CLIO 17:4 1988

AMIHUD GILEAD

Plato's Eros, Camus' Sisyphus, and theImpossibility of Philosophical Satisfaction

I. Philosphy, as the love of wisdom, requires satisfaction. Can wesatisfy it? Some philosphers think that such satisfaction, even final andcomplete, is possible; others reject such a possibility. In this paperI attempt to show that both Plato and Camus share the latter posi-tion, and sometimes for similar reasons. This similarity in reasons andopinions is grounded in a common understanding of the nature ofthe erotic drive of philosophy, since Plato's Eros and Camus' Sisyphusshare much in common. The comparison between the two sheds con-siderable light upon the impossibility of a philosophical satisfaction.A satisfied Eros-Sisyphus is a contradiction in terms. We should re-main free of hope and illusion as to final repose and complete satisfac-tion in philosophy. No final, absolute solution of any philosophicalproblem is possible.

Bearing in mind the Platonic interpretation of the word philosophy(philosophia), some of the greatest philosophers challenge the idea thatthe philosophical desire—the philosophical Eros—cannot be satisfied.They think that all the legitimate questions and problems of philosophymay be answered and solved "once and for all." It was Aristotle whotook the first step in this direction. In Metaphysics I, he speaks of ahuman wisdom {sophia—981a27) and of the wise man {sophon—981 bl6,982a7).' In saying this, he is actually challenging the Platonic state-ment that the epithet wise is proper only to a god (Phaedrtts 278D).^However, the certain, indubitable science (episteme) of first causes andprinciples, to which Aristotle aspires and which he considers himselfto actually attain, is entitled wisdom {sophia—982a6). He regards thefragmentary, partial, and insufficient efforts of his predecessors (in thatdomain of knowledge) as culminating in his own theory, the final andcomplete end of theirs. These predecessors' mere "love of wisdom"

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is supplanted by its satisfaction, which is the wisdom achieved byAristotelian science (982a2-6).

A somewhat similar idea is shared by Kant and Hegel. At theend of the Gritique of Pure Reason (A856, B884),3 Kant actually promisesto convey human reason to complete satisfaction, by the end of theeighteenth century, as regards its desire of knowing. He hopes to con-struct a final scientific metaphysics to which future generations wouldmerely need to add didactic, minor improvements (Axx). Relying onthe principles of his own critical philosophy, we can criticize Kantfor that promise and hope, and note his inevitable failure in this mat-ter.'' Nevertheless, Hegel, too, in the Preface to the Phenomenology ofSpirit, says:

To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goalwhere it can lay aside [relinquish, give up] the title 'love of knowing'and be actual knowing—that is what I have set myself to do.'

Whether or not he was actually able to achieve this is another ques-tion.^ Be that as it may, since the human spirit can become theAbsolute Spirit realizing itself in actual history (Phenomenology, 488)and since the filled-fulfilled whole (487), which is "the True" (11),is attainable for us (as is the Absolute Knowing), Hegel actually thinks,therefore, that a philosophical satisfaction is indeed possible. Humanspirit can be "complete within itself," grasp its pure Notion and canceltime (487). This means that human spirit can reach its goal ("Thegoal, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit, that knows itself as Spirit" [493])within actual human history. In other words, we can actually havecomplete philosophical satisfaction in attaining the absolute knowledgeof "spirit completed itself as World-Spirit" (488). Hegel points outthat in Absolute Knowing, "Spirit has concluded the movement inwhich it has shaped itself (490). Thus Spirit, whose goal is entirelyattainable, has actually found complete satisfaction or fulfillment.

Consequently, Hegel, contrary to Kant, thinks that ourknowledge of the Absolute, or "the True" which "is the Whole" (11),is possible by means of identification. Such identification of theAbsolute with the knower entides such a person to be considered"wise" and not merely a "lover of wisdom" which, although possiblyapproaching it asymptotically, cannot yet actually attain it. Contraryto Hegel, thinking of philosophy as the love of wisdom means thatwe cannot know anything absolutely.

The history of philosophy demonstrates that neither Kant norHegel succeeded in satisfying the "love of wisdom" once and for all.The history of philosophy does not come to a stop at the end of theeighteenth century or at the beginning of the nineteenth. Instead ofsatisfying the philosophical Eros, the Hegelian and Kantian philosophies

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have aroused much criticism and doubt, and it is better to considerthem as sources of stimulation and inspiration rather than as terminalpoints in the search for rest and satisfaction.

Our philosophical Eros, if it is not denied or repressed, refusesto die or to accept "satisfaction" by a sterilization or castration ofour desire for metaphysics. In this matter we may consider Kant'sapproach as more mature and profound than that of the positivists.Speaking of the transcendental illusion, he fully realizes that even thestrictest critical principles cannot put an end to it {Critique of Pure ReasonA293-A298, B350-355). Establishing the scientific mäaphysics cannotrevoke the natural and inevitable illusions (A298, B354) of metaphysicanaturalis, not to mention the tasks of our reason, namely, those "ques-tions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it isnot able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it isalso not able to answer" (A vii).

It seems that all the known attempts to entirely satisfy thephilosophical Eros—whether by attempts at completely solving all thelegitimate philosophical problems or by radically invalidating oreradicating them—have so far failed. No philosophical system ormethod has yet succeeded in bringing the history of philosophy andmetaphysics to an end. In what follows, I would like to show thatthe impossibility of a philosophical satisfaction is not an incidental atall but is essential to philosophy, at least as Plato and Camus, mutatismutandis, conceive it. Full philosophical satisfaction is impossible, unlessthere is a way to put an end to philosophy itself or to invalidate it.If there is no such way, then philosophical frustration (or discontent),to whatever extent, is in principle inevitable. Accepting the idea ofa philosophical progress also does not necessarily undermine our argu-ment, as long as there is no end to that progress and philosophy can-not fully reach its goal, to our complete satisfaction.

Plato, bearing in mind that philosophy is a love (Eros) of wisdom,was the first to point out the impossibility of a philosophical satisfac-tion. Camus' Sisyphus sheds a new light on this impossibility. It isa matter of interest and importance to critically compare Plato's Erosand Camus' Sisyphus with regard to the problem in question. To myknowledge no scholarly attempt has been made until now to under-take such a comparison. I would like to fill the gap with this article.

II. In the Symposium, at a critical stage of his tale, Socrates says thatEros, who "yearns for sagacity" (203D6-7), is "a lover of wisdomall his life" (203D7) and "a sophist" (D8). Moreover, Eros is

neither mortal nor immortal, for in the space of a day he will be now,when all goes well with him, alive and blooming, and now dying,

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to be born again by virtue of his father's nature, while what he gainswill always ebb away as fast. So Love [Eros] is never altogether inor out of need, and stands, moreover, midway between ignorance andwisdom. . . .'

Eros, as the paradigmatic philospher, is deprived, except for a tran-sitory period, of Resource's content, fulfillment, rest, sleep, and in-toxication (according to 203B). Indeed, at the end of the Symposium,Socrates alone remains awake and sober. What is the meaning of thisdissatisfaction, restlessness, and sobriety, which are so essential forphilosophy? A philosopher should not enjoy the satisfaction of the ig-norant or the foolish, and he should be free from intellectual self-deception concerning perfection or ultimacy. He must never considerhis philosophy to be perfect, final, indubitable, and entirely satisfac-tory. Being awake and sober, he must be aware of the possibility ofshortcomings and deficiencies in his philosophy, which is not immuneagainst all possible criticism and doubt. His philosophy should alwaysbe kept open and subject to further considerations, modifications, im-provements, and corrections.

The open, unfinished nature of Plato's theory of ideas, whichis subject to self-criticism and even to radical doubts, finds distinguishedrepresentation in the Parmenides, where the interlocutors of the Republicare, not by chance, mentioned by their names. The aporetic, critical,almost "sceptical" side of Plato's philosophy, which actually does notleave its assumptions undisturbed ("in rest"), is expressed thus:

yet, Socrates, Parmenides went on, these difficulties and many morebesides are inevitably involved in the forms . . . The result is that thehearer is perplexed and inclined either to question their existence, or to con-tend that, if they do exist, they must certainly be unknowable by our humannature. Moreover, there seems to be some weight in these objections,and, as we were saying, it is extraordinarily difficult to convert theobjector.̂

Such a criticism has something of the sceptical spirit of old Gorgias.Although not himself a real sceptic (see, e.g.. Republic VII 538C ff.),Plato is not a dogmatic philosopher either. Actually in the Parmenideshe puts his philosophy to the most severe test. His criticism of theseparate existence of the Ideas has much in common with theAristotelian criticism of it. They both relate to the problems of par-ticipation, "middle man," chorismos, infinite regress, and more. In theParmenides Plato becomes an antagonist of his own theory, almost asceptical critic of it. And to the desperate questions of Parmenides—"What are you going to do about philosophy then? Where will youturn while the answers to these questions remain unknown?"—Socrateshas only an aporetic "answer": "I can see no way out at the presentmoment" (135C). Diotima might consider this aporta as one of the

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temporary "deaths" of Plato's philosophy, after which the way wouldbe cleared for a new attempt ("rebirth"). In any case, Socrates'aporetic "answer" has the distinctive quality of criticism and doubtwhich exists in the undogmatic aspect of Plato's philosophy, markedby its aporetic, resdess, unsatisfied temper. Similarly undogmatic is theassumption that no human being can obtain the entirely indubitable,most perfect knowledge which can be possessed by "a god," if byanyone, alone (134C).

The philosophical imperative to ceaselessly criticize and recon-sider one's philosophy, the imperative to never fall into dogmatic rest,as well as the open, undogmatic nature of philosophy, are admiringlydemonstrated in the Seventh Letter:

no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to put into language thosethings which his reason has contemplated, especially not into a formthat is unalterable [immovable]—which must be the case with what isexpressed in written symbols.'

According to Plato, neither book nor speech can do justice to a realphilosophical doctrine, whereas dialogue is the only medium whichcan meet the requirements of philosophy. Dialogical philosophy bydefinition has the potentiality to remain open and unfinished. Eachinterlocutor can change his mind, and the reader may always thinkto hirnself that the interlocutor is either right or wrong in accepting(or rejecting) Socrates' suggestions. The dialogue is an open invita-tion to the reader to take part, to criticize, and to propose furtherconsiderations. The reader is called upon not to leave the assump-tions and conclusions made in the dialogue "undisturbed," "un-moved," or unaltered. Such is the philosopher's task.

Obviously, Plato's philosophy is a human achievement which,as such, is not entitled to the name of wisdom that is the aspired-to,never achieved satisfaction and rest of philosophy. According to theSymposium, there are no final, entirely satisfactory answers for thephilosophical questions, which are perennial, and there is no way toobliterate them, notwithstanding attempts to do so. From time to timeand for a short while only, the philosophical Eros may meet its"death," but only in order to rise again and live. Philosophy is sub-ject, in a recurrent, cyclic manner, to "death" and "decline" as wellas to rebirth, revival ("renaissance"), and rise. The death of philosophyis, on the one hand, its failure to achieve its goals (of understanding,explaining, and solving problems), and, on the other, it is an illusory,false satisfaction, the imaginary obliteration of its problems or a vainpretension of finding "final" answers and solutions for them; whereas,the rise and revival of philosophy are its everlasting, perennial attemptsand renewed attempts at confronting these problems and offer fur-

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ther, other answers and solutions to them (or rediscover the old ones).Since none of these solutions can be absolute or final and entirelysatisfactory, relativity and plurality, therefore, are qualities essentialto the philosophical activity, which is human and not divine. Theillusion of a complete philosophical fulfillment is ephemeral or lastsfor only a short while. Any philosophical achievement is, in fact, aninvitation to possible criticism, debate, doubt, and further considera-tion. All these together form an open context that cannot ever beclosed, that cannot be exhaustive or entirely comprehensive. Conse-quently, absolute indubitability is always beyond our reach, as far asphilosophy is concerned, because we cannot consider all the possiblerelevant doubts, and because the way is always open to further, more,possible doubts from other points of view; whereas only the failureof all possible attempts at throwing doubt on principles and theories,can prove their "absolute indubitability," which can be possessed bya divine wisdom ailone.

Moreover, unlike the natural sciences (and perhaps other intellec-tual disciplines), philosophy is not subject to a (Kuhnian) paradigm.The so-called "canonical" approaches of some philosophical doctrinesare not scientifically paradigmatic in that sense at all, but actuallyrefer only to the current scope and domain of interest shared by somephilosophers at a certain time. If such is indeed the case, philosophycannot enjoy even that relative immunity of the natural sciences againstradical doubts and falsification (at least as long as a certain paradigmhas been maintained and not overthrown).'"

More than any other intellectual discipline, philosophy shouldbe open to criticism, doubt, and counter-argument. When we con-sider the history of philosophy, we always encounter the same con-frontations between doctrines and counter-doctrines: dualism andmonism, idealism and materialism, realism and nominalism, and manymore. None of them can gain a victory over its antagonist, much lessa final one. On the other hand, however, none can absolutely losethe philosophical game. Philosophical doctrines "die" and rise again.They act and move according to a perennial recurrent pattern of"satisfaction" ("fulfillment") and "frustration," "gain" and "loss,""success" and "failure," ascent and descent, rise and fctll. Each isimpelled by the desire to know and understand, which in the longrun is doomed to everlasting dissatisfaction and restlessness. Such,according to Diotima, is the erotic, "absurd" nature of philosophy.

Where the erotic nature is concerned, no final fulfillment ispossible. If philosophy is indeed a sort of human desire or yearning,it cannot contain the promise of any absolute satisfaction. Such asatisfaction would be the sheer obliteration of that desire, an oblitera-

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tion which is doomed to failure as far as philosophy is concerned.As long as we are alive and active, each satisfaction of our desires(whether nutritive, sexual, or other) gives way to other, new, andrenewed desires, yearnings, and aspirations. "A last satisfaction" and"a final fulfillment" of our desires, if they actually exist, are associatedwith the very terminal stage of life, closely approaching death.Moreover, the renascent, phoenix-like nature of philosophy, emphasizedby Diotima, excludes even the possibility of such final satisfaction,all the more so an absolute one.

If we bear in mind the comprehensive, synoptic nature of Plato'sdialectics {Republic VII, 533B, 537C), a complete satisfaction ofphilosophy is seen to be even more unthinkable. The way to total,comprehensive integration of a closed philosophical system has beenblocked by certain insurmountable obstacles, such as contradictionsand antinomies. It was Kant who pointed out the fact that our attemptat achieving a total, complete knowledge necessarily involves contradic-tions, namely antinomies, or paralogisms. (From a mathematical-logicalpoint of view, Gödel's incompleteness theorem indicates analogous in-consistencies concerning complete provability or justifiability). Nosystem of knowledge is entirely exempt from some relativity andunUaterality. So far no philosophical system, which has been considereditself entirely and absolutely justified, has succeeded in avoidingcriticism, doubts, and difficulties. Indeed, the philosophical aspirationto complete, total justification is necessarily unsatisfiable and impliesan infinite regress, because there are no fecund, "self-evident"philosophical principles which are non-trivial and valuable, and becausephilosophy lacks any solid, secure, absolutely indubitable "foundation."Consequently, total justification, the typical aspiration of synoptic ("in-tegrative") philosophy, is an unending quest, devoid of real fulfill-ment, not to mention complete satisfaction.

The philosophical aspiration towards integration (or synopsis) iswell described by Putnam: "The desire for integration is so centralto philosophy, I think, that no philosophical tendency will long endurewithout it. On the other hand, every attempt at integration whichhas been too grand has collapsed. . . . As philosophers, we seem caughtbetween our desire for integration and our recognition of thedifficulty.""

Reading the Symposium, we must clarify whether Plato considersthe end of the erotic quest attainable by human beings. Indeed,Diotima expresses her doubt as to Socrates' ability to attain it (210A).Yet she actually refers to the knowledge of "the very essence of Beau-ty" (211C8-9), to the contemplation of Beauty itself (21 ID) which isdivine (212A). It seems as if nothing of the undogmatic spirit of the

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later Parmenides can be found in these phrases. Moreover, she speaksof the contact which is not with illusion but with truth (212A5). Whatcan be more dogmatic than this grasp of the absolute truth concern-ing Beauty itself, unless one interprets it as an aspired-to object whichfor us is unobtainable? Can we consider Beauty itself as a regulative,asymptotic ideal? Possibly. Be that as it may, that contact is a "visual-ly" mental one, a "grasp" of contemplation and vision, with whichthe beholder is in union (212A2). Contemplation and vision requiresome distance between the beholder and the contemplated object. Sucha distance prevents an ultimate union (or "identification") with thedivine, absolute Beauty, a union which alone can give complete, finalsatisfaction to the philosopher. Moreover, that vision is not an in-tellectual achievement but the result of a divine, non-rational help.It seems that at this point Plato ignores the finiteness and limitationof human reason, and "trespasses" upon the divine domain, far beyondthe reach of our understanding. This is a grave flaw in the Platonicphilosophy, which requires some discussion.

Diotima emphasizes the gradual process of the erotic activity.The philosopher-lover should advance towards the end of his initia-tion in "ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung torung" (211C). She reiterates the "orderly due succession," "the rightand regular ascent," and "the right order" (210A,E; 211B-C). Readingthis, one has in mind an evolution, each step of which successivelyand consequently leads to the others. One should not expect any break,revolution, and leap. Nevertheless, as the philosopher approaches theend of his initiation, a wondrous vision "suddenly [exaiphnes] bursts uponhim" (210E4). Such a sudden revelation is a leap which has nosystematic, rational justification from within, but is caused as if bya Deus ex machina, from without. Indeed, we meet the same suddenintervention from without in other Platonic works as well. The prisonerin the cave is "freed from his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly"{exaiphnes: Republic VII 515C6). Such a procedure is not a rationalpersuasion or argumentation, since a violent force from without isrequired. At this point Plato exposes a flaw in his philosophy, namelythat the passage from the phenomenal world to the noumenal, trueone is not successive and gradual (nor rationally justified), but is sub-ject to break, which is a further indication for the Platonic chorismos.

Finally, the sudden intervention from without is expressed moststrikingly in the Seventh Letter 341C-D: "suddenly, like a blaze kindledby a leaping [sudden] spark it is generated in the soul and at oncebecomes self-sustaining." That sudden experience is a mystical revela-tion, divine, and non-rational, far beyond the scope of our limitedhuman understanding which, according to Plato himself, is not entitled

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to be called "wise." The philosophical aspiration towards reasons andrational explanations, so emphasized in Republic VII (533C,534B-D), can-not be satisfied by such a divine, non-rational revelation. Transcen-ding our limited reason by a sudden leap does not give us the aspired-tophilosophical satisfaction. On the other hand, the lack of reasons andrational explanations increases the possibilities of doubts and criticism,and diminishes even further the possibility of resisting them. Conse-quently, a philosophical satisfaction becomes even more unobtainable.

Had Plato considered his philosophy entirely satisfactory and in-dubitable, the next stage would have been, according to the cyclicpattern delineated by Diotima, a collapse ("death") of that deceptivepretension, a collapse that would have been caused by the sober self-criticism and sincere doubting which are more typical of Plato. Hadhe considered himself to have ended his dialectical journey, he wouldhave had to start it again from the very beginning. Any sincere self-criticism would have turned his pretentiously satisfying solution intoa new aporia, after which the way would have been cleared for a newattempt which, again, could not have been entirely satisfactory.

III. Socrates refers to the eternal punishment and suffering of Sisyphusin the Hades of Homer's Odyssey (Gorgias 525E), and in the Apologyterms Sisyphus one of the heroes with whom he would like to con-verse after his death (41C).'2 Socrates and Albert Camus' Sisypheanphilosopher would have much to talk about and, in particular, talkabout the impossibility of a philosophical satisfaction. As "the wisestand most prudent of mortals," according to Camus, Sisyphus realizesthat impossibility.'3 Indeed, facing "absurd walls" (8ff), the absurd,Sisyphean philosopher is well aware of the limits of human reason(30). As I intend to show, the Sisyphean hero-philosopher must clear-ly realize that his philosophical aspirations, among other kinds, areincapable of being satisfied and fulfilled. Free of illusions and self-deception, he is dispossessed of any lasting rest in his intellectual crea-tion. He must share the Sisyphean fate, namely, to be doomed toeverlasting labor consisting of recurrent attempts and failures, in con-sistent self-criticism and perpetual reconsideration. Like all otherSisyphean heroes, the absurd philosopher is doomed to watch "thestone rush down in a few moments toward that lower world whencehe will have to push it up again toward the summit" (89) ad infinitum.In spite of their important differences (particularly as regards deathand immortality), he shares with Diotima's Eros a similar recurrentcyclic pattern of ascent and descent, rise and decline, success andfailure, the same destiny of ceaseless labor, of unceasing effort. Like

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Eros he enjoys no final satisfaction and does not share the "divinewisdom."

One might assume that the Platonic philosopher and the absurdthinker do not have much in common. Camus' absurd thinking deniesus immortEility and eternity, and remains in the mortal, humandomain.'* But Plato's philosophy argues for human immortality (inthe Phaedo) and relies on our recollection of the eternal Ideas. Canthese two different philosophies meet on a common ground? Indeedthey can, notwithstanding miiny disagreements and differences.

Unlike Plato, Camus sticks to appearances, of which the bodyis the king. He points out that "appearing creates being" (59) andspeaks of a universe created by an actor which "sacrifices everythingto appearance" (60). In the absurd universe, nothing is left of thePlatonic eternal being (ousia), and it is only the phenomenal, ephemeralbecoming {genesis) that matters. According to Camus, this is theephemeral world of Don Juan, to whom "nothing is vanity exceptthe hope of another life" (52). "Time keeps up with him. The absurdman is he who is not apart from time" (54). Free from the "illusionsof the eternal," he knows very well that there is no "at last" butonly "once more" (51-52), and so "he must repeat his gift and hisprofound quest" (51). He "knows and does not hope. He remindsone of those artists who know their limits. . . . And that is indeedgenius: the intelligence that knows its frontiers" (52). There is no totali-ty, finality, nor absoluteness in his world, except one ultimate, finalfact, which is death. Death alone can make a final end to the recur-rent, Sisyphean efforts of Don Juan.

Camus' description of Don Juan, the absurd man, culminatesthus:

The absurd man multiplies here again what he cannot unify. . . . Thereis no noble love but that which recognizes itself to be both short-livedand exceptional. All those deaths and all those rebirths gathered togetheras in a sheaf make up for Don Juan the flowering of his life. It ishis way of giving and of vivifying. (55—italics mine)

In this passage, it seems, Camus at the same time rejects and acceptsDiotima's description of Eros. The first part can be considered as areaction against Symposium 210B: Don Juan, multiplying again whathe cannot unify, certainly refuses to regard as one and the same thebeauty belonging to Eill bodies; and, recognizing the singularity of eachlove, he decidedly does not deem his passion for one particular person"of little or of no importance." He obviously neither scorns it, norcounts it a trifle. But in the second part of the passage, Camus,astonishingly enough, echoes Diotima's words at 2O3E: the same deaths,rebirths, and ephemeral flourishing of Eros are assigned by Camus to

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Don Juan. He and Eros likewise are subject to the same recurrent,cyclic pattern. Moreover, Eros the philosopher is metamorphosed intoDon Juan as a philosopher who is acquainted with the combinationof love and knowledge:

If the term "wise man" can be applied to the man who lives on whathe has without speculating on what he has not, then they are wisemen. One of them, a conqueror but in the realm of mind, a DonJuan but of knowledge, an actor but of the intelligence. (67-68)

Furthermore, "Loving and possessing, conquering and consuming—that is his way of knowing. (There is significance in that favorite scrip-tural word that calls the carnal act 'knowing')" (56).

At this point one has to bear in mind, says Camus, thatKierkegaard "makes sure in the beginning that no truth is absoluteor can render satisfactory an existence that is impossible in itself. DonJuan of the understanding [knowledge], he multiplies pseudonyms andcontradictions, writes . . . that manual of cynical spiritualism. The Diaryof the Seducer" (19). However, there is yet a vast difference betweenCamus' Don Juan and the Platonic and Kierkegaardian philosophers.The two latter accept the leap from the ephemeral to the eternal,whereas the absurd philosopher, being aware of the limits of hisknowledge, has no "illusions of the eternal" (54). He forever negatesthe "powers of eternal reason, of order, of universal morality" (56),which are symbolized by the Sisyphean "gigantic and soulless stone"(56). Becaiise of this—and in rejecting the offered leap—he adopts,even more than the Platonic philosopher, the recurrent pattern of Eros'activity. Beyond the confrontation and dissimilarities in theirphilosophies, and even because of them, a common insight appears,to which, so it seems, Camus is more faithful than Plato (consideringthe latter's illegitimate leap). He is also more systematic. Eros cannothave a final, complete satisfaction and rest. Camus' Don Juan thinks,knows, and behaves in the light of this evidence, and thus avoids theillusion of leaping to eternal rest and satisfaction, which for him wouldmean either death or self-deception.

In criticizing Plato's leap (the "sudden revelation" in Symposium210E4 and Seventh Letter 341C-D, or the "sudden force" in Republic515C6), we must not ignore Camus' criticism of the "existentialistleap" and, in particular, of the leap made in the phenomenology ofHusserl. One can here find some hint of the Platonic one. Camusthinks that all existential philosophers "without exception suggestescape" (24) from the absurd universe which they all acknowledge.This is not only a self-deception, even a self-betrayal, but an illogical,unjustified way of thinking: "Nothing logically prepares this reason-ing. I can call it a leap. . . . Mystical thought has familiarized us with

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such devices" (25). As a matter of fact, I think, the "sudden spark"in Plato's Seventh Letter 341C-D is of this mystic nature. That leapaims at entering "an eternity that is both incomprehensible and satis-fying" (26—italics mine). From a philosophical point of view, whatis incomprehensible cannot satisfy us; and, as I have mentioned abovein discussing the Platonic leap, being unjustified and irrational, it doesnot satisfy our philosophical demands. One must not forget that,although the absurd universe is irrational, irrationality is not a matterof choice but is forced on us by facts. A meaningful absurd, saysCamus, is not something agreed to (24), but it is the evidence of factsthat we ascertain "without consenting" (26, 40). Accepted, acquiesced-in absurd ceases to be the absurd (100). On the other hand, the leapis chosen by philosophers and is not forced on them, and its irra-tionality thus cannot be admitted, like the absurd fact. It has nolegitimate, admitted place in the absurd world.

"The absurd is essentially a divorce. It lies in neither of theelements compared; it is born of their confrontation" (22-23). It isa confrontation between our desires, rationality, consciousness,familiarity, and humanity on the one hand, and on the other, theirrationality, non-humanity, and unfamiliarity of the world and ofourselves ("it is a constant confrontation between man and his ownobscurity"—40; "what is absurd is the confrontation of . . . [the] ir-rational and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the humanheart"—16). The absurd, therefore, consists in hiatus (14), gulf (13),perpetual opposition (45), divorce (26, 37), exile (5), break, lacera-tion (26), and separation between the two sides of the confrontation,which is also a comparison and an equilibrium (27). There is aborderline which separates them and designates their limits: "The ab-surd is lucid reason noting its limits" (36). Nevertheless, the leap—from the temporal, relative, conditioned, and partial knowledge to theeternal, absolute, unconditioned, and total one—is an attempt at bridg-ing the gulf and mending the break. It can be performed in two ways:either by ignoring the limits of our reason and pretending that wecan understand and explain everything and can make everythingfamiliar and human; or by accepting the irrationality, strangeness,and non-humanity of reality (and of ourselves) and renouncing evenour limited reason and rationality.

The first way is that of the "extreme rationalization" of reality("the triumphal reason"—35) taken by Husserl and to some extentby Plato; the second is that of the "extreme irrationalization" of reality("the humiliated reason") taken by Kierkegaard (35-36). In both these(apparently) opposite ways, thought negates itself (35), and each ofthem means denying the undeniable fact of the absurd, because "the

Amihud Gilead . 335

absurd disappears with one of the terms of its comparison" (27) orequilibrium (28). However, the absurd cannot be suppressed (37),'andescape from it is merely a self-deception or a trance, "that spiritualleap which basically escapes consciousness" (44) or that "intoxicationof the irrational and the vocation of ecstasy" (27). Such an attitudeis most undesirable for an absurd thinker, who aspires to wakefulness,sobriety, and lucidity (48). Camus emphasizes that "everything beginswith consciousness and nothing is worth anything except through it"(10).

The absurd invites and requires struggle, revolt, and dissent:"consciousness and revolt, these rejections are the contrary to renun-ciation" (41). The leap, however, demands that we should sacrificeour intellect (28) and renounce our reason (or, alternatively, ignoreits limits). The absurd philosopher categorically refuses to do this: "ifI recognize the limits of the reason, I do not therefore negate it,recognizing its relative powers. I merely want to remain in this middlepath where the intelligence can remain clear" (30; cf. 27, 28, 36).He should never renounce "the light of the inteUigence" (48), whilebeing aware of its limits. Reason is a weapon in his struggle withthe absurd. No victory can be gained in that battle and revolt (whichmaintains the equilibrium) except insistence, dissent, and refusal, butthe absurd is always there. The leap is either an escape from it byimmersion in vain pretension and illusion (concerning "triumphalreason") or a surrender to the absurd's irrationality by accepting itand consenting to it. Such immersion is only self-oblivion and self-deception. The leap to the incomprehensible domain thus cannot offerany satisfaction in our philosophical quest for truth, awareness, andwisdom; whereas the surrender means self-denial, denying ourhumanity and rationality. The leap cannot give us any satisfactionat all, but something entirely different, a negation or suppression ofour desire ("appetite"—27) for understanding and rationality. Thisimplies a philosophical suicide, the "negation of human reason" (31).The leap is "the movement by which a thought negates itself andtends to transcend itself in its very negation" (31).

Plato attempts to bridge the gulf which separates the phenomenal,relative, temporal world from the eternal, absolute, most rational prin-ciple. In order to do so he needs a "sudden leap." On the otherhand, Plato himself points out the permanent irrational residue in thephenomenal world (considering chora, upodoche, and "bastard reason-ing"), and the Timaeus explicitly demonstrates his struggle with thatresidue. A struggle is the only mature approach to the absurdconfrontation.

336 The Impossibility of Philosophical Satisfaction

Speaking of Husserl's phenomenology and its "leap," Camusmentions Plato and the Platonic realism by name (33). Husserl createsa "new world of ideas" (33). Moreover,

The perception of an angel or a god has no meaning for me. Thatgeometrical spot where divine reason ratifies mine will always be in-comprehensible to me. There, too, I discern a leap, and though per-formed in the abstract, it nonetheless means for me forgetting justwhat I do not Wiint to forget. . . . I know that I am faced with ametaphysics of consolation. . . . after having denied the integratingpower of human reason, he [Husserl] leaps . . . to eternal Reason.(34-35)

Camus, on the other hand, has "no concern with ideas or with theeternal" (66). He is well aware of the fact that "nothing of the con-queror lasts, not even his doctrines" (34-35). For him leaping to theeternal Reason is nothing but an illusion: "The leap in all its forms,rushing into the divine or the eternal, surrendering to the illusionsof the everyday or of the idea—all these screens hide the absurd"(67). Screening the absurd means ignoring the limits of our reasonor denying it completely. Our reason cannot explain and understandeverything, not solve all problems entirely, but only some of themand partially, never to our entire satisfaction. Camus thinks thatHusserl ignores those limits (36) and leaps to eternal Reason. So doesPlato by his "sudden leap."

It seems to me that Camus is more convincing than any of the"men of eternity" who, making the leap, ignore the limitation of ourreason, either deluding themselves that it can be transcended, ordenying it completely. However, on the next point, the "renunciationor despair of true knowledge," he is less convincing and his approachmay raise some doubts.

Paradoxes, antinomies and contradictions—whether in self-referential problems, or in attempting complete justification, or in thecomprehension of totalities—are some of the absurd walls which markthe limits of our reason and reasoning. Before considering these, Camusdescribes his method in the following manner:

I am defining a method. But it is also evident that that method isone of analysis and not of knowledge. For methods imply metaphysics;unconsciously they disclose conclusions that they often claim not toknow yet. . . . the method deñned here acknowledges the feeling thatall true knowledge is impossible. Solely appearances can be enumeratedand the climate makes itself felt." (9—italics mine)

However, the climate of absurdity "is in the beginning. The end isthe absurd universe and that attitude of mind which lights the worldwith its true colors" (9). The absurd universe is much more thanan "enumeration of appearances," and Camus has a "system" ofhis own, more than he is ready to explicitly admit. In the Myth he

Amhud Giiead 337

oí'í'rrs us quite a syslcmafic picture, (iividcd ¿is it is into diítfrrn! essays.His syntht.'sis lacks :my pretensions of ul( inia* y and niinplcicnrss, yetJiis (hou£;ht is much more than "'just an analysis," and it svstrnialKallvI'liiiHiipa-SSfs sonic :i!*ras of human attivi[y. <rcari\-iiv and ktiimlfclgcin which wf cliüllcnsíf the "absuni walis."

More<)\.-er. i!'i>y " t rue knowlrdtic" Camus means a knovvleiit;cihat can be jusufirc] to a reasonabie <-xiei¡l (sueh as a ^orr ni' ¡'latmiicI'fnsfcmr which, however, lacks an unhypotiictical llrsi [>iinciplf. yetdoes not keep ils hypotheses '•iinciisiurt)e(l"l—iie is cenainlv wrong.II. (in ihe (ither ÍI.IIKI, " t rue kriov\leflgc" is an eridrelv iiHlubiiaLileanti completely sa(isf;i( tory knov\leclge. (here tan be no (iiiui)t lliaiC'amus IS right *I o be sure, we t annot reducf the worlti \o luiniancaiegories or to human raîionalilv ("elarity"—13). If (lie taíionaüsisfireterid to do so. dicir pretension is a vain one. Anii iJ thai is thelorreer interpretation ol' " t rue knowledge," Canius perhaps has somereason (whieh 1 regard with cenain resenation.s) to conchide ihal "withdie exception of proiessiimiil rationalists, ttxiay people (iespaii o1~ trueknowledge'" (14), However, althougli 1 accept C^amus' iriuiisin I'on-lerning the extreme ration^ilizatiun ot reality. Í ^annm agree wiih fhealfitiuie expressc(i in liie iollowing (jiintation:

W i t h U s [ n i i i i d ' s | l l r s t m o v e t i i i s v v o r U i ( r m . k s a i u i î L i i n i > J i - s - , i i ! i n i i n i i i 'n u m b e r o ! s h i n i ü ü ' r i i i g t V a g t i i e n t s i s i i l ' t i - t c d [ i i t h e i H k i e i > t a ! K l i n i . i , i t Vmust df.\pair oJ evn- rfionsirufiuig the famiiini, (.aim sur fa re wi i id i wouldtfivf us ¡leacc nf hcirt. Alter so many cetUuries of inqiinics. su inanyabdicatiofis aiiiuiig ihinkcrs, we art- v.<-l] aware ihai i/m /i ¡rw for nilo u r k ' i f i i d n l í j t , " (\\ — i r ; i l i c s m i n e )

MUSI we despair of a tnie knowlciige which is not pieceniea!htii systemaiie:* Xo( at all, and at this piiini. so it seems, ("anius isnot faithtui lo his own methor! which instruns us noi lo leave fheSisy[ih{-an stone al liie fooî of the mountain! To cieceive oin'selves byl)eing eíímpletely satislled with our knowl<-<lge, by pretending lo achieveiliat "peaee of hear t" which onl\' a inst paradise miglii give ns. isone ifiing. whereas never lo ciespair ol a systeniatie knowledge, howeverlinuteci and re]aii\'e, is quite another! To be saiisfied with jiieiemealfragments is as nuH'h a self-deception, an es(-ape. as is ihi- leap. Leius licit Jorgct tfiat Sisyphus sueceecis in pushing the sfone quile closelo (he summii, and ("anius makes ii clear that "Sisyphus teaches thehigher lldelity that , . . raises rocks" (ill). His "struggie toward ilicheigiits" (91) is ni'iiher sterile nor fu(Íle, Ho\ve\'cr, despairing oi' trueknowledge, Sree from illusions and aware of its limils. means iciin-quishing the struggle and surrendering to the absurd. Anci this toois a sort of philosophii al suieide. Kven if Camus were righi m sa\ ingthat the hïstorv of human thought musí be " the histor\' of ils sue-

338 The Impossibility of Philosophicai Satisfaciion

ccssivc rcirn.'ts and its inipi>î<'iK es'" {14). even i!'"ih{-rc arc iruihs í)uinot [he t ru th" {'l~>), anti cvrn if íorfvt-r I v\'ouUi be "a siratiiit.'i- lomyself" aiui tail in fulfilling thi' Sncratic "Know vüui*se!í" (15)—--till¡lier«' ¿ire '•|et,nîinuiîc approximations' ' (If)), Besides. Sisvphus' (uvnhistory too is full oí failures wjiieh did not make him despair, i'ur-dieniHue, iioes Camus realiy wish us to reiiiiquish oui no.sLaliiia toiunity and claiily? Such a renuiu ialitin means pulling an end to theahsurti by elirninaiint; otie of ihe remis of ihe e(|uilibriuin. withouiwhirh there is no absurd (27) It is it;ni!rin^' tlie i;u]i beiwern (hisnostalgia and the world as il is. thai C'ainus wishes us u> i ejeet,

!n the aijsurd world ol" Sisv¡>hiis ihcrc is room lor relan\c f>r(>-gress. some suecess ami knowiedi^e winch lo some exrent is true. Anti!o some extern Sisyjjiius sueeeeds ui raising his stone, l>ut not to thevery suinniii. He has some achievements, to his tredit. and his deter-niinaiion never to lea\e ihc roek at die ioot of the niovniiaiu is nothis onlv .sueeess. Acconïing Co (^lanius. seience ftffers us hypo/iif^/w, "ihatelaim lii teaeh mi- bul that ate not sure" (1.Î). Nevertheless. h)pothesesand even eonieeîuics can teaeh us a lot abotii the work! I'ven thrí>ugíitheir reiutatiim, as Popper has -ihown. Bi-ing tmsatistied wiîli aliypothesis does not îiiake it useless in aiiprehendsng tlie wtirlti. ton-trar\' lo what Cariius thinks. Sei<;nce does not " tease to propouiulIpropose]." in spite of (Camus' argiiment (70), and .siioiüd not so lease.It still shares Û priori assumptions (e.g., as u> the I'eriotiie ¡"abie ojthe eietntfiits} suhjeet to ecnilh-mation or retutation. assnniption?. whuhare of niu(h heÍ¡). liowever limite(i, m exjilaining nature lo us ani!iti makiny prédit tion possible. No one ran make [hem nnmune foreveragainst any possiljle doubt: ne%-ertheless, their usefulness is be\onii(jucstion.

As to the quest lor ai)solute kncnvicdge. al this point loo ("amusIS not (juite faithlu! to his phil(iso(3hic al piineii)Ifs, ilie iinai anibinonof tite absurd piiikjsophiT is to understand e\-ervthinsi altlumgh tie ¡swell aware oi~ the impossibility of an understanding; whieli neeessarilvinvolves eontradi( tions. CJainus" des( ription ol the aetnr !s applnableto the phiiosopher, or in Cianius' words, " an aetur hul ol ihcintelligene<'" (61). As to the actor in í^enera!, Camus says:

ir i.s t h e a b s u r d i - o i i i r a d u ' l i o t i i r s r l t , i h a t i i i d i v ü i u a l ^'.h«! v . : i n i s M> a d i i r v T

r v i ' i - y i l i i n i i a n c i H M - e% í T y i h i n L ; . t l i a t u s c l e ^ ï . i t t n n p i , t h .H ini-IK's lu . i l

p e r s i s t e n c e . W h a t a l w a y s c n n t r a d i r t s i t s e l l n e v i ' r i l i e l r s . s j u i n s in I n n i . "

•["o a(hie\"e everything in philosophy tiieans ro umipliieK' kno\\.understand, explain, and justify. Anv attempt ol' this sort is uselessand ineiieciual. namely, Sisypliean. '"'foial. absolute knowlerigi-" iuustbe dcnieij bv its own inner C!)ntradietions. ("ainus, like Kieikegaarii

Ammud Gileaü

befort- him, considers this attempt as a failure. A "totar' system can-not avoid unilatcrality aiid relativity, and this rules out any longed-for absoluteness. It raises doubts and ieavcs many questionsunanswered. And yet, fallowing Camus' principles, one should neitherrenounce such an attempt nor suppress his -'appaire for the absolute"(13). howevefr unsatisfiable. Such a suppressing means destroying theabsurd equilibruim (27). Moreover, for Don Juati the gigantic andsoulless stone symbolizes "eternal reason" (56). and this is the samestone that he must push to the top oí the mountain, although he mustknow in advanee that he must be ineluctably defeated (69). Wheneverhe fails he must attempt again and again to understand and explainmore and more. Even the attempt to achieve absolute knowledge isa typical Sisyphean task. Its "useiessness and íneífcctuality" do notmake it less'obligatory. After all, that is the meaning of attemptingto raise the Sisyphean stone to the top of the mountain. Such is thestruggle toward the heights. At this point too, concerning the aitcmpfat obtainmg absolute knowledge, Camus is not faithful enough to hisown myth of Sisyphus.

On the other hand, Camus is quite right when he states thatno one is enutled to ignore the absurd walls. Self-referential paradoxes("as soon as thought reileeis on itself, whai it first discovers is a eon-tradietion" [12j), paralogisms and antinomies, eontradictions. incon-sistencies and fallacies—all these poiin out again and again the absurdwalls which necessarily frustrate our aspiration towards absoluceknowledge and block our way to it. One should not ignore Kant'stheory eoncerning antinomies and paralogisms, nor Godel's m-eompleteness theorem. Demolishing one of these walls or cUmbing overit only confronts us with another one, with new apona and so oneverlastingly. Camus, therefore, sounds quite convincing in the follow-ing passage:

h IS useless to negate tlu' reason absolutely. ÍE has its order m whichII is cfficaciotis. ll is properly that of human experience. Whence we^^anieti to make everything clear. If we cannot do so. if the absurdIS born on that occasion, it is born precisely at thf very mei-trng-pointof that effitacious but iiniiied reason with the cüer remrgcnt inationai"127 — italics mine)

At that final pomt, the permanent, irrational residue in our world.Plato would agree with Camus. For Plato fares his own absurd walls,and indeed, such walls form an inexhaustible source for philosophicalfrustration and dissatisfaction,

IV. It seems that most of the foundations required for our anaiv-Siyof the impossibility of a philosophical satisfaction according to Camus.

The Impossíbilily ol Philosophica. Satisfaction

have now hrvn laid. Plain and fUunus share the :^nmv ÍUSIKHÍ a5 !o

Ihai inipossibiJitx'. and both. with sonu- diíícrenrrs. rsla!>ii..h iî on ÜH-

••n-olK- ídcsiíoü..) nature niphilosoplu aiui an human imuvucss and

l i n i i l . i l i i i n .

Absurd n-;isoning slmuld carry absurd % ; ^ lo ¡is ncu'.ssarv c (in

chisitin and mainiaui the absurd as an -'uní rasing stn.gsílc " Camus

••musí admit ihat ihat strui;^\c ,n,pües a tuial ab.seruc- o i \ o p e (which

has noli.ing lo do with d.-spair). a continua] rcjecüon (v\huh musí

n.K be .-(infuseti with renunciaiion). and a cn.scious ,H^v,/nfa^!im (whuh

nuisE not be compared to immature unre.si)" (2:i —iiahcs üiine). In

order !o analyze the rra.sons for diis dissalLsfanion wr must cunsider

some Diher pa.ssages. First.

n . i ing the ssoHd fur a m a n is r edu i iii^ ii u, ihe h u m a n

iî vv.th his si-iú. . . T h e mn.m • 'Al! ÜKnmhi is . in ihroponior-

phic has n o o t h e r m e a n i n g . L ikewis r rhe m i n d ¡hat a i m s .<> u n d ^ î -

s l a n d reaÎHv r a n r o n ^ d e r n-M\ ,aUit),^! onlv bv rr,lu.;inL' H lo U T U I S

»i iho t ig lu . il m a n r c a l i m i tliaî t he univrr.s^. like h i m r a n Inve ^nH

siifier. IK- w o u l d be îcamalfl. ( Í 3 —ita l ics n i jn f )

h IS absolute ly impossible îo reduce the w<trld in nselt to ihe UTins

ot (),ir î h o u g h i . Plato^s mmmma a n d that of Kan t are rn t i r e tv intelligi-

ble, v.\u-vi:>As phnionmm as such a re no ! . Bod, c rn i (a l phi losoph) ' and

Pla to at knowlfdfie shis l imiiai ion nf ou r reason. Th<- (laia of ^he 'x%o,ld

are not redui-ibie lo the pr inc ip les of otu- reason oi uruiersTaniimi;.

Ani in-opornorphi r t h o u g h l . on the o ther h a n d , den ie s ihat l i n m a t m n

Sucii a denial is a se!í-deeep¡ ion, because (he vvorhi is noi mai le ior

o u r purposes a n d no te leo io^ua l way of t h i n k i n g can llnd ils wav at

that poiiH. O n m a n y oecasions we ma> la.T an unia in i l ia i w.)rld,

unr<-as.,nable. indi i íerení to ou r needs and exen dani^eTons Consid.-r-

m g ou r " a p p e t i t e lor elari îv- ' against the i,'iven, real iac(s. there is

a ennsratil ^'gulT ifiat sepára les ou r desires Irom eonfjuesi ' - ( i ; î ) . H i , '

a b s u r d is '-llial di\nre<- beiweeîi the m i n d ihat des i res and the world

thai «lisappoinis'^ {'.M). W e nee,l m o r e and wan ; m<ne

•Ihe phi¡(Koph¡,al minil " a i m s i., u n d e r s i a n d ' ^ Ain\ to know

every i inng . O n l y ••!>lind reason m a y well claim rhai all is d e a r / ' bui

" t i e s p u e so mariv pieK-ntit.ns eenlur ies am! over the heads of so m,in->

eloqui 'nl a n d persuas ive m e n , 1 know that it ts false'^ {]>-,) Hen* e.

'-tiiat universa l reason , praei ical or et iueal , thai deU 'nn in i sn i . ihuM'

ea!ei;.u-ies thai explau i eve ry ih ing are enot tgh to mak<- A , ie ,vni m a n

They have n o i h i n g lo do with (he lu ind . 'J hev negaie i,s pn.-

t r u t h , whi. h is to be e n e h a i n c d ' - (1(0, W e aie e u i h a i n e d b^

Ihe absu rd walls, i,y IÍK- u n d e n i a b l e liinitatHui of ou r reason ian,, i i i ,

" ' the afjsurd is lucni reason nocmg its l i m i t s " [36 | ) . -]'h,,¡ l imna i ion

has a n o l h e r s ide, namely , the notu on<', whici, is if,-' gull s e p a r a n n g

our desire.s ÍR,m iheir satisfaction from WÍÍIKHJÍ, l í i e ab su rd lies m

Amihud Gilead 341

the confrontation of our own irrationality ("forever I shall be a strangerto myself [15]) or the unreasonable world (20, 36, 38), with "thewild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart" (16).The erotic side of our philosophical dissatisfaction is clearly expressedin Camus' description of "the essential passion of man torn betweenhis urge toward unity and the clear vision he may have of the wallsenclosing him" (17—italics mine; cf. Sisyphus' passions—89; "my pas-sion" is the third consequence drawn from the absurd—47). At thispoint the erotic aspect and that of our limitation are only two sidesof the same fact concerning the impossibility of a philosophical satisfac-tion. Indeed, " I want anything to be explained to me. . . . And thereason is impotent when it hears this cry from the heart" (20). Thereis always that "regular hiatus between what we fancy we know andwhat we really know" (14).

Two facts are undeniable in this context, namely, on the onehand the irrational and the "lucidity imposed on me by the pursuitof a science" and, on the other, my wild longing, desire, and passionfor clarity: two undeniable certainties (16). And there is no use deny-ing the absurd. By ignoring one of the terms—the irrational or ourlonging for clarity—"the absurd disappears" (27). However, it is nota real disappearance, but only a repression, or a "suppresion of theabsurd by denying one of the terms of its equation" (37). Kierkegaard,according to Camus, suppresses my longing (nostalgia) for familiarity,and "that desire for clarity must be given up if it wants to besatisfied. . . . Sin is not so much knowing . . . as wanting to know. In-deed, it is the only sin . . . which the absurd man can feel. . . . He

' is offered a solution in which all the past contradictions have becomemerely polemical games. But this is not the way he experienced them.Their truth must be preserved, which consists in not being satisfied. Hedoes not want preaching" (37). A "satisfaction" which is actually arenunciation of the desire to know is nothing but a self-negation. Theabsurd man rejects any "satisfaction" of that kind and refuses the falsesatisfaction which is obtained by the vain solution ("for everything")which is offered to him.'= He experiences the real contradictions inhis life and in the world. The "satisfaction" which he rejects giveshim "peace only by refusing to know and live" (15), namely, thepeace of the graveyard, attained by committing suicide. This is a"poisoned peace produced by thoughtlessness, lack of heart, or fatalrenunciations" (16—italics mine). In the domain of philosophy it is aphilosophical suicide. If I reject it, "I can negate everything of thatpart of me that lives on vague nostalgia, except this desire for unity,this longing to solve, this need for clarity and cohesion" (38).

The Impossibility of Philosophical Satisfaction

Rejecting such a suicide leaves us with a most unsatisfactory,frustrating situation: "These two certainties, my appetite for theabsolute and for unity and the impossibility of reducing this worldto a rational and reasonable principle—I also know that I cannot recon-cile them" (38). Reconciliation there is not, but the revolt is there:

Unhke Eurydice, the absurd dies only when we turn away from it.One of the only coherent philosophical positions is thus revolt. It isa constant confrontation between man and his own obscurity. It isan insistence upon an impossible transparency. It challenges the worldanew every second. . . . metaphysical revolt extends awareness to thewhole of experience. (40—italics mine)

The absurd, contrary to suicide, is at the same time awareness andrejection of death (40). The phUosophical, metaphysical revolt is a cen-tral point in the absurd experience. As such, that revolt is an inex-haustible source for dissatisfaction, in which the absurd—being a divorce,a break, and a separation—consists. Such is the Sisyphean fate, and suchIS that of Eros. The impossible transparency, to which philosophersaspire, most distinctly marks the impossibility of a philosophicalsatisfaction.

In the essay "Philosophy and Fiction," Camus says that "theappeal for satisfaction . . . [is] now devoid of echo" (69). However,philosophers have attempted to give philosophy a final satisfaction,which Camus couples with their attempt at healing the breaches thatseparate us from the whole world. "To think is first of all to createa world" (74), namely to construct a synthesis, a system, in orderto correct our piecemeal experience. We start out from "the basicdisagreement that separates man from his experience in order to finda common ground according to one's nostalgia, a universe hedgedwith reasons or lighted up with analogies but which, in any case, offersan opportunity to rescind the unbearable divorce. The philosopher, evenif he is Kant, is a creator" (74—my italics). Creation is "the absurdjoy par excellence" (69). However, philosophical creation cannot bringthe longed-for satisfaction, since nothing can entirely suppress thedivorce in question, and since

a profound thought is in a constant state of becoming. . . . If somethingbrings creation to an end, it is not the victorious and illusory cry ofthe blinded artist: 'I have said everything,' but the death of the creatorwhich closes his experience and the book of his genius. (84)

Only blindness—a lack of self-criticism—can deceive us, as if therewere final solutions to philosophical problems. The end of some greatphilosophy is the death of its creator, and yet as far as that philosophyis written in certain books, the philosophy itself, as Plato says in theSeventh Letter, remains open and cannot be entirely contained andfinished in a book. In any case, no philosophical creation ends witha final, complete satisfaction. Camus despises the "smug

Amihud Gilead 343

thought . . . [of] philosophers, ashamed of themselves," as opposedto the thought of "lucid thinkers. At a certain point where thoughtturns back on itself, they raise up the images of their works like theobvious symbols of a limited, mortal, and rebellious thought" (85-86).Such a rebellious thought consists of self-criticism, awareness of one'slimits and reconsideration. We can find thought of this kind in Plato'sParmenides. Here Plato can be considered as a "lucid thinker" whosethought is certainly not smug. I have no intention of representing Platoas an absurd philosopher; however, he has an insight concerning theimpossibility of a philosophical satisfaction, which is shared by Camus.

No rest for the Sisyphean philosopher. Being sober and awake,he always finds his burden again. An irrational residue always remainsfor us in the world, as we know it, and in our own knowledge itself.Beyond the top of the mountain, the lost paradise is waiting, but forus it is an illusion. In our dreams we may there find the ultimate,absolute truth of indubitable, entirely satisfied wisdom, but not in thereal world. However, "the struggle itself toward the heights is enoughto fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy" (91). Canwe imagine an unsatisfied, yet happy philosopher? Indeed yes. Self-awareness, self-criticism, reconsidering can give us much joy and makeus happy, because there is no end to the serious philosophical game,to the tragic joy of philosophical creation, except by death. Whenevera great philosophic2il solution rolls back down to the foot of the moun-tain, whenever it no longer satisfies our philosophical desire for wisdomand understanding, we must try again. Refusing to fool ourselves,but without renouncing our desire to understand, we should againattempt to raise the Sisyphean rock to the summit. By making a deci-sion never to cease our philosophical efforts, we gain strength (Sisyphus,as Camus says, is "stronger than his rock"—89) and confidence inourselves. Self-deception is a cause for unhappiness and despair,whereas strength and self-confidence bring happiness. The certaintythat, as often as the rock rolls down, the philosopher will raise it—again and again, till his death—is a genuine source for real happiness.Eros is a great daimon and happiness is eudaimonia, "the daimon's well-being." Since a satisfied Eros is a contradiction in terms, Eros canbe happy but not satisfied. As long as our philosophical passion candrive and stimulate us, we are eager to know and to understand. Thiseagerness fills us with joy and happiness, while we remain free of hopeand illusion as to final repose and complete satisfaction. This freedom,even from our own philosophical achievements, this independence ofthe mind, are the greatest joys of an unsatisfiable philosophy.

The University of HaifaHaifa, Israel

344 The Impossibility of Philosophical Satisfaction

NOTES

1, Aristotelis Opera, ed. I. Bekker, 5 vols. (Berlin: Prussian Academy, 1831-70).

2, Platonis Opera, ed, John Burnet, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1907).

3, The pagination is of Edition A (1781) or Edition B (1787) of Kant's First Critique.See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: StMartin's, 1950),

4, See Section IV of my "Restless and Impelling Reason: On the Architectonic ofHuman Reason According to Kam," Idealistic Studies \b (1985):137-50,

5, G, W, F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans, A. V, Miller (Oxford: Clarendon1979), 3,

6, Consider Theodore F, Geraets, "The ImpossibUity of Philosophy , , , and Its Realiza-tion," Owl of Minerva 16 (1984):32-33. See also Sections 7-8 of my "The Problem ofImmediate Evidence: The Case of Spinoza and Hegel," Hegel-Studien 20 (1985):158 ff,

7, Symposium, trans, Michael Joyce, in The ColUcted Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith HamUtonand Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1963), 556 (203E-204A).

8, Parmenides, trans. F, M, Cornford, in Dialogues, 929 (135A),

9, Seventh Letter, trans, L, A, Post, in Dialogues, 1590 (343A).

10, On this immunity see Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol, 1, Mathematics, Matterand Method, 2d ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979), 259-61, 266, We would drawattention to his notion that, "In no area, not even the area of logic, are 'clear anddistinct ideas' immune from overthrow" (x), Putnam's kind of "Platonism" is "a researchprogram; not something fixed once and for all but something to be modified and im-proved by trial and error. In my view this is something characteristic of all livephilosophical positions" (xii-xiii),

11, Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol, 3, Realism and Reason (Cambridge- Cambridge UP1983), 303.

12, Curiously, one of the spurious "Platonic" dialogues is entided Sisyphus, whosemterlocutors are Socrates and Sisyphus {Platonis Opera 5:387B-391D),

13, Albert Camus, "The Myth of Sisyphus" and Other Essays, trans, Justin O'Brien (NewYork: Vintage, 1955), 88,

14, Myth of Sisyphus, 2, 47, 49, 54, 61, 62, 64, 66,

15, Myth of Sisyphus: "I understand then why the doctrines that explain everything tome also debilitate me at the same time. They relieve me of the weight of my ownlife, and yet I must carry it alone" (41), Relief is a sort of satisfaction. The absurd,Sisyphean thinker must refuse it.