‘Protection’ and ‘Migration’ as an Adaptation Strategy? European Policy and the Case of...

1

AUGUSTUS 2014

Faculteit Criminologie en Rechtsgeleerdheid

VAKGROEP INTERNATIONAAL EN EUROPEES RECHT

‘Protection’ and ‘Migration’ as an Adaptation Strategy?

European Policy and the Case of African Environmental Migrants.

Proefschrift ingediend met het oog op het behalen van de graad van Master in

de Rechten, Afstudeerrichting Internationaal en Europees Recht.

SAMUEL LIETAER

Promotor: Prof. Dr. Serge Gutwirth

Co-promotor: Dr. Richard Lewis

Academiejaar 2013-2014

2

Acknowledgements

Many persons and certain institutions made the writing of this graduation thesis possible.

Accordingly, I wish to convey my thanks to them.

Besides the support of my family and friends, I have been fortunate to have advisors like

prof. Dr. Serge Gutwirth and Richard Lewis who gave me the freedom to explore on my

own, and at the same time the guidance to recover when my steps faltered. They have

been there to listen, give advice and comment on the revisions of this manuscript.

I am also indebted to the organism UCOS (University Centre for Development Cooperation)

with whose members I have interacted during the course of my graduate studies.

Particularly, I would like to acknowledge Bram Cleys, who, in cooperation with the VUB,

allowed me together with some other students to attend the climate negotiations in

Warsaw. Without this study trip I would never have been able to meet quite some European

and African delegates to the COP 19, as well as interesting representatives of civil society.

I thank this diverse panel of interviewed ‘climate actors’ for their time spent to answer my

complex questions.

The helpful members of the richly documented European Central Library also merit an

acknowledgement.

Although under the auspices of the VUB, many reasons brought me to put pen to paper in

the language of Shakespeare rather than in Vondel’s or Molière’s tongue. English being the

most commonly used at the UN is the main one.

Samuel Lietaer Brussels, August 2014

3

Table of Content

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………………………...2

Table of Content………………………………………………………………………………………………………3

List of Acronyms... ………………………………………………………………………………………………..5

1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 6

1.1. Defining the problem ......................................................................... 6

1.2. Defining the Research Question and the Purpose................................... 7

2. Methodology .......................................................................................... 9

3.Migration and Climate Change: choosing and defining the words ................. 10

4.What does and will environmental migration look like? ............................... 12

4.1. Scale ............................................................................................. 12

4.2.Causes and consequences of environmentally induced migration in Africa 14

4.2.1. Many drivers, few options ............................................................... 16

4.2.2. African-EU Migration in perspective ................................................... 20

4.3. The case for Migration ..................................................................... 23

4.3.1. Migration has always existed as an adaptation strategy ......................... 23

4.3.2. Migration as an adaptation strategy .................................................. 22

4.3.3. Some negative consequences……………………………………………………………….….25

4.4. A Human rights Approach to environmental migration………………............... 26

5.“Legal” and “illegal” migration ................................................................. 28

6.Which legal protection, hence recognition? ............................................... 30

6.1.External displacement ...................................................................... 31

6.1.1. International Refugee Law: Nothing in the 1951 Refugee Convention of

Geneva.. ............................................................................................. 32

6.1.2. Protection for EDPs under the Current EU Legal Framework: International and

Complementary Forms ........................................................................... 33

6.1.2.1.The 2001 Temporary Protection Directive ...................................... 34

6.1.2.2.The Qualification Directive: ‘Subsidiary Protection’ .......................... 35

4

6.1.3. Existing National Frameworks in the EU ............................................. 36

6.1.4. Cross-border legal protection in Africa ............................................... 37

6.1.4.1.The African refugee Convention ................................................... 37

6.1.4.2. Any practical support from the EU? .............................................. 38

6.1.4.3. Regional Free Movement Agreement ............................................ 39

6.2. Internal Displacement in Africa ......................................................... 40

6.2.1. The ‘Guiding Principles’, the ‘Nansen Principles’ and the ‘Revised Framework on

Durable Solutions’…………………………………………….…………………………………………………………..40

6.2.2.The Kampala Convention................................................................... 41

6.3. What is the EU’s answer to these legal gaps? ..................................... 43

6.3.1. No institutional and political support for a new legal framework ............... 43

6.3.2. “No reason for a lack of action” ........................................................ 46

6.3.3. Primary Law: A promising basis of Objectives ...................................... 47

7.Migration as an adaptation strategy? ....................................................... 48

7.1. Climate Change Law as a catalyser.................................................... 50

8. The EU’s ‘environmental migration policy’: an adequate response?..............55

8.1. A ‘balanced and comprehensive approach’ ......................................... 55

8.2. Migration as an adaptation strategy promoted and facilitated ............... 57

8.2.1.The EU and Africa as key partners ..................................................... 59

8.2.2.Focus on south-south migration ........................................................ 61

8.2.3.Planned relocation as a last resort solution….………………………………………….……..63

9. The Challenges of Institutional Governance and Policy Coherence ............... 65

10. Issues and lessons of the Africa-EU Cooperation ..................................... 68

11. Financial implications .......................................................................... 70

12. Conclusion ......................................................................................... 72

Bibliography ............................................................................................ 77

Lexicon .................................................................................................. 105

5

List of Acronyms

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States AWG-LCA Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention CBDR Common But Differentiated Responsibilities COP Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change DEVCO Development and Cooperation DG Directorate-General DG CLIMA Directorate-General Climate Action DG DEVCO Directorate-General EuropeAid Development & Cooperation DG ECHO Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid DG ENV Directorate-General Environment DG HOME Directorate-General Home Affairs DPI-NGO Department of Public Information Non-Governmental Organization EC European Commission ECHR European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ECJ European Court of Justice ECtHR European Court on Human Rights EDPs Environmentally Displaced Persons EEAS European External Action Service EM Environmentally-induced Migration EMs Environmental migrants EP European Parliament ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility GCCA Global Climate Change Alliance GHG Greenhouse Gas HLWG High Level Working Group IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICERD International Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights IDP Internally displaced persons IOM International Organization for Migration IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change JHA Justice and Home Affairs MDG Millennium Development Goals MS Member States NGO Non-governmental organization OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right SDGs Sustainable Development Goals TEU Treaty on European Union TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

6

1. Introduction

1.1. Defining the problem

Since the publication of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, evidence has emerged of

greater and more rapid impacts of climate change. We now face the realistic possibility of

climate warming up to four degrees, while more than two degrees is considered a

dangerous level of climate change.1 This phenomenon is already contributing to migration

and displacement, due to the world that is transforming dramatically: besides the number

of more visible sudden-onset natural disasters that is predicted to drastically increase,

there are already parts slowly - but certainly - becoming uninhabitable, and abandoned by

its inhabitants forced to seek sanctuary. This more or less forced migration will happen

internally or externally – from African to developed countries in Europe, for example -

temporarily or permanently.2

First, on a preliminary basis, the research question and the purpose of this paper will be

outlined, as well as the working definitions of the major concepts, namely ‘environmental

migration’ (EM) and ‘environmentally induced displacement’ (EDP).

Second, we will briefly address the impacts of climate change and describe how they link

to the proliferation of ‘environmental migrants’ (EMs) and ‘environmentally displaced

persons’ (EDPs).3 A view will be provided of what climate-induced migration does and will

look like: what are its causes and the expected consequences in terms of numbers, and

what are the main concerns related to the thus established prospects?

Third, against the backdrop of literature designing the case for migration and considering

a human rights perspective as most adequate approach, we will briefly discuss the state of

legal recognition and protection of EDPs at different levels: the international protection

obligations4, i.e. to what extent international refugee law, complementary forms of

1 M.L. PARRY et al. (eds.) Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the

intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; See also the ‘Headline Statements’ of January 2014 sketching out the conclusions of the 5th assessment (a.o. at least 95 percent likely that human activities – chiefly the burning of fossil fuels – are the main cause of warming since the 1950s and the impacts are speeding up): Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group 1 Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC: Summary for Policy Makers, October 2013, 33 p. 2 See the most quoted definition of “environmental refugee” developed by UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

researcher Essam el-Hinnawi: E. EL-HINNAWI, “Environmental Refugees”, Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 1985. 3 In order not to create confusion with traditional refugees, among other reasons, we use the terms environmental

migrants (EMs) and environmentally displaced persons (EDPs). For the exact working definitions of these terms see the Lexicon. 4 Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 including its protocol of 1967.

7

protection (‘subsidiary protection’ in the EU) or ‘temporary protection’, including

corresponding EU norms (Qualification Directive, Temporary Protection Directive) are

applicable or could become applicable if interpreted in a specific way.

Fourth, in order to examine the developing European approach concerning climate-induced

migration in Africa and whether the EU considers migration as an adaptation strategy, an

analysis of the EU’s international obligations by addressing climate change law concerning

this issue will be made.

Fifth, it will also be useful to address and evaluate the challenging existing partnerships so

as to enhance the European climate-induced migration policy as an aspect of the broader

adaptation policies. In addition, we will assess to which extent the external dimension of

the EU’s migration policies provide possibilities to support African countries affected by

adverse slow-onset environmental changes.5 Also other main legal and political triggers

and hurdles will (briefly) come into play throughout the article, such as the financial

implications to conclude.

1.2. Defining the Research Question and the Purpose

Although both sudden and slow-onset environmental events have always had an impact

on the movements of human populations, the last twenty years the impact of climate

change6 on migration movements has received growing public attention - from scholars,

researchers and media - at unprecedented levels and is increasingly a topic of political

interest worldwide.7 This must be perceived in the context of rising awareness and fear

regarding the possible consequences of global climate change.8 It has indeed the potential

to undermine all three pillars of ‘sustainable development’ as identified by the 2002

5 These possibilities include strengthening countries’ policy framework on the protection of environmentally

displaced persons, enhancing governments’ capacities to respond to disasters and medium-/long-term environmental change, and increasing the resilience of local communities. 6 See the Lexicon for the definition of climate change. 7 EU Commissioner MALMSTRÖM recently affirmed: “Migration is certainly a policy area of growing importance

for the EU.” C. MALMSTRÖM, “Progress in EU migration policy since 1999”, Speech of the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Tampere, 13 September 2013; However, the recent UN General Assembly note by the Secretary General on the human rights of migrants draws attention to the absence of a voice of climate-change-induced migrants: UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur, Francois Crepeau, on the human rights of migrants”, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/172, A/67/299, 2012; See also the older speech

of UN High Commissioner about the lack of attention: GUETERRES, A., “Millions Uprooted”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008, cited in UNHCR, “Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective”, 2008, 6. 8 For illustrative examples, see: S. LONERGAN, “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population

Displacement”, Environmental Change and Security Project Report No. 4, 1998, 5-15; T. HOMER-DIXON, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict”, 16(2) International Security, 1991, 76-116; T. HOMER-DIXON, “Thresholds of Turmoil: Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict” in D. DEUDNEY and R. MATTHEW (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Policies, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999.

8

Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development - environmental protection,

economic development, and social development.9 As early as 1990, the IPCC was

concerned that the most severe single impact of climate change could be ‘climigration’10,

that is, environmental, or in particular, climate induced migration.11 Since this increasingly

complex challenge requires a wide array of actions to address it appropriately,12 the EU is

active at different levels, ranging from political dialogue with its partners to ad hoc support

for climate action as well as integrating climate change into its development cooperation

and other policy areas.13

Although there has been increased debate in recent years in both academic and policy

circles concerning the impact of climate change on human migration responses14, little

attention has been focused on how existing climate change policies discuss migration,

whether it is perceived as a ‘problem’, a ‘solution’, or something in between. Questions

remain also as to the legal (normative) and political (policy) aspects of this phenomenon.

This paper has a twofold purpose. On the one hand it attempts to partly address this

research gap by first examining whether the current overall EU framework for immigration

and asylum offer adequate responses to climate change-related movement due to slow-

onset climate events.15 On the other hand, if this is not the case, we will assess the

potential of migration to remedy this problem and examine to what extent the EU’s

migration policy considers – or should consider - migration (from and in Africa16) as an

adaptation17 strategy in response of slow-onset climate change impacts. Migration as an

9World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, § 5, U.N.

Doc. A/CONF.199/20, Sept 4, 2002. See the lexicon for this notion. 10

R. BRONEN, “We must protect communities who face climate change displacement -'Climigration' requires a

new and unique institutional response based in human rights doctrine”, The Guardian, 2009. 11

In this paper, all kinds of human movements being solely or additionally caused by environmental factors (including non-voluntary movements) shall be described using the term ‘environmental migration’ or ‘environmentally induced migration’ (see the section “Working Definitions”). 12 Since 2001 there is no serious scientific dispute about the cause and consequences of anthropogenic

climate change. See: IPCC, “Climate Change 2001: the scientific basis. Contribution of working group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 13. Yet migration was only mentioned formally for the first time in the climate change negotiation texts in Cancun (2010), 18 years after the climate negotiations. 13 EU, “Supporting a climate for Change”, Brussels, 2012, 4; K. WARNER, “Climate Change, Induced

Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negociations”, UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 2011. 14R. McLEMAN and B. SMIT, ”Migration as an adaptation to climate change” , Climate Change, Vol. 76, N° 31,

2006, 23 p.; see, for example, the analyses concerning climate-induced migration of WARNER et al. (2009); PERCH-NIELSEN et al. (2008). 15 Because the tipping point between voluntary and forced migration (refugees) is in a grey area, thus, we will

have to pay attention to both categories (‘Environmentally-induced displacement’ and ‘Environmental migration’), as for the terms of migration and asylum. 16 Africa is a complex and diverse grouping, with 33 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and it is in this continent

that the adaptation challenge is perhaps greatest. In this paper we may sometimes use ‘Africa’ in the sense of ‘African Union’ (AU). See: Constitutive Act of the African Union, signed at Lomé (Togo), 11 July 2000. 17

For the notion of adaptation to climate change, see the lexicon.

9

alternative paradigm could be part of the elements of the complex legal framework

surrounding individuals vulnerable to displacement induced by climate change.18

This research is also of particular relevancy as these slower impacts do not attract the

same level of attention by policymakers and the media as sudden disasters (such as

cyclones, floods, or tidal surges), while they affect much more persons.19

Although we argue that addressing this plight is one of the most crucial governance needs,

our hypothesis is that - due to a fear of massive influx of environmental migrants - the EU

would not have a position on environmental migration, and even less so, a specific and

explicit position on environmental migration from and in Africa. Hence this gap would

reduce the possibilities for Africans to enjoy their rights and opportunities that – both

internal and international - migration could provide.

2. Methodology

Due to the nature of the research question, this multidisciplinary20 and qualitative research

will be of descriptive, explanatory (sociological approach) and evaluative (philosophical

approach) nature.

This research is accomplished by means of research through literature, which encompasses

empirical evidence and theoretical insights, sources of law (relevant primary and secondary

law provisions, case law, policy statements, and past practice) and the most relevant policy

documents on the one hand and a complementing qualitative research method21 on the

other hand. This latter was done by means of semi-structured interviews of African and

EU-policymakers, NGO-activists and scholars.

18 Many Scholars see a mix of strategies as ‘essential’ and reject a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’. See, for example,

R. BEDFORD and C. BEDFORD, “International Migration and Climate Change: A Post-Copenhagen Perspective on Options for Kiribati and Tuvalu” in B. BURSON (ed.), Climate Change and Migration: South Pacific Perspectives, Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2010, 93. 19 J. McADAM, o.c., 2012, 183. 20 We will consider aspects of juridical, political, sociological and geographical nature. 21 For the full list of interviewees, see Appendix I.

10

3. Migration and Climate Change: choosing and defining the words

Many definitions of human migration exist, each of them answering this question in a rather

different way.22 Migration, a movement of a person to a new place of residence23, is a

complexly layered process that intersects with some of the most vexing issues in

international politics today, namely, human rights, development and climate change.24

The effects of environmental change on migration are so diverse that it is hard to

encompass all scenarios under one single concept and definition. Yet, definitions are

“crucial in guiding policy-making to assign roles and responsibilities”25, because “the way

a phenomenon is conceptualized is central to the way its regulation is approached”.26

Moreover, the viability and value of institutionalizing international cooperation on

international migration matters generally, and environmental migration particularly,

depend upon how that phenomenon can and should be formulated as a discrete concept in

law and policy.27

Since for this paper it is not the purpose to look at the most suitable terminology - implying

criteria - for a new ‘Climate Refugee’ Treaty in order to protect EDPs, nor does it attempt

to define a typology, the whole detailed review in terminology can be skipped.28 Certainly,

each terminology has pros and cons with different political and analytical effects and is

fascinating to debate and study in their own right.29 Some prospective research and

proposals30 have been formulated, with different degrees of feasibility and realism.31

Actually, in human sciences and law doctrine there are almost as much working definitions

as there are lawyers, policymakers and researchers in different types of research domains.

22 See the different definitions of, for example, D. PERRUCHNOUD (ed.), “Glossary on Migration”, IOM, 2004, p.

41; Encyclopedia Britannica, cited in I.HRISTOSKI and K. SOTIROSK, “Conceptual Data Modelling of Modern Human Migration”, Management Information Systems, Vol. 7, N° 4, 2012, 3-12. 23 L. KOROVAVALA, “Migration as Adaptation”, Nansen Initiative Consultation, Cook Islands, 21-24 May 2013, 2. 24 K.R. KHORY, “Introduction”, in K.R. KHORY (ed.), Global Migration: Challenges in the 21st Century, Basingstoke:

Palgrave McMillian, 2012, 2. 25 SWD(2013)138 final, 14. 26 J. MC ADAM, o.c., 2012,186. 27 J. McDAM,, ”Environmental Migration Governance”, University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research

Series, Working Paper 1, 2009, 33 p. 28 Moreover, the debate around such treaty would be global (and not inter-regional). In addition, if the treaty

becomes the main focus, attention may shift from the more immediate, alternative, and additional responses that may enable people to remain in their homes for as long as possible (which is the predominant wish among affected communities), or to move safely within their own countries, or to migrate in a planned manner over time. Interviews with several African Delegates from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinée Conakry,Warsaw, November 2013. 29 See, inter alia, B. DOCHERTY and T. GIANNINI, "Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on

Climate Change Refugees", Harvard Environmental Law Review 33, 2009, 349-403. 30 See for example : D.C. BATES, o.c., 2002, 465-477; BOANO, C., “FMO Research Guide on Climate change and

displacement”, 2008, 48 p.; International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), “Climate refugees. Legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration”, Study commissioned by the European Parliament, Directorate General for internal policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' rights and constitutional affairs, civil liberties, justice and home affairs, Brussels, 2011, 90 p. 31 B. DOCHERTY and T. GIANNINI, o.c., 2009, 349-403.

11

Also international organisations (IO), civil society organisations (CSO) and media use the

term that is the most appropriate to their particular agenda.32

In migration theory the decision to emigrate is described as a continuum: ranging from

persons with absolute no control over their relocation (forced migration) to persons with

total control (voluntary migration).33 As RENAUD et al provide a full discussion of this

continuum, they argue that clarification of the role of environmental conditions and change

within migration decisions is essential for informed policy and programmatic response.34

An overview thereof will be discussed in the next section.

Due to the fact that the term ‘environmental refugee’35 has been challenged both in the

academic36 and political debate37, this paper uses the terms ‘environmentally induced

migration’ (EM) and ‘environmental migrants’ (EMs) on the one hand, and ‘environmentally

induced displacement’ and ‘environmentally induced displaced persons’ (EDPs) on the

other hand.38

It is important to know that this is also the official terminology used by the EU,39 and that

this terminology should not be seen as definitive.40

The impacts of climate change need to be the main reason but also the direct cause for

displacement. Thus, pure economic migrants and displacement triggered by conflicts

(which might be caused inter alia by climate change-induced environmental degradation

or disaster) will not be covered. Apart from the complex and difficult relationship of

different factors leading to armed conflicts, persons fleeing violent conflicts are already

32 V. KOLMANNSKOG, “Future floods of refugees. A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migration”,

Norwegian Refugee Council, April 2008, 10; See also in this sense: SWD (2013) final 138, 14. 33 D.C. BATES, “Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations caused by Environmental Change,

Population and Environment”, Vol. 23, N° 5, 2002, 467. 34 F.G. RENAUD et al.. “Decision Framework for Enivronmentally Induced Migration.” International Migration. Vol.

49, 2011, 5-28. 35 The concept “environmental refugees” emerged in the 1970s in parallel with environmental crises, particularly

desertification in Africa. See: C. FARBOTKO and H. LAZRUS, “The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu”,Global Environmental Change, 22 (2), 2012, 382-390. 36 See, for example, R. BLACK, "Environmental refugees: Myth or reality?", New Issues in Refugee Research,

Working paper 34, Geneva, UNHCR, 2001,19 p. 37 For instance, the EU has been convinced by influential institutions like the UNHCR and the IOM, arguing against

this term and against the amendment of the 1951 Convention may undermine the international legal protections for refugees and present a potentially misleading link between climate change and migration. See: B. GLAHN, “Climate Refugees? Addressing the International Legal Gaps”, International Law Bar News, Vol. 63, Issue 3, 2009, 18. Furthermore, some of the ‘Disappearing States’, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, have showed resistance to the ‘climate refugee’ concept. 38 See the lexicon for the working definitions of these terms. 39 Our definition (see the lexicon) is the same definition as advanced by a study commissioned by the European

Parliament (ICMPD, 2011) as well as the latest Commission Staff Working Document on the topic: SWD(2013) 138 final, 15, also referring to F. RENAUD et al., “A Decision Framework for Environmentally Induced Migration”, International Migration, Vol. 49, 2011, 5-29. Also see F.RENAUD et al., “Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?”, UNU-EHS InterSections No. 5, 2007. 40 SWD (2103) final 138, 15; ICMPD, o.c., 31. This also applies at least partially to the definition of a refugee as

defined in the Geneva Convention of 1951 as different and subtle forms of persecution exist. For a detailed discussion of the term ‘refugee’, see R. ZETTER, “More Labels, fewer Refugees: Making and Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalisation”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.20 , Issue 2, 2007, 172-192.

12

sufficiently protected under international law (i.e. international refugee law,

complementary forms of protection, temporary protection, 1998 Guiding Principles on

Internal Displacement).41

4. What does and will environmental migration look like?

The IPCC stated as early as 1990 that “the gravest effects of climate change may be

those on human migration.”42

4.1. Scale

Climate change has already a significant impact on population movements and contributes

to migration43 and displacement44, not least in Africa.45 In accordance with the estimates

of UN Environment Program, by 2060 there could be fifty million ‘environmental refugees’

in Africa alone.46 These (forced) migrations are mostly internal, at least in the initial

phase.47

Dire global evaluations already existed in the 1990s. Although precise numbers of those

likely to be displaced as a result of global warming are impossible to ascertain, the figure

ranges from 50 million48 to “billions having to move”, but is usually estimated to be around

200 million people by 2050.49 On our planet, more people are displaced annually by natural

41 UNHCR, “Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: a UNHCR perspective”, 2008, 8. 42 IPCC, “First Assessment Report 1990”, Working Group II, 20. 43 Around fifty million people or more could now be called “Environmental migrants”. But see F. GEMENNE, “Why

the Numbers don’t Add up: A review of Estimates and Predictions of People Displaced by Environmental Changes”, Global Environmental Change, N° 21, 2011, 41-49. 44 In 2012, 32.4 million people were newly displaced in 82 countries by disasters associated with natural hazards.

T. MORRIS (ed.), “Global estimates 2012. People Displaced by disasters”, Internal-Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and Norwegian refugee Council (NRC), May 2013, 6; K. WARNER and C. EHRHART, “In Search of Shelter, Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement”, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc (CARE), 2008, 4. 45 W. KÄLIN, “The Climate Change–Displacement Nexus”, Speech at ECOSOC Panel on Disaster Risk Reduction

and Preparedness: Addressing the Humanitarian Consequences of Natural Disasters 16 July, 2008; A. WILLIAMS, “Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law”, Law and Policy 30:4, 2008, 522; see also: World Bank, “Infographic: What Climate Change Means for Africa and Asia”, 2013. 46 C. BOANO, R. ZETTER and T. MORRIS, “Environmentally displaced people, Understanding the linkages between

environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration”, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, November 2008, 12. 47 F. RENAUD et al., O.c., 2007, 17. 48 N. MYERS and A. KENT, An environmental exodus. An emergent crisis in the global arena, Climate institute,

1995,3. 49 This is a widely cited number by British environmentalist Norman MYERS, which has become the accepted

figure; see, for instance N. MYERS, “Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue”, 13th Economic Forum, Prague, May 2005, 5 p.; Another frequently quoted prevision -which claims to be an update of Myer's forecast- is that of the non-governmental organisation Christian Aid, which expects 250 million climate refugees

13

disasters than by conflict.50 This is twenty times more than the number of people who are

currently protected by UNHCR.51 Every year more than three hundred thousand people die

due to the impacts of climate change.52

However, while a number of publications in the area of climate change displacement have

acknowledged that migration is likely to occur as a consequence of climate change,

predicting with any accuracy how climate change will impact on population distribution and

movement is difficult. In effect, it has become one of the most contentious issues in the

debates on environmental migration.53 This is because to date, there is neither a

scientifically-agreed methodology to determine the number of displaced people due to

climate change, nor an agreed definition for such migration.54

Also, predictions have been highly instrumental in the ever-increasing attention given to

environmental migration in the media.55

Moreover, none of these estimates of migration associated with global warming gives any

consideration to adaptation mechanisms.56

Furthermore, there has been no agreement on how environmental factors impact

migration, forced migration and displacement and how much weight should be given to it

as opposed to other drivers of migration.57 Hence, according to the vast majority, migration

linked to environmental change needs to be located in the context of the broader range of

factors that drive migration.58

out of a total of one billion environmental refugees between 2007 and 2050. See, for instance, Christian Aid, “Human Tide : The Real Migration Crisis”, May 2007, 5. 50 N. MYERS, “Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century”, Philosophical Transactions

of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences, 2002, 609. 51 F. BIERMANN and I. BOAS, “Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards a Global Governance System to

Protect Climate Refugees” in J. SCHEFFRAN, et al. (eds.), Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 2012, 293. 52 Human Impact Report of Climate Change, The Anatomy of a silent Crisis, Global Humanitarian Forum, Geneva,

2009, 11. 53 See, for instance, D. KNIVETON et al., “Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate

Flows”, International Organisation for Migration Research Series 33, 2008, 72 p. ; V. KOLMANNSKOG, "Future floods of refugees. A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migration", Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008, 43 p.; E. PIGUET, "Climate change and forced migration", New Issues in Refugee Research, research paper No. 153, Geneva, UNHCR, January 2008, 18 p. 54European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions to the Commission, Answer given by Mrs. Malström on behalf of

the Commission, 24 August 2012. 55 F. GEMENNE, “Why the Numbers don’t Add up: A review of Estimates and Predictions of People Displaced by

Environmental Changes”, Global Environmental Change, N° 21, 2011, 41-49. 56 L. HEINZERLING, “Climate change, Human health and the post-cautionary principle”, Georgetown Law Journal,

Vol. 96, N°2, 453. 57 See e.g. the outcomes of the EC-financed project of multi-country comparative research and different kinds of

human mobility worldwide. J. JÄGER, et al., Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR), Synthesis Report, 14 May 2009, 81 p. 58 FORESIGHT, Migration and Global Environmental Change, Final Project Report, London, The Government Office

for Science, 2011, 123.

14

One can thus observe a divide in the literature between two - at first sight - contrary

schools, namely the maximalistic school (or alarmist59) and the minimalistic (or the

skeptic60) school, joining this latter position.61

4.2. Causes62 and consequences of environmentally induced migration in

Africa63

This future climate change is expected, according to the Fourth IPCC report64, to severely

affect people’s livelihoods worldwide through four pathways65:

1) Longer term drying trends, such as warming and intensified droughts and

desertification66, making access to water resources more difficult, and undermining

human health, agricultural livelihoods and reduced food security;67

59 The alarmists see the environment as a principal cause of population movements, emphasize the forced nature

of the migration (using the term “refugee”), and often project that hundreds of millions of persons will be affected, often without differentiating between those who will move short distances to safer ground and those who may move thousands of miles to new countries . For a critique, see: O. BROWN, "Climate change and forced migration: observations, projections and implications", UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Occasional Paper: Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world, UNDP, Geneva, 2008, 35 p. And more recently, S. MARTIN, o.c., 2010, 5. 60 It approaches migration as a consequence of a multitude of complex factors, climate change being one of

those. Since one cannot isolate climate change as one independent cause, 'minimalistic scholars' urged caution in relation to estimating the scale and extremity of the movements. See, for instance, D. KNIVETON et al, “Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows”, International Organisation for Migration Research Series 33, 2008, 72 p.; V. KOLMANNSKOG, "Future floods of refugees. A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migration", Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008, 43 p; E. PIGUET, o.c., 2008. 61See J. MORRISSEY, Environmental Change and Forced Migration: A State of the Art Review, Oxford, Refugee

Studies Centre, 2009, 49 p. 62 An increasing number of authors have started to study the causes since the first decade of the 2000s. For

example: C. BOANO, R. ZETTER and T. MORRIS, "Environmentally displaced people. Understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration", Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, 2008, 44 p. 63 REUVENY discusses 38 cases of environmental migration events in recent years. Of these 15 occurred in Africa,

involving more than 20 million people. R. REUVENY, “Climate Change-induced Migration and Violent Conflict”, Political Geography, N° 26, 2007, 656-673. 64 IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report”, 2007. 65 See for extended explanations: E. PIGUET, “Climate change and forced migration”, New Issues in Refugee

Research, Research Paper N° 153, January 2008, 5-7. 66 See the lexicon for the definition, based on: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries

Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, art. 1(a), 1994, U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/27. 67 See, for an illustrative case-study: A. D. SIYOUM, “Food Insecurity and Environmental Migration in Drought-

Prone Areas of Ethiopia” in M. LEIGHTON, S. XIAOMENG and K. WARNER (eds.), Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction, UNU-EHS, 62-73.

15

2) Rising sea levels68 making coastal areas and deltas uninhabitable, for besides the

floods, it results in sea-water intrusion into freshwater deltas and coastal

groundwater reservoirs;69

3) Intensification of natural disasters (more intense and frequent storms, like

hurricanes, torrential rains and floods)70, that threaten the health and physical

safety of affected populations; and

4) Increased pressure and competition caused by immigrants over natural, scarce

resources71 that may lead to conflict.72 This will be even more likely especially

where other mediating factors are at play in the same region, including social

tensions, extreme poverty and weak governance.73

As mentioned earlier, a major distinction can be made between rapid-onset climate events

describing extreme weather events, slow-onset74 climate events comprising drought,

desertification and land degradation75 and sea-level rise.76

68 For every centimeter of sea-level rise, one million people have to move. An increase in sea level is irreversible

and manifests itself over a long period of time. The projected sea level rise makes populations living at an altitude of less than 1 metre directly vulnerable, see B. SAUL and J. MCADAM, “An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-Induced Displacement and International Law”, Sydney Centre for International Law, Working Paper 4, 16; S. DASGUPTA, et al., “The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4136, World Bank, 2007, 51 p.; G. McGRANAHAN, et al., "The rising tide: assessing the risks of climate change and human settlements in low elevation coastal zones”, Environment and Urbanization, 19(1), 2007, 17; Paleo Sea Level Working Group, “The sea-level Conondrum: case-studies from palaeo-archives”, Journal of Quaternery Science 25, N°1, 2010, 19-25, 7 p. (A constantly rising sea-level scenario is being challenged by this study). 69 For example, a sea level rise (from melting polar icecaps) of just one meter in the Nile Delta of Egypt may

gradually, yet inexorably, displace up to six million people and flood 4,500 square km of farmland. O. BROWN, o.c., 2008, 8. 70 The impact of hurricanes and floods in population displacement is among the easiest to identify, as they manifest themselves in a brutal and direct manner. 71 For example, food and water shortages, housing problems,I. SALEHYAN, “From climate change to conflict? No

consensus yet”, Journal of Peace research, N° 45, 2008, 315. 72

S.F. MARTIN, “ Managing environmentally induced migration”, In F. LACZKO and C. AGHAZARM (eds.),

Migration, environment and climate change: Assessing the evidence,Geneva, IOM, 353–384; N. GLEDITSCH, et al., “Climate Change and Conflict: the Migration Link”, Coping with Crisis: Working Paper Series, New York, International Peace Academy, 2007, 20 p. 73 D. KNIVETON, et al., “Migration and climate change: towards an integrated assessment of sensitivity”,

Environment and Planning, 2011; 43(2):431–450; Contra or at least strongly relativising: TERTRAIS, B., “The Climate Wars Myth”, The Washington Quarterly, 34 (3),2011, 17-29. 74

A slow-onset emergency is defined as one that does not emerge from a single, distinct event but one that

emerges gradually over time, often based on a confluence of different events. OCHA, “OCHA and Slow-onset Emergencies”, OCHA Occasional Policy Briefing Series, N°6, 2011, 3. 75 As has been extensively documented degradation is progressively increasing and not least in Africa, see: M.

LEIGHTON, “Drought, desertification and migration: past experiences, predicted impacts and human rights issues” in: E. PIGUET, A. PECOUD and P. DE GUCHTENEIRE (eds.), Migration and Climate change, UNESCO, 2011, 331-358. 76 ICMPD, o.c., 2011, 20-22.

16

The first two scenarios are probable to cause slow-onset migration, in which people search

for new homes and livelihoods in diverse directions and over a lengthy period of time as

conditions in their home communities worsen. In some cases alternative livelihoods are

not possible or impacted areas cease to fulfil its function, e.g. in the case of severe

desertification or sinking below sea-level.77 In such cases migration can be characterized

as forced movement. The largest group of EDPs are individuals affected by the gradual

environmental degradation due to climate change and the loss of biodiversity.78

The third and fourth scenarios are likely to create conditions that cause large-scale

displacement, often in emergency situations.79 While in the latter case the international

community may not have sufficient time to take precautionary measures to protect the

affected population, in the former situation, with proper planning, displacement – thus

becoming (forced) migration - can be integrated into adaptation strategies.80

Protection of human rights is imperative in both situations. However, the legal situation

that arises in relation to gradual consequences associated with climate change is much

more complex.

4.2.1. Many drivers, few options

When people or faced with severe environmental degradation, they have roughly one of

three options:

1) Stay and adapt to mitigate the effects;

2) Stay, do nothing and accept a lower quality of life; or

3) Leave the affected area.81

If no effort is made to protect the groups of people at risk, then they have no alternative

but to migrate,82 since they will not be able to gain access to alternative livelihoods within

77 K. WARNER, “Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental Change and Human

Migration”, Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration, German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 2010, 4. 78 A. WILLIAMS, “Turning the tide: Recognizing Climate Refugees in International Law”, Law & Policy, Vol. 30,

N°4, 504-506. 79 S.F. MARTIN, Environmental Change and Migration: what we know”, Migration Policy Institute Policy Brief, N°2,

Washington D.C., September 2013, 3. 80 S. ATAPATTU, “Climate Change, Human Rights and Forced Migration: Implications for International Law”, 27

Wis. International Law Journal, 2009, 614. 81 K. WARNER, M. HAMZA, A. OLIVER-SMITH, F. RENAUD, A. JULCA, “Climate Change, Environmental degradation

and migration, Nat Hazards, 55, 2009, 689-715, 690. 82P. ĎURKOVÁ, A. GROMILOVA, B. KISS, M. PLAKU, “Climate refugees in the 21st century”, Regional Academy

on the United Nations, 2012, 4.

17

a reasonable timeframe.83 In general, people prefer to stay - migration is often the last

resort,84 but at early and intermediate stages of environmental degradation, migratory

responses are often temporary in nature and serve as an adaptation strategy to

environmental change. “Eating the dry season”85 by sending a family member to the

nearest city is a widespread strategy to adapt to harsh environmental conditions. The

matrix of factors that impact upon a decision to migrate are complex and contingent,86 in

the sense that “migration becomes a learnt behaviour within a population, developing

emergent properties as a result.”87

At advanced stages of environmental degradation, when livelihoods can no longer be

sustained, communities often resort to permanent migration to less affected areas or to

urban and semi-rural centres.88

An important insight is that the basic role played by socioeconomic inequalities in driving

migration from rural to urban areas has not been properly factored in: much of this

movement is toward and not away from environmental risk and is particularly associated

with growing cities in coastal low-elevation zones, for instance in parts of Africa.89 New

arrivals to urban areas are frequently poor, ill-serviced and often do not have secure land

rights, use substandard materials for housing, and may have no choice but to build in the

most precarious locations. In the absence of affordable, decent housing, migrants may

resort to unregulated construction, as well as unsustainable and unsanitary livelihood

practices leading to serious public health risks, increased risk of violence against women,

deforestation, soil erosion and pollution.90

83 S.F. MARTIN, O.c., 2013, 4. 84 L. KOROVAVALA, “Migration as Adaptation”, Nansen Initiative Consultation, IOM, Cook Islands, 21-24 May

2013, 3. 85 “Eating the dry season” is an expression used in the Sahel to describe the temporary migration of young adults

during dry periods from their rural communities to urban centres in search for work. See: O. BROWN, “Eating the Dry Season – Labour mobility as a coping strategy for climate change”, IISD Commentary, Winnipeg, Canada, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2007; and D. RAIN, “Eaters of the Dry Season: Circular Labour Migration in the West African Sahel”, Boulder, Westview Press, 1999. 86 D. KNIVETON et al., o.c., 2008, 9. 87 R. BLACK et al., o.c., 2013, 30. 88 IOM, “Displacement and migration: examples of initiatives to support resilience and adaptation”, UN System Side Event, Geneva, 2010, 4 p.; T. AFIFI, “Economic or Environmental Migration? The Push Factors in Niger”, International Migration Vol. 49, Issue S1, June 2011, 95 -124. 89 African cities will grow rapidly the next 50 years: from 2 million in 2000 to 26-36 million by 2060. FORESIGHT,

o.c.,10; See also D. POTTS, “Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid urbanization?”, Africa Research Institute, 2012, 20 p. 90 J. JÄGER, et al., Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR), Synthesis Report,

2009, 81 p. The EC SWD (2013) 138 final refers also to this study; F. LACKZKO and C. AGHAZARM (eds.), Migration, environment and climate change: assessing the evidence, Geneva, IOM, 2009, 441 p.

18

Hence, many of those leaving rural areas are likely to settle in cities that may themselves

be under risk of significant environmental change. These challenges are not directly linked

to migration, but rather to development and urbanization.91

The EU has not yet addressed this issue, but it is mentioned in its SWD (2013) that

attention should go to how cities can be assisted in planning for increased migration in

order to meet the needs of all current and future residents. Providing infrastructures and

services (e.g. health, education…) in urban centres will become an even more challenging

issue in the future. The EC stresses in addition that effective urban planning and land use

will be crucial and addressing the social protection needs of migrants in cities will be even

more important.92 In the worst cases, relocation of affected populations either internally

or to a third country may be needed.93

The new wave of empirical research thus that environmental change acts on an already

mobile world.94 Indeed, environmental push factors are not the whole story.95 Socio-

economic, political and cultural factors are also fuelling African emigration, and heavily

influence vulnerability to both direct and indirect impacts of climate change.96

Furthermore, the nature of that relationship remains highly context-specific97 , as it

depends also on understanding “the cognitive processes of the people experiencing the

impact of climate change; the individual, household and community-attitudes to migration

and migration outcomes; and the type of climate stimulus that migration may be

responding to”.98

91 A. GEDDES and W. SOMERVILLE, “Migration and environmental change: Assessing the developing European

approach”, Brussels, Migration Policy Institute Europe, Policy Brief Series, Issue N° 2, 2. 92 SWD(2013) 138 final, 33. 93 IOM, “Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation, and Environmental Migration: A Policy Perspective”,

2010, 3. Further on will be discussed whether the EU considers relocation as an option. See the lexicon for the definition. 94

R. BLACK et al., “Migration and Climate Change: Toward an Integrated Assessment of Sensitivity” in T. FAIST

and J. SCHADE (eds.), Disentangling Migration and Climate Change, Springer Science, 2013, 29-53; C. TACOLI, “Crisis or adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a context of high mobility” , Environment and Urbanization 21(2), 513-525; R. BLACK et al., “The effect of environmental change on human migration”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 21, N°1, 2011, 3-11. 95

The assumption that climate variability leads to migration in a linear way is not any longer supported by

empirical investigation. See: D. KNIVETON et al., “Migration and climate change: towards an integrated assessment of sensitivity”, Environment and Planning, 2011, Vol. 43, N°2, 431–450. This also underlined by a recent study conducted by the ICMPD (2011) for the European Parliament; T. AFIFI, T. and K. WARNER, "The impact of environmental degradation on migration flows across countries", Working Paper 5/2008, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), Bonn, 25 p.Contra: N. MYERS, oc., 1997; F. GEMENNE, “Climate-induced Displacements in 4°C+ world”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 369 (1934), 2011, 182-195. 96 C. TACOLI, “Migration and adaptation to climate change », Sustainable Development Opinion, International

Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 2007, 1. 97

J. McADAM, J. 2012. Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law. Oxford: University Press, 312 p. 98 D. KNIVETON et al., O.c., 57.

19

To conclude, experts disagreed on concepts (who’s affected), causality, likely patterns of

movement and over who will provide protection to such a category of people should they

exist99 and sometimes even whether environmental change is responsible.100

What is sure is that the scale and the degree to which people are forced to migrate will be

determined by their vulnerability101 or resilience to these situations, or in other words, the

capability to cope or adapt to them.102

Climate change poses a major threat for African countries due to the climate sensitivity of

their economies, high exposure to climate disasters, and limited capacity to adapt.103 Africa

is often cited as the continent most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change

and therefore a priority for adaptation funding and projects.104 However, in a context of

uncertain long-term impacts, governments tend to hesitate to engage in policy action.105

Source: FORESIGHT, Migration and Global Environmental Change, London, 2011.

99 F. RENAUD et al., O.c., 2007, 14-15. 100 A. GEDDES and W. SOMERVILLE, “Migration and environmental change: Assessing the developing European

approach”, Brussels, Migration Policy Institute Europe, Policy Brief Series, Issue N° 2, 2. 101 See the lexicon for the definition of vulnerability in this context. 102 R. BLACK et al. , “The effect of environmental change on human migration”, Global Environmental Change,

21 (1), 2011, 3-11; B. MAYER, “Migration as a Sustainable Adaptation Strategy”, Presentation at the second conference of the Initiative on Climate Adaptation Research and Understanding through the Social Sciences: Climate Vulnerability and Adaptation: Marginal Peoples and Environments, Unedited Draft, Ann Arbor, 2011, 4. 103

M. BOKO et al., “Africa. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability” in M.L. PARRY et al.

(eds.), Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 433-467. Africa consists mostly of people directly involved in agriculture, fishing and herding. 104 M. BOKO et al., ‘Africa. Climate change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability’, 443. 105 C.A. VLASSOPOULOS, “Institutional Barriers to the Recognition and Assistance of Environmentally Forced

Migrants”, in T. AFIFI and J. JÄGER (eds.), Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2010, 17-27.

20

4.2.2. African-EU Migration in perspective

Long a region of emigration Europe has become a region of immigration for many migrants

around the world, especially from Africa. There is indeed a clear colonial fingerprint on

much of the trouble, dependency and hardship that modern Africa experiences, resulting

in migration and ‘refugee-flows’.106 In the nineties, the EU has been increasingly involved

in addressing what was then perceived as the so-called “migration pressure”.107 Around 30

percent of migration to Europe is attributed to Africa,108 with an unkown share of them

being probably EMs.

Despite the fact that environmental migration is often depicted as the movement of

vulnerable persons from the global South to wealthy countries in the North, it must be

understood that most EMs are likely to be internal migrants, and, amongst those who will

need or decide to cross an international border, most are likely to remain to neighbouring

countries.109 In other words, only a small share of (African) EMs will come to the EU.

The harsh reality that “many Africans now see migration as a last hope for improving their

living standards”110 should be put into perspective.

First, in many African countries, market oriented reforms have boosted the competiveness

of the national economy, but have failed to create sufficient jobs to absorb the growing

number of people in the deteriorated labour market. As a consequence, many young people

face either long-term unemployment or under-employment.111

Second, Africa’s migration is to considerable extent “a result of bad laws and policies,

unscrupulous employers and corrupt officials.”112 Although the overall democratic prospect

of Africa has improved in recent years, the social and political landscape of the continent

106 A. SIMMS, Ecological Debt. The Health of the Planet and the Health of Nations, London, Pluto Press, 2005,

145-146. 107 In its 1994 Communication, the Commission explains that: “Migration pressure relates to all actual and potential migratory movements directed towards Europe. (…) the root causes need to be addressed take a variety of forms. Economic disparities will generally represent the most significant pressure. Other pressures derive from demographic and environmental factors. In other cases the pressures relates to the human rights of political situation in the country of origin...” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM (94)23 Final, adopted on 23.02.1994, 13, pt. 47. 108 Eurostat, “The European Union and the African Union: A Statistical Portrait”, European Union, 2012, 100 p. 109 For review of literature on frequent destinations of environmental migrants, see A.M. FINDLAY, “Migrant

Destinations in an Era of Environmental Change”, Global Environmental Change 21, 2011, 50-58. Destination areas of geographical proximity often face some of the same environmental challenges as the areas of origin. 110 A. ADEPOJU, “Migration in sub-Saharan Africa”, A background paper commissioned by the Nordic Africa

Institute, 2007 , 6. 111 P. BOSCH and E. HADDAD, “Migration and Asylum: An Integral Part of the EU’s External Policies,” Forum

Natolinskie, Vol. 3, N°11, 2007, 4. 112 I. KHAN, The Unheard Truth: Poverty and Human Rights, WW Norton and Co, 2009, 74. Even though she talks

about India, this is mutatis mutandis applicable to African countries, especially to so-called ‘failed states’ and ‘fragile states’.

21

still remains highly volatile and fragile with many countries experiencing “unconsolidated

hybrid regimes” characterized by a mix of democratic and undemocratic features and

dominated by a low level equilibrium between the demand for democracy and the supply

for democracy.113 This type of regime has a greater propensity toward political instability

and military conflict114 as a result of increasing vulnerability to poverty and social

deprivation, coupled with weak state institutions that are inadequate in managing

competition over diminishing resources due to global warming.115 The conflict in Darfur,

for example, has been recognized as stemming from an ecological crisis in the region,

which, at least in part, was caused by climate change.116

Third, lower costs of migration, improved communication, greater information availability

and the need to join relatives, families and friends are among the factors which compound

with push-pull factors.117

Last but not least, the patterns of migration also depend on the level of education, the

existence of social networks118 and access to transport. Marginalized groups are more likely

affected by climate change, in particular if local institutions are unable to mediate growing

competition for resources.119 In Mali, for example, the drought contributed to a reduction

of cross-border movements because families no longer had sufficient resources to pay for

travel to other countries.120 Hence, environmental change is equally likely to prevent

migration as it is to cause migration.121 In other words, environmental changes may erode

social and human capital, physical and financial resources and thus leave people “trapped”

when migration may be the best strategy for increasing their life chances.122

113 M. BRATTON and R. MATTES, “Neither Consolidating Nor Fully Democratic: The Evolution of African Political

Regimes, 1999-2008”, Afrobarometer Briefing Paper, N°67, 2009. 114 The small democratic gains can be easily reversed by the cycle of conflict as vividly illustrated in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Mali, just to name a few. See: W. NAUDÉ, “Conflict, Disasters and No Jobs. Reasons for International Migration from Sub-Saharan Africa”, Helsinki: UNU-WIDER, 25 p. 115 German Advisory Council on Global Change, “World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk –

Summary for Policy Makers”, 2007, 1. 116 X., “A Climate of Conflict: the links between climate change, peace and war”, International Alert (website),

2007, http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/A_climate_of_conflict.pdf, 12. 117 AU Executive Council, The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, June 29, 2006, EX. CL/276 (IX), 2. 118 In a case study, COLLYER showed that even highly marginalized migrants in the EU were able to develop

transnational social organizations. M. COLLYER, “Migrants as strategic actors in the European Union's Global Approach to Migration and Mobility”, Global Networks, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2012, 50-524. 119 C. TACOLI, o.c., 2009, 5. 120 E. PIGUET, “Climate change and forced migration”, New Issues in Refugee Research, research paper No. 153,

UNHCR, Geneva, January 2008, 7, referring to T. HAMMER, “Desertification and Migration”, in J. D. UNRUH, M. S. KROL, and N. KLIOT (eds.), Environmental Change and Its Implications for Population Migration, Kluwer, Dordrecht 2004. 121 FORESIGHT, o.c., 12. 122 FORESIGHT, o.c., 9.

http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/A_climate_of_conflict.pdf

22

4.3. The case for Migration

Of thirty ways to escape danger, running away is the best. (Old Chinese Proverb)123

4.3.1. Migration has always existed as an adaptation strategy

Migration – both internal and cross-border – is one of the oldest strategies for dealing with

a degradation of environmental conditions.124 Given the historical125 links, human ties, and

geographic proximity between Africa and Europe - and against the backdrop of the push-

pull factors discussed above - Europe will remain, mutatis mutandis, and for the

foreseeable future, a natural outlet for millions of Africans, especially the youth seeking a

“better”126 future.127 This is the reality the European and African policymakers must cope

with. That it comprises both opportunities and challenges for receiving and sending

countries, is acknowledged by the EC128.

Some governments have turned their attention to planned migration options, since experts

observed that international planned migration can provide several advantages.129

4.3.2. Migration as an adaptation strategy

Migration exists along a double continuum: from forced to voluntary, and from being an

element of humanitarian responses to part of sustainable development.130 Several authors

argue indeed that migration should potentially be recognized as part of a poverty reduction

and a sustainable adaptation strategy in the context of growing environmental stress: the

123 With these words pioneer EL HINNAWI begins his 1985 monograph on the topic of environmental refugees. 124 Ironically it dates back from the migration of Homo sapiens from Africa about 100,000 years ago.

Acknowledging this evidence: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1655, “Environmentally induced migration and displacement: a 21st-century challenge”, 30 January 2009; see also Council of Europe, Recommendation 1862, 30 January 2009. 125 For a comprehensive overview of the evolving relationship between Africa and the EU, see: M. CARBONE, “EU-

Africa relations in the twenty-first century: evolution and explanations”, in M. CARBONE (ed.), The European Union in Africa: incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?, Manchester University Press, 2013, 3-21. 126 Indeed, everything is relative… 127 J. MANGALA, “Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment”, in J. MANGALA (ed.), Africa and

the European: a strategic Partnership, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 198. 128 SWD (2013) final 138, 25; COM(2013) 292 final , 4. 129 A. JULCA, “Multidimensional Re-creation of Vulnerabilities and Potential for Resilience in International

Migration”, International Migration, Vol. 49, N° 30, 2011, 34. 130 F. LACKZKO and C. AGHAZARM (eds.), o.c., 2009; C. TACOLI, “Migration and adaptation to climate change”,

Sustainable Development Opinion, Institut international pour l’environnement et le développement (IIED), 1.

23

costs and advantages of adaptation through migration should be compared with those of

other adaptation options.131

The year 2050 is a common marker for narratives on mass displacement.132 While

considerable adaptation measures (building dykes, combating desertification,…) are

feasible over such an extended timeframe, there is a “risk undermining the case for

investment and adaptation measures in vulnerable coastal regions to deal with very real

existing vulnerabilities.”133

Unlike political asylum, slow-onset environmental degradation migration can be foreseen

and planned well in advance, without waiting before it is too late when the worst has

occurred. As BIERMANN and BOAS argue, a “planned and voluntary resettlement and

reintegration of affected populations over periods of many years and decades” should be

preferred to “mere emergency response and disaster relief.”134 It can offer a relatively safe

mechanism for enabling people to move away from the dire effects of climate change

without artificially treating them as being in need of international ‘protection’ (from a

persecutory or abusive State) in a traditional sense of refugee or human rights law.

Managed migration pathways are also better suited to respond to slow-onset climate

change impacts, which are unlikely to trigger existing (or future) temporary protection

mechanisms designed for sudden disasters.135

Reduced options for migration may cut off important forms of income support, such as

remittances, and in the long run may make it unsustainable for households and

communities to remain in situ, ultimately leading to a much larger migration at a later

point, potentially in an unplanned and vulnerable way.136

Considering climate migration as a failure of adaptation reflects the idea that migration is

a wrong on its own, and, therefore, should be prevented, as shown in the policies of

hostility to migration that many Western states currently implement. The wrong is not

migration, but unmanaged migration, resulting in development of slums, human trafficking

and “fourth world.”137

131 B. MAYER, o.c., 2011, 1; See also: R. McLEMAN and B. SMIT, “Migration as an adaptation to climate change”

, Climate Change, Vol. 76, N° 31, 2006; R. BLACK et al., “Migration as Adaptation”, Nature, Vol. 478, 2011, 447-449. 132 J. McADAM, o.c., 2012, 183. 133 IOM, “Assessing the Evidence: Environment, Climate Change and Migration in Bangladesh”, 2010, 18. The

same applies for several low-lying coastal zones in Africa. 134 F. BIERMANN and I. BOAS, “Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol”, Environment,

Vol.50, Issue 8, 2008, 12. (Remarking the link with the precautionary and prevention principles of environmental law). 135 See: J. McADAM, o.c., 2012, 201-211. 136 FORESIGHT, o.c.,14. Also recognized by the EC in SWD (2013) final, 32-33. 137 B. MAYER, “Migration as a Sustainable Adaptation Strategy”, o.c., 2011, 6. See also in this sense: IOM,

“Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation, and Environmental Migration: A Policy Perspective”, 2010, 20 p.

24

Below is a matrix of four possible forms of climate migration that are discussed by MAYER,

that we allow us to reproduce here.138

Degree of political

coordination/ Expected

length

Individual Communities

Temporary Circular Migration Temporary Displacement

Definitive Individual assimilation abroad Permanent Resettlement

In sum, conceived as adaptation, migration is not forced, but voluntary; it is not reactive,

but preventive; it is not precipitated, but anticipated; it is not “inflicted” on public

authorities, but decided and organized by them or, at least, with them, with the aim of

reaching a mutually beneficial program. This may even be the only realistic strategy under

certain circumstances.139

4.3.3. Some negative consequences

As for the negative aspects, migration can among others lead to social issues (due to

integration difficulties) in the host society, disrupt family ties (often for indeterminate

periods), lead to brain drain (exacerbated when others follow) and a loss of possible

community leaders, and result in remittance dependency.140 Though, with a well thought-

out and balanced migration policy these issues can possibly be overcome.

138 B. MAYER, “Migration as a Sustainable Adaptation Strategy”, o.c., 2011 8. 139 B. MAYER, “Migration as a Sustainable Adaptation Strategy”, o.c., 2011, 6. 140 A. JULCA, “Multidimensional Re-creation of Vulnerabilities and Potential for Resilience in International

Migration”, International Migration, Vol. 49, N° 30, 34, 2011, 34; See also: O. BAKEWELL, “Which Diaspora for Whose Development? Some Critical Questions about the Role of Africa Diaspora Organizations as Development Actors”. DIIS Policy Brief, May 2009, 28 p.; J. BURGESS and S. GUTWIRTH, A threat against Europe? Security, Migration and Integration, VUB Press, IES Publication Series, 2011, 224 p.; These negative aspects were also stressed by most African officials in the interviews, thus arguing for “careful and limited planned international migration, for example for study programmes”. (Delegate of the African Group to the climate negotiations, Warsaw, November 2013). Several EU documents and joint EU-Africa partnerships address these issues, as mentioned further in deeper detail.

25

4.4. A Human rights Approach to environmental migration

Some may argue that it is important to focus squarely on climate change in the context of

human movement, otherwise missing an opportunity to leverage funding and assistance,

given its ethical141 and political142 authority.143 As we deal with a novel situation, and with

the advent of the epoch known as the 'Anthropocene' (and thus leaving the Holocene), the

Earth is no longer in the background, but very much in the foreground, in constant rivalry

with human intentionality.144 As the Earth (or ‘Gaïa’) is fighting back, on (meta-) juridical

and ethical grounds human rights and migration may not suffice and might even appear

as a far dream in a near catastrophic future.145 Some authors argue indeed for more

fundamental, ‘cosmopolitical’ legal considerations in the climate debate.146

Yet as for the current situation, we follow McADAM’s reasoning that the most effective

responses will consider climate-change related movement “within a broader human rights

matrix”.147 The most can be made of migration by ensuring that those who move are

accorded the same rights as people in the host community.148 Where migration can

significantly increase community’s capacity to adapt to climate change, studies show that

this is likely to be the case “only where there is a significant degree of autonomy and choice

in mobility decisions”.149 Notwithstanding the evidence that the complexity of climate

change-related movement necessitates a nuanced understanding, a human rights

approach offers indeed “a more sober, and ultimately justifiable, approach”.150

141

P. PENZ, “International Ethical Responsibilities to “Climate Refugees””, in J. Mc Adam (ed.), Climate Change

and Displacement : Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 2010. 142 E. NEUMAYER, “The environment: one more reason to keep immigrants out?”, Ecological economics, Vol. 59,

N°2, 2006, 204-207. 143 The European Greens insist on the fact that, even though they chose to use the term "climate refugee", one

should not ignore the underlying debate about the multi-dimensional nature of migration. THE GREENS, “Climate Change, Refugees and Migration”, position paper, May 2013, 4. 144 S. GUTWIRTH, “Bouleversement Climatique: Penser ce qui vient avec Bruno Latour”, Revue Juridique de

l’Environnement, 1/2014, 45-50 (to be published); B. LATOUR, “War and peace in an age of ecological conflicts”, Sciences Po, Paris Lecture prepared for the Peter Wall Institute Vancouver, 23rd of September 2013. 145 See, for example, Lovelock’s ‘maps of liveability’ in J. LOVELOCK, The revenge of Gaia, Cambridge, Basic

Books, 2006, 81, which provide food for thought concerning the growing population versus the shrinking liveable spaces on planet Earth... 146 Among others: S. GUTWIRTH, 2004, referring to the many books of J. LOVELOCK on the concept of Gaïa; I.

PRIGOGINE and I. STENGERS, 1986; M. SERRES, 2000.; B. LATOUR; H. JONAS, 1985. 147 J. Mc ADAM, o.c., 2012, 38. 148 A. JULCA, “Multidimensional Re-creation of Vulnerabilities and Potential for Resilience in International

Migration”, International Migration, Vol. 49, N° 30, 34, 2011, 34. 149 See, for example, J. BARNETT and M. WEBBER, “Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate

Change”, Commission on Climate Change and Development, 2009, 2. 150 J. Mc ADAM, o.c., 2012, 38.

26

Considering primarily the notion of justice to the climate change induced migrants151 and

article 13 of the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights152, the international community (and

especially the UN) and receiving states must ensure protection to people who are forced

to cross international borders. They are entitled to protection of their human dignity by

human rights guarantees,153 since forced migration itself is a violation of the right not to

be displaced.

The UN Human Rights Council confirmed that - both directly and indirectly - the effects of

climate change may undermine the enjoyment of several human rights, including: the right

to life154, right to adequate food155, the right to water156, the right to health157, and the

right to adequate housing,158 culture, and a healthy environment (to the extent the latter

two rights are recognized under international law).159

According to the EC, “respect for the rights of migrants and refugees, is a key component

of EU policies”.160

In the context of the EU’s legal obligations towards EMs and EDPs we discuss firstly the

difference between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migration, then followed by the existing legal

protection for African EDPs. Thereafter we will assess the EU’s answers to the gaps, its

migration options provided for African EMs at European level and discuss whether they are

sufficient for a humane (environmental) migration policy.161

151 See, for an analysis of the notion: D. SCHLOSBERG, “Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements

And Political Theories”, Environmental Politics, N°13, 2004, 517-540 ; More recently: P. PENZ, P., “International Ethical Responsibilities to “Climate Refugees””, in J. Mc Adam (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement : Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 2010. 152 Article 13 states : “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” 153 M. LEIGHTON, “Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues for Legal Protection of Migrants and Displaced

Persons”, Washington, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010, 3 and 5. 154 Art 6 ICCPR; Art 6 UNCRC. 155 Art 11 ICESCR; Art 14 CEDAW; Art 5 CERD. 156 Art 14 CEDAW; Art 28 CRPD; Art 24 CRC. 157 Art 12 ICESCR. 158 Art 11 ICESR. 159 At the moment, no such right exists in a universally recognized source of international law (see art 38 (1)

Statute of the International Court of Justice). The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) contains both a right to health and a right to environment. Article 16 of the Charter guarantees the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health to every individual. Article 24 declares that all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development. S. ATAPATTU, “Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive this Onslaught?”, COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y , Vol. 20, N°35, 2008, 45-53 . As for the EU, see: O.W. Pedersen, “European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming?”, Georgetown International Environmental Human Rights, Vol. 21, N° 1, 2008. 160 COM (2013) 292 final, 5. 161 Necessary to curbing irregular migration and trafficking and smuggling networks, which take advantage of

migrants’ desperation and vulnerability.

28

5. “Legal” and “illegal” migration

Since the rise of the nation state in the 19th Century, the interposition of borders entailed

a new issue of prevention of entry onto the territory of a nation state. Before that, there

were no passports162 to define migration either as “legal” or “illegal” depending on the

causes that drive people to flee.163 Although the definition of these causes changes over

time, only the migrants defined as refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention are

considered legal migrants, unless they are allowed by specific migration regulatory

schemes (mostly education and/or labour).

A substantial number of economic migrants appear to use the asylum procedure to try

entering or staying on the territory of the EU. The ‘mixed nature’ of migratory flows

contributes to placing the national asylum systems under pressure and the credibility of

the asylum procedures under strain. The 1994 EC’s Communication on immigration and

asylum policies referred for the first time to it by designating “those following a famine or

ecological disaster”.164 Today as the EC acknowledged in the same communication, most

often, these movements and environmental factors, when considered, will amount as a

cause of economic ‘illegal’ migration.

These hundreds of thousands illegal migrants165 don’t enjoy the same rights as the legal

migrants.166 As studies show how parts of the economy of the EU MS rely on migrant’s

exploitation on the black labour market, it seems arguably hypocritical to restrict migration

and call the EU a ‘front-runner in human rights’.167 Moreover, many migrants face

discrimination and xenophobia, while their contributions to the host society go largely

unrecognised.168

162 J. TORPEY, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge University Press,

2000, 93 e.s. 163 The number of illegal migrants in the EU is estimated at between 6 and 15 % of the total number of migrants.

UNDP, "Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development", Human Development Report, 2009, 1. 164 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM(94)23 Final, 15, pt. 56. 165 The nature of irregular immigration into the EU makes it a phenomenon that is difficult to quantify. However,

certain indicators provide guidance: in 2009, the number of irregularly staying non-EU nationals apprehended in the EU was about 570 000. See: European Commission, “Irregular migration”, DG Home Affairs (website), s.d. Though, the EU and Africa “commit to fight irregular migration (…)”, by several means; see: Fourth EU-Africa Summit, EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, Brussels 2-3 April 2014, 3. 166 European Migration Network, “Illegally Resident Third Country Nationals in EU Member States: state

approaches towards them, their profile and social situation”, Synthesis Report, 2007, 32 p. 167Some evolution should be remarked as for this issue at the UN- HLD on migration in October 2013 (see, for

example the IRIS-project). 168 United Nations General Assembly, "Making Migration Work", High-level Dialogue on International Migration

and Development, 68th Session of the General Assembly, 3-4 October 2013.

29

The foot-dragging of MS to implement immigration policies and the calls for stricter border

controls, which are echoing throughout Europe, to control and restrict migration flows are

not likely to decrease - at least not until a brighter economic conjuncture.169

The new EU-Africa Migration Action Plan (2014-2017) is supposed to help decrease the risk

of tragedies such as the Lampedusa tragedy in October 2013.170 Important tools for the

fight against irregular migration between Africa and Europe remain the strengthening of

borders and surveillance systems (through for example Frontex and Eurosur) and the

facilitation of return and readmission on the one hand, and addressing the ‘root causes’ of

irregular migration on the other.171

For memory, more than 25.000 migrants died on their way to the Old Continent since 2000

and more than 40.000 made the crossing last year.172 Between 300.000 and 600.000

people are waiting in North Africa to traverse the Mediterranean.173

As there are now whole groups of persons that are at risk due to environmental change

(EMs and EDPs), we will therefore analyse the extent of their (theoretical) legal status and

protection, which is an indication for the (non-) recognition of the issue.

169 This was also argued in interviews with Italian and Polish delegates at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in

Warsaw, Poland, December 2013. 170 See H. DE HAAS, “The deadly cost of tighter border controls”, De Morgen, 8 October 2013. 171 See the Fourth EU-Africa Summit, EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, Brussels 2-3 April 2014. 172 C. BONAL, “Lampedusa, Melilla, l'Evros... : ces portes de l'Europe où meurent les migrants”, Libération, 7

October 2013. See also : X, “The migrant files”, https://www.detective.io/detective/the-migrants-files/ , s.d. (winner of the Datajournalism Awards) 173 Estimation of the Italian Ministry of Home Affairs and therefore the Italian minister Alfano vows to make

Europe 'defend its border' ; See : Ansa Med, « Up to 600,000 migrants ready to cross Med », (website), 3 April 2014.

https://www.detective.io/detective/the-migrants-files/

30

6. Which legal protection174, hence recognition?

The approach commonly taken to the issue of EMs and EDPs stems principally from a

scientific and developmental perspective, and it is only lately that the rights angle has been

brought into examination.175 We start considering the EDPs, since the (more planned) form

of EM could fall - although not necessarily - into that category.

In terms of categories, a distinction needs to be made with respect to internal or external

displacement, i.e. whether the displacement involves the crossing of internationally

recognised borders.

As for external displacement, two areas of international law, which the EU stated to

advocate strongly and consistently176 - are relevant as to determine the due protection and

assistance: Refugee Law and Human Rights Law.177

The links between climate change, human rights, and displacement have also been taken

up in the UNFCCC negotiations, as part of the emerging Climate Change Law.178 Yet

remarkably, despite the strong ethical claims179, which suggest that a focus on climate

change is warranted, international environmental law presently adds little to a protection

claim.180 This explains why we will not dig deeper into the ‘environmental law principles’ in

the next section.181

174 “Protection” means protection of all rights and fundamental freedoms. 175 One of the first countries to moot the nexus of climate change displacement and human rights was the

Maldives, in September 2007 at the sixth session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The UNHRC has since then adopted three resolutions on human rights and climate change (Human Rights Council Resolutions 7/23, 10/4 and 18/22 on Human Rights and Climate Change) and two resolutions on human rights and the environment (Human Rights Council Resolutions 16/11 and 19/10). 176 European Union, EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law, OJ C327, 23

December 2005, 4. 177 Key international human rights instruments are: the ICCPR, UDHR, ICESC; additionally there are other human

rights instruments and conventions that can be applied more specifically to the protection of displaced persons, such as the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; Convention on Status of Stateless People; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the ILO Convention on the Rights of Indigenous People. 178 Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negociations”, UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy

Research Series, 2011. 179 Climate ethics is an emerging field that has much to offer, but within which much more work remains to be

done. See, for example, P. PENZ, “International Ethical Responsibilities to “Climate Refugees””, in J. McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement : Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 2010; D.G. ARNOLD, (ed.), The Ethics of Global Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2011; A. SIMMS, Ecological Debt. The Health of the Planet and the Health of Nations, London, Pluto Press, 2005. 180 McADAM explains the reasons for this conclusion by examining State responsibility for climate change under

international environmental law. In legal terms it is very difficult to establish causation for climate change. J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, 90-97. 181 Such as the ‘Precautionary Principle’ captured in Article 191(3) of the TFEU, Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio

Declaration and Article 3 (3) of the UNFCCC; and the ‘Principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR) captured in Article 3 of the UNFCCC and Article 10 (1) of its ‘Kyoto Protocol’. For further analysis, see, a.o.: A. BOYLE, “Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment”, UNEP paper revised, 2010, 39 p.

31

6.1. External displacement

Many authors have queried whether there exists a legal protection regime for EDPs,182 but

neither on international or European level183 are there currently specific or adequate legal

frameworks in place to protect EDPs in the country of stay.184

At first, an earlier background paper of the EC noted that there is an urgent need for an

agreed terminology and definition at international level, as well as to clarify the legal status

of people migrating due to climate change to ensure adequate legal protection. The EC

urged the international community to take a proactive approach, amongst others, in

asylum and migration.185 Against this backdrop, Commissioner MALMSTRÖM responsible

for Home Affairs stated that “what we certainly can do is strive for the creation of well-

functioning asylum systems in as many places as possible (…) How do we get there? Well,

we can only start from home, in my case the European Union.”186

Two years later in 2013, the Commission states that “existing legal frameworks could be

applied more effectively and build consensus at the international level on basic guiding

principles187 governing environmentally induced migration and displacement”.188 However,

this latest statement can be seriously questioned, as shows the following analysis.

182 W. KÄLIN, W. and N. SCHREPFER, “Protecting people Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change:

Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches”, Legal and Protection Policy Series, Geneva, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012, 80 p.; See also: ICMPD, o.c.,2011; C. BOANO, o.c., 2008, L.E. BACAIAN, o.c., 2011; M. AMMER, o.c., 2009; B. GLAHN, o.c., 2012. 183 ICMPD, o.c., 2011, 11. 184 R. ZETTER, “Legal and normative frameworks”, Forced Migration Review, October 2008, Issue 31, 62-63. 185 European Commission, EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, Commission Staff Working

Paper, SEC(2011) 1627 final, 4. 186

European Commission, “Higher standards of protection for refugees and asylum seekers in the EU”, Speech

of C. MALMSTRÖM at the UNHCR Ministerial Meeting, Roundtable Discussion on 'Protection Challenges and Opportunities', Geneva, 7 December 2011. 187

In that respect, besides the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, work initiated at the Nansen

Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in Norway in June 2011 is an important step forward. Participants of the conference devised 10 Principles on Climate Change and Cross-Border Displacement, primarily in the context of sudden onset events. Those principles call for strengthening prevention, resilience and disaster preparedness. 188 SWD (2013) 138 final, 21.

32

6.1.1. International Refugee Law: Nothing in the 1951 Refugee Convention of

Geneva.

EMs and EDPs are beyond the scope of the International Refugee Convention of 1951189;

hence it does not apply to them.190 When the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status

of Refugees was drafted, there was to be considered a clear distinction between refugees

and migrants. Article 1 of this Convention established the right to asylum for those in fear

of state-led persecution based on race, religion, political opinion, or ethnicity (nationality

or membership of a social group).191 It would be difficult to deem environmental

degradation as 'persecution' in the sense envisaged in the convention, leaving thus those

whose homes had become uninhabitable due to the changes and forces of nature

uncovered by the current mandate of UNHCR.192

The official definition of refugee is based on very narrow legal concern recognized under

the 1951 Geneva Convention193 that it is leaving little room for debate or expansion.194

While it is often advocated that people living in a degrading environment should have a

“right to leave” and a “right to stay”, these assumptions surely deserve more legal

academic attention195, discussing how we could guarantee these rights in a warming

world.196

189 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on 28 July 1951, entered into force on 27 April 1954, 189 UNTS 137. [hereinafter ‘Geneva Convention’]; M. MOREL and F. MAES, “The Curious Phenomenon of “Environmental Migration/Displacement” and the Role of International Law in Cross-Border Protection” in D. French (ed.), Global Justice and Sustainable Development, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010, 273-288. 190 C. COURNIL, "A la recherche d’une protection pour les «réfugiés environnementaux» : actions, obstacles,

enjeux et protections", REVUE Asylon(s), 6, 2008. 191 Article 1 (A) of the Geneva Convention. 192 Article 1 (A) of the Geneva Convention. Contra: The effort of the advocates of an ad hoc policy for the EM

amounts to persuading the political community that those migrants should also be considered as persecuted. For example, see: CONISBEE, M. and SIMMS, A., “Environmental Refugees. The Case for Recognition”, New Economics Foundation, London, 2003, 44 p.; MYERS, o.c., 1997. 193 S. McINERNEY-LANKFORD et al., Human Rights and Climate change Environmental Protection and Human

Rights Law: Basic Concepts, Washington D.C., The World Bank, 2011, 162 p. 194 L. WESTRA, Environmental Justice and the rights of ecological refugees, London, Earthscan, 2009, 11. 195 N. DE MOOR, “Returning to a destructed environment: on the right and duty to return”, Paper prepared for

the ClimMig Conference on “Human Rights, Environmental Change, Migration and Displacement”, Vienna, 20-21 September 2012, 25 p. 196 See therefore: F. GEMENNE, “Climate-induced displacements in a 4°C+ world: scenarios and policy options”,

IDDRI Science Po, Presentation at the Nansen Conference, Oslo, 6 June 2011; F. GEMENNE, “Migration, Security and Human Development in the Face of Climate Change”, IDDRI Sciences Po, Presentation for the 'Jornada Vint Anys després Rio' in Barcelona, 29 February 2012.

33

6.1.2. Protection for EDPs under the Current EU Legal Framework: International

and Complementary Forms

From the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009),197 European Union

(EU) member states (MSs) have increased the EU competence on immigration, asylum,

and external borders. The enlargement and ever-deeper integration of the EU have

gradually led to a common migration regime, created through the harmonization of

immigration and asylum policies within EU MSs. This regime can be understood as an

“entirety of formal and informal directives, regulations, practices, and conventions adopted

at the level of EU institutions that regulate the movement of persons across borders and

the entry and stay of non-EU nationals in the common territory.”198

As the EU has become an increasingly important player on the global scene, “its common

external action is constantly enlarging to new domains; immigration is one of these.” 199

To protect the refugees, the European Union relies on international instruments like the

1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol, as well as on international principles for the

protection of refugees, like the principle of non-refoulement.200 In cases of severe

environmental degradation the human rights principle of non-refoulement could protect

against return when this must be seen to involve ill-treatment above a certain threshold.201

In human rights law (which has a much broader application than refugee law), the principle

of non-refoulement is an absolute and general ban on returning people to places where

they risk certain ill-treatment.202

Legal scholars have argued that to an extent or another, available instruments providing

complementary203 forms of protection at the EU level, namely subsidiary and temporary

protection could be applicable to ‘environmentally displaced individuals’ as enshrined in the

Qualification Directive and in the Temporary Protection Directive.204

197 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European

Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 (entered into force Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter “Treaty of Lisbon or Lisbon”]. 198 S. LAVENEX and M. E. UCARER, “The Emergent EU Migration Regime and Its External Impact.” In S. LAVENEX

and M. E. UCARER (eds.) Migration and Externalities of European Integration, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2003, 3. 199 Commission of the European Communities, A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, actions and

tools, COM (2008) 359 final, 3. 200 L.E., BACAIAN,“The protection of refugees and their right to seek asylum in the European Union”, Institut

européen de l’université de Genève, Collection Euryopa, vol. 70, 2011, 7. 201 V. KOLMANNSKOG, o.c., 2008, 32. 202

V. KOLMANNSKOG, o.c., 2008, 29. 203 Complementary protection’ is the “protection granted to individuals on the basis of a legal obligation other

than the principle refugee treaty”, M. AMMER, “Climate change and Human Rights: The Status of Climate Refugees in Europe”, 2009, 56 with reference to J. McADAM, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, 2-3. 204 N. DE MOOR and A. CLIQUET, “Environmental Displacement: A New Challenge for European Migration Policy”,

Gent, Rijksuniversiteit Gent, 2009, 20 p.

34

The Return Directive205 and additional Directives addressing such issues as, for instance,

asylum procedures,206 reception conditions,207 and victims of trafficking,208 may, indeed,

have some passing relevance to EDPs, but they are not here subject to review.

6.1.2.1. The 2001 Temporary Protection Directive209

Amongst the available European legal instruments, temporary protection is the only

instrument that, in theory, could be activated in case of mass displacement following an

environmental event.210

The directive defines ‘displaced persons’ in a broader way than beneficiaries of subsidiary

protection in the Qualification. The EU Directive grants temporary protection, on the basis

of a non-exhaustive list, which has been designed in particular for (…) persons who are

“unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that

country (…)”, and “persons at serious risk of, or who have been victims of, systematic or

generalized violations of their human rights”.211 Nevertheless, the Directive leaves wide

room for manoeuvre, in the form of open definitions of key words, such as ‘mass influx’.212

The problem with this mechanism is its temporary nature (a protection within the EU for

up to three years) and would consequently prove insufficient for those that require long

term protection - which is mostly the case with the slow onset climate change impacts.

After this period they may as others without asylum or residence permit, find protection

through the non-refoulement principle, which will be discussed below. Hitherto there is not

much jurisprudence in the EU to support this claim.

205 European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 Dec. 2008 on Common Standards and

Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third Country Nationals, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98 (EC) [hereinafter “Return Directive”]. 206 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 Dec. 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for

Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2005 O.J. L 326 13 (EC). 207 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 Jan. 2003 Laying down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum

Seekers, 2003 O.J. L 31 18 (EC). 208 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 Apr. 2004 on the Residence Permit Issued to Third Country Nationals Who

Are Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings or Who Have Been the Subject of an Action to Facilitate Illegal Immigration, Who Cooperate with the Competent Authorities, 2004 O.J. (L 261) 19(EC). 209 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L 212, 7.8.2001. 210 A. KRALER et al., o.c., 2012, 1. 211 Article 2 c) of the Temporary Protection Directive. See: J. McADAM,“The European Union Qualification

Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2005, 17 (3), 461-516. 212 The term ‘mass influx’, which is the heart of the system, means ‘arrival in the Union of a large number of displaced persons, who come from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Union was spontaneous or aided, for example through an evacuation programme’ (Article 2d)

35

Furthermore, as a political mechanism of burden-sharing within the EU requiring a qualified

majority Council decision on the activation of the directive, the Temporary Protection

Directive is an inherently limited instrument. In addition, it is does not provide individual

protection, but provides collective protection to a group to be defined on a case by case

basis by the Council.213

6.1.2.2. The Qualification Directive: ‘Subsidiary Protection’

However, other available instruments, notably subsidiary protection under the 2004

Qualification Directive, which was “recast” in December of 2011214, could be expanded to

cover individuals displaced by natural disasters.215 It establishes the criteria asylum-

seekers must satisfy in order to have their status as either a “refugee” or a “person eligible

for subsidiary protection” 216 recognised. The rights enjoyed by those who hold one or the

other status, controversially, differed in substance prior to the recast.217

The Qualification Directive uses the human rights framework, in particular the ECHR, as a

yardstick.218 At this moment, neither Article 2 nor Article 3 ECHR have been applied by the

ECtHR in removal cases concerning EM, and it is clear that the ECJ will not take this step

before the ECtHR does.219

As the Directive gives only a common interpretation of the original definition of a

refugee,220 a protection mechanism for individual victims of environmental events is still

missing at EU-level. It would be necessary amending the recast Qualification Directive

through expanding the scope of subsidiary protection and, in particular, the notion of

“serious harm” as defined in the Article 15. A possible option would be, instead of an

exhaustive list of situations, to include also climate change-induced situations.221

213M. AMMER, "Climate change and Human Rights: The Status of Climate Refugees in Europe", Ludwig Boltzmann

Institute of Human Rights (BIM), Austria, 2009, 64. 214 The EU’s new “recast” Qualification Directive must transposed by MS into national law by December 21, 2013.

The U.K., Ireland and Denmark have opted out. See Directive 2011/95/EU of Dec. 13, 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third- Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted (Recast), 2011 O.J. (L 337) 95. [hereinafter Qualification Directive Recast]. 215 See ICMPD, o.c., 2011, 52-53. 216 The recast Directive eliminates the “person who otherwise needs international protection” approach and speaks

instead of “persons eligible for subsidiary protection.” (art. 1) 217 M.D. COOPER, “Migration and Disaster-Induced Displacement: European Policy, Practice and Perspective”,

CGD Working Paper 308, Washington, D.C., 2012, 27. 218 M. AMMER, "Climate change and Human Rights: The Status of Climate Refugees in Europe", Ludwig Boltzmann

Institute of Human Rights (BIM), Austria, 2009, 44. 219 N. DE MOOR, “Returning to a destructed environment: on the right and duty to return”, Paper prepared for

the ClimMig Conference on “Human Rights, Environmental Change, Migration and Displacement”, Vienna, 20-21 September 2012, 25 p. 220 F. BIERMANN and I. BOAS, 2010. ; V. KOLMANNSKOG and F. MYRSTAD, 'Environmental Displacement in

European Asylum Law', European Journal of Migration and Law 11, 2009. 221 ICMPD, o.c., 2011.

36

A wide interpretation of the Qualification Directive so as to include EDPs was clearly not

the intention of the drafters, and is currently not widely accepted. While the principle of

non-refoulement in relation to socioeconomic living conditions could, in theory, act as a

possible basis for the elaboration of a regional asylum regime for EDPs, in practice, such a

development currently still seems an unattainable ideal.222 Thus, even with the non-

refoulement principle, they may end up in a status limbo unless the states use their

discretion to grant humanitarian asylum.

6.1.3. Existing National Frameworks in the EU

For receiving countries, the main legal issue to be considered is under what circumstances

persons displaced across borders by the effects of slow-onset environmental change should

not be expected to return to their country of origin and therefore remain in need of some

form of international protection, whether temporary or permanent.223

This is also covered by the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), which requires Member States

to suspend a return decision should return not be possible and also explicitly allows Member

States to withdraw a return decision and grant a residence status.224

There are isolated (non-harmonized) cases of external displacement due to slow-onset

natural disasters being incorporated - sometimes explicitly and more often implicitly - into

national legal frameworks.225 Sweden and Finland have included EDPs within their

immigration policies. Denmark has between 2001 and 2006, on discretionary grounds,

granted humanitarian status to Afghani victims of drought famines. They would have been

placed in a vulnerable situation had they been returned.226

In the mentioned cases the decision is made on an individual basis.227

Sweden includes within its asylum system persons who do not qualify for refugee status,

but have a need for protection. Such a person in need of protection “has left his native

222 N. DE MOOR, o.c., 24. 223 See: European Migration Network, “The different national practices concerning granting of non-EU harmonised

protection statuses”, 2010, 105. 224 A. KRALER et al.,o.c., 2012. 225 Sweden, Finland and to lesser extent Cyprus and Italy, which are destined to sudden-onset disasters. See for

Cyprus: Article 29 (4) of the Refugee Law of 2000. See for Italy: Legislative Decree nr 286 on the consolidated text of provisions governing immigration and the status of the foreigner, 25 july 1998. 226

ICMPD, “Comparative study on the Existence and Application of Categorized Protection in Selected European

Countries”, ACVZ Preliminary study, N°12, 2006, 33; UNHCR, “Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States under International Law”, 2009. 227 S. MARTIN, “Climate Change and International Migration”, Background paper WMR 201, 2010, 9.

37

country and does not wish to return there because he or she: — has a fear of the death

penalty or torture is in need of protection as a result of war or other serious conflicts in the

country ― is unable to return to the native country because of an environmental

disaster.”228 Most recipients of this status are assumed to need only temporary protection.

But the Swedish rules foresee – like the similar Finnish Aliens Act229 - that some persons

may need permanent solutions.

Although these mechanisms are rather of a humanitarian nature and suited for sudden-

onset disasters, they could serve as best-practice or even offer a model for developing

similar mechanisms - with a more permanent nature - at the EU level.

6.1.4. Cross-border legal protection in Africa

6.1.4.1. The African refugee Convention

One should start with investigating whether the regional ‘African refugee convention’ (or

OAU Convention)230 is an alternative source of protection for persons falling outside the

ambit of the 1951 Convention. It contains - like the Cartagena Declaration in Latin America

- broader refugee definitions than the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The OAU Convention includes as refugees inter alia people who are displaced on account

of “events seriously disturbing the public order”. It has been queried whether this could

encompass environmental catastrophes such as famine and drought.231 Such an

interpretation is theoretically possible, even though people fleeing such catastrophes are

frequently given refuge on the territory of neighbouring States, receiving States rarely

declare that they are acting pursuant to their OAU Convention obligations.232 This is

important because the explanation a State gives for acting in a particular way is relevant

to ascertaining whether it supports or rejects a liberal interpretation of the treaty.

228 Swedish Aliens Act, 2005, 716. 229 The concept of “environmental disaster” is not defined; Finnish Aliens Act, Section 109. 230 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS, 45 (hereinafter ‘OAU Convention’). The definition is reflected in the national law of at least 6 of its Member States. 231 See for example: A. EDWARDS, “Refugee Status Determination in Africa”, African Journal of International and

Comparative Law, Vol. 14, N° 204, 2006, 225-227. 232 A. EDWARDS, “Refugee Status Determination in Africa”, African Journal of International and Comparative Law,

Vol. 14, N° 204, 2006, 227.

38

An expansion of the concept beyond its conventional meaning of public disturbances

resulting in violence is “rather unlikely” to be accepted by the States concerned.233

Consequently, the general practice of hosting people displaced by environmental events

“may be seen as contributing to the development of a right of temporary protection on

humanitarian grounds under customary international law, rather than under treaty”.234

Nevertheless, the OAU Convention would apply if refuge were sought on account of riots

in the aftermath of an environmental event, triggered by the government’s failure to

provide assistance.235

It stresses the difficulties of attributing movement to ‘climate change’: at what point does

it become too indirect to be considered a driver of movement and this matter in terms of

protection and assistance granted?

By contrast to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which assesses the risks of potential future

harm, the AOU Convention seems to require evidence of an actual threat. Thus, protection

is premised on having already been “compelled to leave” because of the threat.236 As a

consequence, its utility as instrument for providing pre-emptive protection is limited.237

6.1.4.2. Any practical support from the EU?

As will be assessed further in this paper more thoroughly in the context of environmental

migration, the EU has not yet been specifically targeting EMs or EDPs in Africa, nor

elsewhere.238 Yet the EU has been active in helping communities to find sustainable

solutions for displaced people, in particular refugees. The EC put a case for some of these

initiatives, if adequately adapted, to possibly serve as a useful model to apply to EDPs.239

One such initiative targeting refugees are the Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) that

comprise two main components: measures to enhance the protection capacity of non-EU

countries where refugees are hosted as well as support to offer durable solutions to

refugees, such as local integration, voluntary return and resettlement (including towards

233 W. KÄLIN, ., “Conceptualizing Climate-Induced Displacement” in J. McADAM, Climate Change and

Displacement, Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Oxford/Portland, 2010 , 88. 234 A. EDWARDS, o.c., 2006, 227. 235 W. KÄLIN, ., “Conceptualizing Climate-Induced Displacement” in J. McADAM, Climate Change and

Displacement, Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Oxford/Portland, 2010 , 88. 236 OAU Convention, Art. 1 (2) : “was compelled to leave…”. 237 J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, 2012, 49. 238 Interview with EC lead negotiator at COP 19; This can also be deduced from: SWD (2013) 138 final, 30. 239 SWD(2013) 138 final, 30.

39

the EU). Such an RPP has been launched, amongst other places, in the Great Lakes Region

with the aim, amongst other things, of building up the capacity of local authorities to

integrate refugees and displaced populations. Lessons learned from projects implemented

in that framework “clearly highlight the need for a comprehensive response to the needs

of long-term displaced people”.240

One of the main challenges is to find integration solutions for these populations, without

affecting the livelihoods of host communities or creating imbalances between each group’s

living conditions.241

6.1.4.3. Regional Free Movement Agreement

Existing regional agreements on the free movement of people, including for the purpose

of work, in particular those adopted through regional integration organisations such as the

Economic Community of West-African States (ECOWAS), might, if properly implemented,

also serve as frameworks for environmentally induced migration.

Although they do not target specifically EMs, they might be used by them to move

temporarily or permanently to other countries in the region. For example, evidence

suggests that the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol has increased access to protection for

refugees in West Africa by allowing the displaced to move as labour migrants to

neighbouring countries.242 However, implementation of agreed provisions is frequently

ineffective.243 Therefore, a 26 million EUR initiative to promote implementation of the

ECOWAS 1980 Free Movement Protocol was recently launched.244

6.2. Internal Displacement in Africa

Assisting and protecting internal migrants has been a difficult task for the international

community for a variety of reasons. These include inadequate resources, lack of

cooperation between different agencies, lack of clarity and consensus over the definition

of IDPs, contradictions between short-term relief aid and longer-term developmental

240 SWD(2013) 138 final, 31. 241 SWD(2013) 138 final, 30-31. 242 K. LONG., “Extending Protection? Labour Migration and Durable Solutions for Refugees”, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 176, October 2009, 33 p. 243 SWD(2013) 138 final, 20. 244 SWD(2013) 138 final, 28.

40

assistance, limited access to displaced populations and insufficient political will to engage

in internal matters of sovereign states.245 Another reason is the fact that internal migrants

remain within the jurisdiction of their own nation states and they may be eligible for

legislation and state policies pertaining to national social protection246 However, social

policy initiatives that focus on the protection of EDPs have, where implemented so far,

done little in achieving their intended goals of providing protection to them.247

The EC recalled indeed: “Where environmentally induced displacement remains internal,

states have a clear responsibility to assist migrants and address their long-term needs”.248

Thereby it echoed what is also stated in the AU Convention for the Protection and

Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the so-called “Kampala Convention”),

which will be discussed next after the so-called “Guiding Principles”.

6.2.1. The ‘Guiding Principles’, the ‘Nansen Principles’ and the ‘Revised

Framework on Durable Solutions’

Internal displacement is covered by the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal

Displacement (‘Guiding Principles’), which defines IDPs in a very broad, general and

indeterminate way and cover also those displaced “by natural or man-made disasters”.249

Principles 10-27 detail the protection that should be provided during a displacement, but

this only applies to those who have not crossed an international border.

They are recognised by the UN General Assembly as "an important international framework

for the protection of internally displaced persons."250 The IDP framework may arguably be

a better solution than traditional refugee umbrella determined by the Geneva Convention

of 1951.251 Promoting the Guiding Principles is thus discussed as one of the most promising

245 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (hereinafter “the Kampala

Convention”), African Union, Addis Ababa, 22 October 2009; UNFPA, “Meeting the Challenges of Migration: Progress since the ICPD”, 2004; See also: A. ABEBE, “The African Union on internally displaced persons: its codification, background, scope and enforcement challenges”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 29, N° 3, 2010, 29-57; A. ABEBE, “Legal and institutional dimensions of protecting and assisting internally displaced persons in Africa”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 22, 2009, 155-175. 246 SABATES-WHEELER, R. and WAITE, M., “Migration and Social Protection: A Concept Paper”, Working Paper

T2, 2003 and http://www. migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-T2.pdf 247 A. D. SIYOUM, “Food Insecurity and Environmental Migration in Drought-Prone Areas of Ethiopia” in M. LEIGHTON, S. XIAOMENG and K. WARNER (eds.), Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction, UNU-EHS, 68 248 SWD (2013) 138 final, 30. 249 The UN adopted a set of non-binding principles governing IDPs in 1998. See UNHCR, “Report of the

Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, delivered to the Economic and Social Council”, 2- 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 1998. [hereinafter the Guiding Principles]. See also the lexicon for a more detailed definition. 250 UN General Assembly, A/60/L.1, 2005, § 132. 251 A. Williams, “Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law”, Law & Policy, Vol.

30, N°4, 2008, 511.

41

options in the literature. They offer, just like the ten ‘Nansen Principles’252, a ‘bottom-up’

approach with a valuable set of legal standards for protection and have the advantage of

leaving governments wide room for manoeuvre when it comes to implementation, which

allows them to take into account various scenarios in a way that is flexible and adapted to

local circumstances.

Even if the list of persons covered by the principles is not exhaustive, it is not clear whether

those who migrate due to gradual processes of degradation can be included. However, as

‘guidelines’ they are ‘soft law’ lacking legal force and, thus, depend on the political will of

governments and other relevant actors to put them into practice.253

Despite their focus on internal displacement, it has also been suggested by the Council of

Europe that the principles could be taken as a model to develop a global guiding framework

for the protection of displaced persons crossing international borders as a result of climate

change (and natural disasters).254

The revised Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, endorsed by

the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in December 2009255, establishes that a durable

solution is achieved when migrants no longer need specific assistance and protection linked

to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting

from their displacement.256

6.2.2. The Kampala Convention

In addition to the Guiding Principles, the African Union adopted a new human right treaty

in 2009: the so-called ‘Kampala Convention’ (KC).257 This is the world’s first legally binding

252 In 2011, participants of the Nansen Conference devised 10 Principles on Climate Change and Cross-Border

Displacement. Building on the Nansen Conference, the Nansen Initiative has been launched in October 2012, a.o. with co-funding of the European Commission. It aims to build consensus on how to address potential legal and

protection gaps for people displaced across borders owing to environmental change and extreme weather events. See: C. GAHRE, “The Nansen Conference. Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century”, Norwegian refugee Council, Oslo, 2011, 20 p. 253 A. BETTS, “Soft Law and the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants”, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, Vol.

24, 2010, 533-552; FATIMA, R. et al., “Human Rights, Climate change, Environmental degradation and Migration: A new Paradigm”, IOM and MPI, Issue N°8, March 2014, 4. 254 SWD (2013) final 138, 17; See also in that’s sense: UNHCR, “Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers,

Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless persons”, Geneva, UNHCR, 2009, 2. 255 IASC, “IASC Framework on durable solutions for internally displaced persons”, The Brookings Institution,

University of Bern, 2010, 3. 256 The EC gives surprisingly and particularly much attention to it, see: SWD (2013) 138 final, 30. 257 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa [hereinafter Kampala Convention],

African Union, Addis Ababa, 22 October 2009, (which entered into force on 6 December 2012 following ratification by fifteen nations). It builds the so-called ‘Great Lakes IDP-Protocol’, which covers those displaced by disasters. Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, 30 November 2006. (The definitions of IDPs in the Guiding Principles, Great Lakes Pact of 2006 and Kampala Convention of 2009 to large extent converge.) See: B. TERMINSKI, ”Environmentally-Induced Displacement. Theoretical Frameworks and Current Challenges”, Geneva, 2012, 159 p.

42

regional instrument that imposes obligations on states to protect IDPs according to their

capacity, which indicates that regional agreements might be the way forward in providing

better protection to environmental IDPs.258

It is understood that persons who are being forced to migrate due to environmental reasons

are often discounted (as compared to persons displaced by conflict and other sudden-onset

disasters), except for some who are registered in the government resettlement

programme.259

Article 3 obliges States “to the extent possible, [to] mitigate the consequences of

displacement caused by natural disasters and natural causes” and to “establish and

designate organs of Government responsible for disaster emergency preparedness,

coordinating protection and assistance to internally displaced persons.”

States Parties are obliged to devise early warning systems in areas of potential

displacement as well as establish and implement disaster risk reduction strategies,

emergency and disaster preparedness and management measures (Article 4). Article 5,

paragraph 4 provides, inter alia, that “States Parties shall take measures to protect and

assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters,

including climate change.“ Furthermore, according to Article 12, paragraph 3, a): “State

Party shall be liable to make reparation to internally displaced persons for damage when

such a State Party refrains from protecting and assisting internally displaced persons in

the event of natural disasters.”

In order to augment State response and to guard against situations when State parties are

unable or unwilling to fulfil their obligations, the KC names other actors include the African

Union (AU), civil society organisations, and international organisations, and requires them

to work within their power to redress internal displacement.260

While the convention has great potential261, it remains to be seen how it will be

implemented and whether it will get (sufficient) European financial and technical support.

As for now, a clear protection gap exists for IDPs due to poor implementation of legal

standards and the weak status of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.262

258 M.T. MARU, "The Kampala Convention and its contribution in filling the protection gap in international law",

Journal of Internal Displacement (1), 1, 2011, 40 p. 259 A.D. SIYOUM, o.c., 63. See also: S. OJEDA, "The Kampala Convention on internally displaced persons: some

humanitarian law aspects", Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, UNHCR, 58-66. 260 X., “Domesticating and Implementing the Kampala Convention: A Dialogue for Action”, 12-13 November 2013,

5. 261 For further analysis, see: W. SCHOLTZ, “The day after no tomorrow? Persons displaced environmentally

through climate change: AU law to the rescue?”, South African Yearbook of International Law, N° 35, 2010, 20 p. 262

See for example ZETTER, 2011, o.c.,19. And for the application of the Kampala Convention, see the Ethiopian

43

6.3. What is the EU’s answer to these legal gaps?

While the EC claims there is a rich diversity of international, regional and national, sub-

national and transnational (potential) legal responses to climate change263, many scholars,

activists, and some political groups in the European Parliament264 argue that it remains far

from sufficient to respond to the need of some categories, such as EDPs.265

In our view, for EDPs due to slow-onset climate change impacts the potential for legal

protections or new interpretations of existing law is only limited. Probably some exceptional

(legal) space could be provided for specific cases, such as Small Island Developing States

or for the use of temporary protection in response to a particular natural disaster. These

cases would involve relatively small populations that are clearly identified to be at risk,

and/or to events that force decision makers to react.266

6.3.1. No institutional and political support for a new legal framework

The absence of a clear international legal framework to respond to people displaced by

climate change has resulted in calls from a variety of sectors for a new institutional

instrument to protect so-called ‘climate refugees’.267 They argue that they are no classic

socio-economic migrants, neither classic refugees: they have specific vulnerabilities and

thus specific needs that should be met by specific measures.

The EC seems to acknowledge this latter argument by stating that “it is essential to provide

assistance to the displaced and safeguard their rights (…)”,268 but replies that “further

investigation is required to determine the nature of the specific measures to develop to

case-study by A. D. SIYOUM, o.c., 63-73. 263 SWD(2013) final 138, 4 264 Clearly more the left-wing political groups, like the European Greens. For an overview of their different

attempts-since 2001- in their fight for recognition of ‘climate refugees’, see: A. SGRO, "Towards recognition of environmental refugees by the European Union ", REVUE Asylon(s), N°6, novembre 2008, Exodes écologiques; The Greens, “Climate Change, Refugees and Migration”, position paper, May 2013, 4. 265 See, inter alia, M. LEIGHTON, o.c., 2010. CONTRA: Mc ADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and

International Law, 2012, 187. 266 In that sense, see: A. GEDDES and W. SOMERVILLE, O.c., 2013, 4. 267

At the global level, five main policy options have been proposed: (1) an extension of the scope of the Geneva

Convention, (2) promoting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (3) using temporary protection mechanisms for persons displaced by environmental events, (4) the creation of a new legal framework and (5) the addition of a protocol on climate-induced migration to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. FALSTRÖM believes there is “sufficient evidence of support within existing international treaty law and customary international law to provide the necessary sense of state obligation for a new treaty to succeed.” D. Z. FALSTRÖM, “Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law, 2002, 9 and 11-14. 268 SWD (2013) final 138, 30.

44

address environmentally induced migration compared to other forms of forced

migration.”269

One might argue that changes to the legal framework for refugee recognition have become

urgent and unavoidable because of the growing significance of climate change-related

migration. In order to address these gaps advocacy groups270 are seeking expansion of the

term ‘refugee’. However, there is controversy whether this is the best way to offer

protection to those displaced by environmental degradation. Moreover, there remains little

agreement on who should qualify as an “environmental refugee”, for the problem remains

as to how environmental reasons can be theoretically or practically separated from other

motives for migration271. This is notably in the context of such a distinction leading to

significant claims by affected people to stay in, and receive protection from another

state.272

Yet the EC is very cautious in its arguments, questioning whether a new specific legal

framework is both necessary and feasible, since persons moving in the context of

environmental change can (potentially) be adequately assisted and protected under

existing frameworks. Furthermore, institutional and political barriers would militate against

such protections ever being adopted.

First, to consider institutional barriers there is scarce support among migration actors

embedded in the governance structure for a new legal status. The institutions responsible

for refugee protection have been opposed to any mention of ‘climate refugees’273 and has

not been seriously considered or proposed by international agencies working on

migration.274

Second, the wider political consensus which would be necessary to establish international

rules remains lacking, including at regional levels.275

Migration is indeed provoking passionate debates over national identity, state sovereignty

269 SWD (2013) final 138, 14. 270 This claim is supported, inter alia, by the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human

Security, Christian Aid, the New Economics Foundation, the Dutch-based organization LiSER (Living Space for

Environmental Refugees) and Greenpeace. 271

S. LONERGAN and A. SWAIN, “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement”,

Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 4, 1998, 5-15; F. FLINTAN, “Environmental refugees – A misnomer or a reality?”, Report of the Wilton Park Conference on Environmental Security and Conflict Prevention, 1-3 March 2001. 272 D. KNIVETON et al., o.c., 2008, 30. 273 For example, the UNHCR, at an international level. 274 For instance, the IOM and the Global Migration Group, which includes 14 agencies, but none of these are

supportive of new protections and does not seriously discuss ‘environmental migration’. 275 J. McADAM, o.c., 2012, 200.

45

and territorial integrity.276 Also within the EU most political groups fear a lack of public

opinion support, as it is clear that negative media coverage of immigrants and immigration

policy is a powerful force in shaping the immigration debate. 277 Except for green (in favour)

and far-right (against) parties, the subject seems to be a non-issue among political

parties.278

The EC puts the explanation in a safer way by arguing that it is mainly due to the

complexities of the topic and its comparative novelty as a subject of international policy

dialogue between states.279

Another reason, arguably more realistic but not mentioned by the EU, is that there seems

to be little appetite for notions like an international convention to protect ‘climate refugees’,

as these require commitments and may imply liability.280 A Green MEP, Jean Lambert,

summarized in 2002 the reason for the absence of international protection by the fact and

fear that “by recognising the problem you start on the road to accepting responsibility and

implementing solutions”.281 Assumed that the adoption of such protections would have

consequent legal and financial ramifications for European governments, Member States

would most likely oppose them, preventing action.

If there would be political will to act on the issue of “climigration”, institutional responses–

including international as well as domestic law – and resources will eventually follow.282

6.3.2. “No reason for a lack of action”

Answering Parliamentary questions concerning how the EC would fill the legal gap

concerning the protection of ‘climate refugees’, the EC thus supports the position that

276 K.R. KHORY, “Introduction”, in K.R. KHORY (ed.), Global Migration: Challenges in the 21st Century,

Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillian, 2012, 1. 277

Notably how the public perceive immigrants from their effects on the job market, to their impact on culture

and society, to their prospects for integration. Also issues such as globalization, economic crisis and demographic change affect the immigration debate. See: Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute (eds.), Migration, Public Opinion and Politics, The Transatlantic Council on Migration, 2009, 392 p. 278 A. GEDDES and W. SOMERVILLE, O.c., 2013, 4. 279 SWD (2013) 138 final, 20-21. 280 FORESIGHT, o.c., 28. 281 J. LAMBERT, “Refugees and the Environment: the forgotten element of sustainability”, The Greens/European

Free Aliance, 2002, 4. 282 S. BAUER, “Climate Refugees beyond Copenhagen. Legal concept, political implications, normative

considerations”, Brot für die Welt, Stuttgart, 2010, 18.

46

refugee law should not be interpreted in such way as to cover also EMs. Still, “the lack of

a ‘refugee’ qualification is by no means a reason for lack of action.”283

Furtermore, the EC stated in the same document that the fact that the environmentally

induced displacement (…) “will inevitably continue must be recognised. Measures will

therefore be required to assist the displaced, (…) and to find durable solutions”.284

The Mobility Partnerships (MPs) would be, in principle, a relevant instrument to bilaterally

cooperate on all sorts of measures regarding EDPs.285 Under the MP framework the EU can

provide assistance in strengthening the domestic capacities of the third countries in dealing

with the IDPs related to the climate change circumstances, while keeping the cooperation

in assuring stability, good governance and respect for human rights democracy and in the

concerned countries.286 Additionally, in relation to countries which are most likely to be

affected by environmental degradation and disasters, the EU might go further and include

EM from the partner countries to the EU in the discussion within the MP framework.287

The MPs will be further discussed in the realm of the question of migration as an adaptation

strategy, where the EU-Africa partnerships and strategies are addressed.

283 European Parliament, Parliamentary questions, Answer given by Mr Dimas on behalf of the Commission, 4

February 2009. 284 SWD (2013) final 138, 25. This is also confirmed in an interview with Jacob Werksman, Principal adviser of

DG-CLIMA and one of the four lead negotiators for the EU at the UN Climate negotiations, Brussels, 11 December 2013. 285 A. KRALER et al., “Climate Change & Migration: What is the Role for Migration Policies?”, ICMPD, Policy Brief,

2012, 7. 286 COM(2011) 248 final, o.c.,17. 287 International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), “”Climate Refugees” Legal and policy

responses to environmentally induced migration”, Study commissioned by the European Parliament, Directorate General for internal policies, Policy Department C: Citizens' rights and constitutional affairs, civil liberties, justice and home affairs, Brussels, 2011, 68.

47

6.3.3. Primary Law: A promising basis of Objectives

A combined reading of the articles 2, 3(5) and 21(1) and (2)288 of the TEU289 reveals an

explicit evolution in common values and objectives, calling for a level of adaptability in the

scope of the EU’s legal and political actions, especially in areas of transversal interests such

as climate change and human rights. They serve as a legal basis for the Union’s external

action, as well as Articles 6 and 7 of the TEU, as a lex generalis for the Union’s competence

in matters of human rights. They mark the adaptability of legal sources to this new legal

and political environment, leaving an open window for perspectives of further

developments.290

Since a new legal status does not seem politically feasible (neither on international and

regional level)291–and even if there would be one it would only solve partially the problem,

because most people affected by climate change stay within their borders, it seems

necessary to recognise that migration could be a form of adaptation.

Academics, as discussed above, argue that States will ultimately need to develop

coordinated responses that acknowledge the need for cross-border movement in certain

circumstances. Protection gaps are especially apparent for persons displaced across

borders and in cases of slow-onset climate events.292 An additional major reason for

existing pressures on the EU asylum system that avenues for ‘regular’ economic or other

independent migration are very restricted for people from African countries (and

developing countries in general).293

As a matter of fact, illegal migration can only be stopped if a legal and safe alternative is

proposed. States will thus need to regularize the status of those who move, either through

humanitarian or migration schemes.294 Against this backdrop, next section assesses

whether the EU starts addressing measures to promote and facilitate migration as a

strategy to promote adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR).

288 Article 21(2) is explicit in this sense: “The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and

shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (…) (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; (…) (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters (…)”. 289 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]. 290 European Union (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change: EU Policy Options, Study of the European

Parliament, DG for External Policies, 2012, 40. 291 SWD (2013) 138 final, 20-21. 292 ICMPD, o.c.,2011, 10. 293 W. KÄLIN and N. SCHREPFER, o.c., 2012, 58. 294 J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, 2012, 189.

48

7. Migration as an adaptation strategy?

We’ve just discussed the responses to climate change-related movement as a protection

issue, which mostly focuses on the human right deprivations. The assumption is that

movement is forced and should be treated like as refugee-like in nature, with binding

protection obligations for States with respect to those displaced - hence calls for a new

treaty.

As a migration issue, movement is often categorized as voluntary, and therefore as not

compelling the ‘international community’ to respond. For example, the lack of employment

opportunities in the country of origin might be cast as the motivating factor of the

movement. The assumption here is that the (EU member) states can respond as and when

they see fit through domestic immigration policy.295

A recent EC Staff Working Document (SWD)296, as well as EC officials, underline that the

EU is gradually moving from providing support to research on conceptualizing the links

between environmental change and migration to identifying internal policies and strategies

for addressing the effects of environmental change on migration.297

A previous EU- supported study argues that planned resettlement as either a post- or pre-

displacement option, as well as strengthening the resilience capacities of affected

populations, should be considered as “additional options” (to the protection options).

Furthermore, the study proposes bilateral migration agreements, including possible

seasonal migration plans, which may be useful tools to promote migration as an adaption

strategy to longer term environmental change, particularly on a regional level.298

The bilateral agreement concluded between Colombia and Spain, which does not address

the cause of displacement, provides for quotas that can be particularly useful for circular

295 Interview with EC lead negotiator to COP 19; See also: J. Mc ADAM, o.c., 2012, 212. 296 SWD (2013) 138 final. This initiative builds upon the White Paper "Adapting to climate change: Towards a

European framework for action" (COM (2009) 147 final) adopted on 1st April 2009. The White Paper announced the development of a comprehensive EU adaptation strategy by 2013. The legal base of the Communication (non-legislative act), that the EC SWD is accompanying is the Treaty on Functioning of the EU: Article 192 (1) of the TFUE. The lead service is CLIMA (Climate Action), while migration is typically a policy area for the DG HOME. See: EC, “Actions adopted by the Commission”, (website), 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/execution_report_2013.pdf 297 Interview with EC lead negotiator to COP 19 and with an EC’s International Cooperation Officer, Directorate-

General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid Unit B3 – Migration and Asylum Sector, 2013; See: SWD (2013) 138 final. 298 A. KRALER et al., o.c., 2012, 2.

http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/execution_report_2013.pdf

49

migration.299 This could also be a pragmatic and immediate solution when risks are

known.300

Responding to the challenges and opportunities posed by migration in the context of

environmental degradation and climate change, the EC (through a SWD) has continued

and confirmed this progressive stance by arguing that “migration has the potential to

contribute to adaptation in a number of ways. This potential should be fully exploited,

including through measures to promote well-managed legal mobility, and support migrants

in strengthening the resilience of their communities of origin.”301

This stands remarkably in sharp contrast with the European policy response to these

challenges a decade ago, if there was one at all. It was defensive and broadly aimed at

reinforcing efforts to reduce immigration to Europe and to strengthen security actors to

prevent conflict that could result from such movement.302 Thus, we would be tempted to

(too hastily) state that the new rhetoric – of DG CLIMA and DG-DEVCO - doesn’t coincide

any longer with the oft-heard idea that climate migration is intrinsically an undesirable

phenomenon and that public authorities should strive to avoid it through adaptation.303

This would be to forget the different ‘lenses’ and priorities of the different policy sectors

within the EU that are dealing with this cross-cutting issue.304

It should in this respect be remarked that, in addition to anti-immigration groups and

former High representative Solana stressing that climate change is a “threat multiplier”305,

it is now Mrs. Ashton and other security and foreign policy actors that deliberately conflate

climate-induced migration with security. They raise fears about “mass migration” fleeing

299 N. DE MOOR, “Temporary Labour Migration for Victims of Natural Disasters: The Colombia-Spain Model”, in M. LEIGHTON, S. XIAOMENG and K. WARNER (eds.), Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction, UNU-EHS, 93. 300 Like the Pacific Access Category (PAC) between Tuvalu and New Zealand. 301 SWD (2013) final 138, 25. This promotion (funding and assisting) of regional migration programmes is what

several African interviewees at the COP 19 and authors propose to preserve the environmental migrant’s dignity, see: B. MAYER, o.c., 13. 302 Solana stated: “Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure” in the coming decades,

highlighting the need for European policies to address the issue. High Representative Javier Solana and European Commission, Climate Change and International Security, S 113/08, Brussels, European Commission, 2008, 8. For an analysis of EU’s external policy with Africa (through PMME within the JAES ) and how development cooperation was rather considered by the EU as a means to better control migration and to lessen migration pressure in host European countries migration, see: S. LAVENEX and R. KUNZ, “The Migraton-Development Nexus in EU-External relations”, European Integration, Vol. 30, N°3, 2008, 442-443 and 445. 303 It should be noted that adaptation is now considered as a means to reduce ‘displacement’ (not migration).

See: SWD (2013) 138 final, 21-23. 304 The issue of policy incoherence is discussed further in this paper. 305 High Representative Javier Solana and the European Commission, o.c. 8.

50

from impoverished, drought-ridden regions of North Africa into Europe,306 is considered as

“one of the new threats that have emerged”. 307

Yet, as we will note when addressing the joint EU-Africa strategies, treating climate change

as a security issue for advanced industrialized countries does not advance the effort to find

adaptive solutions. Instead, as WHITE concludes, it reinforces dynamics within the

international system that contribute to the system itself.308

In contrast with the previously discussed protection claim, international environmental law

- more specifically Climate Change Law - is a relatively significant ground to start discussing

the EU’s environmental migration policy considering migration as an adaptation strategy.

7.1. Climate Change Law as a catalyser

The introduction of climate change concerns into the external dimension of migration

policies appears to be closely linked to the way the international debate has evolved.

Overall, developing countries have contributed only 24 percent - Africa only 3 percent - to

historical emissions. Recognising the importance of historical GHGs, there is a global

commitment under the UNFCCC that developed countries should take the lead in combating

climate change and related crises.309 The EC stressed the fundamental CBDR-principle310

again, which is closely related to the concept of ‘ecological justice’ from a historical and

scientific perspective, and stressed that it will therefore “need to support adaptation actions

in developing countries.”311 Without such support, according to the Stern report, there is

“a serious risk that development progress will be undermined.”312

306 In fact, much of African international migration is intra-regional; See A. ADEPOJU, “Migration in sub-Saharan

Africa”, A background paper commissioned by the Nordic Africa Institute, 2007, 17. 307 European Union, “Opening address by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the symposium on the

Common Security and Defence Policy”, Washington DC, 8 May 2013, 2 and http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137065.pdf 308 G. WHITE, “The “Securization” of Climate-Induced Migration” in K. R., KHORY (ed.), Global Migration.in the

Twenty-first Century, 40. 309 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC and paragraph 1(b)(i) of the Bali Action Plan. 310 Negotiation and implementation of such a principle of burden sharing will, however, become increasingly

complicated once projections of future emissions are included. 311 EC, “Adapting to Climate Change in Europe-Options for EU action”, Green Paper from the Commission to the

Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels , SEC (2007) 849, 22. 312 Indeed, as the Stern Report points out, “Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around

the world – access to water, food production, health, and use of land and the environment”. STERN, N., The economics of climate change: The Stern Review, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 6. And, according to the 2013 UN Human Development Report, climate change and other environmental disasters could put an additional 3.1 billion people into extreme poverty by 2050 if no significant steps are taken.

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137065.pdf

51

As a signatory to the UNFCCC, the EU currently recognises explicitly Africa’s ‘higher

impacts’ and ‘higher vulnerability’313 and contributes with various EU-level initiatives314,

mostly to firstly mitigate and secondly to adapt to climate change and thus prevent a “flow

of climate refugees”.315 If well done, ‘adaptation’ could help direct international money and

attention to reducing vulnerability not just to climate change but also to environmental

degradation, poverty and conflict.316 Promoting adaptation and disaster risk reduction

(DRR)317 to reduce the need for migration are, for the EC, some of the tools necessary to

meet the challenges.318

The issue of migration and displacement is one of many in discussions on adaptation, and

adaptation is only one of an array of complex issues dealt within the global climate

negotiations.319 Migration is, at some level, one of the potential policy approaches

emanating from Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Adaptation Framework under the UNFCCC

(2010), which was the first-time ever inclusion of human mobility on an internationally

agreed climate adaptation decision.320 This provision invites all Parties to “enhance action

on adaptation…taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and

respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives

and circumstances, by undertaking, inter alia”: (…)

(f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to

climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation”.321

An implication of paragraph 14(f) is that it requires wider conversations about current in

situ resilience and how mobility fits into adaptive transformations and resilience.322

313 UNDP, “Chapter Four - Adapting to the Inevitable: National Action and International Cooperation” in Human

Development Report 2007/2008 – Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world, November 2007, 19. 314 EC, “Adapting to Climate Change in Europe-Options for EU action”, Green Paper from the Commission to the

Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels , SEC (2007) 849, 22. 315 B. HEINE and L. PETERSEN, “Adaptation et co-operation”, Les changements climatiques et les déplacements,

RFM31, 48. 316 O. BROWN, A. HAMMILL and R. MCLEMAN, “Climate change as the ‘new’ security threat: implications for

Africa”, International Affairs, Volume 83, Issue 6, November 2007, 1141–1154. 317 See European Commission, The EU approach to Resilience: learning from Food Security Crises, Communication

from the European Commission to the European Parliament, COM (2012) 586 final. (reaffirming the role of DRR as a driver of resilience and sustainable development.) 318 SWD (2013) final 138, 34. 319 See: J. VERSCHUUREN, “Legal aspects of Climate change adaptation” in HOLLO, E.J., KULOVESI, K. and

MEHLING, M. (eds.) Climate Change and the Law, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013, 257-285. 320 K. WARNER, “Environmental Change and Migration: Issues for European governance and migration

management », Network Migration in Europe E.V., 2011, 6. 321

The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action

under the Convention, 1/CP.16, chapter on 'Enhanced action on adaptation', paragraph 14 (f). 322 K. WARNER , “Migration and Global Environmental Change.PD23: Migration and displacement in the context

of adaptation to climate change: developments in the UNFCCC climate negotiations and potential for future Action”, Foresight, London, UK Government for Science, 2011, 26 and see the figures p.23.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/inta.2007.83.issue-6/issuetoc


52

WARNER describes this as a process that framed migration as a technical (rather than

political) and legitimate part of a wider adaptation framework.323

Although the Cancun Adaptation Framework is not legally binding, it has operational

significance and the UNFCCC will have a catalytic role on these issues.324 Some

governments are, for example, responding favourably to the idea of funding further work

on ‘migration as adaptation’, as their contribution to this issue.325

By adapting to international evolutions, the JHA referred in 2011 to a similar statement as

one year earlier at COP 16 in Cancun, included in the Global Approach to Migration and

Mobility (“GAMM”): “The Stockholm Programme326 recognised Climate change as a global

challenge that is increasingly driving migration and displacement and invited the

Commission to present analysis of this phenomenon [...] Addressing environmentally

induced migration, also by means of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change,

should be considered part of the Global Approach”. 327

Under the GAMM and the Agenda for Change328, the EC will “promote migration governance

and effective policy coherence at all levels, to harness the potential of migration and

mobility as development enablers”.329 Making migration part of an integrated,

development-orientated response is a valid and important element of policy solutions.330

This is in full accordance with the literature discussed above.

323 K. WARNER, “Migration and Global Environmental Change”, o.c., 8-13. 324 McADAM, o.c., 230. 325 Mc ADAM, o.c., 232. 326 European Council, Stockholm Programme, Council Document 17024/09, 1-2 December 2009; European Commission, Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final of 20 April 2010. 327 The EU Global Approach to Migration is the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy. Political impetus

is required to enhance GAMM effectiveness and impact and to ensure progress in dialogues on migration, mobility and security and negotiations of mobility partnerships; European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM (2011) 743 fnal, Brussels, 6-7. (DG HOME, as the ‘leader’ of EU’s external migration policy, is the main author of the GAMM document, which was created in close collabouration with the DG DEVCO.) 328 The Agenda for Change is the overall EU development policy framework, which includes some specific priorities

on migration, see: European Commission, Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 637 final, 11 e.s. 329 COM(2013) 292 final, 6 and 13. The Commission explains briefly with three bullet points how it will proceed

in particular to achieve this. 330 Interviews with EC officials, Brussels, 2013; See also: A. GEDDES and W. SOMERVILLE, o.c., 2013.

53

In addition, the decision on loss and damage to the adverse impacts of climate change at

COP 18 in Doha also acknowledges this issue331 and this working programme could include

forced migration as ‘non-economic losses’.332

In November 2013, the ‘Warsaw international mechanism’333 was agreed to build further

on these previous stepping-stones even though it did not mention explicitly ‘migration’ as

such in the text. However, the question of which countries will be responsible for the

financial support, and how payments will take place, has the potential to raise some thorny

questions in the years to come, but, even so, the mechanism is an important commitment

to dealing with the current consequences of climate change, on the ground.

According to one of the EU’s lead negotiators, the EU was “quite open to mention migration

specifically in the climate negations, but because the other developed countries were very

reluctant to undertake something it didn’t get so far.” Negotiators talked “more about

compensation than migration.”334

In sum, there seem to be two main gateways to bring migration as adaptation in the

climate change negotiations, namely the ‘loss and damage framework’ in cases of forced

migration and the ‘adaptation framework’ in cases of more voluntary forms of migration.

Although international considerations of the interconnections between climate change

adaptation and migration are “still in its infancy”335, the EU seems –at least rhetorically- to

track and to adapt to these evolutions in the international climate migration debate closely.

7.2. The African policy advocacy

Some of the most affected African governments are keen to secure international

agreements in which other (developed countries) recognise that climate change has

contributed to their predicament. For them, developed countries should acknowledge

331 UNFCCC, Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing

countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity, Draft decision, COP 18, Doha, 2012, 3. 332 At COP 19 in Warsaw in November 2013, human mobility as non-economic loss has been discussed in one of

the technical papers, but it was not been further crystalized in a concrete text. 333

UNFCCC, Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts,

Decision of COP 19, Warsaw, November 2013. 334 Interview with EC official, Principal advisor of DG-CLIMA, one of the four EU lead negotiators at COP 19,

Brussels, December 2013. 335

S.F. MARTIN, “Environmental Change and Migration: what we know”, Migration Policy Institute Policy Brief,

N°2, Washington D.C., 2.

54

migration (in some cases) and relocation as part of their obligations to assist in a

compensatory way.336

Others fear that if they do so, the EU (and industrialised States in general) may simply

believe that they can ‘solve’ problems like desertification and rising sea-levels by relocating

affected populations, instead of investing in local (material) adaptation measures, or by

tackling the root cause, namely by reducing carbon emissions.337

While many African civil society organisations use the ‘blame game’ for their demands for

admissions of liability or compensation338, most African officials would like to see an

overarching framework. It would 1) acknowledge the reality of climate change-related

movement; 2) Commit to funding adaptation to enable in situ responses for as long as this

is feasible339; and 3) commit in principle to facilitating movement through migration

programmes, and responding to spontaneous movement where inevitable.340

To put in a general way, planned movement may be an adaptation strategy in some cases.

However, the affected governments and their people would be better off, if solutions with

the EU (and other developed countries) were found that involve a combination of in situ

adaptation and migration.

As we argued above, these policies should be considered within a human rights framework,

because adaptation cannot happen at all costs. It should “at least be adaptation with

dignity”.341

Taking a more open approach to vulnerability reduction –by including migration- is deemed

urgent in the South both to build development and to improve adaptive capacity before

the worst occur.342

336 Interviews with Samson Samuel Ogallah Representative of Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance Network

(PACJAN) (Civil Society) and Officials from Senegal, Mali, Chad in Warsaw, November 2013. 337 Interview with Official from Burkina Faso and Tunisia in Warsaw, November 2013. 338 For instance, PACJAN calls for social and ecological justice referring to the « ecological debt » of developed

countries. In the Cancun Adaptation Framework, more specifically in the « Loss and Damage » working programme, they insist that migration should be compensated and considered as a non-economic loss. They argue that planned migration now needs to be a part of this debate. In this sense, hospitality to affected countries from the industrial countries responsible for climate change must be seen as either a mode of adaptation or a form of compensation for profound losses and damages caused by climate change. 339 T. VAN CRIEKINGE, “The EU-Africa migration Partnership : the limits of the EU’s external dimension of

migration in Africa”, in M. CARBONE, O.c., 261-262. 340 Interviews with 6 delegations of African countries and Representatives of the African Group at the COP 19 in

Warsaw, November 2013. Also the PACJAN uses the ‘blame game’ to pressure the developed countries. 341 Interview with Mr. Ogallah, Representative of PACJAN, Warsaw, 12 November 2013. The notion of “human

dignity” has been interpreted and used in different ways. We consider it as the satisfaction of all the fundamental needs of human beings, like stressed in the African Charter (1981), the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), and the Draft Declaration on Principles for Human Rights and the Environment (1994). 342 J. AYERS et al., “Assessing EU assistance for Adaptation to Climate Change in Developing Countries: A

Southern Perspective”, in S. OBERTHÜR and M. PALLEMAERTS (eds.) The New Climate Policies of the EU, Brussels, VUB Press, 2010, 242.

55

8. The EU’s ‘environmental migration policy’: an adequate response?

8.1. A ‘balanced and comprehensive approach’

Addressing the root causes to migration with a view to promoting co-development has

already since 1999 been recognised by the EC as the most relevant preventive approach

within the external dimension of EU’s migration and asylum policy,343 what is called the

‘balanced and comprehensive approach’ to migration344.

The comprehensive approach’s345 conceptual centre of gravity is not to retain the

movement of people (security or remote control approach), but to construct an alternative

through political innovation. Its rationale is that we must seek to influence - while also

reducing - the push factors motivating people to leave their home countries. It has a

preventive dimension since it is more centred on the causes than on the effects of migrant’s

exit option.346

While the underlying logics behind each approach seem rather different, they are both

perceived, at the EU level, as efficient means to fight against illegal immigration.347

However, these two sides of the same coin were not always given equivalent importance

in the EU migration policy. As BOSWELL argues it is until the late 1990s that “cooperation

with third countries on JHA issues largely took the form of providing support to future EU

members to reinforce border control, develop asylum systems and combat illegal

migration.”348

The EU’s position of privilege in Africa is probably due to the fact that the EU has cooperated

in a large number of fields – as a result of its ‘comprehensive approach’ -, thereby going

343 European Union (ed.), Human Rights and climate change: EU policy options, Brussels, 2012, 62. 344 This started with the 1999 Tampere European Council, which highlighted the need for the EU to develop a

comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries of origin and transit. This requires combatting poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights (…), EU Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Tampere, October 15-16, 1999; Art. 13 of the 2000 Cotonou Agreement with ACP countries offers a good illustration of EU’s security agenda in dealing with migration flows from third countries. 345 The EU’s position of privilege in Africa is probably due to its ‘comprehensive approach’, which goes beyond the

pursuit of only material interests and engagement with a selected number of countries. See: F. SÖDERBAUM, “The European Union as an actor in Africa: internal coherence and external legitimacy”, O.c., 2013, 25-43. 346 G. AUBARELL, R. ZAPATA-BARRERO and X. ARAGALL, “New Directions of National Immigration Policies: The

Development of the External Dimension and its Relationship with the Euro-Mediterranean Process”, Euro Mesco Paper, N° 79, 2009, 14. 347 C. BOSWELL, “The 'External Dimension' of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy”, International Affairs, Vol. 79,

No. 3, 2003, 624. The 2006 Communication from the Commission underlines that cooperation with third countries (in order to address the push factors for illegal immigration and the securing of borders are both priority policies (together with other concerns such as the fight against human traficking, illegal employment and return policy.) Communication from the Commission on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals, COM(2006) 402 final. 348 C. BOSWELL, o.c., 627.

56

beyond the pursuit of only material interests and engagement with a selected number of

countries.

For many observers, the current conceptual shift toward a more balanced approach to

migration and the multiplication of events and policy initiatives since 2006 are a direct

response to the tragic events of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005. This tragedy showed the

unsustainability of the security-only approach which had dominated until then, European

discourse and practice on migration. The obvious graphic violation of human rights violated

the Union’s very own values and did harm to its external image in the world.349

Consequently, it prompted the EU – at least at the discursive level - to rethink its

traditionally unilateral and narrow approach centred on the control and repression of

migratory flows, and seek greater cooperation with Africa, by emphasizing a root cause

approach through the migration-development nexus.350

The ‘root causes’ argument precisely links to the logic for support to further regional

economic integration, the creation of jobs and alternative opportunities for young Africans

at the regional level. This seems to serve both sides’ interests with a reduction of migration

pressures for the EU and support for the economic development agenda of African

countries.

Yet the evidence demonstrates it is development that drives migration – both within and

across continents. 351 As aid and trade diplomacy will not reduce the migration pressure

but will foster mobility352, some serious questions can be posed.

After the recognition of environmental degradation as a root cause to migration (only by

the EC) under the GAMM in 2011353, the European Commission draws further on this and

349 S. LAVENEX and R. KUNZ, “The Migraton-Development Nexus in EU-External relations”, European Integration,

Vol. 30, N°3, 2008, 446. 350 P. BOSCH and E. HADDAD, o.c., 2007, 6-7; This led to the adoption by the Commission of following

Communication: European Commission, Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations, Brussels, COM (2005) 390 final. On the African side, two documents were adopted: AU Executive Council, African Common Position on Migration and Development, Banjul, 2006, EX. CL/DEC.305 (IX), Preamble; AU Executive Council, The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, June 29, 2006, EX.CL/276 (IX). 351 H. DE HAAS, “Migration transitions: a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the developmental drivers of

international migration”, IMI Working Paper No 24, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, 2010, 49 p. 352 M. CLEMENS, « Think Development in Poor Countries Will Reduce Migration? The Numbers Say Otherwise »,

Center for Global Development (website), 2014 and http://www.cgdev.org/blog/think-development-poor-countries-will-reduce-migration-numbers-say-otherwise 353 Preceding it, the European Commission undertook a broad consultation on migration and climate change with

the results fitting into the GAMM. See European Commission, Migration and Development, Commission Staff Working Paper, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, {COM(2011) 743 final} Brussels, SEC(2011) 1353 final.

http://www.cgdev.org/blog/think-development-poor-countries-will-reduce-migration-numbers-say-otherwise


57

sees migration in the context of environmental change as “a complex issue that requires

comprehensive responses involving a broad range of issues and policies: climate change

mitigation, disaster risk reduction, urban planning, education, social policy, asylum and

migration policies, development policies and humanitarian and civil protection policies.”354

Although migration has often been portrayed as a failure to adapt, it is now increasingly

also recognised as a legitimate adaptation strategy in its own right.355

In practice however, links between environmental change and migration in the EU have

been subject to few and limited discussions and very little policy development.356

8.2. Migration as an adaptation strategy promoted and facilitated

In accordance with the EC’s new Communication on the Global Approach to Migration and

Mobility (GAMM)357, the EC’s SWD (2013) claims to want to promote and to facilitate migration

as an adaptation strategy.358 It acknowledges the increasing number of studies that specifically

document the potential of migration to contribute to the resilience of communities of origin and

the EU has explored possible concrete measures to exploit this potential.359

Adaptation to climate change seems to be the common ground for consensus among policy

actors associated with GAMM implementation. Adaptation is considered to respond

simultaneously to security risks, development objectives, climate-induced vulnerability and the

displacement of populations.360 Nevertheless, it states that “understanding of the relationship

between migration and adaptation in communities of origin remains limited, and should be

subject to further research.”361 In addition, the SWD assures that “measures are also under

development to mitigate the potential negative social consequences of migration”362.

Through the GAMM the EU already fully recognises that the human, social and financial capital

which migrants transfer to their countries of origin can exert a positive impact on development.

New objectives in the GAMM were drawn up, like the facilitation of the flows of remittances, the

354 SWD(2013) final 138, 15-16. 355 ICMPD et al., o.c.,2011, 10. 356 See for the same alarming review and observation, A. GEDDES and W. SOMERVILLE, o.c., 2013, 2. 357 COM(2011)743 final 358 See the subtitle “Promoting and facilitating migration as an adaptation strategy”. SWD (2013) 138 final, 26. 359 Including the role of remittances, the role of both temporary and permanent migration, 360 C. TACOLI, "Climate Change and Migration. Study of the climate adaptation-migration nexus and the role for

development cooperation", Eschborn: GIZ, 2011, 12 p. 361 SWD (2013) 138 final, 27. 362 SWD (2013) 138 final, 27.

58

engagement of diasporas in home country development or the promotion of circular migration.363

This has recently been concretized in the EU-African Action Plan (2014-2017) on migration and

mobility.364

In this regard, one great challenge is how to ensure a regulatory framework that would both

ensure flexible movement of people365 and their return to their countries of origin. Indeed, for

movement of people to benefit the sending countries, the latter must make sure that emigration

will not amount to losing their human resources, and especially the most qualified one (“brain

drain”)366. Since 2009, the EU has maintained its efforts to ensure that migration genuinely

benefits countries both of origin and of destination, in order to maximize the developmental effects

of its migration policy while minimizing its negative side effects. Much remains to be done to make

sure that migration policy does not negatively affect development objectives and works better for

development, while responding to European needs.367

The EU proposes also that it could consider how to further integrate migration – as adaptation -

into broader efforts to promote climate change adaptation, by for example supporting partners in

introducing a migration dimension to their national adaptation planning.368

Though surprisingly contrasting with international migration, as for internal migration there

appears to be little recognition of the (migration) benefits 369 in National Adaptation Programmes

of Action (NAPAs)370 of developing countries. This is because migratory ‘coping strategies’ are

often seen as producing negative consequences371 and hence have not typically been seen as an

adaptation strategy in itself. As in 2011, of the 45 NAPAs submitted worldwide by the Least

Developed Countries (LDCs), only ten mentioned migration or resettlement in their priority

363 See also: Commission of the European Communities, Communication “On circular migration and mobility

partnerships between the European Union and third countries” COM(2007) 248 final. 364 Fourth EU-Africa Summit, EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, Brussels 2-3 April 2014.

365 Opening up dialogue on migratory routes is on the MME Partnership agenda for the post-2014 period (see

further). 366 Brain drain is becoming a major problem for Arica, where the rate of university graduates who have migrated

to Europe is higher than in any part of the world. L. KATSELI et al., “Effects of Migration on Sending Countries : What do we know ?”, OECD Development Centre Working Paper N°250, Paris : OECD, 2006, 19; IOM, “Diasporas and Development: Bridging between Societies and States”, International Dialogue on Migration 2013, Diaspora Ministerial Conference, June 2013, 13 p. 367 European Commision, EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, Staff working Paper, Brussels,

SEC(2011) 1627 final 76-77. 368 SWD (2013) 138 final, 28. Although some affected African countries already integrate migration within their

NAPAs. 369 As advocated by literature (see above when making “the case for migration”). C. TACOLI, “Not only climate

change: mobility, vulnerability and socio-economic transformations in environmentally fragile areas of Bolivia, Senegal and Tanzania”, IIED Human Settlements Working Paper Series, Rural Interactions and Livelihoods Strategies, London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2011. 370 National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs) are national adaptation plans developed by Least

Developed Countries (LDCs) intended to address immediate adaptation needs. 371 J. SWARD and S. CODJOE, “Human Mobility and Climate Change Adaptation Policy: A Review of Migration in

National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)”, Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium, Working Paper 6 March 2012, 23.

59

projects, from which eight African countries. They considered human mobility as a key variable in

the adaptation challenge. Six of the African countries372, were predominantly concerned with

internal migration as a coping strategy in relation to drought.373

Yet this potential of migration to serve as a coping strategy could also be highlighted to partner

countries through on-going political dialogue initiatives on both migration and climate change

adaptation. Under the GAMM, the EU is engaged in a number of bilateral and regional migration

dialogues with key partners throughout the developing world, and not the least from Africa, as

we’ll discuss.

8.2.1. The EU and Africa as key partners

As the EC states, African countries are key partners for the EU in its work to address the

(consequences of) climate change.374

Although since 2006 the question of migration has been at the forefront of the Africa-EU relations,

up till now there is no concrete specific and explicit position on environmental migration (as an

adaptation strategy) from Africa to the EU. 375. This is because the partnerships happened through

a number of important events and policy initiatives mostly devoted to the migration-development

nexus.376 The EU and Africa have also separately produced a number of important policy

documents outlining their respective positions in the area of migration.377

While Bilateral Dialogues between the EU and Sub-Saharan African States are still very rare378

and “should be intensified”,379 the African continent has witnessed an increasing willingness from

the EU to engage in regional and continental cooperation efforts geared at developing a joint-

strategy on migration. Cooperation at regional level comprises the so-called “Rabat Process”380

372 Namely Chad, Mauritania, Togo, Eritrea, Sudan and Burkina Faso. 373 J. SWARD and S. CODJOE, “Human Mobility and Climate Change Adaptation Policy: A Review of Migration in

National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)”, Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium, Working Paper 6 March 2012, 23. 374European Union (ed.), Supporting a Climate for Change, Brussels, 2012, 4. The EU is, for example, occasionally

participating to the African Environment Ministries (AMCEN) process. 375 This has been confirmed in an interview per e-mail with an EC Official (DG CLIMA), November 2013. 376 It suffices to mention the Euro-African Ministerial Conference in Rabat in July 2006, the UN High Level Dialogue

in New York in September 2006, the Euro-African Conference in Madrid in June 2007, the First Global Forum in Brussels in July 2007… 377 J. MANGALA, “Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment”, in J. MANGALA (ed.), Africa and

the European : a strategic Partnership, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 195. 378

The Mobility Partnership with Cape Verde, since May 2008, is the first cooperation of this kind between the

EU and an African state and, for the time being, the only Mobility Partnership concluded with a Sub-Saharan state. Five Member States participate. See: European Commission, “Africa”, DG Home Affairs (website), s.d. 379 Interview with several African delegates at COP19, Warsaw, November 2013. 380

The Rabat Process is a Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development with Western and Central African

countries launched in 2006 in Rabat. It is financially and politically supported by the EC and it brings together more than fifty countries of origin, transit and destination, which have a shared vision of “a rational, balanced and efficient management of migration flows from and via West and Central Africa.” The objective is to create a framework for dialogue and consultation within which concrete, practical initiatives are implemented.

60

launched in 2006 (with the Dakar Strategy381 to guide it for the years 2012-2014) and the ACP-

EU Dialogue on Migration and Development382, based on article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement. The

insertion of this migration clause was amongst the most contentious issues during the Cotonou

negociations, stressing the weight and importance of the issue for both the ACP and the EU.383

The aim of EU’s engagement in support for mainstreaming of migration into development

strategies is to help its partners to design a pro-development migration framework at home. Some

progress has been made since 2009, with for example the launch of the ACP Observatory on

Migration, an initiative of the Secretariat of the ACP Group of States, empowered by the IOM and

funded by the EU with the financial support of Switzerland.384

After the refugee drama in Lampedusa, the EC recalled that actions in cooperation with third

countries are “one of the most effective ways to prevent persons from attempting to enter the EU

through irregular channels, and put their life at risk by undertaking dangerous journeys towards

Europe.”385 The Seahorse Atlantic Network is an example of a concrete cooperation at regional

level between some European and African countries.386 It enables the information exchange

between authorities along the Western African coast in order to prevent irregular migration and

cross-border crime.

At continental level there is the EU-Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment

(MME), which resulted from the Tripoli Process and was agreed under the ‘Joint EU-Africa Strategy’

(JAES) in 2007387. The JAES defines long-term policy orientations between the two continents,

based on a shared vision and common principles.388 Within this framework which includes eight

areas for strategic partnership389, there was hardly any field or cross-cutting issue in which the EU

X, “Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development”, Rabat Process, s.d. 381 Third Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, 23 November 2011. 382

The EU and the ACP States run a Dialogue on Migration and Development covering several topics agreed

among the parties. See: European Commission, “The Cotonou Agreement”, the EU and the ACP, Ouagadougou,

June 2010. 383 T. VAN CRIEKINGE, “The EU-Africa migration Partnership : the limits of the EU’s external dimension of

migration in Africa”, in M. CARBONE, o.c., 259. 384

European Commision, Staff working Paper, EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, Brussels,

SEC(2011) 1627 final, 78. 385 European Commission, Communication on the work of the Task Force Mediterranean, Communication from

the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, COM(2013) 869 final, 4. 386 Namely Spain, Portugal, Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Morocco, Gambia and Guinea Bissau. 387 Council of the European Union, The Africa-EU strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 16344/07, 9

December, 2007. 388 For more information, see: http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/ 389 These eight priority areas are: 1. Peace and Security 2. Democratic Governance and Human Rights 3. Regional

Economic Integration, Trade and Infrastructure 4. Millennium Development Goals 5. Climate Change 6. Energy 7. Migration, Mobility and Employment 8. Science, Information Society and Space.

http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/

61

and Africa were not meant to cooperate390, as set out in the 2nd Action Plan 2011-2013.391

Initiatives under the 2nd Action Plan so far concentrated on remittances, diaspora, human

trafficking and research. Mobility, migrants rights, international protection and irregular migration

were part of the dialogue component of the partnership but received limited attention overall.392

Both the Rabat and the Tripoli Processes support, in practical ways, broader consultation and

cooperation, for example, the Joint Africa-EU Partnership on MME and, for the EU, the GAMM.

Both are to be situated within the context of a migration-and-development perspective.393

However, the PMME has not stopped the EU and its member states from pursuing unilateral actions

and traditional preoccupations around illegal migration that remain entrenched in the security

approach. Within the mobility partnerships, it has proved difficult for Member States, to offer real

legal migration opportunities, also because of the economic and financial crisis and its impact on

employment.394

In our opinion, the ‘economic crisis’ shouldn’t impede the EU–Africa cooperation to include genuine

plans for mobility. Hence it needs to overcome a focus on the ‘root’ cause argument to fight

irregular migration.

8.2.2. Focus on south-south migration

The EC acknowledges in its working document that fostering mobility and facilitating labour

migration can greatly contribute both to creating opportunities for individuals to take advantage

of the potential of migration to boost adaptation, and to reducing environmentally induced

displacement. This statement applies, however, practically only to south-south migration: by

promoting mobility both within states (e.g. rural-urban migration), and international migration, in

particular between developing countries in the same region.395

390 S. SCHMIDT, “Towards a new EU-African Relationship: A Grand Strategy for Africa?, Foreign Policy in Dialogue,

Vol. 8, N°24, 8-18. 391 It was adopted at the third Africa EU Summit (29-30 November 2010) in Tripoli, Libya. The so-called Tripoli

Declaration aims to shape the future relations between two continents, but it attracted limited interest by political leaders and the media recorded a number of disappointments. 392Africa-EU Partnership on MME, Priorities for future cooperation in the area of Migration and Mobility in the

framework of the Africa -EU Strategic Partnership, Senior Officials Meeting, Brussels, 27 and 28 November 2013. 393 The Tripoli Process encompasses the full African continent, whereas the Rabat Process covers mainly North,

West and Central Africa and is focused on West African migratory routes and issues. IOM, Regional Inter-State Consultation Mechanisms on Migration: Approaches, Recent Activities and Implications for Global Governance of Migration, IOM Migration research Series, N°45, 2013, 37-38. 394 Interview with EC official and African delegates to COP 19, Warsaw, November 2013; See also: J. MANGALA,

“Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment”, in J. MANGALA (ed.), Africa and the European : a strategic Partnership, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 199. 395 SWD(2013) 138 final, 28.

62

According to the EC, current experiences point out that there is no need to 'brand' measures to

promote mobility as specifically targeting a certain type of migrant for them to facilitate the use

of migration as adaptation. Its reasoning is based on the similarities between environmentally

induced migration and other types of migration flows and that some of the most successful

examples of schemes which have promoted migration as adaptation have been set up as 'ordinary'

labour migration schemes.396

Regarding internal mobility, measures to facilitate existing migration trends and promote their

development impact may prove beneficial. These may include supporting developing countries in

planning for increased mobility, strengthening infrastructure or transport links, and supporting

host communities.397

As regards the facilitation of international population movements, the EC has already implemented

numerous relevant measures as fostering well-managed international mobility. Better organizing

legal migration is also recognised as one of the four 'pillars' of the GAMM. Many of these have

focused on promoting circular migration schemes (in particular for students, and businessmen,

not typically EMs). In addition, both the GAMM and the 2011 Agenda for Change on Increasing the

Impact of EU Development Policy398 call on EU to promote inter- and intra-regional mobility in

developing regions. The EC therefore aims to “significantly step up its efforts to promote the

development impact of South-South migration in the coming years through EU development

cooperation”.399

The EC is ready to support capacity building in all relevant areas, including by sharing its expertise

on protecting migrants’ human rights, integration, labour migration systems, asylum and

international protection, tackling human smuggling and trafficking, Integrated Border

Management, etc.400

Whether better regional mobility, integration and employment opportunities will alleviate

migration pressures on Europe is unsure.

In light of these interactions, the EC “will explore how future initiatives on labour migration and

mobility could be more specifically targeted towards regions at risk of climate change or

environmental degradation”. 401 Such measures should build on the experience gained with a

396 SWD (2013) 138final, 28. 397 SWD (2013) 138final, 28. This fits fairly what most of the African delegation interviewees advocated at COP

19 in Warsaw, Poland, November 2013. 398 EC, Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2011) 637 final. 399 SWD(2013) 138 final, 28. 400 COM(2013) 292 final, 13. 401 SWD(2013) 138 final, 28.

63

number of relevant labour migration schemes which have already been implemented both by the

EU and its Member States and by non-EU countries.402 They have been developed in different

contexts which demonstrate that greater mobility can promote the use of migration as adaptation

in a vast range of scenarios.403 The development of such migration schemes often requires the

adoption of 'flanking measures' to support mobility.404

8.2.3. Planned relocation as a last resort solution

As we’ve mentioned in the context of environmental displacement, the EC would also like to

provide durable solutions405 for persons affected by slow-onset environmental degradation,

including planning for relocation406 as a last resort solution for communities which are particularly

at risk.

Planned forced displacement of populations from areas impacted by climate change and the

resettlement of these people is one of the most discussed and controversially debated dimensions

of the migration and climate change relationship.407

In particular, resettlement as a strategy to mitigate harm related to floods or sea-level rise is

increasingly integrated in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) resulting in concrete

programmes to protect affected populations.

Planned resettlement has a long history in development field and prior experience shows that

relocation schemes frequently have a high human cost, and few successful examples exist. One

example is the initiative of the Ethiopian government in 1985 to resettle 1.5 million people as a

consequence of massive food shortages from drought affected areas to more fertile ones. The

programme has been widely criticized for the way the relocations were implemented.408

402 A best practice example for intra-regional cooperation mentioned by the EC, is the Security in Mobility Initiative

(SIM) launched in 2009 by a consortium of international organizations (OCHA, UNEP, IOM and ISS) in the context of the specific case of pastoralists in the Horn of Africa. See: OCHA et al., “Security In Mobility: Advocating for Safe Movement as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Pastoralists in the Horn and East Africa”, June 2010. 403

The EU-funded Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) agreement between Spain and Colombia

could serve as a model; see: S. LACY, “Climate Change and Migration: Possible Roles for German Development Cooperation”, Discussion paper, GIZ, Eschborn, 2012, 8. 404 Such as: involving civil society organisations and local governments in discussions on migration and climate

change or addressing migration governance issues (at local, national, regional and international levels). 405 Some factors which should be taken into account when finding durable and sustainable solutions are the

recovery or creation of livelihoods, compensation for lost or damaged property in case of prohibition of return and the provision of proper housing to services such as health or education. K. WARNER and C. EHRHART, “In Search of Shelter, Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement”, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc (CARE), 2008, 36 p. 406 The terms ‘relocation’ and ‘resettlement’ should be distinguished, since the former only refers to displacement

due to environmental factors. See the lexicon for the definitions. 407

See G. HUGO, ”Lessons from past forced resettlement for climate change migration” in E. PIGUET, A. PECOUD,

P. DE GUCHTENEIRE (ed.) Migration and Climate change, UNESCO, 260-288. 408 See Martin 2010, o.c., p. 5 and McLeman 2011, o.c., p.21.

64

Therefore they represent a “last resort solution”, and must be implemented on a voluntary basis

(i.e. persons in targeted communities must be free to refuse participation in the schemes), “based

on careful planning”.409 If not done so at the local, national and international levels, displacement

may in fact be exacerbated, according to studies. That is also why the governance structures the

States put in place will be crucial in “determining the degree to which migration is a form of

adaptation, or an indicator of a failure to adapt”.410

The EC recognises that planned relocation may nevertheless become a necessity in certain

scenarios. This could not only be necessary for 'trapped populations', as previously discussed in

this paper, but it can also be considered an option in itself for countries facing the risk of parts of

their territory being inundated by sea water or becoming environmentally unsustainable due to

desertification. The EU should therefore consider supporting countries severely exposed to

environmental stressors to assess the path of degradation and design specific preventive internal,

or where necessary, international relocation measures when adaptation strategies can no longer

be implemented. Consultations with authorities at not only national but also regional and

international levels are required in order to assess the most viable and sustainable solution for

relocation.411 This question concerns the decision making process: who should choose between

different adaptation options? Democratic decision-making is probably the only acceptable option,

at least at the local or national level, but what procedure should be followed?412

The experience amassed by the EU and its Member States in the process of supporting and

implementing their own resettlement programmes “could prove useful and enable the EU to play

a role in supporting non-EU countries’ efforts to use relocation in managing environmentally

induced migration”.413 Planned relocation of populations has been used in the past also to allow

implementation of development programmes, such as dams or urban reorganisation. But it might

take on larger proportions in the future. As designing an appropriate and durable relocation

strategy has to take into account a number of issues, the EC refers to case studies illustrating

some of the challenges.414

The resettlement of individuals from the countries that have experienced environmental disasters

is an important solution that should be considered by the EU. However, a coherent and pragmatic

coordination mechanism among MS is required.

409 SWD (2013) 138 final, 31. 410 K. WARNER, “Assessing Institutional and Governance Needs Related to Environmental Change and Human

Migration”, Study Team on Climate-Induced Migration, German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 2010, 8. 411 SWD(2013) 138 final, 31. 412 J. McADAM illustrates this with the story of an Alaskan village, which decided to choose by means of a

referendum. J. McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, 146-147. 413 SWD(2013) 138 final, 31. 414 Especially, the case study carried out on Mozambique in the ‘EACH-FOR’ project, SWD(2013) 138 final, 32.

65

9. The Challenges of Institutional Governance and Policy Coherence

Although it was made clear that the new policy consideration should be dealt with as part

of the “external dimension” of migration policies, the question of who must do what has

not been answered. It is argued that the way migration is framed as an external policy

issue, within the current institutional balance of power in the EU, is preventing the

emergence of a new climate change - migration nexus.415

Coordination between policy sectors dealing with the externalization of migration policy is

indeed far from being clear. Incoherencies are further exacerbated by the introduction of

the climate change dimension - perceived differently by each policy sector - and the

relevant policy sector into the institutional arena.

In effect, as previously remarked climate change-related movement can be categorized

and responded to in a variety of ways: as a protection issue, a migration issue, a disaster

issue, an environmental issue, a security issue, or a development issue. As McADAM puts

it, “each ‘lens’ contains an implicit set of assumptions that motivates different policy

outcomes.”416 The inadequacies and shortcomings of institutional responsibility in many

ways mirror the conceptual and legal challenges concerning environmental migration.

At the EU-level, the same complexity for this cross-cutting environmental migration issue

is true. It encompasses at least five different (external) policy areas (DGs): DG for Climate

Action (CLIMA), DG for EuropeAid Development and Cooperation (DEVCO)417, the DG for

Home Affairs (HOME), DG for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), the DG for External Relations

(RELEX)418 and also the EU External Action Service (EEAS) is not to be neglected. A paradox

is thus created, because the ‘climate change’ element of movement increases the number

of relevant institutions, but at the same time it overshadows the capacity of existing

mechanisms and mandates to respond.419

415 European Union (ed.), “Human Rights and Climate Change”, 2012, 60. 416 J. Mc ADAM, o.c., 2012, 212. 417 Even DG DEVCO’s complex organization with different unities (Unit D3 works on migration issues) results in

inefficiency. A more holistic, transversal organization would be better equipped to deal with problems relating to the interaction between societies and their environment. See: European Union (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change: EU policy options, Study of the European Parliament: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2012. 418 The Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union is responsible for organising the work of Parliament's

committees and interparliamentary delegations in the field of external policies. 419 McADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law, 2012, 213.

66

According to previous research in the field, internal fragmentation within the EC may

“negatively affect its effectiveness and assertiveness vis-à-vis member states”420, thus

confirming the importance of the ‘Commission Unity’, characterized by internal

coherence421, as a factor for an enhanced environmental migration policy with Africa.

Divergences among the member states about what exactly this policy should entail, may

not only impact negatively on the Council, but may also make the EC weak, by watering

down its proposals to the lowest common denominator.422 A possibly inspiring institutional

solution was found for its trade policy with Africa. It was built around exclusive competence

of the EU, strengthened the EC’s autonomy and resulted in fairly strong ‘EU actorness’.423

Definitely, with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the dominant position

of JHA and perhaps the security oriented approach has been (partially) challenged, as JHA

has officially ceased to exist as an EU pillar and was fully integrated into Community-

decision making mechanisms. It provided a window of opportunity for the EU to assume a

more coherent role as a global development partner both within the more traditional sphere

of development cooperation and beyond it, notably through the creation of the European

External Action Service (EEAS).

On the other hand, a stronger institutional link between migration, environment and

development is not very likely given that many provisions in the treaty actually strengthen

the security-oriented approach.424 While the Directorate-General Home Affairs (DG HOME)

sector continues to react to the requirements of interior ministers from Member States

(MS), internal considerations remain its dominant rationale. In this sense, DG HOME does

not appear as the most relevant institution for tackling this issue and an institutional

restructuration for addressing EM seems necessary.425 It is by definition an international

issue, and one that mainly involves third countries. Consequently, giving a clear mandate,

if not playing a lead role, to the development sector could strengthen policy-making in this

field.

420 M. CARBONE, The European Union and International Development : The Politics of Foreign Aid, London:

Routledge, 421 The principle of policy coherence has been the object of a contentious debate in the external relations of the

EU. Coherence is often used interchangeably with consistency. See: M. CARBONE (ed.), Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy, London: Routledge, 2013, 168 p. 422 See the findings of O. ELGSTRÖM, O. and M., FRENNHOFF LARSEN, “Free to Trade? Commission Autonomy in

the Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations”, Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2), 205-223. 423 F. SÖDERBAUM, “The EU as an actor in Africa”, O.c., 31. 424 Firstly, the Treaty of Lisbon reinforces the EC’s legal competence to negotiate readmission agreements.

Secondly, the dominance of justice and home affairs officials in formulating the orientation of the external dimension of migration policy will remain, in that institutional practices and decision-making in this realm persist unchanged. 425 European Union (ed.), o.c., 11. The study suggests giving a clear mandate, if not a lead role, to the

development sector to strengthen policy making in this field.

67

As for now, better linking migration with other relevant policy areas, such as the

environment and development, will depend on the extent to which the EEAS will be willing

and capable in formulating a more coherent approach to migration dialogue with third

countries by collaborating with its counterpart in the EC.426

For joint migration management (through the JAES) to be effective, the EU considers

coherence amongst the relevant policies and policy-actors as essential,427 but therefore

the significant problematic gaps persisting within this “polyphonic institutional venue”428

should first be addressed.

426 DG EuropAid Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), DG Climate Action (CLIMA), DG Enviroment (DG ENV) ; T. VAN CRIEKINGE, O.c., 272. 427 European Commission, « A Global Approach to migration One Year On : Towards a Comprehensive European

Migration Policy », COM (2006) 735, 30 November 2006, 4; European Commission, « Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration : Increasing Coordination, Coherence and Synergies », COM (2008) 611, 8 October 2008, 12.See also: European Commission, EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2011) 1627 final. 428

European Union (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change: EU policy options, Study of the European

Parliament: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Brussels, 2012, 64; See: W. KÄLIN and N. SCHREPFER, “Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change. Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches”, 2012, 82 p.; V. KOLMANNSKOG and L. TREBBI, “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Displacement: a Multi-track Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps”, 92(870) INT’L REV. RED CROSS, 713.

68

10. Issues and lessons of the Africa-EU Cooperation

Certainly, lessons for EM could be drawn from the failure of the PMME within the JAES.

After almost five years into the implementation of the PMME, the “bargain429 has not been

fulfilled and the partnership seems to have lost its core equilibrium by reverting back – for

the most part - to traditional preoccupations around illegal migration and security issues

and the pursuit of bilateral approaches”.430

Despite the increased engagement, the EU has proven limited in its ability to narrow the

gap between capabilities (lack of human and financial resources) and engagement,

between security interests (as a priority and condition) and development prospects431 and

in coordination at different levels of governance432 comprising the external dimension of

migration policy towards Europe (problem of policy coherence).433

While its added value lies in the importance it places on the centrality of the political

dialogue – posited as a cardinal principle and modus operandi in Africa-EU relations -, the

operationalization has seen a growing political dilution. This institutional dynamic stresses

the fact that the partnership has been mostly subjected to a technical and bureaucratic

management under the responsibility of various officials and groups of experts who have

tended to focus on projects rather than processes, and to highlight activities that indicate

some measure of “quick progress” while contentious and sensitive issues remain off the

table. The ‘technocratisation’ might, over time, empty the partnership of its political

relevance.434

The expectation that “cooperation between Africa and the EU on these subjects will

continue and, where possible, be reinforced”435 has more or less been met by changing the

emphasis at the Africa-EU summit in April 2014. Yet it doesn’t seem to resolve the

underlying challenges, such as: getting member states involved; improve the capacity and

coordination within and between the AUC and the EC; move beyond dialogue (for the few

429 The PMME was conceived of as a bargain whereas African countries will increase their efforts and work closely

with the EU countries on illegal migration while expecting, in return, more cooperation from the EU side on mobility and employment/development. J. MANGALA, “Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment”, 217. 430 J. MANGALA, “Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment”, 217. 431 The EU used and still uses the ‘stick and carrot approach’. 432 Coordination between the EC and the member states, between the EC departments internally, and between

the EC and other EU institutions. 433 T. VAN CRIEKINGE, “The EU-Africa migration Partnership : the limits of the EU’s external dimension of

migration in Africa”, in M. CARBONE, O.c., 278. 434 J. MANGALA, “Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment”, 217. Against this backdrop,

MANGALA outlines seven recommendations worth considering, also for a future development of an EU-African environmental migration policy. 435 X, Q&A with EC DG DEVCO Head of Unit B.3 Employment, Social Inclusion, Migration, Ms. Hélène Bourgade,

“Eyeing the Future of the MME Partnership”, 22 November, 2013.

69

concrete results of the previous Action Plans emerged from initiatives outside the dialogue

component).436

Achievements of the Partnership on Climate change and the Environment include primarily

symbolic results437 and the implementation of the goals set by the first Action Plan is still

lagging behind.438 There are nevertheless some tangible steps in the implementation of the

Action Plans, involving financial commitments, such as financing of concrete disaster risk

reduction initiatives.439

Two major factors seem to constrain inter-regional cooperation in the field of climate

change and the environment, namely the mutual representation of African and EU

delegates as unreliable partners and the cumbersome institutional structure of the

partnership440. African leaders depicted the EU as a paternalistic actor, unable to consider

the AU and its members as equal partners, while EU actors stressed the lack of preparation

and political will of African governments and regional organisations as a crucial obstacle of

the implementation of the partnership.441

For the sake of a better common future – and for EMs particularly - , these issues should

be tackled and the lessons applied to the partnerships related to migration. It appears no

responsible option to choose waiting any longer to include EMs.

436 A. KNOLL and E.A. BEKELE, “Migration and Mobility in the Africa-EU Partnership: A Breakthrough or More of

the Same?”, ECDPM (website), http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/migration-mobility-africa-eu-partnership-breakthrough/ , 18/4/2014. 437 For example, the Joint Declaration on Climate Change (2008), which remains a programmatic document. The

plan of the implementation of the Monitoring of Environment and Security in Africa program for the beginning of 2012 is the most tangible achievement of the partnership. See D. SICURELLI, O.c., 159. 438 For a complete table of the Priorities and Initiatives of the First and Second Action Plans, see D.

SICURELLI, “Africa-EU Partnership on climate change and the environment”, in J. MANGALA (ed.), Africa and the European : a strategic Partnership, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 153. 439 For a brief review on EU’s financial commitments, see D. SICURELLI, O.c., 160. 440 D. SICURELLI, « Africa-EU Partnership on climate change and the environment », in J. MANGALA (ed.), Africa

and the European : a strategic Partnership, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 149. 441 D. SICURELLI, O.c., 149.

http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/migration-mobility-africa-eu-partnership-breakthrough/


70

11. Financial implications

It stands to reason that dealing with large-scale migration will have considerable financial

and economic implications. These will in various ways affect countries of origin and transit

countries as well as receiving countries.442 A detailed assessment of expected financial

implications is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

The Stern report’s broad economic analysis of the macroeconomic costs incurred by

ongoing climate change arrives at a very clear and convincing conclusion: the costs of

inaction will be far higher than the costs of timely action for both mitigation and

adaptation.443 There is no logical reason, why this conclusion would not apply to the aspect

of climate-induced migration, too. And as the Chinese proverb says: To know and not to

act, is not to know.

Given the wide range of relevant financial instruments at EU level, the EC will explore how

relevant funds can be used to address the complex issues underlying migration and climate

change in a more coherent and coordinated manner, including under the future financial

perspectives for 2014-2020.444 The Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)445 is the main

financial mechanism serving mainstream climate adaptation (and mitigation) concerns in

the EU's development policy446 by engaging in dialogue between the EU and target

developing countries.447

Remarkably, none of the three adaptation funds at international level (the Adaptation Fund,

LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change (SCC) Fund) have projects directly related with

migration. The SCC Fund could nevertheless work on relocation.448

442 See: World Bank, “The Cost to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change, New Methods and

Estimates - The Global Report of the Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study”, World Bank, Executive Summary, 2009, 109 p.; 443 N. STERN, The economics of climate change: The Stern Review, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 444 Interview with EC official, Warsaw, November 2013; In accordance with: SWD (2013) final 138, 34. 445 GCCA, adopted in 2007 by the Council, combines (i) A platform for dialogue to raise awareness of issues and

identify areas of cooperation at global, regional and national level and (ii) Technical and financial support. Particularly relevant areas of funding include Adaptation and DRR. European Council, Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the European Union and Poor Developing Countries Most Vulnerable to Climate Change, Council Conclusions, 15103/07, 2007. See: European Union (ed.), Supporting a Climate for Change, Brussels, 2012, 6-7. 446 The EU’s development policy is rooted in the colonial relations of its member states. For an overview of the

evolution from the mid-1960s to 2013, see: F. SÖDERBAUM, “The European Union as an actor in Africa: internal coherence and external legitimacy”, in M. CARBONE (ed.), The European Union in Africa: incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?, Manchester University Press, 2013, 31. 447 YAMINEVA, Y. and KULOVESI, K. “The new Framework for climate finance under the United Nations Framework

on Climate Change: a breakthrough or an empty promise?” in HOLLO, E.J., KULOVESI, K. and MEHLING, M. (eds.) Climate Change and the Law, Dordrecht, Springer, 191-223; X., “EU Climate Finance: Quo Vadis?”, CAN, WWF, CIDSE, Oxfam, 2013, 5 p. 448 Interview with an official of the SCC Fund, Warsaw, November 2013.

71

In terms of international negotiations the issue relates first and foremost to the costs of

adaptation and ensuing questions of burden sharing.449 The EU could take a proportion of

the EMs in proportion to their GHG emissions. Amongst others, the Norwegian Refugee

Council calls for a new international environmental migration fund which could provide the

financial basis for policy measures to deal with displacement due to environmental

factors.450 This ‘burden-sharing mechanisms’ could be based on principle 7 of the 1992 Rio

Declaration on Environment and Development which underlines the shared - but

differentiated - responsibilities of all states.

If the EU is still the world's leading provider of climate finance,451 this could change soon.

As CAN, a European environmental lobbyist platform warns, “The EU has a committed

Climate Action Commissioner, but it remains a question mark what will become after the

2014 European elections, when new Commissioners will have to be appointed.” 452

449

At the time of writing, the price tag the European Union is willing to accept 17, 7 billion Euros per year,

provided that other industrialized countries will make commensurate commitments, too. See: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/finance/budget/index_en.htm 450 V. KOLMANNSKOG,o.c., 2008, 31. 451 Climate Action EU-Commissionner Connie Hedegaard, “Connie Hedegaard: Promoting a climate for change »,

The New Zealand Herald, 2 September 2013, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/environment/news/article.cfm?c_id=39&objectid=11117879&ref=rss 452Interview with Ulriikka Aarnio; She is 'senior policy officer UN climate negotiations' for CAN Europe.

http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/finance/budget/index_en.htm

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/environment/news/article.cfm?c_id=39&objectid=11117879&ref=rss

72

12. Conclusion

Besides the conceptual gaps, hitherto legal and policy gaps clearly persist concerning (more

or less) forced movement due to the climate change impacts.

The aim of this paper was to address - partly and mainly - the EU’s legal and policy research

gap by exploring first whether the current overall EU framework for immigration and

asylum offers adequate responses to climate change-related movement due to slow-onset

climate events. Second, as this was not the case, it examined to what extent the EU

considers environmental migration (EM) as an adaptation strategy to remedy this problem.

In accordance with our hypothesis one can moderately settle that the EU does not have a

clear position on EM, let alone specific and explicit (legal) policy views on EM from and in

Africa. Our assumption that this would mainly be caused by its fear for this phenomenon

resulting in a rather security-driven approach, should nevertheless be nuanced.

First, as for the preliminary conceptual issue, the value and viability of institutionalizing

international cooperation on international migration questions generally, and EM

particularly, depend upon how that phenomenon can and should be formulated as a

discrete concept in law and policy. The EC recently chose for the less precise

‘environmental migrants’ (EMs) and ‘environmentally induced displaced persons’ (EDPs) as

concepts of reference. By choosing so, the EU left the more controversial terms – probably

because implying liability and responsibility - such as ‘climate refugees’. The former terms

remain confined in EC communications or EP commissioned study reports, and are as such

still missing in legally binding texts.

Yet the persistent distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ forced migrants (like ‘EMs’) -

based on the 1951 Geneva Convention and some limited migration programs - does not

appear any longer to correspond to today's reality and new challenges of a globalized

world.

Second, after having put African (environmental) migration in perspective, we found many

research studies to support our case for migration as an adaptation strategy. The EC and

EP joined – rhetorically - the academic trend and also recognised the importance of

migration in the face of climate change.

Third, as for the legal protection mechanisms for EDPs, the EU’s legal framework still

relies on international and complementary forms of protection. Although scholars argued

that subsidiary and temporary protection as enshrined in the Qualification Directive (a.o.

non-refoulement principle) and in the Temporary Protection Directive (theoretically, the

most feasible collective protection) could be applicable to EDPs, the EU, including the ECJ,

does not seem to be willing to adapt the law, nor interpret it in a teleological way. A

73

protection mechanism for individual victims of environmental events is thus still missing at

EU-level.

The problem with the latter mechanism for collective protection on a case-by-case basis is

its temporary nature and would consequently prove insufficient for those that require long

term protection - which is typically the case with the victims of slow-onset climate change

impacts.

Fourth, some progressive national laws (e.g. Finnish and Swedish Aliens Acts) and the

cases of liberal use of the Return Directive, show more solidarity with the EDPs. Although

these actions were of humanitarian nature and suited for sudden-onset disasters, they

could serve as a new sub-paragraph recognizing explicitly EDPs or offer a model for

developing similar mechanisms - with a more permanent nature - at the EU level.

From this time, the directives must be applied and interpreted in today’s context of climate

change.

Fifth, more frequent use of bilateral agreements providing for quotas was also found to be

relevant by the EC as a practical and protective solution when the risks are known.

Sixth, while the African legal framework appears more ambitious by giving broader refugee

(or IDP) definitions in the texts than the EU’s equivalent, due to a lack of financial and

institutional means, as well as weak internal and external political support (also from the

EU), it seems rather unlikely that the African Parties will be able to protect and assist

adequately their internal and external EDPs.

Regarding their external (cross-border) EDPs the OAU Convention uses a broader refugee

definition than the 1951 Refugee Convention, but as most Parties reject practically a liberal

interpretation of the treaty, it is still of limited pre-emptive and protective use for EDPs.

Concerning its internal EDPs, the ‘Guiding Principles’, the ‘Nansen Principles’ and the

‘Revised Framework on Durable Solutions’ are promising and useful (because flexible)

guidelines for governments – though not legally binding. Moreover, it is arguable whether

African countries could include EDPs in these soft law frameworks. These depend indeed

again on the political will of governments and other relevant actors (like the EU) to interpret

them and put them into practice. The EU gave mostly some assistance to African countries

through the rights-based framework of the Guiding Principles.

Finally, as for new legal rights, the political and institutional barriers are huge and a

breakthrough in recognition of rights concerning slow-onset climate change impacts seems

74

highly unlikely.453 All the same, the EC responded that this could not be a reason for a lack

of action.

Since the legal protection and assistance framework for African EDPs (both willing and not

willing to move to the EU) is still deficient, we intended to investigate how (by which

actions) and to what extent the EU’s policy considers EM as an adaptation strategy.

Slowly454 but surely the EU shows a substantial potential to support a suite of policies that

focus on preventing displacement (among others through adaptation responses, including

south-south migration, support for livelihoods and education) - which is in line with our

hypothesis.

First, via climate law working as a catalyser the EU’s present policy response to migration

linked to environmental change has certainly evolved positively and tends to be situated

within a human rights-based framework.

The EC’s recent staff working document (SWD) plainly demonstrates that European

institutions have grasped the latest evidence-based insights and have progressed on the

issue. Yet this relatively progressive work, though, does not mean that European

institutions are fully mobilized and active for the purpose. On the contrary, looking at the

actual (very) weak proposed actions, institutional inertia and insufficient adequate

responses still seem of actuality, despite the recognition of the EM’s vulnerability.

The EU doesn’t seem to lead the international climate migration debate, but is rather an

adapting follower. This is related to the unwillingness of MS to implement immigration

policies - and their still persisting underlying fear expressed with the ‘logic’ of security -

within the comprehensive approach, by exerting pressure for the promotion of border

control measures.

Since many provisions in the Lisbon Treaty (potentially) strengthen the power of DG HOME,

deeper European integration of this policy field could reinforce the EU's position on the

opposition from MS to finally start with concrete and constructive action. Quite the reverse,

the security-approach could also be strengthened, - but would be, in our opinion, a less

judicious priority.

Second, for slow-onset climate change the basis is set for a more considered response,

aligning policy solutions within the development field to an understanding of the dynamics

of migration.

453 Yet in carefully circumscribed cases, such as for temporary status in the event of a natural disaster, some

possibilities seem to emerge. See: M.D. COOPER, “Migration and Disaster-Induced Displacement : European Policy, Practice and Perspective”, CGD Working Paper 308, Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2012, 83 p. 454 Arguably faster than the slow-onset climate change impacts.

75

The EU’s approach most likely to succeed in the longer term is one that works within the

existing policy trajectory of incremental, relatively minor, change. Projects and strategies

that support adaptation strategies therefore remain, according to the EC, the most viable

set of policy responses.

On the one hand, migration should indeed be incorporated within key development

strategies. This might comprehend European inputs into NAPAs, Poverty Reduction

Strategies, the migration and development pillar of the GAMM, the JAES with its MME - and

where appropriate, thinking on the 2015 MDGs and the new post-2015 SDGs. Building

resilience in affected communities using existing, well-informed development models,

should be the aim.

On the other hand, the EU should establish more genuine bilateral, regional and

intercontinental ‘economic’ migration opportunities for Africans. This should be done

without expending unnecessary energy pursuing a global ‘protection’-oriented treaty that

would be ill-suited to the complexity of the movements involved.

The EU, however, views and encourages mere south-south migration, that is to say internal

(e.g. rural-urban migration) or regional migration. These are considered an acceptable

form of adaptation that can help to sustain livelihoods in the places that people move to

and also the places that they leave behind, including through planned, rights-respecting

resettlement schemes involving the participation of affected countries.

Existing regional agreements on the free movement of people (e.g. ECOWAS) could,

according to the EC, serve as frameworks for EM. Likewise, the Mobility Partnerships (MPs)

would be, in principle, a relevant instrument to bilaterally cooperate on all sorts of

measures regarding EDPs and EMs.

For the Africa-EU policy initiatives were mostly devoted to the migration-development

nexus, there has never been a concrete specific and explicit position formulated on EM (as

an adaptation strategy) from Africa to the EU. This finding was unexpected considering

that since 2006 (Rabbat Process) the question of migration has been officially at the

forefront of the Africa-EU relations, including the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and

Development (2010); the regional cooperation: (e.g. Seahorse Atlantic Network ); the

continental cooperation with the EU-Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and

Employment (MME).

In reality however, until April 2014, mobility, migrant rights, international protection and

irregular migration were surely part of the strategic partnerships’ dialogue, but received

overall limited effective attention. Hence, it would have been surprising if EMs and EDPs

were taken more into consideration than ‘regular’ migrants.

76

Some interesting aspects of this new EU-African Action Plan (2014-2017) on MME include

the migration-development nexus (diaspora and remittances); advancing legal migration

and mobility by promoting circular migration schemes (in particular for students and

businessmen, - who are not typically EMs) and the strengthening of international

protection.

Positively, a more coherent strategy for European engagement with Africa in the future is

feasible thanks to the Lisbon Treaty.

Firstly, the EU therefore still has to tackle challenges of institutional governance and policy

coherence. The main issues are that EM is still a ‘polyphonic institutional venue’ and that

the clumsy coordination between the DGs is still preventing the emergence of a new climate

change-migration nexus. In order to strengthen its policy-making a lead role could be given

to the development sector (DEVCO), cooperating closely with a more coherent EEAS

regarding its migration dialogue with third countries by collaborating with its counterpart

(DG RELEX) of the EC.

Secondly, some mutual relationship improvements are needed in the EU-Africa

partnerships, as well as a ‘brighter’, more transparent institutional structure. This could be

realised, on the one hand, by getting more EU MS involved, and on the other hand, by

enhancing its capacity and coordination within and between the AUC and the EC.

The signals now timidly evoked by the EC should be sent louder by EU actors, not only in

rhetoric and as policy recommendations, but as effective policy actions. Such policies would

help to tackle the actual human rights and security issues arising from climate change-

related displacement in Africa, in particular social tensions over scarce resources, problems

of urbanization, and cross-border sensitivities about irregular migration.

While a timely and humane EM policy within the adaptation (and/or loss and damage-)

framework will certainly cost the EU some of its budget (20-40 billion Euros?), the price

tag will be almost insignificant compared to the far higher financial and moral costs of

inaction.

Political leadership will represent a decisive force in achieving the types of changes outlined

in this paper as steps toward a framework for action capable of responding to the

challenges of the future. To achieve more (environmental) justice the EU must address the

discussed shortfalls and make firm commitments on migration as adaptation with the full

engagement of African country partners, in order that the trust between both continents

and between the North and the South in general is ensured.

77

Bibliography

1. Legislation

1.1. International Law

Universal Treaties and Declarations

• Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York, General Assembly resolution 217

(III), 10 december 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810.

• Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954, New York, United

Nations, Treaties Series, vol. 360, 117.

• Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Geneva, United Nations,

Treaties Series, vol. 189, 137.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 19 december 1966,

United Nations, Treaties Series, vol. 999, 171.

• International Covenant on economic social and cultural rights, New York, 16

december 1966, United Nations, Treaties Series, vol. 993, 3.

• Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, New York, United Nations, Treaty

Series, vol. 606, 267.

• United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing

Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, signed in Paris on the

17th of June 1994, entered into force on the 26th of December 1996, 33 I.L.M. 1994,

U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/27.

• United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted on

29th of May 1992, entered into force on the 21st of March 1994, 31 I.L.M. 1992,

849.

• Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,

adopted on the 10th of December 1997, entered into force on the 16th February

2005, 37 I.L.M. 1998, 22.

• World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Declaration on

Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20, 4 September 2002.

• UNFCCC, The Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, 14 March 2008.

78

• UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur, Francois Crepeau, on the

human rights of migrants”, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/172,

A/67/299, 2012.

• UNFCCC, Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change

impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse

effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity, Draft decision, COP 18,

Doha, 8 December 2012.

• UNFCCC, Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with

climate change impacts, Decision of COP 19, Warsaw, November 2013.

1.2. European Law

Treaties, conventions, charters

• Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome,

4 November 1950 in Rome, Council of Europe, Treaties Series, 5.

• Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty

Establishing the European Community, O.J. C 306/1, adopted on 13 December

2007, entered into force 1 December 2009.

• Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 303, 14 December

2007.

• Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May

9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [TFEU]

• Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C

83) 13 [TEU].

Directives

• Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving

temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on

measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such

persons and bearing the consequences thereof, O.J. (L 212).

• Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 Jan. 2003 Laying down Minimum Standards for

the Reception of Asylum Seekers, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18.

79

• Council Directive 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the

qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees

or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the

protection granted, O.J. (L 304)12 [Qualification Directive].

• Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the Residence Permit Issued to

Third Country Nationals Who Are Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings or Who

Have Been the Subject of an Action to Facilitate Illegal Immigration, Who Cooperate

with the Competent Authorities, 2004 O.J. (L 261) 19.

• Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on

Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2005

O.J. (L 326) 13.

• European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on

Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally

Staying Third Country Nationals, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98 [Return Directive].

• Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of

Third- Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International

Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary

Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted (Recast), 2011 O.J. (L

337) 95.

Other Instruments

• Africa-EU Partnership on MME, Priorities for future cooperation in the area of

Migration and Mobility in the framework of the Africa -EU Strategic Partnership,

Senior Officials Meeting, Brussels, 27 and 28 November 2013.

• Commission of the European Communities, A Common Immigration Policy for

Europe: Principles, actions and tools, COM (2008) 359 final, 7 June 2008.

• Commission of the European Communities, Communication “On circular migration

and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries”,

COM(2007) 248 final.

• Council Conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy, “Towards a renewed and

strengthened European Union Climate Diplomacy”, Joint Reflection Paper by the

High Representative and the Commission, 3106th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting,

Brussels, 18 July 2011.

• Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1637 “Europe’s boat people:

mixed migration flows by sea into southern Europe”, 2008.

80

• Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1655, “Environmentally

induced migration and displacement: a 21st-century challenge”, 30 January 2009.

• Council of Europe, Recommendation 1862, 30 January 2009.

• Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Global Approach to

Migration and Mobility, Brussels, 3 May 2012.

• Council of the European Union, The Africa-EU strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-

EU Strategy, 16344/07, 9 December, 2007.

• European Commission, Adapting to Climate Change in Europe-Options for EU

action, Green Paper from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,

and the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the

Regions, Brussels , SEC (2007) 849.

• European Union, “Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African,

Carribean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community

and it Member States , of the Other Part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000”,

Official Journal of the European Communities, L 317/3, 15 December 2000.

• European Commission, “Higher standards of protection for refugees and asylum

seekers in the EU”, Speech of C. MALMSTRÖM at the UNHCR Ministerial Meeting,

Roundtable Discussion on 'Protection Challenges and Opportunities', Geneva, 7

December 2011.

• European Commission, A dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the

southern Mediterranean countries, Communication from the Commission to the

European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee

and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2011) 292 final.

• European Commission, A Global Approach to migration One Year On : Towards a

Comprehensive European Migration Policy, COM (2006) 735, 30 November 2006.

• European Commission, Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme,

COM(2010) 171 final of 20 April 2010.

• European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Policy priorities in

the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals, Brussels, COM(2006)

402 final.

• European Commission, Communication on migration, Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social

Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2011) 248 final.

81

• European Commission, Communication on the work of the Task Force

Mediterranean, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the

European Parliament, Brussels, COM(2013) 869 final.

• European Commission, EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development,

Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2011) 1627 final.

• European Commission, “The Cotonou Agreement”, the EU and the ACP,

Ouagadougou, June 2010.

• European Commission, Immigration and asylum policies, Communication from the

Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, COM(94) 23

final.

• European Commission, Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda

for Change, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the

Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the

Regions, COM(2011) 637 final.

• European Commission, Maximizing the Development Impact of Migration. The EU

contribution for the UN High-level Dialogue and next steps towards broadening the

development-migration nexus, Communication from the Commission to the


and the Committee of the Regions, , Brussels, COM(2013) 292 final.

• European Commission, Migration and Development, Commission Staff Working

Paper, Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the


and the Committee of the Regions, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,

{COM(2011) 743 final} Brussels, SEC(2011) 1353 final.

• European Commission, Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations,

Brussels, COM (2005) 390 final.

• European Commission, Policy plan on asylum : an integrated approach to protection

across the EU - Impact Assessment, Commission staff working document

accompanying the communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the

Committee of Regions, COM(2008) 360 final, SEC(2008) 2030.

• European Commission, Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing

Coordination, Coherence and Synergies, COM (2008) 611, 8 October 2008.

82

• European Commission, The (revised) Cotonou Agreement, the EU and the ACP,

Ouagadougou, June 2010.

• European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the

European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,

Brussels, COM (2011) 743 final.

• European Commission, The EU approach to Resilience: learning from Food Security

Crises, Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament,

COM (2012) 586 final.

• European Council, Declaration on Principles of governing external aspects of

migration policy, Conclusions of the Presidency, Edinburgh December 12, 1992, SN

456/92 Annex 5, Part 2.

• European Council, EU Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 19 to 20 June 2008.

• European Council, EU Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, October 15-16, 1999.

• European Council, Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) between the European

Union and Poor Developing Countries Most Vulnerable to Climate Change, Council

Conclusions, 15103/07, 2007.

• European Council, Stockholm Programme, Council Document 17024/09, 1-2

December 2009.

• European Union, EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international

humanitarian law, OJ C327, 23 December 2005.

• European Parliament, Parliamentary questions, Answer given by Mr Dimas on behalf

of the Commission (website), 4 February 2009 and

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2009-

5520&language=EN ( accessed on 23/8/2013)

• European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions to the Commission, Answer given by

Mrs. Malström on behalf of the Commission (website), 24/8/2012 and

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2012-

006604&language=EN (accessed on 23 October 2013)

• European Commission, Climate change, environmental degradation, and migration,

Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying the document Communication

from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An EU Strategy

on adaptation to climate change, Brussels, SWD(2013) 138 final.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2009-5520&language=EN




83

• European Union, The European Consensus, 1352 Joint Statement by the Council

and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States Meeting within

the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union

Development Policy, O.J., C46/1, 24 February 2006.

• European Union, “Opening address by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the

symposium on the Common Security and Defence Policy”, Washington DC, 8 May

2013.

• Fourth EU-Africa Summit, EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, Brussels,

2-3 April 2014.

• MALMSTRÖM, C., "Establishing the Common European Asylum System by 2012 –

an ambitious but feasible target", Ministerial Conference “Quality and Efficiency in

the Asylum Process”, Brussels, 14 September 2010.

• MALMSTRÖM, C., “Progress in EU migration policy since 1999”, Speech of the EU

Commissioner for Home Affairs, Tampere, 13 September 2013.

• The Schengen Acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14

June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union,

the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition

of checks at their common borders, OJ L 239, 22.9.2000, 19–62.

• Third Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, 23

November 2011.

1.3. The African System

• African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), Naïrobi (Kenya),

27 June 1981, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1520, 217.

• AU Executive Council, African Common Position on Migration and Development,

Banjul, 2006, EX. CL/DEC.305 (IX).

• AU Executive Council, The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, June 29, 2006,

EX.CL/276 (IX).

• African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced

Persons in Africa ("Kampala Convention"), African Union, Addis Ababa, 22 October

2009

• Convention Concerning Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa,

Organisation of African Unity, 10 september 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series,

vol. 1001 , 45.

• Constitutive Act of the African Union, signed at Lomé (Togo), 11 July 2000.

84

2. Doctrine

2.1. Books, chapters and monographs

• ADGER, W.N., AGRAWALA, S., MIRZA, M.M.Q., CONDE, C., O’BRIEN, K., PUHLIN,

J., PULWARTY, R., SMIT, B., TAKAHASHI, K., “ Assessment of adaptation practices,

options, constraints and capacity. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and

Vulnerability”, 2007, in M.L. PARRY, O.F. CANZIANI, J.P. PALUTIKOF, P.J. VAN DER

LINDEN, C.E. HANSON (eds.), Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth

Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge, UK, 717–743.

• AFIFI, T. and JÄGER, J. (eds.) Environment, Forced Migration and Social

Vulnerability, Berlin, Springer, 2010, 210 p.

• AYERS, J. et al., “Assessing EU assistance for Adaptation to Climate Change in

Developing Countries: A Southern Perspective”, in S. OBERTHÜR and M.

PALLEMAERTS (Eds.) The New Climate Policies of the EU, Brussels, VUB Press,

2010, 339 p.

• Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute (eds.), Migration, Public Opinion

and Politics, The Transatlantic Council on Migration, 2009, 392 p.

• BETTS, A., LOESCHER G. en MILNER, J., UNHCR: The politics and practice of refugee

protection into the 21st century, New York, Routledge, 2008, 161 p.

• BIERMANN, F. and BOAS, I., “Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards a

Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees”, in J. Scheffran et al.

(eds.), Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, Berlin: Springer-

Verlag, 2012.

• BLACK, R. KNIVETON, D. and SCHMIDT-VERKERK, K., “Migration and Climate

Change: Towards an Integrated Assessment of Sensitivity” in T. FAIST and J.

SCHADE (eds.), Disentangling Migration and Climate Change, Springer Science,

2013, 29-53.

• BLACK, R., Refugees, environment and development, Longman development

studies, Longman, 229 p.

• BOKO, M., I. NIANG, A. NYONG, C. VOGEL, A. GITHEKO, M. MEDANY, B. OSMAN-

ELASHA, R. TABO and P. YANDA, “Africa. Climate Change 2007: Impacts,

85

Adaptation and Vulnerability”, in M.L. PARRY, O.F. CANZIANI, J.P. PALUTIKOF, P.J.

VAN DER LINDEN and C.E. HANSON (Eds.), Fourth Assessment Report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge UK, 433-467 and

http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch9.html

• BURGESS, J. P. and GUTWIRTH, S., A threat against Europe? Security, Migration

and Integration, VUB Press, IES Publication Series, published by ASP, 2011, 224 p.

• CARBONE, M. (ed.), Policy Coherence and EU Development Policy, London:

Routledge, 2013, 168 p.

• CARBONE, M. (ed.), The European Union in Africa: incoherent policies,

asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?, Manchester University Press, 2013,

330 p.

• CARBONE, M., “EU-Africa relations in the twenty-first century: evolution and

explanations”, in M. CARBONE (ed.), The European Union in Africa: incoherent

policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?, Manchester University

Press, 2013, 3-21.

• CARLIER, J.-Y and VANHEULE, D., Europe and Refugees: a challenge?, The

Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 241 p.

• EKARDT, F., “Climate change and justice: perspectives of legal theory” in HOLLO,

E.J., KULOVESI, K. and MEHLING, M. (eds.) Climate Change and the Law,

Dordrecht, Springer, 2013, 63-82.

• GUTWIRTH, S., “Le cosmopolitique, le droit et les choses”, in F. AUDREN and L. DE

SUTTER, Pratiques cosmopolitiques du droit, Cosmopolitiques. Cahiers théoriques

pour l’écologie politique, N° 8, Paris, L’Aube, 2004, 77-88.

• HAMMER, T., “Desertification and Migration”, in J. D. UNRUH, M. S. KROL, and N.

KLIOT (eds.), Environmental Change and Its Implications for Population Migration,

Kluwer, Dordrecht 2004.

• HOLLO, E.J., KULOVESI, K. and MEHLING, M. (eds.) Climate Change and the Law,

Dordrecht, Springer, 2013, 693 p.

• HOMER-DIXON, T., “Thresholds of Turmoil: Environmental Scarcities and Violent

Conflict” in D. DEUDNEY and R. MATTHEW (eds.), Contested Grounds: Security and

Conflict in the New Environmental Policies, Albany, NY: State University of New York

Press, 1999.


86

• HUGO, G., “Lessons from past forced resettlement for climate change migration”,

in E. PIGUET, A. PECOUD, P. DE GUCHTENEIRE (eds.), Migration and Climate

change, UNESCO, 2011, 260-288.

• JONAS, H., The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the

Technological Age, University of Chicago Press, 1985, 255 p.

• KÄLIN, W., “Conceptualizing Climate-Induced Displacement” in J. McADAM, Climate

Change and Displacement, Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Oxford/Portland, 2010,

84 – 86.

• LACKZKO, F. and AGHAZARM, C. (eds.), Migration, Environment and Climate

Change: Assessing the evidence, Geneva, International Organization for Migration,

2009, 441 p.

• LACZKO, F. and AGHAZARM, C., “Introduction and overview: Enhancing the

knowledge base”,In F. LACZKO and C. AGHAZARM (eds.), Migration, environment

and climate change: Assessingthe evidence, Geneva, IOM, 7–40.

• LAVENEX, S. and UCARER, M.E., “The Emergent EU Migration Regime and Its

External Impact” In S. LAVENEX and M. E. UCARER (eds.) Migration and

Externalities of European Integration, Oxford: Lexington Books, 1-13.

• LEIGHTON, M., “Drought, desertification and migration: past experiences, predicted

impacts and human rights issues” in: E. PIGUET, A. PECOUD and P. DE

GUCHTENEIRE (Eds.), Migration and Climate change, UNESCO, 2011, 331-358.

• MANGALA, J., “Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment”, in J.

MANGALA (Ed.), Africa and the European : a strategic Partnership, New York,

Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 195-222.

• McADAM, J. 2012. Climate Change, Forced Migration and International Law. Oxford:

University Press, 322 p.

• McINERNEY-LANKFORD, S., DARROW, M. and RAJAMANI, L., Human Rights and

Climate change Environmental Protection and Human Rights Law: Basic Concepts,

Washington D.C., The World Bank, 2011 and

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/HumanRightsAndC

limateChange.pdf, 162 p.

• MOREL, M. and MAES, F., “The Curious Phenomenon of “Environmental

Migration/Displacement” and the Role of International Law in Cross-Border

Protection” in D. French (ed.), Global Justice and Sustainable Development, Leiden,

Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010, 273-288.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/HumanRightsAndClimateChange.pdf

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/HumanRightsAndClimateChange.pdf

87

• PAREDIS, E., GOEMINNE, G., VANHOVE, W., MAES, F. en LAMBRECHT, J., The

Concept of Ecological debt: its Meaning and Applicability in International Policy,

Gent, Academia press, 2008, 280 p.

• Parry, M. L., Canziani, O. F., Palutikof, J. P., van der Linden, P. J. and Hanson, C.

E. (eds.) Contribution of working group II to the fourth assessment report of the

intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2007, and http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch9.html,

433-467.

• PENZ, P., “International Ethical Responsibilities to “Climate Refugees””, in Mc Adam,

J. (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement : Multidisciplinary Perspectives, 2010.

• PIGUET, E., PECOUD, A. and DE GUCHTENEIRE, P., (eds.) “Intoduction: Migration

andClimate change”, in PIGUET, E., PECOUD, A. and DE GUCHTENEIRE, P.,

(eds.) Migration andClimate change, UNESCO, 2011, 102-137.

• PRIGOGINE, I. and STENGERS, I., La nouvelle alliance. Metamorphose de la

science, Gallimard, 1986, 439 p.

• SERRES, M., Retour au Contrat naturel, Bibliothèque nationale de France, 2000, 29

p.

• SICURELLI, D., “Africa-EU Partnership on climate change and the environment”, in

J. MANGALA (ed.), Africa and the European: a strategic Partnership, New York,

Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 149-169.

• SIYOUM, A.D., “Food Insecurity and Environmental Migration in Drought-Prone

Areas of Ethiopia” in M. LEIGHTON, S. XIAOMENG and K. WARNER (Eds.), Climate

Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk

Reduction, UNU-EHS, 63-73 and

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fullreport_149.pdf, 121 p.

• SÖDERBAUM, F. “The European Union as an actor in Africa: internal coherence and

external legitimacy”, in M. CARBONE (ed.), The European Union in Africa:

incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?, Manchester

University Press, 2013, 25-42.

• STERN, N., The economics of climate change: The Stern Review, Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 2007, 692 p.

• TORPEY, J., The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State,

Cambridge University Press, 2000, 211 p.

• VAN CRIEKINGE, T., “The EU-Africa migration Partnership : the limits of the EU’s

external dimension of migration in Africa”, in M. CARBONE, The European Union in


http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/fullreport_149.pdf

88

Africa: incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance?,

Manchester University Press, 2013, 258-282.

• VERSCHUUREN, J., “Legal aspects of Climate change adaptation” in HOLLO, E.J.,

KULOVESI, K. en MEHLING, M. (eds.) Climate Change and the Law, Dordrecht,

Springer, 2013, 257-285.

• VLASSOPOULOS, C.A., “Institutional Barriers to the Recognition and Assistance of

Environmentally Forced Migrants”, in T. AFIFI and J. JÄGER (eds.), Environment,

Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2010,

17-27.

• WESTRA, L., Environmental justice and the rights of ecological refugees, London,

Earthscan, 2009, 302 p.

• WHITE, G. “The “Securization” of Climate-Induced Migration” in K. R., KHORY (ed.),

Global Migration.in the Twenty-first Century, 2012, 17-41.

• YAMINEVA, Y. and KULOVESI, K. “The new Framework for climate finance under

the United Nations Framework on Climate Change: a breakthrough or an empty

promise?” in HOLLO, E.J., KULOVESI, K. and MEHLING, M. (eds.) Climate Change

and the Law, Dordrecht, Springer, 191-223.

2.2. Articles, Reports and Occasional Papers

• ABEBE, A., “Legal and institutional dimensions of protecting and assisting internally

displaced persons in Africa”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 22, June 2009, 155-

175.

• ABEBE, A., “The African Union on internally displaced persons: its codification,

background, scope and enforcement challenges”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.

29, N° 3, 2010, 29-57.

• ADEPOJU, A., “Migration in sub-Saharan Africa”, A background paper commissioned

by the Nordic Africa Institute, 2007 and

http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/08/88/66/730473a9.pdf, 59 p.

• AFIFI, T. and WARNER, K., "The impact of environmental degradation on migration

flows across countries", Working Paper 5/2008, United Nations University Institute

for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), Bonn, 2008 and

http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file.php?id=394, 25 p.

http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/08/88/66/730473a9.pdf

http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file.php?id=394

89

• AFIFI, T., “Economic or Environmental Migration? The Push Factors in Niger”,

International Migration Vol. 49, Issue S1, June 2011, 95 -124.

• AMMER, M., “Climate change and Human Rights: The Status of Climate Refugees in

Europe”, Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights (BIM), Austria, 2009

and http://www.udhr60.ch/report/ClimateChange-paper0609.pdf, 78 p.

• AMMER, M., "Climate change and Human Rights: The Status of Climate Refugees in

Europe", Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights (BIM), Austria, 2009 and

http://www.udhr60.ch/report/ClimateChange-paper0609.pdf, 78 p.

• ATAPATTU, S., “Climate Change, Human Rights and Forced Migration: Implications

for International Law”, 27 Wis. International Law Journal, 2009, 607-636.

• AUBARELL, G., ZAPATA-BARRERO, R. and ARAGALL, X., “New Directions of National

Immigration Policies: The Development of the External Dimension and its

Relationship with the Euro-Mediterranean Process”, Euro Mesco Paper, N° 79, 2009.

• BACAIAN, L.E., “The protection of refugees and their right to seek asylum in the

European Union”, Collection Euryopa, vol. 70, Genève, 2011 and

http://www.unige.ch/ieug/publications/euryopa/Bacaian.pdf, 84 p.

• BAKEWELL, O., “Which Diaspora for Whose Development? Some Critical Questions

about the Role of Africa Diaspora Organizations as Development Actors”. DIIS Policy

Brief, May 2009, 28 p.

• BARNETT, J. and WEBBER, M., “Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation

to Climate Change”, Commission on Climate Change and Development, 2009, 61

p.

• BATES, D.C., “Environmental Refugees? Classifying human migrations caused by

Environmental Change”, Population and Environment, vol. 23, no. 5, 2002, 465-

477.

• BAUER, S., “Climate Refugees beyond Copenhagen. Legal concept, political

implications, normative considerations”, Brotfür die Welt, Stuttgart, 2010 and

http://www.aprodev.eu/files/climate_change/other/climate%20refugees_bfw.pdf,

32 p.

• BELLAMY, A., “Realizing the responsibility to protect”, International Studies

Perspective, Volume 10, 2009, 111-128.

• BETTS, A., “Soft Law and the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants”, Georgetown

Immigration Law Journal, Vol. 24, 2010, 533-552 and

http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/seventhcoord2008/Betts_SoftLaw_Pa

per.pdf, 26 p.

http://www.udhr60.ch/report/ClimateChange-paper0609.pdf

http://www.udhr60.ch/report/ClimateChange-paper0609.pdf

http://www.unige.ch/ieug/publications/euryopa/Bacaian.pdf

http://www.unige.ch/ieug/publications/euryopa/Bacaian.pdf8

http://www.unige.ch/ieug/publications/euryopa/Bacaian.pdf8

http://www.aprodev.eu/files/climate_change/other/climate%20refugees_bfw.pdf

http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/seventhcoord2008/Betts_SoftLaw_Paper.pdf

http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/seventhcoord2008/Betts_SoftLaw_Paper.pdf

90

• BETTS, A., "Migration Governance, Alternative Futures", IOM, Background Paper

WMR 2010 and

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2010_migration_governance_alter

native_futures.pdf, 23 p.

• BIERMANN, F. and BOAS, I., “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global

Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees”, Global Environmental Politics,

Vol. 10, N°1, 2010, 60-88.

• BLACK, R., BENNETT, S.R.G. THOMAS, S.M. and BEDDINGTON, J.R., “Migration as

Adaptation”, Nature, Vol. 478, 2011, 447-449.

• BLACK, R., "Environmental refugees: Myth or reality?", New Issues in Refugee

Research, Working paper 34, Geneva, UNHCR, 2001

and http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0d00.pdf, 19 p.

• BLACK, R., ADGER, W.N., AMELL, N.W., DERCON, S., GEDDES, A. and THOMAS,

D. , “The effect of environmental change on human migration”, Global

Environmental Change, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 2011, 3-11.

• BOANO, C., “FMO Research Guide on Climate change and displacement”, 2008,

http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo046, 48 p.

• BOANO, C., ZETTER, R. and MORRIS, T., “Environmentally displaced people,

Understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced

migration”, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, November 2008 and

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policy-briefings/RSCPB1-Environment.pdf,

44 p.

• BOANO, C., ZETTER, R. and MORRIS, T., "Environmentally displaced people.

Understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced

migration", Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre, 2008 and

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policy-briefings/RSCPB1-Environment.pdf,

44 p.

• BOSWELL, C., “The 'External Dimension' of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy”,

International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, 2003, 619-638.

• BOYLE, A., “Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment”, UNEP paper

revised, 2010 and

http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/Hu

manRightsEnvironmentRev.pdf, 39 p.

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2010_migration_governance_alternative_futures.pdf

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2010_migration_governance_alternative_futures.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ae6a0d00.pdf

http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo046

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policy-briefings/RSCPB1-Environment.pdf

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/policy-briefings/RSCPB1-Environment.pdf

http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/HumanRightsEnvironmentRev.pdf

http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/HumanRightsEnvironmentRev.pdf

91

• BROWN, O., “Eating the Dry Season‖: Labour mobility as a coping strategy for

climate change”, Opinions and insights from the International Institute for

Sustainable Development, June 2007 and

http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/com_dry_season.pdf, 3 p.

• BROWN, O., HAMMILL, A. and MCLEMAN, R., “Climate change as the ‘new’ security

threat: implications for Africa”, International Affairs, Vol. 83, Issue 6, November

2007, 1141–1154 and

http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/climate_security_threat_africa.pdf, 14 p.

• BROWN, O., "Climate change and forced migration; observations, projections and

implications", UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Occasional Paper:

Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world, UNDP, Geneva, 2007

and www.hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-

2008/papers/brown_oli.pdf., 35 p.

• BROWN, O., “Migration and Climate Change”, Geneva, IOM, 2008 and

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS-31_EN.pdf, 64 p.

• CASTLES, S., "Environmental change and forced migration: making sense of the

debate", UNHCR Working Paper No. 70, 2002

and http://www3.hants.gov.uk/forced_migration.pdf, 16 p.

• Christian Aid, “Human Tide : The Real Migration Crisis”, May 2007

http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/human-tide.pdf, 28 p.

• COLLYER, M., “Migrants as strategic actors in the European Union's Global Approach

to Migration and Mobility”, Global Networks, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 2012, 50-524.

• CONISBEE, M. and SIMMS, A., “Environmental Refugees. The Case for

Recognition”, New Economics Foundation, London, 2003 and

http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/lpce0g55xjx5eq55mfjxbb5523102003

180040.pdf, 44 p.

• COOPER, M.D., “Migration and Disaster-Induced Displacement: European Policy,

Practice and Perspective”, CGD Working Paper 308, Washington, D.C.: Center for

Global Development, 2012 and

http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426605_file_Cooper_disaster_displacement_FINAL.p

df, 83 p.

• COURNIL, C., "A la recherche d’une protection pour les « réfugiés

environnementaux » : actions, obstacles, enjeux et protections", REVUE

Asylon(s), 6, 2008, and http://www.reseau-terra.eu/article843.html, 26 p.

http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/com_dry_season.pdf




http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/climate_security_threat_africa.pdf

http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/brown_oli.pdf

http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/brown_oli.pdf

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MRS-31_EN.pdf

http://www3.hants.gov.uk/forced_migration.pdf

http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/human-tide.pdf

http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/lpce0g55xjx5eq55mfjxbb5523102003180040.pdf

http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads/lpce0g55xjx5eq55mfjxbb5523102003180040.pdf

http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426605_file_Cooper_disaster_displacement_FINAL.pdf

http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426605_file_Cooper_disaster_displacement_FINAL.pdf

http://www.reseau-terra.eu/article843.html

92

• DASGUPTA, S. et al.., “The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A

Comparative Analysis”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4136, World

Bank, 2007 and

http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/02/09/

000016406_20070209161430/Rendered/PDF/wps4136.pdf, 51 p.

• DE HAAS, H., “Migration transitions: a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the

developmental drivers of international migration”, IMI Working Paper No 24,

International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, 2010 and

http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/wp/wp-24-10, 49 p.

• DE MOOR, N. and CLIQUET, A., “Environmental Displacement: A New Challenge for

European Migration Policy”, Rijksuniversiteit Gent, 2009 and

http://www.academia.edu/224274/Environmental_Displacement_A_New_Challeng

e_for_European_Migration_Policy, 20 p.

• DE MOOR, N., “Returning to a destructed environment: on the right and duty to

return”, Paper prepared for the ClimMig Conference on “Human Rights,

Environmental Change, Migration and Displacement”, Vienna, 20-21 September

2012 and http://www.humanrights.at/climmig/wp-

content/uploads/Nicole_de_Moor.pdf, 25 p.

• DENG, F., “The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”,

E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, New York, United Nations, 1998 and

www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/principles.htm, 8 p.

• DOCHERTY, B. and GIANNINI, T., "Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a

Convention on Climate Change Refugees", Harvard Environmental Law Review 33,

2009, 349-403.

• DUN, O. and GEMENNE, F., “Defining ‘environmental migration’”, Forced Migration

Review, 31, 2008 and http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR31/FMR31.pdf, 10 p.

• ĎURKOVÁ, P., GROMILOVA, A, KISS, B., PLAKU, M., “Climate refugees in the 21st

century”, Regional Academy on the United Nations, 2012 and http://acuns.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/01/Climate-Refugees-1.pdf, 26 p.

• EDWARDS, A., , “Refugee Status Determination in Africa”, African Journal of

International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, N° 204, 2006, 225-227.

• European Migration Network, “Illegally Resident Third Country Nationals in EU

Member States: state approaches towards them, their profile and social situation”,

, Synthesis Report, 2007 and http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-,affairs/e-

http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/wp/wp-24-10

http://www.academia.edu/224274/Environmental_Displacement_A_New_Challenge_for_European_Migration_Policy

http://www.academia.edu/224274/Environmental_Displacement_A_New_Challenge_for_European_Migration_Policy

http://www.humanrights.at/climmig/wp-content/uploads/Nicole_de_Moor.pdf

http://www.humanrights.at/climmig/wp-content/uploads/Nicole_de_Moor.pdf

http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/principles.htm

http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR31/FMR31.pdf

http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Climate-Refugees-1.pdf

http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Climate-Refugees-1.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-,affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/pdf/general/emn_synthesis_report_illegal_immigration_final_january_2007.pdf

93

library/documents/policies/immigration/pdf/general/emn_synthesis_report_illegal

_immigration_final_january_2007.pdf, 32 p.

• European Migration Network, “The different national practices concerning granting

of non-EU harmonized protection statuses”, 2010, and

http://www.sisekaitse.ee/public/ERV/synthesis_reports/0_EMN_Synthesis_Report

_NonEUharmonised_FinalVersion_January2011.pdf, 110 p.

• European Union (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change: EU policy options, Study

of the European Parliament: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union,

Brussels, 2012 and

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/DROI/studies.html?action=2&tab

=last, 137 p.

• European Union (ed.), Supporting a Climate for Change, Brussels, 2012 and

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/environment/documents/supporting_a_clima

te_for_change_2012.pdf, 40 p.

• Eurostat, “The European Union and the African Union: A Statistical Portrait”,

European Union, 2012 and

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-31-12-239/EN/KS-31-

12-239-EN.PDF, 100 p.

• FALSTRÖM, D.Z., “Stemming the Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a

Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Environment”, Colorado Journal of

International Environmental Law, 2002 and

http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5530/v07/undervisningsmateriale/e

nvironmental%20refugees%20article.pdf, 19 p.

• FARBOTKO, C. and LAZRUS, H., “The first climate refugees? Contesting global

narratives of climate change in Tuvalu”, Global Environmental Change, 22 (2),

2012, 382-390.

• FATIMA, R., JAWADUROVNA, A. W. and COELHO, S., “Human Rights, Climate

change, Environmental degradation and Migration: A new Paradigm”, IOM and MPI,

Issue N°8, March 2014 and

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MPI_Issue_No8_web.pdf, 12 p.

• FINDLAY, A.M., “Migrant Destinations in an Era of Environmental Change”, Global

Environmental Change 21, 2011, 50-58.

• FORESIGHT, Migration and Global Environmental Change, Final Project Report, The

Government Office for Science, London, 2011 and

http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/11-1116-migration-and-

global-environmental-change.pdf, 234 p.



http://www.sisekaitse.ee/public/ERV/synthesis_reports/0_EMN_Synthesis_Report_NonEUharmonised_FinalVersion_January2011.pdf

http://www.sisekaitse.ee/public/ERV/synthesis_reports/0_EMN_Synthesis_Report_NonEUharmonised_FinalVersion_January2011.pdf

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/DROI/studies.html?action=2&tab=last

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/DROI/studies.html?action=2&tab=last

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/environment/documents/supporting_a_climate_for_change_2012.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/environment/documents/supporting_a_climate_for_change_2012.pdf

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-31-12-239/EN/KS-31-12-239-EN.PDF

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-31-12-239/EN/KS-31-12-239-EN.PDF

http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5530/v07/undervisningsmateriale/environmental%20refugees%20article.pdf

http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5530/v07/undervisningsmateriale/environmental%20refugees%20article.pdf

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MPI_Issue_No8_web.pdf

http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf

http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf

94

• GAHRE, C., “The Nansen Conference. Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st

Century”, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oslo, 2011 and

http://www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf, 20 p.

• GEDDES, A. and SOMERVILLE, W. “Migration and environmental change: Assessing

the developing European approach”, Brussels, Migration Policy Institute Europe,

Policy Brief Series, Issue N° 2, 2013 and

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPIEurope-EnvironmentalMigration.pdf, 8 p.

• GEMENNE, F., “Climate-induced Displacements in 4°C+ world”, Philosophical

Transactions of the Royal Society A 369 (1934), 2011, 182-195.

• GEMENNE, F., “Why the Numbers don’t Add up: A review of Estimates and

Predictions of People Displaced by Environmental Changes”, Global Environmental

Change, N° 21, 2011, 41-49.

• Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, “Climate

change and Human Rights: The status of climate refugees in

Europe”, www.udhr60.ch/report/ClimateChange-boltzmann1108.pdf, 10 p.

• GLEDITSCH, N., NORDAS, R. and SALEHYAN, I., Climate Change and Conflict: the

Migration Link, Coping with Crisis: Working Paper Series, New York, International

Peace Academy, 2007 and

http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/political_science/shared/political_science/

1701/Environmental-Security-Article-Nordas-Gleditsch.pdf, 14 p.

• GUTWIRTH, S., “Bouleversement Climatique: Penser ce qui vient avec Bruno

Latour”, Revue Juridique de l’Environnement, 1/2014, 45-50 (to be published).

• HEINE, B. and PETERSEN, L., “Adaptation et co-operation”, Les changements

climatiques et les déplacements, RFM31, 48-51 and http://fmr-

live.nsms.ox.ac.uk/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/fr/pdf/MFR31/28.pdf, 3 p.

• HEINZERLING, L., “Climate change, Human health and the post-cautionary

principle”, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 96, N°2, 445-458.

• High Representative Javier Solana and European Commission, “Climate Change and

International Security”, Paper from the High Representative and the European

Commission to the European Council, S 113/08, Brussels, European Commission,

2008, and

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99

387.pdf, 11 p.

• HRISTOSKI, I. and SOTIROSK, K. “Conceptual Data Modelling of Modern Human

Migration”, Management Information Systems, Vol. 7, N° 4, 2012 and

http://www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPIEurope-EnvironmentalMigration.pdf

http://www.udhr60.ch/report/ClimateChange-boltzmann1108.pdf

http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/political_science/shared/political_science/1701/Environmental-Security-Article-Nordas-Gleditsch.pdf



http://fmr-live.nsms.ox.ac.uk/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/fr/pdf/MFR31/28.pdf

http://fmr-live.nsms.ox.ac.uk/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/fr/pdf/MFR31/28.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf

95

http://www.ef.uns.ac.rs/mis/archive-pdf/2012%20-%20No4/MIS2012-4-1.pdf, 12

p.

• Human Impact Report of Climate Change, The Anatomy of a silent Crisis, Global

Humanitarian Forum, Geneva, 2009

and http://www.globaldialoguefoundation.org/files/humanimpactreport.pdf, 127 p.

• ICMPD, “Comparative Study on the Existence and Application of Categorized

Protection in Selected European Countries”, ACVZ Preliminary study, N°12, 2006

and http://www.acvz.org/publicaties/S_VS12_ENG.pdf, 67 p.

• Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), “IASC Framework on durable solutions

for internally displaced persons”, The Brookings Institution, University of Bern, 2010

and

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/IASC%20Framework%20DS%20fo

r%20IDPs.pdf, 57 p.

• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Climate Change 2001: the

scientific basis. Contribution of working group I to the Third Assessment Report of

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2001 and

http://www.acrim.com/%5C/Reference%20Files/CLIMATECHANGE%202001%202

0The%20Scientific%20Basis.pdf, 94 p.

• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Climate Change 2007:

Synthesis Report”, 2007 and http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-

report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf, 52 p.

• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Climate Change 2013: The

Physical Science Basis. Working Group 1 Contribution to the Fifth Assessment

Report of the IPCC. Summary for Policy Makers”, October 2013 and

http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGI_AR5_SPM_brochure.pdf

, 33 p.

• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Managing the Risks of

Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation”, A Special

Report of Working Groups I and II of the IPCC, 2012, available in extended version

or in summary at: http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/report/

• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), “First Assessment Report

1990”, Working Group II, 1990 and

http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_II/ipcc_far_wg_II_full_report.pdf, 296 p.

http://www.ef.uns.ac.rs/mis/archive-pdf/2012%20-%20No4/MIS2012-4-1.pdf

http://www.globaldialoguefoundation.org/files/humanimpactreport.pdf

http://www.acvz.org/publicaties/S_VS12_ENG.pdf

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/IASC%20Framework%20DS%20for%20IDPs.pdf

https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/IASC%20Framework%20DS%20for%20IDPs.pdf

http://www.acrim.com/%5C/Reference%20Files/CLIMATECHANGE%202001%2020The%20Scientific%20Basis.pdf

http://www.acrim.com/%5C/Reference%20Files/CLIMATECHANGE%202001%2020The%20Scientific%20Basis.pdf

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf



http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/report/

http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/wg_II/ipcc_far_wg_II_full_report.pdf

96

• International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), “Climate refugees.

Legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration”, Study

commissioned by the European Parliament, Directorate General for internal policies,

Policy Department C: Citizens' rights and constitutional affairs, civil liberties, justice

and home affairs, Brussels, 2011, and

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/ep-climate-change-refugees-

study.pdf, 90 p.

• International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Displacement and migration:

examples of initiatives to support resilience and adaptation”, UN System Side Event,

Geneva, 2010 and

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradat

ion/Climate-Change-Displacement-and-Migration-Shared-Messages.pdf, 4 p.

• International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Migration and the Environment”,

Discussion note, Geneva, 14 February 2008,

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/

94/MC_INF_288.pdf, 9 p.

• IOM, “Diasporas and Development: Bridging between Societies and States”,

International Dialogue on Migration 2013, Diaspora Ministerial Conference, June

2013 and http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-

Do/idm/workshops/IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/Background-Paper-

2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference-EN.pdf, 13 p.

• IOM, “Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change Adaptation, and Environmental

Migration: A Policy Perspective”, 2010 and

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradat

ion/DRR-CCA-Policy-Paper-Final.pdf, 20 p.

• IOM, “Regional Inter-State Consultation Mechanisms on Migration: Approaches,

Recent Activities and Implications for Global Governance of Migration”, IOM

Migration research Series, N°45, 2013 and

http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/2013-Global-RCP-

Background-Study_MRS45.pdf, 140 p.

• IOM, "Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows",

Geneva, IOM Migration research studies, 2008 and

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/publis

hed_docs/serial_publications/MRS-33.pdf, 72 p.

• JÄGER, J., FRÜHMANN, J., GÜNBERGER S. en VAG, A., Environmental Change and

Forced Migration Scenarios Project (EACH-FOR ), Synthesis Report, 14 May 2009

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/ep-climate-change-refugees-study.pdf

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/ep-climate-change-refugees-study.pdf

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/Climate-Change-Displacement-and-Migration-Shared-Messages.pdf

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/Climate-Change-Displacement-and-Migration-Shared-Messages.pdf

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/about_iom/en/council/94/MC_INF_288.pdf

http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/idm/workshops/IDM-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference/Background-Paper-2013-Diaspora-Ministerial-Conference-EN.pdf



http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/DRR-CCA-Policy-Paper-Final.pdf

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/DRR-CCA-Policy-Paper-Final.pdf

http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/2013-Global-RCP-Background-Study_MRS45.pdf

http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/2013-Global-RCP-Background-Study_MRS45.pdf

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_publications/MRS-33.pdf

http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/serial_publications/MRS-33.pdf

97

and http://www.each-for.eu/documents/EACH-

FOR_Synthesis_Report_090515.pdf, 81 p.

• JULCA, A., “Multidimensional Re-creation of Vulnerabilities and Potential for

Resilience

• in International Migration”, International Migration, Vol. 49, N° 30, 2011, 30-49.

• KÄLIN, “The Climate Change–Displacement Nexus’”, Speech at ECOSOC Panel on

Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness: Addressing the Humanitarian

Consequences of Natural Disasters 16 July, 2008 and

http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0716_climate_change_kalin.aspx?p=1

A, x p.

• KÄLIN, W. and SCHREPFER, N., “Protecting people Crossing Borders in the Context

of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches”, Legal and Protection

Policy Series, Geneva, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012

and http://www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.pdfhttp://www.unhcr.org/protect, 80 p.

• KATSELI, L., LUCAS, R. and XENOGIANI, T., “Effects of Migration on Sending

Countries : What do we know ?”, OECD Development Centre Working Paper N°250,

Paris : OECD, 2006 and

http://www1.oecd.org/development/poverty/37053726.pdf, 90 p.

• KNIVETON, D., SCHMIDT-VERKERK, K., Smith, C. and BLACK, R., “Climate Change

and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows”, International

Organisation for Migration Research Series 33 , University of Sussex, 2008, 72 p.

• KOLMANNSKOG, V. and TREBBI, L., “Climate change, natural disasters and

displacement: a multi-track approach to filling the protection gaps”, International

Review of the Red Cross, 92, 2010, 717 – 720.

• KOLMANNSKOG, V., "Future floods of refugees. A comment on climate change,

conflict and forced migration", Norwegian Refugee Council, April 2008 and

http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9268480.pdf, 43 p.

• KOROVAVALA, L., “Migration as Adaptation”, Nansen Initiative Consultation, IOM,

Cook Islands, 21-24 May 2013 and

http://www.nanseninitiative.org/sites/default/files/Migration%20as%20Adaptation

%20_0.pdf, 14 p.

• KRALER, A., CERNEI, T. and NOACK, M., “Climate refugees. Legal and policy

responses to environmentally induced migration”, Paper prepared for the ClimMig

Conference on Human Rights, Environmental Change, Migration and Displacement,

http://www.each-for.eu/documents/EACH-FOR_Synthesis_Report_090515.pdf

http://www.each-for.eu/documents/EACH-FOR_Synthesis_Report_090515.pdf

http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0716_climate_change_kalin.aspx?p=1A

http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0716_climate_change_kalin.aspx?p=1A

http://www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/protect

http://www1.oecd.org/development/poverty/37053726.pdf

http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9268480.pdf

http://www.nanseninitiative.org/sites/default/files/Migration%20as%20Adaptation%20_0.pdf

http://www.nanseninitiative.org/sites/default/files/Migration%20as%20Adaptation%20_0.pdf

98

Vienna, 20-21 September 2012 and http://www.humanrights.at/climmig/wp-

content/uploads/Paper_ICMPD_2012-10-15.pdf, 18 p.

• KRALER, A., CERNEI, T. and NOACK, M., “Climate Change & Migration: What is the

Role for Migration Policies?”, ICMPD, Policy Brief, 2012,

http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/ICMPD_-_Policy_Brief_-

_Climate_Refugees_May_2012.pdf, 8 p.

• LACY, S. “Climate Change and Migration: Possible Roles for German Development

Cooperation”, Discussion paper, GIZ, Eschborn, 2012 and

http://www.giz.de/Themen/de/dokumente/giz2012-en-climate-and-migration.pdf,

14 p.

• LACZKO, F., "Migration, the Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the

Evidence", 2008 and

https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/attachments/get_attachment?code=H69R15F9G8X

DNPEIR82XPA86906PQEOP, 6 p.

• LATOUR, B., “War and peace in an age of ecological conflicts”, Sciences Po, Paris

Lecture prepared for the Peter Wall Institute Vancouver, 23 September 2013 and

http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/527, 13 p.

• LAVENEX, S. and KUNZ, R., “The Migraton-Development Nexus in EU-External

relations”, European Integration, Vol. 30, N°3, 2008, 439-457.

• LEIGHTON, M, "Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues for Legal Protection of

Migrants and Displaced Persons, Washington", The German Marshall Fund of the

United States, 2010 and www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/7102, 12p.

• LEIGHTON, M., “Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues for Legal Protection of

Migrants and Displaced Persons”, Washington, The German Marshall Fund of the

United States, 2010 and www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/7102, 12p.

• LONERGAN, S. and SWAIN, A., “The Role of Environmental Degradation in

Population Displacement”, Environmental Change and Security Project Report,

Issue 4, 1998, 5-15 and

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF1493.pdf, 10 p.

• LONG, K., “Extending Protection? Labour Migration and Durable Solutions for

Refugees”, New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 176, October

2009, 33 p.

• MARTIN, S., “Climate Change and International Migration”, Background paper WMR

201, 2010 and

http://www.humanrights.at/climmig/wp-content/uploads/Paper_ICMPD_2012-10-15.pdf

http://www.humanrights.at/climmig/wp-content/uploads/Paper_ICMPD_2012-10-15.pdf

http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/ICMPD_-_Policy_Brief_-_Climate_Refugees_May_2012.pdf

http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/ICMPD_-_Policy_Brief_-_Climate_Refugees_May_2012.pdf

http://www.giz.de/Themen/de/dokumente/giz2012-en-climate-and-migration.pdf

https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/attachments/get_attachment?code=H69R15F9G8XDNPEIR82XPA86906PQEOP

https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/attachments/get_attachment?code=H69R15F9G8XDNPEIR82XPA86906PQEOP

http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/527

http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/7102


http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF1493.pdf

99

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2010_climate_change_migration.p

df, 19 p.

• MARTIN, S.F., “Environmental Change and Migration: what we know”, Migration

Policy InstitutePolicy Brief, N°2, Washington D.C., September 2013 and

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Migration-EnvironmentalChange.pdf, 12 p.

• MARU, M.T., "The Kampala Convention and its contribution in filling the protection

gap in international law", Journal of Internal Displacement (1), 1, 2011, 40 p.

• MAYER, B., "Governing International Climate Change-Induced Migration", chapter

3, University of Singapore, 2011 and http://ssrn.com/abstract=1955849, 13 p.

• MAYER, B., "Sustainable Development Law on Environmental Migration: The story

of a bag of marbles, an obelisk and a tapestry", International Development Law

Organisation, 2011 and http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/4._Benoit_Mayer_2.pdf,

32 p.

• MAYER, B., “Migration as a Sustainable Adaptation Strategy”, Presentation at the

second conference of the Initiative on Climate Adaptation Research and

Understanding through the Social Sciences: Climate Vulnerability and Adaptation:

Marginal Peoples and Environments, Unedited Draft, Ann Arbor, 2011 and

http://www.icarus.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Mayer.pdf, 14 p.

• MAYER, B., "Environmental Migration in Asia-Pacific Regions: Could We Hang Out

Sometime?", 2012 and http://ssrn.com/abstract=1955818, 45p.

• McADAM, J., “The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a

Subsidiary Protection Regime”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2005, 17 (3),

461-516.

• McADAM, J.,“Climate Change “Refugees” and International Law”, New South Wales

Bar Association address, 2007,

http://www.nswbar.asn.au/circulars/climatechange1.pdf, 12 p.

• McDAM, J., ”Environmental Migration Governance”, University of New South Wales

Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper 1, 2009,

file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/SSRN-id1412002.pdf, 33 p.

• McGRANAHAN, G. et al., “The rising tide: assessing the risks of climate change and

human settlementsin low elevation coastal zones”, 19(1) Environment and

Urbanization, 2007 and

http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/docs/McGranahan2007.pdf, 21 p.

• McLEMAN, R. and SMIT, B. “Migration as an adaptation to climate change” , Climate

Change, Vol. 76, N° 31, 2006, and

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2010_climate_change_migration.pdf

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR2010_climate_change_migration.pdf

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Migration-EnvironmentalChange.pdf

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1955849

http://cisdl.org/public/docs/news/4._Benoit_Mayer_2.pdf

http://www.icarus.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Mayer.pdf

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1955818

http://www.nswbar.asn.au/circulars/climatechange1.pdf

file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/SSRN-id1412002.pdf

http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/docs/McGranahan2007.pdf

100

http://perceval.bio.nau.edu/downloads/grail/climate_seminar/section3/McLeman_

and_Smit06.pdf, 23 p.

• MORRISSEY, J., "Environmental Change and Forced Migration: A State of the Art

Review, Oxford", Refugee Studies Centre, 2009

and http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/events/environmental-change-

andmigration/EnvChangeandFmReviewWS.pdf., 49 p.

• MYERS, N. and KENT, J., "Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global

Arena", Climate Institute, Washington DC, 1, 1995 and

www.climate.org/PDF/Environmental%20Exodus.pdf, 214 p.

• MYERS, N., “Environmental refugees in a globally warmed world”, Bioscience, Vol.

43, 1993, 752–761.

• MYERS, N., “Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st

century”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-

Biological Sciences, 1420, 2002, 609–613.

• MYERS, N., "Environmental Refugees: An emergent Security Issue", 13th Economic

Forum, 2005 and http://www.osce.org/eea/14851, 5 p.

• NAUDÉ, W., “Conflict, Disasters and No Jobs. Reasons for International Migration

from Sub-Saharan Africa”, Helsinki, UNU-WIDER, 25 p.

• OCHA, “OCHA and Slow-onset Emergencies”, OCHA Occasional Policy Briefing

Series, N°6, 2011 and

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/report_36.pdf, 11 p.

• OELS, A., "Asylum rights for climate refugees? From Agamben’s bare life to the

autonomy of migration", Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Convention

of the International Studies, Association in San Francisco, 2008

and http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/0/8/

pages251088/p251088-1.php, 22 p.

• OJEDA, S., "The Kampala Convention on internally displaced persons: some

humanitarian law aspects", Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, UNHCR, 58-

66.

• Paleo Sea Level Working Group, “The sea-level Conondrum : case-studies from

palaeo-archives”, Journal of Quaternery Science 25, N°1, 2010, 19-25 and

http://www.dartmouth.edu/~meredithkelly/Palsea,%202010.pdf, 7 p.

http://perceval.bio.nau.edu/downloads/grail/climate_seminar/section3/McLeman_and_Smit06.pdf

http://perceval.bio.nau.edu/downloads/grail/climate_seminar/section3/McLeman_and_Smit06.pdf

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/events/environmental-change-andmigration/EnvChangeandFmReviewWS.pdf

http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/events/environmental-change-andmigration/EnvChangeandFmReviewWS.pdf

http://www.climate.org/PDF/Environmental%20Exodus.pdf

http://www.osce.org/eea/14851

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/report_36.pdf

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/0/8/pages251088/p251088-1.php

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/0/8/pages251088/p251088-1.php

http://www.dartmouth.edu/~meredithkelly/Palsea,%202010.pdf

101

• Pedersen, O. W., “European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental

Rights: A Long Time Coming?”, Georgetown International Environmental Human

Rights, Vol. 21, N° 1, 2008.

• PERCH-NIELSEN, S., BÄTTIG, M. And IMBODEN, D., “Exploring the Link between

Climate Change and Migration”, Climate Change, Vol. 91 , 2008, 375-393 and

http://geminis.dma.ulpgc.es/profesores/personal/jmpc/Master08(SegundaEdici%F

3n)/PARA%20EL%20MASTER%20SEGUNDA%20EDICION%203/ClimateAndMigrati

ons(L,U).pdf, 19 p.

• PIGUET, E., "Climate change and forced migration", New Issues in Refugee

Research, research paper No. 153, Geneva, UNHCR, January 2008

and http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd68/newissues153.pdf, 18 p.

• POTTS, D., “Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid urbanization?”, Africa Research

Institute, 2012, and

http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/files/counterpoints/docs/Whatever-

happened-to-Africas-rapid-urbanisation-6PZXYPRMW7.pdf, 20 p.

• RENAUD, F., BOGARDI, J., DUN, O., WARNER, K., “Control, Adapt or Flee. How to

Face Environmental Migration?”, InterSecTions 5/2007, Bonn, UNU-EHS,

2007, http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/3973, 48 p.

• RENAUD, F., BOGARDI, J., DUN, O., WARNER, K., RENAUD, F. G., “Decision

Framework for Enivronmentally Induced Migration”, International Migration, Vol.

49, 2011, 5-28 and

http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/eaere/2011/1107/Environmentally%20In

duced%20Migration%20and%20Sustainable%20Development_Milan_Areikat_Afifi

.pdf, 29 p.

• REUVENY, R., “Climate Change-induced Migration and Violent Conflict”, Political

Geography, N° 26, 2007, 656-73.

• ROBINSON, M., "Climate Change and Justice", Barbara Ward Lecture, 11 December

2006, http://www.realizingrights.org/pdf/Barbara_Ward_Lecture_12-11-

06_FINAL.pdf, 14 p.

• SABATES-WHEELER, R. and WAITE, M., “Migration and Social Protection: A Concept

Paper”, Working Paper T2, 2003 and http://www.

migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-T2.pdf, 62 p.

• SAUL, B. and MCADAM, J., “An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-

Induced Displacement and International Law”, Sydney Centre for International Law,

http://geminis.dma.ulpgc.es/profesores/personal/jmpc/Master08(SegundaEdici%F3n)/PARA%20EL%20MASTER%20SEGUNDA%20EDICION%203/ClimateAndMigrations(L,U).pdf




http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd68/newissues153.pdf

http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/files/counterpoints/docs/Whatever-happened-to-Africas-rapid-urbanisation-6PZXYPRMW7.pdf

http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/files/counterpoints/docs/Whatever-happened-to-Africas-rapid-urbanisation-6PZXYPRMW7.pdf




http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/eaere/2011/1107/Environmentally%20Induced%20Migration%20and%20Sustainable%20Development_Milan_Areikat_Afifi.pdf




http://www.realizingrights.org/pdf/Barbara_Ward_Lecture_12-11-06_FINAL.pdf




102

Working Paper 4, 2008 and

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292605, 25 p.

• SCHLOSBERG, D., ”Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements And

Political Theories”, Environmental Politics, N°13, 2004, 517-540.

• SCHMIDT, S. “Towards a new EU-African Relationship: A Grand Strategy for

Africa?”, Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Vol. 8, N°24, 8-18.

• SGRO, A., "Towards recognition of environmental refugees by the European

Union", REVUE Asylon(s) 6, Exodes écologiques, 2008 and http://www.reseau-

terra.eu/article844.html, 8 p.

• TACOLI, C., “Crisis or adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a context of

high mobility”, Environment and Urbanization 21(2), 2009, 513-525 and

http://eau.sagepub.com/content/21/2/513.full.pdf, 12 p.

• TACOLI, C., "Climate Change and Migration. Study of the climate adaptation-

migration nexus and the role for development cooperation", Eschborn: GIZ, 2011

and www.giz.de/Themen/de/dokumente/giz2012-en-climate-and-migration.pdf,

12 p.

• TACOLI, C., "Migration, climate change and the multiple drivers of mobility: current

debates, empirical evidence and implications for policy, International Institute for

Environment and Development", 2012 and

http://migrationeducation.de/fileadmin/uploads/Cecilia_Tacoli__2012.pdf , 4 p.

• TACOLI,C., “Migration and adaptation to climate change”, Sustainable

Development Opinion, International Institute for Environment and Development

(IIED), 2007 and http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17020IIED.pdf, 2 p.

• TERMINSKI,B., ” Environmentally-Induced Displacement. Theoretical Frameworks

and Current Challenges”, Geneva, 2012, http://www.cedem.ulg.ac.be/wp-

content/uploads/2012/09/Environmentally-Induced-Displacement-Terminski-

1.pdf,159 p.

• TERTRAIS, B., “The Climate Wars Myth”, The Washington Quarterly, 34 (3), 2011,

17-29.

• United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), “The State of the World Population

2009”, New York, 2009 and

http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2009/st

ate_of_world_population_2009.pdf, 104 p.

• UNDP, "Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development", Human

Development Report, 2009,

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292605



http://eau.sagepub.com/content/21/2/513.full.pdf

http://www.giz.de/Themen/de/dokumente/giz2012-en-climate-and-migration.pdf

http://migrationeducation.de/fileadmin/uploads/Cecilia_Tacoli__2012.pdf

http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17020IIED.pdf

http://www.cedem.ulg.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Environmentally-Induced-Displacement-Terminski-1.pdf



http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2009/state_of_world_population_2009.pdf

http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2009/state_of_world_population_2009.pdf

103

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf,

229 p.

• UNDP, “Chapter Four - Adapting to the Inevitable: National Action and International

Cooperation” in Human Development Report 2007/2008 – Fighting climate change:

Human solidarity in a divided world, November 2007 and

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.p

df, 399 p.

• UNFPA, “Meeting the Challenges of Migration: Progress since the ICPD”, UNFPA and

IMP, 2004 and

http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2004/m

igration_icpd.pdf, 99 p.

• UNHCR, “UNHCR Resettlement Handbook”, 2011, Geneva,

http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.html, 428 p.

• UNHCR, “2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally

Displaced and Stateless Persons”, Division of Programme Support and

Management, 15 June 2010 and http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html, 32 p.

• UNHCR, “Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for

States under International Law”, 2009 and

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/049.pdf, 13 p.

• United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR),

Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, 2009 and

http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf, 35 p.

• WARNER, K., AFIFI, T., DUN, O., STAL, M. and SCHMIDL, S. “Human Security,

Climate Change and Environmentally Induced Migration”, Report if the UNU-IEHS,

2008, http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/4033, 69 p.

• WARNER, K., HAMZA, A., OLIVER-SMITH,A. RENAUD, F. and JULCA, A. “Climate

Change, Environmental degradation and migration, Nat Hazards, 55, 2009, 689-

715.

• WARNER, K. and EHRHART, C., “In Search of Shelter, Mapping the Effects of

Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement”, Cooperative for Assistance

and Relief Everywhere, Inc (CARE), 2008, and

http://ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_media.pdf, 36 p.

• WARNER, K. “Climate Change, Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the

Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negociations”, UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy

Research Series, 2011.

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf



http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2004/migration_icpd.pdf

http://www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2004/migration_icpd.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.html

http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/049.pdf

http://www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf


http://ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_media.pdf

104

• WARNER, K., "Environmental Change and Migration: Issues for European

governance and migration management", Network migration in Europe E.V.,

December 2011 and

http://migrationeducation.de/fileadmin/uploads/Warner_K._pdf_2012.pdf, 11p.

• WARNER, K., “Migration and Global Environmental Change. PD23: Migration and

displacement in the context of adaptation to climate change: developments in the

UNFCCC climate negotiations and potential for future action”, London, Foresight,

2011 and http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/policy-

development/11-1269-pd23-migration-displacement-in-adaptation-climate-

change.pdf, 36 p.

• WILLIAMS, A., “Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in

International Law”, Law and Policy 30:4, 2008, 502-529.

• World Bank, “The Cost to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change, New

Methods and Estimates - The Global Report of the Economics of Adaptation to

Climate Change Study”, World Bank, Executive Summary, 2009,

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/Resources/EACCReport0928Final.pdf,

109 p.

• X., “Domesticating and Implementing the Kampala Convention: A Dialogue for

Action”, Pilot workshop Uganda, 12-13 November 2012 and http://www.internal-

displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/1A8F3A7ADE766F66C12

57B4F003211F7/$file/Uganda+Workshop+Report+April+2013+-+Online.pdf, 35

p.

• ZETTER, R., “Legal and normative frameworks”, Forced Migration Review, Issue 31,

October 2008 and

http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/FMR31/62-

63.pdf, 62 p.

• ZETTER, R., “More Labels, fewer Refugees: Making and Remaking the Refugee Label

in an Era of Globalisation”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.20, Issue 2, 2007, 172-

192.

4. VARIA (website resources)

• Ansa Med, « Up to 600,000 migrants ready to cross Med », (website), 3 April 2014,

http://ansamed.ansa.it/ansamed/en/news/sections/generalnews/2014/04/03/up-

http://migrationeducation.de/fileadmin/uploads/Warner_K._pdf_2012.pdf

http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/policy-development/11-1269-pd23-migration-displacement-in-adaptation-climate-change.pdf



http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/Resources/EACCReport0928Final.pdf

http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/1A8F3A7ADE766F66C1257B4F003211F7/$file/Uganda+Workshop+Report+April+2013+-+Online.pdf



http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/FMR31/62-63.pdf

http://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/FMR31/62-63.pdf

http://ansamed.ansa.it/ansamed/en/news/sections/generalnews/2014/04/03/up-to-600000-migrants-ready-to-cross-meditalian-minister_b1e57f60-3e0e-4cbb-a442-1855396e3787.html

105

to-600000-migrants-ready-to-cross-meditalian-minister_b1e57f60-3e0e-4cbb-

a442-1855396e3787.html (accessed on 8/8/2014)

• BONAL, C., « Lampedusa, Melilla, l'Evros... : ces portes de l'Europe où meurent les

migrants », Libération (website), 7 October 2013,

http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/10/07/lampedusa-melilla-l-evros-ces-

portes-de-l-europe-ou-meurent-les-migrants_937602 (accessed on 14/10/2013)

• CLEMENS, M., “Think Development in Poor Countries Will Reduce Migration? The

Numbers Say Otherwise”, Center for Global Development (website), 2014,

http://www.cgdev.org/blog/think-development-poor-countries-will-reduce-

migration-numbers-say-otherwise (accessed on 7/8/2014).

• DE HAAS, H., “The deadly cost of tighter border controls”, De Morgen (website), 8

October 2013 and http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/4211031-deadly-

cost-tighter-border-controls. (accessed on 18/10/2013)

• European Commission, “Actions adopted by the Commission”, (website), 2013,

http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/execution_report_2013.pdf (accessed on

12/12/2013)

• European Commission, “Africa”, DG Home Affairs (website), s.d.,

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-

affairs/africa/index_en.htm (accessed on 10/11/ 2013)

• European Commission, “Irregular migration”, DG Home Affairs (website), s.d.,

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-

immigration/index_en.htm (accessed on 8/12/2013)

• GLAHN, B., “Adressing the international legal gaps. Part I”, feature article,

International Bar Association (website), Salzburg,

2012, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-

4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442 (accessed on 10/11/2012).

• GLAHN, B., “Adressing the international legal gaps. Part II”, feature article,

International Bar Association (website), Salzburg,

2012, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=3E9DB1B0-659E-

432B-8EB9-C9AEEA53E4F6 (accessed on 18/11/2012).

• GUETERRES, A., "Millions Uprooted", Foreign Affairs (website), September/October

2008, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63572/ant%C3%83%C2%B3nio-

guterres/millions-uprooted, x p. (accessed on 23/4/2013)



http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/10/07/lampedusa-melilla-l-evros-ces-portes-de-l-europe-ou-meurent-les-migrants_937602

http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/10/07/lampedusa-melilla-l-evros-ces-portes-de-l-europe-ou-meurent-les-migrants_937602



http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/4211031-deadly-cost-tighter-border-controls

http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/4211031-deadly-cost-tighter-border-controls

http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/execution_report_2013.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/africa/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/index_en.htm

http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442

http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442

http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=3E9DB1B0-659E-432B-8EB9-C9AEEA53E4F6

http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=3E9DB1B0-659E-432B-8EB9-C9AEEA53E4F6

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63572/antÃ³nio-guterres/millions-uprooted

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63572/antÃ³nio-guterres/millions-uprooted

106

• KNOLL, A. and BEKELE, E.A., “Migration and Mobility in the Africa-EU Partnership:

A Breakthrough or More of the Same?”, ECDPM (website), 18/4/2014,

http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/migration-mobility-africa-eu-partnership-

breakthrough/ (accessed on 8/8/2014)

• MARTINEZ-ALIER, J., SIMMS, A. and RIJNHOUT, L., “Poverty, development and

ecological debt”, pamphlet, 2002, x p.

• United Nations General Assembly, "Making Migration Work", High-level Dialogue on

International Migration and Development, 68th Session of the General Assembly

(website), 3-4 October 2013, http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/,

(accessed on 10/10/2013)

• World Bank, “Infographic: What Climate Change Means for Africa and Asia”,

(website) 2013,

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/19/Infographic-Climate-

Change-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-South-Asia-South-East-

Asia?cid=EXT_TWBN_D_EXT (accessed on 10/12/2013)

• X., “The migrant files” (website), https://www.detective.io/detective/the-migrants-

files/, s.d. (accessed on 12/12/2013)

• X., "Africa and Europe in Partnership" (website), s.d., http://www.africa-eu-

partnership.org/international-protection, x p. (accessed on 14/12/2013)

• X., “A Climate of Conflict: the links between climate change, peace and war”,

International Alert, 2007, http://www.international-

alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/A_climate_of_conflict.pdf (accessed on

23/11/2012)

• X., “Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development”, Rabat Process, s.d.,

http://www.dialogueuroafricainmd.net/web/the-rabat-process (accessed on 12

October 2013)

• X., Q&A with EC DG DEVCO Head of Unit B.3 Employment, Social Inclusion,

Migration, Ms. Hélène Bourgade, “Eyeing the Future of the MME Partnership”

(website), 22 November 2013, http://www.africa-eu-

partnership.org/newsroom/all-news/qa-ec-dg-devco-head-unit-b3-employment-

social-inclusion-migration-ms-helene (accessed on 24/11/2013)

• X., “EU Climate Finance: Quo Vadis?”, CAN, WWF, CIDSE, Oxfam (website), 2013,

http://www.climnet.org/fundwhatcounts (accessed on 29/11/2013)



http://www.un.org/en/ga/68/meetings/migration/

http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/19/Infographic-Climate-Change-in-Sub-Saharan-Africa-South-Asia-South-East-Asia?cid=EXT_TWBN_D_EXT





http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/international-protection

http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/international-protection



http://www.dialogueuroafricainmd.net/web/the-rabat-process

http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/newsroom/all-news/qa-ec-dg-devco-head-unit-b3-employment-social-inclusion-migration-ms-helene



http://www.climnet.org/fundwhatcounts

107

Lexicon

The main concepts and terms used in this paper are defined below:

Adaptation to climate change: refers to “adjustments in natural and human systems in

response to actual or expected climate change impacts, which moderate harm or exploit

beneficial opportunities”.455

Climate change: is defined originally in the UNFCCC of 1992 (art. 1 (2)) and has been

expanded by the IPCC which refers to ”any change of climate over time as a result of

human activity or due to natural variability”.456

455

Guiding definition used by the European Commission Staff Working Document, “Guidelines on Developing

Adaptation Strategies”, Brussels, 16/4/2013, drawn from W.N. ADGER et al. , “Assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, 2007, in M.L. PARRY et al. (eds.), Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 717–743. 456 IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report”, 2007, 30.

108

Desertification: is defined as "land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid

areas resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human

activities".457

Ecological debt: “is the debt accumulated by Northern, industrialized countries toward

Third World countries on account of resource plundering, unfair trade, environmental

damage, and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit waste. A particular

and interesting aspect of it is carbon debt, as a consequence of greenhouse gas

emissions”458

Environmental degradation: is the reduction of the capacity of the environment to

meet social and ecological objectives and needs.459

‘Environmental migrants’ (EMs) - Environmentally induced Migration (EM):

denotes the broader phenomenon encompassing all types of more or less forced migrants

moving internally and crossing international borders for reasons related to climate

change or (intent or accidental) environmental degradation, especially due to slow-onset

disasters.460

‘Environmentally displaced persons’ (EDPs)- ‘Environmentally induced

displacement’: refers specifically to migrants who move as a 'last resort response'

(forced form of mobility) to the effects of environmental change. In addition, one needs

to differentiate between internal and external displacement and between temporary

forms and permanent forms of environmentally induced displacement because they

require different responses.461

457 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or

Desertification, Particularly in Africa, art. 1(a), 1994, U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/27. 458 J. MARTINEZ-ALIER, A. SIMMS and L. RIJNHOUT, “Poverty, development and ecological debt”, pamphlet,

2002, 1. 459 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), Terminology on Disaster Risk

Reduction, Geneva, 2009, 14. 460This working definition relies on the one provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM):

“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.” IOM, “Discussion note: migration and the environment”, IOM, “Migration and the Environment”, Discussion note, Geneva, 14 February 2008, 1. 461 For a detailed discussion on the proposed typology and methodology, see ICMPD, o.c., 2011, 29-36.

109

Internally displaced persons (IDPs): are “persons or groups of persons who have

been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in

particular as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized

violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have

not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”462 This definition includes all

those forcibly displaced within their country due to the effects of climate change.

Relocation: is used when referring to people affected by environmental factors.463 The

European Commission’s SWD refers to the Foresight study which has defined relocation

as “the movement of people, typically in groups or whole communities, as part of a

process led by the state or other organisations, to a predefined location”.464

Resettlement: is defined in international refugee law and the UNHCR therefore

advocates limiting the application of the terminology to refugees as defined in the

Geneva Convention.

Sustainable development: is "development that meets the needs of the present

without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."465

Although this concept receives increasingly international recognition as part of customary

international law, no unitary and detailed definition exists for this term. By contrast, the

tone is quite different in the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable

Development, for example. 466

462This definition has been jointly drafted by IOM and UNHCR for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) report, “The State of the World Population 2009”, 31. For further discussion and background on terminology, see LACZKO and AGHAZARM, o.c., 2009. 463

UNHCR, “UNHCR Resettlement Handbook”, Geneva, 2011, 416. 464 FORESIGHT, o.c., 2011, 176. 465 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford paperbacks, 1989, [ The

Brundtland Report], 43. (This definition is also echoed in Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration, 1992.)

466 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, U.N.

Doc. A/CONF.199/20, 4 September 2002 [hereinafter Johannesburg Declaration]:

5. Accordingly, we assume a collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development—economic development, social development, and environmental protection-at the local, national, regional, and global levels(...)

11. We recognize that poverty eradication, changing consumption and production patterns, and protecting and managing the natural resource base for economic and social development are overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for sustainable development.

110

Vulnerability: defines “the extent to which climate change may damage or harm a

system. It depends not only on a system’s sensitivity but also on its ability to adapt to

new climatic conditions”. 467

The emphasis in this definition on systems implies that both socio-economic and natural

systems are important subjects of analysis.

Appendix: List of interviewees468

1. Migration experts interviewed for this study:

- Abigail Blue, Lead Policy Analyst, Seatrust Institute, interviewed at the Climate

Negotiations (COP 19) in Warsaw, November 2013.

- Koko WARNER: Academic Officer, Head of Section, Institute for Environment and

Human Securiy (United Nations University-EHS), interviewed at the Climate Negotiations

(COP 19) in Warsaw, November 2013.

-Dina Ionesco, International Organization for Migration (IOM), officer for climate

migration policies, interviewed at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in Warsaw,

November 2013.

467 R. T. WATSON et al.,“ Scientific and Technical Analysis of Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate

Change: Summary for Policymakers”, IPCC and WMO: Geneva, 1996, 6.

468 The audio tapes of (most of) these interviews are available.

111

-Samson Samuel Ogalah (Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance Network- PACJAN),

interviewed at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in Warsaw, November 2013.

-Soumya DUTTA (Energy and Climate Group, Beyond Copenhagen Collective),


-Ulriikka Aarnio, Senior policy officer UN climate negotiations' for CAN Europe,

interviewed in Brussels, October 2013.

2. Officials interviewed for this study:

- John B. KADDU, Lead negotiator Climate Change Adaptation Negotiations for Uganda,


-Mamadou GAKOU, Directeur-Général de l'Agence de l'Environnement et du Développment

Durable (AEDD), Mali, interviewed at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in Warsaw,

November 2013.

-Mamadou Saliou DIALLO, Magistrat, Conseiller juridique, cabinet du Ministre, Ministère de

l'Environnement, des Eaux et des Forêts, interviewed at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19)

in Warsaw, November 2013.

-Sunday Toka, Lagos State Government, Head of Public service Office, interviewed at the

Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in Warsaw, November 2013.

-Jacob Werksman: Lead Negotiator for the EU at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in

Warsaw, Poland, Delegation of the European Commission to the UNFCCC, interviewed in

Brussels, Belgium, December 2013.

-Alfredo Guillet, Ministery of Foreign Affairs, Responsible for Environmental policy with

Developing countries, interviewed at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in Warsaw,

November 2013.

- X., Negotiator for Poland at the Climate Negotiations (COP 19) in Warsaw, Poland,

December 2013.

112

2.1. Interviews with officials per e-mail:

-Sami Zeidan, Official of the European Commission, (DG-Climate Action), November 2013.

-Markus Sperl, International Cooperation Officer, Directorate-General for Development and

Cooperation – EuropeAid Unit B3 – Migration and Asylum Sector, December 2013.

3. Institutional Affiliations of Interviewees whose anonymity is preserved:

-Delegate of the African Group to the UNFCCC, Warsaw, Poland, November 2013.

- Official of the SCC Fund, Warsaw, Poland, November 2013.

‘Protection’ and ‘Migration’ as an Adaptation Strategy? European Policy and the Case of...

Documents

Transcript of ‘Protection’ and ‘Migration’ as an Adaptation Strategy? European Policy and the Case of...