous cost for illegal behaviour. This kind of corruption does not tarnish all police officers, only the few who knowingly exploit the opportunity. In developing countries, however, bribery becomes a transaction fee for doing any business with the police. It afflicts everyone, not just criminals, and it implicates all police officers. (D. Bayley & Perito, 2011, pp. 5-6)

The Military and the Institutionalization of Corruption in Nigeria

The military (conceived as a non-monolithic entity) ruled Nigeria for nearly 30 years out of its first 40 years of political independence and has intervened




Agbiboa 11

intermittently in the country’s post-colonial politics ever since. According to Ekineh (1997, p. 272), no other country in Africa has been as coercively dominated for so long a period by their own military as the people of Nigeria. While the Nigerian military has often seized power through extra-legislative and unconstitutional means, they have justified their actions by claiming them to be corrective (Adekanye, 1993; Agbese, 1992). As Nwankwo (1997, p. 31) argues, the new Nigerian military leaders often claim their regime to be “a child of circumstance and necessity; a regime whose short reign is designed to arrest the drift into chaos, restore national peace, order and stability, improve the economic well-being of society and its people, and leave behind a prosperous, democratic nation.” For instance, after the first coup that ended the First Republic (1960-1966), the main architect of the coup Major Kaduna Nzeogwu assured Nigerians that the intention of the military elites was to rid the society of “irresponsible and opportunistic politicians, and incompetent and corrupt civil servants; restore respectability, professionalism, transpar-ency, and accountability to Nigeria’s public service; and then return to the barracks” (Agbese, 1992, cited in Agbiboa, 2010, p. 485). Similarly, after the second coup that ended the Second Republic (1979-1983), Gen. Muhammed Buhari rationalized the coup thus: “The corrupt, inept and insensitive leader-ship in the past four years has been the source of immorality and impropriety in our society, since what happens in any society is largely a reflection of the leadership of that society”.

After one civil war, seven military regimes, and three botched attempts at building democracy, there is one key factor in the failure of virtually all attempts to govern Nigeria: corruption (Iyoha & Oriakhi, 2008, p. 656). In fact, since 1966, most military leaders have behaved basically as the civilian elites that they ousted from office—“they have either been engaged in many forms of opportunism to enrich themselves at the expense of the people or have allowed members of their regime to turn governmental structures into instruments of plunder” (Mbaku, 2000, p. 23). Former Nigerian President Obasanjo acknowledged the military’s role in entrenching corruption in Nigeria: “One of the greatest tragedies of military rule in recent times is that corruption was allowed to grow unchallenged and unchecked even when it was glaring for everyone to see” (“Excerpts of President Obasanjo’s speech,” 1999).

The rise of corruption to high visibility and mass tolerance in Nigeria is traceable to specific dictatorships that varied highly. In particular, two dicta-torships stand out for their degrees of tolerance of corruption and untram-melled cupidity. These are the regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and that of his military successor General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). As one commentator notes,





Demonstrations of political fecklessness in the matter of the control of corruption abound in Nigeria’s political history . . . [However] brazen acts of venality in the public service reached unprecedented levels under the military regimes of Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998). From the very apex of political leadership to the bottom of the ladder, public officers . . . wallowed openly in corruption. (Ocheje, 2001, pp. 173-174)

The high level of corruption during the Babangida era was given greater rein by two propitious factors: The 9-year tenure of the regime and the huge surge in oil revenue, including the famous oil windfall occasioned by the Iraq War in 1991. A whopping sum of US$12.67 billion earned during the war could not be accounted for by the Babangida-led regime (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 489). According to Ribadu (2006), this era was tainted with “profligacy, wanton waste, political thuggery and coercion . . . .” Osoba (1996, p. 381) argues that for the 8 years of Babangida’s stay in power, the regime “never took a public stance against corruption.” Instead it proceeded with hitherto unknown dynamism to establish a sui generis military autocracy, grounded on “cronyism, blatant corruption of high-profile individuals and groups in society and ruthless and systematic suppression of so-called ‘radicals,’ ‘extremists,’ and other real or imagined opponents of the regime.” As Kraxberger (2004) argues, “co-optation of oppositional figures was a key strategy [of the Babangida regime]” (p. 416). Indeed, it would appear that

the widespread and systematic use of corrupt means by Babangida to “settle” many actual and potential critics rested on the impeccable presupposition that if he corrupted enough Nigerians there would be nobody to speak out on the issue of corruption or public accountability.” (Osoba, 1996, p. 381; cf. Agbiboa, 2013; Harsch, 1993)

Elsewhere, Osoba (1996) argues that

the main distinguishing feature of corruption in the Babangida regime was the pervasive culture of impunity: any of his acolytes, however high or low in status, could loot the treasury to their heart’s content with impunity, provided they remained absolutely loyal and committed to the leader. Those who backslide or waver in their loyalty and commitment, were terrorised with all the coercive instruments of state power, even when they had done no wrong. (p. 382)

A curious action taken in the late 1980s by the Babangida regime was its release of the ill-amassed assets seized from top government officials who served in Yakubu Gowon’s regime (1966-1975), after these officials were




Agbiboa 13

found guilty of corrupt enrichment by a special military tribunal. These seized assets were returned to their “owners” (Ocheje, 2001, p. 173). Babangida also released most of the corrupt politicians incarcerated by Buhari-Idiagbon regime and restored to them their lost military ranks, in addition to tendering a national apology to the officers (Agbiboa, 2013). In 1991, Babangida’s regime also formally rehabilitated all the military officers who had been probed, found guilty of corruption, and dismissed “with igno-miny” from the Armed Forces by Murtala Mohammed’s regime in 1976. Among the more prominent of these are Jim Nwobodo, former governor of Anambra State, who was convicted of corruption, sentenced to 22 years imprisonment, and ordered to refund N9.95 million, but later became a sena-tor of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Solomon Lar, former governor of Plateau State, found guilty of corrupt operation of ‘security’ vote, and sen-tenced to 21 years in jail, but later became chairperson of the ruling People’s Democratic Party; Samuel Ogbemudia, former military governor of the then Bendel State, found guilty of corrupt enrichment and made to forfeit millions of naira worth of assets to the federal government by a special tribunal under the Murtala Mohammed regime in 1975, but went on to become a civilian governor of the same state in 1983; Philip Asiodu, found guilty of corruption by the same tribunal, but who later became senior presidential advisor on the economy (Ocheje, 2001, p. 190). Ocheje (2001) describes these actions as “political fecklessness in the matter of the control of corruption that abounds in Nigeria’s political history” (p. 173).

Subsequently, the wrong signal was sent to public officials in Nigeria that corruption in the public sector was a pardonable offence, thus making confor-mance to ethical standards appear to be foolish (HRW, 2010; Iyoha & Oriakhi, 2008). This pattern of “pardoning” corrupt public officials has continued to this day in Nigeria. In the most recent case, President Goodluck Jonathan granted pardon to ex-Bayelsa state Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha (1999-2005)—who was convicted of stealing millions of dollars during his time in office—because he had been “remorseful” (BBC, 2013. Alamieyeseigha was also declared free to run for elections again (BBC, 2013). Nigeria’s former anti-corruption czar Nuhu Ribadu (2006) condemned the “irresponsible decision” and noted that the pardon was “the final nail” in the coffin for fighting corruption in the country.

Moving on, the interim administration of Chief Ernest Shonekan was invited to take over power, after the Babangida regime was forced to step aside due to an election debacle. However, this interim government was unseated (after only 3 months) in 1993 by a military coup that led to the ascension to power of General Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s last despot. If Babangida was bad, Abacha was worse. In 5 years of dictatorship and





looting, Abacha “paralyzed the machinery of governance and pauperized the citizenry” (Agbiboa, 2012). He notably arrested/incarcerated commercial bank chiefs in Lagos while he and his kitchen cabinet were simultaneously stealing and stashing away in banks around the world of between US $5 bil-lion to US $50 billion (Agbiboa, 2012). Nearly 15 years after Abacha’s death, the Swiss Government has so far repatriated the sum of US $700 million stolen by the late dictator and deposited in several Swiss banks (Agbiboa, 2012). However, former Nigerian President Obasanjo has alluded to US$1 billion still been held by Swiss banks (Agbiboa, 2012). What is more, under Abacha, Nigeria’s “rule of law” was dealt a fatal blow. For example, the regime enacted “Decree No. 12, of 1994, which officially removed the authority of the courts to investigate, let alone challenge, the actions of mem-bers of the regime” (Badru, 1998, p. 151). The late Professor Ake (1995, p. 16) argues that when this happens, “the state effectively ceases to exist as a state and compromises its ability to pursue development.”

Between 1960 and 1999, Nigerian officials had stolen close to US$440 billion (Agbiboa, 2012). This is six times the Marshal Plan, the sum total needed to rebuild devastated Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. The extent of Nigeria’s failure during this period is brought into bold relief when we compare the country to Indonesia, another huge, populous, ethnically diverse, and oil-rich nation. Both Nigeria and Indonesia have suf-fered military rule and, at times, massive bloodshed. At independence, both countries were nations of subsistence farmers. Both struck oil and were del-uged with petrodollars. But here the parallels cease. Indonesia has not exactly been a model of good governance, yet average incomes rose from under US$200 in 1974 to US$680 in 2001 (Agbiboa, 2011). This is despite the Asian financial crash of 1997. In 2002, the UNDP reported that Nigerians are more than twice as likely as Indonesians to be illiterate or to die before the age of 40 (UNDP, 2002, p. 151).

On balance, military interventions in Nigerian politics seem to have done more harm to the Nigerian political economy than any other single factor. An elongated and largely meaningless military dominance of the Nigerian politi-cal landscape merely served to precipitate the state’s collapse into unfettered prebendalism as well as the emergence of an increasingly predatory and self-interested armed force and ruling elites. By weakening the structures for rational government, accountability, and democratic participation, Nigeria’s military governments inadvertently strengthened the institutions for arbitrary, oppressive, and insensitive personal rule, most exemplified today by the Nigeria Police Force.

Prolonged military rule in Nigeria had a major impact on the Nigeria Police Force. In particular, the periodic balkanization of Nigeria into states




Agbiboa 15

under successive military regimes, as it turned out, has impacted on the struc-ture of the Nigerian Police. For example, the creation of 12 states on May 27, 1967, which was used as Police Commands with each headed by a Commissioner of Police, rose to 19 in 1976 with the creation of the 19 state structures. In 1986, 1991, and 1996, more states were created thereby rework-ing the federal structure into 36 states, apart from the federal capital territory. Thus, the 37 police Commands in the country. On October 14, 1986, Zonal Command headed by Assistant Inspector-General of Police was introduced to conform to the political structure of the country. Today, there exists 12 Zonal Commands in the country while the Force Headquarters operates as a Police Command (Omotola, 2007).

Another major impact of military rule on the Nigerian police is the prob-lem of marginalization and funding. Nigeria’s first four decades following independence were dominated by a series of military coups and successive military dictatorships. The police force—which at independence numbered approximately 12,000—was larger than the military, and thus was perceived by the military leaders as a threat. Consequently, the police force was chroni-cally underfunded and marginalized by the military government during this period (1960-1999; Dayil & Sjoberg, 2010). There was no constitutional pro-vision that a certain percentage of national revenue be allocated to the police. As such, the police have been subjected to a perpetual crisis of underfunding (Omotola, 2007).

An analysis of the national budgets for the Nigeria Police since 1980 reveals a pattern of continuous under-funding (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2010). Apart from 1983, under the Shagari administration when the Police received an allocation equivalent to 10.7% of the national budget, in all other years (including 2011 and 2012) the Police with its approximately 400,000 staff got allocated an average lower than 5% (see the appendix—Funding of the Nigeria Police From 1980-2007; el-Rufai, 2012; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2010). Furthermore, when the funds are released, the headquarters, zonal, and area commands withhold substantial amounts leaving only very little for intelligence-gathering, street patrols, and policing at the divisional and station levels where most of the law enforcement is done (el-Rufai, 2012). Consequently, rather than benefit the public, the expansion of the Nigeria Police Force merely increased the number of rank and file officers involved in corrupt and deviant practices across the country.

Last, successive military governments deliberately installed few effective checks on abuses of police authority, leaving misconduct and corruption to flourish. For example, under the military, the suspension of such democratic institutions as the National Assembly, the Police Council, and the Police Service Commission all of which have oversight functions over the Nigeria





Police left the police institution as “an orphan at the mercy of the ruling mili-tary” (Osayande, 2008, p. 6). Recruitment into the Police Force and training were suspended for many years, while a good number of Officers left the service through compulsory retirement and dismissals (Mwalimu, 2009). Subsequently, vices such as “corruption, greed, indolence, tribalism, godfa-therism, nepotism injustice and various malpractices crept into the police and attained their peak during this period . . . ” (Mwalimu, 2009, p. 865). Over time, morale declined and the police’s deteriorating public image deterred quality candidates from entering the force. As one former senior police offi-cial described to HRW (2010, p. 13), “It ended up with most of the people who were joining the Nigerian police, joined it simply because it was a very easy way of making money.”

Colonialism and the (Un)making of the Nigerian Police Force

The primary purpose of the colonial police was to protect the British economic and political interests. The police accomplished this objective through the often brutal subjugation of indigenous communities that resisted colonial occupation. The use of violence, repression, and excessive use of force by the police has characterized law enforcement in Nigeria ever since. (HRW, 2010, p. 14)

Traditionally, African policing methods were largely community-based and closely interlined with social and religious structures consisting of, for example, age grades (formal organization whose membership is based on pre-determined age ranges), secret societies, and vocational guilds (hunters, farmers, fishermen, and other professions; Ahire, 1991; K. Rotimi, 2001). With the advent of colonial domination, the concept of using local forces to enforce local ruler administration was adopted by the British administrators. Traditional policing institutions were integrated into the newly created colo-nial policing system following the theory of “likes policing likes” or “strang-ers policing strangers” (Clayton, 2004, p. 534). Furthermore, policing institutions were created and utilized by the colonial administration to ensure the smooth running of the colony. Ahire (1991, p. 56) argues that colonialism was all about the political subjugation and economic exploitation of the gov-erned by the governors. A law unto itself, “the colonial state used violence to maintain its domination, to appropriate the colony’s resources, to proleterian-ize peasants in order to ensure an adequate labour supply for its projects, to maintain order against a hostile population” (Ake, 1995, p. 3). Members of the police were a ready instrument for the realization of these ignoble goals.




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In confronting its subjects so violently, the colonial state and its police force foreclosed all prospects of legitimation.

In the colony, it was the policeman and the soldier who were the “official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppres-sion” (Fanon, 1963, p. 38). Brewer (1992) argues that

[t]he police were central to the success of colonialism because they imposed law and order on the subject population and, by acting as agents of the state in civil and judicial administration, helped to disseminate the standards and practices of the metropolitan society. (p. 518)

In practice, this was done mostly by coercion and consent (Anderson & Killingray, 1991), and this meant “the use of police to facilitate the process of pacification of the vanquished countries and the subsequent patrol of cities and commercial enterprises” (Mwalimu, 2009, p. 865). According to Ekeh (2002), “right from the beginning, the purpose of the Nigeria Police Force was to protect [the colonial] government functionaries, sometimes against natives.” As such, a military character was stamped on the police at inception by the British colonialists (Omotola, 2007, p. 626).

The colonial police force performed a variety of functions, including

. . . investigating and detecting crime, escorting residents and other officials; prosecuting offenders; guarding goals and prisoners at work outside the precincts of the prisons, serving summons and executing warrants; patrolling, aiding and protecting revenue and customs officials, guarding and escorting goods; and suppressing slave raiding. (Annual Report of Colonial Nigerian Police by Major Bain, 1906, cited in HRW, 2010, p. 14)

The local police force charged with maintaining order in the colony often found itself in direct opposition to its own people especially in activities such as “exacting taxes and labour that for all intents and purposes amounted to servitude, suppressing dissent, harassment, and abuse of nationalists espe-cially those agitating for independence and demonstrations in urban areas by a semblance of labour movements” (Mwalimu, 2009, p. 865; cf. HRW, 2010, p. 14). As Fanon (1963, p. 38) argues,

In the colonial countries, the policeman and the solider, by their immediate presence and their frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise him by means of rifle butts and napalm not to budge . . . the agents of government speak the language of pure force . . . he is the bringer of violence into the home and into the mind of the native. (p. 38)





As the police were created as a coercive force to silence all forms of oppo-sition from Nigerians to colonial rule, and as they were required to enforce colonial policies, especially regarding labor, taxation, and criminal laws,

a selective process of recruitment was employed to incorporate into the force those [Nigerians] from the subservient but courageous tribal groups to ensure docile compliance to orders but at the same time capable of combat type arrangements into a parliamentary setting. (Mwalimu, 2009, p. 865)

The British had an unconcealed preference for using native authority police in the north of Nigeria, and from 1907 to 1915 armed government police were completely excluded from the emirates (Mwalimu, 2009). When they were reintroduced, administrative officers in the north persistently sought to marginalize them (Ahire, 1991; E. O. Rotimi, 1993). In 1861, the first 100-man police force was established by British colonial administrators as a fundamental consular protection force based in Lagos State (Ahire, 1991). This contingent later became known as the “Hausa Force,” so-named because of the ethnicity of the recruits.

The local authority police forces were an effective tool of local political oppression in northern Nigeria. Especially from the beginnings of party poli-tics in 1951 to the collapse of the First Republic, the local police were able to hamper the activities of opposition parties throughout the north (E. O. Rotimi, 1993). Native authority police in the Western Region also had a hand in the harassment of political opponents in the post-1962 Action Group party schism (Ahire, 1991). As far back as 1891, the consul general of the Oil Rivers Protectorate in what is presently eastern Nigeria expressed shock at the “numerous acts of lawlessness and pillage” by the police, who were com-monly referred to in the community as the “forty thieves” in police uniform (HRW, 2010). The governor of Lagos colony expressed similar sentiments when he argued in 1897 that the Hausa Force “no doubt behaved very badly in the hinterland by looting, stealing, and generally taking advantage of their positions” (HRW, 2010). Flowing from this historical account, it has become obvious that the Nigerian Police are essentially a colonial creation, imbued with military character for furthering the cause of British colonization of Nigeria (Omotola, 2007). As Peter Ekeh (2002) puts it, “its purpose was quasi-military assistance to the British colonization of Nigeria.” This military character inherited at independence in 1960 was strengthened by successive military regimes and up till today remains one of the greatest undoing of the Nigerian Police.




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The Centralization of the Nigerian Police Force

During Nigeria’s first republic (1960-1966), local power elites and political parties turned to the use of local police forces for their own personal agenda; local authority police were deployed by the government of the day to vio-lently suppress challenges to the corrupt status quo (Mwalimu, 2009; K. Rotimi, 2001). Local police forces were also heavily implicated in elec-tion rigging, harassment of voters, and intimidation and/or elimination of political opponents. On one hand, the Action Group government in the West sought to introduce a Nigeria Police Force superintending presence; on the other, the Northern People’s Congress in the north did everything in its power to ensure that authority over the local forces would remain in its own hands (K. Rotimi, 2001). In the intervening time, regional authorities sought supe-rior funding and training for their forces, but with their use parti pris (Mwalimu, 2009; K. Rotimi, 2001). While the northern regional authorities sought to “defend and develop local forces” and to “marginalize the Nigeria Police Force” (Clayton, 2004, p. 535), Premier of the Western Region Samuel Akintola (1960-1966) sought to diminish the power of the Nigerian Police advisers, and until the military coup of 1966 was returning to the arguments for local police firearms (Clayton, 2004; K. Rotimi, 2001). Under the military regimes of General Aguiyi Ironsi (January-July 1966) and General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975), the local forces were dissolved, at least in theory, in favor of a centralized police force—Nigeria Police Force. The 1979 and 1999 constitutions explicitly prohibited the establishment of police forces other than the Nigeria Police Force. Section 213(1) stipulates, “There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.”

According to the 1956 Police Act, the duties and responsibilities of the Nigerian police are

prevention and detection of crime; apprehension of offenders; preservation of law and order; protection of life and property; due enforcement of all laws and regulations which they are directly charged; the performance of such military duties within and without Nigeria as may be required of them under the authority of the police act. (Fayemi & Olonisakin, 2008, p. 252; Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 71)

As the number one state provider of internal law and order in Nigeria, the police service remains a federal body because the constitution, as noted above, does not allow local or regional police forces. Yet non-state security





providers, such as private security companies, militia, and community vigi-lante groups, are increasingly present and even collaborate with the police as service providers (Fayemi & Olonisakin, 2008, p. 245). The presence of a regional coordination structure notwithstanding, decision making at the regional level is centralized in the person of the state commissioner of police, who takes orders directly from the national inspector-general of police, who in turn reports directly to the president (Dayil & Sjoberg, 2010, p. 189; Fayemi & Olonisakin, 2008). In the early years of the democracy, the police service grew rapidly to almost 300,000 officers (Dayil & Sjoberg, 2010). This growth underscored the existing challenges in terms of both training quality and insufficient resources (arms and other equipment, accommoda-tion, transportation, communication networks; Hazen & Horner, 2007, p. 10).

The Nigerian Police Force: Perceptions From Without and Within

How the public perceives a government’s function is significantly affected by the perceptions of police as an instrument of the state. As a unit of govern-ment, the police force is critical to the state’s ability to maintain power and authority. So understood, no significant distinction can be made between police behavior and state power (Mwalimu, 2009). As Oluwaniyi (2011, p. 69) argues,

The police represent for many citizens the most immediate and visible expression of government authority and power evoked to represent the interest of victims of crimes . . . their role depends on the character of the state, how a government defines national security, how fragile public order is, and how secure the governing elite are in the state. (cf. Kleinig, 1996, p. 13)

In 2006 CLEEN Foundation, a major nongovernmental organization in Nigeria with a focus on security sector reform, conducted a nationwide opin-ion poll that ranked the Nigeria Police Force as the most corrupt public insti-tution in Nigeria (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2007, p. 46). An earlier research conducted in 2000 by the CLEEN found that the use of violence by the police against citizens in Nigeria was widespread. Of 637 respondents to a survey carried out in 14 states, 14.8% said they had been beaten by the police, 22.5% said police has threatened to shoot them in the past, and 73.2% said they witnessed the police beating another person. A further sample of 197 prison inmates revealed higher figures of police abuse; 81% of the respondents said they had been beaten or slapped and 39% burnt with hot objects (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2000). Recently, in 2008, research by the Presidential Committee




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on Police Reform in Nigeria found that “the Police today is publicly per-ceived as the most corrupt government institutions, with its personnel con-stantly accused of bribery and extortion in the course of performing their functions” (p. 31). This research is corroborated by Oluwaniyi (2011) and HRW (2010).

The Nigeria Police Force itself is not oblivious of the pervasiveness of corruption and brutality in its ranks. In 1990, secretary of the Nigeria Police Force Ibrahim Coomassie decried the “corruption, lack of supervision, negli-gence of duty, abuse of office, insubordination . . . misappropriation of funds . . . extortion and demanding by menaces” that had become regular trade-marks of senior police officers (cited in Alemika, 1993, p. 200). In addition, the following statement from a key senior member of the Nigeria Police Force is supportive:

It is apparent that indiscipline, un-professionalism and widespread corruption have been the bane of the Nigeria Police over the years, a situation that has greatly hampered the quality of service delivery. Our image has been battered time and again, leading to a loss of confidence by members of the public. (A Welcome Address by the Inspector-General of Police Mr. Ogbonna O. Onovo at the Senior Police Officers Conference, 29 September 2009)

While corruption in the Nigerian police is glaring for everyone to see, some officers have argued that it is not unique to it. As one police officer rationalizes,

How can people say that the police are the most corrupt agency in Nigeria? What about Immigrations? If you have been to other government agencies, then you will know that there are worst corrupt agencies. Many people complain about what they face with Customs and even LASTMA. People just apportion blame on the police because we are the closest to them. Do you know the rate of corruption perpetrated by our leaders at the National Assembly? I don’t know what you mean by “police and corruption.” As far as I am concerned, every sector is corrupt including the most important decision-making institutions in the country. (Oluwaniyi, 2011, p. 74)

Rationalizations, such as the above, pave the way toward defining the cor-rupt practices of the Nigeria Police Force as business as usual or “help” to ease misgivings about police behavior. According to Anand et al. (2004), rationalizations—the use of socially constructed accounts to recast corrupt acts in a normal, acceptable and justifiable light—are signs of corruption normalization and embeddedness in an organizational culture. In particular, Anand et al. (2004, p. 43) identifies a form of rationalization that he terms





“selective social comparisons.” In the face of negative impressions about themselves, individuals may compare their unethical actions with others who appear even worse to bolster them against the threat. As Anand et al. (2004, p. 43) puts it, “because corrupt acts can make individuals appear bad, they are motivated to find examples of others who are even more corrupt and thereby show that we’re not so bad” (p. 43).

Debilitating Forms of Police Corruption and Deviance in Nigeria

A major constraint against police effectiveness in the current democratic dis-pensation is the pervasiveness of the culture of corruption and deviance in the police as an institution. Whereas, Article 324 of Police Act provides for the standards of conduct required of a police officer to include “offer prompt obedience to lawful order” and “be determined and incorruptible in the exer-cise of his duties” (Police Act, Cap 154), the phenomenon of corruption has totally overwhelmed the Nigeria Police Force (Omotola, 2007). Corrupt and deviant practices in the Nigeria Police Force are institutionalized through a lucrative system of “returns” whereby rank-and-file officers are expected to give a cut of the money they extra-legally take at checkpoints to officers higher up the chain of command (Nguyen, 2010). Police corruption in Nigeria takes various forms, including traffic duties; arrest and prosecution of crime suspects; court trial in form of delay of justice, undue adjournment of cases; destruction of exhibits and evidence; issuing of licensing and permits; falsifi-cations and tampering with statements and police investigations (Omotola, 2007). Not infrequently, some police officers fail to arrest, investigate, or prosecute offenders because of family or friendship ties to colleagues in the force (Takebe, 2010). Others collect bribes from suspects either to overlook their offences and not to arrest them, or to present weak cases in court. Yet others mount roadblocks to collect bribes from motor traffic offenders (Takebe, 2010). However, the most visible forms of police corruption in Nigeria are bribery, extortion, and brazen human rights abuses committed largely by rank-and-file-police officers (HRW, 2010). It is to these debilitat-ing forms of police corruption and deviance that we turn to next.

Police corruption in Nigeria occurs by coercion and usually affects the poorest people in Nigeria. Ordinary Nigerians commuting on the country’s roadways, buying or selling at markets, running daily errands are routinely subjected to police extortion and abuses on a daily basis. Refusal to give in to repeated demands for bribes by low-level, trigger-happy police officers often hold serious consequences: Ordinary Nigerians are frequently threatened and




Agbiboa 23

illegally detained, and at times physically and sexually assaulted, tortured, or even killed (HRW, 2010). The fact that little attempt is made by members of the Nigeria Police Force to conceal the collection of money throw into stark relief the near total lack of political will on the part of Nigerian authorities to hold police officers accountable for their gross misconduct and malpractice. This has led to the embeddedness of corruption in the Nigerian societal cul-ture to the point that it is now regarded as a “normal” part of life—commonly described as “the Nigerian factor” (Smith, 2007). As one Police Commissioner once stated, “People just want to pay and go their way” (HRW, 2010).

Corruption in the Nigeria Police Force usually occurs at police roadblocks and checkpoints. Ostensibly put in place to curb the prevalence of crimes on Nigerian roads, these checkpoints have in practice become a lucrative crimi-nal ventures and centers of corruption. Commercial drivers and Okada (com-mercial motorcycles) riders in Nigeria are obliged to stop at mounted roadblocks (often illegal) where they are subjected to routine extortion under threat of arrest, detention, and physical injury (HRW, 2010; Oluwaniyi, 2011). In Anambra State, one civil society report estimated that in 2008 the police collected roughly N540 million (U.S. $4.5 million) in extra-legal “tolls” from some 70 police checkpoints along Anambra State’s roadways (Intersociety Statement, 2008). The report further noted that in 2008, there were approximately 70 police checkpoints located on Anambra State roads and that about 1,000 commercial minibuses and motorcycle taxis passed through each checkpoint on a daily basis. Taking an average “toll” of N20 as a point of reference, the report estimated that the average checkpoint makes N20,000 per day. This means that 70 checkpoints collected roughly N1.4 mil-lion daily, N42 million monthly, and N504 million yearly (Intersociety Statement, 2008).

Not infrequently, the police impound cars and motorcycles on the pretext that vehicle registration papers are not in order, only to be given permission to proceed once the driver has “dropped something” (bribed the police offi-cers on duty). Commercial drivers are often required to pay bribes to police officers ranging from N20 to N20,000 ($0.13 to $167)—a substantial amount of money when considered in the Nigerian context where over 100 million survive on less than US$1 a day (Agbiboa, 2012). Commercial drivers of minibus are often required to pay a pre-arranged amount ranging from N20 to N100 (depending on the distance of journey) to the first police-mounted road block and then are usually waived through without incident. In cases where drivers fail to pay this amount, or to “understand the language of the police,” as it is described, their vehicles are “parked” and their passengers are ordered to get out of the vehicle. These passengers are then ordered by the police officers to “drop something” or to negotiate payment directly with the driver





to give them the “right” of passage. The commercial vehicle drivers have come to accept this as a sacrifice they have to make to avoid higher penalty and waste of time. As one Mafutau, a commercial bus driver noted, “We don’t waste time in giving them the money. When you don’t bring out the money in time, they will tell you at gunpoint to park and then you might be required to pay more than the regular bribe. They won’t collect anything less than N500” (Quoted in This Day, 19 June, 2004, cited in Omotola, 2007, p. 627). Andreski’s (1969, cited in Okereke, 1995, p. 281) description of the behavior of the police in Africa four decades ago remains valid in Nigeria today:

The Police are among the worst offenders against the law: they levy illegal tolls on vehicles, especially the so-called mammy-wagon (heavy lorries with benches and roofs) which usually carry many more passengers than they are allowed and transgress a variety of minor regulations. [These vehicles] are allowed to proceed regardless of the infractions of the law if they pay the policeman’s private toll. (cited in Okereke, 1995, p. 281)

In some local government areas in Nigeria, police extortion has become so rampant that it has become standardized. In the Bariga district of Lagos, for example, commercial minibus drivers who pass through the police check-points on more than one occasion each day complain about having to repeat-edly bribe the same police officers. In response to these complains, the police set up a creative system in which drivers are given a password (for example, a number on their license plate) to identify drivers who had already paid the daily “toll.” The situation is clearly described by one commercial driver in Lagos: “At Evan bus stop, they [the police] ask for N50 ($0.33) and give you a number. At the second one, at Olojojo bus stop, they collect N100 or N50 and will give you a number. At Olorunshogo bus stop, the police will collect another N100 and give you another number. Once they give us a number, when I come back for another trip, I will tell them my number and they will [let me] leave” (HRW, 2010, p. 27). The foregoing reveals the extent to which corruption has become institutionalized and part of the way the system works in Nigeria. The “normalized” nature of police corruption in Nigeria finds strong resonance in Cameroon where members of the police force have also been accused of supplementing their wages by regularly charging taxi drivers for imaginary offences as bizarre as “having a double windscreen” for drivers who wear glasses (Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006, p. 16). In 2004, taxi drivers did eventually go on strike in protest, not at the fact they had to pay so many bribes to police officers, but that not all officers were sticking to the accepted rate of payments (Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, 2006).




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The problem of illegal and innumerable police roadblocks and check-points, and the corruption and barefaced abuses they give rise to, is hardly novel in Nigeria. Indeed, the usefulness of these checkpoints for crime clean-ups was questioned by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (UN Commission on Human Rights, 2006, p. 15) which found that rather than preventing crime, police checkpoints in Nigeria are “used primarily for the purposes of extorting money from motorists.” As corrupt police officers are more concerned with how much money they can extract from commercial drivers and motorists, members of criminal gangs often find it easier to simply pay off money-thirsty police officers (HRW, 2010). Acknowledging the veracity of this finding, the police leadership in Nigeria has on more than one occasion ordered the removal of checkpoints. In 1992, for example, then Inspector General of Police Aliyu Attah ordered the withdrawal of the mobile police from checkpoints, but checkpoints soon returned under the facade of “stop-and-search” patrols (Civil Liberties Organisation, 1995, pp. 74-75). Today, the problem of police checkpoints, and the extortions that pervades them, is getting worse (HRW, 2010) despite dubious claims recently made by the current Nigerian Inspector General of Police, Mohammed Abubakar, that the withdrawal of police roadblocks has reduced 80% corruption in the Nigeria Police (“IGP: Removal of roadblocks reduced corruption in police by 80 percent,” 2013). At the very least, what has changed is the nomenclature: Police check points have been replaced by “nipping points” or “stop-and-check” operations (HRW, 2010, p. 31). At the end of the day, members of the police still look for every means to obtain money from commercial drivers, mostly by coercive strategies.

Besides police checkpoints and the extortion in them, another major form of police corruption and deviance in Nigeria is the unlawful detention of individuals and groups of citizens (who are never formally charged) with the intention of extorting money from them or those related to them. This form of police misconduct is alarmingly on the rise in Nigeria today (Oluwaniyi, 2011). In the case that the person arrested by the police is unable or unwilling to “drop” the required money (bribe) for their release, they are subjected to threats, beatings, sexual assault, torture, or even death (Dayil & Sjoberg, 2010; HRW, 2010). While most victims who are arbitrarily arrested appear to be detained for a matter of hours, those who are either unwilling or unable to pay are typically held in a police cell overnight, and may be detained for several days or even weeks. The longer the unlawful detention, the more opportunities the police have in extorting money from the victims and their close relatives. The police strategy, according to one civil society leader in Nigeria, is “to cast the net very wide so they can arrest as many suspects as possible. This affords them more chances for extortion and corruption”





(HRW, 2010; cf. US Department of State, 2013). In most of the cases, the amount of the bribes paid to the police ranged from N800 to N398,000 (roughly US$5 to US$2.636). The median amount paid, or extorted by the police, comes to N3,500 ($23; HRW, 2010). Yet, according to police regula-tions in Nigeria, the police are not permitted to demand or accept money to release a person in police custody, and there are often posters at police sta-tions to this effect, stating that “bail is free” (Dayil & Sjoberg, 2010).

Many victims of unlawful police detention live a precarious economic existence and eke out a living on what they earn as day laborers, drivers, and market traders (Oluwaniyi, 2011). In most instances, the modus operandi of the police is to simply round up groups of citizens from public spaces, espe-cially restaurants, bars, bus stops, and markets, who are then transported to the police station in a police pickup van. These raids are often done under the pretext of a crackdown on crime. Once at the police station, police officers will then demand money for their ransom, either from them and/or from those close to them. It is not uncommon to hear stories (from victims and/or eye witnesses) in Nigeria about how Nigerian police officers had commandeered a commercial minibus, collected unsuspecting passengers at bus stops, and then diverted the minibus to a nearby police station where they detained them and demanded money for their release (Network on Police Reform in Nigerian and Open Society Justice Initiative, 2010, pp. 87-88). This crime is com-monly known in Nigeria as “one chance.”

The above police misconducts belie the provisions of the Nigerian Constitution that guarantees that “every person shall be entitled to his per-sonal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty [except] . . . in accordance with a procedure permitted by law” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Sec. 35(1)). The Constitution further stipulates that for an arrest without warrant, “reasonable suspicion” must exist that the suspect committed a criminal offense (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). In addition, the Nigerian Constitution provides that any person who is arrested “shall be brought before a court of law” within 24 hr (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Sec. 35(4)). The problem of (prolonged) unlawful arrest and detention has not escaped the notice of government officials. For example, a 2008 Report of the Presidential Committees on Police Reform in Nigeria (p. 195) concluded that the police “extort money from accused persons” and “those who do not cooperate usu-ally suffer unlawful arrest and detention.” But acknowledgment of a problem never translates into action (Ocheje, 2001). Until now, the police leadership has failed to emplace best practices to curb the pervasiveness of unlawful detention and police officers are rarely held accountable for their (in)actions (HRW, 2010).




Agbiboa 27

Quite aside, a major tool of police corruption and extortion is torture. In 2007, a Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2007, p. 18) found that “torture and ill-treatment are widely practised in police custody” and are “an intrinsic part of the functioning of the police in Nigeria.” Several victims of police extortion have described how they have been threatened with or subjected to torture as a means of forcing them to give in to bribery and corruption (Dayil & Sjoberg, 2010; HRW, 2010; Oluwaniyi, 2011). In most cases, the families of victims have no choice but to fork out huge amounts of money to free their loved ones from the excruciating pain of police torture (HRW, 2010). Ironically, Nigeria is a signatory to several inter-national treaties that prohibit torture, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Nigerian Constitution also requires relevant authorities to investigate and prosecute those who commit torture and compensate those who suffer it (see Convention against Torture, art 7, 12, 14). Despite these public signs of commitment to the protection of Human Rights, “the Nigerian police routinely use torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and are rarely held accountable for it” (HRW, 2010, p. 44). Quite aside, on several occasions, the Nigeria Police Force have used the threat of rape and/or other forms of sexual assault as a means to extort money from women stopped at checkpoints, accosted by the police in public places, or detained in police custody (CLEEN Foundation, 2008). In most of these reported cases, which are well documented by human rights organizations, women are given the “option” of providing sex in lieu of cash payment (Amnesty International, 2009; CLEEN Foundation, 2008; HRW, 2010; Network on Police Reform in Nigeria and Open Society Justice Initiative, 2010, p. 79). Based on police data, CLEEN Foundation (2008) of Nigeria indicates that there were 1,359 reported cases of “rape and indecent assault” in 2008.

Perhaps, the most alarming issue concerning police corruption and deviant conducts in Nigeria today is the fact that those who refuse to give in risk been shot dead on the spot. In 2009, a comprehensive report by Amnesty International (p. 1), titled “Nigeria: Killing at Will: Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria,” revealed that the Nigeria Police Force “is responsible for hundreds of extrajudicial executions, other unlawful killings and enforced disappearances every year.” A case in point is the extrajudicial killing of the “Apo Six” detailed in the following case study:





On June 7 and 8, 2005, the police in Abuja killed six young Nigerians, most of whom were from Apo village, including Augustina Arebun, a 22-year-old university student. The Police initially claimed the six were armed robbers and had been killed in a gun battle with the police. On June 8, the police called Augustina’s family and demanded a N5,000 (approximately $38). The family was unable to come up with the money and “[s]everal of them were executed a few hours later.” A commission of inquiry found that Deputy Commissioner of Police Ibrahim Danjuma and Chief Superintendent of Police Abdulsalam Othman ordered the “elimination” of Augustina and one of the other survivors, and then covered up the killing of the six. Five police officers were charged with homicide in July 2005, but the trial has since stalled. Othman however, “escaped” from custody at police Force Headquarters in June 2005 and remains at large, while Danjuman has been free on bail since August 2006. (“Will Nigeria’s ‘Apo Six’ Ever Get Justice?,” 2009; UN Commission on Human Rights, 2006, pp. 7-8; HRW, 2010, p. 48)

In 2006, the UN Commission on Human Rights found that police “check-points provide the occasion for a large number of extrajudicial executions by police” (p. 15). The countless number of checkpoints are not only centers of extortion but of police altercation with motorists who refuse to give in, or are frustrated with, police bribery and corruption. Far too often these confronta-tions escalate into fatal shootings by the police. Numerous such killings are reported in Nigerian media each year (see, for example, Fagbemi, 2010; Obe, 2010; Odesola, 2009). While police corruption and abuses are most visible among rank-and-file officers, large-scale embezzlement by mostly senior officers in Nigeria underlies and indeed drives many of these corrupt prac-tices. Indeed, down the years, several high-ranking police officials, from inspector general of police to commissioner of police, have also been impli-cated in high-level corruption scandals that involve embezzlement and mis-appropriation of staggering sums of public funds earmarked for basic police operations (Agbiboa, 2012; Oluwaniyi, 2011). Unfortunately, in many of these cases the federal government and the police leadership have failed to properly investigate, prosecute, or discipline implicated officers, much less take tangible steps to prevent future cases of embezzlement of police funds.

One of the cause célèbre and most notorious case of embezzlement of police funds is that of former Nigerian Inspector General of Police, Tafa Balogun. Balogun was convicted in November 2005 of laundering US$150 million (Adigun, 2005; Nguyen, 2010). The former Inspector General was also accused of having laundered through Shell companies large sums of money from bribes and kickbacks he had received while in office (HRW, 2010). One of Balogun’s front companies, for example, was convicted of laundering N30 million (U.S. $227,000) bribe paid by the Societe Generale




Agbiboa 29

Bank of Nigeria after Balogun had threatened to withdraw police protection from the bank’s headquarters (Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Tafa Adebayo Balogun et al., 2005). Eight of his other front companies were also found guilty of money laundering (Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Tafa Adebayo Balogun et al., 2005). The News magazine reported how the former Inspector-General of Police used the instruments of state security to extort money and pervert justice: “He got about N12 million from First Bank; NNPC N10 mil-lion; Kaduna N7 million; Rivers N10 million . . . He withdrew N27 million from the operations account of the force in three instalments of N9 million . . . in June 2004, he withdrew another N150 million for logistics . . . Criminals could buy their freedom if the prize was right . . . ” ( Orilade, 2004). The entire funds stolen by Balogun “would have been enough to fund the total budgeted operating costs of the police force—apart from personnel costs and capital projects—for nearly two and a half years” (HRW, 2010, p. 69; Report of Presidential Committees on Police Reform in Nigeria, 2008). For all the staggering sum of money stolen by Balogun, he was handed a mere six-month jail term—a sentence so light that it makes mockery of the amount of money he stole (Adigun, 2005).

Conclusion

This article has attempted to critically examine the embedded problem and ramifications of police corruption and deviance in Nigeria. The article was historically anchored and foregrounded colonial and military policies that created a fertile ground for the breeding of corruption and deviance in the Nigeria Police Force. Several key points may be deduced from this article: (a) Corruption and deviance are pervasive and systemic in the Nigeria Police Force; they are not simply a problem of the lower ranks but have been found at all levels of the police organization; (b) Police corruption and deviance are continuing problem in Nigeria—there is evidence of corrupt practices from all stages of Nigeria’s police history; (c) police corruption and deviant con-ducts are normally perpetuated by coercion and brazenly violate core human rights; (d) police corruption and deviant conducts chiefly affects poor Nigerians eking out a living in the workaday world, especially those who work in the transportation sector; and (e) the coercive strategy of the Nigeria Police Force is itself a reflection of the nature of the colonial and post-colo-nial Nigerian state that, from the onset, has always had an extremely narrow base in social forces and relied unduly on the use of force (or threat of it) to quench all protests against its exploitative and accumulative dispositions. Any serious and successful attempt to democratically reform the problem of police corruption and deviant conducts in Nigeria today must first come to terms with these key findings.




30

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31

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App

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Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-cation of this article.

Note

1. The concepts of “primordial” and “civic” spheres of individual behavior are familiar analytical concepts in sociological studies (see Geertz, 1963; Shils, 1957). They are similar to Durkheim’s distinction between social relations and behavior in organic and mechanical societies (Durkheim, 1984, p. 106). The cru-cial point here is that the distinction between primordial and civic public made by Ekeh is not premised on any implied value judgment about the moral superi-ority or inferiority of either public (see Takebe, 2010, p. 301).

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Author Biography

Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa is a Queen Elizabeth House (QEH) Doctoral Scholar in the Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford. He holds an MPhil in Development Studies from the University of Cambridge, an MA in International Relations (Summa cum laude) from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and an Advanced Certificate in Social Research from the Australian National University. He has written extensively on issues of corruption and conflict in West Africa, with over 30 peer-reviewed publications in journals like Third World Quarterly, African Spectrum, and Review of African Political Economy.




Protectors or Predators? The Embedded Problem of Police Corruption and Deviance in Urban Nigeria

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