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Prorogation as Partisan Political Tool: The Western Australia Experience1

For Presentation at the APPSA Annual Conference

St. Thomas University

September 28-30, 2012

Gerard W. Horgan

DRAFT ONLY – NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION

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Introduction

The historical evolution of the Westminster Parliament left the constitutional power over the

summoning, dismissal, and temporary suspension of that body in the hands of the sovereign. Some

facets of this aspect of the ‘royal prerogative’ power were gradually diminished via parliamentary

action: statutory control was gained over the maximum length of a Parliament, for example. The

ultimate power over the length and frequency of sessions of Parliament, however, remained with the

sovereign. As ‘Westminster-style’ legislatures developed in Britain’s colonies, this aspect of the

prerogative came to be exercised by colonial governors.

As ‘responsible government’ evolved in the 18th and 19th centuries, both at Westminster and in its

progeny, conventions developed whereby the ministerial executive advised the Crown on the exercise

of this aspect of the prerogative power. Thus, it remained a feature of the routine operation of

Westminster-style parliaments that the executive – now normally in the form of the ministerial

executive – had considerable control over the timing of sessions. However, the Crown or its

representatives sometimes still performed an oversight function concerning parliamentary sessions by,

for example, denying a ministerial request for a suspension of parliament. In doing so, they asserted a

remaining ‘reserve power’ of the Crown to defend constitutional values.

It is therefore true that prorogation – the temporary suspension of parliamentary activity – is a perfectly

legitimate parliamentary device. It is routinely used in Westminster-style parliamentary systems when

the governing party/coalition has largely completed its legislative agenda as proposed in a Throne

Speech, and wishes to set out a new legislative programme for a parliament. It is also true, however,

that this leaves open the opportunity for governing parties to manipulate the parliamentary calendar for

political advantage. Prorogation in particular presents itself as a useful partisan political tool, due to its

essential features: the suspension of all parliamentary activity, and the 'death' of all legislation that has

not yet completed the legislative process.

The purposes of this paper are two-fold. First, it seeks to identify the factors that commonly lead to the

'political use' of prorogation, by examining relevant cases in a polity where it has seen repeated

application: the Australian state of Western Australia (WA). Second, by examining, to the degree

possible, the Crown representatives’ reactions to requests for such prorogations and the reactions of

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Westminster-based officials to their actions, it seeks to explore the extent of these representatives’

discretion regarding the reserve power in this area.

We proceed in the following manner: first, we note the legal instruments that have conferred on the

Governor of WA authority regarding the prorogation of Parliament; second, we examine a series of

cases of the attempted use of prorogation for political purposes in the Parliament of WA; finally, we

consider some conclusions that may be drawn from these cases, and suggest areas for further research.

Powers of the Governor

When Captain James Stirling arrived with the first British settlers for the new colony in June, 1829, his

authority rested on Instructions issued the previous December.2 Those Instructions, appointing him

Lieutenant-Governor, were to be of a temporary nature, with a proper commission for the formation of

government for the colony to be issued later. That Commission, establishing Stirling as Governor, was

not issued until March, 1831, and did not arrive in WA, along with new Instructions, until December of

that year.3 Until 1877, each new Governor was issued with a new set of both Letters Patent,

establishing his powers, and Royal Instructions, which provided detailed directions dealing with the

issues relevant at the time. In 1877 a ‘permanent’ set of Letters Patent was issued; ensuing Governors

would simply receive a Commission appointing the individual to the office constituted by the Letters

Patent.4 A new set of permanent documents was issued in 1890 to take account of the Western

Australia Constitution Act 1890 (see below); a third set was issued in October 1900, to encompass the

changes relating to Australian federation.5

Under the terms of the Acts Amendment (Constitution) Act, 1978, any Bill which “expressly or

impliedly provides for the abolition of or alteration in the office of Governor” must be supported both

by an absolute majority of each House of Parliament and by a majority of electors in a plebiscite.6

Under the terms of the Australia Acts 1986 (UK & Cwth) the office of Governor of each State is

recognized.7 The Office of Governor in Western Australia, however, continues to be constituted by the

prerogative instrument of Letters Patent, the latest set issued to take account of the changes wrought by

the Australia Acts 1986 (UK & Cwth).8

The power of the Governor in relation to the prorogation of the legislative bodies of WA has, as one

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might expect, been inextricably linked to the evolution of these institutions. Therefore, a brief survey

of the statutes that have defined the development of these institutions is in order.

The Western Australia Act 1829 provided simply that, on the advice of the Privy Council, the king

could

authorize and empower any three or more persons and being within the said settlements to make ordain and establish all such laws instructions and ordinances and to constitute such courts and officers as may be necessary for the peace order and good government of His Majesty’s subjects.9

Pursuant to that legislation, an Order in Council of November, 1830, provided the basis for the

establishment of a Legislative Council.10 Concurrently, an Executive Council was constituted; both

Councils were to consist of the same five officials, one of whom was the Governor, who had the sole

right to introduce legislation in the Legislative Council. Neither the Order nor its accompanying

documents, which did not arrive in WA until December 1831, specified how often the Legislative

Council was to convene, or how long it should sit. The Council met for the first time on February 7,

1832.

In 1838, four non-official, appointed members were added to the Legislative Council.11 It was thus at

this point that the differentiation between those responsible for legislative and executive functions

began.

Under the terms of the Australian Colonies Government Act 1850, it was provided that the size of the

Council could be expanded, and two-thirds of the total could be elected. However, two conditions were

attached: at least one-third of householders would have to petition for this change; and the system

would have to be financially self-supporting, not dependent on continuing financial grants from the

UK.12 Given that the colony was still heavily dependent on grants in 1850, the option was not

exercised immediately.

The 1850 Act noted that, when the partly-elected body did come into being, the role of the Governor

was to be the same as that prescribed by the New South Wales Constitution Act 1842, which established

the first partly-elected legislative body in that colony. That legislation stated that:

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it shall be lawful for the governor of the said colony for the time being to fix...such times for holding the first and every other session of the said council as he may think fit...and also to prorogue the said council from time to time and dissolve the same by proclamation or otherwise whenever he shall deem it expedient...and that every council shall continue for five years from the day of the return of the writs for choosing the same and no longer subject nevertheless to be sooner prorogued or dissolved by the governor of the said colony.13

Two further non-official members were added to the Legislative Council in 1867; while these were

officially appointive positions, the Governor convinced the current non-official members to resign, and

then organized elections, the winners of which he then appointed. Finally, in 1870, the terms of the

1850 Act were fulfilled, and a two-thirds elected Council was established. This body was to remain in

place until 1890.

The Western Australia Constitution Act 1890 provided for the first bicameral Parliament (see below).

The relevant portions of this Act prescribed:

3. It shall be lawful for the Governor to fix the place and time for holding the first and every other session of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly...and also to prorogue the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly from time to time, and to dissolve the Legislative Assembly by proclamation or otherwise whenever he shall think fit. 14. Every Legislative assembly shall continue for four years from the day of the return of the writs for choosing the same and no longer; subject, nevertheless, to be sooner prorogued or dissolved by the Governor.14

At federation, a Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899 was passed to accommodate the new situation

and consolidate minor changes made since 1870.15 However, the 1899 Act made no changes to the

power of the Governor in regard to prorogation.

In regard to the power to prorogue the WA Parliament, then, the Governor’s authority has been, since

the coming into force in WA of the terms of the 1850 Act, established on a statutory, rather than a

prerogative basis.16 It is of course the case that, since the advent of responsible government, the

Governor normally acts on ministerial advice. However, there has always been and remains an ill-

defined reserve power. As reserve powers to act contrary to, or in the absence of, advice are often

associated with prerogative powers – indeed, sometimes the terms are used interchangeably – it is

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worth making the point that the two are distinct. Taylor provides a reasonably concise statement of the

situation:

The prerogative powers of the Crown are those it possesses aside from statute – that are conferred on it by special rules of the common law applying only to the Crown. They are not to be confused with the reserve powers of the Crown, which are the powers that it may exercise in some circumstances without, or contrary to, the advice of the Premier and other Ministers. Reserve powers may be either conferred by statute (such as the power to dissolve Parliament) or by the common law (in which case they are also prerogative powers as well as reserve powers). 'Prerogative' refers to the source of the power, while 'reserve' refers to the responsibility for its exercise, so that the two notions are quite distinct. Not all reserve powers are prerogative powers, and it is equally true that not all prerogative powers are reserve powers.17

It is in part to understand better the contours of the Governor’s reserve power in regard to prorogation

that this study is undertaken. With the background thus established, it is to the cases that will

illuminate those contours that we now turn.

Cases

1888

In 1888, the Legislative Council was composed of one-third appointed members, and two-thirds elected

members. The Governor was Sir Frederick Broome, who had been in place since 1883. While the

Governor was generally well thought-of regarding his advocacy of the colony's position to the Colonial

Office, he had a stormy relationship with the Legislative Council.18 In some cases, these disputes

escalated into resignations and suspensions of senior officials.19

While Broome had successfully championed the construction of a number of railways during his term

in WA, he was not always successful in convincing the Colonial Office to support schemes that had

wide popular backing in the colony. Such was the case of the proposed Bayswater-Busselton line.

When the Legislative Council considered the proposal in August, 1887, on a series of close votes the

proposal was set aside pending the tabling of the financial estimates in the next session.20 However, it

had highlighted a fault-line in the legislature: the majority of the elected members voted for the

proposal, while all the appointed members voted against.21

Between the sessions Broome corresponded with the Colonial Office regarding the colony's financial

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situation, and the possible costs to the Treasury if the construction were to proceed. When Broome

delivered the Throne Speech opening a new session of the Council on December 15, 1887, he had to

report that the Colonial Office considered the finances of the colony too precarious at the moment for it

to take on the project.22

Given the interest in the project, however, a new set of private backers proposed, in March, 1888, to

complete the line at considerably lower cost to the government.23 When initially raised in the Council,

the government lost two votes on the proposal, this time the elected members voting unanimously for

the proposal.24 The West Australian newspaper editorialized that the government found itself in this

“strange and humiliating position” because the reasons advanced for delay were “preposterous”.25

A Select Committee of the Council reported in favour of the latest proposal, and a resolution passed the

Council, again with only the opposition of nominated members, calling on the Governor to enter into a

contract to build the line.26 When, three days later on April 19, the answer came, it was in both word

and deed. The Speaker read a detailed reply from the Governor, reiterating the government's position

that, although it was a worthy project, it could not be afforded at the present time.27 A newspaper

described the scene:

the Speaker read the communication from His Excellency...re the Bayswater-Busselton Railway – every paragraph of the precious document being listened to with a painfully breathless silence. At its conclusion, before hon. members even had the opportunity of hearing the echo of the concluding words die away, the announcement of the prorogation was made.28

The prorogation, which lasted until June 29, had several consequences. In the immediate aftermath,

angry at having been “chucked out” of the House, at least one member spoke of resigning, while

another questioned whether he would return to the House when it re-convened.29 Within days, a public

meeting was held in Perth, where a crowd estimated at one thousand, out of a total colonial population

of forty thousand, heard speakers denounce the Governor, both for his decision and his apparently off-

hand treatment of the Council.30 As one Council member who spoke at the meeting put it:

The way in which the Legislative Council was prorogued was a way in which no member of that House could help feeling individually insulted....I think that the way the business was conducted at the close of the session was an insult perpetrated upon the

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Legislative Council, and through them to the people...I felt it. When that prorogation was put forward by the Speaker, I felt that we were put in a most undignified position and were treated like so many schoolboys who had proved refractory to their teacher.31

Eventually, cooler heads prevailed. Meanwhile, in a despatch to the Colonial Office, Broome insisted

that the prorogation had been expected no later than the following day, and that, had he announced

support for the railway, no objection to the prorogation would have been heard.32

Subsequently, the move toward responsible government, which had already been underway and was

supported by Broome, moved inexorably toward its conclusion. Broome's desire for an extension of

his term as Governor was, however, not fulfilled; thus, it was his successor who proclaimed the

constitution, which brought both responsible government and a bicameral parliament to the colony, on

October 21, 1890.

1907

The early years of responsible government featured unstable governments, partly as a result of the fact

that political parties had not yet solidified in the state.33 Coalescence of parties for Legislative

Assembly elections, however, quickened in the period between 1901-11, and the October, 1905 election

was the first to eliminate Independents from the Assembly.34 It was the Ministerialist administration of

Newton Moore which was the first to benefit from this, lasting from May, 1906 - September, 1910.35

However, party voting had not yet taken hold either in voting for, or in voting in, the Legislative

Council. When a single Labor candidate won one of the ten Council seats open for election in May,

1906, it was the first time a candidate affiliated to a political party had gained election to that body.36

Thus, the thirty-member Council remained overwhelmingly populated by Independents and, as the

franchise for the upper house was restricted by property ownership and income qualifications, the

membership was highly sympathetic to the concerns of property owners and those living in rural

areas.37

In November, 1906, the Moore administration passed a Land Tax Bill through the Assembly, and

passed it on to the Council, where it was promptly defeated.38 As there was a mechanism for the

reinstatement of defeated Bills in the Council, the government pursued this avenue. However, while

the vote on the motion of reinstatement was 14-9 in favour, as the Standing Orders prescribed that an

absolute majority was necessary for a reinstatement, the Bill was lost.

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In September, 1907, the government tried again, passing the measure through the fifty-seat Assembly

on an overwhelming majority, only four of the members voting against.39 However, on September 17,

the Bill was again defeated in the Council, on a close vote. This time, the Premier decided the issue

must be settled. On the same evening, he called on the Governor, Sir Frederick Bedford, and offered

the government's resignation.40 However, given that the government clearly held the confidence of the

Assembly, the Governor informed the Premier, on the morning of the 18th, that he declined to accept

the resignation. The Premier then asked for a dissolution, so that an election might be held on the

issue; confident that the voters supported the tax, Moore reasoned that a strong mandate would put

unbearable pressure on the Council. Again, however, Governor Bedford demurred, preferring not to

put the state through an unnecessary election. At this point, the Premier asked for a prorogation of

Parliament, so that the measure might once more be introduced. To this the Premier and Governor

agreed, and the Parliament was prorogued on September 19, to return on October 8.41 It is notable that

the Opposition, while agreeing that it was a matter of principle that the Assembly's will on Supply

should be upheld, thought that a dissolution should have been insisted upon by the Premier.42 Colonial

Office papers indicate, however, that the Secretary of State, Lord Elgin, approved of the Governor’s

refusals of the ministry’s resignation and the request for dissolution; the fact of the prorogation rated no

comment.43

Governor Bedford made the following points in his prorogation speech:

I have to thank you for the earnest attention which you have given to your public duties, and regret that the labours of the Session have been brought to an abrupt and unexpected termination....I am confident in the hope that the proposals which will be presented to you on reassembling will secure that favourable consideration which any financial measure, endorsed emphatically by that branch of the Legislature in which all financial measures must be initiated demands, and which my advisers consider to be of vital importance to the financial stability and development of the State.44

In the end, the Council did give way, after a fashion: an amended Land Tax Bill, with the addition of an

Income Tax, passed in December, 1907.45

1909

Premier Newton Moore’s administration was returned to power in the September, 1908, elections with

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a majority government, holding twenty-eight of the fifty Assembly seats.46 The first session of the

Parliament proceeded as normal. Near the end of the session, at the end of January, 1909, a Supply Bill

was introduced, providing for the financial needs of the administration through the end of June.47 The

Bill having passed the Council on February 4, the Parliament was prorogued on February 6 until June

30.48

An interstate conference on financial relations between the states and the Commonwealth government

was held in Hobart, Tasmania, in March 1909.49 A consensus was reached among the states, which

involved a special consideration for WA. Subsequently, a conference between the states and the

Commonwealth government was scheduled for August.

Meanwhile, Governor Bedford retired from his post in April, being replaced by Sir Gerald Strickland,

who had just previously been Governor of Tasmania. The holder of a law degree from the University

of Cambridge, Strickland has been described as “an intelligent, ambitious activist, fascinated by

questions of constitutional law and propriety.”50

As the usual pattern of sitting would place the opening of the new session of Parliament in July,

Premier Moore approached the new Governor with a request that the Parliament be further prorogued

until after the end of the Commonwealth-State conference, re-convening in late August. However,

Governor Strickland would not countenance this, given that Supply ran out at the end of June.51 The

Governor did agree, however, to a short extension, until July 29. As a result, Parliament re-convened

for two days, July 29-30; the government having obtained Supply for a three-month period, Parliament

then adjourned until August 31.52

1916

Labor Premier John Scaddan was returned to power in the elections of 1914, but with a reduced

majority. While the combined opposition parties had twenty-four seats in the fifty-seat Assembly,

Labor held twenty-six.53

In April, 1915, the Premier and another minister were involved in the letting of an un-tendered

construction contract, against the advice of officials and without the knowledge of other ministers.54

Subsequently, the contract had to be cancelled, with compensation paid to the contractor. When the

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Assembly met in July, the government came under intense pressure from the Opposition, but was able

to survive, in part by acquiescing in a Select Committee investigation into the affair.

A Labor member on the Committee voted with the Opposition members a number of times within the

Committee.55 The Committee reported on October 20 and, on November 3, the Chair of the Committee

moved a motion in the Assembly that the government considered a matter of confidence. The

Assembly then adjourned for a week, giving the government time to re-group.

When the Assembly re-convened, the three Labor members who had been expected to vote with the

Opposition soon declared that they would vote with the government.56 One, E.B. Johnston, made a

point of noting that he was unwilling to bring down the entire ministry because of the actions of just

two ministers. As a result, the government survived the confidence vote.

Meanwhile, a by-election campaign was underway for one of the constituencies that had been held by a

Labor member. When the election was held, on November 17, it was won by a Liberal.57 However, the

newly-elected member could not take his seat until the returned election writ reached the Assembly

Speaker. While November 24 was the deadline for the return of the writ, the Attorney-General on that

day explained that, although the writ had been officially 'returned' by the deadline, it would not reach

the Speaker until the following Tuesday, November 30.58

It became clear that the government intended for the House to rise before the writ reached the Speaker.

During the week of November 22-26, it either abandoned controversial legislation or accepted

significant amendments to Bills before the Legislative Council. By 12:35 am on Saturday the 27th, the

Notice Paper was exhausted, and the Assembly was adjourned until January 24, 1916.59 As the Sunday

Times reported:

The Government...reached the haven of recess by a reckless heaving overboard of policy and prestige....During the closing hours of the session, in fact, the Legislative Council did exactly what it pleased. The Government practically abdicated its functions. It was so frantically anxious to get into recess at all costs that it ceased for the time being to control the legislative business of the country.60

Scaddan's troubles were not yet at an end, however. It emerged before Christmas that Johnston had

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supported the government in the confidence vote because he believed he had a commitment from the

Premier that the composition of the ministry would be put to the Labor caucus during the recess, and

that the Premier himself would retire from that office.61 As this would have meant that Scaddan, and

most likely the other minister involved as well, would be out of the ministry, Johnston had been

satisfied. However, when the caucus meeting was held, Scaddan did not retire, and the vote Johnston

expected did not transpire.

Consequently, Johnston made a public speech in his constituency in which he explained these

developments in detail, denounced the Premier's duplicity, and ended with the statement that he was

resigning from the Assembly in order to run, as an Independent opposed to the current ministry, in a by-

election. In the event, Johnston was acclaimed by mid-January, as none of the parties put up opposing

candidates.62 This meant that, when the Assembly re-convened, the Labor would have twenty-four

members, including the Speaker, and the combined opposition would number twenty-six.

On Monday January 24, the day that the Assembly was due to return, it was instead prorogued until

March 9.63 Under the headline 'The Premier's Humiliation', the Western Mail called his actions “an

outrage on responsible government.”64 When, during the first week of March, the Parliament was

further prorogued to April 20, the Geraldton Guardian noted that Scaddan was ignoring the rule that

“insists upon Governments taking the earliest opportunity of testing their numerical strength when

reason exists for doubting their political stability.”65 In mid-April Parliament was further prorogued

until May 25; on May 17 it was further prorogued until June 22; on June 16, it was further prorogued

until July 13; in early July, it was finally prorogued until July 20.

Remarkably, the Governor, Sir Harry Barron, made no mention of the controversial nature of these

events in his despatches. As early as January 1st, when noting the loss of the government's majority and

Johnston's resignation, he simply noted that the Scaddan administration was likely to “remain in power

till the next reassembling [of Parliament] probably in July.”66 At no point does he report considering

refusing prorogation in order to force the government to meet the House. His concerns seem to have

been directed elsewhere: in a despatch of July 1, he noted that “It would be a great misfortune to have

to face a general election while the war is on.”67

When the Assembly met on July 20, the Opposition notified the House of a motion to test the

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government's position for the following Tuesday; the House then adjourned.68 When it re-convened on

Tuesday, July 25, the government fell. Scaddan's request for a dissolution was denied by Governor

Barron, and a Liberal minority administration took its place. However, the Scaddan administration had

delayed its inevitable demise, by avoiding having its position tested in Parliament, for just a few days

short of eight months.

1954

In the Assembly elections of February 14, 1953, the Liberal-Country Party Coalition government of

Premier Duncan Ross McClarty was defeated by the Labor Party, the latter gaining a bare majority:

twenty-six seats in the fifty-seat Assembly.69 Even more problematic for the new government was the

fact that Labor held only nine of the thirty Legislative Council seats.

The issue of rent controls had been a matter of disagreement between the two Houses even when

McClarty’s Coalition had faced a supposedly friendly majority in the Council.70 Controls had been in

place since 1939, as a war measure; the majority in the Assembly, whatever its partisan complexion,

was generally in favour of their continuance, while the Council was generally for their repeal. When

the Council rejected McClarty’s proposals for the extension of the controls in September, 1951, the

Premier was faced with the fact that the measures were due to expire three months later, on December

31. McClarty therefore had Parliament prorogued on October 12, opened a new session four days later,

and subsequently introduced a new version of the Bill.71 It was only after the government accepted a

plethora of amendments by the Council that the legislation could be passed, coming into force 11 days

before the expiry of the previous legislation.72 Even so, the new legislation constituted merely a one-

year extension of rent controls.73 In October 1952, however, with elections for the Assembly looming

in early 1953, a further one-year extension passed both Houses relatively smoothly.74

It was against this backdrop that Labor leader Albert Hawke led his party to victory in the Assembly.

When Hawke's government passed another one-year extension of rent controls through the Assembly,

in early December 1953, the legislation was eviscerated in the Opposition-dominated Council.75 A

thirteen-hour conference of managers of the two Houses produced only a stop-gap extension until April

30, 1954.76 The government considered its position while Parliament enjoyed its usual December-July

adjournment. On March 19, Parliament was prorogued, and recalled for a special session on April 6 as

a last-ditch attempt to prevent the demise of rent controls set for April 30.77 Party-line voting again

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prevailed in both Houses, however; when a conference of managers failed to resolve the stand-off, the

Houses were adjourned indefinitely on April 15.78

When the regular elections for one-third of the Legislative Council seats were held on May 8, Labor

achieved a surprising result, gaining four new seats, wins attributed to a significant degree to the

Opposition’s stance on rent controls.79 Perhaps attempting to take advantage of the evident public

mood, Hawke announced on May 18 that Parliament would again be prorogued, and recalled six weeks

earlier than usual, on June 17, in order to attempt yet again to deal with the rent control issue.80 In this

he was, however, again disappointed, as the Council remained recalcitrant.81 When the government

and the Opposition in the Council were finally able to agree on legislation two months later, it was “a

pale reflection of the Government's intentions.”82

1971

In the elections of February 20, 1971, the Liberal-Country Party Coalition government of Premier

David Brand was defeated by the Labor Party.83 However, the new government of Premier John

Tonkin was not in a comfortable position. The election results – Labor twenty-six, Liberal seventeen,

Country eight – gave Labor only a one-seat majority. Once Labor Party member J. M. Toms took the

Speaker's chair, the government and opposition were tied.

The government did survive its first meeting with Parliament, in mid-July, to reach an adjournment.

However, on October 8, 1971, four days before the house was to re-convene, Mr. Toms died.84 While

the seat he had held was a safe Labor constituency, the question for the government was whether it

could survive as a minority, which it would be after appointing another Speaker from its ranks, until a

by-election could be held. The West Australian staked out its position immediately: in an editorial on

October 9, it called for another general election.85 Despite rumours that a deal with one or the other of

the opposition parties might be possible, involving one of them providing a Speaker and thus altering

the balance in the Assembly, no such deal emerged.86

By Monday October 11, the newspapers were reporting that Tonkin had met with the Governor, Sir

Douglas Kendrew, three times, and that Tonkin either had already or soon would request a

prorogation.87 Notably, while the Governor characteristically made no public comment on the

situation, his Secretary was slightly more forthcoming. He was quoted in a newspaper, in advance of

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the prorogation, as saying: “One would expect Sir Douglas to act on the advice of the Executive

Council, but he is not bound to”.88

It appears that, before making his decision, Governor Kendrew consulted both a former Chief Justice of

the state and the current Chief Justice.89 In the event, however, the Governor did accept the advice of

Premier Tonkin, and Parliament was prorogued on October 11.90 While all sides accepted that the

Governor had been put in a difficult position, the Opposition leader was blunt about the dangers of

what had happened:

This will create an awkward precedent….It simply means that if a Government with a one-man majority loses a member all it has to do is slip down to Government House and make a recommendation for Parliament to be prorogued. I think that the royal prerogative is too important and too valuable to be used to turn Parliament off and on so that a Government can restore its numbers.91

The West Australian editorialized that, although the Governor had “acted with complete propriety”,

Tonkin's actions were another matter:

The Government's clear duty...was to have rejected any idea of evading its responsibility to be subject to the will of Parliament....The outcome of the political crisis has unexpectedly brought into sharp relief not only the powers of the Governor but also the constitutional obligation of ministers....All this may be perfectly constitutional but it is a chilling thought that the executive should be able to bend the constitutional rules for party advantage.92

The prorogation lasted until November 16, three days after the by-election would be held. Labor did

hold the seat, and Tonkin's government survived for the remainder of its three-year term.

However, Kendrew regarded the case as sufficiently troubling that, after the fact, he sought advice from

the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as to whether he had acted correctly. The request for

advice itself caused some discussion in the FCO, with some suggesting that it was inappropriate for the

Governor to have asked the question, and that therefore an answer should not be provided.93 In the

end, the FCO decided to provide a response indicating that the Governor had acted within his powers,

but not commenting on the question of whether those powers had been used appropriately in the

circumstances.94

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Although the FCO was being very careful in its response, however, a rather interesting phrase did make

its way into the final reply to Governor Kendrew. It first appears, in the currently existing records, in a

draft letter from the Private Secretary in the FCO, Sir S. Tomlinson, to the then Assistant Private

Secretary to the Queen, Sir Martin Charteris, although the initials on the draft are those of FCO officer

P.H. Grattan.95 The paragraph in which the phrase appears in the final reply to the Governor from the

Secretary of State, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, is as follows:

With regard to your invitation to me to comment on use of Section 3 of the Constitution to resolve the deadlock which resulted from the death of the Speaker, I can only say for Your Excellency's private information that, while the decision to prorogue Parliament

was a matter within your personal discretion, it appears to have been intra vires the powers of Section 3 of the Constitution of Western Australia.96

While not intended as a general statement of policy, the phrase as it stands certainly indicates that the

FCO's position in this case was that the Governor had a decision to make when the request to prorogue

was proffered. That is, a request to prorogue Parliament, like a request to dissolve Parliament, is not

binding.

1985

The Labor Party under the leadership of Brian Burke had defeated the previous Liberal-National

Country Party coalition in the elections of February 19, 1983.97 Labor held a comfortable seven-seat

(32-25) majority in the fifty-seven seat Assembly. However, the opposition parties still held twenty-

three of the thirty-four seats in the Legislative Council.98

The third session of the Parliament began on August 15, 1985.99 The expectation that the latter half of

the year would be dominated by the parties jockeying for position in anticipation of a February 1986

election were fulfilled, with the Opposition using its majority in the Council to embarrass the

government whenever possible. Government legislative proposals on electoral reform were heavily

amended in the Council, and had to be abandoned when no agreement between the Houses could be

reached. In October, legislation based on a Royal Commission report on the resolution of deadlocks

between the Houses was defeated in the Council. In the same month, Opposition cooperation in the

normal parliamentary practice of 'pairing' of members was withdrawn as a protest over the

government's parliamentary tactics in the Assembly.

17

Matters came to a head in November. Under threat of being found in contempt of the House, the

government Leader in the Council tabled documents relating to an Aboriginal Land Rights inquiry.100

The documents indicated that public funds allocated to assist Aboriginal groups with their submissions

had not been subject to scrutiny by the Auditor-General, and that some allocations had either been over-

spent or spent after the inquiry had been completed. The Council established a Select Committee to

look into the detail of the allocation of the grants. However, the Committee's work was cut short when,

unexpectedly, the Parliament was prorogued on November 27. The Opposition accused Burke’s

administration of being “terrified by the truth.”101

1991

The Labor Party was returned to power in the elections of February 4, 1989, under the leadership of

Peter Dowding.102 With a five-seat (31-26) advantage over the combined opposition in the Assembly,

Labor was still faced with a Council in which those same opposition parties held a narrow, eighteen-to-

sixteen, majority.103

Despite the election win, however, all was not well in the Western Australia Labor Party.104 Allegations

of wrongdoing were swirling around both Dowding and his predecessor as Premier, Brian Burke. The

involvement of the government in business activities, and the contributions of some businesses to the

Labor Party, were commonly summarized as the 'WA Inc' scandal. Under pressure from his own Party,

and the federal Labor Party, Dowding resigned the Premiership in mid-February, 1990. His successor

as Premier, Carmen Lawrence, tried to distance herself and her government from her predecessors, but

continued to resist calls from the opposition for a Royal Commission to look into the WA Inc affair.105

To pressure the government into agreeing to a Royal Commission, the Opposition began selectively to

block government bills in the Council, and the Opposition Leader advocated blocking Supply to force

the issue.

Meanwhile, a Committee of the Legislative Council had been investigating some aspects of the WA Inc

affair. In late April, the Committee released an interim report, which, although it reached no

conclusions, increased the pressure on the government.106 Following further revelations in October and

early November concerning possible links between former politicians and a private investigator,

Premier Lawrence finally agreed, on November 19, to a wide-ranging Royal Commission.107 However,

despite this move, the Legislative Council decided, on November 21, to initiate a Select Committee

18

investigation into the allegations regarding government surveillance and phone-tapping. As a result, by

the time Parliament adjourned in December, there were, in addition to the planned Royal Commission

inquiry, two Legislative Council Committee investigations underway.

On January 3, 1991, Parliament was prorogued. The move was widely interpreted as a tactic to prevent

the Legislative Council Committees from continuing their work during the recess.108

Results and Discussion

The primary purpose of this paper has been to identify the factors that commonly lead to the 'political

use' of prorogation, by examining relevant cases in a polity where it has seen repeated application. The

results are indicated in tabular form in Table I.

Case Government

Position in

Assembly

Novel

Context

Proximate Issue Dispute

with L.C.

Prior to

Imminent

Scheduled

Election

1888 Not Applicable

Refusal to Endorse Railway Project

1907 Majority 1st wholly partisan Assembly

Refusal of L.C. to pass Tax Bill

X

1909

(Refusal)

Majority Lack of Supply

1916 Minority Loss of majority due to by-elections

1954a Majority Refusal of L.C. to pass Rent Control Bill

X

1954b Majority Refusal of L.C. to pass Rent Control Bill

X

1971 Minority Loss of majority due to death

1985 Majority Scandal – L.C. committee investigation underway

X

X

1991 Majority Previous Premier in same Parliament forced to resign

Scandal – L.C. committee investigations underway

X

First, proximate issues of a highly controversial or partisan nature are certainly associated with this

19

type of prorogation. The 1888, 1907, 1954, 1985, and 1991 cases all fall into this category. Three of

these six cases, spanning both the eras of representative and responsible government, involve an

administration ‘pulling the plug’ on Parliament in order to avoid further discussion of issues likely to

embarrass the administration.

Second, it is clear that, in the era of responsible government, the most common proximate issue in

relation to the political use of prorogation has been conflict between the government and the

Legislative Council when the two Houses have differing partisan majorities. In five of the eight cases

in this period, governments facing a contrary majority in the Council which persisted in pursuing

actions displeasing to the government chose to shut down Parliament as a method of coercion or

control of Council actions.

Third, the sudden loss of majority status by a government is a proximate issue that may lead to

prorogation. In two of the eight cases in the responsible government era, governments used

prorogations to avoid facing an Assembly in which they were newly in a minority. Whether current

democratic practice in WA would allow an administration to repeat Premier Scaddan’s use of six

consecutive prorogations in order to avoid facing the Assembly for almost eight months is unclear.

In a comparative context, it appears that in WA proximate issues play a more critical role in partisan

prorogations than in New South Wales. In a study of such prorogations there, Horgan found that

minority or near-minority status for a government was the circumstance most often associated with

prorogations initiated for partisan purposes.109 However, there are as well notable commonalities in the

two states. In each, about half of the cases involve disputes between the two Houses of Parliament; in

both, prorogation has been used in an attempt to preclude or derail upper chamber committee

investigations of questionable government actions. As well, the presence of a novel context leading to

general uncertainty and higher than usual partisanship – such as the first wholly partisan Assembly or

when a Premier has recently been forced to resign – has been associated with a significant proportion

of partisan prorogations during the era of responsible government in both states.

A second purpose of this paper has been to examine the Crown representatives’ reactions to requests for

partisan prorogations, and the reactions of Westminster-based officials to their actions, in order to

explore the extent of Crown representatives’ discretion regarding the reserve power in this area.

20

To the degree that actions speak louder than words, the most notable finding in this area is that there is

at least one case in which a Governor of Western Australia has refused a request for prorogation. This

in itself places WA in the company of New South Wales, where Governors have refused such requests

at least twice.110 It remains the case, however, that in the face of such requests most WA Governors

appear to be remarkably complaisant, perhaps even complacent. Of the records currently available,

other than those relating to the Strickland case, only those relating to the 1971 case involving Governor

Kendrew indicate gubernatorial concern about such use of the Crown's powers. This latter case thus

does bear some comment.

Most significantly, both the comments of the Governor’s Private Secretary and those of the Secretary of

State lend credence to the idea that the accession of a Governor to a request for a prorogation remains a

matter of gubernatorial discretion. While it appears that no Governor of WA has chosen to deny such a

request since 1909, it does seem that there remains support for the stance that Governors do still have a

decision to make when such a request is presented.

Less significant, but arguably equally trenchant, were the remarks made by the West Australian

editorialists. When ministers try to use the power of the Crown to evade their responsibility to be

subject to the will of Parliament, they undermine the foundations of the parliamentary system of

responsible government. In such situations, while it is usually the Crown's representative who is put in

a difficult position in the eyes of the public, it should rather be the ministry that is held accountable. A

ministry that seeks to use the Crown’s power for short-term partisan gain has, in short, failed to live up

to the constitutional obligations placed upon it.

Conclusion

The prorogation of Westminster-style parliaments remains, for historical reasons, a power held by the

executive. In the case of WA, the power to prorogue Parliament was initially held by the Governor as a

prerogative; with the coming into force of the terms of the Australian Colonies Government Act 1850,

it was placed on a statutory foundation. With the subsequent evolution of responsible government, the

principal site for decisions with respect to the timing of prorogations shifted from the Governor to the

ministry, a fact that provided the opportunity for governing parties to manipulate the parliamentary

calendar for political advantage.

21

In WA, the factors we have identified that conduce to the use of prorogation as a partisan tool include:

the existence of a proximate issue of a highly controversial or partisan nature; differing partisan

majorities in the two Houses of Parliament; the sudden loss of majority status in the lower chamber;

and a novel context leading to general uncertainty and higher than usual partisanship.

Regarding the WA Governors’ use of their reserve power to deny prorogations, two comments appear

warranted. First, the fact that only a single example has been uncovered in over one-hundred-and-

twenty years of responsible government indicates at the very least that Governors are loathe to deny

such requests. Second, however, when considering constitutional conventions, precedents are pivotal.

Governor Strickland’s action in 1909 provides a precedent for similar action by another Governor, as

long as the constitutional framework remains unaltered. The fact that it appears Governor Kendrew

and the FCO believed as recently as 1971 that decisions on prorogation remained within the discretion

of the Governor provides further evidence for the persistence of the reserve power in this area.

Finally, some observations are warranted regarding further research. First, the most obvious strategy to

increase the external validity of this study would be to undertake similar studies in other polities that

utilize the Westminster-style system. Beyond the work already completed on New South Wales, other

Australian states, having similar constitutional and cultural backgrounds, would be the obvious first

candidates. Second, and specifically regarding the use of the reserve power, further study of the

correspondence between the Governors and the UK Colonial/Dominions Office might prove

illuminating.

22

Notes

1 The author wishes to acknowledge both the financial support of The Global and International Studies Initiative at St. Thomas University, and the invaluable assistance provided for this project by the Office of the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly of Western Australia.

2 UK, Colonial Office, Sir George Murray to Captain James Stirling formally appointing him as Lieutenant-Governor of the

Swan River Colony and furnishing him with his instructions, 30 December 1828, [cited November 15 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-did-91.html.

3 Brian de Garis, "The First Legislative Council, 1832-1870," in The House on the Hill: A History of the Parliament of

Western Australia, 1832-1990, ed. David W. Black (Perth: Parliament of Western Australia, 1991), 23; UK, Colonial Office, Commission Appointing Stirling Governor and Commander-in-Chief, 4 March 1831, [cited November 16 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-did-94.html.

4 ———, Colonial Office, Letters Patent re Constitution, 25 August 1890, [cited November 16 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-13.html.

5 Ibid.

6 Western Australia, An Act to amend the Constitution Act 1889–1970 and the Constitution Acts Amendment Act, 1899–1977

(No. 59 of 1978), 15 September 1978, [cited November 16 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-15.html.

7 Australia, Australia Act 1986, 4 December 1985, s.7(1), [cited November 17 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-103.html.

8 UK, Letters Patent Relating to the Office of Governor of the State of Western Australia, 14 February 1986, [cited November 17 2011]; available from http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_reg/lp162.txt.

9 ———, Western Australia Act 1829, 14 May 1829, [cited November 17 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-6.html.

10 de Garis, "First," 23.

11 Ibid., 28-9; 34-5.

12 UK, Australian Colonies Government Act 1850, 5 August 1850, s.IX, [cited November 18 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-did-76.html.

13 ———, New South Wales Constitution Act 1842 5 & 6 Vic. C.76, 30 July 1842, [cited September 2 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-77.html.

14 ———, Western Australia Constitution Act 1890, 25 July 1890, [cited November 18 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-12.html.

15 Western Australia, Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899, 16 December 1899, [cited November 18 2011]; available from http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-sdid-14.html.

16 For a more developed discussion of this point, see George Winterton, "The Constitutional Position of Australian State Governors," in Australian Constitutional Perspectives, ed. H.P. Lee and George Winterton (Sydney: Law Book Company Ltd., 1992), 283-6.

17 Greg Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006), 101.

18 F.K. Crowley, "Broome, Sir Frederick Napier (1842–1896)," in Australian Dictionary of Biography (Canberra: Australian National University, 1969).

19 de Garis, "Constitutional," 54.

20 "Legislative Council - Friday, August 20," West Australian, 22 August 1887, 3.

21 "Vigilans et Audax - Wednesday, March 28," West Australian, 28 March 1888, 2-3.

22 "Legislative Council - Thursday, December 15," West Australian, 16 December 1887, 3.

23

23 "The Proposed Vasse-Bayswater Railway," West Australian, 26 March 1888, 3.

24 "Vigilans et Audax - Wednesday, March 28," 2-3; "Legislative Council - Monday, March 27," West Australian, 27 March 1888, 3.

25 "Vigilans et Audax - Wednesday, March 28," 2-3.

26 "Legislative Council - Monday, April 16," West Australian, 17 April 1888, 3.

27 "The Bayswater-Vasse Railway," Western Mail, 21 April 1888, 16.

28 "The Prorogation of the Legislative Council," Inquirer and Commercial News, 25 April 1888, 2.

29 Ibid.

30 "Public Meeting at the Town Hall," Western Mail, 28 April 1888, 40.

31 "Meeting at the Town Hall," Inquirer and Commercial News, 25 April 1888, 3.

32 Despatch by Sir Frederick Broome to the Secretary of State, 3 May 1888, TNA: PRO CO 18/210, 182-85.

33 ———, "Constitutional," 63.

34 ———, "Self-Government and the Evolution of Party Politics 1871-1911," in A New History of Western Australia, ed. C.T. Stannage (Nedlands, WA: University of Western Australia Press, 1981), 350.

35 Colin A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968), 227. In fact, as Moore took over from a retiring predecessor and later handed the office over to a successor, this period of stability lasted from Oct. 1905-Oct. 1911.

36 University of Western Australia, "Australian Politics and Elections Database," http://elections.uwa.edu.au/index.lasso.

37 de Garis, "Constitutional," 89; University of Western Australia, "Australian Politics and Elections Database".

38 "The Political Situation," West Australian, 19 September 1907, 5.

39 Ibid.

40 "The Decision of the Government," West Australian, 19 September 1907, 5.

41 "Prorogation of Parliament," West Australian, 20 September 1907, 5.

42 "The Decision of the Government," 5.

43 Minutes by Colonial Office Officials, 21-22 September 1907, TNA: PRO CO 418/55, 494.

44 "Prorogation of Parliament," 5.

45 "Vigilans et Audax - Thursday, December 19," West Australian, 19 December 1907, 6.

46 ———, "Australian Politics and Elections Database".

47 "Parliament: Legislative Assembly - Thursday January 28," West Australian, 29 January 1909, 9.

48 "Parliament: Legislative Council - Thursday February 4," West Australian, 5 February 1909, 2; "Parliament: Legislative Council - Saturday February 6," West Australian, 8 February 1909, 3.

49 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia 1901-1911 (Melbourne: McCarron, Bird & Co., 1912), 791.

50 Peter Boyce, "Governor and Parliament," in The House on the Hill: A History of the Parliament of Western Australia,

1832-1990, ed. David W. Black (Perth: Parliament of Western Australia, 1991), 277; G.P. Walsh, "Strickland, Sir Gerald (1861-1940)," in Australian Dictionary of Biography (Canberra: Australian National University, 1990).

51 Boyce, "Governor," 278.

52 "Legislative Assembly - Friday July 30," West Australian, 31 July 1909, 8.

53 University of Western Australia, "Australian Politics and Elections Database".

24

54 J.R. Robertson, "The Internal Politics of State Labor in Western Australia, 1911-1916," Bulletin of the Australian Society

for the Study of Labour History, no. 2 (1962): 68-9.

55 Ibid., 69-70.

56 Ibid., 70-1.

57 "State Politics: The Roebourne Election," West Australian, 18 November 1915, 6.

58 "News and Notes," West Australian, 25 November 1915, 6.

59 "Scaddan Safe," Sunday Times, 28 November 1915, 9.

60 Ibid.

61 "State Politics: Labour Government's Troubles," West Australian, 22 December 1915, 8.

62 "State Politics: Williams-Narrogin By-election," West Australian, 10 January 1916, 7.

63 "State Politics: The Premier and His Critics," West Australian, 24 January 1916, 8.

64 "The Premier's Humiliation," Western Mail, 28 January 1916, 32.

65 "The Government and Parliament," Geraldton Guardian, 02 March 1916, 2.

66 Despatch by Sir Harry Barron to the Secretary of State, 1 January 1916, TNA: PRO CO 418/150, 438.

67 Despatch by Sir Harry Barron to the Secretary of State, 1 July 1916, TNA: PRO CO 418/150, 463.

68 "Essence of Parliament," Western Mail, 28 July 1916, 19.

69 University of Western Australia, "Australian Politics and Elections Database".

70 F.R. Beasley, "Review of Legislation, 1951," University of Western Australia Annual Law Review 1951-1953 (1951): 405-7, 13.

71 Western Australia, Government Gazette, 15 October 1951, [cited 11 September 2012]; available from http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/gazette/gazette.nsf/gazlist/367700A2FA92D2FA48257715001D19D0/$file/gg100.pdf. For our purposes, these events do not constitute a case of partisan use of prorogation, as the government and the majority in the Council were co-partisans. We thus consider these events as an example of non-partisan intercameral conflict.

72 Beasley, "Review of Legislation, 1951," 413-15.

73 "Rent Bill Passed by Parliament," West Australian, 17 December 1951, 2.

74 ———, "Review of Legislation, 1952," University of Western Australia Annual Law Review 1951-1953 (1952): 630-31; "The Rent Act Will Be Continued," West Australian, 23 October 1952, 2.

75 ———, "Review of Legislation, 1953," University of Western Australia Annual Law Review 1954-1956 (1953): 135-36.

76 "Rent Controls Will Virtually Go Next April 30," West Australian, 19 December 1953, 1.

77 Western Australia, Government Gazette, 19 March 1954, [cited 11 September 2012]; available from http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/gazette/gazette.nsf/gazlist/72F0997BC93412A7C82576400083C48D/$file/gg014.pdf; "Special Session Will Be Held on Fair Rents," West Australian, 20 March 1954, 1.

78 "Failure to Reach Compromise Kills the Bill on Rents," West Australian, 17 April 1954, 1.

79 Beasley, "Review of Legislation, 1953," 126; "Labour Makes a Sweep of Seats," West Australian, 10 May 1954, 1; "Council Elections," West Australian, 10 May 1954, 2.

80 "A New Session Will Consider Law on Rents," West Australian, 19 May 1954, 1; Western Australia, Government Gazette, 28 May 1954, 959, [cited 11 September 2012]; available from http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/gazette/gazette.nsf/gazlist/96419E7FB244610AC82576410000CE14/$file/gg026.pdf.

81 "State Restores Rent Control," West Australian, 20 August 1954, 2.

82 Ross Parsons, "Review of Legislation," University of Western Australia Annual Law Review 1954-1956 (1954): 348.

25

83 University of Western Australia, "Australian Politics and Elections Database".

84 "Australian Political Chronicle: September-December 1971," Australian Journal of Politics and History 18, no. 1 (1972): 122-3.

85 "Political Crisis," West Australian, 9 October 1971, 6.

86 D.B. Smith and R.J. Barry, "Tonkin May Seek Recess to Avert Defeat," West Australian, 11 October 1971, 1.

87 Ibid.

88 Peter Johnston, "Tonkin v Brand: Triumph for the Rule of Law," in State Constitutional Landmarks, ed. George Winterton (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006), 232, n.110.

89 Anne Twomey, The Chameleon Crown: the Queen and Her Australian Governors (Annandale: Federation Press, 2006), 78.

90 Western Australia, Government Gazette, 12 October 1971, [cited 04 May 2012]; available from http://www.slp.wa.gov.au/gazette/gazette.nsf/gazlist/7D8C2760149209EBC82574890036E638/$file/gg088.pdf.

91 D.B. Smith, "Liberals Angry Over Decision to Prorogue Parliament," West Australian, 12 October 1971, 4.

92 "Executive Rule," West Australian, 12 October 1971, 6.

93 Minute by FCO South West Pacific Dept. Officer R.D. Wall, 16 November 1971, TNA: PRO FCO 24/1037, 52; Minute by FCO Commonwealth Coordination Dept. Officer P.D. McEntee, 18 November 1971, TNA: PRO FCO 24/1037, 53.

94 Letter by FCO Secretary of State Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 13 December 1971, TNA: PRO FCO 24/1037, 58.

95 Draft Letter from the Private Secretary in the FCO, 1 December 1971, TNA: PRO FCO 24/1037, 54.

96 Letter by FCO Secretary of State Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 13 December 1971, 58. Emphasis added.

97 University of Western Australia, "Australian Politics and Elections Database".

98 Ibid.

99 "Australian Political Chronicle: July-December 1985," Australian Journal of Politics and History 32, no. 2 (1986): 294-5.

100 Ibid., 295-6.

101 Quoted in ibid., 296.

102 ———, "Australian Politics and Elections Database".

103 Ibid.

104 "Political Chronicle: January-June 1990," Australian Journal of Politics and History 36, no. 3 (1990): 446-7.

105 Ibid., 448.

106 Ibid.

107 "Political Chronicle: Australia and Papua New Guinea, July-December 1990," Australian Journal of Politics and History 37, no. 2 (1991): 338.

108 "Political Chronicle: Australia January-June 1991," Australian Journal of Politics and History 37, no. 3 (1991): 498.

109 Gerard W. Horgan, "Prorogation as Partisan Political Tool: The New South Wales Experience," Journal of Parliamentary

and Political Law 6, no. 1 (2012): 182-5.

110 Ibid.

26

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