Pigou’s Dividend versus Ramsey’s Dividend in the Double Dividend Literature

PIGOUrsquoS DIVIDEND VERSUS RAMSEYrsquoS DIVIDEND IN THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND LITERATURE ()

Authors Eduardo L Gimeacutenez (a)

Miguel Rodriacuteguez (b)

Universidad de Vigo

P T No 206

() We specially thank Xavier Labandeira for useful insights We also have benefited from comments and suggestions by Fidel Castro-Rodriacuteguez and Fuco Lores Miguel Rodriacuteguez grateshyfully acknowledged the financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Education and ERDF (Projefts BEC2002-04394-C02-02 and SEC2002-03095) the Galician government (Project PGIDIT03PXIC30008PN) and Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF)

Corresponding author Miguel Rodriacuteguez (miguelruvigoes)

(a) Facultade de ciencias Econoacutemicas e Empresariais 36310 Vigo Tph (+34) 986 813 514 Fax (+34) 986 812 401 egimenezuvigoes Personal urlhttpwebsuvigoesegimenez Departamento de Fundamentos da Anaacutelise Econoacutemica e Historia e Institucioacutens Econoacutemicas and research group REDE

(b) Facultade de Ciencias Empresariais e Turismo 32004 Ourense Tph (+34) 988 368 760 Fax (+34) 988 368 923 miguelruvigoes Personal url httpwebsuvigoesmiguelr Departamento de Economiacutea Aplicada and research group REDE

URL research group httpwwwredeuvigoes

NB Las opiniones expresadas en este trabajo son de la exclusiva responsabilidad de los aushytores pudiendo no coincidir con las del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales

Desde el antildeo 1998 la coleccioacuten de Papeles de Trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales estaacute disponible en versioacuten electroacutenica en la direccioacuten gthttpwwwminhacesiefprincipalhtm

Edita Instituto de Estudios Fiscales NIPO 602-06-006-5 ISSN 1578-0252 Depoacutesito Legal M-23772-2001

3

3

3

INDEX

1 INTRODUCTION

2 THE SOCIAL OPTIMUM AND THE DECENTRALIZED ALLOCATION

3 THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND OF GREEN TAX REFORMS

31 The environmental approach

32 The public finance approach

33 A proposal of definition

4 AN ILLUSTRATION FOR THE US ECONOMY

5 CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX MEASURING THE DIVIDENDS IN AN ANALYTICAL EXAMPLE

REFERENCES

SIacuteNTESIS PRINCIPALES IMPLICACIONES DE POLIacuteTICA ECONOacuteMICA

mdash 3 mdash

XXXXX

ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the welfare analysis of green tax reforms The aims of this paper are to highlight misinterpretations of policy assessments in the double dividend literature to specify which of the efficiency costs and benefits should be ascribed to each dividend and then to propose a definition for the first divishydend and the second dividend

We found the Pigoursquos dividend more appropiate for policy guidance in conshytrast to the Ramseyrsquos dividend usually found in mainstream literature Thereshyfore we take up some authorsrsquo recent claims about the need of unambiguous and operative definitions of these dividends both for empirical purposes and political advice

Finally the paper analyzes a green tax reform for the US economy to illusshytrate the advantages of our definitions for policy assessment The new definishytions proposed in this paper i) overcome some shortcoming of the mainstream current definitions in the literature regarding overestimation of the efficiency costs and ii) provide information by themselves and not as a partial view of the whole picture

Keywords Double dividend Green Tax Reforms Ramseyrsquos dividend Pigoursquos dividend

JEL Codes H23 Q58

mdash 5 mdash

XXXXX

Instituto de Estudios Fiscales

1 INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with the welfare analysis of green tax reforms a twoshystep policy scheme consisting of setting a tax on emissions and then devoting the tax revenue to finance reductions in incentive-distorting taxes (eg labour or income taxes) As a result the government may reap a double benefit or divishydend a cleaner environment and additionally a less distorting tax system The implementation of each policy step linked to this kind of tax reform however involves efficiency costs and benefits both on the consumption of environmental and non-environmental commodities

The aims of this paper are to highlight misinterpretations of policy assessshyments in the double dividend literature to specify which of the efficiency costs and benefits should be ascribed to each dividend and then to propose a definishytion to the first dividend and the second dividend Therefore we take up the recent claims about the need of unambiguous and operative definitions of these dividends both for empirical purposes and policy advice Finally we analyze a green tax reform for the US economy to illustrate the advantages of our definishytions for political implementation

The case for green tax reforms is well rooted as academic research on the double dividend hypothesis within the so-called1 ldquoenvironmental viewrdquo (see Tullock 1967 Terkla 1984 Lee and Misiolek 1986 and Pearce 1991) These authors were mainly interested in the first dividend assuming that reducing disshytorting taxes results in a welfare improvement ie a positive second dividend Their analysis however was built on a partial equilibrium approach and had two important shortcomings first none of the proponents provided a full characshyterization of both dividends to allow for an unambiguous definition and policy analysis and second they failed to identify the interaction effects of environshymental taxes with other distorting taxes which might bring with some efficiency losses and would require a more general framework2

Along the 90rsquos a different strand of the literature usually known as the ldquopublic financerdquo view intended to overcome these difficulties by placing the discussion into the realm of optimal taxation in the general equilibrium framework previously developed by Sandmo (1975) (see Goulder 1995 Bovenberg 1999 and Bovenshyberg and Goulder 2002 for subsequent surveys) This line of research was

1 Schoumlb (1997) used the terms environmental and public finance view to classify the double dividend literature 2 See Goulder (1995) Parry (1995) and Parry Williams and Goulder (1999) Among others Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) and Parry (1995 1997) pointed out that the double dividend hypothesis is flawed because it ignores the taxshyinteraction effect ie by raising costs and prices environmental taxes aggravate the distorshytions of pre-existing taxes (by reducing the labor supply below its already suboptimal level)

mdash 7 mdash

mainly interested in the possibility of Goulder (1995)rsquos strong double dividend taking for granted that setting an environmental tax improves the welfare related with the environment ie a positive first dividend is achieved3 The main conclushysion that can be drawn from this literature is that a strong double dividend occurs under rather ldquolimitedrdquo circumstances (eg an initial non-optimal tax menu)

Yet the ldquopublic financerdquo approach may be subject to two critiques First the fact that the strong version of the double dividend hypothesis compares the equishylibrium after the tax reform with the previous status quo instead of analysing the two policy changes (ie the new environmental tax and the recycling of reveshynues) has lead several authors to assign incorrectly efficiency costs and benefits the first dividend strictly accounts for the environment-related welfare changes after the green tax scheme is fully implemented that is the entire decrease of the externality whereas the remaining non-environmental welfare changes are integrated in the second dividend Consequently this definition of the second dividend considers the non-environmental benefits and costs of green tax reshyforms However the goods being levied by the environmental tax accounts for a reduction in their consumer and producer surpluses therefore i) they are costs needed to improve efficiency and ii) they should not treated as efficiency costs as some authors have done in the public finance approach who consider ldquothat an environmental tax is distortionary [which would] imply a redefinition of this term as commonly understoodrdquo (Bohm 1997 p 121)4

Actually the definitions provided by the proponents of the ldquopublic financerdquo approach seem of not great help to avoid these misunderstandings For examshyple Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) definition of the ldquodouble dividendrdquo hyshypothesis5 focused the discussion on the behavior of the labor market considering the effects on employment as the second dividend6 Others have considered different definitions such as fiscal benefits7 economic growth in terms of GDP

3 That is whether an environmental tax reform enhances not only environmental quality but also non-environmental welfare so that gross efficiency costs are negative after substituting an environmental tax for a distortionary tax (Bovenberg 1999) 4 For example the Royal Society (2002) distinguishes four effects of green tax reforms desshycribing the tax interaction effect as ldquothe distortionary effect of the pollution tax through its effects on raising the price of polluting goodsrdquo (p 5) Accordingly Royal Society considers that an environmental tax on polluting goods reduces their consumer surpluses which represhysents an efficiency cost Another example Bovenberg (1999) denotes all gross costs as effishyciency cost 5 ldquoThe hypothesis that higher pollution taxes associated with more environmental concern would not only improve the environment but also boost employment (and hence the tax base)rdquo 6 See for example Bossier and Breacutechet (1995) Kuper (1996) Carraro Galeotti and Gallo (1996) Majocchi (1996) Ligthart and Van Der Ploeg (1999) Jansen and Klaassen (2000) or Bayındır-Upmann (2004) 7 For example Morris Reacuteveacutesz Zalai and Fucskoacute (1999)

mdash 8 mdash


and consumption8 increased output and economic welfare9 or a mixture of them10 These vague definitions noted also in Pezzey and Park (1998 p 545) may lead to misinterpretations of policy assessments since it overestimates the true efficiency costs of green tax reforms11 in addition some authors like Patuellia Nijkamp and Pels (2005) recognize the difficulty to undertake an emshypirical analysis of the double dividend as long as ldquothere is no lsquostandardrsquo definition of the double dividend (or a standard method of recycling environmental tax revenues) in the literaturerdquo (p 566-567) and claim for ldquothe choice of an operashytive definition of the double dividend to be kept constant throughout our [emshypirical] analysesrdquo (p 576)

The second critique deals with the fact that the definitions of the first and second dividends do not provide information by themselves but they represent a partial view of the whole picture These definitions account for a global accepshytance or rejection of a green tax reform and not for the suitability of setting an environmental tax or the need to reform the tax system Actually we could trace the roots of this characterization in Ramseyrsquos optimal taxation theory when externalities are absent so the second dividend as the way it is treated in the public finance approach could be termed then as the Ramseyrsquos dividend As a consequence the requirement of a positive second dividend (as defined above) as a criterion to implement a green tax reform seems to be a very restrictive condition for the double dividend hypothesis As Goulder (1994) noted a posishytive second dividend would only prove the necessity to reform the current tax system abstracting from any environmental concern12

Clearly these two previous critiques could have been avoided with an unamshybiguous definition for both dividends that did not create confusion among comshypeting policy objectives namely to reduce the level of an externality and to alleviate the tax distortions provoked by the fiscal system

The present paper aims to clarify the debate about what should be included as efficiency benefits and costs in the measurement of the environmental and second dividend In tune with Terkla (1984)rsquos spirit on the double dividend conshy

8 See Garbaccio Ho and Jorgenson (1999) 9 See Jorgensen and Wilcoxen (1993) 10 Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) or Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha (2005) 11 In this respect it is illustrative that Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) have to state to avoid misleading interpretations that these distortions in consumption patterns or input choice (primary costs) are desirable on environmental grounds (p 1501) They also recognize that the failure of the double-dividend claim does not imply that green tax reforms are ineffishycient (p 1502) 12 In fact some authors like Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) have recognized that the envishyronmental taxes could play an important role to ease political constraints to reform suboptishymal initial tax systems stating that ldquo[] environmental taxes are the lubricating oil that makes possible a tax reform to eliminate particularly bad taxesrdquo (pp 1507-08)

mdash 9 mdash

jecture the first dividend will measure the welfare costs and benefits after the implementation of environmental taxes when revenues are given back to houseshyholds by lump-sum transfers This first dividend comprises the net benefits from reducing external costs the primary motivation for the environmental policy which could be denoted as the Pigoursquos dividend in contrast to the Ramseyrsquos divishydend in the public finance approach13 On the other hand the second dividend will measure the welfare changes from recycling green tax revenues through lower distorting taxes instead of lump sum transfers this second dividend comshyprises the net benefits from reducing distorting taxes the secondary motivation for green tax reforms ie the ldquoefficiency value of tax revenuesrdquo in Terkla (1984)rsquos terminology14

The proposed definitions show up two important advantages First it is avoided misunderstandings usually found in the double dividend literature such as the identification between the second dividend and the efficiency costs of green tax reforms Second our definitions of the first and second dividends provide inshyformation by themselves and not as a partial view of the whole picture Hence the regulatory office is assisted to determine whether only a green tax should be set out regardless of the implementation of a green tax reform or whether addishytionally raised revenues should decrease any distorting taxes In fact these definishytions could be considered as a reformulation of Goulder (1995)rsquos weak form of the double dividend hypothesis15 which compares two policy changes with difshyferent recycling options In addition Goulder (1995)rsquos strong form is equivalent to the sum of the new first and second dividends put forward in this paper

For illustration purposes we calibrated the theoretical model with a numerishycal example for the US economy on 1995 We simulated a green tax reform by introducing a $10 tax per ton of carbon with revenues devoted to reduce the income tax We show that alternative definitions for both dividends arrive to very different conclusions following the public finance approach we might conshyclude that the green tax reform improves welfare but there is a negative second

13 It could be interpreted also in terms of Pigoursquos taxes in opposition to Ramseyrsquos taxes This terminology have been extensively used in the literature See for example Mayeres and Proost (1997) or Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) 14 Interestinlgy this definition was already writen in Mayeres and Proost (1997 footnote 12) but as a result of a misinterpretation of Goulder (1995)rsquos terminology There are several problems with Mayeres and Proost (1997)rsquos terminology (i) the absence of a proper definishytion (ii) it is not clear if their first dividend includes only welfare effects related to changes in the externalities only and (iii) we can not be sure what they are really measuring by their first and second dividend in their empirical exercise when we compare explanations in main text Table 2a and footnote 15 That is efficiency costs of a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform are lower if the additional revenues from the environmental taxes are recycled in the form of lower distorshytionary taxes compared to the case that these revenues are recycled in a lump-sum fashion

mdash 10 mdash

2


dividend as expected However we found a positive double dividend when we use the new definition proposed in this paper

The paper develops through the following sections In Section 2 we present the Pareto-optimal allocation and the competitive equilibrium in our general equilibrium framework A feature of the model is that it allows to understand the magnitude of the inefficiency of market allocation of resources in the presence of externalities and to compare the results (even graphically) in a general equishylibrium setting with those found in well-known standard partial equilibrium analysis Section 3 is concerned with the welfare effects of green tax reforms and it aims to measure the first and second dividends in a general equilibrium set-up It presents the competing approaches in the double dividend literature and shows that the public finance view overestimates the efficiency costs of green taxes As a consequence this section proposes a definition for the first and second dividends Section 4 carries out a numerical example for the US economy showing that a positive double dividend could be possible as opposed to the public finance approach to conclude that the green tax reform will raise gross efficiency costs Finally Section 5 summarizes conclusions and policy implications


This section presents a framework to determine the social optimum and the decentralized market equilibrium allocation of resources with externalities This will be the benchmark set-up for further discussion on green tax reforms along subsequent sections One contribution of this section is to establish the corresponshydence between the well-known partial equilibrium and the general equilibrium counterpart through a graphical analysis

We develop a static rational general equilibrium model with an externality There are two types of agents heterogeneous households in preferences and firms There are a number of perfectly price-taker competitive firms and a techshynology with constant returns of scale therefore a single aggregate polluting firm could be considered Labor N is the only input required to produce a private good Y =F( )N and pollution E = Λ( ( )F N ) This formulation recognizes the complemenshytary relationship between the production of the private good Y and emissions E We will consider this relationship to be represented by a real monotonically inshycreasing function Λ( ) Hence the production function can be considered a

( ) ( ( ) F N )homomorphic function Ψ on R2 + such that Ψ N = YE) = (F N Λ( ( ))

Each household h is endowed with T units of time (eg hours per year) that are allocated between working time n h and leisure time l h The model is static

mdash 11 mdash

so there are neither savings nor capital accumulation Households enhance welshyfare by consuming the private good c h and leisure time l h and in addition the pollution E produced by firms affects each negatively Their preferences are represented by a twice-differentiable continuous utility function U h = (c hl hE) verifying partUh partc partUh partl are positive and partUh partE is negative and part2Uh partc2 and part2 U h part l 2 are negative while part 2U h partE2 part2Uh partcpart l and part2Uh part lpartc are positive16

The Pareto social optimum level of emissionsmdashThe social planner maximizes the agentsrsquo weighted welfare function subject to the technology to produce pollution and the private good and the feasibility conditions consumption of goods

H

equals private good production sumch = Y the total number of hours worked at firms h=1

sumH

is equal to the sum of labour made by each households nh =N and each houseshyh=1

hold endowment of time is devoted to working activities and leisure n h + l h = T h ⎧The Pareto optimal allocations are given by ⎨ ˆ Hh h ˆ ⎫c l h =1 Y NE⎬ following the ⎩ ⎭

optimal Samuelson-Lindalh condition

partU h (c h lh E) partEminus

H partUh (ch lh E ) sum

ˆ partc 1

( ) =

h h ( )ˆ part NE Λ F ˆ

=1 part F NU ch lh l ( ( )) ( )F N minus

partUh (c ˆ h lh E) partc

and partU h (c h l h E) partl ⎡ micro ⎤ ( )ˆ

= F N 1minus Λ N ˆ

⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ

( ( ))⎥part ˆ U c l E partc ⎦

where λ and micro are the positive Lagrangian multipliers namely the former represhysents the social marginal utility from individual consumption of the private good whereas the latter stands for the social marginal utility from pollution Under

16 The complementarity or substitutability relationship between pollution and consumption or leisure may be crucial in certain results First pollution could be considered a source of agentsrsquo diseases not related to the other variables In this case eg the quasilinear approach

h h h h h c ( ( )U ( lh E)= u c lh )+ v E pollution has no effect on labor supply Second pollution could decrease the ldquoqualityrdquo of leisure since agents cannot carry out certain activities (eg swimshyming in polluted rivers etc) Hence a complementarity relation to leisure could be taken

h h h heg as U (c lh E)= c + v (lh E) Finally pollution could decrease the ldquoqualityrdquo of consumpshytion (eg deterioration of consumerrsquos health illness) Therefore a complementarity relation

h h h h hto consumption could be for example U (c lh E)= v (c E)+ l In the last two cases labor supply and its slope are affected by an increase of pollution

mdash 12 mdash


this condition the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumpshytion equals the marginal productivity of labor at the optimum In other words an individual supplying one extra unit of working time increases production and their consumption but also it rises the environmental damages suffered by society which the social planner must internalize

Decentralized level of emissionsmdashIn the decentralized competitive equili-brium firms maximize their profits which must be equal to zero as long as we assume price-taker competitive firms and constant returns to scale As a conseshyquence labour payment will be the only source of income although households are the owners of the firms Each household h maximizes utility subject to the

wh hincome restriction c = (T minus l ) where the real wage is w There is not a P P

market for pollution therefore competitive firms do not care about the extershynality and each household takes the amount of pollution as given Then we find

H⎧ h h ⎫the optimal market allocations given by c l Y N E and the first orshy⎨ h=1 ⎬⎩ ⎭

der condition for allocation of resources As a result the marginal rate of substishytution between leisure and consumption equals the marginal productivity of labor at the market equilibrium

( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)

Individual self-interest leads each agent to equate their private marginal rate of substitution (or transformation) between leisure and the private good to relashytive prices which results in the equalization of private rates among agents On the contrary Pareto optimality requires the equalization of social rates and therefore conditions (1) and (2) permit us to show that the competitive equishylibrium with externalities is not Pareto efficient

Pareto social optimum and decentralized level of emissions a graphical analysis of partial and general equilibrium approachesmdashWe can illustrate the previous conclushysion with the usual partial equilibrium analysis (see Figure 1) The MPB curve represents the Marginal Private Benefits from polluting activities which is the sum of the consumers and producers surplus In absence of public regulation the competitive equilibrium at the level of emissions E is determined by the condishytion of null marginal private benefits from extra consumption and production

The social optimum is determined by the intersection point between the Marginal Social Damage from emissions (MSD) that is the monetarization of the negative externality and marginal private benefits (MPB) in Figure 1b This reshysult could be also represented graphically with the level of pollution that makes null the Marginal Social Benefits from emissions (MSB) ie MPB minus MSD Therefore the area (integral) under the MSD function in Figure 1b in the range

[EE ] over all individuals represents the external social costs

mdash 13 mdash

Figure 1 SOCIAL OPTIMUM AND DECENTRALIZED LEVEL OF POLLUTION IN PARTIAL

EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

Ecirc E emissions Ecirc E emissions

Figure 1a Figure 1b Source the authors

It is straightforward to establish the graphical equivalence between the partial equishylibrium analysis in Figure 1 and our general equilibrium framework First denote the function ( ) ( minusN E equiv Λ 1 E ) Then the function ϕo F ) ( (E) equiv F (N (E )) at the right hand side of (2) is decreasing with pollution because of the decreasing returns to scale of the production function F Intuitively the increase in labor is more than proportional to the increase in production and emissions Finally the function ϕ (E) equiv ϕ (E )[1 minus σ (E )] onthe right hand side of (1) is also decreasing and always below ϕ ( )E as

( ) microσ E = Λ (F( )N ) gt 0 Second the left hand side of (1) and (2) is the marginal rate of

λ

h partU h ( h (( ) c E ) (l h E )E partl)substitution between labor and consumption MRS E =

partU h (

c h ( )E l h ( )E E ) partc

Figure 2 SOCIAL PARETO OPTIMUM AND DECENTRALIZED LEVEL OF POLLUTION IN

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ

( ))[1E( ( )]ENFˆ σminus=ϕ

( )E

emissions

Source the authors


Figure 2 provides some hints about the amount of external costs in our general equilibrium setup The term σ(E) which is the difference between ϕ ( )E ϕ( ) is the marginal damage from one extra unit of labor suppliedand ˆ E

by agent h Thus the area (integral) between these two functions in the ˆrange [EE ] over all individuals represents the external social costs Thereshy

fore it is straightforward to establish the equivalence between the partial equilibrium analysis in Figure 1a and our general equilibrium framework in Figure 2

The firm generating negative externalities will often produce too much as in the partial equilibrium illustration in Figure 1 However the general equilibrium effects namely the changes in price and income variables may countervail these intuitive results of partial equilibrium analysis (see Laffont 1988 p 14) The same could happen here Note first that the slope of MRSh(E) depends on the functional forms where the derivative is

⎡ 2 h h ( ) h ⎤h h ⎢part U (c E l ( )( ) ( ) E E) partlpartE part2U h (c h ( ) E l h ( )E E partcpartE ⎥MRS E = MRS E minus

) (3)⎢ ⎢ partU h (c h ( )E l h h ) ⎥⎣ ( )E E partl partU h (c ( )E l h ( )E E) partc ⎥⎦

which could either take a positive or a negative sign We explore three exshytreme cases for functional forms First pollution could be separable in the utility function not related to other variables eg the quasilinear approach

h h h h h h hU ( )= u c l )+ v E

ply the MRSh ( )c l E ( ( ) In this case pollution has no effect on labor sup-

E function is constant and then the competitive stock of pollushytion is greater than the optimum ie E gt E The same happens if the individualsrsquo preferences will be specified such that pollution only affects the

h h h h hldquoqualityrdquo of consumption for example U ( = v (c E)+ h MRSh ( ) has ac l E) l E

positive slope and again E gt E However if the preferences have been represhysented by a quasilinear utility function with a complementary relationship betshy

h h h h h hween pollution and leisure ie U (c l E)= c + v (l E) then the MRSh (E) would be decreasing Firms will pollute less than optimum ie E lt E if there is a strong enough complementary relationship between pollution and leisure that is in the case that the MRSh (E) ϕ Eslope is lower than the ( ) slope in Fishygure 2 This result could never arise in partial equilibrium analysis as desshycribed in Figure 1

In the real world however a complementary relationship between pollution and leisure as well as between pollution and consumption are expected so whether the MRSh (E) slope is greater than the ϕ(E) slope in Figure 2 is an emshypirical issue to be tested

mdash 15 mdash


This section is concerned with the welfare effects of green tax reforms and it aims to measure the first and second dividends of green tax reforms in a general equilibrium set-up The main results in this section are the following (i) the usual definitions of first and second dividends in the literature overestimates the effishyciency costs of green tax reforms and (ii) the analysis and definitions proposed below clarifies the welfare contributions of green tax reforms schemes an issue of great interest for academic and political discussion on this kind of environshymental regulation as it will be shown in section 4

The decentralized equilibrium allocations found in the previous section are not Pareto optimal because of the externality However the government could achieve a higher level of social welfare by affecting agentsrsquo behavior with taxes resulting in second-best allocations17 We proceed first by illustrating green tax reforms as a second-best solution when distortionary taxes finance the public budget Suppose that there is a Public Tax Office an agency authorized by the central government to tax private agents both households and firms in order to finance some (exogenous) lump-sum transfers to households ie Th for hisinH The menu of taxes twtctE consists of taxes on income t w on consumption goods t c and on pollution tE The budget constraint of the public sector is

sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum

hw (T minus l )+ tc sumc h (4)

h=1 h=1 h=1

The representative firm maximizes profits subject to technological constraints and each household h maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint

( w1minus t )c h h

c = (1+ tw ) (T minus l )+ T h Then it is straightforward to find that the optimal P

condition for equilibrium is the following given the government budget constraint h (~ ~ ~

partU c h l hE) partl ~ ~ ( )[ ( ( ))]partU h (

= τF N 1minus t E Λ F N ~h ~ c l h

~ E) partc

where 1minus t τ = w 1+ tc

17 It might be Pareto optimal if the consumption labor and pollution taxes are set as t = minust c w

and t =micro but we presume positive tax rates uniform across all individuals HoweverAn en-

E λ

vironmental tax like t =micro is not possible in the real world because of two reasons (a) it

E λ

should take a different value for each individual (actually it is the value for optimal compensashytions) and (b) it is supposed to be a tax on polluters

mdash 16 mdash


represents the individual value of one extra unit of net income of taxes Thereshyfore in a second-best equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution equals the market productivity of labor net of taxes Observe that a rise on any of the tax rates moves the right-hand side downwards

Next we analyze the welfare effects of green tax reforms For the sake of easier exposition suppose that the welfare function is separable between conshysumption of environmental quality and consumption of other goods (leisure and the private good) so that any agent hrsquos utility function is given by

h h h h h h hU ( )= u c l )+ v Ec l E ( ( ) The social welfare function is the weightened aggreshygation of individual welfare levels that depends on the tax menu defined by the Public Tax Office

U(t τ) = u(C(t τ)L(t τ))+ v(E(t τ)) equivE E E E H

hequivsum[αhuh (c (tEτ) ( lh tEτ))+ αhvh(E(tEτ))] h=1

where C and L are the aggregate level of consumption and leisure respectively and αh is the weight for household h

We characterize two scenarios the pre-reform case with no environmental taxes (denoted as the benchmark case) where the tax menu is given by

0t t t = 0t t0 and the post-reform after the green tax reform where theE c w c w 1 1tax menu will change to tEtctw= tEtct1

w In the benchmark case the social 0 0 0 0welfare level is given by U(0τ )= u[C(0τ )L(0τ )] + v[E(0τ )] whereas

1 1U(t1 τ )= u[C(t1 τ1)L(t1 τ1)] + v[E(t1 τ )] is the welfare level achieved after the greenE E E E

reform Therefore the difference between the two scenarios welfare level 1 1U(tEτ )minusU(0τ0 ) represents the gains or losses of implementing the green tax

reform Finally the welfare changes from green tax reforms could be decomposed betshy

ween the first and the second dividend following the double dividend hypothesis A first or environmental dividend exists because environmental taxation reduces pollution and other negative externalities There is a second dividend when reducshytions in incentive-distorting taxes results in a lower excess of burden As pointed out by several authors (eg Labandeira 1998) these definitions are too vague to permit a single interpretation or a precise measurement and the literature shows alternative views on the double dividend hypothesis gathered into two main strands referred to as the ldquoenvironmentalrdquo and the ldquopublic financerdquo approaches


The ldquoenvironmental viewrdquo is the departure point for the double dividend hyshypothesis and was originated on the research of Tullock (1967) Terkla (1984)

mdash 17 mdash

Lee and Misiolek (1986) and Pearce (1991) This view stresses the desirability of environmental taxation because they could give some extra-benefits to society first they are one of the most efficient instruments for pollution control and second they provide an extra efficiency value when revenues finance reductions on other distorting taxes instead of bringing them back to households by lumpshysum transfers (see Terkla 1984)

Their analysis built on a partial equilibrium approach makes use of Figure 1 to highlight that emission level above Ecirc represents an inefficient allocation of resources Therefore it is necessary to reduce emissions and consumption in order to improve efficiency and social welfare The area under the marginal prishy

vate benefit (MPB) curve in the range [EE ] represents the costs of reducing inefficient levels of emissions and consumption (ie lower consumer surplus from polluting goods) As a consequence they concluded that there are no deadweight losses (efficiency losses) from green taxes as resources get closer to the social planner efficient allocation as shown in Section 2

But this is only true within a partial equilibrium analysis The interaction of green taxes with other distorting taxes may raise some efficiency losses (see Goulder 1995 Parry 1995 and Parry Williams and Goulder 1999) Unfortushynately due to the extensive use of partial equilibrium approaches this view does not provide a full characterization of both dividends to allow for an unamshybiguous definition and policy analysis


The ldquopublic financerdquo view has become the most widespread in literature in the 90rsquos (see Bovenberg and Goulder 2002 for a survey) This literature is mainly concerned with the non-environmental side of welfare changes from green tax reforms taking for granted a positive environmental dividend which probably stems from the difficulty of economic evaluation of the environmental benefits By circumventing these problems this approach studies the efficiency gains or losses in the tax system after the introduction of environmental taxes thus undertaking cost-effectiveness analysis that may be suitable for policymaker advice

Unlike the previous view the use of general equilibrium tools within the ldquopublic financerdquo approach allows for a full charaterization of the first and second dividend (as an illustration see Schoumlb 1996 Hakonsen 2001 Mayeres and Proost 2001) The first dividend strictly accounts for the environmentally reshylated welfare changes after the green tax scheme is completely implemented ie the decrease of the externality and it could be formalized as

1 1 0FD = u[E(t τ )]minus u[E(0τ )] PF E

mdash 18 mdash


whose positiveness is assumed by the public finance view The remaining nonshyenvironmental welfare changes are integrated in the second dividend that is

1 1 1 1 0 0SD = u[C(t τ )L(t τ )]minus u[C(0τ )L(0τ )] PF E E

Thus the focus of the ldquopublic financerdquo view is on the second dividend and mainly on the efficiency of the tax system to raise fiscal revenues Actually we could trace the roots of this characterization in Ramseyrsquos optimal taxation theory when externalities are absent So the second dividend as the way it is treated in the public finance approach could be termed then as the Ramseyrsquos dividend

The ldquopublic financerdquo approach may be subject to criticism First the definition of the second dividend includes some costs that cannot be treated as efficiency costs which otherwise would ldquoimply a redefinition of this term as commomly understoodrdquo (Bohm 1997 p 121) We showed in Figure 1 that primary costs18

represented by the area under the MPB curve in the range [EE ] are the costs of reducing inefficient levels of emissions and consumption and should not be reshygarded as efficiency costs As long as the Ramsey or second dividend attending to the public finance view considers the non-environmental efficiency benefits and costs of green tax reforms this may lead to misinterpretations of policy assessshyments Consequently it overestimates the true efficiency costs of green tax reshyforms In this respect it is illustrative that Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) have to state to avoid misleading interpretations that these distortions in consumption patterns or input choice (primary costs) are desirable on environmental grounds (p 1501) as well as to recognize that the failure of the double-dividend claim does not imply that green tax reforms are inefficient (p 1502)

Therefore it would be desirable to consider an unambiguous definition for both dividends which does not create confusion among competing policy objecshytives namely to reduce the level of an externality and tax distorsions due to the fiscal system Accordingly it is attractive to have a sort of separability in the tax structure which might be taken to suggest that environmental taxes should be employed first with the Ramsey taxes being used to fill up the tax revenue reshyquirements (Sandmo 1995 p 24)

The second critique refers to the fact that the definitions of the first and second dividends do not provide information by themselves but they represent a partial view of the whole picture These definitions accounts for a global acceptance or rejection of a green tax reform and not for the suitability of setting an environshymental tax or the need to reform the tax system This global assessment is not in tune with Terkla (1984)rsquos spirit on the double dividend conjecture As a conseshyquence the requirement of a positive second dividend (as defined above) as a crishy

18 For an illustration of the diverse effects related to environmental taxes eg primary costs tax interaction effect and revenue recycling effects see Parry Williams and Goulder (1999)

mdash 19 mdash

terion to implement a green tax reform seems to be a very restrictive condition for the double dividend hypothesis Goulder (1995) noted that a positive second dividend would only prove the necessity to reform the current tax system absshytracting from any environmental concern19 Accordingly we suggest that more orthodox analyses should consist of integrating Ramsey and Pigou approaches esshytablishing a parallelism with Bovenberg and Goulder (2002 pp 1484-5)


Next we propose a new definition for both dividends that overcome both critiques and formalizes Goulder (1995)rsquos weak form of the double dividend hypothesis The first dividend will measure the welfare costs and benefits after the implementation of environmental taxes when revenues are given back to households by lump-sum transfers and it will be formalized as

1 0 0FD = U(t τ )minus U(0τ )= new E

1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0= u[E(t τ )]minus u[E(0τ )]+ u[C(t τ )L(t τ )]minus u[C(0τ )L(0τ )] E E E

These are the net benefits from reducing external costs the primary motivashytion for the environmental policy Accordingly it could be denoted as the Pigoursquos dividend in contrast to the Ramseyrsquos dividend in the public finance approach Therefore the Public Tax Office should set an environmental tax tE whenever the first dividend has a positive sign The second dividend will measure the welshyfare changes from recycling green tax revenues through lower distorting taxes instead of lump sum transfers that is

1 1 1 0SD = U(t τ )minus U(t τ )= new E E

1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0= u[E(tEτ )]minus u[E(tEτ )]+ u[C(t τ )L(tEτ )]minus u[C(tEτ )L(tEτ )] E

These are the net benefits from reducing distorting taxes the secondary moshytivation for green tax reforms ie the ldquoefficiency value of tax revenuesrdquo in Terkla (1984)rsquos terminology The reduction in distorting taxes affects labor supshyply and consumption which increase production and welfare as well besides

19 In fact this author distinguishes between the weak double dividend and the strong double dividend The latter stands whenever a positive second dividend exists The former holds as long as green tax reforms achieve higher welfare levels by cutting existing distorting taxation financed by environmental tax revenues instead of returning the revenues to taxpayers by lump-sum transfers There is no theoretical or empirical controversy about the achievement of weak double dividends by green fiscal reforms (lump-sum transfers do not provide any extra benefit to the economy) Researchers have turned to looking for conditions to get posishytive strong double dividends assuming some effectiveness on pollution reduction The weak and strong dividend definitions arose as a consequence of the rather limited meaning of the double dividend approach followed by the public finance view

mdash 20 mdash


some costs arise due to increased pollution from higher production levels go with which also increase pollution

Observe that our definitions make clearer Pezzey and Park (1998 sec 4) exposition avoiding some shortcomings (see their footnote 3) and could be rewritten as follows The weak form of the double dividend claim is that

1 1 1U(tEτ ) gt U(tEτ0 ) also known as the ldquorevenue-recycling effectrdquo that is welfare is raised by using the revenue of the environmental tax to lower the distortionary tax instead of to give taxpayers lump sum subsidies And the strong form is that

1 1U(tEτ ) gt U(0τ0 ) that is there is an economic benefit from the revenue-neutral substitution of a new environmental tax for a change in a typical distortionary tax so that the regulatory office should fully implement a green tax reform With regard to our proposal of definition the strong form is equivalent to the sum of the new first and second dividends put forward in this subsection

Our definitions of the first and second dividends have relevant implications for policy implementation as they establish a criterium on whether only a green tax should be set out or whether additionally raised revenues should decrease any distorting taxes Besides it avoids misleading interpretations like identificashytion of gross costs from green tax reforms with efficiency costs

Next we show the advantages of our definition with respect to alternative one for political assessment in a numerical example for 1995 US data


In this section we undertake the experiment of introducing a green tax reshyform for the 1995 US economy Our main goal is to compare our definition of the first and second dividend with that proposed by the public finance view and to numerically assess the policy implications of the implementation of a green tax reform in a general equilibrium model

The set-up is the same as the one studied in previous sections except for one extension on the supply side Instead of one technology that produces one output with the labor input we will consider two technologies that produce two final goods in the economy an energy-intensive good X and a non-energyshyintensive good Y both produced with two inputs labor L and an intermediate pollution input P (Power) These extensions will be shown to be useful for imshyproving the modelrsquos ability to gauge the empirical significance of competing defishynitions for the dividends20 In the appendix we compute analitically a simplified

20 For example if there is only one good it is easy to show that any tax menu is always burshydened by the same item Consequently the equilibrium allocations after a green tax reform are exactly the same as the initial one Interestingly this means that the public finance view definitions of first and second dividends are both equal to zero whereas ours are not zero but with the opposite sign

mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi

version of this general equilibrium model without intermediate inputs which displays algebraically the relationship between different definitions of the first and second dividend21 furthermore it allows us to understand why a green tax reform cannot achieve the optimal tax menu In order to undertake a numerical example we take the following functional forms22 The production technology for the two industries is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function

1 ρi

ρi

ρ ρi iX = [γPx + (1minus γ)Lx ] 1ρ ρY = [δP i + (1minus δ)L i ]y y

( )x = ϑPxEx = Λ P

E = Λ( )P = ϑPy y y

E =Ex +Ey

where γ ϑ δ and ρi are technological parameters and σ is the elasticity of subshystitution between inputs satisfying the condition that σ ) Preferences are also assumed to be represented by two nested CES utility functions with environmental damages included as a separable element affecting individual welshyfare in the outer nest the CES function combines the consumption of leisure l and goods produced by the firms C while the inner nest combines the conshysumption of goods X and Y That is

ρu]1

1 ρ

h h h ρu ρuU (c l E)= [αC + (1minus α)l minus φE

cρ ρc cC = [βX + (1minusβ)Y ]where α β ρ c ρ u and φ are parameters of the preferences The disutility from pollution represented by φ is taken from the benefits of carbon abatement (the marginal value of external damages) and set equal to $20 per ton of carbon that is φ( )E = 20E which is an average of the estimations found in the literature (for instance see Tol 2005)23 Parameter ρ u is related to the substitution possibilities between consumption of goods and leisure and ρ c is related to the substitution possibilities between consumption of X and Y As in Parry et al (1999) the pashyrameter controlling the sensitivity of labor supply to the after-tax wage σ u is equal to 120 which implies an uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticity of 15 and 03 respectively besides non-sleep leisure time equals 03

21 This approach is justified because derivation of first-order conditions from the numerical model is much more complicated and the expression for the dividends becomes meaningless 22 See Parry Williams and Goulder (1999) for a similar approach Analogous to that paper we make use of the software package GAMSMPSGE and the algorithm solver PATH to solve the numerical model 23 Actually this represents a conservative parameter Burtraw and Toman (2001) reviewed some empirical evidence about ancillary benefits in the US and concluded that average ancillary benefits per ton of carbon reduction are greater than $30US (1996 dollars)

mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714


times hours worked For simplicity we assume unitary elasticity of substitution between inputs and goods in the production and utility functions respectively That means a Cobb-Douglas function characterizing the consumption and proshyduction of final goods Therefore the elasticity of substitution σ u between conshysumption C and leisure l in the welfare function and between labor L and energy P in the production function σi are equal to one At the end of this section we will undertake a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of the results under different parameter values

The baseline labor tax rate is equal to 40 which takes into account the sum of federal income state income payroll and consumption taxes ldquoThis average rate is relevant for the participation decisionrdquo (Parry et al 1999 p 65) This means that the distorting tax ratio τ0 is equal to 60 All tax revenues are given back to the households as a lump-sum transfer This convenient simplification allows us to overlook public expenditures without loss of generality The houseshyholdrsquos budget constraint is

⎡ Py ⎤ ⎡ w ⎤h h h hX + Y (1+ τ) (T minus l )+ T⎢ ⎥ = ⎢ ⎥P P⎣ x ⎦ ⎣ x ⎦

The benchmark data set for the US economy in the year 1995 is summarized in Table 1 As mentioned only two final goods X and Y are produced in the economy (4551247 and 27142432 millions of 1995 dollars) The consumpshytion of energy P for the production of the two final goods X and Y is responsishyble for 14236 millions of tons of carbon emissions E to the atmosphere24

Table 1 BENCHMARK DATA FOR THE NUMERICAL MODEL

P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167

Source own computations from Parry et al (1999 Table I) Note TOV is total output value TIV total input value and TCV total consumption value All values are in millions of 1995 US dollars except carbon emissions (in million tons)

24 We suppose a constant technical relationship between consumption of energy and emisshysions At the benchmark data the consumption of one dollar of energy generates 0026787394 tons of carbon emitted to the atmosphere

mdash 23 mdash

Now we are ready to undertake a green tax reform and to compare different definitions of the first and second dividends We simulate the introduction of an exogenously given green tax t1

E equal to $10 per ton of carbon This is a relatively low tax rate so we follow a precautionary approach in order to derive robust conclusions from our analysis It is similar to some international estimation of equishylibrium prices for carbon permits in an international carbon market with grandshyfathering allocation of tradeable pollution permits for achieving Kyoto commitments (for instance see the surveys by Springer 2003 and Springer and Varilek 2004)

The environmental tax is modelled as an excise tax on the consumption of energy P given the close relationship between consumption of this good and emissions Revenue recycling through a lower labour tax rate complete the green tax reform with transfers fixed at the benchmark level so that τ1 = 6048 The effects of the green tax reform on emissions production activities and prices are summarized in Table 2

The increase in the price of energy P provokes as expected a significant reshyduction in the production and consumption of energy (-209) That reduces carbon emissions to the atmosphere by the same rate The rise in energy prices increases the costs in the energy-intensive sector X whose prices increase (+21) and reduces activity levels in that sector Accordingly in the economy there is a substitution of non-energy intensive goods Y for energy intensive goods X which are now cheaper in relative terms (-03 reduction in relative prices for Y) As a consequence of all these changes in economic and environshymental variables there is a relative increase in welfare (+0112) with respect to the benchmark and equal to 456198 million 1995 US dollars as it is shown in Table 3 Therefore the green tax reform is welfare-improving and it should be implemented

Table 2 RESULTS FROM SIMULATED REFORMS RELATIVE CHANGES (in percentage) ON

EMISSIONS PRICES PRODUCTION AND WELFARE WITH RESPECT TO THE BENCHMARK

Green Tax Reform Lump Sum Activity level Prices Activity level Prices

P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00

Total Welfare + 0112 + 0086

Note Labor is the numeraire Therefore all changes on prices are expressed as relative changes with respect to the price of labor

mdash 24 mdash


The contribution of this section is to assign the welfare changes from the green tax reform between the first and the second dividends In Table 3 we show the welfare gains after the implementation of the green tax reform and the results from different definitions of dividends These welfare measures were estimated using the definitions in Section 3 and the data in Table 2 The public finance approach concludes that there is not a positive double dividend because the second dividend is negative as it is usually found in the literature (see the survey in Bovenberg and Goulder 2002) That is the effects of the green tax reform on consumption and leisure reduce the efficiency in the economy (using Goulder 1995rsquos terminology)

Table 3 FIRST AND SECOND DIVIDENDS AND WELFARE GAINS AFTER THE

GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026

Total Welfare Variation + 456198 + 0112 + 456198 + 0112

Note ues in millions of 1995 US dollars Percentage values with respect to welfare level at the benchmark

However we reached a very different conclusion when we used the definishytions proposed in this paper (column denoted by New The second dividend now has a positive sign and the first dividend is still positive but lower than the counterpart for the public finance Note that the value of the first dividend now corresponds to the welfare changes following the lump-sum reform as reported in Table 2 that is the revenues from a $10 tax per ton of carbon are given back to households by lump-sum transfers and τ0 = τ1 So we can assert two conclushysions first the environmental tax is welfare-improving and therefore it should be implemented independently of the green tax reform and second there is an efficiency value of revenues raised by the environmental tax so there exist some extra benefits from a green tax reform

There are key policy implications stemming from these results As mentioned above the main interest of the ldquopublic financerdquo approach is on the second divishydend for two main reasons the difficulty of economic evaluation of environmental benefits and the fact that the definition of the second dividend is appropriate for cost-effectiveness analysis Following this approach the green tax reform will be rejected by a policymaker because it reduces efficiency in public finance termishynology by an amount equal to 13987 million 1995 US dollars As argued before

mdash 25 mdash

some costs included in this second dividend do not represent a drop in efficiency when we use careful analysis Furthermore rejection should take place only when a 209 reduction in carbon emissions is not enough to counterbalance the above drop in efficiency within a cost-effectiveness analysis In general we may conclude that inaccurate negative evaluations of green tax reforms by the ldquopublic financerdquo view may have been undermining their implementation in some OECD countries since the 90rsquos

Finally we undertake a sensitivity analysis of the results involving the increase and reduction of 50 in the benchmark value of the elasticity parameters in the production and utility functions Table 4 shows the relative changes (in pershy

h hcentage) in emissions E aggregate welfare without pollution U (c lh ) and also h h htotal welfare U (c l E) that includes environmental damages following the apshy

plication of the green tax reform In general there is no significant change exshycept some sensitivity of results to the value of substitution elasticity between inputs in the production With that evidence we may conclude that the results in Tables 2 and 3 are robust in qualitative terms despite of course there exist some significant changes in quantitative values

Table 4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR THE GREEN TAX REFORM

Uh(ch lh) Uh(ch lh E) E

Benchmark Case (Tables 2 and 3) -0034 0112 -209

Production Elasticity (σi = 1)

σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119

Labour Supply Elasticity (σ u = 12)

σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209

Consumption Elasticity (σ c = 1)

σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202

Note Percentage deviations () with respect to benchmark welfare levels and emissions Benchmark case parameters values are in brackets

5 CONCLUSIONS

The popularity of green tax reforms as a relevant policy option increased rapidly at the beginning of the nineties to fall shortly at the end of the same decade As arshy

mdash 26 mdash


gued in this paper this quick rise and fall is related to the fact that mainstream double dividend literature advocated divergent approaches at different moments in time Now tradable pollution permits have took the lead in the policymakerrsquos agenda despite analyses showing that green tax reforms may be superior (see Parry Williams and Goulder 1999)

The double dividend hypothesis argues that two benefits or dividends may be attained namely a better environment and a less distorting tax system so that it could represent a win-win policy Thus a correct definition and thereshyfore a correct measurement of both dividends are of great relevance for policyshymakers advice and for any policy recommendation In this paper we specified which of the efficiency costs and benefits should be ascribed to the first dividend and the second dividend highlighting misinterpretations of policy assessments in the double dividend literature

For this purpose the paper presents a general equilibrium set-up with a pollushytionary externality and provides a new definition for the first dividend and the second dividend conformed to the double dividend hypothesis Our definitions show up two important advantages First it is avoided misunderstandings such as the identification between the second dividend and the efficiency costs of green tax reforms usually found in the double dividend literature Second they provide information by themselves and not as a partial view of the whole picture Hence the regulatory office is assisted to determine whether only a green tax should be set out regardless of the implementation of a green tax reform or whether addishytionally raised revenues should decrease any distorting taxes Accordingly we believe that these definitions will contribute to clarify the debate and represent operative definitions of the double dividend for empirical research as claimed by some authors like Patuellia Nijkamp and Pels (2005)

As an illustration we calibrated the theoretical model with a numerical examshyple for the US economy on 1995 We simulated a green tax reform by introducing a $10 tax per ton of carbon with revenues devoted to reduce the income tax to find that alternative definitions reached very different conclusions while the public finance approach concludes that the green tax reform improves welfare but ndashas expectedndash there is a negative second dividend the new definition proposed in this paper recognizes a positive double dividend

Regarding to policy implications a relevant conclusion refers to the fact that the public finance approach overestimates the efficiency costs of green taxes negative evaluations of green tax reforms by the public finance view might have been undermining their implementation in some OECD countries since 90s Thus the results obtained by either the empirical and theoretical literature might have lead economists and policymakers to favour the use of instruments like grandfathering pollution permits instead of taxes which represents a deparshyture from the polluters pay principle

mdash 27 mdash

We do not intend to be exhaustive about their reasons but other considerashytions mainly regarding political feasibility issues are important (Stavins 1998) For example entrepreneurs constituted in lobbying groups prefer freely alloshycated tradable permits since they convey rents to firms with allocation surpluses and may raise entry barriers In addition policymakers may also favor them be-cause they hide to some extent the costs of the environmental protection over highly visible green policies such as environmental taxes and auctioned permits Concerns on competitiveness and distributional issues play also an important role in the comparisons among instruments

mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash

In this appendix in a simple analytical example we illustrate the definitions of first and second dividends proposed above and we compare them with those proposed by the public finance approach Besides this analytical framework will be useful for showing that a green tax reform does not need to be an optimal taxation policy

Consider the same economy as that studied in Section 2 but now there are two goods in the economy X is produced with a dirty technology and Y is proshyduced with a clean technology The budget constraint is

P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦

There are H identical households with preferences represented by the utility σ

function U h ( 1 ρ 1 c hl h E)= [α c ρ + α l ρ ] minus φ E with c = [β σ σ

1 2 ( ) x X + βy Y y ] taken fromParry et al (1999) where φ() is an increasing and concave function that represhysents disutility from pollution In order to compute the equilibria analytically we choose ρ = 1 and σ = 0 set β2 = (1minusβ1) and α2 = (1minus α1) and reparametrize α equiv α1 and β equiv βx The production technology for both goods is linear X = F(Nx ) = AN x and Y = F(Ny ) =DNy and pollution is proportional to production

B E = Λ( )Y = X This greatly simplifies the labor market equilibrium by setting the

A wreal wages at the infinitely elastic demand = A minus tEB and the consumption Px

P goods price ratio y A minus t B

= E Px D

The interior competitive equilibriummdashConsider the proposed menu of taxes ⎧and the supply of the public sector good are ⎨ H h ⎫T h =1t E t c t wg⎬ For simplicity⎩ ⎭

we will assume that there is no public expenditure The competitive equilibrium when all taxes are considered that is tEtctw and g = 0 where tax revenue is

evenly given back to households Th is obtained from the first-order conditions and government budget constraint

h( ) α τ l τtE = T minus (A minus tEBβ) (A1)1minus α A

( h( ) h ( )) ⎛ α ( ) ( ) α ⎞ X τtE Y τtE = ⎜β τ A minus tEB 1minusβ Dτ⎟ (A2)⎝ α minus1 1minus α ⎠

T hα ))

t (A minus tE = EB (τ [A minus τ(A minus t Bβ)] (A3)

α E1minus A

⎛ α H α ⎞ (Nx (τtE )N y (τtE )) = ⎜β τ(A minus tEB) (1minus β) Hτ⎟ (A4)⎝ 1minus α A 1minus α ⎠

( BH E )

α E τt = β τ(A minus t EB) (A5)1minus α A

1minus twhere τ = w Consequently we find the individual indirect utility function 1+ tc

Uh (τt E ) = Uh (c h(τt E )lh (τ t E ) E(τt E )) = βα ⎛ βα BH ⎞

= + β K t B) 0 K1τ(A minus E minus τ(A minus tEB) minus φ⎜ τ(A minus t

minus α EB)⎟A ⎝1 A ⎠

2 ) α ( α T and minusK β 1 β)with K0 = (1minus 1 = β [(1minus β)D] The aggregate utility function is

1minus α

U(τt h h hE ) = sum αhU (c l E) where αh is the household weights for the governshy

h

ment which for simplicity will be set equal for all αh = 1

A green tax reformmdashThe benchmark is an economy where the menu of taxes ⎧without supply of the public sector good is ⎨ h H ⎫T h=1t E t c t wg⎬ = ⎩ ⎭

⎧⎨ T h0 H 0 0 ⎫= ⎩ h=10tc tw0⎬ That is all tax revenue is always given back to households

⎭and no pollution tax exists ie t0

E = 0 A benchmark competitive equilibrium is (A1)-(A5) for (τ 0t0

E ) After the green tax reform has been fully implemented the revenue from the

pollution tax is devoted to reducing distorting taxes and keeping the final ⎧households transfers at their initial level ie H

T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t

1 t 1 t 1 E c w 0 ⎬ The new level of the distorting taxes ratio is

⎩ ⎭0 1

1 A(Aτ minus t E B) τ = (

(A6)A minus t 1

E Bβ) (A minus t 1E B)given that the following government budget constraint must hold

⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w

minus + t0 c h0 ⎥ minus ⎢t1 ⎜ ⎟ T minus l h1 + t1 h1 E w c ⎥ ⎜ 0 ⎟sum ( ) c sum w ⎜ 1 ⎟sum ( ) c

Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦

The green tax equilibrium is (A1)-(A5) for (τ1 t1 E ) The global gains or losses in

welfare from the green tax reform are equal to the difference between U(τ1 t1

E )minus U(τ 00) so that a difference with a positive sign will justify its implementation

mdash 30 mdash


The first and second dividend according to the public finance approachmdashThe public finance approach (see ie Schoumlb 1996 or Mayeres and Proost 2001)compares the benchmark equilibrium with the resulting equilibrium after the green tax is fully implemented The first dividend would be computed as the final effect of the

0 1FD = φ(E(τ 0))minus φ(E(τ t1 ))PF E

which is unambiguously positive when distorting taxes decrease τ1 lt τ0 and the second dividend is

1⎧ 1 β 1 1 ⎫ 0 βSDPF = τ ⎨K1(A minus tEB) + (1minus α)T minus (A minus t Bβ) minus τ K1A + (1minus α)T minus1E ⎬⎩ A ⎭

where τ1 is the distorting tax ratio found in (A6) However the sign of the secshyond dividend is uncertain as there are some trade-offs between changes in conshysumption and leisure

The first and second dividends in our definitionmdashIn order to compute our defishynitions we need to establish a fictitious intermediate step in the full implemenshytation of the green tax reform Taking the benchmark tax menu as a departure point we introduce the environmental tax t1E while keeping all other tax ratios constant τ0 so that the additional tax revenues are given back to households in

⎧ h H ⎫lump-sum transfers like those found in (A3) that is ⎨T = tEt twg⎬ = h 1 c⎩ ⎭⎧ h1 1 0 0 ⎫ ⎩

⎭= ⎨ T

H h=1tEtc tw0⎬ Due to general equilibrium arguments a new competitive

equilibrium and a new tax revenue are obtained from (A1)-(A5) for (τ0 t1 E ) Our

definition of the first dividend following the introduction of the pollution tax gathers the welfare effects for reducing external costs

0 1 0FD =U(τ t )minusU(τ 0)= new E

β = ⎨K ⎢ ⎥ t + φ( ) E ))τ0 ⎧ ⎡(A minus t1B) minus Aβ ⎤ +

Bβ 1 ⎫⎬ E0 minus φ( (τ0 t1

1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭

The sign of the first dividend is uncertain Although the last difference is posishytive because the tax reduces pollution the first difference is probably negative This is because the pollution tax is now distorting the allocation between conshysumption and leisure and therefore the utility from the aggregate of both must be lower than the benchmark level following the revealed preferences The key innovation in our definition of first dividend is that it allows us to decide whether the regulatory office should apply a tax on pollution although no green tax reshyform would finally be implemented That is if the first dividend is positive it will make some sense to consider the application of the pollution tax because there are some improvements in welfare (internalization of external costs)

mdash 31 mdash

φ E = φE2 The optimal taxation menu τ tE in the example is given by

Next we measure the second dividend gathering the general equilibrium effects when the distorting taxes are reduced or have to be increased to keep the same transfers level25

1 1 0 1SD =U(τ t )minusU(τ t )= new E E

1 0 ⎧ 1 β 1 1 ⎫ 0 1 1= [τ minus τ ] K (A minus t B) minus (A minus t Bβ) + φ(E(τ t ))minus φ(E )=⎨ 1 E E ⎬ E⎩ A ⎭

0 1 E= t1

E τ [1minusβ(A minus t B)]minus A ⎧

⎨K1(A minus t1 EB)β minus 1 (A minus t1

EBβ)⎫⎬ + φ(E(τ0 t1 E ))minus φ(E1)

1 1 ⎩ A ⎭(A minus t Bβ) (A minus t B)E E

which may be positive or negative To sum up there are important advantages of our definitions for they allow

us to show whether a pollution tax should be set to improve welfare abstracting from green tax reforms With regard to the public fiscal approach definitions of the first and second dividend however they only show if a green tax reform has to be implemented or not

The green tax reform and the optimal taxation schememdashFinally the analytical example studied shows that a green tax reform does not necessarily achieve the optimal taxation Let us take the parametrization for the disutility from pollution ( ) ( )partUh (τtE ) partτ = 0 and partUh(τtE ) parttE = 0 which gives us the following expression

1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞

E = minus ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟B B ⎝ K1 ⎠ ⎛ 1 β ⎞β ⎜ ⎛ α ⎞ ⎟A minus ⎜ ⎟ minus⎜ ⎜ ⎟ (1minus α)

A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞

Th (τ AK minus1 βtE ) α

= K1 β ⎢ ⎥1 1minus 1 ⎜A(1minusβ)+ ⎟

1minus α ⎢ 2 ⎜ 1 β ⎟⎥⎛ α ⎞ 1 β ⎝ K⎢ φ⎜ BH⎟ βK 1 ⎠ ⎥ ⎢ ⎠ 1 ⎣ ⎝ 1minus α ⎥⎦

25 An extreme example is the case when there are no taxes initially τ0 = 1 and then no tax

Th0revenue or household transfers = 0 exist After a green tax reform with t1 tax revenueE

is positive and then some subsidy will be undertaken to keep household transfers to the inishy

tial zero level that is τ1 gt 0 so t1 lt 0 or t1 lt 0 w c

mdash 32 mdash


Th0Observe that the initial transfers for each h = 1 H are not necessarily h equal to T (τ tE

) so the green tax reform will not mean to achieve optimal taxation Furthermore assume that the government never considered a pollushytion tax so tE

0 = 0 but it sets the available or existing taxes at its optimal taxashy

K1Aβ minus αtion level In this case the distorting tax ratio is τ = and the

⎛ α ⎞2

φ⎜β BH⎟ ⎝ 1minus α ⎠

households transfers are

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥

h α K Aβ minus α⎢ 1 ⎥T (τ 0) = A 1minus⎢ 2 ⎥1minus α ⎛ α ⎞⎢ φ⎜β BH⎟ ⎥ ⎢ ⎝ 1minus α ⎠ ⎥⎣ ⎦

In consequence if the government later realizes that the tax menu could be modified with a green tax reform the optimal taxation menu will never be achieved First observe that the distorting tax is obtained as in (A6) ie

1 A(Aτ minus tEB) h ττ =

Then initial transfers T ( 0) for each h = 1 H will (A minus t Bβ) (A minus t B)E E

remain the same after the implementation of the reform even in the case that the tax on pollution is taken at its optimal value tE

which clearly differs from h 1 h those obtained in optimal taxation ie T (τ tE ) ne T (τ tE

) The issue here is that we cannot achieve the optimal taxation menu implementing a tax reform that imposes a constant transfers pattern set at its initial level

mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES

BAYINDIR-UPMANN T (2004) ldquoOn the Double Dividend under Imperfect Comshypetitionrdquo Environmental and Resource Economics 28(2) 169-194

BOHM P (1997) ldquoEnvironmental Taxation and the Double Dividend Fact or Fallacyrdquoin OrsquoRIORDAN (ed) Ecotaxation Earthscan Publications London

BOSSIER F and BRECHET T (1995) ldquoA fiscal reform for increasing employment and mitigating CO2 emissions in Europerdquo Energy Policy 23(9) 789-798

BOVENBERG A (1999) Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend an Upshydated Readerrsquos Guide International Tax and Public Finance 6 421-443

BOVENBERG A and GOULDER L (1996) ldquoOptimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes General-Equilibrium Analysesrdquo American Ecoshynomic Review 86(4) 985-1000

ndash (1997) Costs of Environmentally Motivated Taxes in the Presence of Other Taxes General Equilibrium Analysis National Tax Journal 50(1) 59-87

ndash (2002) Environmental Taxation and Regulation in AUERBACH A J and FELDSTEIN M (eds) Handbook in Public Economics vol 3 Elsevier Science North-Holland 1471-1545

BOVENBERG A and DE MOOIJ R (1994) ldquoEnvironmental Levies and Distortionary Taxationrdquo American Economic Review 94(4) 1085-1089

BOVENBERG A and VAN DER PLOEG F (1994) ldquoGreen Policies and Public Fishynance in a Small Open Economyrdquo Scandinavian Journal of Economics 100(3) 593-610

ndash (1998) ldquoConsequences of Environmental Tax Reform for Unemployment and Welfarerdquo Environmental and Resource Economics 12(2) 137-150

BURTRAW D and TOMAN M (2001) Ancillary Benefits of Greenhouse Gas Mitishygation Policiesrdquo in TOMAN M (eds) Climate Change Economics and Policy Reshysources for the Future

CARRARO C GALEOTTI M and GALLO M (1996) ldquoEnvironmental Taxation and Unemployment Some Evidence on the Double Dividend Hypothesis in Europerdquo Journal of Public Economics 62 141-181

CHIROLEU-ASSOULINE M and FODHA M (2005) ldquoDouble Dividend with Involunshytary Unemployment Efficiency and Intergenerational Equityrdquo Environmental and Resource Economics 31(4) 389-403

GARBACCIO R HO M and JORGENSON D W (1999) ldquoControlling Carbon Emissions in Chinardquo Environment and Development Economics 4 493-518

mdash 35 mdash

GOULDER L H (1995) ldquoEnvironmental Taxation and the lsquoDouble Dividendrsquo a Readerrsquos Guiderdquo International Tax and Public Finance 2(2) 157-183

HAKONSEN L (2001) ldquoA Note on Green Taxes and Double Dividendsrdquo Intershynational Tax and Public Finance 8 75-80

JANSEN H and KLAASSEN G (2000) ldquoEconomic Impacts of the 1997 EU Energy Tax Simulations with Three EU-wide Modelsrdquo Environmental and Resource Economics 15 179-197

JORGENSON D and WILCOXEN P (1993) ldquoReducing US Carbon Emissions an Econometric General Equilibrium Assessmentrdquo Resource and Energy Economics 30 433-439

KUPER G (1996) ldquoThe Effects of Energy Taxes on Productivity and Employment The Case of The Netherlandsrdquo Resource and Energy Economics 18 137-159

LABANDEIRA X (1998) ldquoEnvironmental Taxation in an Imperfect World An Applishycation to Spainrdquo Ph D dissertation unpublished Universidade de Vigo

LAFFONT Jacques (1988) Fundamentals of Public Economics Cambridge Mass MIT Press

LEE D and MISIOLEK W (1986) ldquoSubstituting Pollution Taxation for General Taxation Some Implications for Efficiency in Pollutions Taxationrdquo Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 13 338-347

LIGTHART J and VAN DER PLOEG F (1999) ldquoEnvironmental Policy Tax Incishydence and the Cost of Public Fundsrdquo Environmental and Resource Economics 13(2) 187-207

MAJOCCHI A (1996) ldquoGreen Fiscal Reform and Employment A Surveyrdquo Envishyronmental and Resource Economics 8(4) 375-397

MAYERES I and PROOST S (1997) Optimal Tax and Public Investment Rules for Congestion Type of Externalities Scandinavian Journal of Economics 99(2) 261-279

ndash (2001) Marginal Tax Reforms Externalities and Income Distribution Jourshynal of Public Economics 79 343-363

MORRIS G E REacuteVEacuteSZ T ZALAI E and FUCSKOacute J (1999) ldquoIntegrating Envishyronmental Taxes on Local Air Pollutants with Fiscal Reform in Hungary Simulations with a Computable General Equilibrium Modelrdquo Environment and Development Economics 4 537-564

PEZZEY John C V and PARK Andrew (1998) rdquoReflections on the Double Divishydend Debate The Importance of Interest Groups and Information Costsrdquo Environmental and Resource Economics 11(3-4) 539-555

PARRY I (1995) ldquoPollution Taxes and Revenue Recyclingrdquo Journal of Environshymental Economics and Management 29 364-377

ndash (1997) ldquoEnvironmental Taxes and Quotas in the Presence of Distorting Taxes in Factor Marketsrdquo Resource and Energy Economics 19 203-220

mdash 36 mdash

PARRY I WILLIAMS R and GOULDER L (1999) ldquoWhen Can Carbon Abatement Policies Increase Welfare The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Marshyketsrdquo Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 37 52-84

PATUELLIA R NIJKAMPB P and PELS E (2005) ldquoEnvironmental tax reform and the double dividend A meta-analytical performance assessmentrdquo Ecological Economics 55 564-583

PEARCE D (1991) ldquoThe Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global Warmingrdquo The Economic Journal 101 938-948

SANDMO A (1975) Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities Swedish Journal of Economics 77(1) 86-98

ndash (1995) Public Finance and the Environment in BOVENBERG and CNOSSEN

(eds) Public Economics and the Environment in an Imperfect World Kluwer academic Publishers

SCHOumlB R (1996) ldquoEvaluating Tax Reforms in the Presence of Externalitiesrdquo Oxford Economic Papers 48 537-555

ndash (1997) ldquoEnvironmental Taxes and Pre-Existing Distortions the Normalizashytion Traprdquo International Tax and Public Finance 4 167-176

SPRINGER U (2003) The Market for Tradable GHG Permits under the Kyoto Protocol A Survey of Model Studies Energy Economics 25(5) 527-51

SPRINGER U and VARILEK M (2004) Estimating the price of tradable permits for greenhouse gas emissions in 2008-12 Energy Policy 32(5) 611-621

STAVINS R (1998) ldquoWhat can we learn from the Grand Policy Experiment Lessons from SO2 Allowance Tradingrdquo Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(3) 69-88

TERKLA D (1984) ldquoThe Efficiency Value of Effluent Tax Revenuesrdquo Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 11 107-123

THE ROYAL SOCIETY (2002) ldquoEconomic Instruments for the Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissionsrdquo Policy Document 2602

TOL R (2005) The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions an Assessment of the Uncertainties Energy Policy 33(16) 2064-2074

TULLOCK Gordon (1967) ldquoExcess Benefitrdquo Water Resources Research 3 643-644

mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS

PRINCIPALES IMPLICACIONES DE POLIacuteTICA ECONOacuteMICA

Este trabajo analiza las denominadas reformas fiscales verdes una propuesta fiscal que combina dos poliacuteticas consistentes en introducir nuevos impuestos ambientales para reducir la externalidad negativa obtenieacutendose un beneficio denominado primer dividendo o dividendo medioambiental y conseguir un beneficio adicional denominashydo segundo dividendo al dedicar los ingresos fiscales obtenidos a reducir otros imshypuestos distorsionantes (por ejemplo impuestos sobre la renta o el trabajo)

Los objetivos de este trabajo son destacar las interpretaciones erroacuteneas existentes en la literatura del doble del dividendo especificar queacute costes y beneficios deben ser atribuidos a cada dividendo y proponer una nueva definicioacuten del primer y segundo dividendo de las reformas fiscales verdes

Recogiendo el espiacuteritu de los primeros planteamientos de la hipoacutetesis del doble del dividendo de las reformas fiscales verdes en la literatura defendemos que el primer dividendo debe medir los costes y beneficios de la introduccioacuten de impuestos ambienshytales cuando sus ingresos son devueltos a los ciudadanos mediante transferencias de suma fija Este primer dividendo comprende los beneficios netos de reducir los costes externos (contaminacioacuten) la motivacioacuten primaria de la poliacutetica ambiental y que podriacutea denominarse como el dividendo de Pigou en contraste con el dividendo de Ramsey utilishyzado en la literatura Por otra parte el segundo dividendo mediraacute los cambios en el bienestar de reciclar la recaudacioacuten verde mediante reducciones en otros impuestos este segundo dividendo incluiriacutea los beneficios netos obtenidos mediante la reduccioacuten de impuestos distorsionantes la motivacioacuten secundaria de las reformas fiscales verdes es decir el valor de la eficiencia de los ingresos fiscales verdes siguiendo la terminoshylogiacutea en Terkla (1984)

Nuestras definiciones presentan dos ventajas importantes Primero evitan habituashyles malentendidos tales como la identificacioacuten entre el segundo dividendo y los costes de eficiencia de las reformas fiscales verdes En segundo lugar proporcionan informashycioacuten por siacute mismas y no como una aproximacioacuten parcial del cuadro de una poliacutetica fisshycal maacutes general Por lo tanto el regulador dispone de mayor informacioacuten para determinar si debe introducir un nuevo impuesto verde sin que ello implique la puesta en praacutectica de una reforma fiscal verde o si ademaacutes los ingresos fiscales obtenidos deben reciclarse para reducir un determinado impuesto distorsionante De hecho las definiciones propuestas podriacutean considerarse como una reformulacioacuten del doble divishydendo deacutebil en Goulder (1995) siendo ademaacutes la suma de ambas equivalente al doble dividendo fuerte en Goulder (1995)

Como conclusioacuten una consecuencia relevante con implicaciones de poliacutetica signifishycativas es que el enfoque de anaacutelisis habitual en la literatura del doble dividendo soshybreestima los costes de eficiencia de los impuestos ambientales evaluaciones negativas

mdash 39 mdash

pueden haber dificultado la puesta en praacutectica de reformas fiscales verdes en algunos paiacuteses de la OCDE desde los antildeos 90 Asiacute los resultados obtenidos por la literatura empiacuterica y teoacuterica pueden haber condicionado que economistas y poliacuteticos hayan promocionado el uso de instrumentos como permisos de contaminacioacuten negociables distribuidos gratuitamente en lugar de impuestos lo cual representa una desviacioacuten del principio de quien contamina paga

mdash 40 mdash

NORMAS DE PUBLICACIOacuteN DE PAPELES DE TRABAJO DEL INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES

Esta coleccioacuten de Papeles de Trabajo tiene como objetivo ofrecer un vehiacuteculo de expresioacuten a todas aquellas personas interasadas en los temas de Economiacutea Puacuteblica Las normas para la presentacioacuten y seleccioacuten de originales son las siguientes

1 Todos los originales que se presenten estaraacuten sometidos a evaluacioacuten y podraacuten ser directamente aceptados para su publicacioacuten aceptados sujetos a revisioacuten o rechazados

2 Los trabajos deberaacuten enviarse por duplicado a la Subdireccioacuten de Estudios Tributarios Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Avda Cardenal Herrera Oria 378 28035 Madrid

3 La extensioacuten maacutexima de texto escrito incluidos apeacutendices y referencias bibliograacutefiacutecas seraacute de 7000 palabras

4 Los originales deberaacuten presentarse mecanografiados a doble espacio En la primera paacutegina deberaacute aparecer el tiacutetulo del trabajo el nombre del autor(es) y la institucioacuten a la que pertenece asiacute como su direccioacuten postal y electroacutenica Ademaacutes en la primera paacutegina apareceraacute tambieacuten un abstract de no maacutes de 125 palabras los coacutedigos JEL y las palabras clave

5 Los epiacutegrafes iraacuten numerados secuencialmente siguiendo la numeracioacuten araacutebiga Las notas al texto iraacuten numeradas correlativamente y apareceraacuten al pie de la correspondiente paacutegina Las foacutermulas matemaacuteticas se numeraraacuten secuencialmente ajustadas al margen derecho de las mismas La bibliografiacutea apareceraacute al final del trabajo bajo la inscripcioacuten ldquoReferenciasrdquo por orden alfabeacutetico de autores y en cada una ajustaacutendose al siguiente orden autor(es) antildeo de publicacioacuten (distinguiendo a b c si hay varias correspondientes al mismo autor(es) y antildeo) tiacutetulo del artiacuteculo o libro tiacutetulo de la revista en cursiva nuacutemero de la revista y paacuteginas

6 En caso de que aparezcan tablas y graacuteficos eacutestos podraacuten incorporarse directamente al texto o alternativamente presentarse todos juntos y debidamente numerados al final del trabajo antes de la bibliografiacutea

7 En cualquier caso se deberaacute adjuntar un disquete con el trabajo en formato word Siempre que el documento presente tablas yo graacuteficos eacutestos deberaacuten aparecer en ficheros independientes Asimismo en caso de que los graacuteficos procedan de tablas creadas en excel estas deberaacuten incorporarse en el disquete debidamente identificadas

Junto al original del Papel de Trabajo se entregaraacute tambieacuten un resumen de un maacuteximo de dos folios que contenga las principales implicaciones de poliacutetica econoacutemica que se deriven de la investigacioacuten realizada

mdash 41 mdash

PUBLISHING GUIDELINES OF WORKING PAPERS AT THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES

This serie of Papeles de Trabajo (working papers) aims to provide those having an interest in Public Economics with a vehicle to publicize their ideas The rules govershyning submission and selection of papers are the following

1 The manuscripts submitted will all be assessed and may be directly accepted for publication accepted with subjections for revision or rejected

2 The papers shall be sent in duplicate to Subdireccioacuten General de Estudios Tribushytarios (The Deputy Direction of Tax Studies) Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (Institute for Fiscal Studies) Avenida del Cardenal Herrera Oria nordm 378 Madrid 28035

3 The maximum length of the text including appendices and bibliography will be no more than 7000 words

4 The originals should be double spaced The first page of the manuscript should contain the following information (1) the title (2) the name and the institutional affishyliation of the author(s) (3) an abstract of no more than 125 words (4) JEL codes and keywords (5) the postal and e-mail address of the corresponding author

5 Sections will be numbered in sequence with arabic numerals Footnotes will be numbered correlatively and will appear at the foot of the corresponding page Matheshymatical formulae will be numbered on the right margin of the page in sequence Biblioshygraphical references will appear at the end of the paper under the heading ldquoReferencesrdquo in alphabetical order of authors Each reference will have to include in this order the following terms of references author(s) publishing date (with an a b or c in case there are several references to the same author(s) and year) title of the article or book name of the journal in italics number of the issue and pages

6 If tables and graphs are necessary they may be included directly in the text or alshyternatively presented altogether and duly numbered at the end of the paper before the bibliography

7 In any case a floppy disk will be enclosed in Word format Whenever the docushyment provides tables andor graphs they must be contained in separate files Furshythermore if graphs are drawn from tables within the Excell package these must be included in the floppy disk and duly identified

Together with the original copy of the working paper a brief two-page summary highlighting the main policy implications derived from the reshysearch is also requested

mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

UacuteLTIMOS PAPELES DE TRABAJO EDITADOS POR EL

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES

2000

100 Creacutedito fiscal a la inversioacuten en el impuesto de sociedades y neutralidad impositiva Maacutes evidencia para un viejo debate Autor Desiderio Romero Jordaacuten

200 Estudio del consumo familiar de bienes y servicios puacuteblicos a partir de la encuesta de presupuestos familiares Autores Ernesto Carrilllo y Manuel Tamayo

300 Evidencia empiacuterica de la convergencia real Autores Lorenzo Escot y Miguel Aacutengel Galindo

Nueva Eacutepoca

400 The effects of human capital depreciation on experience-earnings profiles Evidence salaried spanish men Autores M Arrazola J de Hevia M Risuentildeo y J F Sanz

500 Las ayudas fiscales a la adquisicioacuten de inmuebles residenciales en la nueva Ley del IRPF Un anaacutelisis comparado a traveacutes del concepto de coste de uso

Autor Joseacute Feacutelix Sanz Sanz 600 Las medidas fiscales de estiacutemulo del ahorro contenidas en el Real Decreto-Ley 32000

anaacutelisis de sus efectos a traveacutes del tipo marginal efectivo Autores Joseacute Manuel Gonzaacutelez Paacuteramo y Nuria Badenes Plaacute

700 Anaacutelisis de las ganancias de bienestar asociadas a los efectos de la Reforma del IRPF sobre la oferta laboral de la familia espantildeola Autores Juan Prieto Rodriacuteguez y Santiago Aacutelvarez Garciacutea

800 Un marco para la discusioacuten de los efectos de la poliacutetica impositiva sobre los precios y el stock de vivienda Autor Miguel Aacutengel Loacutepez Garciacutea

900 Descomposicioacuten de los efectos redistributivos de la Reforma del IRPF Autores Jorge Onrubia Fernaacutendez y Mariacutea del Carmen Rodado Ruiz

1000 Aspectos teoacutericos de la convergencia real integracioacuten y poliacutetica fiscal Autores Lorenzo Escot y Miguel Aacutengel Galindo

2001

101 Notas sobre desagregacioacuten temporal de series econoacutemicas Autor Enrique M Quilis

201 Estimacioacuten y comparacioacuten de tasas de rendimiento de la educacioacuten en Espantildea Autores M Arrazola J de Hevia M Risuentildeo y J F Sanz

301 Doble imposicioacuten ldquoefecto clientelardquo y aversioacuten al riesgo Autores Antonio Bustos Gisbert y Francisco Pedraja Chaparro

401 Non-Institutional Federalism in Spain Autor Joan Rosselloacute Villalonga

501 Estimating utilisation of Health care A groupe data regression approach Autora Mabel Amaya Amaya

mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1

601 Shapley inequality descomposition by factor components Autores Mercedes Sastre y Alain Trannoy

701 An empirical analysis of the demand for physician services across the European Union Autores Sergi Jimeacutenez Martiacuten Joseacute M Labeaga y Maite Martiacutenez-Granado

801 Demand childbirth and the costs of babies evidence from spanish panel data Autores Joseacute Mordf Labeaga Ian Preston y Juan A Sanchis-Llopis

901 Imposicioacuten marginal efectiva sobre el factor trabajo Breve nota metodoloacutegica y comshyparacioacuten internacional Autores Desiderio Romero Jordaacuten y Joseacute Feacutelix Sanz Sanz

1001 A non-parametric decomposition of redistribution into vertical and horizontal composhynents Autores Irene Perrote Juan Gabriel Rodriacuteguez y Rafael Salas

1101 Efectos sobre la renta disponible y el bienestar de la deduccioacuten por rentas ganadas en el IRPF Autora Nuria Badenes Plaacute

1201 Seguros sanitarios y gasto puacuteblico en Espantildea Un modelo de microsimulacioacuten para las poliacuteticas de gastos fiscales en sanidad Autor Aacutengel Loacutepez Nicolaacutes

1301 A complete parametrical class of redistribution and progressivity measures Autores Isabel Rabadaacuten y Rafael Salas

1401 La medicioacuten de la desigualdad econoacutemica Autor Rafael Salas

1501 Crecimiento econoacutemico y dinaacutemica de distribucioacuten de la renta en las regiones de la UE un anaacutelisis no parameacutetrico Autores Juliaacuten Ramajo Hernaacutendez y Mariacutea del Mar Salinas Jimeacutenez

1601 La descentralizacioacuten territorial de las prestaciones asistenciales efectos sobre la igualdad Autores Luis Ayala Cantildeoacuten Rosa Martiacutenez Loacutepez y Jesus Ruiz-Huerta

1701 Redistribution and labour supply Autores Jorge Onrubia Rafael Salas y Joseacute Feacutelix Sanz

1801 Medicioacuten de la eficiencia teacutecnica en la economiacutea espantildeola El papel de las infraestrucshyturas productivas Autoras Ma Jesuacutes Delgado Rodriacuteguez e Inmaculada Aacutelvarez Ayuso

1901 Inversioacuten puacuteblica eficiente e impuestos distorsionantes en un contexto de equilibrio general Autores Joseacute Manuel Gonzaacutelez-Paacuteramo y Diego Martiacutenez Loacutepez

2001 La incidencia distributiva del gasto puacuteblico social Anaacutelisis general y tratamiento especiacuteshyfico de la incidencia distributiva entre grupos sociales y entre grupos de edad Autor Jorge Calero Martiacutenez

2101 Crisis cambiarias Teoriacutea y evidencia Autor Oacutescar Bajo Rubio

2201 Distributive impact and evaluation of devolution proposals in Japanese local public finance Autores Kazuyuki Nakamura Minoru Kunizaki y Masanori Tahira

2301 El funcionamiento de los sistemas de garantiacutea en el modelo de financiacioacuten autonoacutemica Autor Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz

mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2401 Rendimiento de la educacioacuten en Espantildea Nueva evidencia de las diferencias entre Hombres y Mujeres Autores M Arrazola y J de Hevia

2501 Fecundidad y beneficios fiscales y sociales por descendientes Autora Anabel Zaacuterate Marco

2601 Estimacioacuten de precios sombra a partir del anaacutelisis Input-Output Aplicacioacuten a la econoshymiacutea espantildeola Autora Guadalupe Souto Nieves

2701 Anaacutelisis empiacuterico de la depreciacioacuten del capital humano para el caso de las Mujeres y los Hombres en Espantildea Autores M Arrazola y J de Hevia

2801 Equivalence scales in tax and transfer policies Autores Luis Ayala Rosa Martiacutenez y Jesuacutes Ruiz-Huerta

2901 Un modelo de crecimiento con restricciones de demanda el gasto puacuteblico como amortiguador del desequilibrio externo Autora Beleacuten Fernaacutendez Castro

3001 A bi-stochastic nonparametric estimator Autores Juan G Rodriacuteguez y Rafael Salas

2002

102 Las cestas autonoacutemicas Autores Alejandro Esteller Jorge Navas y Pilar Sorribas

202 Evolucioacuten del endeudamiento autonoacutemico entre 1985 y 1997 la incidencia de los Esshycenarios de Consolidacioacuten Presupuestaria y de los liacutemites de la LOFCA Autores Julio Loacutepez Laborda y Jaime Valleacutes Gimeacutenez

302 Optimal Pricing and Grant Policies for Museums Autores Juan Prieto Rodriacuteguez y Viacutector Fernaacutendez Blanco

402 El mercado financiero y el racionamiento del endeudamiento autonoacutemico Autores Nuria Alcalde Fradejas y Jaime Valleacutes Gimeacutenez

502 Experimentos secuenciales en la gestioacuten de los recursos comunes Autores Lluis Bru Susana Cabrera C Moacutenica Capra y Rosario Goacutemez

602 La eficiencia de la universidad medida a traveacutes de la funcioacuten de distancia Un anaacutelisis de las relaciones entre la docencia y la investigacioacuten Autores Alfredo Moreno Saacuteez y David Trillo del Pozo

702 Movilidad social y desigualdad econoacutemica Autores Juan Prieto-Rodriacuteguez Rafael Salas y Santiago Aacutelvarez-Garciacutea

802 Modelos BVAR Especificacioacuten estimacioacuten e inferencia Autor Enrique M Quilis

902 Imposicioacuten lineal sobre la renta y equivalencia distributiva Un ejercicio de microsimulacioacuten Autores Juan Manuel Castantildeer Carrasco y Joseacute Feacutelix Sanz Sanz

1002 The evolution of income inequality in the European Union during the period 1993-1996 Autores Santiago Aacutelvarez Garciacutea Juan Prieto-Rodriacuteguez y Rafael Salas

1102 Una descomposicioacuten de la redistribucioacuten en sus componentes vertical y horizontal Una aplicacioacuten al IRPF Autora Irene Perrote

mdash 45 mdash

1202 Anaacutelisis de las poliacuteticas puacuteblicas de fomento de la innovacioacuten tecnoloacutegica en las regioshynes espantildeolas Autor Antonio Fonfriacutea Mesa

1302 Los efectos de la poliacutetica fiscal sobre el consumo privado nueva evidencia para el caso espantildeol Autores Agustiacuten Garciacutea y Juliaacuten Ramajo

1402 Micro-modelling of retirement behavior in Spain Autores Michele Boldrin Sergi Jimeacutenez-Martiacuten y Franco Peracchi

1502 Estado de salud y participacioacuten laboral de las personas mayores Autores Juan Prieto Rodriacuteguez Desiderio Romero Jordaacuten y Santiago Aacutelvarez Garciacutea

1602 Technological change efficiency gains and capital accumulation in labour productivity growth and convergence an application to the Spanish regions Autora Mordf del Mar Salinas Jimeacutenez

1702 Deacuteficit puacuteblico masa monetaria e inflacioacuten Evidencia empiacuterica en la Unioacuten Europea Autor Ceacutesar Peacuterez Loacutepez

1802 Tax evasion and relative contribution Autora Judith Panadeacutes i Martiacute

1902 Fiscal policy and growth revisited the case of the Spanish regions Autores Oacutescar Bajo Rubio Carmen Diacuteaz Roldaacuten y M a Dolores Montaacutevez Garceacutes

2002 Optimal endowments of public investment an empirical analysis for the Spanish regions Autores Oacutescar Bajo Rubio Carmen Diacuteaz Roldaacuten y Ma Dolores Montaacutevez Garceacutes

2102 Reacutegimen fiscal de la previsioacuten social empresarial Incentivos existentes y equidad del sistema Autor Feacutelix Domiacutenguez Barrero

2202 Poverty statics and dynamics does the accounting period matter Autores Olga Cantoacute Coral del Riacuteo y Carlos Gradiacuten

2302 Public employment and redistribution in Spain Autores Joseacute Manuel Marqueacutes Sevillano y Joan Rosselloacute Villallonga

2402 La evolucioacuten de la pobreza estaacutetica y dinaacutemica en Espantildea en el periodo 1985-1995 Autores Olga Cantoacute Coral del Riacuteo y Carlos Gradiacuten

2502 Estimacioacuten de los efectos de un tratamiento una aplicacioacuten a la Educacioacuten superior en Espantildea Autores M Arrazola y J de Hevia

2602 Sensibilidad de las estimaciones del rendimiento de la educacioacuten a la eleccioacuten de insshytrumentos y de forma funcional Autores M Arrazola y J de Hevia

2702 Reforma fiscal verde y doble dividendo Una revisioacuten de la evidencia empiacuterica Autor Miguel Enrique Rodriacuteguez Meacutendez

2802 Productividad y eficiencia en la gestioacuten puacuteblica del transporte de ferrocarriles implicashyciones de poliacutetica econoacutemica Autor Marcelino Martiacutenez Cabrera

2902 Building stronger national movie industries The case of Spain Autores Viacutector Fernaacutendez Blanco y Juan Prieto Rodriacuteguez

3002 Anaacutelisis comparativo del gravamen efectivo sobre la renta empresarial entre paiacuteses y activos en el contexto de la Unioacuten Europea (2001) Autora Raquel Paredes Goacutemez

mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3102 Voting over taxes with endogenous altruism Autor Joan Esteban

3202 Midiendo el coste marginal en bienestar de una reforma impositiva Autor Joseacute Manuel Gonzaacutelez-Paacuteramo

3302 Redistributive taxation with endogenous sentiments Autores Joan Esteban y Laurence Kranich

3402 Una nota sobre la compensacioacuten de incentivos a la adquisicioacuten de vivienda habitual tras la reforma del IRPF de 1998 Autores Jorge Onrubia Fernaacutendez Desiderio Romero Jordaacuten y Joseacute Feacutelix Sanz Sanz

3502 Simulacioacuten de poliacuteticas econoacutemicas los modelos de equilibrio general aplicado Autor Antonio Goacutemez Goacutemez-Plana

2003

103 Anaacutelisis de la distribucioacuten de la renta a partir de funciones de cuantiles robustez y senshysibilidad de los resultados frente a escalas de equivalencia Autores Marta Pascual Saacuteez y Joseacute Mariacutea Sarabia Alegriacutea

203 Macroeconomic conditions institutional factors and demographic structure What causes welfare caseloads Autores Luis Ayala y Ceacutesar Peacuterez

303 Endeudamiento local y restricciones institucionales De la ley reguladora de haciendas locales a la estabilidad presupuestaria Autores Jaime Valleacutes Gimeacutenez Pedro Pascual Arzoz y Fermiacuten Cabaseacutes Hita

403 The dual tax as a flat tax with a surtax on labour income Autor Joseacute Mariacutea Duraacuten Cabreacute

503 La estimacioacuten de la funcioacuten de produccioacuten educativa en valor antildeadido mediante redes neuronales una aplicacioacuten para el caso espantildeol Autor Daniel Santiacuten Gonzaacutelez

603 Privacioacuten relativa imposicioacuten sobre la renta e iacutendice de Gini generalizado Autores Elena Baacutercena Martiacuten Luis Imedio Olmedo y Guillermina Martiacuten Reyes

703 Fijacioacuten de precios oacuteptimos en el sector puacuteblico una aplicacioacuten para el servicio munishycipal de agua Autora Mordf Aacutengeles Garciacutea Valintildeas

803 Tasas de descuento para la evaluacioacuten de inversiones puacuteblicas Estimaciones para Espantildea Autora Guadalupe Souto Nieves

903 Una evaluacioacuten del grado de incumplimiento fiscal para las provincias espantildeolas Autores Aacutengel Alantildeoacuten Pardo y Miguel Goacutemez de Antonio

1003 Extended bi-polarization and inequality measures Autores Juan G Rodriacuteguez y Rafael Salas

1103 Fiscal decentralization macrostability and growth Autores Jorge Martiacutenez-Vaacutezquez y Robert M McNab

1203 Valoracioacuten de bienes puacuteblicos en relacioacuten al patrimonio histoacuterico cultural aplicacioacuten comparada de meacutetodos estadiacutesticos de estimacioacuten Autores Luis Ceacutesar Herrero Prieto Joseacute Aacutengel Sanz Lara y Ana Mariacutea Bedate Centeno

1303 Growth convergence and public investment A bayesian model averaging approach Autores Roberto Leoacuten-Gonzaacutelez y Daniel Montolio

mdash 47 mdash

1403 iquestQueacute puede esperarse de una reduccioacuten de la imposicioacuten indirecta que recae sobre el consumo cultural Un anaacutelisis a partir de las teacutecnicas de microsimulacioacuten Autores Joseacute Feacutelix Sanz Sanz Desiderio Romero Jordaacuten y Juan Prieto Rodriacuteguez

1503 Estimaciones de la tasa de paro de equilibrio de la economiacutea espantildeola a partir de la Ley de Okun Autores Ineacutes P Murillo y Carlos Usabiaga

1603 La previsioacuten social en la empresa tras la Ley 462002 de reforma parcial del impuesto sobre la renta de las personas fiacutesicas Autor Feacutelix Domiacutenguez Barrero

1703 The influence of previous labour market experiences on subsequent job tenure Autores Joseacute Mariacutea Arranz y Carlos Garciacutea-Serrano

1803 Promoting sutdents effort standards versus torunaments Autores Pedro Landeras y J M Peacuterez de Villarreal

1903 Non-employment and subsequent wage losses Autores Joseacute Mariacutea Arranz y Carlos Garciacutea-Serrano

2003 La medida de los ingresos puacuteblicos en la Agencia Tributaria Caja derechos reconocishydos y devengo econoacutemico Autores Rafael Frutos Francisco Melis Mordf Jesuacutes Peacuterez de la Ossa y Joseacute Luis Ramos

2103 Tratamiento fiscal de la vivienda y exceso de gravamen Autor Miguel Aacutengel Loacutepez Garciacutea

2203 Medicioacuten del capital humano y anaacutelisis de su rendimiento Autores Mariacutea Arrazola y Joseacute de Hevia

2303 Vivienda reforma impositiva y coste en bienestar Autor Miguel Aacutengel Loacutepez Garciacutea 2403 Algunos comentarios sobre la medicioacuten del capital humano

Autores Mariacutea Arrazola y Joseacute de Hevia 2503 Exploring the spanish interbank yield curve

Autores Leandro Navarro y Enrique M Quilis 2603 Redes neuronales y medicioacuten de eficiencia aplicacioacuten al servicio de recogida de basuras

Autor Francisco J Delgado Rivero 2703 Equivalencia ricardiana y tipos de intereacutes

Autoesr Agustiacuten Garciacutea Juliaacuten Ramajo e Ineacutes Piedraescrita Murillo 2803 Instrumentos y objetivos de las poliacuteticas de apoyo a las PYME en Espantildea

Autor Antonio Fonfriacutea Mesa 2903 Anaacutelisis de incidencia del gasto puacuteblico en educacioacuten superior enfoque transversal

Autora Mariacutea Gil Izquierdo 3003 Rentabilidad social de la inversioacuten puacuteblica espantildeola en infraestructuras

Autores Jaime Alonso-Carrera Mariacutea Jesuacutes Freire-Sereacuten y Baltasar Manzano 3103 Las rentas de capital en Phogue anaacutelisis de su fiabilidad y correccioacuten mediante fusioacuten

estadiacutestica Autor Fidel Picos Saacutenchez

3203 Efecto de los sistemas de rentas miacutenimas autonoacutemicas sobre la migracioacuten interregional Autora Mariacutea Martiacutenez Torres

3303 Rentas miacutenimas autonoacutemicas en Espantildea Su dimensioacuten espacial Autora Mariacutea Martiacutenez Torres

mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3403 Un nuevo examen de las causas del deacuteficit autonoacutemico Autor Santiago Lago Pentildeas

3503 Uncertainty and taxpayer compliance Autores Jordi Caballeacute y Judith Panadeacutes

2004

104 Una propuesta para la regulacioacuten de precios en el sector del agua el caso espantildeol Autores Ma Aacutengeles Garciacutea Valintildeas y Manuel Antonio Muntildeiz Peacuterez

204 Eficiencia en educacioacuten secundaria e inputs no controlables sensibilidad de los resultashydos ante modelos alternativos Autores Joseacute Manuel Cordero Ferrera Francisco Pedraja Chaparro y Javier Salinas Jimeacutenez

304 Los efectos de la poliacutetica fiscal sobre el ahorro privado evidencia para la OCDE Autores Montserrat Ferre Carracedo Agustiacuten Garciacutea Garciacutea y Juliaacuten Ramajo Hernaacutendez

404 iquestQueacute ha sucedido con la estabilidad del empleo en Espantildea Un anaacutelisis desagregado con datos de la EPA 1987-2003 Autores Joseacute Mariacutea Arranz y Carlos Garciacutea-Serrano

504 La seguridad del empleo en Espantildea evidencia con datos de la EPA (1987-2003) Autores Joseacute Mariacutea Arranz y Carlos Garciacutea-Serrano

604 La ley de Wagner un anaacutelisis sinteacutetico Autor Manuel Jaeacuten Garciacutea

704 La vivienda y la reforma fiscal de 1998 un ejercicio de simulacioacuten Autor Miguel Aacutengel Loacutepez Garciacutea

804 Modelo dual de IRPF y equidad un nuevo enfoque teoacuterico y su aplicacioacuten al caso esshypantildeol Autor Fidel Picos Saacutenchez

904 Public expenditure dynamics in Spain a simplified model of its determinants Autores Manuel Jaeacuten Garciacutea y Luis Palma Martos

1004 Simulacioacuten sobre los hogares espantildeoles de la reforma del IRPF de 2003 Efectos sobre la oferta laboral recaudacioacuten distribucioacuten y bienestar Autores Juan Manuel Castantildeer Carrasco Desiderio Romero Jordaacuten y Joseacute Feacutelix Sanz Sanz

1104 Financiacioacuten de las Haciendas regionales espantildeolas y experiencia comparada Autor David Cantarero Prieto

1204 Multidimensional indices of housing deprivation with application to Spain Autores Luis Ayala y Carolina Navarro

1304 Multiple ocurrence of welfare recipiency determinants and policy implications Autores Luis Ayala y Magdalena Rodriacuteguez

1404 Imposicioacuten efectiva sobre las rentas laborales en la reforma del impuesto sobre la renshyta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en Espantildea Autoras Mariacutea Pazos Moraacuten y Teresa Peacuterez Barrasa

1504 Factores determinantes de la distribucioacuten personal de la renta un estudio empiacuterico a partir del PHOGUE Autores Marta Pascual y Joseacute Mariacutea Sarabia

1604 Poliacutetica familiar imposicioacuten efectiva e incentivos al trabajo en la reforma de la imposishycioacuten sobre la renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en Espantildea Autoras Mariacutea Pazos Moraacuten y Teresa Peacuterez Barrasa

mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1

1704 Efectos del deacuteficit puacuteblico evidencia empiacuterica mediante un modelo de panel dinaacutemico para los paiacuteses de la Unioacuten Europea Autor Ceacutesar Peacuterez Loacutepez

1804 Inequality poverty and mobility Choosing income or consumption as welfare indicators Autores Carlos Gradiacuten Olga Cantoacute y Coral del Riacuteo

1904 Tendencias internacionales en la financiacioacuten del gasto sanitario Autora Rosa Mariacutea Urbanos Garrido

2004 El ejercicio de la capacidad normativa de las CCAA en los tributos cedidos una primeshyra evaluacioacuten a traveacutes de los tipos impositivos efectivos en el IRPF Autores Joseacute Mariacutea Duraacuten y Alejandro Esteller

2104 Explaining budgetary indiscipline evidence from spanish municipalities Autores Ignacio Lago-Pentildeas y Santiago Lago-Pentildeas

2204 Local governmets asymmetric reactions to grants looking for the reasons Autor Santiago Lago-Pentildeas

2304 Un pacto de estabilidad para el control del endeudamiento autonoacutemico Autor Roberto Fernaacutendez Llera

2404 Una medida de la calidad del producto de la atencioacuten primaria aplicable a los anaacutelisis DEA de eficiencia Autora Mariola Pinillos Garciacutea

2504 Distribucioacuten de la renta crecimiento y poliacutetica fiscal Autor Miguel Aacutengel Galindo Martiacuten

2604 Poliacuteticas de inspeccioacuten oacuteptimas y cumplimiento fiscal Autores Ineacutes Macho Stadler y David Peacuterez Castrillo

2704 iquestPor queacute ahorra la gente en planes de pensiones individuales Autores Feacutelix Domiacutenguez Barrero y Julio Loacutepez-Laborda

2804 La reforma del Impuesto sobre Actividades Econoacutemicas una valoracioacuten con microdashytos de la ciudad de Zaragoza Autores Julio Loacutepez-Laborda Mordf Carmen Trueba Corteacutes y Anabel Zaacuterate Marco

2904 Is an inequality-neutral flat tax reform really neutral Autores Juan Prieto-Rodriacuteguez Juan Gabriel Rodriacuteguez y Rafael Salas

3004 El equilibrio presupuestario las restricciones sobre el deacuteficit Autora Beleacuten Fernaacutendez Castro

2005

105 Efectividad de la poliacutetica de cooperacioacuten en innovacioacuten evidencia empiacuterica espantildeola AutoresJoost Heijs Liliana Herrera Mikel Buesa Javier Saacuteiz Briones y Patricia Valadez

205 A probabilistic nonparametric estimator Autores Juan Gabriel Rodriacuteguez y Rafael Salas

305 Efectos redistributivos del sistema de pensiones de la seguridad social y factores detershyminantes de la eleccioacuten de la edad de jubilacioacuten Un anaacutelisis por comunidades autoacutenomas Autores Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz y Yolanda Ubago Martiacutenez

405 La relacioacuten entre los niveles de precios y los niveles de renta y productividad en los paiacuteses de la zona euro implicaciones de la convergencia real sobre los diferenciales de inflacioacuten Autora Ana R Martiacutenez Cantildeete

mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

505 La Reforma de la Regulacioacuten en el contexto autonoacutemico Autor Jaime Valleacutes Gimeacutenez

605 Desigualdad y bienestar en la distribucioacuten intraterritorial de la renta 1973-2000 Autores Luis Ayala Cantildeoacuten Antonio Jurado Maacutelaga y Francisco Pedraja Chaparro

705 Precios inmobiliarios renta y tipos de intereacutes en Espantildea Autor Miguel Aacutengel Loacutepez Garciacutea

805 Un anaacutelisis con microdatos de la normativa de control del endeudamiento local Autores Jaime Valleacutes Gimeacutenez Pedro Pascual Arzoz y Fermiacuten Cabaseacutes Hita

905 Macroeconomics effects of an indirect taxation reform under imperfect competition Autor Ramoacuten J Torregrosa

1005 Anaacutelisis de incidencia del gasto puacuteblico en educacioacuten superior nuevas aproximaciones Autora Mariacutea Gil Izquierdo

1105 Feminizacioacuten de la pobreza un anaacutelisis dinaacutemico Autora Mariacutea Martiacutenez Izquierdo

1205 Efectos del impuesto sobre las ventas minoristas de determinados hidrocarburos en la economiacutea extrementildea un anaacutelisis mediante modelos de equilibrio general aplicado Autores Francisco Javier de Miguel Veacutelez Manuel Alejandro Cardenete Flores y Jesuacutes Peacuterez Mayo

1305 La tarifa lineal de Pareto en el contexto de la reforma del IRPF Autores Luis Joseacute Imedio Olmedo Encarnacioacuten Macarena Parrado Gallardo y Mariacutea Dolores Sarrioacuten Gavilaacuten

1405 Modelling tax decentralisation and regional growth Autores Ramiro Gil-Serrate y Julio Loacutepez-Laborda

1505 Interactions inequality-polarization characterization results Autores Juan Prieto-Rodriacuteguez Juan Gabriel Rodriacuteguez y Rafael Salas

1605 Poliacuteticas de competencia impositiva y crecimiento el caso irlandeacutes Autores Santiago Diacuteaz de Sarralde Carlos Garcimartiacuten y Luis Rivas

1705 Optimal provision of public inputs in a second-best scenario Autores Diego Martiacutenez Loacutepez y A Jesuacutes Saacutenchez Fuentes

1805 Nuevas estimaciones del pleno empleo de las regiones espantildeolas Autores Javier Capoacute Parrilla y Francisco Goacutemez Garciacutea

1905 US deficit sustainability revisited a multiple structural change approach Autores Oacutescar Bajo-Rubio Carmen Diacuteaz-Roldaacuten y Vicente Esteve

2005 Aproximacioacuten a los pesos de calidad de vida de los ldquoAntildeos de Vida Ajustados por Calishydadrdquo mediante el estado de salud autopercibido Autores Anna Garciacutea-Alteacutes Jaime Pinilla y Salvador Peiroacute

2105 Redistribucioacuten y progresividad en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones una aplicacioacuten al caso de Aragoacuten Autor Miguel Aacutengel Barberaacuten Lahuerta

2205 Estimacioacuten de los rendimientos y la depreciacioacuten del capital humano para las regiones del sur de Espantildea Autora Ineacutes P Murillo

2305 El doble dividendo de la imposicioacuten ambiental Una puesta al diacutea Autor Miguel Enrique Rodriacuteguez Meacutendez

mdash 51 mdash

0 0

2405 Testing for long-run purchasing power parity in the post bretton woods era evidence from old and new tests Autor Juliaacuten Ramajo Hernaacutendez y Montserrat Ferreacute Cariacedo

2505 Anaacutelisis de los factores determinantes de las desigualdades internacionales en las emishysiones de CO2 per caacutepita aplicando el enfoque distributivo una metodologiacutea de desshycomposicioacuten por factores de Kaya Autores Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa

2605 Planificacioacuten fiscal con el impuesto dual sobre la renta Autores Feacutelix Domiacutenguez Barrero y Julio Loacutepez Laborda

2705 El coste recaudatorio de las reducciones por aportaciones a planes de pensiones y las deducciones por inversioacuten en vivienda en el IRPF 2002 Autores Carmen Marcos Garciacutea Alfredo Moreno Saacuteez Teresa Peacuterez Barrasa y Ceacutesar Peacuterez Loacutepez

2805 La muestra de declarantes IEF-AEAT 2002 y la simulacioacuten de reformas fiscales desshycripcioacuten y aplicacioacuten praacutectica Autores Alfredo Moreno Fidel Picos Santiago Diacuteaz de Sarralde Mariacutea Antiqueira y Luciacutea Torrejoacuten

2006

106 Capital gains taxation and progressivity Autor Julio Loacutepez Laborda

206 Pigoursquos dividend versus Ramseyrsquos dividend in the double dividend literature Autores Eduardo L Gimeacutenez y Miguel Rodriacuteguez

mdash 52 mdash

Edita Instituto de Estudios Fiscales NIPO 602-06-006-5 ISSN 1578-0252 Depoacutesito Legal M-23772-2001

3

3

3

INDEX

1 INTRODUCTION







5 CONCLUSIONS


REFERENCES


mdash 3 mdash

XXXXX

ABSTRACT





JEL Codes H23 Q58

mdash 5 mdash

XXXXX


1 INTRODUCTION






mdash 7 mdash





mdash 8 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

3

3

3

INDEX

1 INTRODUCTION







5 CONCLUSIONS


REFERENCES


mdash 3 mdash

XXXXX

ABSTRACT





JEL Codes H23 Q58

mdash 5 mdash

XXXXX


1 INTRODUCTION






mdash 7 mdash





mdash 8 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

XXXXX

ABSTRACT





JEL Codes H23 Q58

mdash 5 mdash

XXXXX


1 INTRODUCTION






mdash 7 mdash





mdash 8 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

ABSTRACT





JEL Codes H23 Q58

mdash 5 mdash

XXXXX


1 INTRODUCTION






mdash 7 mdash





mdash 8 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

XXXXX


1 INTRODUCTION






mdash 7 mdash





mdash 8 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash


1 INTRODUCTION






mdash 7 mdash





mdash 8 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash





mdash 8 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash







mdash 9 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash





mdash 10 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

2









mdash 11 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash



H


sumH






ˆ partc 1

( ) =






⎢ (1)h ( h h )

F ⎣ λ







mdash 12 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash








( ) ( )hhh

hhh

cElcU

lElcU

partpart

partpart ( )

P w

F N ⎟ ⎠ ⎞

⎜ ⎝ ⎛ == (2)





mdash 13 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash



a MSB

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts

MPB MPB

b MSD

Mar

gina

l be

nefit

s an

d co

sts





λ


partU h (




mdash 14 mdash

euro

Ecirc E

MRS U

U h

c

l =

( ))E(NF =ϕ


( )E

emissions

Source the authors
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash
















mdash 15 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash




sumH w H H

T h = tE E + t Psum


h=1 h=1 h=1


( w1minus t )c h h





~ E) partc




E λ


E λ


mdash 16 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

















mdash 17 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash









mdash 18 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash










mdash 19 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash











mdash 20 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash












mdash 21 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

11 i

i = ( minus ρi


1 ρi

ρi




E =Ex +Ey


ρu]1

1 ρ




mdash 22 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

4 271 31 2

3 44 2714







P X Y TIV TCV

P

X

Y

L

TOV

Leisure

E

531444531444

473491

4077756 4551247

12684

57953

27084479 27142432

1552

531444

31693679

4551247 27142432

31693679 932167



mdash 23 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash








P X Y L E

ndash 209 ndash 21

+ 03 00

ndash 209

+ 264 + 21 ndash 03

00

ndash 209 ndash 22

+ 02 ndash 01

ndash 209

+ 268 + 25 + 01

00



mdash 24 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash




GREEN TAX REFORM

Public Finance New

US$ US$

First Dividend

Second Dividend

+ 5953

ndash13987

+ 0146

ndash0034

+ 351475

+ 104723

+ 0086

+ 0026





mdash 25 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash









σi = 15

σi = 05

-0047 -0020

0157 0063

-290 -119


σ u = 18

σ u = 06

-0036 -0032

0110 0114

-209 -209


σ c = 15

σ c = 15

-0035 -0033

0116 0108

-216 -202


5 CONCLUSIONS


mdash 26 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash







mdash 27 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash


mdash 28 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

APPENDIX



mdash 29 mdash



P (

+ y t )⎡1 Xh + Yh ⎤ c ⎢ ⎥ = (1minus t w )

⎡ w (T minus lh ) h ⎤ ⎢ + T ⎥

⎣ P x ⎦ ⎣ Px ⎦







= E Px D






T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

T hα ))


α E1minus A


( BH E )







1minus α


h








T h ⎫⎨ ⎩ h=1t E t c t w g ⎬ =

⎭⎧ Hh0 ⎨ h ⎫= T =1t


⎩ ⎭0 1


(A6)A minus t 1


⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ ⎡ ⎛ ⎞ H H ⎤ t1 E 1 = ⎢t0 w ⎜ ⎟ T l h0 w


Psum

⎣⎢ ⎝ 1 ⎠ h=1 h =1 ⎦⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎝ P 1 ⎠ h=1 h=1 ⎥⎦




mdash 30 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash









⎭= ⎨ T







1 E E E⎩ ⎣ ⎦ A ⎭


mdash 31 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash





0 1 E= t1








1 β

t A 1 ⎛ α ⎞


A K ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 1 ⎠τ =

2⎛ 1 β ⎞⎜ α ⎛ α ⎞

⎟φ βBH⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎜ ⎟1minus α K ⎟⎝ 1 ⎠⎝ ⎠

⎡ ⎤ ⎢ 1 β ⎥⎛ ⎞








mdash 32 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash






⎛ α ⎞2



⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥








mdash 33 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

REFERENCES















mdash 35 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

















mdash 36 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash
















mdash 37 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

SIacuteNTESIS







mdash 39 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash


mdash 40 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash











mdash 41 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash











mdash 42 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1



2000




Nueva Eacutepoca









2001






mdash 43 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

1

1

1

1



















mdash 44 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1








2002












mdash 45 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash




















mdash 46 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1






2003














mdash 47 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash





















mdash 48 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



2004

















mdash 49 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

0

0 0

1















2005





mdash 50 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

0

0

0

0

0




















mdash 51 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

0 0






2006



mdash 52 mdash

Pigou’s Dividend versus Ramsey’s Dividend in the Double Dividend Literature

Documents

Transcript of Pigou’s Dividend versus Ramsey’s Dividend in the Double Dividend Literature