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Daniel London December 25 2008
Philosophy of History Final Paper
Thucydides, Augustine, and Hegel on Morality and War
An insult is noted, a declaration is drawn, armies are
formed, and a battle ensues. War has always been a defining
feature of human experience, a terrible reality with which great
thinkers and philosophers have grappled with for thousands of
years. When is it “right” to wage a war? What is the “right” way
to wage it? Philosophers have sought to answer these questions by
drawing from their notions of morality, seeking to distinguish a
“just” from an “unjust” war. However, while many texts have been
written about the different moral solutions philosophers have
posed to these questions, less attention has been paid to how
their thoughts on morality are related to their broader ideas
concerning the nature of human history. This paper explores this
question through the philosophies by Thucydides, St. Augustine,
and Hegel.
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I have chosen these three philosophers in particular because
they offer instructively divergent ideas on the direction and
purpose of history. Thucydides believed history, like human
nature, was unchanging over time. Augustine held that it was
possible for mankind to ascend to a higher plane if they held
true to divine precepts on earth. Hegel had a vision of
inevitable earthly progress. Together, we are confronted with
cyclical, transcendent, and teleological conceptions of human
destiny. Such a divergent set of historic schemas, I will argue,
leads to equally divergent approaches to the proper conduct of
war.
Thucydides: As immoral as possible, as moral as necessary
In order to understand Thucydides’ thoughts on humanity’s
ultimate objectives, we must first look at his conception of
human nature. For him, mankind is chiefly motivated by the desire
for earthly power, willing to engage in any means necessary in
order to attain it. There is no greater goal possible, much less
attainable, within an anarchic and amoral universe such as ours.
i Accordingly, egotistical and ruthless behavior of historical
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characters pervades his magnum opus, The History of the Peloponnesian
War. In a famous passage he explains the origins of the conflict
as lying in “...the growth of Athenian power, which inspired fear
in the Lacedaemonians and compelled them to go to war.”ii No
divine meddling or unforgivable ethical lapses here; fear of
losing power at the hands of a rising state was all that was
necessary to let slip the dogs of war. Indeed, Thucydides seems
to remove morality entirely as a consciously pursued aim both for
individuals or states: it is either deployed as a screen to
justify the expansion of the strong, or employed by the weak as a
last-ditch protection against those who would oppress them. The
Athenians dispense with any moral pretense at all, nakedly
proclaiming their plans for conquest and secure in the belief
that they act according to eternal edicts. The law that “the
strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must...”, as
they explain to the Melians before annihilating them, “...was not
made by us… we obey it in the knowledge that you and all mankind,
with our strength, would do the same.”iii
i Steven Forde, “Varieties of Realism: Thucycides and Machiavelli,” The Journal of Politics 54.2 (1992): 375.ii Chatper One Section 23iii Chapter 5 Section 89 5. 105 – 184
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Because human nature does not change, it follows that
history itself does not progress in any meaningful way. While
events might vary in their particulars, the basic struggle for
power pervades all eras equally. Ian Johnston writes that
Thucydides “…regards history and the things that matter most in
history as more or less static....Power relations do change, and
thus there will always be winners and losers. But there is no
gradual transformation of that process manifesting itself event
by event.”iv Indeed, Thucydides’ belief that his history would be
a “useful” guide for future readers hinges on the belief that the
world at the time they read it will “...resemble what has
occurred”. History is less a process than a condition; a
reflection of unchanging human nature across time. As a result,
mankind’s goals for the future are nothing more than what they
have always been: temporary security and temporal happiness
through the pursuit of power. For Thucydides, this is as close to
the “purpose” of human existence as we can ascertain.
With this in mind, it would appear that whether a war is
moral or not is quite beside the point for Thucydides. Rather,
iv Ian Johnston, “Preliminary Observations on Thucydides”, http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/introser/thucy.htm
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his only concern is whether war helps one attain or retain power.
Theoretically, even massacres could be justified as long as they
accomplish this end. This is certainly the rationale employed by
the Athenian Cleon who, when confronted with the rebellion of the
Myteans, lobbies for the execution of all their men folk and the
enslavement of their women and children, declaring to the
assembly: “...you ought now to chastise them beyond what is
right, or immediately to forego your power, and dropping yourself
down into impotent security, to set about the practice of
humanity and virtues. But adieu to this vain expedient!”v The
fact that Thucydides never offers a judgment as to whether this
position on the conduct of warfare is either moral or immoral
would seem to indicate a tacit acquiescence to practices that
appear appallingly cruel and callous to modern sensibilities.
A closer reading of the text, however, reveals an abiding
concern with ethically-charged aspects of war that belies the
work’s nihilistic reputation. First, it is made clear that the
human beings caught up in war are not soulless automatons but
operate according to their own standards of right and wrong,
v Chapter Three Section One
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justice and injustice, cowardice and glory. Even Cleon seeks to
persuade his fellows by appealing to their sense of fairness as
well as to their more expedient concerns.vi Second, Thucydides’
tendency to explain the motivations, speeches, and actions of
opposing states in an even-handed manner instills compassion for
all those involved in a conflict; victims as well as victors. War
is not a question of “right” vs. “wrong”, but the collision
between subjective perspectives of “rights”. vii Finally, by
recounting the negotiations and forsaken opportunities that
bookend conflict, Thucydides emphasizes that war are not
inevitable, but the result of conscious human choices. Had this
not been so, moral objections would be futile. Instead, critics
of war on both sides can act in the confidence that they have the
power, potentially, to stop a war they despise.viii
From these observations, one could conclude that Thucydides
does not impose a moralistic viewpoint of his own, but merely
considers the moral perspective of his subjects as crucially
important factors in understanding “what happened.” But
vi (7.30), 2.51-53, 3.81-83vii Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, Endre Begby, The Ethics of War Classic and Contemporary Readings, (Boston: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 3. viii “Thucydides’ Realistic Critique of Realism” Policy 30.2 (1997): 255.
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Thucydides is not so detached from the events he describes to
ignore their concrete moral implications for his own time. It is
Thucydides’ genius to realize that the injudicious use of war in
ways perceived as immoral can actually hinder or defeat the
attainment of power by increasing resistance abroad and fostering
violent discord at home. In the first case, using the threat of
war to pressure a country into obedience can instigate a powerful
resentment that did not exist before. “Moral” notions of honor
and sovereignty can spark an outsized resistance to such
coercion. The Athenians disregard this truth at their own peril,
undiplomatically threatening the Melians with utter destruction
if they do not follow their commands to join them against the
Spartans. Their belligerent disregard of the Melian’s notions of
morality ultimately works against them, leading the small island
state to resist their advances when a more measured approach
could have brought about a superior outcome.ix As Clifford Orwin
writes, “the [Athenian] envoys...underestimated the depth of the
Melians’ resistance to reason, the likelihood of which a more
reasonable strategy would have taken into account.”x
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Secondly, the pressures and instability wrought by war can
destroy the bonds of civil society at home, leading to the kind
of domestic discord, or “statis” as Thucydides called it, which can
destroy a state. The History is suffused with examples of societies
fragmenting and dissolving as individual passions overwhelm
loyalty to the greater community – in Coryca, Athens, Sparta, and
eventually throughout the entire Hellenic world. Jonathan Price
writes that “Both epidemic and war which bring stasis are viewed
as processes of nature, not in themselves bearing any negative
moral value… but leading to disruptions in morality as defined by
society.”xi Thucydides paints a vivid portrait of the anarchy and
chaos that can result from this, his otherwise neutral prose
replaced by tirades against the “savagery”, (82.1) and
“wickedness” (83.1) of statis. He declares that “Civil War
assimilates most people’s passions to their conditions, which
are, since there is a war, violent conditions. By doing so, it
takes away the everyday resources available to judgment, namely,
calm passions and satisfied appetites. The result is that ix “Thucycides Realistic Critique of Realism ciritque 254. x Clifford Orwin, The Humanity of Thucydides, (Princeton: Princeton university press, 1994), 116.xi Jonathan Price, Thucydides and Internal War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 30.
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judgment or good sense is unbalanced by strong and undisciplined
passion.”xii Thus, wars can destroy the moral bonds within a
society, unleashing destructive and violent behaviors which
peaceful nations are normally able to keep in check. Whether
these moral bonds are real or imagined is beside the point; upon
breaking, the effect is just as catastrophic.
These two insights into the self-defeating nature of
unrestrained warfare formulate a kind of “realistic critique of
realism”, in the words of Peter J. Ahrensdorf.xiii The entire
History is a cautionary tale in this regard. While an immorally
conducted war can bring great power to those who wage it
successfully, it can also lead to the downfall of victors as well
as victims.
Of course, resorting to unqualified altruism is no more
effective than unchecked selfishness – people are just as quickly
to take advantage of a saint as to violently resist a sinner. The
History reveals the weaknesses behind these two paradigms– while
“The Melians may be fools for thinking that justice can prevail
in the face of Athenian might...Thucydides shows the Athenians to
xii Chapter 82, Section one xiii “Thucydides’ Realistic Critique of Realism”: 254.
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be equally blind to the consequences of living wholly by the law
of power.”xiv Only through a combination of coerciveness and moral
sensitivity can one effectively attain temporal power, the
nominal purpose of human existence. Ironically, the statesman
many consider the “father of realism” was actually one of the
first philosophers to emphasize the utilitarian function of
ethical behavior in war as well as in peace. As Mary Francis
Williams wrote in Ethics and Thucydides, “Moral difficulty and the
need for moral return is the crowning point of Thucydides book,
and they are the basis for his analysis of power.” xv
Augustine: The ends justify the divine means
The explicitly moralistic, purposeful vision of history pup
forth by Augustine appears to be thE antithesis of the cyclical
schema suggested by Thucydides. It is less a refutation, however,
than a re-conceptualization of the Greek’s philosophy,
accomplished by grafting a divinely redemptive plan onto
Thucydides static account of earthly history. Augustine holds
xiv “Varieties of realism”, 384. xv Mary Frances Williams, Ethics and Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity (Lanham, University Press of America, 1998), 5.
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that the suffering and hardship we experience in life, the “City
of M`n”, derives from the sinful desire to serve one’s earthy
interests without regard to the divine dimension of existence:
the “City of God.” Concomitantly, human history is a purposeless
succession of rising and falling empires, violence and misery –
not too far, in fact, from the world described by Thucydides. But
while Thucydides resigns himself to this reality, Augustine holds
that by adhering to God’s moral precepts the soul of man can
enter “the City of God”, to dwell forever in peace. Therefore,
mankind’s goal (whether or not it is consciously acknowledged) is
to prepare for the life beyond by behaving morally, i.e. obeying
God’s commands.
As Hannah Arendt observed, “Secular history in the Christian
view remained bound within the cycles of antiquity – empires
would rise and fall as in the past- except that Christians, in
the possession of an everlasting life, could break through this
cycle of everlasting change and must look with indifference upon
the spectacles it offered.xvi”. Even so, while Augustine stresses
that mankind should eschew earthly temptations he does not
xvi Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York, Penguin Classics, 1990), 20.
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promote the opposite extreme - that people should retreat from
civilization entirely as righteous hermits. Rather, one can and
must utilize mortal institutions to implement the will of God
while living in the City of Man. He writes that “…this divine
Master inculcates two precepts – the love of God and the love of
our neighbor – and as in these precepts a man finds three things
he has to love – God, himself, and his neighbor – it follows that
he must endeavor to get his neighbor to love God, since he is
ordered to love his neighbor as himself.”xvii Anything that
accomplishes this, whether it be personal entreaties or
government legislation, can be considered “moral” and for
Augustine, this logic extends to war as well. Accordingly,
warfare conducted in pursuit of divinely mandated goals is
necessarily a “just war.”
By contrast, any that is waged for man’s ends rather than
God’s is an “unjust war.” For all the ink Augustine spills on the
gruesome conduct and consequences of unjust wars, his ultimate
objections to such wars derive solely from their secular
xvii Book XIX, sec 14
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motivations. Indeed, any action conducted for the sake of the
City of Man over the City of God is, by defInition, immoral.
Speaking of Rome, Augustine laments that such a state “seeks to
be the conqueror of peoples while "being itself the #captive of
vices”, going on to proclaIm “...I should like first to inquire
for a little what reason, what purpose, There is in wishing to
glory in the greatness a.d extent of tha empire, when you cannot
point out the happiness of men who are always rolling, with dark
fear and cruel lust, in warlike slaughters and in blood, which,
whether shed in civil or foreign war, is still human blood...”xviii
Had this expansion occurred without spilling a single drop of
this blood, however, it would still be sacrilegious folly due to
the immoral ends for which it was waged. The fact it led to
murder and destruction merely compounded its tragedy.
A truly just or moral war, in contrast, is waged in service
of God’s will and therefore satisfies the ultimate purpose of
humanity. Such a crusade must fulfill three criteria in order to
be so sanctioned; it must be granted under just authority
(leadership sanctioned by God), it must be fought for just ends
xviii City of God Book IV, chapter 3.
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(God’s ends), and it must be conducted in ways that preserve
explicitly sacred sites and personnel (i.e. churches, priests).xix
Besides this last stipulation, none of these condipions concern
the actual behaviob of war’s combatants - it is assumed by
Augustine that the conduct of war will alter as its ends shift
from those of man to those of God. First, the passionate emotions
that so troubled Thucydides and which can lead to such Brutal
excesses will be made irrelevant. Since individuals have no
private stake in its outcome, theoretically war should become an
antiseptic instrument of the Lord’s will. Indeed, introducing
human passions into the mix would weaken its purity and efficacy.
Augustine holds that the real evils of war are not death, which
is inevitable in any regard, but “the love of violence,
revengeful cruelty, Fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance
and the lust of power, and such...”xx These emotions cause not
only physical, but spiritual death. As he advises a statesman,
“Let necessity slay the warring foe, not your will”.xxi
xix Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby eds., The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 85. xx Augustine, Contra Faustum XII 74, in Ibid, 76. xxi Augustine, Letter 189 to Boniface, in Ibid., 79.
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Additionally, if emotions and passions are removed from the
equations of a just war, so are feelings of responsibility and
guilt. The morality of killing in the name of God, who represents
the highest good and to whom the greatest loyalty is required,
supersedes ordinary ethical standards. Augustine is explicit
about this. “He to whom authority is delegated, and who is but
the sword in the hand of him”, he states, “is not himself
responsible for the death he deals.”xxii Likewise, “The soldier
who has slain a man in obedience to the authority under which he
is lawfully commissioned, is not accused of murder by any law of
his state...but if he has been acting on his own authority, and
at his own impulse, he has in this case incurred the crime of
shedding human blood.”xxiii Consequently (and in stark contrast to
the view of Thucydides), any and all means necessary to
accomplish a just war are legitimate, no matter how ordinarily
distasteful. Augustine advises a statesman that “[S]uch things
[as ambushes] are legitimate for those who are engaged in a just
war. In these matters the only thing a righteous man has to worry
about is that the just war is waged by someone who has the right
to do so... Once an individual has undertaken this kind of war,
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it does not matter at all, as far as justice is concerned,
whether he wins victory in open combat or through ruses”. xxiv In
short, Augustine, the great Christian theologian, argues that, in
the case of “exempted” wars, the ends may very well justify the
means. It is essential to understand that these wars are not
justified by God because they are just, but are just because they are
justified by God – Euthyphro’s dilemma resolved.xxv
Still, in spite of his insistence on their importance in
spreading God’s will, Augustine regrets their necessity: He
writes that
“They say...that the wise man will wage only just wars
– as if, mindful that he is human, he would not much rather
lament that he is subject to the necessity of waging just
wars. If they were not just, he would not be required to
wage them, and thus he would be free of the necessity of
war. It is the iniquity on the part of the adversary that
forces a just war upon the wise man.”xxvi
xxii Book one, chapter 21xxiii City of God, book I, chapter 31.xxiv Augustine, From Questions on the Heptateuch, bk. VI, chapter 10, The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 83. xxv
xxvi Bk. XIX, chap 7
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Above all, Augustine holds peace as the most desirable end
sought by mankind, declaring “...nothing is heard with greater
pleasure, nothing desired more longingly, and in the end, nothing
better can be found”.xxvii Thus, even in the midst of the harshest
conflict Augustine urges statesman to retain the possibility of
peace. And yet, there is a deep contradiction here. If one is
truly doing God’s works, should not it be waged unceasingly- even
joyfully- until His work is accomplished? Augustine himself writes
that “because it would be worse if wrongdoers dominated those who
are more just, it is not inappropriate to call even this
necessity “happiness.”xxviii The image of armed men gleefully and
unrestrainedly slaughtering non-combatants is difficult to
reconcile with a philosophy of history that regarded morality as
the only legitimate premise for warfare. Yet this is the
inevitable outcome of a philosophy that (a.) regards as “moral”
any action that advances a religiously sanctioned goal and that
(b.) regards the achievement of such an overarching goal to be a
religious duty; one which is necessary for personal salvation.
The parallel with contemporary events could not be more chilling.xxvii City of God, bk. XIX, chap 11. xxviii City of God, bk. IV, chap 15
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And (for the purposes of this essay) nor could the contrast
with the pragmatic philosophy of Thucydides be more illuminating
in respect to their assessment of the morality of the methods of
warfare: while the pragmatist Thucydides rejects immoral conduct
when they are detrimental to secular goals, the moralist
Augustine readily accepts – nay, encourages- immoral conduct when
they facilitate the achievement of religious goals. He might
write hopefully that “If the earthly city observes Christian
principles, even its wars will be waged with the benevolent
purpose that better provision might be made for the defeated to
live harmoniously together in justice and goodness”xxix. But a
benevolent purpose imposed through cruel means is unlikely to
bring about a harmonious conclusion, much less “justice” or
“goodness”.
Hegel: Reaching Morality through Immorality
We have explored Thucydides’ notion of cyclical history,
delved into Augustine’s conception of divine purposiveness, and
now arrive at the quintessentially teleological historical schema
xxix Letter 138 to Marcellinus, in The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (NewYork: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 73.
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held by Hegel, one as breathtakingly ambitious as it is
infamously complex. Like the other philosophers we have analyzed,
Hegel characterizes human history as an endless succession of
suffering and cruelty, a “slaughter-bench” where “the happiness
of nations, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals
are sacrificed.xxx However, whereas our previous philosophers see
no inherent meaning or purpose in the practice of warfare as a
means of resolving human conflict, Hegel holds that these
apparently “immoral” conflagrations have served an indispensable
role in bringing mankind closer to its objective – the self-
conscious awareness of its freedom. How does he arrive at this
conclusion? First, Hegel seeks a basic dynamic, or Idea, that
brings order and direction to the seemingly random swirl of human
history. This Idea is Reason, the central force that has
animated, regulated, and guided human behavior throughout time.
As Hegel writes in Philosophy and History, “Reason is the law of the
world and that, therefore, in world history things have come
about rationally”xxxi
xxx 68-69 reason in history xxxi 20
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If Reason is the hidden logic of history, where has it been
taking us? Hegel perceives a single dynamic consistently
unfolding as human history progresses – the gradual and self-
conscious expansion of mankind’s Spirit, or Freedom. The
attainment of this freedom, “the ultimate purpose toward which
all world history has continually aimed”, is accomplished by
actualizing the individual potential, self-worth, and self-
awareness of all humanity. xxxii This cannot come about, however,
as long as the human race is atomized and alienated from one
another. Only in a social setting where citizens rely on one
another and where a hierarchy of ruler and ruled is established
does “...the problem of individual freedom arise and assert
itself”, for it is only in such a context that mankind’s
selfishness and short-sightedness is challenged to go beyond its
limitations. xxxiii Hegel can see this occurring as human
societies increase in size and complexity, from the small village
into the city-state, then into the feudal kingdom, until reaching
a kind of culmination in the form of the modern nation-state.
Encompassing and protecting vast amounts of people and territory,
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the nation instills the kind of internal co-dependence crucial in
actualizing the freedom of its populace. Hegel believes that “The
history of the world is the progress in the consciousness of
freedom”, with its ultimate fulfillment in the nation-state, “the
definitive object of world-history proper.” xxxiv
But how can Hegel hold out hope for a utopia of untrammeled
freedom when, by his own account, mankind has historically acted
for short term, selfish goals? Interestingly, Hegel sees this
“passion”, as he calls such egotistical behavior, as the means by
which the long-term, altruistic destiny of mankind can be
realized. By seeking power over their fellow man, statesmen such
as Caesar and Napoleon wage wars and dominate their neighbors,
inadvertently laying the foundation for the kind of cities,
kingdoms, and eventually nation-states in which freedom can best
be brought to fruition. In this way, “the human
passions...fulfill themselves and their ends in accordance with
their specific nature, and thereby create the edifice of human
society in which justice and order are given power over the
xxxii 25. xxxiii Master/Slave dynamic. 161. xxxiv 53
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passion themselves.”xxxv In even more strident terms Hegel
declares “All...expressions of individual and national life, in
seeking and fulfilling their own ends, are at the same time the
means and instruments of a higher (bold face added by Hegel)
purpose and wider enterprise of which they are themselves
ignorant and which they nevertheless unconsciously carry out.”xxxvi
Through the Cunning of Reason, by and only by acting selfishly-
that is, by acting “immorally”- can the utopian and equitable
ends of history come to fruition in the future.
Conversely, acting with moral intentions can actually delay
or retard this process. Self-interest is able to move history
precisely because “...passion has a more immediate hold over man
than artificial and laborious acquired discipline of order and
moderation, justice and morality.”xxxvii Were rulers to be bound
by constraints of morality, no wars would be fought, no nations
could arise, and freedom could not exist. Though Hegel concedes
that “...examples of virtue elevate the soul…” he goes on to say
that “…the destinies of nations, the convulsions of states and
xxxv Philosophy of Righy, 71. xxxvi 32xxxvii 68,. –art B 1830 draft
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their interests, predicaments, and involvements are of a
different order from that of morality.”xxxviii A cruel regime gives
birth to the French Revolution, engendering a new birth of human
freedom; the invasion of Prussia instills common feelings of
national unity which had not previously existed, forming a model
of constitutional monarchy. The philosophical conception of
history promoted by Hegel judges human actions based on their
ultimate effect on the historic dialectic, not according to one
of the many subjective conceptions of “morality” espoused by
individuals or cultures. As actors in history ourselves, our
imperative is to leave such reflection for this enlightened
future - a future that can only come about by pursuing our own
selfish desires in the present.
Thus we return to an extreme endorsement of pragmatism that
goes beyond Thucydides in jettisoning morality as a means as well
as an ends. War, like all human enterprises, is a slave to
passion and thus should not be restrained by moral preferences
which only delay the inevitable unfolding of history. All
attempts to limit or ban war derive from a hopeless misreading of
xxxviii 21 reason in history.
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humanity’s purpose and destiny, as “the road to human self-
consciousness is through conflict over non-natural ends”.xxxix War,
therefore, cannot be judged in either moral terms as “just” or
“Unjust”, nor can it be described in pragmatic terms as the mere
will and whim of individual statesmen. Hegel’s thoughts on the
matter are best encapsulated in this passage from The Philosophy of
Right:
“War is not be regarded as an absolute evil, and as a
purely external accident, which itself therefore has
some accidental cause, by it injustices, the passions
of nations or the holders of power &c., or in short,
something or other which ought not to be...Here as
elsewhere, the point of view from which things seem
pure accidents vanishes if we look at them in the light
of the concept and philosophy, because philosophy knows
accident for a show and sees in its essence,
necessity.”xl
xxxix George Dennis O’Brien, Hegel on Reason and History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 75.xl Philosophy of Right, 209.
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As part of a greater unfolding process of history, war plays
an instrumental role in the development of human institutions
that advance the attainment of greater freedom. Indeed, war is a
brutal, but crucial reminder of the nation state’s
indispensability as the cradle and defender of freedom. Only when
it is threatened, Hegel believes, can the true value of this
precious quality be revealed to a nation’s populace. In this way,
Hegel declares that “...the ethical significance of war
resides... above all in its ability to raise us above the level
of mere civil association with its rootedness in material
possessions. In times of war, common values and commitments are
not only preserved but enhanced”.xli He observes that states
which refuse to go to war are often the victim of more aggressive
nations, and thus “their freedom has died from the fear of
dying”. xlii In contrast, victorious nations not only preserve
their freedom, but find their national power consolidated with
domestic unrest checked and the population firmly united.
Ironically, the philosopher who most decries morality is the most
outspoken in his support of war as an ethical endeavorxliii.
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This brings us to a crucial point about the dynamic status
of morality in Hegel’s philosophy. As we have seen, whether an
action is “right” or “wrong” is less important to him than
whether or not it contributes to mankind’s path towards ultimate
freedom. Historically, morality was more of a distraction for
Hegel because held mankind back from doing what needed to be done
to create the conditions necessary for this state to come into
being. Indeed, without the kind of co-dependence brought about by
freedom, morality itself is nothing more than a subjective,
abstract concept with only an “implicit connection with the
universal will.”xliv As this freedom becomes actualized, however,
individual notions of ethical behavior are subsumed by a more
unified, general conception of morality. It “…determines itself
as objective…and so as truly concrete”. xlv.
xli 628.xlii Chapter 2 324Remark:xliii This is not to say, of course, that the victor in a war was neccearily “right” or “wrong”. INdeed, in the grand scheme of history such judgements hold even less significance than whether one country emerges defeated or triumphant. Only the ends of history can reveal the true tale. Hegel is adamant, after all, that “world history is not the verdict of mere might?” ONly world-history itself truly knows, in the end, xliv 106xlv Section 108, Philosophy of Right.
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Thus, Hegel can foresee a time when war, undoubtedly immoral
in spite of its constructive role in history: a time when its
raison de entre- the formation of freedom- is finally
accomplished. First, as nation-states arise and multiply, the
kind of anti-social behavior that gives birth to inter-state
conflicts will run increasingly counter to the interests of the
many who enjoy peace and freedom within the statist umbrella. In
this sense “war itself is characterized as something which ought
to pass away”xlvi Furthermore, a “family” of autonomous nation
states will have less inclination to fight one another. Hegel
writes in the Philosophy of History that “The trend of the states
is...towards uniformity. There prevails among them one aim, one
tendency, which is the cause of wars, friendships, and the needs
of dynasties. But there also prevails among them another
uniformity...the hegemony of Spirit [actualized freedom].
Theoretically, the entity which gave birth to the nation state
will be made obsolete by the prevalence of its offspring.xlvii
xlvi Ibid 4xlvii G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, ed. G. Lasson(Leipzig, 1920), 761
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When wars do occur, Hegel urges contemporary states to
preserve the progress already made in terms of mankind’s social
and material well-being by sparing its citizens the worst
excesses of conflict. He asks that even during the fiercest
fighting “the possibility of peace be retained (and so, for
example, that envoys must be respected), and, in general, that
war be not waged against domestic institutions, against the peace
of family and private life, or against persons in their private
capacity”xlviii The distinction between a “just” and “unjust” war
thus becomes relevant again. Hegel writes that “Just wars…are
defensive wars waged for the preservation and protection of the
state. Wars of subjugation, by definition, are aggressive wars
which manifest only the desire for domination of another, rather
than the preservation of a free life internal to a community”.xlix
For Hegel, war that is “moral” is that which aids the survival
and strength of the nation-state, and war that is immoral is that
which undermines it. From this unique perspective on the morality
of armed conflict, based, in turn, on his conception of the ends
of history, Hegel derives moral injunctions against wanton
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cruelty and aggression that transcend the pragmatic
considerations of Thucydides and that are notably absent in the
theological teachings of Augustine.
Heg’s believed that war’s cruelty would be mitigated with
the rise of the nation-state, as “person is not set over against
person in hatred. At most, personal enmities appear in the
vanguard, but in the main body of the army hostility is something
vague and gives place to each side’s respect for the duty of the
other”.lIf this was ever true in Hegel’s lifetime, it certainly
has not lasted. It would appear as if there is still too much
“passion” involved in modern nation states, a “passion” that,
according to Hegel, only further wars and unifications can
nullify. While Hegel was very detailed at explaining how one
would arrive at the “ends of history” and what it would look
like, it appears doubtful that we are due to arrive in it any
time soon.
In contrasting Hegel’s opus with that of Augustine, however,
one should not conclude that Hegel presents a fully secular
xlviii Philosophy of Right 338xlix
l Section 295
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viewpoint. Like Augustine, Hegel sees God’s will manifested
through history. Whereas Augustine would forsake this world
completely for the sake of the City of God, Hegel reclaims Earth
as the site both of mankind’s struggle and its eventual reward.
In a sense, Hegel marries the pragmatism of Thucydides with
Augustine’s utopian teleology, but while Augustine sees in
history primarily the fallenness of the world and human
institutions, Hegel sees not only division and conflict in the
world, but also a positive manifestation of “the divine idea:”
the dynamic progression toward human freedom and reason.
Conclusion
Terrorism has re-defined warfare in the 21st century: the
mind conjures up images of suicide bombers or heavily armed men
joyfully slaughtering noncombatants in the hope of reaching
Heaven. In light of their ideas on morality and human destiny,
how might Thucydides, Augustine, and Hegel critique their
actions? Thucydides would clearly reject terrorism for two
reasons. Its religious motivations and objectives make no
pragmatic sense, as the prospect of attaining “heaven” can only
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be illusory These terrorists thus fight and die for, literally,
nothing. Neither will terrorism help accomplish any earthly end,
such as the establishment of an Islamic Republic. By affronting
the moral sensitivities of the global community, Thucydides might
argue, they discredit their cause in the eyes of the world while
committing infinitely more powerful nation-states to their
destruction. Thus, the means of terrorists ensure that their
earthly ends can never be accomplished.
Augustine would mostly likely condemn the actions of
Islamic terrorists – not because they are terrorists, but because
they are not Christian. Augustine was quite comfortable with
war, provided it was waged for his Judeo-Christian deity. “how
much…must the man be blameless who carries on war on the
authority of God, of whom every one who serves Him knows that He
can never require what is wrong?”li The fact that such
terrorists’ earthly goals might not be attained in their
lifetimes is beyond the point, as this world is but shadow and
dust in any event. And even if their actions may not
li Book VII, Section 7.
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pragmatically advance their cause, as Thucydides would argue,
their selfless desire to martyr themselves for a divine cause,
from an Augustinian perspective, qualifies their actions as
“moral.”
In turn, Hegel would be deeply affronted by the actions of
terrorists. The fact that they seek an exclusively Islamic
republic on earth is surely not in keeping with the purpose of
history, in which nations promise to become more and more
inclusive as time progresses. In the distant past such efforts to
religiously unify a region through violent means could have
served a historical purpose, laying the foundation for the kind
of political unity Hegel yearns for. Indeed, this actually
occurred during the early Jihads through the Middle East and
North Africa, which preceded the formation of the Mogul and
Turkish empires. In a world already comprised of established
nation-states, however, such efforts to violently replace the
rule of law with the rule of God would go against the flow of
history and would be, therefore, doomed to failure. The actions
of stateless religious sects against both formally organized
states and against non-combatants within a state (including their
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own) undermines the legitimacy of all states and, as such, from
the Hegelian perspective are essentially immoral.
Three different philosophers: three radically different
perspectives on the morality of warfare. takes on a single action
- war. The reason for this divergence, we have argued, stems from
their respective ideas concerning a purpose to human history. To
the pragmatist Thucydides, warfare is a useful means to the human
goals of prosperity and security, and immoral tactics are
rejected because they tend to become counterproductive to those
material goals. Both Augustine and Hegel view warfare as a mans
of achieving a greater, perhaps “transcendent" end, but while
this teleological perspective results in Augustine’s acceptance-
even endorsement- of aggressive and ruthless tactics, Hegel’s
evolutionary perspective would constrain him to denounce those
“atavistic” methods of warfare that are no longer appropriate for
use by the modern state.( H-bombs? Yes. Car bombs? No) In this
sense, both these philosophers can justify war for the sake of a
future lying just beyond the horizon – forward in time for Hegel,
up in heaven for Augustine.
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Only Thucydides has a notion of morality that applies to
everyone in our own world and time. It is indeed ironic that the
intellectual father of Metternich, Bismarck, and Kissinger has
offered one of the most workable conceptions of morality in war,
applicable in our own time as it was when The History was written
over two thousand years ago. In order to accomplish earthly goals
most effectively, Thucydides argues, one must pay heed to one’s
own moral principals, as well as the moral principles of others,
whether they be against nuclear weapons, submarine warfare,
destroying school buses, or laying landmines. Of course, acting
brutally in war might gain a party temporary power and security.
But as we have learned in countless cases of over-reaching
aggressors, disregarding morality – even in the name of religion
or a political ideology- has not proven to be a winning strategy
in the long run..
The modest path of pragmatism, while lacking in romance or a
transcendent vision of a paradise to come, might just lead us to
a more peaceful world by respecting people’s moral constraints
free from any overarching religious or ideological agenda.
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