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Daniel London December 25 2008

Philosophy of History Final Paper

Thucydides, Augustine, and Hegel on Morality and War

An insult is noted, a declaration is drawn, armies are

formed, and a battle ensues. War has always been a defining

feature of human experience, a terrible reality with which great

thinkers and philosophers have grappled with for thousands of

years. When is it “right” to wage a war? What is the “right” way

to wage it? Philosophers have sought to answer these questions by

drawing from their notions of morality, seeking to distinguish a

“just” from an “unjust” war. However, while many texts have been

written about the different moral solutions philosophers have

posed to these questions, less attention has been paid to how

their thoughts on morality are related to their broader ideas

concerning the nature of human history. This paper explores this

question through the philosophies by Thucydides, St. Augustine,

and Hegel.

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I have chosen these three philosophers in particular because

they offer instructively divergent ideas on the direction and

purpose of history. Thucydides believed history, like human

nature, was unchanging over time. Augustine held that it was

possible for mankind to ascend to a higher plane if they held

true to divine precepts on earth. Hegel had a vision of

inevitable earthly progress. Together, we are confronted with

cyclical, transcendent, and teleological conceptions of human

destiny. Such a divergent set of historic schemas, I will argue,

leads to equally divergent approaches to the proper conduct of

war.

Thucydides: As immoral as possible, as moral as necessary

In order to understand Thucydides’ thoughts on humanity’s

ultimate objectives, we must first look at his conception of

human nature. For him, mankind is chiefly motivated by the desire

for earthly power, willing to engage in any means necessary in

order to attain it. There is no greater goal possible, much less

attainable, within an anarchic and amoral universe such as ours.

i Accordingly, egotistical and ruthless behavior of historical

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characters pervades his magnum opus, The History of the Peloponnesian

War. In a famous passage he explains the origins of the conflict

as lying in “...the growth of Athenian power, which inspired fear

in the Lacedaemonians and compelled them to go to war.”ii No

divine meddling or unforgivable ethical lapses here; fear of

losing power at the hands of a rising state was all that was

necessary to let slip the dogs of war. Indeed, Thucydides seems

to remove morality entirely as a consciously pursued aim both for

individuals or states: it is either deployed as a screen to

justify the expansion of the strong, or employed by the weak as a

last-ditch protection against those who would oppress them. The

Athenians dispense with any moral pretense at all, nakedly

proclaiming their plans for conquest and secure in the belief

that they act according to eternal edicts. The law that “the

strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must...”, as

they explain to the Melians before annihilating them, “...was not

made by us… we obey it in the knowledge that you and all mankind,

with our strength, would do the same.”iii

i Steven Forde, “Varieties of Realism: Thucycides and Machiavelli,” The Journal of Politics 54.2 (1992): 375.ii Chatper One Section 23iii Chapter 5 Section 89 5. 105 – 184

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Because human nature does not change, it follows that

history itself does not progress in any meaningful way. While

events might vary in their particulars, the basic struggle for

power pervades all eras equally. Ian Johnston writes that

Thucydides “…regards history and the things that matter most in

history as more or less static....Power relations do change, and

thus there will always be winners and losers. But there is no

gradual transformation of that process manifesting itself event

by event.”iv Indeed, Thucydides’ belief that his history would be

a “useful” guide for future readers hinges on the belief that the

world at the time they read it will “...resemble what has

occurred”. History is less a process than a condition; a

reflection of unchanging human nature across time. As a result,

mankind’s goals for the future are nothing more than what they

have always been: temporary security and temporal happiness

through the pursuit of power. For Thucydides, this is as close to

the “purpose” of human existence as we can ascertain.

With this in mind, it would appear that whether a war is

moral or not is quite beside the point for Thucydides. Rather,

iv Ian Johnston, “Preliminary Observations on Thucydides”, http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/introser/thucy.htm

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his only concern is whether war helps one attain or retain power.

Theoretically, even massacres could be justified as long as they

accomplish this end. This is certainly the rationale employed by

the Athenian Cleon who, when confronted with the rebellion of the

Myteans, lobbies for the execution of all their men folk and the

enslavement of their women and children, declaring to the

assembly: “...you ought now to chastise them beyond what is

right, or immediately to forego your power, and dropping yourself

down into impotent security, to set about the practice of

humanity and virtues. But adieu to this vain expedient!”v The

fact that Thucydides never offers a judgment as to whether this

position on the conduct of warfare is either moral or immoral

would seem to indicate a tacit acquiescence to practices that

appear appallingly cruel and callous to modern sensibilities.

A closer reading of the text, however, reveals an abiding

concern with ethically-charged aspects of war that belies the

work’s nihilistic reputation. First, it is made clear that the

human beings caught up in war are not soulless automatons but

operate according to their own standards of right and wrong,

v Chapter Three Section One

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justice and injustice, cowardice and glory. Even Cleon seeks to

persuade his fellows by appealing to their sense of fairness as

well as to their more expedient concerns.vi Second, Thucydides’

tendency to explain the motivations, speeches, and actions of

opposing states in an even-handed manner instills compassion for

all those involved in a conflict; victims as well as victors. War

is not a question of “right” vs. “wrong”, but the collision

between subjective perspectives of “rights”. vii Finally, by

recounting the negotiations and forsaken opportunities that

bookend conflict, Thucydides emphasizes that war are not

inevitable, but the result of conscious human choices. Had this

not been so, moral objections would be futile. Instead, critics

of war on both sides can act in the confidence that they have the

power, potentially, to stop a war they despise.viii

From these observations, one could conclude that Thucydides

does not impose a moralistic viewpoint of his own, but merely

considers the moral perspective of his subjects as crucially

important factors in understanding “what happened.” But

vi (7.30), 2.51-53, 3.81-83vii Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, Endre Begby, The Ethics of War Classic and Contemporary Readings, (Boston: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 3. viii “Thucydides’ Realistic Critique of Realism” Policy 30.2 (1997): 255.

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Thucydides is not so detached from the events he describes to

ignore their concrete moral implications for his own time. It is

Thucydides’ genius to realize that the injudicious use of war in

ways perceived as immoral can actually hinder or defeat the

attainment of power by increasing resistance abroad and fostering

violent discord at home. In the first case, using the threat of

war to pressure a country into obedience can instigate a powerful

resentment that did not exist before. “Moral” notions of honor

and sovereignty can spark an outsized resistance to such

coercion. The Athenians disregard this truth at their own peril,

undiplomatically threatening the Melians with utter destruction

if they do not follow their commands to join them against the

Spartans. Their belligerent disregard of the Melian’s notions of

morality ultimately works against them, leading the small island

state to resist their advances when a more measured approach

could have brought about a superior outcome.ix As Clifford Orwin

writes, “the [Athenian] envoys...underestimated the depth of the

Melians’ resistance to reason, the likelihood of which a more

reasonable strategy would have taken into account.”x

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Secondly, the pressures and instability wrought by war can

destroy the bonds of civil society at home, leading to the kind

of domestic discord, or “statis” as Thucydides called it, which can

destroy a state. The History is suffused with examples of societies

fragmenting and dissolving as individual passions overwhelm

loyalty to the greater community – in Coryca, Athens, Sparta, and

eventually throughout the entire Hellenic world. Jonathan Price

writes that “Both epidemic and war which bring stasis are viewed

as processes of nature, not in themselves bearing any negative

moral value… but leading to disruptions in morality as defined by

society.”xi Thucydides paints a vivid portrait of the anarchy and

chaos that can result from this, his otherwise neutral prose

replaced by tirades against the “savagery”, (82.1) and

“wickedness” (83.1) of statis. He declares that “Civil War

assimilates most people’s passions to their conditions, which

are, since there is a war, violent conditions. By doing so, it

takes away the everyday resources available to judgment, namely,

calm passions and satisfied appetites. The result is that ix “Thucycides Realistic Critique of Realism ciritque 254. x Clifford Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides, (Princeton: Princeton university press, 1994), 116.xi Jonathan Price, Thucydides and Internal War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30.

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judgment or good sense is unbalanced by strong and undisciplined

passion.”xii Thus, wars can destroy the moral bonds within a

society, unleashing destructive and violent behaviors which

peaceful nations are normally able to keep in check. Whether

these moral bonds are real or imagined is beside the point; upon

breaking, the effect is just as catastrophic.

These two insights into the self-defeating nature of

unrestrained warfare formulate a kind of “realistic critique of

realism”, in the words of Peter J. Ahrensdorf.xiii The entire

History is a cautionary tale in this regard. While an immorally

conducted war can bring great power to those who wage it

successfully, it can also lead to the downfall of victors as well

as victims.

Of course, resorting to unqualified altruism is no more

effective than unchecked selfishness – people are just as quickly

to take advantage of a saint as to violently resist a sinner. The

History reveals the weaknesses behind these two paradigms– while

“The Melians may be fools for thinking that justice can prevail

in the face of Athenian might...Thucydides shows the Athenians to

xii Chapter 82, Section one xiii “Thucydides’ Realistic Critique of Realism”: 254.

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be equally blind to the consequences of living wholly by the law

of power.”xiv Only through a combination of coerciveness and moral

sensitivity can one effectively attain temporal power, the

nominal purpose of human existence. Ironically, the statesman

many consider the “father of realism” was actually one of the

first philosophers to emphasize the utilitarian function of

ethical behavior in war as well as in peace. As Mary Francis

Williams wrote in Ethics and Thucydides, “Moral difficulty and the

need for moral return is the crowning point of Thucydides book,

and they are the basis for his analysis of power.” xv

Augustine: The ends justify the divine means

The explicitly moralistic, purposeful vision of history pup

forth by Augustine appears to be thE antithesis of the cyclical

schema suggested by Thucydides. It is less a refutation, however,

than a re-conceptualization of the Greek’s philosophy,

accomplished by grafting a divinely redemptive plan onto

Thucydides static account of earthly history. Augustine holds

xiv “Varieties of realism”, 384. xv Mary Frances Williams, Ethics and Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity (Lanham, University Press of America, 1998), 5.

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that the suffering and hardship we experience in life, the “City

of M`n”, derives from the sinful desire to serve one’s earthy

interests without regard to the divine dimension of existence:

the “City of God.” Concomitantly, human history is a purposeless

succession of rising and falling empires, violence and misery –

not too far, in fact, from the world described by Thucydides. But

while Thucydides resigns himself to this reality, Augustine holds

that by adhering to God’s moral precepts the soul of man can

enter “the City of God”, to dwell forever in peace. Therefore,

mankind’s goal (whether or not it is consciously acknowledged) is

to prepare for the life beyond by behaving morally, i.e. obeying

God’s commands.

As Hannah Arendt observed, “Secular history in the Christian

view remained bound within the cycles of antiquity – empires

would rise and fall as in the past- except that Christians, in

the possession of an everlasting life, could break through this

cycle of everlasting change and must look with indifference upon

the spectacles it offered.xvi”. Even so, while Augustine stresses

that mankind should eschew earthly temptations he does not

xvi Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York, Penguin Classics, 1990), 20.

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promote the opposite extreme - that people should retreat from

civilization entirely as righteous hermits. Rather, one can and

must utilize mortal institutions to implement the will of God

while living in the City of Man. He writes that “…this divine

Master inculcates two precepts – the love of God and the love of

our neighbor – and as in these precepts a man finds three things

he has to love – God, himself, and his neighbor – it follows that

he must endeavor to get his neighbor to love God, since he is

ordered to love his neighbor as himself.”xvii Anything that

accomplishes this, whether it be personal entreaties or

government legislation, can be considered “moral” and for

Augustine, this logic extends to war as well. Accordingly,

warfare conducted in pursuit of divinely mandated goals is

necessarily a “just war.”

By contrast, any that is waged for man’s ends rather than

God’s is an “unjust war.” For all the ink Augustine spills on the

gruesome conduct and consequences of unjust wars, his ultimate

objections to such wars derive solely from their secular

xvii Book XIX, sec 14

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motivations. Indeed, any action conducted for the sake of the

City of Man over the City of God is, by defInition, immoral.

Speaking of Rome, Augustine laments that such a state “seeks to

be the conqueror of peoples while "being itself the #captive of

vices”, going on to proclaIm “...I should like first to inquire

for a little what reason, what purpose, There is in wishing to

glory in the greatness a.d extent of tha empire, when you cannot

point out the happiness of men who are always rolling, with dark

fear and cruel lust, in warlike slaughters and in blood, which,

whether shed in civil or foreign war, is still human blood...”xviii

Had this expansion occurred without spilling a single drop of

this blood, however, it would still be sacrilegious folly due to

the immoral ends for which it was waged. The fact it led to

murder and destruction merely compounded its tragedy.

A truly just or moral war, in contrast, is waged in service

of God’s will and therefore satisfies the ultimate purpose of

humanity. Such a crusade must fulfill three criteria in order to

be so sanctioned; it must be granted under just authority

(leadership sanctioned by God), it must be fought for just ends

xviii City of God Book IV, chapter 3.

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(God’s ends), and it must be conducted in ways that preserve

explicitly sacred sites and personnel (i.e. churches, priests).xix

Besides this last stipulation, none of these condipions concern

the actual behaviob of war’s combatants - it is assumed by

Augustine that the conduct of war will alter as its ends shift

from those of man to those of God. First, the passionate emotions

that so troubled Thucydides and which can lead to such Brutal

excesses will be made irrelevant. Since individuals have no

private stake in its outcome, theoretically war should become an

antiseptic instrument of the Lord’s will. Indeed, introducing

human passions into the mix would weaken its purity and efficacy.

Augustine holds that the real evils of war are not death, which

is inevitable in any regard, but “the love of violence,

revengeful cruelty, Fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance

and the lust of power, and such...”xx These emotions cause not

only physical, but spiritual death. As he advises a statesman,

“Let necessity slay the warring foe, not your will”.xxi

xix Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby eds., The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 85. xx Augustine, Contra Faustum XII 74, in Ibid, 76. xxi Augustine, Letter 189 to Boniface, in Ibid., 79.

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Additionally, if emotions and passions are removed from the

equations of a just war, so are feelings of responsibility and

guilt. The morality of killing in the name of God, who represents

the highest good and to whom the greatest loyalty is required,

supersedes ordinary ethical standards. Augustine is explicit

about this. “He to whom authority is delegated, and who is but

the sword in the hand of him”, he states, “is not himself

responsible for the death he deals.”xxii Likewise, “The soldier

who has slain a man in obedience to the authority under which he

is lawfully commissioned, is not accused of murder by any law of

his state...but if he has been acting on his own authority, and

at his own impulse, he has in this case incurred the crime of

shedding human blood.”xxiii Consequently (and in stark contrast to

the view of Thucydides), any and all means necessary to

accomplish a just war are legitimate, no matter how ordinarily

distasteful. Augustine advises a statesman that “[S]uch things

[as ambushes] are legitimate for those who are engaged in a just

war. In these matters the only thing a righteous man has to worry

about is that the just war is waged by someone who has the right

to do so... Once an individual has undertaken this kind of war,

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it does not matter at all, as far as justice is concerned,

whether he wins victory in open combat or through ruses”. xxiv In

short, Augustine, the great Christian theologian, argues that, in

the case of “exempted” wars, the ends may very well justify the

means. It is essential to understand that these wars are not

justified by God because they are just, but are just because they are

justified by God – Euthyphro’s dilemma resolved.xxv

Still, in spite of his insistence on their importance in

spreading God’s will, Augustine regrets their necessity: He

writes that

“They say...that the wise man will wage only just wars

– as if, mindful that he is human, he would not much rather

lament that he is subject to the necessity of waging just

wars. If they were not just, he would not be required to

wage them, and thus he would be free of the necessity of

war. It is the iniquity on the part of the adversary that

forces a just war upon the wise man.”xxvi

xxii Book one, chapter 21xxiii City of God, book I, chapter 31.xxiv Augustine, From Questions on the Heptateuch, bk. VI, chapter 10, The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 83. xxv

xxvi Bk. XIX, chap 7

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Above all, Augustine holds peace as the most desirable end

sought by mankind, declaring “...nothing is heard with greater

pleasure, nothing desired more longingly, and in the end, nothing

better can be found”.xxvii Thus, even in the midst of the harshest

conflict Augustine urges statesman to retain the possibility of

peace. And yet, there is a deep contradiction here. If one is

truly doing God’s works, should not it be waged unceasingly- even

joyfully- until His work is accomplished? Augustine himself writes

that “because it would be worse if wrongdoers dominated those who

are more just, it is not inappropriate to call even this

necessity “happiness.”xxviii The image of armed men gleefully and

unrestrainedly slaughtering non-combatants is difficult to

reconcile with a philosophy of history that regarded morality as

the only legitimate premise for warfare. Yet this is the

inevitable outcome of a philosophy that (a.) regards as “moral”

any action that advances a religiously sanctioned goal and that

(b.) regards the achievement of such an overarching goal to be a

religious duty; one which is necessary for personal salvation.

The parallel with contemporary events could not be more chilling.xxvii City of God, bk. XIX, chap 11. xxviii City of God, bk. IV, chap 15

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And (for the purposes of this essay) nor could the contrast

with the pragmatic philosophy of Thucydides be more illuminating

in respect to their assessment of the morality of the methods of

warfare: while the pragmatist Thucydides rejects immoral conduct

when they are detrimental to secular goals, the moralist

Augustine readily accepts – nay, encourages- immoral conduct when

they facilitate the achievement of religious goals. He might

write hopefully that “If the earthly city observes Christian

principles, even its wars will be waged with the benevolent

purpose that better provision might be made for the defeated to

live harmoniously together in justice and goodness”xxix. But a

benevolent purpose imposed through cruel means is unlikely to

bring about a harmonious conclusion, much less “justice” or

“goodness”.

Hegel: Reaching Morality through Immorality

We have explored Thucydides’ notion of cyclical history,

delved into Augustine’s conception of divine purposiveness, and

now arrive at the quintessentially teleological historical schema

xxix Letter 138 to Marcellinus, in The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (NewYork: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 73.

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held by Hegel, one as breathtakingly ambitious as it is

infamously complex. Like the other philosophers we have analyzed,

Hegel characterizes human history as an endless succession of

suffering and cruelty, a “slaughter-bench” where “the happiness

of nations, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals

are sacrificed.xxx However, whereas our previous philosophers see

no inherent meaning or purpose in the practice of warfare as a

means of resolving human conflict, Hegel holds that these

apparently “immoral” conflagrations have served an indispensable

role in bringing mankind closer to its objective – the self-

conscious awareness of its freedom. How does he arrive at this

conclusion? First, Hegel seeks a basic dynamic, or Idea, that

brings order and direction to the seemingly random swirl of human

history. This Idea is Reason, the central force that has

animated, regulated, and guided human behavior throughout time.

As Hegel writes in Philosophy and History, “Reason is the law of the

world and that, therefore, in world history things have come

about rationally”xxxi

xxx 68-69 reason in history xxxi 20

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If Reason is the hidden logic of history, where has it been

taking us? Hegel perceives a single dynamic consistently

unfolding as human history progresses – the gradual and self-

conscious expansion of mankind’s Spirit, or Freedom. The

attainment of this freedom, “the ultimate purpose toward which

all world history has continually aimed”, is accomplished by

actualizing the individual potential, self-worth, and self-

awareness of all humanity. xxxii This cannot come about, however,

as long as the human race is atomized and alienated from one

another. Only in a social setting where citizens rely on one

another and where a hierarchy of ruler and ruled is established

does “...the problem of individual freedom arise and assert

itself”, for it is only in such a context that mankind’s

selfishness and short-sightedness is challenged to go beyond its

limitations. xxxiii Hegel can see this occurring as human

societies increase in size and complexity, from the small village

into the city-state, then into the feudal kingdom, until reaching

a kind of culmination in the form of the modern nation-state.

Encompassing and protecting vast amounts of people and territory,

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the nation instills the kind of internal co-dependence crucial in

actualizing the freedom of its populace. Hegel believes that “The

history of the world is the progress in the consciousness of

freedom”, with its ultimate fulfillment in the nation-state, “the

definitive object of world-history proper.” xxxiv

But how can Hegel hold out hope for a utopia of untrammeled

freedom when, by his own account, mankind has historically acted

for short term, selfish goals? Interestingly, Hegel sees this

“passion”, as he calls such egotistical behavior, as the means by

which the long-term, altruistic destiny of mankind can be

realized. By seeking power over their fellow man, statesmen such

as Caesar and Napoleon wage wars and dominate their neighbors,

inadvertently laying the foundation for the kind of cities,

kingdoms, and eventually nation-states in which freedom can best

be brought to fruition. In this way, “the human

passions...fulfill themselves and their ends in accordance with

their specific nature, and thereby create the edifice of human

society in which justice and order are given power over the

xxxii 25. xxxiii Master/Slave dynamic. 161. xxxiv 53

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passion themselves.”xxxv In even more strident terms Hegel

declares “All...expressions of individual and national life, in

seeking and fulfilling their own ends, are at the same time the

means and instruments of a higher (bold face added by Hegel)

purpose and wider enterprise of which they are themselves

ignorant and which they nevertheless unconsciously carry out.”xxxvi

Through the Cunning of Reason, by and only by acting selfishly-

that is, by acting “immorally”- can the utopian and equitable

ends of history come to fruition in the future.

Conversely, acting with moral intentions can actually delay

or retard this process. Self-interest is able to move history

precisely because “...passion has a more immediate hold over man

than artificial and laborious acquired discipline of order and

moderation, justice and morality.”xxxvii Were rulers to be bound

by constraints of morality, no wars would be fought, no nations

could arise, and freedom could not exist. Though Hegel concedes

that “...examples of virtue elevate the soul…” he goes on to say

that “…the destinies of nations, the convulsions of states and

xxxv Philosophy of Righy, 71. xxxvi 32xxxvii 68,. –art B 1830 draft

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their interests, predicaments, and involvements are of a

different order from that of morality.”xxxviii A cruel regime gives

birth to the French Revolution, engendering a new birth of human

freedom; the invasion of Prussia instills common feelings of

national unity which had not previously existed, forming a model

of constitutional monarchy. The philosophical conception of

history promoted by Hegel judges human actions based on their

ultimate effect on the historic dialectic, not according to one

of the many subjective conceptions of “morality” espoused by

individuals or cultures. As actors in history ourselves, our

imperative is to leave such reflection for this enlightened

future - a future that can only come about by pursuing our own

selfish desires in the present.

Thus we return to an extreme endorsement of pragmatism that

goes beyond Thucydides in jettisoning morality as a means as well

as an ends. War, like all human enterprises, is a slave to

passion and thus should not be restrained by moral preferences

which only delay the inevitable unfolding of history. All

attempts to limit or ban war derive from a hopeless misreading of

xxxviii 21 reason in history.

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humanity’s purpose and destiny, as “the road to human self-

consciousness is through conflict over non-natural ends”.xxxix War,

therefore, cannot be judged in either moral terms as “just” or

“Unjust”, nor can it be described in pragmatic terms as the mere

will and whim of individual statesmen. Hegel’s thoughts on the

matter are best encapsulated in this passage from The Philosophy of

Right:

“War is not be regarded as an absolute evil, and as a

purely external accident, which itself therefore has

some accidental cause, by it injustices, the passions

of nations or the holders of power &c., or in short,

something or other which ought not to be...Here as

elsewhere, the point of view from which things seem

pure accidents vanishes if we look at them in the light

of the concept and philosophy, because philosophy knows

accident for a show and sees in its essence,

necessity.”xl

xxxix George Dennis O’Brien, Hegel on Reason and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 75.xl Philosophy of Right, 209.

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As part of a greater unfolding process of history, war plays

an instrumental role in the development of human institutions

that advance the attainment of greater freedom. Indeed, war is a

brutal, but crucial reminder of the nation state’s

indispensability as the cradle and defender of freedom. Only when

it is threatened, Hegel believes, can the true value of this

precious quality be revealed to a nation’s populace. In this way,

Hegel declares that “...the ethical significance of war

resides... above all in its ability to raise us above the level

of mere civil association with its rootedness in material

possessions. In times of war, common values and commitments are

not only preserved but enhanced”.xli He observes that states

which refuse to go to war are often the victim of more aggressive

nations, and thus “their freedom has died from the fear of

dying”. xlii In contrast, victorious nations not only preserve

their freedom, but find their national power consolidated with

domestic unrest checked and the population firmly united.

Ironically, the philosopher who most decries morality is the most

outspoken in his support of war as an ethical endeavorxliii.

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This brings us to a crucial point about the dynamic status

of morality in Hegel’s philosophy. As we have seen, whether an

action is “right” or “wrong” is less important to him than

whether or not it contributes to mankind’s path towards ultimate

freedom. Historically, morality was more of a distraction for

Hegel because held mankind back from doing what needed to be done

to create the conditions necessary for this state to come into

being. Indeed, without the kind of co-dependence brought about by

freedom, morality itself is nothing more than a subjective,

abstract concept with only an “implicit connection with the

universal will.”xliv As this freedom becomes actualized, however,

individual notions of ethical behavior are subsumed by a more

unified, general conception of morality. It “…determines itself

as objective…and so as truly concrete”. xlv.

xli 628.xlii Chapter 2 324Remark:xliii This is not to say, of course, that the victor in a war was neccearily “right” or “wrong”. INdeed, in the grand scheme of history such judgements hold even less significance than whether one country emerges defeated or triumphant. Only the ends of history can reveal the true tale. Hegel is adamant, after all, that “world history is not the verdict of mere might?” ONly world-history itself truly knows, in the end, xliv 106xlv Section 108, Philosophy of Right.

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Thus, Hegel can foresee a time when war, undoubtedly immoral

in spite of its constructive role in history: a time when its

raison de entre- the formation of freedom- is finally

accomplished. First, as nation-states arise and multiply, the

kind of anti-social behavior that gives birth to inter-state

conflicts will run increasingly counter to the interests of the

many who enjoy peace and freedom within the statist umbrella. In

this sense “war itself is characterized as something which ought

to pass away”xlvi Furthermore, a “family” of autonomous nation

states will have less inclination to fight one another. Hegel

writes in the Philosophy of History that “The trend of the states

is...towards uniformity. There prevails among them one aim, one

tendency, which is the cause of wars, friendships, and the needs

of dynasties. But there also prevails among them another

uniformity...the hegemony of Spirit [actualized freedom].

Theoretically, the entity which gave birth to the nation state

will be made obsolete by the prevalence of its offspring.xlvii

xlvi Ibid 4xlvii G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, ed. G. Lasson(Leipzig, 1920), 761

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When wars do occur, Hegel urges contemporary states to

preserve the progress already made in terms of mankind’s social

and material well-being by sparing its citizens the worst

excesses of conflict. He asks that even during the fiercest

fighting “the possibility of peace be retained (and so, for

example, that envoys must be respected), and, in general, that

war be not waged against domestic institutions, against the peace

of family and private life, or against persons in their private

capacity”xlviii The distinction between a “just” and “unjust” war

thus becomes relevant again. Hegel writes that “Just wars…are

defensive wars waged for the preservation and protection of the

state. Wars of subjugation, by definition, are aggressive wars

which manifest only the desire for domination of another, rather

than the preservation of a free life internal to a community”.xlix

For Hegel, war that is “moral” is that which aids the survival

and strength of the nation-state, and war that is immoral is that

which undermines it. From this unique perspective on the morality

of armed conflict, based, in turn, on his conception of the ends

of history, Hegel derives moral injunctions against wanton

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cruelty and aggression that transcend the pragmatic

considerations of Thucydides and that are notably absent in the

theological teachings of Augustine.

Heg’s believed that war’s cruelty would be mitigated with

the rise of the nation-state, as “person is not set over against

person in hatred. At most, personal enmities appear in the

vanguard, but in the main body of the army hostility is something

vague and gives place to each side’s respect for the duty of the

other”.lIf this was ever true in Hegel’s lifetime, it certainly

has not lasted. It would appear as if there is still too much

“passion” involved in modern nation states, a “passion” that,

according to Hegel, only further wars and unifications can

nullify. While Hegel was very detailed at explaining how one

would arrive at the “ends of history” and what it would look

like, it appears doubtful that we are due to arrive in it any

time soon.

In contrasting Hegel’s opus with that of Augustine, however,

one should not conclude that Hegel presents a fully secular

xlviii Philosophy of Right 338xlix

l Section 295

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viewpoint. Like Augustine, Hegel sees God’s will manifested

through history. Whereas Augustine would forsake this world

completely for the sake of the City of God, Hegel reclaims Earth

as the site both of mankind’s struggle and its eventual reward.

In a sense, Hegel marries the pragmatism of Thucydides with

Augustine’s utopian teleology, but while Augustine sees in

history primarily the fallenness of the world and human

institutions, Hegel sees not only division and conflict in the

world, but also a positive manifestation of “the divine idea:”

the dynamic progression toward human freedom and reason.

Conclusion

Terrorism has re-defined warfare in the 21st century: the

mind conjures up images of suicide bombers or heavily armed men

joyfully slaughtering noncombatants in the hope of reaching

Heaven. In light of their ideas on morality and human destiny,

how might Thucydides, Augustine, and Hegel critique their

actions? Thucydides would clearly reject terrorism for two

reasons. Its religious motivations and objectives make no

pragmatic sense, as the prospect of attaining “heaven” can only

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be illusory These terrorists thus fight and die for, literally,

nothing. Neither will terrorism help accomplish any earthly end,

such as the establishment of an Islamic Republic. By affronting

the moral sensitivities of the global community, Thucydides might

argue, they discredit their cause in the eyes of the world while

committing infinitely more powerful nation-states to their

destruction. Thus, the means of terrorists ensure that their

earthly ends can never be accomplished.

Augustine would mostly likely condemn the actions of

Islamic terrorists – not because they are terrorists, but because

they are not Christian. Augustine was quite comfortable with

war, provided it was waged for his Judeo-Christian deity. “how

much…must the man be blameless who carries on war on the

authority of God, of whom every one who serves Him knows that He

can never require what is wrong?”li The fact that such

terrorists’ earthly goals might not be attained in their

lifetimes is beyond the point, as this world is but shadow and

dust in any event. And even if their actions may not

li Book VII, Section 7.

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pragmatically advance their cause, as Thucydides would argue,

their selfless desire to martyr themselves for a divine cause,

from an Augustinian perspective, qualifies their actions as

“moral.”

In turn, Hegel would be deeply affronted by the actions of

terrorists. The fact that they seek an exclusively Islamic

republic on earth is surely not in keeping with the purpose of

history, in which nations promise to become more and more

inclusive as time progresses. In the distant past such efforts to

religiously unify a region through violent means could have

served a historical purpose, laying the foundation for the kind

of political unity Hegel yearns for. Indeed, this actually

occurred during the early Jihads through the Middle East and

North Africa, which preceded the formation of the Mogul and

Turkish empires. In a world already comprised of established

nation-states, however, such efforts to violently replace the

rule of law with the rule of God would go against the flow of

history and would be, therefore, doomed to failure. The actions

of stateless religious sects against both formally organized

states and against non-combatants within a state (including their

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own) undermines the legitimacy of all states and, as such, from

the Hegelian perspective are essentially immoral.

Three different philosophers: three radically different

perspectives on the morality of warfare. takes on a single action

- war. The reason for this divergence, we have argued, stems from

their respective ideas concerning a purpose to human history. To

the pragmatist Thucydides, warfare is a useful means to the human

goals of prosperity and security, and immoral tactics are

rejected because they tend to become counterproductive to those

material goals. Both Augustine and Hegel view warfare as a mans

of achieving a greater, perhaps “transcendent" end, but while

this teleological perspective results in Augustine’s acceptance-

even endorsement- of aggressive and ruthless tactics, Hegel’s

evolutionary perspective would constrain him to denounce those

“atavistic” methods of warfare that are no longer appropriate for

use by the modern state.( H-bombs? Yes. Car bombs? No) In this

sense, both these philosophers can justify war for the sake of a

future lying just beyond the horizon – forward in time for Hegel,

up in heaven for Augustine.

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Only Thucydides has a notion of morality that applies to

everyone in our own world and time. It is indeed ironic that the

intellectual father of Metternich, Bismarck, and Kissinger has

offered one of the most workable conceptions of morality in war,

applicable in our own time as it was when The History was written

over two thousand years ago. In order to accomplish earthly goals

most effectively, Thucydides argues, one must pay heed to one’s

own moral principals, as well as the moral principles of others,

whether they be against nuclear weapons, submarine warfare,

destroying school buses, or laying landmines. Of course, acting

brutally in war might gain a party temporary power and security.

But as we have learned in countless cases of over-reaching

aggressors, disregarding morality – even in the name of religion

or a political ideology- has not proven to be a winning strategy

in the long run..

The modest path of pragmatism, while lacking in romance or a

transcendent vision of a paradise to come, might just lead us to

a more peaceful world by respecting people’s moral constraints

free from any overarching religious or ideological agenda.

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