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PLEASE RETAIN ORIGINAL ORDER

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TO:

FROM :

UNITED NATIONS • ~

NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Mr . James o.c . Jonah Under-Secretary-General Department of Politica l

DATE: 30 July 1993 )

Affad./ s

S. Iqbal Riza *' i' ! 1 1/~..l~n W ~f-Assistant Secretary en ra t t ,,/ ,;11 fl

SUBJECT :

Peace-keeping Ope a'l:i ns / p_ tu, _: I 0/9911 ll

Se cre tary-General 's Repo_r:/ Liberia 6/, N -

1. Thank you for sharing with us the draft report of the Secretary-General to the Security counci l on Liberia. We find the r eport to be quite comprehens ive . In addition to minor editorial comments which you will find in t he attached copy of the r eport , we would like to make the following more s ubstantive comments and suggestions :

(1) Paragraph 7 notes that "250 to 300 United Nations observers would monitor and verify ECOMOG activities." As the number of Unit ed Nations military observers to be deployed in Liberia wi ll be a determination and recommendation of the technical mission , specific numbers of observers should not be noted i n the text of this report. This would only serve to raise questions by the council on a point which we ourselves are not sure about at this stage.

( 2) In paragraph 17 the Secretary-General recommends that the Security Council authorize the establishment of UNOMIL. We shoul d not recommend that the Council take this step on the basis of the present report. In fact, the Council itself would not do so without more detail on the proposed mission and supporting financial data. Ins tead , it should be not ed in the r eport that the Secre t ary-General i s sending a technical mission to Liberia and that on the basis of this mission's findings and recommendations , he will be submitting a further r eport to the Security Council . The further report will include details on the s ize , scope and financial requirements of the mission, and will recommend to the Securi t y Counci l that it authorize the mission . ·

(3) Paragraph 3 notes that the agenda of the Geneva peace talks "was designed to meet the interests of the individua l parties ••• ". The word " interests" should be changed to "concerns" as this may more accur ately r eflect the s i tuation .

,n - 7 . £1 >e .

Furthermore, it would be informative for the Security Council if the report were to state . at this point exactly what the concerns of the parties were.

(4) Paragraphs refers to the "difficulty and intensity of some aspects of the negotiations, as well as other considerations, " that led to the document being signed in Cotonou instead of Geneva. We feel that either the phrase "as well as other considerations" should be removed or the report should explain, however briefly, exactly what these "considerations" were.

(5) The dates when events took place should be_ noted in the report. This is especially in reference to the Special Representative's return to the region to prepare the ground for talks (paragraph 3).

2. It is noted in paragraph 12 of the draft report that two consultants were sent to Liberia by the United Nations in May 1992 to evaluate the availability of population data and the situation of constituency maps. The report of this mission and data col l ected by it may be helpful to the Department in planning the technical mission. We would greatly appreciate your sharing this information with us.

3. As you are aware, it will be vital for the success of the peace-keeping operation in Liberia to determine in advance the relationship between ECOMOG and UNOMIL, as well as the level and specifics of each mission's authority. This will be one of the main objectives of the technical mission.

Thank you and best regards

--

• . -=-~. ~rn--=u'W _... _,-

r•I~ -2R'8 - -S'l15 Note to Mr. Gharekhan

Please find attached a draft of the report of the Secretary- ~.c( General to the Security Council on the situation in Liberia. The report has been prepared in consultation with the Departments of ~ Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian Affairs, whose views and So1/ suggestions have been taken into account in preparing this draft./

One point which I have however not been able to clarify with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs is the usage of "humanitarian intervention" in paragraph 19 of the report which was drafted by Humanitarian Affairs. You may want to consider if a formulation such as "humanitarian involvement" would not be more appropriate.

I wish to draw to your attention that the United Nations has undertaken to consider dispatching 30 military observers to participate in the work of the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee which will function between 1 August and the arrival of additional ECOMOG troops and the main body of the UN observers. This was the result of discussions between DPKO and the Force Commander of ECOMOG, General Olurin, who is presently in New York.

cc : Mr . Annan Mr. Eliasson

--- __. J<!)C..,J .

James o.c. Jonah 30 July 1993

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NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ~ ' - j f993 · PROPOSED TECHNICAL MISSION TO LIBERIA 1 ~ A... • • _f.. CJ )

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1. As -you wi-11 recall, Security Council Resolution 813 (1993) requested you, in consultation with ECOWAS, to consider the possibility of convening a meeting of the President of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the warring factions in Liberia to restate their commitment to the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord . .

2. Accordingly, your Special Representative for Liberia, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, worked with the warring factions to prepare the ground for renewed peace negotiations and, in collaboration with ECOWAS and the OAU, oversaw these negotiations in Geneva from 10-17 July. The three parties signed the agreement in Cotonou on 25 July 1993. This agreement is based on the Yamoussoukro Accords and reaffirms that these accords provide the best framework for peace in Liberia.

3. Security Council Resolution 813 (1993) also requested you to discuss with ECOWAS and the parties concerned the contribution which the United Nations could make in support of the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accords, including the deployment of United Nations observers~

4. The peace agreement signed on 25 July 1993 thereby calls on the ECOWAS peace-keeping force (ECOMOG) to continue its peacekeeping role in Liberia and for the United Nations to play a verification and monitoring role through the deployment of United Nations military observ§fs. -5. Accordingly, we propose, for your concurrence, to send a technical mission to Liberia in order to determine the scope and size of the proposed United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), especially in terms of its relationship to ECOMOG and the level and specifics of each mission's authority. The mission's draft terms of reference are attached for your information.

6. Fielding of this technical mission is mentioned in your draft report to the Security Council on Liberia which is currently being prepared by DPA for issuance next week.

7. The findings and recommendations of the mission would form the basis of a report to the Security Council requesting its authorization of UNOMIL.

8. Thank you for y,our consideration.

rn~u wrnw

EOSG/CENTRAL

1lLL ~ Kofi nnan 30 July 199j

(

..

Reference:

DRAFT

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

TASKS

Agreement signed on 25 July 1993 by Interim Government of ·National Unity (IGNU), National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO).

Must be carried-out

1. Joint ceasefire Monitoring committee CJCMC) • Between the period of the effective date of the ceasefire and arrival of additional troops of ECOMOG & full contingent of the u N Observer Mission, as member of the JCMC (JCMC will be chaired by the UN Observer), monitor, investigate and report all ceasefire violations.

2. Violation Committee. As member of the Violation committee (Violation Committee will be chaired by a member of the UN Observer Mission), ensure that either the corrective measures are taken by the violating party or ask ECOMOG to use its peace enforcement powers against the violator.

3. schedules for the implementation of the agreement. Alongwith the ECOMOG, draw-out the schedules for the implementation of the agreement, including a schedule for disarmament, encampment and demobilization of combatants.

4. o'isarmament. Monitor and verify the disarmament process (of combatants and non-combatants) being carried-out under the ECOMOG.

5. Encampment sites. Alongwith ECOMOG, identify the locations of the encampment sites.

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6. Encampment and demobilization. Monitor and verify the process of encampment and demobilization of combatants being carried-out under the ECOMOG.

7. Security of Encampment Sites. Monitor and verify the security of the encampment sites being provided by the ECOMOG.

8. Entry points. Monito~, verify and report on the activit i es being carried-out under the supervision of the ECOMOG at all points of entry to Liberia, to include sea ports, airfields and roads.

May be carried-out

9. Buffer Zones. Monitor, verify and report on the activities in the buffer zones (created by the ECOMOG) or along the borders (sealed by the ECOMOG) between Liberia-Guinea, Liberia-Sierra Leone and Liberia-Cote d'Ivoire.

..

Reference:

General

DRAFT

UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL MISSION TO LIBERIA TASKS

Agreement signed on 25 July 1993 by Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO).

1. On 25 July 1993 at Cotonou (Benin), IGNU, NPFL and ULIMO declared a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities to become effective after seven days from the date of signing of this agreement, commencing at 12 midnight.

2. In view of the above development, on 27 July 1993 it was decided to send a technical mission to Liberia to examine the request by IGNU, NPFL and ULIMO for deployment of United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia.

Tasks

3. Liaison and reconnaissance. To carryout a study on ground, liaise with IGNU, NPFL, ULIMO, ECOWAS & ECOMOG and conduct reconnaissance for effectively deploying the u N observer mission in Liberia.

4. Collection and collation of information. To gather all information relevant to the deployment of the u N Observer Mission.

5. Information evaluation. To evaluate the information gathered and determine the tasks which could be performed by the UN military observers.

6. concept of operations. To define a concept of operations for the u N observer mission.

7. Division of responsibilities. To suggest the scope and fields of responsibilities between ECOWAS/ECOMOG and the UN observer mission as envisaged in the agreement.

·- ..

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. . 8. Organization and deployment. To evolve a skeleton organization and suggest a deployment pattern for the observer mission based on the envisaged mandate.

9. Logistics. To prepare an estimate of the necessary logistics and administrative support r equirements.

10. Time-frame. suggest a time-frame for the deployment of the observer mission.

Humanitarian Assistance and _Political Affairs

11. The mission team will include members from DHA and DPA who will examine issues related to humanitarian assistance and the electoral process. l .

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIOUE DES ETATS DE L' AFRIOUE DE L'OUEST

ECOWAI HEADQUARTERS:

, / CIDEAO l.)/' . ~IEGE:

6, KING GEORGE V ROAD 6, KING GEORGE V ROAD , P. M, 8. 12745 LAGOS (NIGERIA) TELEPHONE: 636839, 636841, 6k064 TELEX 22633 ECOWAS NG. SECRETARIAT

P. M. B. 12745 LAGOS (NIGERIA) TELEPHONE: 636839, 636841, 6l6064 TELEX 22633 ECOWAS NG. SECRETARIAT

FROM: ~. -Sui'\~ 28 July 93 ..••••.••• •• .••• • •• 18 •••• Executive Secretary

CA- CC. ,~C'A EGW/REL/20/ES/137/93

.. ,

H.K. Dr. Boutros Boutros Secretary-Gener al United Nations 1 United Nations Plaza New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Secretary-General,

Ref: No •••••• •• ••• . ..• •. •• . --

The Liberian Peace Agreement and the Resolution of the Liberian Conflict

In their review of developments relating to

the ,. con fl l e t i n Liberia,. ECOWAS Heads of State and

Government,. at their recently-concluded Sixteenth

. $ummit Meeting at Cotonou from 22 to 24 July 1993.,

~xpr~ss~~ their gratitude to the United Nations for the .. - - -- - - ---· - ----- -- ~ - -

•· , assistance extended to the Community which culminated

in the c onvening o f the peace talks in Geneva between

the Interim Government of National Unity and the

Liberian warring parties . Those talks successfully led - --

to the signing of a Peace Agreement in Cotonou on 25

July 1993,. witnessed., inter alia., by President

Ni cephore Soglo of Benin who is also current Chairman

of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of

ECOWAS and your representative., Dr. James Jonah.

The ceasefire wi 11 t _ake __ e_~~e~_!; _ s~_ven days from

t "h !:__da~e of s_~~~~~~ _ _?_f _ the Agreement. It is therefore

now most urgent that all necessary action to facilitate

.. - 2 -

the implementation of the Agreement should be taken by

all concerned. It is with this in view that Heads of -· -· ------·-

St ate and Government resolved to appeal to the United .. - --- ·····- - -··--·•- -•

Nations to create a Special Fund for Liberia to finance

the implementation of the Cotonou Accord, and to the

international community to generously contribute to the

Special Fund.

The establishmen t of such a Fund., we believe.,

would go a long way to encouraging African governments

to agree to send the required reinforcements to ECOHOG.

lt would also provide the necessary assistance to the

countries which are already participating in ECOMOG to

sustain th~ir effort. Both the present ECOMOG and the

new troops to be introduced ~ould definitely require

the s'!pport of the Fund i _f the · operation is to be

!executed smoothly and successfully. I therefore take

_this opportunity to appeal to you., Hr. Secretary-----·-------·------- -- - -

' General., to take whatever action is necessary to --- - . --· . .. estab_lish · t~e-~ Sp~_cial Fund -~~-~---to --~-~-~~-=-~ -~-~-~~t~nt~: _ _1 reeourcea f~om the international donor community for .1-t. ·

.. ' •-.· '

. . I am sending you a copy of the Resolution

ad~~tfd py ECOWAS leaders.

Please· accept., Mr. Secretary-General., the

r~riewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Abass Bundu (Dr.)

Executive Secretary

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'93-07-26 14:53 P.001

UNITED NATION$ DEVEL COTONOU - BENIN

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FAX N° (212) 963--2979

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16.07.9.1 James Jonah PNUD!COTONOU

lxp/; Aflotment-Compte: File - Domu:

TO SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNITED NATIONS ~~~

FROM: -- ~ 0 JONAH, USG/DPA J~ • e... ✓ ~,_.~

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Hombre de pages 1 2 41 er ________________ , ~-Subject: LIBERIA PEACE AGREEMENT

AS YOU MAY HAVE HF.ARD, THE I.IBERIAN PARTIES; lNTERIM GOVERNMENT OF

NATIONAL UNIT OF LIBERIA (IGNU), THE NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF UBERTA(NPFL) AND THE UNITED r JBERATION MOVEMENT OF LIBERIA FOR DEMOCRACY (UUMO) SIUNED LAST EVUNLNG 25 JULY AN AGREEMENT TIIAT CONTAINS 1WO PARTS:

PART ONE : DEALING Wint MIL11'ARV ISSUF.

i'AKT TWU : WITH l:'OUTICAL ISSUE

THE SIONlNO CEREMONY WAS PRESIDED OVER BY PRESIDENT sooLO, CURE!NT E!COWAS CflAfRMAN WllO llAD BEEN MANDATED BY nm SUMMIT'TO WITNESS THE AGREEMENT ON 1HEIR BEHALF.

AT THE I...ASf DAY OF 1HE SUMMIT 11fB NEGOTIATIONS ALMOST C'OLLAf'SED WHEN Tiffl NPFL PAfUID TO SHOW UP FOR A CRUCIAL NEGOTIATION :SESSION TO COMPLETE TIIE DOCUMENT THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED THAT DAY. lNSTEAD, THEY ISSUED A

l'RESS STATEMENT WHlCJf CAST DOUBT ON TifE SERIOUSNESS OF TIIEIR INTENTION.

FORTUNATELY AS A RFSULT OF A NUMBER OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS THE NEGOTIATION Kl:iSUMBD LATE THAT NIGHT t'IRST UNDER THE! CHAIRMANSttlP OF

PRESIDENT SOGLO AND LATER ON AMONG TIIE LIBERIAN PARTIES THEMSELVES.

Developpemant Mondial

'93-07-26 14: 53 PNJD313321

NEGOTI A TION:i RESUM[!D nm r,oLLOWING MORNING ANl) 000D l"kOG[S.$ WN:; MADE.

THROUGHOUT 11-fE NEOOTIATINO PRocr.ss A T.ROUBUNO ISSUE WAS HOW TO RECONCir.F. TliE NPFL"S DlsrR UST OF ECOMOO AS fRB~NlL Y CON'STI1UI'E:D WITH THE

DETERMINATION Of A MAJORITY OF ECOWAS MEMHl'!RS TO MAINTt'IIN TIIB INTEGRITY OF ECOMOG.

YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OORDON SOMERS AND PRESIDENT C. BANANA WERE

ABLE TO WORK OUT PROVISIONS, ACCEPTABLE TO 11-IE PARTIES, THAT RETAINED ECOMOG WHILE CALLING fQR ITS EXPANSION l'JY AFRICAN CONTJGENTS OUTSIDE OF F,OWAS SlJR"RF.CiTON AS WELL AS UN MILITARY OBSBRYERS TiiA"f WILL i\SS[S'f ECOMOG TO MONITOR AND SUPERVISE TIIE AGREEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THEREFORE

THAT THE AVA181l.IfY OF UN OBSERVERS IS A FUNDAMENTAL CONDffiON FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

YOUR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND I CAUITONED lHE PAIHTES REGARDING THE l)JFf-lCULTIES OF PROVIDING 2j0-300 MILlTARY OBSERVERS AT SHORT NOTICE. JN RES'PONSE, THE PARTIES AND iHE an-tER ECOWAS MEMBERS PLEDGED TO UNDERTAKE 11--IE NECESSARY DIPWMATIC: STEPS TO ENSURE APPROVAL BY SECURITY COUNCIL OF HFQUIRED MILITARY OBSERVERS. IN ADDfflON IBEY URGED TIIAT YOU GNE SERIOUS CONSIDERATJON TO ·rt-1E IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF A LIMJTED NUMBER OF MILlTARY

OBSERVERS TO LIBERIA FOLLOWING DISCUSSION Wfil:I IllE SECURITY COUNCIL

WE UNDERSTAND TIIAT AS AN EXPRESSION OF 1llE SERIOUSNESS WHlCH TI-IEY VIEW TT!E MATIER, IT llAS BEEN DECIDED TO DISPATCH lMMEDIATLY TO NEW YORK Tiffi F1F.T .D COMMANDER OF ECOMOG, GENERAL OUJRIN. TO BRIEF MEMBERS OF TIJE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS FOR TIIE FULL

IMP LEM f.N'T A TION OF TI-IE AGREEMENT.

YOUR SPECIAL REPRll:SENTATIVE. AND I WILL BE RETUR.l'I.TJNG TO NEW YORK ON TU F.SOA Y, JULY 2&, TO PREP ARE YOUR REPOltT TO TI-IE SECURITY COUNCIL

DURING THE CO URSE OF ffiDA Y, PRIOR TO OUR DEPARTURE THIS EVENING, WE ARE PLANNING TO SET IN MOTION TI-IE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE UNINfERRUPTED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELTEFTO TIIE PEOPLE OF LIBERIA..

l:lfST REGARDS.

. 002

AK/zp. CONFIDENTIAL .

Orig: SG cc: JCA

CG/LMB AS Central MIG/JOCJ

Notes of the Secretary-General's Task Force on United Nations Operations

Held at United Nations Headquarters on Wednesday, 28 July 1993 at 18:30 hours

Present:

Mr. Eliasson Mr. Gharekhan Mr. Jonah Ms. Wells Mr. Riza Mr. de Soto Ms. Kane

Liberia Update

Though the agreement - which gave a crucial role to the United Nations - was signed, Mr. Jonah cautioned that implementation was not certain. Charles Taylor could not be trusted, he felt, and we thus had to ensure that the UN for its part did not renege on its obligation, so that in case of failure, it was clear where the blame lay.

The UN had essentially three tasks: (i) to provide military observers; (ii) to give humanitarian assistance; and (iii) to organize elections. Mr. Gordon-Somers had cautioned ECOMOG that the Security Council might not agree to the role envisaged for the UN, which had led to ECOMOG's decision to dispatch its Field Commander to New York to mount a diplomatic initiative with the members of the Council.

Regarding the military observers, discussions had already started with DPKO. The Secretary-General had expressed the view that some UNMOs might be transferred from Cambodia, from where they were being withdrawn. According to the agreement, all the steps were linked: the trigger for disarmament, for example, was the deployment of the UNMOs. According to Mr. Jonah, the UN was not known to move quickly, so we were being put into a difficult situation and should try our best to expedite matters.

Asking additional clarifications, Mr. de Soto expressed misgivings. This was clearly not a UN-model peace-keeping operation, and he wondered how the two forces - UN and

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ECOMOG - would co-operate, since ECOMOG's rules of engagement differed from those of the UN. Some "hard-nosed bargaining" might have to take place in order to arrange for this "delicate co-habitation", particularly as the UNMOs would be unarmed. He understood that Charles Taylor's signature of the agreement in Cotonou had been conditional on the UN's involvement.

Mr. Jonah concurred. Charles Taylor had not wanted ECOMOG at all and had even tried to get it removed from Liberia. He explained that about nine months ago, France had also "worked on removing ECOMOG" ~d replacing it with other contingents ·from ECOWAS countries which would be deployed in Charles Taylor's area. With the help of the United States, a contingent from Senegal had been obtained, but after six of their soldiers were killed, Senegal - in fury - had withdrawn their force. When negotiations started again, Taylor had agreed that contingents from other countries outside Africa were acceptable, to be deployed primarily in the area controlled by him, while ECOMOG would be deploy~ throughout Liberia. The weapons, however, would only be handed over to these additional contingents, not to ECOMOG.

"So we are monitoring the monitors", Mr, de Soto observed. Mr. Riza entirely shared Mr. de Soto's misgivings. The relationship between the UN and ECOMOG was unclear: the agreement spoke of "monitor" and "verify", but to whom would the UN report infractions? and what if the UN found that ECOMOG forces violated the agreement?

In Mr, Jonah's opinion, we would report to the Security Council. A howl of derision from the Task Force met this remark: and what would the Council do then? The Council would ask ECOMOG to desist, Mr. Jonah remarked. He believed that the UN would in fact be supervising ECOMOG, but agreed that the relationship needed to be worked out in grater detail.

The Task Force was not satisfied. Mr, Riza insisted that this was not a purely military matter: what precisely was the relationship between the UN and ECOMOG? Mr. Eliasson also foresaw problems and considered that it would not be good if a conflict between the UN and a regional organization was seen to develop.

(Mr. Gharekhan joined the meeting.)

Mr. Jonah did not "see what the difficulties are" and stressed that the ECOMOG Field Commander had come to New York with full authority to work out all the details. Mr. Riza observed that ECOMOG had 9,000 troops (compared to the 250-300 asked of the UN) and considering that Charles Taylor would only work with the non-ECOMOG contingents regarding the cantonment, disarmament etc., this would put an impossible burden on these troops. The relationship between the two forces had to be very clear "before we get on the ground", while the Security Council had to take the political decision whether to agree

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to the UN role in Liberia. Mr. Jonah insisted that the relationship could be worked out with the ECOMOG Field Commander.

Asked by Mr. de Soto about a precedent for such an arrangement, Mr. Jonah answered in the negative. This was all the more reason, in the view of the Task Force, to be cautious and fix the rules before taking on the operation.

Mr. Eliasson raised humanitarian issues: ECOMOG wanted to set up an international fund. What were the numbers of soldiers to be demobilized? he asked, and were we being asked to feed them during cantonment? Mr, Jonah admitted that no one knew the size of Charles Taylor's army, but as in Angola, the soldiers were to be provisioned. This would be an expensive operation, he warned, even more expensive than the elections.

Turning to the interim arrangements, Mr. Riza remarked that ECOMOG was to supervise the ceasefire (to start on Sunday, 1 August), but he was unsure of the role for the UN in that period. The ceasefire was already in effect informally, Mr. Jonah informed. On other matters: DPKO was currently putting together a mission, which was to depart for Liberia next week. A report to the Security Council was being drafted by Mr. GordonSomers, with the electoral chapter being provided by DPA.

As the elections were seven months away, Mr. Gharekhan felt that this was too early. Messrs. de Soto and Riza disagreed: seven months was not very much lead time.

Mr. de Soto suggested that the ECOMOG Field Commander talk first to the UN Secretariat before approaching Security Council members: this would give him an idea of the problems involved. Without wishing to be negative, it should be pointed out to the Field Commander that such a joint operation had never been mounted before. In Mr. Jonah's opinion, this raised an interesting matter: in reality, the Council preferred an ECOMOG operation over UN involvement, but the members would tell a different story to the ECOW AS countries. He recalled a previous request from ECOW AS for observers and in that context referred to the letter from former US President Carter. The Secretary-General had turned down that request before it had reached the Security Council and this had not sat well with the African countries. Now, the idea of UN deployment had been discussed already with France, the UK and the US, so preparatory work had been done.

Haiti Update

Mr. Riza informed of his meeting wit SRSG Caputo: the US wanted to send a small advance team to Haiti, and the UN had agreed. The US would provide the bulk of the military forces, while Canada and France would provide most of the police force. "We are trying to internationalize", he added, but it was difficult due to language requirements.

I'

Liberia Peace Agreement and Role of UNOMIL

Issues for Discussion

Definition of Fundamental Terms

1. The demarcation of responsibility between ECOMOG and UNOMIL is not clear. It seems from the Agreements that ECOMOG has primary responsibility for supervising the peace agreement, i.e., as an operational authority, and that the UN's role would be to verify and monitor activities of ECOMOG. Yet, the supervisory, verification and monitoring tasks of ECOMOG and UNOMIL are not clear in the various areas of the agreement1 •

What is the definition of "supervision", "verification" and "monitoring"?

Section B. "Supervisor and Monitoring Authority", para 1 notes "The presence of the UN Observer Mission will ensure confidence for the neutrality of the operations." This seems to imply supervisory responsibilities for UNOMIL.

Section B, para 2, notes "The ECOMOG and UNOMIL shall supervise and monitor the implementation of this Agreement." This statement seems to imply that this is a joint operation with each party having the same level of responsibility and authority.

In some areas, as in buffer zone monitoring, the only responsible party mentioned is UNOMIL; in other areas, such as encampment, the responsibility seems to be jointly UNOMIL and ECOMOG, and in other areas, such as disarmament, the responsibility seems to be ECOMOG with UNOMIL verification and monitoring, implying that levels and extent of responsibility vary with functions. This requires precision.

To what extent could the UH realistically "verify and monitor" "ECOMOG supervision", noting that the ECOMOG force is 12,000 and the UN is 300?

Command structure ' ' f

2. The neutral command structure over ECOMOG and UNOMIL is not clear. If UNOMIL determined that ECOMOG was not imparti~l, to whom would it report? What actions would it have the authority to take in such a situation? If UNOMIL · reported such to the Secretary-General, could the UN take corrective measures as ECOMOG is under the jurisdiction of ECOWAS?

1 Unless otherwise noted, the "agreement" referred to herein is the Military Agreement.

r

3 •. . ·.It is noted [B.1] that troops would also be recruited from OAU member states. If these troops are not also of an ECOWAS state,. ··1;0 whom do they report? Are they under ECOMOG command?

4. It• is noted that ECOMOG has the right to self defense [G.1]; it should also be made clear that UNOMIL has this right.

ECOMOG Troops

5. It is understood .that .NPFL do~s not trust the neutrality of the present ECOMOG force and that the four new ECOMOG battalions will be responsible for activities in NPFL territory. If this is the case, NPFL could hold up participation in the agreement until the new battalions of ECOMOG are deployed. Even when the new battalions are deployed, NPFL could hold up participation on the grounds that they, too, are not neutral.

6. It is noted [B.2] that ECOMOG and UNOMIL would enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout Liberia. Would this also hold true for the present nine battalions of ECOMOG troops which the NPFL does not trust are neutral?

Acts in Violation

7. Section D refers to various acts as constituting violations of the ceasefire. Not all of these acts seem to be violations of the ceasefire; some of them seem to be violations of the Agreement. Confusion could, therefore, arise as to what constitutes a ceasefire violation as opposed to a violation of the Agreement.

Ceasefire

s. During the period between ceasefire and full deployment of ECOMOG and UN personnel, it is proposed that a Joint ceasefire Monitoring Committee be set up to verify the ceasefire. (B.3] The Committee would be headed by the UN and would include the parties and ECOMOG. The Agreement notes that the committee will consist of several groups, each of which will be chaired by a UN observer: how many groups would be formed and for what purpose? To whom does the JCMC report: to the UN or ECOWAS?

9. After ECOMOG and the UN are fully deployed, the JCMC would cease and a Violations Committee would be established. [G.2-3) All violations are to be reported to UNOMIL which investigates and takes correct actions. What does "corrective action" mean? Given its size, would UNOMIL have the capacity to investigate? Shouldn't the first instance of investigation be taken by ECOMOG?

10. If UNOMIL can not correct the infraction, it would be reported to the Violations Committee which would require the violating party to take corrective measures. What would such measures

~--------- - - - ----

be? Should the party not do so, the violation would be reported to ECOMOG which shall use its peace enforcement powers against the violator. Exactly what peace enforcement powers would ECOMOG have?

11. would the decisions of the Violation Committee be taken by consensus? If so , is it realistic to expect a party to allow action to be taken against itself?

Disarmament and Demobilization

12. ECOMOG supervises disarmament; parties disarm to ECOMOG; ECOMOG has the authority to disarm and to search for arms; and ECOMOG collects, stores and secures arms in armouries. [E] All of this is verified and monitored by UNOMIL. What specific tasks are involved for UNOMIL? Does this mean that UNOMIL supervises ECOMOG?

13. What happens to arms after the government is established and UNOMIL/ECOMOG forces leave the country?

14. The Agreement states [E. 7] that "for the sole purpose of maintaining the ceasefire, the ECOMOG shall conduct any search to recover lost or hidden weapons". This implies that ECOMOG can only search for weapons if there is a threat they will be used. If this is the case, it seems that stores of arms could be maintained by the parties, thus undermining the peace process.

15. In section H.2, the parties call on the UN and others to finance demobilization, retraining, etc. Demobilization would be part of the disarmament/encampment activities and should not be referred to in an appeal for rehabilitation assistance~

Encampment

16 . Voluntary encampment of forces is under ECOMOG supervision with UN monitoring. Yet, the parties will submit to both ECOMOG and UNOMIL lists of their combatants and weapons and both UNOMIL and ECOMOG will identify locations for camps, thus implying joint/equal responsibility for UNOMIL and ECOMOG. The roles of ECOMOG and UNOMIL are not clear in this area.

17. It is not clear if the parties will encamp 100% of their combatants or a fraction of the total number of combatants. Nor is it clear how long the combatants will stay in the

/ camps.

18. Section F.1.a notes that encampments will be used as transit points for further education, etc. As this is dependent on voluntary rehabilitation contributions, it seems it should be left out of the Agreement.

19. It is noted that the security of the camps will be provided by

-ECOMOG with UN monitoring and verification. If a camp was to be attacked, what actions could UNOMIL take?

20 • . The parties, UNOMIL and ECOMOG should be aware that the camps will require food, medical and sanitation assistance. Would this be provided through voluntary assistance or by ECOWAS, UNOMIL and/or the OAU?

Border Monitoring . .

21. Again, the lines of responsibility between ECOMOG and UNOMIL are not clear. It seems that the buffer zones are demarcated by ECOMOG and monitored by UNOMIL. Does that mean that ECOMOG will be patrolling them? Is this also the case for patrolling and monitoring movement over county lines?

22 . How would the coastline be secured?

Prisoners of War

23. All POWs are to be released to an available UN authority or to the Redcross. [I] Does this imply that the UN is to take charge of POWs? (Which has not before been done by the UN.) Who determines if a prisoner is a POW or a common criminal?

Schedule of Implementation

24. It is noted that formulating the implementation schedule is a joint responsibility of ECOMOG and UNOMIL. This could bring problems. Shouldn't the parties be involved?

25. Seven days after signature of the peace agreement the ceasefire is to take affect. At this time the Joint Cease Fire Monitoring committee is to be established, including the advance UNOMIL team. Is it realistic to expect an advance UNOMIL team to be fielded by that time?

26. Within a month of the cease fire, both ECOMOG and UNOMIL are to be fully deployed. Is this a realistic expectation?

27. All demobilization, disarmament, election activities are to take place within seven months of signature. Again, is this a realistic expectation, especially as election activities include voter registration, electoral roll's, polling stations, election supervision, etc?

Other Questions and Concerns

28. What would be the financial responsibilities of each party: ECOWAS, the OAU and the UN?

29. It is noted [B.1] that "adequate security for the NPFL leader as determined by NPFL in conjunction with the UN Observer Mission will be provided." What does that mean? The UN

j

cannot provide security.

30. The number unrealistic. of the UNMO countries?

of UNMOs recommended for the task seems DPKO/Technical mission will determine the size force. Can UNOMIL have UNMOs from ECOWAS

31. What is the duration of the UNOMIL mandate? (The Agreements state it would be until a government is established, how long is that after elections?)

32. What is the situation of mines and demining?

33. What would be the role of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in supporting UNHCR and other agencies in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and the delivery of humanitarian assistance?

34. It is noted in the Political Agreement [F.c] that the parties will guarantee and provide security to UNHCR and other organizations necessary to carry out their work. Does this imply use of force? It is assumed that the parties would not be providing security, as such, but would guarantee not to impede safe delivery of assistance. This should be clarified.

35. What would be the UN's role, if any, in preparing and holding elections?

MC 21/7/93

·-

[JIDlffit@dl Press Release

Department of Public Information • News Coverage Service • New York

SG/1998 19 July 1993

PARTIES TO LIBERIA CONFLICT RBACH AGRREMRNT ON POLITICAL,

MILITARY, HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

(Received from a UN official.)

GENEVA, 17 July -- At the invitation of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on behalf of President Nicephore Soglo, current Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Salim A. Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the parties to the Liberian conflict met here from 10 to 17 July to take part in peace talks aimed at ending three and a half years of civil war in Liberia.

The talks were held under the co-chairmanship of Trevor Gordon-Somers, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Liberia, President Canaan Banana, of the OAU and Abbas Bundu, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.

This historical meeting provided a unique opportunity for the three parties to engage in a friendly and conciliatory dialogue among themselves with a view to advancing the search for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Liberian crisis -- in accordance with the ECOWAS Peace Plan and the Yamoussoukro Accords.

The parties adopted an Agreement containing decisions with respect to political, military, humanitarian and refugee repatriation issues. This Agreement will be signed by the leaders of the parties during the ECOWAS Summit on Cotonou, Benin, on 24 July.

The Agreement on political issues reaffirmed that the Yamoussoukro Accords provi ded the best framework for peace . It was agreed that Liberia would be unified under a civil transitional government to run for a period of seven months . Various proposals were made with respect to the executive, judiciary and legislative branches of government, with decisions in some cases deferred for consultation among the leaders of the parties.

The Agreement on military issues contained conditions for a cease-fire, the establishment of a supervisory and monitoring authority, bringing together representatives of the three parties, the Economic Community's Monitoring

(more}

4631P

For information media-not an official record

. ·; 1

2 ., ':- ~

Press Reiease ,.SG/1.998 . 19 . J'uly f.99:3 '.· . .

• ' • > :

Observer Group (ECOMOG), and the United Nat ions Observer Mission. Attention " was given to monitoring ·or·cease-fire v i olations and the process c;;f

d~.f;lannarnent, encampment- and demobilization consisterrt . wi'th, the terms arid· · . coqct_tt i ons of . t h~ ECOWAS Peace Plan and the Yamoussoukro Accords.

The parties agreed that every effort should be made to deliver humanita rian assistance to all Liberians , particularly children, who are malnour ished and suff°rfring from related diseases . Convoys of humanitarian a s si s tance should travel to all areas of Liberia through the most direct routes .

The Uni te,d ~at ions High Commissioner· for Refugees (UNHCRJ. presented to the parties a summary of its p l ans for refugee repatriation and reintegration .in the country . It ca l le,~. speci fic attent i on to the need for security and protect ion of United Nations staff working in the country. The part i es called upon the United Nations, particularly UNHCP., to carry out the necessary p l anning and resource mobilization to facilitate a speedy return of refugees to Liber ia.

* *** *

4 631P

10-JUL 17:26

/

OF

ERIC AVE8URY 071 738 7861

July 10, 199!-!

Aft.P.r wf': mP.t, hP.rP. in Lonnon during your visit in ,January 1992,_you vP.ry kindly wrot.e tn me on .January 30, 1992, inviting me tn keep you informed ofmatters_that were of concern to ti:il"s Group. I have used this privilege sparingly, because I am conscious of the inadequacy of the resources of the Unit.Ad N attons f n rela.tf on u, the demands placed upon you.

A matter on which members of this Group are indeed greatly concerned is the conflict in Liberia. You mny recall that J wrote to you on November 8, 1992, and again_on March_27,_1993, making~~c:t.ls for ending the bloodl:ihed. I wso wrote to thu U ndcr Sucrcus.r.v-Gcneral, Mr Jttme:::; Jom1h, on_ June 17 ttn<l 22, ttbuuL Lhe H.LrociLie~ which hH.ve ~t'-11

ClJlllllliL~ in Lh~ cuuns~ uf Lhi:::; wu.r, :::;ugg~Liut{ Llrn.L Lraiu~J uimi.uu.l inve~Ligat.ors be broughL in from out.aide, particularlyoallist1cs experts who could identify the weapons used in the llarhel m~Sa£re. I took up with Mr ,Jonah the question of trials of those responsible for the atrocities. I wrote al.so to Mr Trevor Gordon-Somers about the need for profesisional.:s to be involved in his own investigation of Ilarbcl.

We were very glad to note thut u fre3h round oftullw hud been convened in Cenevu, -with thtt o.im of finding u peuceful 1:1olution tot.he prohlemi:. of Lib~riu. But. t.he 1:1uccesa of your efforts will depend on the level of trust. o.nd confidence nmong the parties, nnd this is relntcd to the conditions provniling in Liberia it.t:clf. If, during the truk&, there could be a total cct1£:e fire, and abstention from acts of violence or threats of violence, it would help enormously to create an atmosphere in which the negotiations could be fruitful. The suspension of hostilities would enable relief agencies to bring food and medical supplies into the areas administered by the National Patriotic Recuru;lruction AssQmbly Government (NPRAG). Since May, the agenciei; have su9pended their relief operation~ via. CotQ d'Ivoiro on tho instructions of th~ ECO MOL; a.nd thQ ECUW.AS Sc:-crC'tariat, and t.h.is has caw!!ed ieriom1 hiudship fo ordinary Liberians. Nothing in Hesolutions 788 And 81~ of the Security Council authorised. t.he. exte.n~ion oft.hP. hlor.knrlP. t.o h11m:rnit.~r1::i·ii-rPliAf StT_~ iP.i:.~-nnri i t. wnn lrf hP. RJl r~r.tMP.rl i r you won lo nraw-th_i~ T~--~hP-_

10-JUL 17:26 ERIC AVE8URY 071 738 7861 P.02

attention of ECOWAS stat.cs, ti8 well us inviting them tu agre.~ t.n A. r.eru.e fire.

ThH question of responsibility for the Harbel masgacT'I-! nP.eds to be r1...'8ulved promptly, beco.uGo it has affected the Mtt.it.iirle of oLher states wwards the conflict. Initially thQ media. unequivrK~R.lly stated that Mr Charles Taylor was guilty, largely on the b~Rii:: of statements alleged to have been made by Mr Mahiga, a UNHCR offida.1. The ONHCR Dirt:tewr of the Regional Bureau for Europe, Mo; AnnP.--Marie Demmer, has put-lY repudin.te<:i: the eomment.G attribut.C'd tll Mr Mahiga in The Guarditt.n of T ,ondon, snying that they were not confirmed by other media rcwrlb 01·

by internal communications, Ann others have sliid that the evitltince points to the AFL as the aRRa.~sins, but the damage haH Leeu done. It is nr.sential, in our view, t.hAt. a proper investigation 1,~ cuuducted by trained polic~ officer~, with forensic and ba.Jli8Lic eAJ~~~-~_!i_ac~_them up, with a vi~w t.o ui<mtifying those responsi1Jl~ uuL only for the Harbel mass.acrg but ot.hP.r atrocities wh1ch havl:! lJ~11 cu1runitted since the fighting begsrn Rgain last October.

1 t i~ A l~o necessazy for 8i!:eeml:!11L Lu be reached on thti prosecution of thosP. against whom a prirna fncie case ct1n be made out;-nncf'we ;_,ould hP. grateful for your thou~hl..l; r~n _!his. Questioned obout the proaocution of war criminals in Hu::miH., the Under-Secretory of Sta to at the Foreign and Commonwl:!H-lLh Onice, Daroness Cho.Iker, told the Holl.ie of Lords on Thun,day Un.1L progress was being m11dc towards tho establishment. of tribumdi:; fur Lhis purpose. It seems to many of us that there shoulri hP- a univeri:;~ rule of law which applies to conflict'3 hgtween entities whi~h are nuL High Contracting Parties to the FourthGen~a [fun~~nt.ion,--;;r t:!Vt:ii "sovereig~_~ta~. 'l'hc· cffoct. on thH ~icUms is the SRmH, and it is 8

matter for con:sidero.tion how the Fourth Ggneva Conwmtion could be extended to cover military conflicu; s.uch as the I ,ihP.riR.n one.

H E th9 SecrP.tary-UeunrA I, Unit.9d Nn.tions, Fax 0101 i1:t ~63 4R79

cc Pr~iriP-nt Soglo, Chair of ECOWAS (010229 300636) Pl'AAident Yowert Museveni (010256 41255 243)

EXECUTIVE OFFlCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

THE E.XSCUTIVE MANSION 0...:. •fllS PIIBSIDIDfT

Mottaovµ., LIBBalA

July 8, 1993 t 81994

EOSG/CENTRAL .Dear Mr. secretary-General:

-I wish to express my deep thanks and appreciation for your

letter of 6 Julv 1993 inviting me. on behalf of the Chairman of the Economic Commuiii ty of West African States, President Nicephore Soglo, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, Dr. Salim Ahmed Sa lim and the Uniteo Nations, to participate in a meeting to bring about a neqotiated settlement of the Liberian crisis in Geneva on 10 July 1993.

I am pleased to confirm our participation in the Geneva Meeting by the fo llowing delegation which has been given full authority to negotiate a lasting solution to the Liberian crisis without reservations:

1. Hon. G. Baccus Matthews 2. Hon. Philip A. Z. Banks 3. Hon. Lamini Waritay 4. Hon. J.D.Baryogar Junius 5. Hon. Bai M. Gbala, 6. Hon. Conmany B. Wesseh 7. Hon. James T. Tarpeh 8. Hon. D.J. Samukai 9. Hon. Lt/Gen. Hezekiah Bowen-

10. Hon. Arthur Dennis

Head of Delegation Minister of Justice/Member Minister/Information" ILA Advisor to President Advisor/Peace Process Ambassador Depty Min./Defense Chief of Staff/AFL Asst. Min./Defense

With the concer~ed and coordinated efforts of !C0WAS , OAU and the United Nations, it is our fervent hope that a final solution to this long standing crisis will emerge from the Geneva talks.

In this connection, Mr. Secretary-General, we ask that you use your good offices to ensure tn~t a durable peace is restored to t1heria so that the suffering of th2 Liberian people will fjnally come to an end.

His Excellency Boutros Boutros-Ghali Secretary-General of the United Nations Headquarters o r the United Nations New York, New York, U.S . A.

:,,

Jonah/LMB/js C. C. : SG File: XRef:

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

6 July 1993

Excellency,

His Excellency President Nicephoro Soglo, in his capacity as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, has informed me that you have agreed to take part in negotiations to end the civil war in Liberia. President soglo has conveyed to me that he has received similar agreement from Mr. Alhaji G.V. Kromah and Mr. Charles Taylor.

Having been deeply concerned at the tragic situation in your country, which has claimed the lives of so many men, women and children during the past three and one-half years, I welcome the decision of all the parties to pursue the path of a negotiated solution to the conflict. You have already requested me, by your letter dated 5 May 1993, to convene the peace talks. ·

Following a suggestion of President Soglo, I am pleased to invite you, on behalf of President Soglo and of Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of Africa Unity, as well as on behalf of the United Nations, to take part in the meeting to be held in Geneva, starting on 10 July 1993 at 1000 hours. I expect the talks to last until 17 July. The meeting will be held in Conference Room V of the Palais des Nations.

I am proposing that, at this stage, the talks should be co-chaired by Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, my Special Representative, President Canaan Banana, the OAU Eminent Person, and Dr. Abass Bundu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. The first item for substantive discussion will be the agenda, a copy of which is attached. This agenda was, of course, drawn up in consultation with you.

His Excellency Dr. Amos Sawyer President of the Interim Government

of the Republic of Liberia Monrovia

![nJmrnawm ~ ln] JUL - 6 1993 / lj /

EOSG/CENTR

. , I .envisage that the Foreign Ministers of the Committ~e of Nine will join the talks to endorse the ~greem~rits reached, and that the agreements will be formally witnessed at a Special Summit Meeting of the Heads of State of the Committee of Nine of ECOWAS, to be convened in Cotonou or in another West African capital at a date to be determined later this month.

Your agreement to take part in peace negotiations is an important step forward. A process has begun which hopefully will reduce tension and create an atmosphere of trust which should lead, eventually, to the organization of f .ree and fair elections as · foreseen in the ECOWAS Peace Plan and the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. For my part, I can assure you of the full support of the United Nations in the task of building a lasting peace in your country.

I look forward to receiving from you, soon, your confirmation that you will take part in the talks, together with the names of the other members of your delegation.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

.,.

LIBERIA PEACE TALKS - AGENDA A. 01 SARUAMENT

II.

c.

1. CEASE FIRE

al Oeclaration

b) Agree11ent

c) UN Cease Fire Observers

ENCWNT

a) Role of E'.COf.tOQ

b) c011111en c emerrt

c) I dent i ficat ion o1 locar;ons

DEMOBlLIZATlON

a) Seneitizat1::,n of communiti••

b) ReabeorDtion of ex-c:ombatants ;ncluding c:h11d soldiers into civilian life

4. .!\lelESTY

HlleANITAftIAN ASSISTANCE

ELECTORAL PROCESS ,. DA.TE OF ELECTIONS

2. ELECTOIIAL COla4188ION

.1. SUPIIDIE COURT

•• 08aEIYER8

5. FlNANCUfta

D. PIEPATRIATIOM OF REFUGEES AND RESErrt.BIENT OF DISPLACED PERSOHS

I. SECURITY FROM CEASE FIRE TO ELECTIONS

F. RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION

G. RECONCJLIA TION

.... '

Jonah/LMB<• · 'File: \~~

c.c.: SG

XRef: ~ THE SECRETAR Y-G ENERA L.

fn) rn

Ul) JUL - 6 1993

6 July 1993 EOSG/CENTRA

Dear Mr. Taylor,

His Excellency President Nicephoro Soglo, in his capacity as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, has informed me that you have agreed to take part in negotiations to end the civil war in Liberia. President ~oglo has conveyed to me that he has received similar agreement from President Amos Sawyer and Mr. Alhaji G.V. Kromah.

Having been deeply concerned at the tragic situation i n your country, which has claimed the lives of so many men, women and children during the past three and one-half years, I welcome the decision of all the parties to pursue the path of a negotiated solution to the conflict. You have already requested me, by your letter dated 23 April 1993, to convene the peace talks.


I am proposing that, at this stage, the talks should be co-chaired by Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, my Special Representative, President Canaan Banana, the OAU Eminent Person, and Dr. Abass Bundu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. The first item for substantive discussion will be the agenda, a copy of which is attached. This agenda was, of course, drawn up in consultation with you.

Mr. Charles Taylor Leader of the National

Patriotic Front of Liberia Monrovia

I envisage that the Foreign Ministers of the Committee of Nine will join the talks to endorse the agreements reached, and that the agreements will be formally witnessed at a Special Summit Meeting of the Heads of State of the Committee of Nine of ECOWAS, to be convened in Cotonou or in another West African capital at a date to be determined later this month.

Your agreement to take part in peace negotiations is an important step forward. A process has begun which hopefully will reduce tension and create an atmosphere of trust which should lead, eventually, to the organization of free and fair elections as foreseen in the ECOWAS Peace Plan and the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. For my part, I can assure you of the full support of the United Nations in the task of building a lasting peace in your country.


Please accept, Mr. Taylor, the assurances of my highest consideration.


r---------------------- ------ -

I

I

I

y"1~j v.N--~ (.~~ J~ ~ , ;L~1,)'13 r ~ ~ (L

NATIONAL PA1RIOTIC RECONSTRUCTION ~SEMBLY GOVERNMENT Office of the President

rn-=~:.....SE ... P~l ~--:--1 ........ rn--, OO Republic of Liberi:

1.993

fo) rlli © ~ uJ lli

IJI] I SEP 2 8 003 J:!J EOSG/CENTRAL

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to ;:-ieacefu'

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_ :::-1 P21tr .. r~~- "r c.or,• tructio, A-ce,rnbly _,_._lple J-f ~~ .cl, we hav j-l !:' 'L r,our

1 £>rc! Odr proio...., t-'"c11''-".S and ,:1pr ,.-;::;, l ,t__ion

f~r the t ITel "'r~ favo~rdL:e response f=.· gre,:iter lJN _nvc! 1 emert in •.:._ d ... -·q a the Lib~rian cris·s.

- ... -" £. - t e;:! i, / uLP ~Pnt! / , 41 S

I to ;::.,• -1t•1c=;t

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.~ ·d1ac.1 tci t·,= t. ely Pr.able , E cl~.:._ t Y

-""l as : .. ,2~ ...... _s4: on r t e follovJ.tr =.:_,e of

'1:c.t.1ve1-' - le -~Ed to -0Lric11 s pcsitio~ as

, of ResolL.t ~or l'-!o. 813:

1) Ar t-.1.:.-le # 6 of the Resclut ... on clearl/ ire-:ogrizes ECOl"'IOG as. :::1 ,....P:;1c.e 1<_ep1 q _r I r1e 1t"al for._2 in the Liberiar

~- is ,rd • 1_;_..- ctly .3CC"L c::p'= '=,:::- of 1-1av1rig c1ttacl<ed a

P~ace •e~~l g f~"ce.

Your E rot re;=d1-1--:.~.. repo•-"':. :::--r .. L.r" beligerar·~ a - t i \I l t it-' s l q .l t =· L ,.. E ,.., ~ - . .,. r'll - q - - .. ~ l n an Ci n g Ci

diss1dert ~ :;i c. .. ~s ni.tE· . +i:;r ""'r:,v'?iT?, t \~LIMO), Dr. Sa ... E.:' ·::, '.:"' •. J. eon t ,Lrej Blac.l- 2erets; 1rd Arned Forces of Liber.:a (AFL,. A1sc. it is c1 1 r .:H "act .,.:. .--e:::e Dissident c:;.,.oups are fight .. r>_ dongside E.['.) :::::~ against t'Pl="L ir violatio, of UN Rr1c-,:;l ·::_,, 788 _nti 21·' :-kwever, tt--is ::-,L1tE o' af-f_;iir::o m.,st not

it C. ld "F'

LIBERTY •JUSTICE• DISCIPLINE• WORK

Below ar ~rom tr:

2)

f C.

ep e ~-tirq he ground~ deliberately e cl ded

t t~e SecJrity Co~nci::

thP B of' f Pr Z'.:me to UL I '10, a '"1on-part S'"'O ro P a:::::e Accord and subsequErt

t :;. sp tir'q of -aid d1::>side'"lt rmc-d ~ ~ t r~ NP~L positions at the Po of Va □u-sou ro IV w~ich calls for !l 8 ter~al th edts by ECOMOG.

~) t~nt 7Y. of t•e pr □ 1sicns ~.,der the Vammo~ssoukro Peace

6

Accord. 1g Pe oi:el"li g of ":ill major High-Ways; E.stc1L! ' ' er AD HOC f}p,. io~s Commission, AD HOC f ,.rrnfl l 1 -pat1on o-f a BLffer Zone betl,Jeen Sie,,.ra

eore a~d Li ~ :1; dei:,lo emt of ECOl''OG Troops t'iroughout r d _t bl ·stnPnt r 4 a joint ~ec~nical Committe~ -J.P.i=-.L. c:1 j ECOMOG to work OLt nodal-ties for

E

e · of "a,..,c us'-'out ro Pe, c_e Accordc, the 1t l wud h,hP ronclu~ed that NPF~ is not gg n ab~tacle to t~e peace process.

si E'=- f _'"'Ql"'OG"s :i.ndisc.r·ni "'e tr .:.v0 t::irt k 111nq (")f childr 1, :::- 1 d persons ard the mas i e

and rLb~ic properties "'o incl de r ,.. 1-i B..iild1ngs, Hospital rpc- Hien t ia 1 areas C.:OL,p 1 ed wi tr

1c..:.t dr gt aff eking by ECO or o r£ fle_t d ... r tt-ic> report.

· 1j:' t-t1:ctl 1 c. r1veyed the sentirients., np-s~gE?c- of the l ibe ian people present d

ss- Ect1rr c_..f tre cit 2ens, tl-ie Securit; a ~ ::::iwr tr t the L1ber1an peoplE! de d

e s_t1rr uf tustilit.1es, tl->e subsequen 1:c _ r F ... Pe ar d fa 1... elect i ors.

'"lot explain to Yo r d1_p} ce children, babies

c1t rra1rutrition because i d, dr1qs arid other ,umanita--i

.. /3

Y□ ~~r •12 cy, ,01 ~111 please ncte t,at at the conclGs1or Jf A'Tb 5·:;;ado Ge don Sorr, = s asse ,.,men t t.- ip to Greater Liberia, we prese te-i - .., 1-r E r,:laraL, 3uT,mar-y of i=-acts constitutinq the pos!.ll~ G= ~ f"I ent a~d tre pe~ple of ~iberia as regarding thP ped s~ ~-r orward s bT•ssio~ tc '"he Security Cou c1l.

Ac::: d1rq !. ~o•~r •1c ... nt the universally accepted doc.tr-1 E f d e pr 'a .. {tr,e ~-w wrich hears before it

n ~ m , , , we:c t a ,ighest 2rb1te- a,d to the passa e Jf ar a~eqtate de~- ~ ~

tt-o ; 1- that the Security Counci 1 beirg ti-,e dispen=er of ~ t1ce, would invite us, prior reso tic,·,, t_~ clar1f pr.::;)pe-1)', pr-esef"lt and

r p-s1ticn and cause.

H we e apped' t_ th S ct..rit CoLncil to corv c,,

pec..1ai -ffor s the oppcrtunit, to prove our respPct f r ~ st b1lit inter-national laws, huma, rights and to disprove tre allPyd.ltwr s, intf'T ""l1a, ti.at we are the aggressor and obst.-uctio, to pe re ir tre _iberian crisis.

Attacred I-ere- is a r y, ed E. i 1. t •, Lt

ne tot S ~ Lt C of transpa ent J 5t1ce.

RESOLUTION t-,..IR.

r.JiJ of the Su'!' ,a"y of Facts offic...ial , e,uest that ~tr E ce lency will present

il ford e constderatior i~ the i7ter2st

8 1. 3

lndeed, we are delighted ton te ::1nd welcome the position of ... he Sec.u, · t; (oLrit.1! de rE. fl ,ct d r-1 Articles tt ... :?, 1:,, 16. 17, and 18 of t e resC'! • t 107:

a We; v1.e>w t._.e rn H d ":.e I? s'-,rir ed ir c-ou'"lt tti.2, requ.irir>q all Member St :1tE s c ~ ECOMCG to e ,erci se sel f-restra.int in thE ..- ..- .dt.1or s t L' i:-:'l.rties 1 1 thP L'lbPria co +1~ct, as tre ~ st desirable ard decisive step toward •he aerie eme cf ldst1rg peace 1n L1beria. Repugnan~ t tt m rd ttc we _tse•vc t._.at Tligeria as a "'I' e•- of +he E[OWAS ctate hac i'l fact irtensi 4 ied its blatant aggr ess1~n ::igc: ir t ,!Pr!.. c:1s evidenced by the fol lowirg ir sL,-ir1ce'-':

i t t :1

l i F'.:'rtvo

er ll0 r~ ;:io~1t1ons ir Roberts Interna ional rd Firestone Plc:1ntations;

terdr .... C"' to f ._qht and acol i.rr> terr1 +- c y;

• .. / 4

Appr i-r s ts.= a ready i tl='r 0l1..1t1

4 ... disc reca

t re .l.f di::, t l mi ' - ': r AR I , 1 a, T ~ 4-

bom•Jt CJ of Gbarr ~ Pal 1-,, SKT, ·ra, y-, .1_a, Harper, Greenville,

tj r J, " tgib• all be ,::1vil1-1r> tar-gt far ,.. emo ... f ..- um u- .:-.. w2r- fr,nt, '::iets-Jeer; '1-rch 26 d Apr 1 l 2 7 , 1993;

c -rt at'· ~ by ~:;2riar ·et bo- .... e..-s ag-1-_t. ti-. lea ider•1-Fied o s l nging .n h rn r 1.ta 1 n _upplie'= dr 1gs, ood, etc.) to GrT r '1ber1 fr:r- displ,ced peoi:-,le, if"' utter v·olati~n of tt-e 1 ro'7..-en+-i~ s, as evidenced by e d ate t· ~-r;g ~edic1.-~ -~ns Fr -tier· c.. lO' IE"r,t· '"'r on :e pr1.l '99..,,.

b

grin -iir- bonbers -t abo~t ~ · □ Clo P.M.

TIO~

s _spec+ • , api::,r ate =i. e 1 corn;:, tre

t l 1 r ibel'""i=-,

Pe-' tio

t

i. on ..: c t - ~ n t t - • of r 1·~-+ ass1•tar;ce as ref:~cted in count

- f r esa • d.

1y 1

tliro 1

cf e,ider-2 on th lOl tior

,.__c: car patently l--:i0 seen from the ir di c.ri.mir-at -ident~~iable vehicle bonb1ng """ clearl

b ·g 'tar1 r -upp , to Lib,..., 1.

+- e ',PP.AS -~- e corgratulat_s the Secur1.t +ur accn~odati~q tre con~~pt

+' neeti g a.rang Liber ns tc ""1nd t ion the · 1 berian

~1ect~ Arti ~ 17, re;ol0tio~

t~ ~ r pedLe ~~~posa~ reflected in t e S...1m~ar f ~ r esentud to thE· Se cur .1 t / Counci 1 by ot..r For

""• WE"', cc 1:::te t Hth Art.:cle 17 ,nd 18 c-i: SL,t"- · + t-~ -fc'' >,q, -c-tit...1t1, ur ·,g_rid

n C l"" r-

••• / '5

A G E J D A

1) C:edsef J.re

Cor 1tions

1 1~ ~1 te hdlt to air a~d sea raids a~d bol'lbings on 1vi, ar te1rgets including l-1umMnitarian ascicctanc-e;

i • 1 ipr t• fl.L':lti ln f parties

11 · ) qu t ... or nf Econo'T'ic Sanct1nn

~) Review l and cu~ eqJe,t re-affirmation of Yamo1,soukrn Accord.

Ire eased Ar+-1c'e 14,

hl marita .... ian assistance consistent with 1~ ard 16 respectively, of Resolution Bl:.

a) deli ery D-F humaritarian assistance dt vario..1s arts of 2r t y, cor' ✓ eniert to beneficiaries;

4) P'ans f r r&patr:ation and re-settlement of refugees tt-1rc qhout L1ber1a,

5) Dc::1te of Elec i r tr.,.ee (~) ~orths as of signing oft e c e se f : r _ ig.,. t>E'ner t;

7 \ RPcort: uration ~~m8deli q of FCOMOG;

8) rf r Ee-, t rf Re<olu'"ior r. 813;

• • • I 6

n 1.e .. t s • r ~

c ene re_ r g f ' 1 tk• ~sJp- tli Q p

lease JL.._epi

estee .

Secretar l r 1 d lat i or -

De rit~d f-1~rs

Ne Yori<, New v

CGT/me

- G , l

Pla:a 1001

e hall bn grateful ~er u to t1· olv d to ~oberly dis 0ss

Gene al, assurances of ~y high

you·--,

_t G. T iyl~ / PREST DEl'-JT

Jonah/LMB/j~- · File: f J XRef: ~

THE SECRETARY- GENERAL

c. c. : SG

fo)~©~OIU~ Ull JUL - 6 1993 ~

EOSG/CENTRAL Dear Mr. Kromah,

6 July 1993

His Excellency President Nicephoro Soglo, in his capacity as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, has informed me that you have agreed to take part in negotiations to end the civil war in Liberia. President ~oglo has conveyed to me that he has received similar agreement from President Amos Sawyer and Mr. Charles Taylor.

Having been deeply concerned at the tragic situation in your country, which has claimed the lives of so many men, women and children during the past three and one-half years, I welcome the decision of all the parties to pursue the path of a negotiated solution to the conflict. You have already requested me, by your letter dated 10 May 1993, to convene the peace talks.


I am proposing that, at this stage, the talks should be co-chaired by Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers, my Special Representative, President Canaan Banana, the OAU Eminent Person, and Dr. Abass Bundu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. The first item for substantive discussion will be the agenda, a copy of which is attached . This agenda was, of course, drawn up in consultation with you.

Mr. Alhaji G.V. Kromah Leader of the United Liberation

Movement of Liberia for Democracy Monrovia

I envisage that the Foreign Ministers of the Committee of Nine will join the talks to endorse the agreements reached, and that the agreements will be formally witnessed at a Special Summit Meeting of the Heads of State of the Committee of Nine of ECOWAS, to be convened in Cotonou or in another West African capital at a date to be determined later this month~

Your agreement to take part in peace negotiations is an important step forward. A process has begun which hopefully will reduce tension and create an atmosphere of trust which should lead, eventually, to the organization of free and fair elections as foreseen in the ECOWAS Peace Plan and the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. For my part, I can assure you of the full support of the United Nations in the task of building a lasting peace in your country.


Please accept, Mr. Kromah, the assurances of my highest consideration.


.. '

TO: A:

THROUGH : 5/C DE :

FROM : DE:

SUBJECT: OBJET:

UNIT E D NATIONS


The Secretary-General

Mr. Chinmaya Gharekhan Executive Office of the

\0~\JV Jan Eliassen~ y Under- Secretar Y:,-General

Liberia

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

DATE: ________ _

LIR1702A.SHB REFERENCE: ______ _

Secretary-General

for Humanitarian A

EXECUTIVE OFFICE L ___ O'-F T:.:.:H.:..E S~E~CR;::;,ET:.a,AR~Y,:!;!•G.5.[EN~ER~AlL.J

I met on 14 June 1993 with Mr. Abass Bundu, Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to discuss problems . relating to emergency humanitarian assistance to Liberia , This meeting was followed by an exchange to letters, copies of whi ch are attached for your reference.

In the cours e of these discussions, Mr. Bundu stressed that ECOMOG, the military component of ECOWAS, is engaged in what it terms a peace enforcement action in Liberia. In ECOWAS' view, this necessitates t h e impos i tion of restri~tions and !imitations on the a ctivities o f ____ ref ief orga-nizations, including United Nations agencies and NGOs.

I underlined the neutral and impartial character of our relief operations as well as the humanitarian imperative to reach all civilians in need . I expressed particular concern over the lack of access to areas controlled by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), in view of the deteriorating living conditions there.

On the latter point, it was agreed to explore the possibility of cross-border deliveries through G-uinea. -While discussions on this optiori are currently--go-Tng--ori-Tn the field, I am not entirely confident they will lead to a workable solution-. - :( ·- also £ernain concerned about t he gener a l ___ Tnsecurity ·-- experienced by relief workers in Liberia during this period-· of heightened tension and of open warfare in parts of the country.

cc: USG Jonah USG Wells \

TO: A:

THROUGH : S/C DE:

UNITED NATIONS


Mr. Jean-Claude Aime Chief of staff Executive Office of


DA TE: -~2---ctJ-t,Ut:11=-"J,-r ---::llc-'9~9~3--

~cretary-General REFERENCE : ______ _

b~~M: Officer-in-Charge Hisham Omayad __ l 1 A~\~'~ r~l w-t: ~:-

A \'Jjf i[0f3~ Department of Pol Affairs

SUBJECT: Liberia Peace Ne otiations in Ge e;a OBJ ET: \ 1 t ~--7 ~ .... ~~ · --::: "( from 10 to 17 July 1993 ,.

Enclosed draft l~tter of invitation from the

Secretary-General to the Liberian political parties

to participate in peace negotiations in Geneva from

10 to 17 July 1993, which was prepared by Mr. Trevor - -

Gordon-Somers, Special Representative of the

Secretary-General for Liberia, has been approved by

Mr. James Jonah.

In the absence of Mr. Gharekhan, Mr. Jonah has . - . ··-· - -· ---- -

requested that the draft of the letter which is

enclosed be sent as a matter of urgency to the --·····-~- --· -- ·-·---------------·- ·- - . -·----- ··- -- . --- -- --- -

Secretary-General for his approval, so that it could - -

be signed and transmitted under his signature to the

parties today.

You might, therefore, wish to req~est th~

Secretary-General's urgent approval for the enclosed

letter of invitation so that it could be sent out

today. As the meeting in Geneva is expected to

commence on 10 July, it is important that we send out

the letters today to make sure that it is received in

time by all the participants. . . ....._""---------._

/@ruu rr w~~;; /11 11: .® - 7 1'..T, .. /f UJ i . ' ! i -" ' l -, J t '

E'"';"\ (' . .,- -:-::-- ,, . -. j ,. ·~ . ' . . . .. -- ____ .,. __ ...... .. ______ ·:___.,J

DRAFT LETTER OF INVITATION TO LIBERIANS

2 July 1993

Dear • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I

I have now received a letter from

President Nicephore Soglo, in his capacity as current

Chairman of ECOWAS, informing me of the agreement

reached by the Liberian parties to the conflict to

enter into negotiations to end the civil war. I also

recall that you had written to me on (date)

requesting that I convene peace talks. Accordingly,

on behalf of President Soglo and Mr. Salim Ahmed

Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of

African Unity (OAU), I am most pleased to invite you

to attend peace negotiations in Geneva, from 10 to

17 July 1993, at 1000 hours, in Conference Room V of

the Palais des Nations.

The talks will begin with substantive

discussions on the agenda prepared in consultation

with you. A copy of the agenda is attached. At this

stage the talks will be co-chaired by Mr. Trevor

Gordon-Somers, my Special Representative, President

Canaan Banana, the OAU Eminent Person, and Dr. Abass

Bundu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. It is

envisaged that the Foreign Ministers of the Committee

of Nine will join the meeting to endorse agreements

which you will reach. At a date to be determined

later this month, a special summit of the Heads of

State of the Committee of Nine of ECOWAS will be

convened in Cotonou or in another West African

capital in order to witness formally the agreement.

- 2 -

I do believe that your decision to embark upon

peace negotiations will ultimately result in the

reduction of tension and the creation of an

atmosphere of trust, leading to free and fair

elections, as foreseen in the ECOWAS Peace Plan and

Yamoussoukro IV Accord. I wish to assure you that

with your co-operation and in a spirit of goodwill,

the United Nations will spare no effort in assisting

you to build a durable peace leading to prosperity in

Liberia.

I take this opportunity to thank you for your

co-operation, and look forward to receiving your

confirmation that you will attend this meeting, as

well as the names of your delegation members.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest

consideration.


\

_:---~- · •.. ';/(~ .• CYG-'f ·+t I H9-,-- 0-r-;•O 5 1 :r: :3 3 · 5 6 0 :3

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NATIONS HOS NEW YORK 00 8 F OE.

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~ ~? NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-G~~n,-=~~!.,__J

. :U:;[::: \ ~ h- . -TARY-GEHERAL ~

l During Monday and T~c ><lay of this week, I had e~tensivc discussions

2

3

4

With Presidents Sawyer, Sor ,c the Executive Secret~ry ¢f ECO WAS, Mr. · Bundu. and former Pres,~•:m Ban~na, eminent personality of OAU for

Liberia. · All o( them em ,.Dasized that it was necessary to convene immediately talk$ between the parnes in Liberia. I indicated that you were prepared to issue an invitation for 4 meeting on July 1, but it had to be cancelled when it appeared that there we(e difficulties with the preparatory meeting for such a conference.

'

During the second day oi' Lhe ex,hange of views, Messers. Banana and Bundu proposed July 10 as. the dafc for th~ meeting in Geneva . I then suggested tha1 ic would be h~ lpful if ?resident Sogto, ,urrer.t Chairman of ECOWAS, should request rhe .Secretary-Oeneral to issues an invitation at such shon notice.

Another factor thar in:1uen,ccd my suggestion wo.s the fact that ill the report presented to the 0 9' U Summil here in Cajro b)' Mr. Banan.1, rhere appeared to be some di9e..cgence between che approach that 1vfr. Oordon~ Su~'ncrs was taking and t.'1at seL mn in the rcp¢n. Esrtier1 Mr. OordonSummers had envisaged thu he wouJd issue an invitation for the meeting. However, according to Mr. Banana'$ r~pon1 only one invitation would be issued by the Secretary.General of lhe United Nations. Thi1 proccdw-e had been rollowed bc,ause UH.j Wl!'rc of the view that if tb~ Secrcta.ry-Oeneral of the United Nations issui.:d .m invitation, it would be e<>mparativel)' easier fer .M,. Charles Taylor of ;..JPr L to an!nd. As you know, tv1r. Taylor has been somewhat distrUstful r)f ECOWAS and may no, also loolc favourably on the OAU.

By this note, l a.i-n forwarding to you the text of President Soglo1s lener add,es&cd to you. I heve already been in ,om.act wilh Mr. OordonSummers who is now in Abidjan to work out the necc~sary a.rransem(nts. On the buis o.f our conversarior1 1 l requested him to prepare the draft of the invitation that you would s<:-nd to the pa.rtie$, I have also asked him to send the draft to New York for ,cv;~w by mt office and Mr. Oharekhan prior to it~ dispatch to y ou m Genr,\·a. (Pn,e you appro-,,c the text, we could immediately tax the · Jnv;r_o~•cn 10 alf the pu1Jes. ln the meantime, I hive

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CYZ -P6/7

CNP-31 P6/7

asked Mr. Gordon-Summers to be m touch with the NPFL to advise rhein of the possib-ilicy of convening a rne~cing iri Geneva on July 1 O. t\lJ the other po.rties have agre~d lo the dgl~

I ha.ve also been in tou~11 with Confcrtnce Servius in Geneva to ensure lhat facilities for Lht :n ,: e1,11g would be provided at lhc Palais. 1 have been usured that this could be done for the duration of the meeting wMch is cxptcted to last seven days.

lo accordance with the scenario discussed, it is expected that your presence would be required at U1e final signing -ceremony. I had Informed my interlocutors Lhat no guarantees would be given on that score, particularly since it was expected that CotonOII or one of the other capitals of th~ ECOW AS member countries will be the ...,enue for the 6n'11 swnmit me-cring. However, we may revert to this issue at a later stage.

In the tighr of the abo.., : consid~rations, 1 would recommend that you avee to issue the inVltaupn ~s propo~ed by the parties and endorsed by President Soglo.

(Q)

- -.J O c.. .) James O.C. Jonah Cairo, 1 July 1993

00 8 P07_

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M. B/Jutrol &u1,01 GHALJ S(crltJurt Glnlro.J dt 1'0.N. U,

NICBPHORB A. SOGIA PRESIDENT DB U REPU/JUOUE DU BENTN.

1333-07 - 05

..

5 60:] UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

TO: PETROVSKY

FROM >-fr AIMl!:, NEW

CNP-31 Pl/7 '

OUTGOING CRYPTOFAX

ONLY FOR THE s~c . Y-GENERAL, GENEYA

YORK ·7 _./"\ a::i , ~· -DATE: 4 JULY 1993 //

NUMBER: MSC - 1352

v

C)

FURTHER TO OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION YESTERDAY REGARDING

LIBERIA, GHAREKHAN HAS BEEN CONSULTED REGARDING ADVISABILITY OF

CONVENING IN GENEVA A MEETING OF THE PARTIES TO THE LIBERIAN

CONFLICT. HE FEELS THAT IF THE PREPARATORY WORl< UNDERTAl<EN BY

GORDON-SOMERS HAS CREATED THE NECESSARY FRAMEWORK FOR CONVENING SUCH A MEETING, ANO HAS REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF SUCCESS,

INVITATIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO THE PARTIES. HE ASSUMES THIS TO BE '.IBE CASE GIVEN THAT AN AGENDA HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY TH&,. PARTIES AND PRESIDENT SOGLO HAS WRITTEN TO \'OU. HE ADDS, HOWEVER, THAT

HE HAS NOT SEEN THE REPORT PRESENTED TO THE OAU BY MR. BANANA NOR T E REPORT OF GORDON-SOMER'S.

AM ATTACHING FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION A DRAFT INVITATION WHICH

COULD BE SENT IN CABLE FORM TO THE PARTIES TOMORROW, 5 JULY, IF

YOU WISH TO PROCEED. GHAREKHAN AND JONAH AGREE ON TEXT. FOR EASE OF REF£RENCE AM ALSO ATTACHING COPIES OF JONAH'S NOTE AND

PRESIDENT SOGLO'S LETTER.

WILL CALL YOU IN PARIS TOMORROW.

t

TO:

UNITED NATIONS


Ms. c. Dodson

N ATIONS U N IES


CATE: 30 J une 199 3 A: Acting Director of Personnel, OHRM

THROUGH : S/C CE:

FROM: DE:

Jean-Claude Aime Chief of Staff, ES

-REFERENCE: ______ _

SUBJECT: ~ OBJET: special Representative of t he Secretary-General for Liber::}

The Secretary-General has decided to extend the appointment of Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, for a period of two months through 31 July 1993.

I would be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements.

cc: Mr. Jonah Mr. Baudot

i

UNITED NATIONS


M~. _Jean-Claude Aim~ Chief· of Staff

NATIONS UNIES


_J

28 June 1993 DATE: _______ _

Executive Office of the Secretary-General REFERENCE: _____ _

THROUGH : .. , ..... .... . ·---S/ C DE :

Hisham Omayad b~~M: Officer-in-Cha

Department of

sueJEcMr Trevor Gordon-Somers ecial Re resentative OBJ ET: ..::o..::f:....0_t~h:.c:...::..e_.,;::S;,_:e:....;c:....;r::...e.c......;;.t..,;;.a_r~y.._-_G_e_n_e_r_a___,;;l_.,;:::....;;,_:;;__L;;;;;;,__;i __ b_e_r_1..,;;.· .c.,;,a f ::{;:·~rt~~:': ., .

I have been advised by Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers,

Special Representative of the Secretary-General for

Liberia, that his contract has expired.

I should be most grateful if you would authorize

the renewal of his contract to cover his current --------------

mandate.

cc: Mr. P. Sjogren

, .

CONFIDENTIAL · 1 ·, •

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Orig: SG cc: CG/LMB

JCA/JB/FA AS/AK Central

Notes on the secretary-General's meeting with the President of Guinea

Held at the Hotel- Keridien, Cairo, -on--sunday 27 June 1993 at 4:30 p.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General Mr. Jonah Ms. Aboulnaga Ms. Mackay

H.E. Mr. Lansana Conte, President of Guinea

H.E. Mr. Ibrahima Sylla, Foreign Minister of Guinea

One adviser

The Secretary-General wished to thank the President for releasing Ambassador Kouyate to serve for another year in Somalia. His participation in UNOSOM helped the United Nations greatly, and at the same time reinforced Guinea's presence in the Organization.

Liberia

The Secretary-General sought the President's views on how to proceed in Liberia. The situation was showing no improvement.

The problem was, according to the President, that the Liberian question had not been taken seriously enough by the international community at the outset. Now the United Nations and other institutions wanted to find a political solution; however, not all the factions in Liberia were interested in that. The President did not feel that a purely political approach would be successful; in his view, a solution would have to be imposed on the parties by the international community.

The Secretary-General commented that the ECOMOG had not yet managed to contain the situation, particularly Charles Taylor and his faction.

The President thought that ECOMOG could achieve much more, and could handle Charles Taylor, if its troops were given the means by the states which had dispatched the force, and by the international community in general. ECOMOG was an inter-African force, but lacked the necessary support from ECOWAS, the OAU and the United Nations.

2

The President's advice was appreciated by the SecretaryGeneral. · The· proposal put forward by the Secretary-General's Special 'Representative was that a conference be convened; how' er, it appeared that the President did not think that such an app ach could be successful.

A conference would be "a fiasco, pure and simple", in the President's opinion. · It was impossible to solve the Liberian problem by talking. A political solution might be desira~le, but the President was of the view that politics sometimes had to be backed up by some force.

A way had to be found to persuade all parties to put down their arms. It was difficult for ECOMOG to wage an all-out war against Taylor, because the members of his forces were intermingled with the civilian population in the villages. If it were a war between two armies, it would be a simpler operation. But if ECOMOG were to launch a direct attack against Taylor's forces, it would be innocent civilians who would suffer most.

It was essential, the President said, that ECOWAS, the OAU, and the United Nations find a means to impose a solution that would oblige Charles Taylor to abandon the war, as it was he who continued to deny and disobey the will of the international community.

The Secretary-General asked for the President's views on responsibility for the killings at Harbel.

The President's impression was that no other faction than Charles Taylor's could have perpetrated the massacre, as part of a campaign of terror to subdue the population. ECOMOG had certainly not been responsible, and it was not in ULIMO's interest to have done it.

It was an unfortunate and undesirable fact, he continued, · and one he had always condemned, that Charles Taylor was benefiting from outside support. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1989, ce~tain countries had tried to help instal him in power.

The United Nations had become involved in the search for a peace plan. It was important for it to become more active, the President said.

·The problem, the Secretary-General explained, was that the Security Council was reluctant to intervene in a situation which was already being dealt with by a regional organization, in the case of Liberia by ECOWAS. The Security Council had considered the question, but had restricted itself to a support role for the efforts of ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

• .,

3

To the Pres i dent ' s observation that that was not sufficient, t he Secretary-Gener a l pointed out that those decisi ons were taken by the fi f t een members of the Security Council, and not by him.

He def ended the cause of Liberia at every opportunity vis-avis t he members of the Security Council. But there was a real r esistanc e , for various reasons , on the part of the Council to get involved in situations where there was no agreement among the parties , those reasons i ncl uding cost, the difficulty in obtaining troops, and the fact that t he Council was already overburdened.

The Pres ident observed that the Counci l seemed to be ready to l aunch and pay for operations all over the world, such as in Bos nia , Somalia, and Cambodi a , but not Liberia.

He emphasized the need , i f the United Nations was not prepared to intervene more aggressi vely on the ground, for it at l east to he lp on the material l eve l t o allow ECOMOG to operate more efficiently. The countries i nvolved in the operation were poor, and were not well equipped.

The Secretary-Gener a l mi ght be able to convince some countries to provide equipment for t he ECOMOG force .

It would be preferable to receive money, the President counter ed, and to let ECOMOG dec ide what it needed; alternatively, transportation could be provi ded, in order to be able to move the troops . ECOMOG was at a r eal d i sadvantage, as it did not have . the means to r edeploy its forces a s necessary. It would be useful if the United Nations could be of help in that area .

While it might not be possible for the United Nations to send peacekeeping troops, he thought it was not to much to ask for that the Organization provide some f unds. People would then see that the United Nations was i ntervening not only on the d i plomatic level, but on a real financi a l l evel too.

The Secretary-Genera l woul d see what he could do .

The Se cretary-General asked about the number of displaced persons, and enquired if UNHCR was helping.

The President estimated the number of refugees at 600,000; UNHCR was providing some assistance, but it was not sufficient to deal with the scale of the problem.

He reiterated Guinea's preoccupation with finding a solution in Liberia, both because of its participation in the operation on the ground, and because of the presence of a large proportion of the refugees; the populations of the two countries were "brothers and sisters", and had very close connections • . Guinea was making every effort to help attain peace without waging a full-scale war,

4

but those efforts were not succeeding, essentially because of Charles Taylor. The situation in Liberia was destabilizing for the whole region.

The Secretary-General stressed his commitment to finding finding a solution to the Liberian conflict, and to the problems of the African continent as a whole. He was concerned about the marginalization of Africa, and had sent a letter to the participants in the upcoming G-7 meeting in Tokyo, urging them not to forget the continent in its deliberations.

He was pleased to have had the honour of meeting the President again, and would keep him informed of his endeavours to put an end to the war in Liberia. The President could count on him to make every effort.

~tk~ Freda Mackay 24 July 1993

CONFIDENTIAL Orig: cc:

SG CG/LMB JCA/JB/FA :AS"] I Cen ral QJ-,_ ·

Notes on the Secretary-General's meeting with the Foreign Minister of Guinea

Held at the- Hotel Meri.dien, cai.ro, on. Saturday 26 June 1993 at 10:45 a.m.

Present:

The Secretary-General Ms. Aboulnaga Ms. Mackay

H.E. Mr. Ibrahima Sylla, Foreign Minister of Guinea

The Foreign Minister informed the Secretary-General that his President would arrive that afternoon.

The Secretarv-General welcomed the Foreign Minister, and asked him to convey his greetings. He would like to meet with the President, whom he had last met at the OAU summit in Dakar in 1992, but his schedule was very tight, as he had to return to Geneva on Monday afternoon to inaugurate the ECOSOC meeting.

The President was aware that the Secretary-General's time was limited, the Foreign Minister said.

The President had received the Secretary-General's letter indicating that Ambassador Kouyate, his Deputy Special Representative in Somalia, had done a good job, and asking that he accept another year's contract, renewable on expiry.

The Secretary-General thought that a year's experience in the field would be very important for the Ambassador. It was good for the image of Guinea, and it was also important for the diplomats in Guinea's Foreign Ministry to be mobile and to gain experience. Excellent diplomacy was essential for African countries, as that was how they would attract maximum international attention and maximum aid, which Africa would need for the next twenty years. It was possible to obtain that only through the international organizations.

The Foreign Minister had discussed the matter with his President, and would appoint a Charge d'affaires in New York for the meantime, to carry out the Mission's work and prepare for the next General Assembly.

)

2

The Ambassador was at the Secretary-General's di year, at the end of which it would be decided whetht would return to his country's service. His post would kept open; if at the end of that year's service, he d < return, a full-time ambassador could be nominated at

osa l for a or n t he

~anwhj e be .. ded · ,: to 1at f t.

How was the internal situation in Guinea? t ~ ! s~ General asked.

cary-

Things wer--e- going well, the Minister respond were in progress for presidential and legislative it was hoped would take place before the end oft not think that the process would be interrupted or any reason.

Pre .rations ~ct ions, which year. He did postponed for

A problem which preoccupied Guinea greatly was the situation in Liberia.

The Secretary-General agreed that the situation was very serious, but remarked that his hands were tied; so long as ECOWAS was in charge of the operation, the Security Council would not permit the United Nations to intervene.

The Secretary-General noted that he had appointed Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers as his special representative for Liberia.

Mr. Gordon-Somers was doing a good job, the Minister responded. He was currently trying to persuade the parties to meet at neutral location of their choice. If he succeeded in getting them to the table, it would be a very good development.

A summit meeting had been proposed of the ECOWAS countries involved in the Liberian question. Charles Taylor had rejected that proposal, saying that he wanted to contain the problem in the Liberian context, and to negotiate as Liberians with no outside intervention. Guinea had no objection to that approach, as long as the interim government was included in the talks.

The plan favoured by Guinea was clear, the Minister said. What would be necessary was to set up a timetable for a ceasefire, the cantonment of troops, and disarmament of the factions, before proceeding to elections. Events in Somalia had shown how important it was to approach all the elements from the outset. If the gangs in Somalia had been disarmed from the start, things might be very different now.

The Secretary-General agreed that that kind of integrated approach would have made a difference; however, it had not been done and "now we are paying the price".

The Minister said that unfortunately for now the process was blocked. The Yamassoukro IV accords were in place, and should be

f

3

implemented . . He would appreciate it if the Secretary-General could encourage Mr.· Gordon-Somers to continue his eff arts to get the parties together. It would be a big step forward if the factions could be persuaded to talk amongst themselves.

There had been some talk of possible venues for such a meeting, with mention of Conakry, Lagos, and Cotonou. Benin was apparently not acceptable, as it was too close to Nigeria. Then Bamako had been suggested.

Mali was not involved in ECOMOG in a significant way, the Minister said; it had only three or four officers participating, and no troops on a scale comparable to Guinea or Nigeria.

Mali had furthermore indicated its willingness to host the negotiations, so long as Taylor would make a firm commitment to attend.

Bamako might be acceptable as a neutral venue, the SecretaryGeneral remarked. Senegal would not be acceptable to Taylor; on the contrary, particularly since President Diouf had withdrawn his troops from ECOMOG.

If the parties wanted to talk in Geneva, the United Nations was at their disposal, the Secretary-General continued. He himself was prepared to go there to inaugurate the meeting in order to encourage them to negotiate seriously.

The parties had already got together once in Geneva at a meeting organized by President Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, the Foreign Minister recalled. Geneva was quite acceptable; alternatively, Guinea would have no objection to an African venue. The important thing was to obtain assurances that Taylor would attend.

The Secretary-General would try to meet with President Conte during his stay in Cairo. Learning from the Foreign Minister that he would arrive that afternoon at six-thirty, the Secretary-General indicated that he might meet with him immediately after his arrival, before the President's schedule became too full.

~~k~ 12 July 1993

NOTE TO MR. GHAREKHAN

I have been requested by Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers,

Special Representative of the Secretary-General for

Liberia, to forward the attached report on the massacre

at Harbel to you as instructed by Mr. Jonah. I am also

forwarding a copy to Mr. Aime.

J~ ~ T.

25 June

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RePORT ON THE MASSACRE AT THE CARTER CAMP IN HARBEL 6 JUNE 1993

INTRODUCTION The history of the civil war in Liberia is a chronicle of

human rights abuse. Atrocities against civilians have been documented in reports by several human rights organizations, including Africa Watch. Over a three year period, the conflict has generated a culture of violence against civilians, resulting in repeated and wanton destruction of life.

This is the environment in which 562 innocent Liberians (313 females and 249 males), includ1ng 269 minors, ware murdered in and around Carter camp in the early hours of Sunday 6 June, 1993. Deaths were attributed to multiple gun shot wounds, as well as from the use of sharp implements, such as CLltlasses and knives to disembowel v i ctims and blunt instruments to SMash skulls. At last count 32 wounded have been treated, including 11 serious cases still in swedrel i ef hospital in Monrovia.

In preparing this report the Special Representative for Liberia was assisted by representatives of UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP. Well over 200 displaced persons and others with intimate knowledge of the situation , individually and in groups, were interviewed at the site of the massacre. In addition, six of the eleven ser1ously wounded survivors (three adults and three children, including four females) were 1nt~rviewed in Swederelief hospital in Monrovia. One allegedly e$caped abductee was also questioned. Special Emergency Li f• Food (SELF), a local NGO, administers the food distribution programme for the displaced persons in Harbel, and supervises their daily needs, provided valuable background information.

Written documentation was sought and obtained from the following parties:

Dates: RequNted Received

Interi• GolemrMnt of Natiaial Unity ( I<nl) 9/6 10/6

E<X.'#AS Honi todng Group (ECXMlG) 9/6 12/6

Nat ional Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 10/6 14 and 17/6

United Liberation Moweinent of Liberia for Democracy {ULII«>) 12/6 14/6

Armed Forces of Li beria (AFL) 14/6 18/6

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,-povi.,. Hts IL• .Jl-ffll

- 2 -

Various reports resulting from mi 1 it ary and j ud; c 1 a 1 investigations, as well as those by the Government Pathologist, were also made avai1able to the Special Representative.

On Tuesday, 15 June, NPFL radio reported that over JOO Carter Camp survivor:;; h&d arrivod in Gbarng11. Thi~ report was carried by Reuters on Wednesday,16 June, and in the Monrov;a prc~s on Thursday, 17 June. That same day a senior official of NPFL gave similar information to UN headquarters. On Monday, 21 June, the Special Representative telephoned and faxed the NPFL representative in the USA seeking writ terr verification of this information and the circumstances surrounding their arrival fo Gbarnga. A rep1y was received on 23 June but contained no new information. NPFL continues to call for an international investigation.

~ITE OF MASSACRE; CARTER CAMP, HARBEL

Harbel is tha administrative headquarters of the Firestone Rubber Plantation, situated 45 miles from Monrovia, in Margibi county. The Firestone P1antation covers an area of approximately 1,502 square miles of rubber trees and forest. Located in the south-west of the country, Harbel is approximately f;ve miles from Roberts Field international airport and about fifty miles from Buchanan, the second largest port of Liberia.

Displaced persons from the area of the Buchanan high~ay have been relocated by ECOMOG and the Interim Government to centres in Harbel (31 1 500) Unification Town, also known as smell no Taste, {30,500) and in Buchanan (85,000). Carter Camp, with a population of 1,832, mainly of the Bassa tribe, comprises 162 housing structures, on the northern edge of Harbel, approximately two-thirds of a mile from the centre of the town. When the Fi rest one Pl ant at ion was ope rat i ona 1 , these houses provided she 1t er for the workers. In tightly packed rows witti intermittent cross walks, each house has a single opening at the front to permit both entrance and exit. This was the location where the massacre took place.

CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE MASSACRE

According to the inhabitants of Carter Camp they were awakened in the early hours of Sunday morning by intense gunfire and the screams of the1r neighbours. This was accompanied by orders from their assailants to ·come out· of their houses. While one or two survivors claimed to have heard the invaders singing in a Liberian language, the preponderance of testimony indicated that English was the medium of command, It appears that food and security, and the;r interrelatedness, are major factors in the ongoing conflict, as seemed to be the case in Carter Camp.

'"

- 3 -FOOD

In a civil conflict of this type massive population dhloc.:at ions occur with every m"il itary ebb and fl ow. Farming is largely abandoned. People are relocated to safe havens, relying on international humanitarian assistance, which is never sufficient and subject to delivery and security problems in some parts of the country. Generally, soldiers and members of armed groups are excluded from food distributed by the relief community, although if they are integrated within ~h• household structure of the displaced persons they are likely to benefit. The scarcity of food is a major rac.:tor with all warring factions. In Harbel, AFL used to receive rice as a "hun,ani tarian gesture .. , increased from 17 to 113 bags over a three week period in May 1993 but this was stopped by WFP and SELF when it was discovered that the rice was being sold to traders from Monrovia.

carter Camp residents recount numerous problems with AFL soldiers during food distribution. On Saturday 5 June, 58 bags of rice and 10 bags of beans ware delivered to the Camp from the SELF warehouse. After d1stributing only 22 begs of rice and 7 bags of beans, soldiers identifi ed as AFL prematurely stopped the process and i nstructed people to go into their houses. This was considered unusual s i nee food di st r i but ion was i ncomp 1 et e and the sudden imposition of the curfew at 1700 hour~ was two hours earlier than normal. A few survi vors also claim to have noticed a number of un f ami l i a r soldiers around the Camp that d a.y but apparent 1 y thought nothing of it, as many more AFL soldiers are always present during food dfatribution. After the massacre no rice nor beans were found in the camp distribution centre. Some displaced persons from other locations (Biocks O,E and F} claim to have seen one or two soldiers in uniform car r yin9 rice in a southerly direction on the Sunday morning. The h;gh command of the AFL indicated that it receives 500 bags of rice and other assortment of foodstuff from the Interim Goverrvnent every two weeks. and therefore questions the credibility of the opinions given by tha di~olaced population.

SECURITY

According to ECOMOG, the security of Carter Camp was the respon~ibi1ity Qf AFL. This is denied both by the AFL authorit ies in Harbel and the h1gh comm~nd in Monrovia. Further, the number of forces available to the AFL in Harbel is also a matter of dispute. Tha high command asserts that 72 men were assigned while the AFL on the ground maintains that the correct number is 22. This contradl~tion reflect~ tho state of affeirs in ~Artar Camp that fateful night. It appears that two or three AFL soldier$ did periodically reside within the Camp, having connections with some of the displacod persons. It also ~eAm~ that soma rice traders from Monrovia were in the Camp that night alt~ougn no one w~~ ~ul~ tu c61"1Ti l"rft tne rrnmt.uu . Af'L maint4in3 they tr1otl to r&~el th• p,ttnrlrnl"~

but wer~ forc~d tn withdraw due to heavy firepower And a shortage of ammunition.

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- 4 -

Residents of Cartar Camp, and elsewhere in Harbel, expressed grave concern with respect to security being provided by the AFL. Incidents of alleged rape and intimidation were reported to the Special Representative but no evidence was furnished by the AFL high command to indicate the results of follow up investigations. According to many residents, the ideal and most des1rab1e arrangement would be for ECOMOG to spread its security net over HarbeJ, 8s it presently does for Unification Town (Smell no Taat •).

Harbel, Roberts Field tntarnational airport and the port of Buchanan were in NPFL hands from 1990. Since the capture by ECOMOG three months ago, the population in villagesa along the Buchanan highway have been relocated to Harbel and Unification Town, for reasons of security. This meant that the d'i sp 1 aced persons were no longer able to harvest provisions from their villages. Many of them complained or harassment by AFL whenever they attempted to enter th• forests in search of food or firewood. These forays into the bush were usually seen by security as opportunities for collaboration with the NPFL which i~ reportedly operating throughout the Firestone Plantation. The two roads leadinQ ftom Harbal to Gate 15 and the Kakata highway encompass a large unguarded area of dense roreat.

After daybreak on Sunday 6 June, a trail of bodies, rice and beans was followed from Carter CAmp along the asphalt road towards Gata 1~, a main junction w,th the highway. It turned in a north-westar1y direction after croaa1ng the Du River Bridge. going along a dirt road towards OlVision 5 of the plantation, approximately ten miles away, where another fourteen bodies were found by ECOMOG. From an examinatinn by the Government Pathologist, he concludes that this group was killed on the preceeding Saturday,5 June, by tha same peool~ •ho carried out the Carter camp massacre. According to him, the ~rade marks were distinctly similar.

PATTERN OF ATROCITIES The Liberian civil w11r 1s a sad tale of human

deveatat1on. Estimates of tatalit1e, 4ra placed at 150,000, mostly civilians, although some argue that it , . likely to be higher. In July 1990, during the regime of ttH1 late President Doe, AFL was held responsible t'or the murder o t some 600 men, women • and children, in St .Peter's Lutheran f.hurch In Sinker, a suburb of

. ... ....

• •

90

-5-

Monrovi~. That single event seemed to be the h;gh point of the . human~tragedy. As the war enters a new phase reports of civilian atrocities are again on the increase. A commonly held view in Liberia i~ tha~ no warring faction is above reproach.

· ECOMOGf s progress in peace enforcement has 1 ed to an announced change in NPFL strategy. Its leader, Mr. Char1es Taylor has proclaimed to all and sundry that he has adopted guerilla tactics and would continue the struggle against ECOMOG, which he considers a warring faction. He maintains that his forces are behind ECOMOG' s 1 i nes and that the Harbe 1 and Buchanan areas shou 1 d .not be considered secure. It is against this background that the litany of recent civilian atrocities must be assessed.

Reports abound of mass graves, villages looted and torched by marauding bands, ci~ilians abducted and force-marched as carriers of food and other material, and murdered when no longer considered useful. Stories ore also told of child soldiers conscripted into service, drugged, and used for reconnaissance missions and other operational assignments. Although numbers of civilian casualties and a.bductees are not always precise, a few eyewitness accounts are indicative of the terror that currently stalks Liberia. Government pathology reports point to recent cases of bodies found in the bush and in shallow graves in the Harbel area, Mount Barclay , Fendell, Bernard Farm, Barnersville Estate, Yamah Town, Owansgrove and Fassama Town. A11 of these cases bear the trade mark of a reign of terror.

CONCLUSIONS

This investigation was carried out with recognizable time and resource constraints and some difficulty was experienced in gathering conclusive evidence. Although due care was exercised in the search for corroborative information, by varying interview techniques with individuals and in groups, the recounting of detail by some survivors could not always be substantiated. The effects ot trauma should not be underestimated. Concern has been expressed in some quarters regarding intimidation and possible reprisals. Some written submissions have contributed significantly to understanding the cirumstances and the environment within which this tragedy took place. However, a wider and more thorough international investigation ought to be considered.

Estimates of the number of survivors of the Carter camp mas sacra and their 1 ocat ion are for the time being somewhat imprecise. Many surv;vors have been relocated to Unification Town and other sites in Harbel but numbers are not reliable. Eleven survivors remain in Swedrelief Hospital in Monrovia , while others are believed to have taken refuge with relatives and friends in the capital. NPFL also claims to have survivors in Gbarnga but despita written requests for details, no information has been furnished

rHH'Ol8tl " 1JnNd

. · : .·

-6-

regarding numbers and circumstances of their arrival in that town. Therefore, until more reliable information becomes available, when the census of displaced parsons is updated, an exact count of survivors may be difficult. To date, 5C2 Liberians have been ~uried as a result 01 the Carter Camp massacre and more bodies may be found as t~e search continues.

According to survivors, the assailants wore an 11ssortment of clothing; some were in battle fatigues, others in military trousers and T-shirts and the remainder i n civilian clothing, However, no one to whom the Special Representative spoke was able to claim recognition on the basis of specific military insign i a.

Considering th& proximity of the Carter Camp to dense and unguarded forest, and NPFL announced gueri 1 la warfare strategy, particularly in areas previously under their control,security seemed totally inadequate in that location. Many of the survivors were of the opinion that their assailants were familiar with the surroundings of tho Camp, suggesting infiltration. Notwithstanding AFL's claim of an attempted rescue operation, in the absence of corroboration, their performance on that occasion seemed grievous 1 y negligent. It is quite understandable that the displaced persons continue to express concern at having the AFL responsible for their security. Their clear preference is for ECOMOG's protection.

This recent tragedy demonstrates in the clearest possible terms the need to find an urgent political solution to the Liberian conflict. Lives · continue to be Jost in a senseless pursuit of power. The major impediment to 1'inding psace in Liberia is the abundance of arms in the country and the distrust which remains evident among the parties. Implementation of the ECOWAS Peace Plan and the Yamoussoukro IV Accord is essential for resolving the conflict. No solution can be durable without parties making common cause in favour of a unified nation through the holdin~ of free and fa;r elections. The international community must reflect in resolutfons and with resources a commitment to unearth the facts surround1 ng the recent l 1tany of human rights abuses. A democratically elected Government should, as a rAatter of prioirity, address th• violations of human rights which have characterised the conflict and face up to accountability, in the interest of reconciliation.

••

TO :

---~- (/-

UNITED NATiONS {~\ NATIONS UNIES ,~, ~

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

25 June 1993 A :

Mr. · Jacques Baudot, Controller, Office of cATE, --------Pro~ r a mm e Planning, Budget and Finance

REFERENCE: ___ 2_._W_C_F_._4_ THROUGH : S/C CE:

Ms . Melissa Wells, Under-Secretary-General Department of Administration and Management

FROM: DE:

The Secretary-General ~

SUBJECT: OBJET: Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses: JUL - 61993

Mission to Liberia

EOSG/CENTRAL 1. It is estimated that an additional $25,400 to the previously authorized $180,200 would be required to meet the costs of convening a meeting of Liberian parties in Bamako, Mali, and for travel to Monrovia by Headquarters staff pursuant to Security Council resolution 788 (1992).

2. As no appropriation has been made for this purpose, I hereby authorize you to enter into the necessary commitments up to a maximum ·of an additional $25,400 under the authority granted to me in paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly resolution 46/187 relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, under which I am authorized to enter into commitments not exceeding $3 million in any one year of the biennium 1992-1993.

3. I certify that these· expenses relate to the maintenance of international peade and security.

' '

~ :

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

,;....

I wish to make some comments on the letter of 4 June addressed to you by your Special Representative for Liberia, Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers.

The letter gives a comprehensive picture of the activities of the Special Representative and of developments regarding the conflict in Liberia following the adoption of Security Council resolution 813 (1993). In accordance with guidance given to Mr. Gordon-Somers, efforts were made to encourage ECOWAS to hold a meeting on Liberia. But as the letter indicates, the consensus among the parties is that the Secretary-General of the United Nations should play a major personal role in efforts to bring the conflict to an end . This is of some importance owing to the lack of trust of ECOWAS and ECOMOG on the part of Charles Taylor of the NPFL.

I had previously explained this factor to Ms. Aboulnaga and was pleased to be informed of your decision to proceed to convene a meeting on Liberia on 1 July in Geneva, subject to the receipt of a formal request from the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Soglo.

A potential difficulty is the manner in which your decision is reflected in the letter of Mr. Gordon-Somers. There is apparently an understanding, not previously known to me, that a Summit meeting on Liberia will depend on the successful outcome of another meeting which the Special Representative plans to convene on 21 June. There is still no agreement on the venue of this meeting although Mr. Gordon-Somers, taking into account (of/ the concerns of some of the parties, would prefer Bamako. Th~ Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mr. Abass Bundu, had raised the question of security in Bamako in view of the proximity of Mali to Burkina Faso, one of the strongest supporters of Mr. Charles Taylor. A second difficulty is that of costs. From discussions held by the Special Representative with the Malian authorities, it is clear that the Government is not prepared to bear the costs. Mr. Gordon-Somers has inquired of me if the United Nations could cover the costs. While there is no budgetary provision for this, I promised to ascertain from the Administration if any funds could be made available. The possibility of convening such a meeting in Geneva was also explored. But here again the issue of travel costs of participants would arise.

However a much more important consideration is the uncertainty that surrounds the outcome of the meeting to be convened on 21 June. It can by no means be assumed that this meeting will be able to reach an agreement on key issues. This

I

CYX 234 - ',/6

- 2 -

being the , case, it may be prudent for you to reco matter of convening a Summit meeting on Liberia oi,Mim:fi;:v,:~~ ....... J Simply· put, if the meeting on 21 June does not make-su~l..!!IJ:JU':j progress, there will be no justification for convening meeting at a higher level. And even if the meeting on 21 June is successful, there would not be sufficient time to issue invitations and make all the preparations necessary for a Summit meeting on 1 July. I would then recommend that you put aside the question of a meeting on 1 July and revisit the matter after we are certain about the outcome of the preparatory meeting.

An additional r ea son for some delay is the information contained in the letter of the Special Representative regarding the intention of President ·soglo to hold consultations on Liberia at the forthcoming OAU Summit in Cairo.

If you are in agreement with the approach I am suggesting, I will then inform Mr. Gordon-Somers that it has been decided to defer for the moment the question of your convening a meeting on Liberia. You should also be aware that from my contacts with ECOWAS officials, it is clear that there is some lingering concern that the ECOWAS peace initiative will be overshadowed by efforts of the United Nations. I have related to ECOWAS officials your preference to allow subregional organizations to play a leading role in dealing with regional conflicts. It is precisely for this reason that you would prefer ECOWAS to take the initiative in organizing a meeting on Liberia. My explanation was accepted but the ECOWAS officials still wanted to know if any invitation to a meeting you would convene would be issued jointly with President Soglo. I have not yet responded to this specific question.

It would also appear that the prospect of convening a Summit meeting on Liberia may be affected, in one way or another, by the recent massacre in Liberia near Harbel. There are those who believe that the incident should give impetus to efforts to arrange a peaceful resolution of·the conflict. Others, convinced of the culpability of Charles Taylor, observe that the massacre demonstrates that Mr. Taylor cannot be trusted and that there is no r e ason to hold discussions with him. This view was recently conveyed quite forcefully to Mr. Gordon-Somers in Freetown by Chairman Strasser of Sierra Leone.

In the meantime, in my conversation with Mr. Gordon-Somers this morning, I learned of his efforts to comply with your request to investigate the incident at Harbel. He indicated to me that he could not complete an investigation before 15 June. He wants to be certain that the report on the ' incident he will prepare will be thorough and credible. ' -:;-0 C. ·-:7 ·.

James o.c. Jonah 10 June 1993

~ UNITED

~ s NATIONS

• Security Council Distr. GENERAL

S/25918 9 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3233rd meeting, on 9 June 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Liberia":

"The Security Council is shocked and saddened by the senseless killing of innocent civilians which occurred near Harbel, Liberia, on the morning of 6 June 1993. It strongly condemns this massacre of innocent displaced persons, including women and children, which comes at a time when the Secretary-General's Special Representative is working diligently, in furtherance of the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on the basis of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, to arrange a meeting of the warring factions in order to bring the three-year civil war to a peaceful end.

"The Security Council urges all parties to the conflict to respect the rights of the civilian population and take all necessary measures to secure their safety.

"The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to commence immediately a thorough and full investigation of the massacre, including any allegations as to the perpetrators whoever they may be, and report to it as soon as possible. It warns that those found responsible for such serious violations of international humanitarian law will be held accountable for such crimes and demands that the leaders of any faction responsible for such acts effectively control their forces and take decisive steps to ensure that such deplorable tragedies do not happen again.

"The Council remains firmly supportive of the efforts of ECOWAS and the Secretary-General to bring peace to Liberia. It urges all Liberian _ factions and regional leaders to give their full cooperation to current efforts by Special Representative Trevor Gordon-Somers to assist in the implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord calling, inter alia, for a cease-fire, encampment, disarmament and democratic elections."

93-33945 (E) 090693

JUN I 0 NOTE FOR THE FILE

EOSG/CENTRAL Mr. Gharekhan's meeting with the Permanent Representative of

Liberia to the United Nations (Noon, 9 June 1993)

Present:

Mr. Gharekhan Mr. Weisbrod-Weber

H.E. Mr. William Bull, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations

Mr. Christian M. Wisseh, Minister Counsellor

The Permanent Representative delivered a letter from his Government to the Secretary-General, dealing with the 6 June 1993 attack in the Harbel area. He welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to conduct an investigation by his Special Representative into the circumstances of the attack.

The Permanent Representative briefed Mr. Gharekhan on the status of a draft statement prepared for the Security Council by ECOWAS. ECOWAS had agreed on a text that included a reference that attributed responsibility for the attack to Mr. Taylor's National Patriotic Front. After consultations, all of the Security Council members except France were ready to accept the text. France insisted that there be no reference to the responsibility for the attack until the Secretary-General had reported on the findings of his Special Representative.

Responding to a question by Mr. Gharekhan, the Permanent Representative clarified that the Republic of Liberia was ready to accept France's position, but that it would be necessary to consult with the other ECOWAS members since the text had been a common ECOWAS draft.

Mr. Gharekhan inquired about the military situation in Liberia. The Permanent Representative stated that Mr. Taylor's forces have been on the retreat since October 1992. ECOWAS was advancing very cautiously because of its desire to limit any negative effect on the civilian population. However, a military solution for the conflict in Liberia, even if it could be achieved, was not desirable. Rather, Mr. Taylor should keep the agreements he has already made and start to negotiate.

Asked about Taylor's military strength, the Permanent Representative replied that there were a lot of desertions in Mr. Taylor's forces because the people were tired of fighting. Taylor still had, however, a core of fighters strengthened by new

- 2 -

• arrivals ~hp . had been training in other countries. There were also repo~ts' ' that Taylor had recruited mercenaries. Moreover, it was no sdcret that some countries in the region supported him.

In response to Mr. Gharekhan's request to be more specific , the Permanent Representative recalled that his Government had, in the past, accused both Burkina-Faso and Cote d'Ivoire of behaviour that was not conducive to a solution. He added that both countries had denied direct involvement and that their Presidents had given assurance of this. Liberia had also seen that efforts were undertaken by both countries to help in finding a solution. In this context, he referred to the meeting between the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Mr. Taylor in Ouagadougou. Nevertheless, it still seemed as if Mr. Taylor would receive supplies and safe haven in these neighbouring countries. The Permanent Representative also pointed out that France's insistence on not naming Mr. Taylor's NPF as the culprit for the attack in the Harbel area would encourage Mr. Taylor.

Mr. Gharekhan assured the Permanent Representative that his views would be conveyed to the Secretary-General and that he would have the letter circulated as a document at the Security Council.

cc: Central

w.~s~c,J-~ Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber

9 June 1993

[JJillJllft®dl Press Release

Department of Public Information • News Coverage Service • New York

SG/SM/5006 8 June 1993

SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPRESSES OUTRAGE AT MASSACRE OF CIVILIANS IN LIBERIA

AND INSTRUCTS HIS SPECIAL RBPRBS.lffi'TATIVB TO INVESTIGATE INCID.lffi'T

The following statement was issued today by a spokesman for Secretary-General Boutros Boutros -Ghali :

The Secretary-General is shocked and outraged on learning of the senseless massacre perpetrated on defenceless displaced persons over the weekend at Camp Carter near Harbel, Liberia. According to preliminary reports from representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), who were able to visit the site on 6 June, it appears that the majority of those killed in the incident were women and children .

The Secretary-General had instructed his Special Representative, Trevor Gordon-Somers, to depart from Bamako, Mali, and proceed immediately to Monrovia to conduct a thorough investigation into this incident. As the Special Representative will arrive in Liberia on 9 June, the preliminary action is being undertaken by other United Nations officials on the spot.

The Secretary-General wishes to appeal to all concerned in the conflict in Liberia to have due respect for the principles regarding protection of innocent civilians caught in thi s senseless tragedy .

* *** *

3957P

For infonnation media-not an official record

,l ~~d UNITED NATI6NS EMERGENCY RELIEF OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COORDINATOR

~

LeUcr No: Reference:

OF THEXECUTIVE Off IE SECRETARY.

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

UNSCOL

4 June 1993

Office Address Daher Apartments Mamba Point Monrovia, Liberia

Mailing Addresa UNSCOL, LIBERIA Grand Central Station Box 1608, New York, N.Y. 10163

Tel: (231)) 225579 ,223402, 224603 Fax: (231) 225771 Telex: (41) 2962 Satel. -Tel. & Fax:(874) 1505746

I am writing to apprise you of pro ress made in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 813, adopted on 26 March :

You will undoubtedly recall that the Security Council Resolution, in paragraph 17, requested you, in consultation with ECOWAS, to consider the possibility of convening a meeting of the Interim Government and the warring factions, "after thorough and detailed groundwork" had been completed. The factions are expected to reaffirm their commitment to implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord.

After consultation with ECOWAS, I sought and obtained letters from the NPFL(23 April)•, the Interim Government(5 Ma l~d ULIMO(l0 May, - re questing that you convene such a meeting. Those letters, addressed o you, - h ave been- dispatched to UN headquarters and I trust that you have seen them. The fact that you have been asked to convene a meeting does not preclude your preference to have the Liberia conflict consldered- within the framework of an ECOWAS summit. However, I firmly believe that-your personal involvement at this crucial juncture will reinforce the regional peace keeping effort. You may therefore wish to consider convening the meetin on Liberia in concert with the ECOWAS Chairman ; President Soglo. -

Dr. Boutros-Boutros Ghali Secretary General United Nations New York, New York

2

On the basis of the letters from the parties, Dr. Abass Bundu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS and I jointly prepared and distributed a provisional agenda, a copy of which is attached for your perusal. You will notice that the agenda faithfully reflects the ECOWAS peace plan and the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. Each party was given one week to approve the agenda and name delegates to attend the talks. I have now received their agreement to proceed.

We are approaching the talks in two stages. First, assisted by Dr. Bundu and President Canaan - Banana, the OAU Special Representative, I am planning to convene and chair a meeting in Bamako, scheduled for 21 June, lasting -no longer than seven days, tos eek- common ground on the agenda. The first item of the agenda woul a ress military matters - ie.cease fire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization. The sequence of discussion for the remainder of the agenda, dealing with the political aspects, will be decided upon by the Liberians when we meet in Bamako. If these talks are successful we would then move to the second stage -of forma cease~-fire talks within the Summit framework with your involvement. But, if we d o not makes ignTilcant progress the next step would be to seek mediation by the Foreign Ministers of the ECOWAS Committee of Nine (Benin, Burkina Faso, - Cote - d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, the Gambia and Senegal) after which we could go to the Summit. The next Summit of ECOWAS --Is- being planned for around 22 July. President Soglo raised as an option the possibility of a meeting of the ECOWAS heads during the OAU summit in Cairo, as- all of them will be present. While the various partfes find this prospect quite attractive as a cost saver, timing may be overly opt i mistic. President Soglo will be writing to you on e subject.- -

Let me now turn to the militar situation, as I understand it, from briefings by the Field Commander-;- Mafor-General Olurin. ECOMOG has succeeded in pushing the NPFL away from Monrovia, captured the international airport at Roberts Field, the headquarters of Firestone Plantation at Harbel and Buchanan, the port from which NPFL used to export iron ore, rubber and timber. Harper, another port in the south-east of the country, has been rendered inoperable by ECOMOG. Most of ECOMOG's peace enforcement is taking place north of Kakata on the road from Monrovia to Gbarnga, the headquarters of the NPFL. These military gains have severely stretched ECOMOG's supply and communications lines. The result is that NPFL ambushes occur with increasing frequency. While the Field Commander is confident that ECOMOG will prevail, one cannot overlook the onset of the rainy season, the time it has taken ECOMOG to reach the present position in the field and the possible effects of elections in Nigeria this month and a change to civilian Government in August.

3

The military osition of ULIMO is also a factor. Having captured the western counties of Cape Mount and Bomi from NPFL, ULIMO has virtually cut off contact between the Sierra Leone rebels and NPFL. similarly, ULIMO is active in Lofa County in the north and is threatening Gbarnga. From that vantage point it has also denied the Sierra Leone rebels another access to NPFL. But pockets of NPFL resistance remain in the area creating havoc in the surrounding villages .

All of this is to point out that while Mr.Taylor is not now in as strong a position as previously assessed, his hit and run tactics, with the threat of infiltration in Monrovia, mean that he is still a force. The territory over which the NPFL can now claim effective control is significantly reduced and more concerns are being expressed regarding fragmentation among their forces.

An important feature of the cease fire negotiations is recognition of the need to reinforce ECOMOG. The Field Commander indicates that he needs an additional four battalions to carry out the disarmament andd emob1l1zation of all warringf actions. As Mr. Taylor refuses to disarm to Nigerian troops, ECOWAS has agreed that with four additional battalions the Field Commander could deploy those troops which have not been involved in the conflict to disarm the NPFL. Of the four battalions, two would be from ECOWAS member states and the remaining two are being sought through the OAU from Tanzania and Zimbabwe . Dr. Bundu has contacted the OAU Secretary General on this matter . The major constraint is finance. ECOWAS is planning visits a number of countries {France, Germany, Japan, Russia, USA, UK and the EEC} in search of resources.

As is my practice, I have briefed and obtained the endorsement of the ECOWAS Chairman, Presr ent Soglo ; as well as Presidents Babangida, Campaore, Conte, Rawlings and Chairman Strasser (his support was somewhat qualified due to his mistrust of Mr. Taylor) on my approach to cease fire talks. In the absence of President Houphouet Boigny, the ForeT gn Minister of Coted' Ivoire has been kept fu lly informed . I l eave for -art- tomorrow-tcror1ef President Konare and to seek his agreemen to fiost the rirst stage of talks.

The role for the UN now becomes crucial. If a cease fire agreement- were reached i n the shor run, ECOMOG would not have the capacity on the ground to carry out the encampment, disarmament and demobilization process. The need for early arrival of UN cease fire observers becomes even more urgent to ea le to monitor the cease fire and encampment. In order to exp-edite decisions on the UN

4

observers I would like to suggest that preliminary soundings_ be taken with a few countries which have provided observers on other occasions ~ or example, feelers ought to be put out to Brazil,the En lisli=s eakin Caribbean (possibly as a group - through CARICOM),India,Ireland, Malaysia and the OAU, on behalf of some African countries.- ECOWAS- as a ready sent signals to those countries to alert them to a possible approach from the UN. ---

Another important facet in this conflict is the provision of humanitarian assistance. Security Council Resolution 813 calls on the various parties to ensure the unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance to all sections of Liberia and to safeguard all personnel involved in the delivery of such assistance. The delivery of humanitarian assistance remains complex. Mr.Taylor accuses the UN of playing politics with food and medicine because we try to comp y w1th the dictates of ECOMOG t oavoid cross border operations from Cote d'Ivoire. Although ECOWAS/ECOMOG have instructed the relief community to utilize the road from the port of Buchanan to Gbarnga as a corridor of tranquility, NPFL is resisting this on grounds of insecurity. I suspect a more sinister motive having to do with opportunities to circumven~ sanc~ions hrough t he border with Cote d'Ivo ire:--Although I am satisfied that - the Ivorian Gover nment is acting in good faith, the nor ~ is long and the envir-onment is fertile- for corruption. In fact, ECOWAS accuses some relief agencies of prolonging the conflict by surreptitiously assisting the NPFL. A shadow of doubt has been cast on MSF(Belgium), although I have not been shown any concrete evidence. T e Ivorian Government is now ready to accept your offer of technical assistance in sanctions monitoring and I am awal ing details from headquarters.

I have sought to report on the progress made to date in the search for a lasting peace in Liberia. We are still optimistic that with your personal involvement the UN will be a positive instrument in the resolution of the conflict. In thi s way you will have demonstrated the effectiveness of systematic cooperation between the UN and a regional organization, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Yours sincerely,

Speci

"

LIBERIA PEACE TALKS - AGENDA

A. DISARMAMENT

1. CEASE FIRE

a) Declaration*

b) Agreement*

c) UN Cease Fire Observers

2 • ENCAMPMENT

a) Role of ECOMOG

b) Commencement (Duration)

c) Identification of locations

3. DEMOBILIZATION*

a) Reabsorption of ex-combatants including child soldiers into civilian life

b) Sensitization of communities

4. AMNESTY

B. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

C. ELECTORAL PROCESS

1. DATE OF ELECTIONS

2. ELECTORAL COMMISSION

3. SUPREME COURT

4. OBSERVERS

5. FINANCING

D. REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS*

E. SECURITY FROM CEASE FIRE TO ELECTIONS

F. RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION

G. RECONCILIATION

* Documentation to be provided

TO:

UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES


Mr. Jan Eliassen DAT~ June 2, 1993 k Under-Secretary-General for

THROUGH: S/Cre

FROM: re

SUBJECT:

Humanitarian Affairs

C.R. Gharekhan Special Political Adviser to the

Secretary-General

Liberia

This is with reference to your memo of yesterday on the above subject.

I have discussed the matter at length with Mr. Jonah today. Apparently, the situation is quite complex. I suggest that three of us discuss it together.

cc: Mr. J onah u w m In) vUN - 219ro ~

C SG!CENTRA

TO: A:

THROUGH : S/C DE :

FROM: DE:

SUBJECT: OBJET:

U NITED NATIONS


• ~ ~ , ~ \: ,;I NATIONS UNIES ~


Mr. Chinmaya R. Gharekhan Special Political Adviser to the

Secretary-General DATE :

1 June 1993 - --------

LIR1528C.YHM REFERENC E:

, '

iasson Secretary-General

Department of Humanitarian Affairs

Liberia

1. Recently announced decisions by ECOWAS/ECOMOG will have the

effect of precluding the distribution of humanitarian assistance

to the areas of Liberia under the control of Charles Taylor, NPFL

(probably more than 50 percent of the country). In addition to

our concern about the welfare of the affected population, these

decisions are expected to produce a very negative reaction in the

NGO community (most of the major international NGOs are involved

in Liberia). This in turn, could also be reflected in the

attitudes of some major Member States. The UN may be requested

to outline its policy toward this situation.

2. The ECOWAS/ECOMOG decision is that all humanitarian relief

shipments should go through a "corridor of tranquillity",

beginning at the port of Buchanan. There is some question of the

capacity of the port but, more important, ECOMOG can provide

security only for a short distance (approximately 5 miles) from

the port. The NPFL, for its part, has refused to guarantee

security beyond that point and, in fact, active fighting is going

on in the area. The UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Operations,

Mr. Mountain (who is now leaving Liberia for another assignment),

does not believe security conditions permit the use of the

proposed corridor, an assessment shared by the NGO community.

3. The alternative routing for relief supplies is cross-border

from Cote d'Ivoire. ECOMOG opposes this and argues that the NPFL

, J

./

,,

-2-

takes advantage of relief convoys to re-supply its forces. Even

before the announced ban on cross-border movements, UN and NGO

relief subject to aerial attacks by ECOMOG.

4. The Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) has accepted

the basic principles governing UN

inc u .ing access to all in need.

being biased toward the NPFL even

humanitarian relief operations,

It is now accusing the UN of

though the United Na~ions

relief programme practically · feeds the entire population under

their control.

5. It is a complicated situation and there is some merit to the

arguments of the various parties involved. But the net effect is

to preclude needed emergency relief throughout the country. As

indicated earlier, major international NGOs are involved -- Save

the Children, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, CONCERN, OXFAM,

etc. Rightly or wrongly, they perceive ECOWAS/ECOMOG as the

villain.

6. While efforts are continuing in Liberia to work out some

acceptable modus operandi, there is a real danger that the

situation wi l l explode in the public arena. For the UN, the core

question will be the support of ECOWAS/ COMOG peace initiative

versus the commitment to humanitarian assistance to all in need.

I would strongly hope that the two are compatible.

c.c.: Mr. Jonah

(

CONFIDENTIAL

1 (JJ',~ ~ vv~ ~~ce·'/1-)

L ~ (J ·tl~) Orig: SG

cc: JCA CG AS Central

Notes of the Meeting of the secretary-General's Task Force on United Nations Operations

Held at the United Nations Headquarters on Tuesday, 1 June 1993, at 4:oo p.m.

Present:

Mr. Annan Mr. Eliassen Mr . Fleischhauer Mr. Goulding Ms. Wells Mr. de Soto Mr. Vianello-Chiodo Mr . Omayad Mr. Taylor

o · fff _@mnw 1

· JM-nim f EOSGICENTRAL

Cambodia: elections and contingency planning

Mr. Annan noted that the elections had gone well but, with FUNCINPEC more than 5 percentage points ahead of the CPP {SOC), the latter had made a statement indicating it would not respect the results unless alleged "violations" were corrected. They had asked Mr. Akashi, inter alia, to refrain from announcing the results. Mr. Akashi had rightly responded that he would continue to make interim f igures available to promote transparency.

Although thi s time it would be the Government which was threatening the process, "another Angola" had to be avoided; the UN might have to consider allowing UNTAC soldiers to adopt a "more assertive" stance, as the international community had invested a lot of money and effort. "Serious contingency planning•i was needed.

Mr. Goulding believed that, if UNTAC were to be directed to be more asserti ve, this should be done soon indeed and in consultation with contributing Member States. Mr. Annan noted that, in an earlier instance, the UN had not sought out the contributors before General Sanderson had declared a more assertive posture. However, if a "longer perspective" was desired, then they would perhaps have to go to the contributing States first . Mr. Goulding noted that UNTAC had stood on the

- 8

the French ,Ambassador to Morocco, Henri de Coignac, might ask to see ·the secretary-General in Rabat; Mr. de Soto had informed the Secretary-General of the situation.

Mr. Annan noted that the Secretary-General had been furi~us when the press had taken up the story that no Islamic countries were participating in UNPROFOR, in particular, since both Egypt and Jordan were contributors. Mr. Eliassen said the Turkish representative had indicated to him his country's belief that Greece was behind it; he had wanted Mr. Eliassen to "throw out" the Greeks. Mr. Goulding noted it would be difficult to say no, since Turkey had participated once before. Mr. de Soto should relay to the Secretary-General the Task Force's recommendation that he stand by Mr. Annan•s·decision to allow Turkish participation.

Liberia

Referring to a briefing note on Liberia she had provided the participants, Ms. Wells believed the security of United Nations personnel in areas controlled by the NPFL forces of Charles Taylor was in question. Until late February, the United Nations had been delivering relief supplies through Cote d'Ivoire to NPFL areas. On 27 February, ECOMOG jets had strafed a UN relief convoy as it crossed into Liberia. As a result, operations by the relief community had become more difficult.

ECOWAS had announced the establishment of "corridors of tranquillity" through which relief agencies would deliver humanitarian assistance under the security of ECOMOG forces. Once relief staff reached NPFL areas, however, Charles Taylors forces would take over the escort. The route imposed by ECOMOG put the relief workers at risk of harassment and worse. Ms. Wells asked if the UN could continue to live with the situation.

Tensions between the relief community and ECOMOG had been further strained by ECOMOG statements accusing relief agencies of providing the NPFL with weapons. Other charges had also been levelled. The interim government of Liberia had expelled the UN's Chief Logistics Officer for "acts incoJllpatible with his status which tends to impede the peace process". Relief agencies had also been accused of bias towards the NPFL; and harassment by ECOMOG of UN staff had increased.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Liberia, Mr. Gordon Trevor-Somers, was apparently unwilling to speak out against this harassment. She believed, however, it was time to take the matter up with ECOWAS/ECOMOG. Mr. Eliassen supported Ms. Wells. This was a growing problem. The UN had been accused of helping Charles Taylor. The cross-border operations had been "miraculously saved so far"; but ECOMOG/ECOWAS had apparently

..

- 9 -

been sending -warnings and the Organization had to stand up to them·. Attempts should be made to convince the regional organization that the UN had to deliver the assistance. NGOs, he noted, were furious. The situation could "explode" in the UN's face and become a press issue. Mr. Eliasson confirmed there had been threats of physical violence towards UN staff.

Mr. Omayad suggested the Secretary-General send communications to Presidents Babangida of Nigeria and Soglo of Benin informing them of their responsibility. ECOMOG was simply a creation of ECOWAS, so it was important to communicate with ECO AS. The United Nations, he said, was supposed to assist them in implementing the Yamoussoukro Agreement. Mr. Annan · said the problem was that ECOMOG had taken sides in the conflict. Mr. Omayad stressed that ECOMOG was accountable to ECOWAS and they should therefore go to the President of ECOWAS.

Mr. Annan suggested the Secretariat might have to operate on two levels. One would be to instruct Mr. Trevor-Somers to talk with the people in the field. He supposed Mr. Trevor-Somers had not been "keen" to take a stand, perhaps in the belief it could complicate his role as a negotiator. However, there was a need to inform him. Mr. Goulding said the Secretary-General could send letters to the Presidents of Benin and Nigeria and also instruct Mr. Trevor-Somers to begin taking the matter up with ECOMOG Field Commanders. Mr. Eliasson agreed, especially since there were "some feelings [Mr. Trevor-Somers) did not always get appropriate instructions" from Headquarters. Mr. Omayad noted that Mr. Jonah provided Mr. Trevor-somers with political instructions. Mr. Goulding thought the NGOs should also know of the letters.

Arms cache in Nicaragua

Mr. Goulding noted both he and Mr. de Soto were in agreement that there needed to be a written report made to the Security Council on the arms cache in Nicaragua, once that country had completed its investigation. In the meantime, the council could be orally briefed. This was a serious violation and the Secretary-General had to be seen as reacting to it.

~Q'------Russell Taylor

3 June 1993

PHONE No. 30i 948 6429 Ma1::1,18 1993 12:22PM P01

@~©~I!~~~! [JI) MAY I 8 I~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NA.'.IlON.AI-' PAtfRIOTIC RECONSTRUCTION ASS:EM'BLY GOVERNM'ENT (NPRAG)

REPl.JBLTC OR LTBERlA Cll'l'IC:ll OF 1111( MIN1~1 I'•:~

li"ROM: MIN. MOMOLU V. SACKOR SIRLEAF MlN. 011' 11'0IO;J(;N Al(fi'AIRS, NPRAG ~_,,,.,~ ]l'AX: (~01) 94R-6429

TOi H.KBOlTTTtOSBOTJTROS-GHALI Sl~CRETAR.Y GENERAL UNITED NATIONS 1 U.N. PLAZA NYNY10017 (212) 963-2J!S(VIA JrAX)

1>ATJ1~: MAY 18, 1993

NO. 01' PACES (INCLUDING THIS) . .... 2

\ 9 l

EOSG/CEN1RAL

GHARNOA CITY

l YN A(H~NCJRS lN l,JUJ~HJA SAY G0RD0N-S0Mll}HS IS PRr•:!VRNTING R.lGLJRF All> TO LlBERIA. THEY SAY HIS INTENTIONS HA.VIC NO LJ.CGAL BASlS, TlIE;Y ACCUSE HIM 011 SABOTAGING SECURITY COUNCIL lH~SOLtJTJON 813(1993).

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PHONE No. : 301 948 6429 Ma~.18 1993 12:22PM P02

U.N. AGENCIES IN LIBERIA SAY GORDON-SOME S It PREVENTING RELIEF AID TO LIBERIA: " lNTENTI01' OF THE U.N. SPECIAL ENVOY HA VE NO LEGAL BASl OFFICJAL TEX.T RCD. 05\10\93 1. TUE l.JN SPECIAL l~NVOY liA~ HR111:FED .THE NGO'S INVULVl~ll OH TNTJf,Rlf,STED IN RRLIF:F opgRATIONS fl'()R THF; PJi;OPLE OF GR}~AT~R LIBERIA 'I'IJAT TUE cnoss BOR CONVOYS our 01r IVORY COAST WER't RESENTJi~D HY TH'1~ ]VOHl,-\N AlJ'fIIORITIJ.~S . Ml 1ST 'l'lU:J.n◄:l◄'<>lH<~ STOP.

Wl~ INFOR.Mg)) TUg UN SPlDCIAL l!~NVOY OP OUR J~AlU .JJ•!R M.fijf~TING ON APRIL 9Tl MAN \Vl'l'H A DJn.,Ji~GATJON OF THJ1; JVORlAN DIPLOMATIC CORPS. THE Al\1.BASSAl)Ol{~_ SEV1i~RAL WORLD PO\VERS, INCLUDJ.NG A REPRESENTATIV1'J OJ•' THE lVOH GOVERNMENT CAME TO APPLAlJD THE EF]fORTS TO KEEP A LIJ<'ELlNE or11;N FOR . LlBJCRlAN P~OPLE WH.~REVER THEY ARE. THE UN SPECIAL ENVOY QUESTION~D . WEIGUT OF THIS ]ENCOURAGEMENT.

OlJI{ f·Ut;PHl 1;SJ~NTAT1Vl: lN ABIDJAN HAS NOW AGAIN CONTACTED SEVERAL Ulf ·_ CONCl~RNED PICRSONALI'J.'Jl~S (M.INIS'J'Ji:R RJi::Nn~n., THE Jt'R'4.:NCH AMBASSADOR. .. ). Tl

STRONGLY D~NY ANY !YORI.AN OPPOSITION TOWARDS TUE CROSS BORJ OPF:nATT NS AND, ON _Tlill CONTRARY, URGE US TO CONTL~UE. TH~ lVOR GOVERNMKNT RJ~GRI!;TTED THE A1,'ACK Oil' AN MSII' CONVOY BY ECOMOG J

ASSISTED lJS BY INFORMING THE MEDIA.

2. TII.IC UN SPl<'.ClAL J,;NVOY APPARENTLY DOES NOT WANT TO TAK}: ANY n CONCI~HNIN<1 THt: SO\'RElGN IVORlAN DEClSlONS AND WJLL '! ASSIST'! IVORY CO. WlTl l l JN MONITORS TO KEEP ITS BORDERS WITH LIBERIA CLOSED, EVEN FOR REL Sl1PPLn-:s. H:fi: FF:Ji:Ls THAT tJN RJ1;SOLUTION SU GIVES HIM TJ-JJ<: Nt:CJ~SSAHY BACK FOR TH] S. THE RESOLlJTION HO\\-'l~VICR ASRS 'l'llJ!'. SI!'.CRE'l'ARY GENERAL J~VF:STT(;ATK THK POSSlBILITY TO DEPLOY MONITORS TO li~Lr 11\lrLEMKNT "J Y AMOlJSSOUKRO JV AGRKEMF~NT. THTS DORS NOT M~~AN THF~ l•:NDORS~:MENT OF' J!;!\1UARGO ACAJNST FOOD, VACCINES AND MEDICINES. AS THJ:i; ICRC RJ1:PRESI1;NTAT: CORRJ.X~'J'LY STATF-D, 1 NTF.:NTIONS OF THE UN SPECIAL ENVOY HA VE ABSOJ ,lJTF:J ,Y Llf;GAL B/\S]S. TT WAS INTm.u.;sTING TO HEAR FRUM HlM THAT liJ◄~ IS MOTIVATJ~n POLJTJCS, NOT THE LA\V.

3 ...... 'flIIS rn TJJE SEcor,..,n TIME THAT MR. SOM.Ji~RS JS TRYING TO DISCOlJRAGJ:<: NGO'S

DO A CROSS 1.301{1>1~1{ OPl~RATJON, AND l'l'OR TUE SECOND TIME Illi: DOES EXACTLY TL FOH JJJS DIPL01\1ATIC MAKE UP. THERR JS CLEARLY A CONTRADICTlON JU~TWE.EN T POLlTlCAL POSITION OF TJ-]Ji; VN AND THE MANDATF~~ OR WlSHt;S ()Ji' TH.11:IR RJU,J AGJ<~NCIES ON THE FIELD.

WI~ ARE INCRii:ASJN(;f .Y CONCJ1:RN.l!:U ABOUT TliJ!; '!M.ELANl~~~•t OJ◄' THE POLlTlC lNTlr.RJr.STS AND THE HUl\.1Ai"'llTARIAN AID OPJt..::RATlONS 01◄" TJ-JK UN. 1¥ JT

UNA VOIDAHJ ,,1': TO THJC lJN AGENCIES, Tllli:N W~..: MUST INSlS'J' NOT TO lUNDJ•~H T "'OHK OJl' OTlllr.H~ UY IT. JJ1' lT GIYES THE VN A DAD REPlJTATlON, THEN IT IS ON T.JJANl(S TO TJH; J.<:.\1J3AH.RASS1NG STATEMKl\'1.'S LIKE ·nu~ ONES \VE Hl~ARD FROM T UN SPEClAL ENVOY.

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TEL: C212l 688-1656

FAX: 1212)688-4924

PERMANENT MISSION OF

THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

y~ ~h,Q ~ vV/

245 EAST 49TH STREET

NEW YORK. N.Y. 10017

UN/P0!,./705 -------~~10 May~ 1993

fo)rn@uwrn~ H.E.Dr.'Boutros :Boutros-Gha.l.1. Secretary-Gene~al ot the United Nations .

!UU MAY I 2 1900 ~ '

Exe:el le::i.cy,

I have the honour to refer to your ~ote SCA/2/93 (4) of 31 March ,1993 ,.:.nd.er -.:hich y--ou d:reT ..... atte-;:ition to .""res-oTu·n.on-a-1-s-·{1993 l ado~tcd by the Security Council in connection· vith tne 1tem entitled "The Situation in Liberia~

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I~ orde~ to comply vith th~ terms of that resolution, I v~uld like to inform you thet the Government of the Rep~blic or Sierra Leone 11---ish es to e.·,ra.11 its elf of the · of£' e~ m.s.de in na.ra ra_pb. · ·41·.- of _y~\1 r-_ report to the Council S/25 02 regarding the extens!on 0£ technical a~sistance, if req_ue~t-~~, ~--- ·-

According:j..y ; · oii ~ behalf of m.y· Governm.ent, I no..-- wish t.c m.ake a req,rn·st £or such a.s s ista:tce. . ···-------

Please ~cce~t, Excellency~ .the consider-at±on.

.Anbs.s sad.or _Permanent Re~resent~tive.

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BELGIU0/1

Rue Descharnpheleerstraat, 24 Bruxelles 1080 Brussel

tel 2 425 03 00 fax 2 425 34 60 tlx 63607 MSF B ccp-pcr 000-0000060-60

MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES 'ARTSEN ZONDER GRENZEN

Son Excelle nce, Mon s i eur Boutros Boutros Ghali Secretaire General des Na tions Unies

Exce llence,

Le 22 avril 1993

Ce 18 avril, un convoi de Medec ins Sans Frontieres a ete attaque par l' aviation de la Force de Maintien de la Paix de la CEDEAO a l ors qu' il acheminai t a partir de Cote d'Ivoire des medicaments, des vaccins et de l'aide alimentaire fournis par la CE.

Les cinq vehicules etaie nt c l airement marques du sigle de notre organisme e t l e c onvoi etait sans aucun doute possible identifiable. Par miracle, personne n'a ete blesse.

L'assaut, qui visait a tuer, a dure plus d'une demi-heure. Il fait suite a l'attaque, le 27 fevrier, d'un convoi humanitaire au poste frontiere de Loguatuo qui constitue l 'unique voie d'acces vers le nord du pays pour l'aide humanitaire internationale, a la double attaque du Phebe hospital de G'barnga les 5 novembre et 10 mars derniers et au bombardement de l'hopital de Greenville en mars dernier.

Nous sollicitons votre appui dans notre demande d'explications aupres d'ECOMOG et de la CEDEAO quanta cette nouvelle agression. Nous sollicitons egalement votre intervention pour que la force regionale de maintien de la paix mette fin a ses attaques et permette la reprise de l'action humanitaire conformement a la resolution 813 du conseil de Securite.

Nous nous trouvons deva nt une situation sans precedent l'agre s s ion del i beree d ' agents humanitaires, non par des belligerants mais par une Force de Maintien de la Paix.

Nous vous prions d croire , Excellence, en notre tres haute consideration . -------i-----

Dr Rony Brauman Pre sident MSF In:ternationa l

MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES EST UNE ORGANISATION HUMANITAIRE, PRIVEE ET INTERNATIONALE ARTSEN ZONDER GRENZEN IS EEN PARTICULI ERE, INTERNATIONALE, HUMANITAIRE ORGANISATIE

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I UJ~ l APR 2_ I 1993 l ~ i ,

EXECUTIV[ GfflCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

LEW-2/2394-lSc/04/93

Mr. Secretary-General;

,,... <:::: ~

EMBASSY ~ EPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

WASH I NGTON . D. C . 200 11

Apri l 13, 1993

I have the honour to extend an invitati on t o the United Nations - -----

Organization as a special guest t o present a ten-minute prepared

statement at a conference canpri sing of all Liberian Organizati ons

in the United States. '!he conference is sponsored by the Einbassy of

Liberia, and scheduled to take place on May 1, 1993, fran 9:00 A.M.

to 7:00 P.M. at the Park View Inn , 9020 Baltinore Blvd., College Park,

Md. '!he telephone number is (301) 441 8110.

The purpose of the conference is for the various Liberian organi

zations in the United States to camence discussing ways and neans by

which they can contribute to the post-civil war reconstruction and

rehabilitation of Liberia. The therre of the conference is "IOOKING

AHEAD: RECONSl'RDCrICN OF POsr...wAR LIBERIA".

In view of this, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), :Ec:ananic

camn.mity of West African States (EXXmAS), the Interim Government of

National Unity (IGNU), and United States Depart::nent of State have also

been invited as special guests .

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Gllali Secretary-General

Ulited Nations Organization United Nations Secretariat New York, NY 10017

2

rtr. Secretary-General

- 2 -

Mr. Secretary-General, I certainly look forward to the United

Nation's participation in this all-inportant rreeting. 'Ib confinn

the United Naticn's attendance, please contact Mr. Tinothy Siklo

at (202) 723 0437 by April 23, 1993.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary-General, the assurances of my highest

consideration and esteem.

Enclosures:

KB/ryk

</(~---'4~ Konah Blackett

CHARGE D'AFF.A:rac:S, A.I.

Tentative agenda

Conference staterrent

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, a . . .

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

WASHINGTON. 0. C . 20011

CONFERENCE STATEMENT

A conference of the various Liberian organizations within the United

States of America has been scheduled for Saturday, May 1, 1993, at

Parkview Inn in College Park, Maryland from 9:00 A.M. to 7:00 P.M. The

conference is being sponsored by the Embassy of Liberia, Washington,

D.C.

The Purpose of the meeting is for Liberians in the United States to

discuss ways and means by which they can contribute constructively to the

reconstruction of post-civil war Liberia ·as a unified group. The Embassy

hopes to achieve the following objective:

1. Practical ways and means by which the Embassy can disseminate information to Liberians in the United States through their various organizations.

2. Practical ways and means by which Liberians in the United States can contribute to post-civil war Liberia reconstruction, rehabilitation, unification,etc.

The theme of the conference is: "Looking Ahead: Reconstruction of

Post-War Liberia."

More than seventy Liberian organizations(community, religious, ethnic

political, special interests, etc.), across the United States have been

invited. Also invited to make IO-minute presentations focusing on the

general theme are the following speical guests:

(1) UN. (2) OAU. (3) ECOWAS. (4) US. and (5) IGNU

After the presentation by the special guests and opening statements

by the heads of each delegation, the conference will break into five

committees to discuss the issues raised and come up with workable solutions~

1. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS

This committee shall discuss ways and means whereby the Embassy could be of more service to the Liberian communities, especially in the areas of dissemination of information, and the compilation of a rooster of Liberians. This committee may also present a structure of coordination and means to facilitate flow of information, and the coordination and support of

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activities among and between the various organizations.

2. REPATRIATION, REHABILITATION & RESETTLEMENT

This committee shall discuss ways and means whereby Liberians may make financial, material and professional contributions with human service programs to Liberia.

3. RECONCILIATION ARD NATIONAL UNITY

This committee shall develop a proposal to promote reconciliation and national unity among the Liberian people.

4. NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

This committee shall come up with suggestions as to how Liberians in the U.S can contribute toward the reconstruction of the nation's physical infrastructure and institutions.

5. SOCIAL & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

This committee shall develop proposals for encouraging trade and investments for economic development.

FINAL COMMIJHIQUE

At the end of the conference, a final communique shall be issued reflecting final decisions of the conference.

SECRETARIATE

The Embassy shall provide a working secretariate to facilitate smooth operation and efficiency.

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TENI'ATIVE AGENDA SESSIOO I: INFO™ATICN & CHAI..LE:N;ES

9:00 A.M.

9:25 A.M.

9:30 A.M.

10:00 A.M.

Chainnan

Vice Chainran

- 9:25 A.M.

- 9:30 A.M.

- 9:50 A.M.

- 11:00 A.M.

11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.

1:00 P.M. - 2:00 P.M.

2:00 P.M. - 3:00 P.M.

3:00 P.M. - 3:30 P.M.

Konah Blackett Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Embassy of Liberia

Alexander Wallace Cotmsellor Embassy of Liberia

Registration

Call to order

Introduction of special guests & delegates

Presentation by: (a) UN

(b) CWJ

(c) EXXMAS

(d) US State Depart:rrent

(e) IGNU

Staterre:nt by heads of delegations of Liberian organizaitons.

Break for ltmch

Continuation of statenents

Questions and Answers

· SESSICN ·II: OOLUTICNS & · JMPLEMENmTION

Chaiman

Vice Chairman

Arrbassador William V. s. Bull Pennanent Representative of Liberia to the United Nations

Alexander Wallace Counsellor, Drbassy of Liberia

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3:30 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.

4:30 P.M. 6:00 P.M.

6:00 P.M. 6:30 P.M.

6:30 P.M. 7:00 P.M.

Meetings of Ccmnittees

(a) Public Affairs & Camumity Relations

(b) Repatriation, Rehabilitation & Resettlement

(c) National Reconstruction

(d) Reconciliation & National Unity

(e) Social & F.cananic Developrent

Reports fran Ccmnittees and Discussion an Reports.

B R E A K

Final Carmunique

UNITED NATIONS

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: A:

Mr. Jacques Baudot, Controller DATE: 26 March 1993 Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance 2.WCF.4

REFERENCE: _____ _

THROUGH : S/C DE:

FROM: The Secretary General DE:

~~~~~~TUnf oreseen and extraordinary expenses: Mission to Liberia

1. It is estimated that $149,000 will be required to provide for the salary and emoluments of my Special Representative to Liberia for the period 26 November 1992 through 26 May 1993, ($79,000), for additional travel requirements undertaken on missions of consultations to the region ($60,000) and for miscellaneous expenses in connection with the mission ($10,000), pursuant to Security Council resolution 788 (1992).

2. As no appropriation has been made for this purpose, I hereby authorize you to enter into the necessary commitments up to a maximum of $149,000 under the authority granted to me in paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly resolution 46/187 relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, under which I am authorized to enter into commitments not exceeding $3 million in any one year of the biennium 1992-1993.

· 3. I certify that these expenses relate to the maintenance of international peace and security.

+223300636 PRc:S I [B,(E COTOUI ~ .. , ; ...... ~v ..

P02 16:47

Cotonou. le 23 .ar-g, 1993

-REPUBLIQUE DU BENJN Presidence de la Ripubtique RM. 11G9/PR/CAB/SP -~ Le President

Monsieur .Boutros Boutros-Gha.1.i Secrataire General de ll'Organi-sat:ion des Nations uni~e-s-~--------New-York Ny ioo11

~o.nsiaur Jg S9Cr~taire General .~

J' ai appris qu 'une lettre revet:ue de ma signature a ate envoye.e aur leaders des ex-factions liberiennes, parties aur accords de pai.x de Cotonou, recom:mandant que deux des quatre portefeuilles Jtinisteriels non encore attribues soient a.ccordes a NPFL de ltonsieur Charles TAYWR. Il s'agit du Ministe.re des Affairas Etrangeres et de celui de la justice.

Je voudrais ezpriBIGr .aa surprise ~ace a un acta si peu respcnsable car le conten.u de cette lettre differe completement des recoimaan,jations que j.,ai eu a faire pa.rvenir aux leaders des ex-factions relative11ent a la repartition des quatre ( 4) portefeuilles Jtlni.steriels en question.

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En effet, par l I in.ter.adiai.re ae 1 "~sadeur du Ben.in en cots-d 1 Ivoire 1 j 1 ai -.eu· ·a repeter que Ia decision en la. matiere incombait aux Liberiens eu.r-me11.es. L' ideal etant d'a..boutir a un consensus autour de la question et, en toute derniere ertreai.te, d'avoir recours au vote. cecte reco.lllllal'ldation demeure toujours va..la.ble et la position de la Pre.sidence en ezercice de la CEDE;,.J sur le dossier de la crise liberienne, n'a pas · varie. Le Benin, dont la position de neutralite est bien connue, .a'a d'autre interet que la pai.I dans ce pays :trere et aai.

Qu 1 il vous souvienne agalement qu 'a 1 1 issue des negooia-tions qui ont precede l,. installation le 7 J1U1rS 1994 du Consail dl'Etat, j'ai eu a raa.t:tirmer la me.me recoJll'ftz:lndation~ J'ai ~ eu a con:tineer .ma disponibilite, en cas de dirticultss majeures, a accueillir a Cotonou une rencontre speciale e~ vue de la resolution de ce problem.e.

J'ai. toujou.rs exhorte, ta.n.t par ecrit qu'orale111ent, les signataires des accords de Cotonou sur le L:f...beria a depasser

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+229300€,36 PRES I DEN:£ COTCNOU P03 05. 04. 94 16: 91 --

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reconciliation, de la pair, de 1'urute et de la prosperite de lecrr pays. Il est te.aps, il est grand temps qu'au .ao.aent ou, avec l'a..ide de la Co.tmJnaute Internationale, le conseil d; Etat a eta instaile et le dasarme§43nt amorce,. ces exhortations soient prises en ao-.pte.

J'en appelle done ~u civisJte,. au patriotisms et: a 1 'esprit de rasponstibilite des uns et des autres P?Uz: un pro~t regleent par les li..beriens au..r-■eaes de oette quest:i,on dont la persist.a.nee aoapromettrait graveme.nt les sacrifices consentis jusqu 1 a ce jour, et las re:aarquables rasu.ltats obtanus.

Je voudrais vous sugge_rer de ~er le contena de ce .message avea vos coll agues du Conseil a1 Etat aiI1Si qye toutas les persorn.li_tes- ~~-9..~Pt_l.D_les·-,Paiae!_--~~~~ - !~~QJU~i(?n_ _<J..._Ef! ce p.robleae aans u.n espr.1.t de dialogue, de cop.certatiQ..n.,__d'_e:qui-libre et d-ieqi:dte ~ ... . . . . . . . ..

SUr la longue et sinueuse route · vers la pa.ix et la reco12cil1ation au Liberia, ce qui se passe act:uellemerrt ne const:it;ue qu "'un obstacle · qu' il nous taut :tranchir avant d'arriver a bon port.

Je demet1re a votre entiere disposition et vous pria dragre-er, Konsieur le Secretaire General, les assurances de •a haute et traternell~ consideration.

I

[email protected] P. SQGW

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+223300636 PRESIDENC:E OJTCNOU ~P01

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NTO:

DE/FROM·:

MESSAGE TELECOPIE TELECOPIED :MESSAGE

s-=G . de----.. -1•organr:sat.ion des Nations- Unies

Cabinet d\l · President de , la R~bfique d u , Benin

Datie: Apri'I S/'4NR de/of page: 3 (Including Cover Sheet)

05.04.94 16:43

Retranssaission lettre jointe, Ref. 11C9/PR/CAB/SP du 23 mars 1'9.\ re;ue ~-

Retra~tnissk>n upon r~.

Attention : Secreta-ry-General - UN

~nee de la .Repttbllqne dn. Benin Tat 229/30 09 09 -, FAX. 229/80 06 as

"

B,P. 1288 Cotonou Telex; 5347 PRIM.AT CTNOU

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RAMSEY CLA~K

L.AWRE:NCE: W . SCHILLING

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IJi) AR I 8 f993 •~

LAW OFFICES

March 18, 1993

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LAW OFFICES

36 EAST 12TH ST~E:E'.T

NEW YORK, N . Y. 10003

F"AX (212) 979-1$83

EOSG/CENTRAL By Fax; (212) 963-,,21ss

His Excellency Boutros Boutros-Ghali Secretary General / Room 3800 United Nations New York, NY 10017

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

An important seven person Special Dele ation frorn_the NPRAG of Liberia sent by PresidentCharles Taylor to discuss with you the_present crisis situation affec ing tat country is unable to board a plane in Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire for the United States.~ U.~._ consular officer has determined they have failed to present evidence that- fndfcates they have a strong inducement to return to Liberia and denied them visa's. Enclosed is a copy of the letter introducing the delegation to you from President Taylor and a list of the seven delegates. You know Minister of State Ernest Eastman, I believe, and possibly others.

At this critical time in Liberia discussions with all parties is essential and could save many lives. To silence the voice of the major Liberian government is a disservice to peace and violates the spirit of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

I urge you to issue an invitation to this dele ation to come to the U.N. to- discuss the crisis in Liberia. The matter is of extreme urgency because of the daily loss of life and destruction of property from intensive military actions including heavy bombing by ECOMOG aircraft.

The delegation has important comments to make on your Report on the Question of Liberia which are not otherwise available here. You are aware of the great difficulty of communication from most parts of Liberia.

The delegation hopes to leave Abidjan on an Air Afrique flight scheduled to depart at 11: 00 p. m., Fridl!Y, _March 19, 1993 arriving in New York satu!-"9,ay morning . --Thedele ation would be available to meet you and your representatives at any time thereafter~ - - - - ----- --

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His .Exc:ellency Boutros Boutros-Ghali March ta·, ·1993 Page Two

If I can provide further information, please call me. I can communicate the invitation directly to the delegation in Abidjan, to President Taylor and to the United States if that is convenient for you.

Sincerely,

..

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N(\,'flQ~,4iJ - f~lftUOTIC IUION~THUOlON roj[MDLY uOVIINMINT

Your E: :cellency :

Offict! of 1he President Republic n( Liberia

March 12, 1993

r have the h □nou : : to introduce to yc,u the members of the Special

o,,leg r~ion of L:L beria, National Patriotic: Reconstruction Assembly

G,)ver.'llnent, in ,mom "'3 have reposed conf:.d8nce enc trust to hold ois

c 1J&s i •)•1s as to ·:he pnsent crisis situ&t:.on llffecting the Country

I request of yoL, Excollancy Sil' 1 to grant tl1em whatever

courtesy your good erd gracious self may deem epp1~priste and

necessary.

Be plea5Ad to accept Exeellency, tha roncwod essuronces

of my highest O$toom for your personal well-being

Sincerely yours,

H i1 E, celloncy, Or. E1outro9 Ghali S;f;CRI.TAAY GEHEP:Al. OF Tl£ t.lUTEO MATICICS mGANl7.AHOH Uni tr1cl Nations Build2.ng ~lew Yc,rk City, New Yurk.

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Honourable Ernost £astman H!NISTEA Of STATE FOR PRESIDENTIAL AFFAIRS

VICJ-CHAIRMAH

Horourebi.e Lneli Supwood MI~ISTEA Of JUSTICE

HOOER

Honourable D. HuAuleng CoopE'.r MifHSTER Of EDUCATION

Ml:>'.SER

Honourable Willie■ £. Denni, HINISTU CW: FINANCE

ME)IJElf

Hig Excellency, SMuel 8ened ict Coope,SPEGIAL ENVOY FOH POlITICAL 'FFAIHS & AMBlSSAD(R .. AT-1.AAGE/ MEMBER

Hia Excellency, Frencia A. Dennis A>1flASSAOCR-AT-LARGE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MEHBER

Counsellcr Francis Y. S. Gerlawolu HIMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST COUNCtLLCR-AT-LAW / MCHOEO

.· •··· · a

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council Distr. GENERAL

S/25402 12 March 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION OF LIBERI~

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION •.••••••••••.••.••.••••.•.••••.•.••••••••••••.••.

I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES •••••

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE .....•.......•.•.....••..•.....•

I II. ECOWAS PEACE INITIATIVES ...•.. • ....•.•....•.••••......•

IV. ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ••

V. OBSERVATIONS •••• • ••••••..•••..•.••.•.•..•.•••.••••••...

93-14508 {E) 150393

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S/25402 English Page 3

INTRODUCTION

1. The Security Council first considered the question of Liberia at its meeting held on 22 January 1991, when the President of the Council made a statement commending the efforts of the heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 1/ and called upon the parties to the conflict to respect the cease-fire agreement (S/22133). At a subsequent meeting on 7 May 1992, the Council again commended ECOWAS and indicated that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991 offered the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict (S/23886).

2. At its 3138th meeting, held on 19 November 1992, the Council adopted resolution 788 (1992), by which it, inter alia, called upon all parties to the conflict in Liberia to respect and implement the cease-fire and various accords of the peace process; decided, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Liberia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia, with the exception of weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the peace-keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia; requested the Secretary-General to dispatch to Liberia urgently a Special Representative to evaluate the situation, and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible; and decided to remain seized of the matter.

3. Immediately following the adoption of resolution 788 (1992), I appointed Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers as my Special Representative under the terms of paragraph 7 of the resolution. He was assisted by a Senior Political Affairs Officer from the Department of Political Affairs. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraphs 7 and 13 of resolution 788 (1992).

I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

4. Liberia is situated on the west coast of Africa, sharing common borders with Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone. Independent since 26 July 1847, the country has a population of 2.5 million. Monrovia grew as the commercial centre of the country and the location of the elite settler community. The remainder of the country, largely rural, with an abundance of natural resources, was home to the indigenous population. The conflict in Liberia has its genesis in a complex history of relationships between the settler and the indigenous communities, low levels of literacy among the latter, crushing poverty in the rural areas and a perception that benefits accrued primarily to the population in Monrovia.

5. The immediate origins of the three-year war can be traced to the complete breakdown of law and order and civil authority which accompanied the overthrow in 1990 of the regime headed by President Samuel Doe. The civil war has caused severe casualties and major displacement of the population, both internally and in terms of refugees in countries bordering Liberia. The rupture of the system of civil administration, the cessation of most forms of social services and the disruption of economic activities have resulted in considerable dependence on

I •••


humanitarian assistance provided by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations.

6 . The effects of the prolonged c i vil war have worsened the fragile state of the economy characteristic of many developing countries during the decade of the 1980s. The de facto division of the country as a result of the civil war into two administrations with separate economic zones, two different domestic currencies with widely varying rates of exchange, further aggravates an already difficult situation. Prolonged shortages of foreign exchange render almost impossible the importation of food, fuel and other essential consumer goods. The banking system has completely broken down with respect to foreign exchange transactions.

7. At present, the country remains part i tioned, with the Interim Government of National Unity, headed by President Amos Sawyer, administering Monrovia and its environs, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Mr. Charles Taylor, in control of 10 counties, with its headquarters in Gbarnga and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), led by Mr. Alhaji Kromah, having captured two counties, maintaining its headquarters in Tubmanburg. Most of the productive sectors of the economy (agriculture, forestry, iron ore, rubber and precious metals) are in areas held by NPFL and ULIMO. Monrovia remains the centre for commercial activities but at significantly reduced levels. Efforts at reactivation of the economy have yielded results far below pre-war levels. Some rubber, iron ore and timber were exported through the ports of Buchanan, Greenville and Harper under NPFL control, as well as through Monrovia. Reports have been received indicating that commercial arrangements have been made between NPFL and investors in Europe for the export of timber and iron ore. However, exports have virtually ceased since comprehensive economic sanctions have been applied by ECOWAS since July 1992, although there are continuing reports of some violations.

8. War-related casualties among civilians and armed combatants have been estimated as high as 150,000, with the overwhelming majority being civilians. Young people under 18 years of age are particularly hard hit. Population displacement is a significant consequence of the conflict. Monrovia's population is estimated to have doubled from 400,000 to 850,000 and may have exceeded 1 million since the beginning of the crisis. Liberian refugees now number between 600,000 and 700,000, mainly in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

9. The conflict has resulted in a monumental deterioration in social services. The health care system is plagued by chronic shortages of drugs, fuel and other essential supplies, while an increase in the incidence of malnutrition, gastroenteritis and measles is recorded, particularly among the young. Most schools have remained closed during the crisis. Liberia will continue to depend on relief and humanitarian efforts of private institutions and the international community for the foreseeable future.

10. All United Nations emergency relief and humanitarian programmes in Liberia are coordinated by a United Nations Special Coordinator, drawing upon the staff

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and resources of the Un i ted Nat i ons Development Programme, in close collaboration wi th the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations , the United Nations Population Fund , t he Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization. Through regular coordination meetings, the United Nations family and the NGO community have developed integrated programmes (e . g., food aid, especially for vulnerable groups, water and sanitation, disease control, including HIV/AIDS, nutritional surveillance and drug abuse counselling) designed to address the needs of all Liberians in Monrovia and i n territory hel d by both NPFL and ULIMO.

11. In 1991, arrangements fo r the distribution of humanitarian assistance had been carefully worked out by the United Nations Special Coordinator, with the NPFL and the Interim Government . Under the prevailing conditions, delivery of such assistance can be quite hazardous, depending on the level of insecurity and problems of logistics . Most of the drugs, food and other relief supplies have been imported, stored and distributed in and around Monrovia, where the bulk of the displaced population resides. Since October 1992, some stores are maintained in Danane and Man in Cote d'Ivoire and in Gbarnga, for use in NPFL territory. The inability to deliver sufficient quantities to NPFL territory continues to be a source of concern, particularly with regard to the provision of fuel. Viewed as a strategic commodity in a war situation, but needed for the functioning of hospitals , the delivery of fuel is often delayed at the border with Cote d'Ivoire and only dispatched in small quantities under the supervision of internat i onal United Nations or NGO staff.

12. Responding to concerns of sanctions violations expressed by the Interim Government, my Special Representative reviewed various route options for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Of the possibilities via Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, through a peace corridor from Monrovia to Kakata or, from Monrovia to the port of Buchanan , the most direct and convenient route continues to be v i a Cote d'Ivoire . Although thi s is consistent with security concerns and logistic feasibility, reports are received from time to time regarding difficulties of strict compliance with sanctions.

13. I have launched several appeals for humanitarian assistance to Liberia. Of the total of $161 million requested, a funding gap of US$ 57 million remains, covering priority areas of food aid, health, water and sanitation, agriculture and assistance to displaced persons and refugees, former combatants and children. Given the extent of the damage caused by the civil war in Liberia, it will be necessary for the United Nations and the entire international community to support a comprehensive programme for reconstruction and development once peace has returned to the country. As a first step this should involve a needs assessment, to be undertaken by the United Nations development system , in association with the Bretton Woods institutions, the African Development Bank and i nterested Governments .

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III. ECOWAS PEACE INITIATIVES

14. The fighting which engulfed Liberia and the massive destruction and large loss of human life which followed in its wake have led to intensive West African diplomatic efforts. The repercussions of the Liberian civil war on neighbouring countries, particularly on Sierra Leone, have underlined the international dimension of the conflict.

15. ECOWAS has since 1990 been preoccupied with the situation in Liberia. It has operated under provisions of the Protocol on Non-Aggression, adopted at the Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, held in Dakar, Senegal, on 22 April 1978, and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence adopted in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981. The initiatives of ECOWAS have included the creation of an ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) I/ by the Standing Mediation Committee at Banjul, Gambia, on 7 August 1990. The primary function of ECOMOG was to keep peace, restore law and order and ensure that a cease-fire agreed to by the warring factions in Liberia was respected. Since its deployment in Liberia, in August 1990, ECOMOG has succeeded in restoring a measure of order in Monrovia and its environs. Much of the remainder of the country, however, remains under the control of NPFL and ULIMO. Under the auspices of ECOWAS, negotiations between the Liberian parties led to a series of agreements which formed the basis of an ECOWAS peace plan of November 1990. This plan, inter alia, called for:

A cease-fire and cessation of destruction of life and property;

ECOWAS monitoring of the cease-fire;

The establishment of a broad-based Interim Government acceptable to the people of Liberia;

The holding of general and presidential elections within 12 months; and

Observation of the elections by ECOWAS and other international bodies to ensure that they are free and fair.

16. Following further discussions and negotiations among Liberians themselves and between Liberians and ECOWAS member States, agreements were reached at meetings held in 1991 at Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, on steps to implement the broad outlines of the ECOWAS peace plan. The Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991 specifies the steps, which taken together, constitute a framework for the settlement of the crisis. Specifically, these steps included the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG and the establishment of institutions to carry out free and fair elections.

17. In view of the widespread fighting, it was not possible to carry out the measures envisaged in the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. The recognition by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations of the Interim Government headed by President Amos Sawyer and the unwillingness of one of the main factions, the NPFL , headed by Mr. Charles Taylor, to recognize ECOMOG as an impartial and neutral force, led to a prolonged stalemate.

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18. The United Nations has, from the beginning of the crisis in Liberia, supported efforts of ECOWAS member States to achieve a just and lasting solution to the conflict. In 1990, my predecessor had apprised the Security Council of actions being taken by ECOWAS with respect to Liberia so that they might consider how international assistance could best be provided to ECOMOG. He had also underlined his support for the ECOWAS peace plan and appealed to all sides to cooperate fully with ECOMOG.

19. The inability to move forward with the ECOWAS peace plan led to intensified efforts to break the stalemate. In this context the need for the involvement of the United Nations became more evident. ECOWAS, at the fifteenth session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in Dakar, Senegal, from 27 to 29 July 1992, decided to impose comprehensive sanctions against the territory controlled by the NPFL. The ECOWAS Summit sought the assistance of the Security Council to make sanctions effective and binding on all members of the international community in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

20. At the First Joint Meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five of ECOWAS, held at Cotonou on 20 October 1992, and the First Meeting of the Committee of Nine of ECOWAS on the Liberian Crisis, held in Abuja on 7 November 1992, it was decided that a delegation of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers should come to New York to seek the endorsement of the Security Council for the path being followed by ECOWAS. I was represented at these meetings, and at all previous important ECOWAS meetings on Liberia, by Mr. James Jonah, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs.

IV. ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

21. My Special Representative visited Liberia as well as Benin, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia and Burkina Faso from 29 November to 22 December 1992 and again from 10 January to 2 February 1993. He provided me with a preliminary assessment of the outcome of the first half of his mission on 29 December 1992 at Geneva.

22. In an exchange of views with the different heads of Government and officials of ECOWAS, my Special Representative explained the purpose of his mission. In separate meetings with Presidents Nicephore Soglo of Benin, Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria, Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Dawda Jawara of the Gambia, Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso and with Prime Minister Habib Thiam of Senegal and with Vice-Chairman Solomon Musa of the National Provisional Ruling Council of Sierra Leone, and their Foreign Ministers, they all expressed their appreciation for the support of the United Nations to the endeavours of ECOWAS in the search for a peaceful solution to the Liberian conflict. They also emphasized the need for continued support by the international community for the efforts of ECOWAS to bring peace and stability to the region; only then would ECOWAS be able to concentrate on its primary goal of attaining economic integration in the subregion.

23. President Nicephore Soglo of Benin, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, stressed to the Special Representative the view that there was a clear role for the United Nations in monitoring a cease-fire, encampment, disarmament,

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demobilization and the organization of free and fair elections. In view of the level of mistrust among the various protagonists, President Soglo felt that a greater United Nations involvement would ensure successful implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord.

24. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, Chairman of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Liberia, viewed with grave concern the conflict i n Liberia and its implications for Cote d'Ivoire and the region. Notwithstanding the strict control instituted by his Government, the President pointed out some of the difficulties of policing the long border of some 580 kilometres with Liberia. These difficulties were further compounded by the fact that the population on both sides of the border belonged to the same ethnic groups and in some instances, the same family. In spite of these problems, the Government of Cote d'Ivoire fully supported the relevant decision of the Security Council on an arms embargo and the ECOWAS decision on economic sanctions.

25. In a meeting at the headquarters of ECOWAS in Lagos, the Executive Secretary, Mr. Abass Bundu, and the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Adetunji Olurin, recalled the Banjul decision establishing ECOMOG and the conditions which obtained in Monrovia when ECOMOG was first deployed to Liberia in August 1990. They also called attention to the fact that ECOMOG deployment was strongly opposed by Mr. Charles Taylor. Having succeeded in stoppi ng the advance of NPFL, ECOMOG proceeded in the traditional peace-keeping role to commence planning for encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the warring factions. However, the NPFL infiltration and attack on Monrovia on 15 October 1992 obliged ECOMOG to defend and protect the capital by adopting a peace enforcement mode. To ensure that Monrovia was no longer threatened by NPFL and in order to reduce civilian casualties, ECOMOG continued to repel NPFL forces. They also referred to the fact that the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) has ceased to exist as a warring faction after the surrender of its leader, Mr. Prince Johnson, to ECOMOG .

26. In Liberia, the Special Representative had extensive consultations with all the parties to the conflict. He also met with a wide range of NGOs and civic, religious and voluntary associations.

27. President Amos Sawyer supported the call by ECOWAS for United Nations involvement in the peace process within the context of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. He provided the Special Representative with historical details regarding the decisions of the All-Liberia National Conference in Virginia, Liberia, 15 March to 18 April 1991, establishing the Interim Government. He recounted the decisions with respect to the organization and functioning of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The composition of the Elections Commission and the Supreme Court as well as arrangements for monitoring general and presidential elections were also discussed. He stressed that for the ECOWAS peace initiative to succeed, it was imperative that all concerned parties honour commitments made to achieve a lasting settlement of the conflict. For his part, he was ready for a genuine dialogue in order to expedite a settlement. President Sawyer also emphasized the need for the United Nations to continue rendering humanitarian assistance to all Liberians. He underlined that the United Nations should remain sensitive to and supportive of the efforts of ECOWAS to resolve the crisis in Liberia.

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28. Mr. Charles Taylor, leader of NPFL, expressed his willingness to agree to a cease-fire and to talks with other parties to the conflict, leading to free and fair elections, so long as the United Nations would facilitate and be fully involved in the process. He voiced concerns for his personal security, because he was convinced that ECOMOG was no longer a neutral peace-keeping force. His reasoning rested on the historical inyolvement of ECOWAS member States in the creation of the Interim Government in Banjul, July 1990, which he maintained contravened the existing constitution. Further, the capture of President Doe in September 1990, while on the premises of EC0MOG and his subsequent assassination, did not inspire confidence for his own safety. He argued that the dominance of Nigeria in EC0MOG was at variance with a traditional multinational peace-keeping force. Mr. Taylor complained that persistent bombing attacks by EC0MOG of civilian targets, as recently as 27 February 1993, resulted in extensive casualties. Finally, he asserted that ECOMOG sponsorship of ULIMO and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) nullified the basis for the arms embargo contained in Security Council resolution 788 (1992).

29. In Tubmanburg, Mr. Alhaji Kromah and the military command of ULIMO confirmed that the Movement was united, that it supported the ECOWAS peace plan and that it existed with the sole purpose of ending the conflict and would disband once the NPFL agreed to cessation of hostilities.

30. Since the adoption of the EC0WAS peace plan, many cease-fire agreements have been broken. Taking these factors into account, EC0WAS leaders and the warring factions are in agreement that there needs to be a role for the United Nations by providing observers. Arrangements envisaged in this regard would link the deployment of United Nations observers with the signature of a cease-fire agreement. It was suggested that the United Nations observers, numbering approximately 200, would take up positions; along with ECOMOG, between the various combatants, as well as at the ports and border crossings with Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

31. In order to facilitate implementation of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, most interlocutors with the Special Representative stressed that encampment should commence concurrent with announcement of an agreed cease-fire. All existing military checkpoints established by various combatants should be removed. Such checkpoints as may be needed after the cessation of hostilities should be administered by EC0M0G. They called for agreement between the Interim Government, NPFL, ULIM0 and EC0M0G on the location of these checkpoints to guard against any unauthorized activity. In their view, gradual relaxation of these arrangements would send clear signals .that the cease-fire was holding and people should be able to move freely throughout the country.

32. Notwithstanding some agreement among the various parties, basic differences still exist with respect to the process of disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants. The NPFL is insistent that it will not disarm to ECOMOG in its present composition. In the light of this intense mistrust, these concerns could be addressed by reconfiguring EC0MOG by more members of EC0WAS participating in it, while retaining the present command structure. It is generally agreed that broadening the participation in EC0MOG of forces from those ECOWAS countries which have not, or only marginally, been involved in the monitoring group, would provide the guarantees which Mr. Taylor seeks. However, such a reconfiguration of EC0M0G would require additional resources.

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33. The reconciliation process would be greatly enhanced by progress in the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the ex-combatants on the basis of the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. While in Monrovia, my Special Representative had the opportunity to meet with the Inter-Faith Mediation Council, comprising representatives of religious groups and organizations as well as leaders of public opinion in Liberia who, at the outset of the conflict, played an important role. Following his exchange of views with these organizations on the question of national reconciliation, my Special Representative has stressed the need to involve elders, community leaders and women's groups, in the search for lasting solutions to the long-standing causes of ethnic conflict. This would be an essential step to a major national reconciliation conference, organized and conducted by Liberians, which would address participatory democracy, the strengthening of civil society and reconstruction and development of the country.

34. As indicated earlier in the report, the number of Liberian refugees is estimated between 600,000 and 700,000. Many of these refugees are already r egistered with UNHCR. It is important to repatriate the refugees promptly after the cease-fire has been verified as sustainable, for two reasons: unburdening the neighbouring countries and ensuring the participation of the returnees in the electoral process. In order to facilitate this, UNHCR will be requested to update its information, including final destination of returnees, and make it available to the central database for preparing voters' lists. Resources for transportation and other assistance will also be required for repatriation.

35. In recent discussions of the Special Representative in Monrovia and Gbarnga, headquarters of NPFL, consideration was given to the polling date of 26 July 1993, the anniversary of national independence. However, continued hostilities now seem to rule out that date. An election date in October 1993 would be consistent with existing constitutional provisions. Whatever date is finally chosen, it would be desirable to have conditions which would allow for an agreement on a unified administration, complete freedom of movement, disarmament and encampment as essential ingredients for free and fair elections.

36. Decisions taken in ECOWAS meetings in Dakar on 27-29 July 1992 and Cotonou on 20 October 1992 and reaffirmed at Abuja on 7 November 1992, requested the United Nations to assist in the electoral process. Other international observers, for example, the International Negotiation Network (Carter Centre), the Republican Institute for International Affairs and the National Democratic Institute, both of the United States, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth Secretariat, could also be invited to participate in monitoring the elections. Financial and technical assistance will be necessary at various stages for registration of voters, preparation of reliable voters' lists, delineation of constituency boundaries and in the general oversight, to ensure the credibility and integrity of the electoral process.

37. Regrettably, the resumption of fighting in Liberia in October ~992 continues at the present time. ECOMOG has succeeded in regaining control of Monrovia and surrounding areas and has recently taken over the international airport at Roberts Field, as well as White Plains, the source of Monrovia's water supply. ULIMO forces have meanwhile made advances beyond Cape Mount and

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Semi counties. The intensification of the conflict and the wanton death and destruction which inevitably follow could threaten regional stability. This makes it imperative to continue the search for a lasting peace in Liberia and the surrounding countries.

V. OBSERVATIONS

38. The consultations of my Special Representative indicate that all of the warring factions in Liberia continue to accept the Yamoussoukro IV Accord as the most realistic basis on which a durable peace can be constructed. An essential first step in this process is the cessation of hostilities, to be followed by immediate encampment, disarmament and demobilization of the forces of the warring factions.

39. As in similar situations in other parts of the world, in Liberia, too, it is the common people, for the most part, who have become the innocent victims of the civil war. This is particularly the case in regard to women, the aged and the very young. The United Nations, its agencies and the international NGO community have made a significant contribution, often in very difficult circumstances, to provide humanitarian assistance to the Liberian people without any discrimination. My Special Representative has devoted particular attention to this matter in his discussions in Liberia, in order to ensure safe routes and corridors so that no section of the target community is deprived of at least the basic essentials.

40. Liberia represents a good example of systematic cooperation between the United Nations and a regional organization, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter. From the beginning, diplomatic and even military initiatives have been taken by ECOWAS. The Yamoussoukro IV Accord was arrived at as a result of the efforts of ECOWAS and it has been the responsibility of ECOWAS to ensure the implementation of the provisions of that Accord. The role of the Security Council has been one of supporting the initiatives and endeavours of ECOWAS. This is clear from the presidential statements issued by the Council on 22 January 1991 and 7 May 1992. It was at the initiative of ECOWAS that the Security Council convened on 19 November 1992 and adopted resolution 788 (1992). I believe that it would be the wish of the Council to continue and expand, as appropriate, this cooperative relationship between the United Nations and the concerned regional body.

41. The comprehensive economic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS are an important part of ECOWAS efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The Security Council, for its part, supplemented ECOWAS action by imposing an arms embargo in its resolution 788 (1992). If requested, I would be willing to send a few experts who would extend technical assistance to ECOWAS in monitoring the sanctions. The Security Council may also wish to consider enlarging the scope of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. ·

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42. The discussions my Special Representative has had with the leaders of the warring factions as well as with the President of the Interim Government, the Executive Secretary and member States of ECOWAS indicate that there is a general consensus to the effect that the United Nations should assume a larger role in the search for peace in Liberia. The international community has an interest in the restoration of conditions of peace and stability in Liberia and in the West African subregion as a whole. One proposal, which has the support of all the parties as well as of ECOWAS, is that I should convene a meeting of the President of the Interim Government and the warring factions at which they would solemnly conclude and sign an agreement reaffirming their commitment to the Yamoussoukro IV Accord, as well as to implement promptly the various steps envisaged therein within an agreed time-frame. I am ready to extend whatever assistance I can to bring about an end to the senseless killings in Liberia. While I would be prepared, in principle, to convene such a meeting, I feel that it would be more appropriate if ECOWAS were to consider the situation in Liberia, preferably at summit level, to bring about the desired reconfirmation of the commitment of parties to the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. I have been informed by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS about the meeting of that organization on 15-16 April, at which the heads of State would consider, inter alia, the Liberian situation. The United Nations, which must continue to play its supportive role, will be represe_nted by Mr. Gordon-Somers, my Special Representative for Liberia.

43. Accordingly, I am asking my Special Representative to return to the region to resume his discussions with ECOWAS as well as with others concerned regarding the meeting mentioned above. He will also initiate discussions among the United Nations agencies and with the Bretton Woods institutions and the African Development Bank on future rehabilitation and reconstruction plans for Liberia.

1/ ECOWAS membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

1

1 / Membership of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG): Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger i a , Senegal (withdrew January 1993) and Sierra Leone.

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NO.053/MPB/CM/MC/AP/93

La Mission Permanente de la Republique du Benin

aupres des Nations Unies presente ses compliments au

Secretaire General de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et a

l'honneur de porter a sa connaissance l'organisation en

54-26.92

Avril ou Mai 1993 a Geneve d'une Table Ronde des factions

belligerantes du Conflit liberien. Le Gouvernement du BENIN,

qui assume actuellement la presidence de la CEDEAO, voudrait

que Monsieur GORDONS SOMERS, Representant Special du Secretaire --- - --· - --

General pour le Liberia se rend·e a Cotonou aux fins de

discuter avec lui des modalites pratiques d'organisation de

cette Table Ronde .


aupres des Nations Unies remercie le Secretaire General de

l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour son aimable cooperation

et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de

sa tres haute consideration.~ 1/

SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE L'ONU UNITED NATIONS PLAZA

NEW YORK

MAR I 8 1993

New York, le 10 Mars 1993 /

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-

UNITED NATIONS


NATIONS UNIES


TO: Mr. Armando Duque 9 March 1993 DATE: ________ _

A : Director of Personnel, OHRM REFERENCE: ______ _

THROUGH : S/C DE :

FROM: DE:

SUBJECT: OBJ ET:

f'

Jean-Claude Aime \J~ Chief of staff, Eo5';- \

Special Representative of the Secretary-Ge ner a l for Liberia

The Secretary-General has decided to extend the appointment of Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, for a period of three months through 26 May 1993.

I would be grateful if you would make the necessary arrangements.

cc: Mr. Jonah Mr. Baudot

FM/fm CONFIDENTIAL

Orig: SG JCA/JB AS/AK/FA/IJ.II.B CG Central File

Notes on the Secretary-General's meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs -of the Interim Government of Liberia

Held at United Nations Headquarters on Thurqday 4 March 1993 at 10.30 a.m.

Present:

t.OSG/Ct.N1Rl\l

H.E. Mr. Gabriel Bacchus Matthews Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government of Liberia

H.E. Mr. William Bull Permanent Representative of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations

The oreign Minister conveyed the greetings of President Amos Sawyer to the Secretary-General, and to his Special Representative, Mr. Gordon-somers. After Mr. Gordon-somers' return to Monrovia following his assessment mission, the government had been quite impressed by his understanding of the complexities of the problem. The Foreign Minister understood that Mr. Gordon-somers had now submitted his report to the Secretary-General, and the Foreign Minister had come to inquire if there were any aspects of the report about which the Secretary-General had questions that he may be able to answer, particularly in connection with any recommendations to be presented to the Security Council.

The Secretary-General was still working on the report. However, the idea was to work toward a meeting of the different factions, and to obtain from them a ceasefire agreement, and at the same time, to seek the Security Council's approval for the presence of observers on the ground. Would all the factions be ready to participate in such a meeting? the Secretary-General asked.

The warring factions had apparently indicated to Mr. GordonSomers that they would wish to attend such a meeting, the Foreign Minister replied. Dr. Sawyer, who was currently performing "a neutral role" as interim President, would also be disposed to attend.

The Secretarv-Genera 1 enquired about the reaction of the members of ECOWAS. Would it be advantageous for them to participate, or should ECOWAS representation be limited to its

- 2 -

leadership? And at what level should member states were involved? He asked for the Foreign Minister's views.

The suggestion of the Foreign Minister was that the current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Soglo of Benin, should be invited to be represented at the meeting; he might choose to dispatch a team comprising, for example, of his Foreign Minister as well as the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. It was important that ECOWAS be fully apprised of developments .

To the Secretary-General's question whether he would prefer that the meeting take place somewhere in Africa, or at the Uni ted Nations Off ice at Geneva, the Foreign Minister emphasized the importance of choosing a venue that all factions felt comfortable with. It was possible that some factions might have problems on the ground, and would not want to remove themselves too far from the scene.

The Secretary-General understood that concern. He had mentioned Geneva as a possible neutral venue. However, if some of the leaders had difficulty with the idea of being so far away, then some place in Africa would have to be found. Maybe since the leaders of all the warring factions would be absent at the same time, the problem of their wishing to remain near to events on the ground might be overcome.

To the Secretary-General's question as to the format and content of the meeting, the Foreign Minister confirmed that its purpose would be to achieve the signing of a ceasefire, which he trusted Mr. Gordon-Somers would have negotiated with the warring factions beforehand. The interim government did not want to enter into protracted negotations at the conference itself . It would be very much a 'proforma' exercise.

The Secretary-General's understanding was that the meeting was therefore more ceremonial in nature, the work having been done on the ground by Mr. Gordon-Somers prior to the meeting. In that case, he felt, the Chairman of ECOWAS might very well want the meeting to be held in his country. If some sort of "diplomatic competition" was entered into over the venue of the conference, Geneva could be kept in mind as a neutral option.

Turning to the possibility of UN observers in Liberia, the Secretary-General asked how many the Foreign Minister thought were needed. The Foreign Minister replied that a figure between 150 and 200 had been mentioned, and "we could live with that". If the warring factions felt that the same standard of monitoring could be achieved with fewer observers, "well and good", said the Foreign Minister. But for his part, he preferred to rely on the judgment of the United Nations, which had experience in that area.

Mr. Jonah brought up the rapidly changing military situation on the ground. ECOMOG was apparently winning, and ULIMO was moving fast. The whole matter could very quickly become academic. The Secretary-General asked what, in those circumstances, would be the

- 3 -

point of a conference. "Frankly", replied Mr. Jonah, "that is the basic problem we have with the report".

In military terms the war was virtually over. "But we are trying to encourage them to find not just a military solution, but also a political solution", he continued. It might at this juncture prove possible to bring the factions together, since they might be less intransigent in the circumstances.

He explained that the idea was for Mr. Gordon-somers to return to the area to undertake consul tat ions in preparation for the meeting. That would also demonstrate that the United Nations was not just waiting for a military solution to the equation, but was serious about pursuing peace.

Three things were i mportant: a ceasefire, disarmament, and encampment. In the past, a ceasefire had been achieved, but not the other two elements. Mr. Gordon-Somers would follow the three together. Previously, Mr. Taylor had been in a very strong position; now that he was militarily weak, he may be more receptive to an agreement. So, he concluded, there could be much value in a meeting.

At the meeting, the modalities of a ceasefire, disarmament, and encampment would be decided. The possibility of expanding ECOMOG could be considered, as well as its financing. These issues were currently being discussed with the parties, and there was "general broad agreement" that would take concrete form at the meeting.

In the Secretary-General's view, the problem would be to convince the fifteen members of the Security Council to send a mission of 200 observers, costing millions of dollars which they would have to pay. It was important to be able to present a convincing argument that such a mission had clear objectives and had a chance of success . To the Secretary-General, the goals of the proposed conference seemed rather vague.

The Foreign Minister thought the value of the conference lay in its providing a way out to the warring factions. Even if the situation on the ground was resolved militarily, it would still be necessary to come to a political accommodation. The warring factions had to be persuaded to pursue their interests through the electoral process.

It would be important, if a ceasefire agreement were signed, to be able to follow up i mmediately with disarmament and encampment, without any time lag. This process would have to be monitored, whether it be by ECOMOG or by UN observers; what was essential was that the mechanism be in place at that time. It had to be a "synchronized process".

To the Secretary-General's question about the possibility of a coalition government, the Foreign Minister said that the interim government had been encouraging that idea since the start of the

- 4 -

crisis. In fact, Liberia already had a coalition government, , except for one group.

Mr. Jonah asked the Foreign Minister for any information he could provide on a reported bombing by ECOMOG of some border villages. He mentioned this incident since "at least one" permanent member of the Security Council was of the view that ECOMOG was not a neutral force, and felt that this incident reinforced their view. The Foreign Minister gave his version of events, adding that the Ivory Coast had issued a protest, and seemed content to let things rest, and not to let the incident be blown out of proportion. "It is strange for the French to be more strict that President Houphouet-Boigny", he said.

Summing up, the Secretary-General said that first of all, the objectives of any UN involvement would have to be clarified, so that the Secretary-General could submit a report the matter to the Security Council. He could present the purpose of the meeting as being aimed at political rapprochement leading to national reconciliation.

If the Security Council decided to move ahead with preparations for a conference, he said, in practical terms it would take some time to arrange. And practically speaking, he cautioned, even if the Security Council were prepared to take action, it would be at least some weeks before any observers could be sent, during which time the situation on the ground could change drastically.

The Secretary-General asked the Foreign Minister to tell the President that he would study the whole issue, including possible UN involvement, very carefully. "We will do our homework", he said, as the United Nations wanted to be of help.

/ L~ fJ'Lc.___d~

Freda Mackay~ 9 March 1993

qpho,n,6 (212) 24.9-6014

9T'a.z (212) 7.14-47.15


aupres des Nations Unies presente ses compliments au

Secretaire General de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

et a l'honneur de porter a sa connaissance que dans la

perspective des prochaines assises du Sommet de la Comrrunaute - -----. -- - - -·--··----- -----··-· -- ---·- ·- ·- -· -- •····-·----·- ----- .. --··

des Etats -de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, le President de la Repu--. ----- - -- - -- -·- · · .. ··-···· •· ... - --- -- ··- .. . -

blique du BENIN, President en exercice de la Conference .. -----------··--- --·---- - ...

des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de ladite Communaute

lui demande de bien vouloir autoriser son Representant

Special charge d'etudier la situation au Liberia, Monsieur

TREVOR GORDON SOMERS, a se rendre a Cotonou en vue de

l'informer des conclusions de sa mission dans le cadre du

reglement du conflit liberien.


aupres des Nations Unies remercie le Secretaire General de

l'Organisation des Nations Unies de son aimable cooperation

et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances

de sa tres haute cons i deration.

Secretariat Genera l des Nations Unies NEW YORK

vrier 1993

511-2692

l ., I

Note to the Secretary-General

Under-Secretary-General James Jonah called today at 12:15 p.m. Freetown and asked me to convey to you the following:

After his arrival, yesterday, he held two meetings, first with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and then with the Minister of State - office of the Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council.

This morning Mr. Jonah was received by the Chairman of the National P~ovisional Ruling Council, Captain Valentine E.M. Strasser, and handed over to him the Secretary-General's letter. The Chairman asked to see Mr. Jonah again in the afternoon after discussing the content of the letter with his advisers. Immediately after his meeting with the Chairman Mr. Jonah met with the Deputy Chairman and later with the Attorney General.

This afternoon the Chairman received Mr. Jonah - as agreed in the morning - and asked him to convey the following message to the Secretary-General:

The Chairman wishes to express his sincerest thanks and gratitude to the Secretary-General for his most appreciated way of handling the situation quietly.

He wishes to give the Secretary-General full assurances that:

EOSG/CENTRAL

1- There will be no further executions;

2 -

3-

4-

There will be no further secret trials;

They expect, very soon, the release of a large number of political prisoners;

On the establishment of a civilian government, an independent commission was set up to review and study the question;

r

5- The Chairman also wishes to inform the Secretary-General that:

With regard to the repeal or the amendment of Decree No. 12 (which Amnesty International had requested) the Chairman will have to go back to the Council in order to take a decision;

free access to prisons has been already granted to ICRC and has been exercised twice.

P.S. Since there is no crypto in Freetown, Under-Secretary-General Jonah was not able to cable this message. He should be back on Monday 8 February 1993.

__ .. ----_,

cc.: Mr. de Soto

...

---TO: A:

UNITED NATIONS

. INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

Mr. Jacques Baudot, Controller DATE: __ 2_8_J_an_u_ary __ 19_9_3_ Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Finance

REFERENCE: ____ 2=·~W~C=-F ___ .4'--17t0:S~,H, Mr. Dick Thornburgh, Under-Secretary-General

FROM: CE:

SUBJECT: OBJET:

for Administration and Management

The Secretary General

Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses: Mission to Liberia

1. It is estimated that $31,200 will be required to meet the costs of my Special Representative to Liberia for missions of consultations to several ECOW AS states, as well as for travel undertaken to Geneva for briefings with me, pursuant to Security Council resolution 788 (1992).

2. As no appropriation has been made for this purpose, I hereby authorize you to enter into the necessary commitments up to a maximum of $31,200 under the authority granted to me in paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly resolution 46/ l 87 relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, under which I am authorized to enter into commitments not exceeding $3 million in any one year of the biennium 1992-1993.

3. I certify that these expenses relate to the maintenance of international peace and security.

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY RE I LIBERIA OfF1CE OF THE SPECIAL COORO.NATOA (UNSCOl)

To: Mr. James J onah

Copy:

Under Secretary-General DPA united Nations, New York

Mr. Jean-Claude Ame. Chief of Staff Executive Office of the

Secretary General. United Nations, New York

FAX NO: (212) 963-2979

SUBJECT: MEETINGS/NIGERIA

DATE: 27 Januaey 1993 FILE: FAX : '1?_:;), CHARGE: UNDP

PAGE 1 OF 1

. DEPARTING MONROVIA TODAY {27/01) POR lAGOS AND ABUJA. EXPECTED MEET DR. ABBAS BUNDU AND FIELD COMMABDER OF ECOMOGr MAJOR GENERAL OLURDT ON .28/01. ON 29/01 WILL Kn.~ PRESIDENT BABANGIDA. PLAN TO LEAVE ABUJA, SATURDAY OR SUNDAY ( JO/Jl) DEPENDING ON AVAILABILITY OF FLIGHTS . TO BtJRICnfA FASO. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED ABOUT MOVEMENTS

. AND EXPECTED DATE ·. OF RETURN TO tflM YORK.

~S •

. ~ DAHbl ~ARTMOITS MAMflA f'CMNT" ~ UIIERUL P.O. BOX 1o-c27.& T'£L:(Z3'f) 224-CtG FA1874-~Y4(; c.M9LE: UN0£YPRO .

YAX! (D1)225771

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council Distr. GENERAL

S/25105 14 January 1993 ENGLISH

. ORIGINAL: FRENCH .

LETTER DATED 13 JANUARY 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF SENEGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED

TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a communique from the Government of the Republic of Senegal concerning the withdrawal of Senegalese troops from Liberia .

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

93 - 02474 3968e (E) 140193 . 140193

(Signed) Mame Balla SY Charge d'affaires a.i.

I• • •

s


Annex

Communique from the Government of the Republic of Senegal on the withdrawal of Senegalese troops from Liberia

"True to its commitment always to strive for the promotion and defence of peace and security wherever they are under threat, Senegal sought active involvement together with other States members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in seeking a just and durable peace in Liberia.

"It did so in the conviction that such a peace would be achieved by a settlement negotiated by all the parties to the conflict that for three years has been tearing this fraternal country apart.

"It was in this context and at the explicit request of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) that our country sent troops to participate, in a spirit of strict neutrality, in the mission of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

"It was in the same spirit that it participated actively in all the meetings held to advance the cause of peace in Liberia.

"Despite numerous obstacles to a political settlement constantly created by one of the parties to this conflict - in the event, Charles Taylor's NPFL -and despite the loss of 14 of its soldiers, fallen on the field of honour in the service of peace, Senegal nevertheless continued to make considerable sacrifices in order to assist the fraternal people of Liberia to restore peace and national concord.

"In parallel with the presence of its soldiers on the spot, Senegal made active endeavours at the diplomatic level in concert with the other members of ECOWAS for the effective involvement of the United Nations in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Liberia.

"The results of this activity included the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992 by which the Secretary-General of the United Nations was requested to dispatch a Special Representative to Liberia, thereby expressing the willingness of the United Nations to participate actively in the search for a peaceful solution to the Liberian crisis.

"Given this new situation and in light of internal dictates, the Government has decided to withdraw the Senegalese contingent of ECOMOG, which has accomplished the mission entrusted to it most effectively. As before, it remains intent on striving for a just and durable political solution to the crisis being endured by the fraternal people of Liberia, in accordance with the Yamoussoukro IV Accord as reaffirmed at Geneva."

R7277

RX-LN1 1138 GMT 01/1 3 / 93

ZCZC MXA8169 MDX6769

SS NYI<

.HQCOMCEN <UNNY> 1144 GMT 01/13/93

BT

MXD024:'.:: M:3CB1904

LAGOS 13/01/9:3

OUR/TELEX NO 93/025/AB/AM

ATTENTION:H.E. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

UNITED NATIONS.

NEW YORI< ••

CONSULTATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS ABOUT CONVENYING AN EXTRAORDINARY

SUMMIT OF ECOWAS AUTHORITY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ABUJA

ON 28 AND 29 JANUARY 1993 .THIS SUMMIT WILL BE PRECEDED BY A MEETING

OF THE COUNCIL OF MINI STERS FROM 25 TO 27 JANUARY.ALTHOUGH THE MAIN ----- - ---- -PURPOSE OF THE SUMMIT IS TO ADOPT AND SIGN THE REVISED ECOWAS TREATY.

HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WILL ALSO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS ON THE

SITUATION IN LIBERIA. IN THI S REGARDS ,IT IS MY PLEASURE TO INVITE YOU

I OR YOUR REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND AS AN OBSERVER.

I SHALL CONFIRM THE DATES OF THE MEETING AS SOON AS GENERAL AGREEMENT

HAS BEEN OBTAINED ON THE PROPOSED DATES.

HIGHEST CONS IDERATION

To:

From:

Inter-office memorandum Confidential

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali Secretary-General

Ter Gordo~So Spec al 3-epr n at:i ve for jJ5eria

/ .

Subject: Report on Liberia

r-tJ

9 January 1993

As promised, I am submitting a draft of my report, which omits the section on recommendations which I would prefer to complete during the next phase of my consultations in the region. I will remain in contact with James Jonah.

I was invited last Thursday to brief members of the Security Council in an informal session, which I understood from Jean-Claude Aime, you authorized. I also had separate discussions with representatives from the us Department of State, the US and French Missions. Although I do not wish to prejudge your final decision with respect to UN involvement in the resolution of the Liberian conflict, there are indications that a number of Security Council members anticipate a role for the-UN.

During this phase of my mission, I will be pursuing the goal of trying to bring the leaders of the two warring factions (i.e. NPFL and ULIMO} along with the President of the Interim Government to the negotiating table . . The objective of this exercise will be to obtain a verifiable cease fire. I trust that I still have your agreement that the UN will facilitate the dialogue, preferably in Geneva, when all parties to the conflict are ready.

I am greatly appreciative of your continued confidence and support for this mission.

cc: Mr. James Jonah FEB , ~

Mr. Jean-Claude Aime

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