Articles

Perspective Taking and Peer Int^^etion:Structund and

Lucy J. LeMfu*e and Kenneth H. RubinUniversity ofWaterloo

LEMARE, LUCY J., and RUBIN, KENNETH H . Perspective Taking and Peer Interaction: Structural andDevelopmental An^es. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1^7, M, 306-315. The primaiy aim of the presentresearch was to further examine a model of perspective taldi^ presented by Ed^stiein, Keller, andWahlen. 2 versions of a perspective-^cmg task were administerod to diiJkken in kiottergtoten and^ades 1 and 3. The kii^rgKrt«i and ade 1 children represented a Icmgitudtinal stonj^. Da^ werescored according to Ed^lstein et al.'s adtexia. The results <iiftained d^^ved somewhi^ &om those ofEdelstein et al. ITiese results are discussed in terms of tiieir in^lications for a structural develop-mental api»roach to perspective tidcuig and for the task a]aal)^i9 a^^roach to social-cognitive mea~sures. The second m of ^is research was to examine e relation between perspective tsJdng andsocial experience- Peer interactive exi^rience was assessed in the kindei^artoi and grade 3 samplesby me^is (rf'behavuHal o^^iervations and peer assessments, respectively. In grade 3 only, there was asignificant relation betw^n peer sodabUity and perspective talang. These results are discussed interms of Piaget's position concerning peer experience and social-cognitive devel<^ment.

A nwQor focus of social-cognitive research standing of perfbrnu^ce on perspective-in the Pi£^getian tradition has been on per- t ^ n g tasks necessitates the identification ofspective tsddng. Perspective t ^ n g refers to the component structures and the relationsthe process throu|^ which individuals difier- among those structures bo6i between (Urbe^entiate and cocntllnate tiie psychological per- & Docherty, 15^6) and within the VMiousspectives of the self and others. According to measures (£(fetstein et al., 1^4). To un<fer-Piagetian theory, tihe ability to take the per- stand the strictures Mid operations involvedspectives of others is derived primarily from in a ven perspective-taking task, researchersopportunities to interact, excliange ii^rma- must conceptually is<^te tiie types of skiHstion, and discover dilfering roles and view- required to solve the task and ^ H h lpoints in the company of peers. It is believed, cal order or deve](^»nentel hierarchyfurther, tibat perspective-tiduiig skills become those operations,increasingly sophisti<^tedwiA^ and that Recently, Edelstein et al. (1984) per-they play a sigmficant role m Ae devdop- ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^f Chandler ^ dment of social concepUons ( S e l ^ , 1981, Qi^en^ian's (1972) w«fely used %«toKier Car-commimic^ve skUls i ^ ^ ^ ^ ) and al- ^ ^ U ^ ^ Bfl

^ ycommimic^ve skUls i^^^^)> and al- ^ ^ ^^ U s p ^ v e t ^ Briefly,^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ U s p ^ v e t ^ Briefly,truism (Krebs & Russell, 1981). ^^ Bystander cSoon measure consists of

Althou^ numerous measures have been cartoon sequences that depid: a central char-developed to assess perspective t£^ng, the acter in an alSsctively chai ged sitUEdion. Thecomponent structures embe^ided wiBiin p$i~ central chan rfeer is joined by a late arrivingticular tasks axe not well understood (Edels- bystamier who wihiesses the dwa-acter's emo-tein, Keller, & Wahlen, 1984). Recently, it has tional stete but not the antecedent circum-been suggested that a comprehensive under- stances &at gave rise to it

An earlier v^^ion of this article was presented at the biennial meetings of the InternationalSociety for tiie Study of Behavimal Development beld at TOOTS, Frwice, July 1985. The researchreputed herein was supported, in part, by E>octcnal Fellowship 453 84 0 ^ , awso-^d to the firstaudior by Uie Social Sciences and Htmuuiities Res^ardi CouiKdl of Caoaik, and by grants to thesecond »ithor Sram H e s ^ and Wd&re Canada and tiie Oattuio Mental He^th Fousdation. Re-quests for reprints sluHild be address»l to K. H. Rubin, Department of Psychology, University ofWaterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1.

iChOd E>evdopment, 1987,58, 306-315. © 1987 by die Society for Research in Child Deveidpment, Inc.All rig)^ reserved. O0Od- 920«7 S8(S-00O7$01.CiO]

From their analysis, Edelstein et al.(1984) identified a series of six subtasks thatthey believed were involved in successfulperiformance on the Bystander Cartoons.These may be described briefly as follows (fora more detailed description and rationale, seeEdelstein et al., 1984): Subtaskl, understand-ing the pictorial representation of events;Subtask 2, decoding the pictorial representa-tion of emotions; Subtask 3, understandingsimple causal relations between antecedentevents and subsequent emotions; Subtask 4,understanding the relation between parts andwhole; conserving the identity of a narrativeacross a sequence of events as a meaningfulwhole; Subtask 5, comprehension of complexor multiple psychological causality; and Sub-task 6, understanding that cognitive perspec-tives depend on access to specific infor-mation.

From a structural-developmental view-point, it was postulated that the six subtasksformed a logical hierarchy. To test this propo-sition, Edelstein et al. (1984) administeredtwo stories from the Bystander Cartoon mea-sure, one dealing witii aggression and theother with sadness, to grade 1 children. Infact, the six subtasks composed a logical se-quence for both stories; consequently, Edel-stein et al. argued that the scale assessesdistinct stages in the Piagetian structural-developmental sense.

Piagetian stages must satisfy several cri-teria (see, e.g., Brainerd, 1978; Kohlberg,1969). These include the demonstration of (a)qualitative changes in cognitive structureswith age; (b) a cidturally universal, invariantsequence in the overall progression of stages;and (c) hierarchical integration such that thecognitive structures of each preceding stagebuild the foundation for, and are included in,each subsequent stage.

Edelstein et al.'s (1984) conceptual analy-sis of performance on the Bystander Cartoonmeasure appears to establish a sequence ofqualitatively distinct structures. Moreover,these investigators found their six-subtask se-quence to be h i^ ly scalable; this lends initialsupport for the invariant sequence require-ment. However, to demonstrate clearly an in-variant sequence, data displaying the samescalability characteristics for different ages ofchildren would be desirable. In addition, lon-gitudinal data showing patterns of develop-mental change consistent with the predictedorder of acquisition for individual childrenwould make for a much stronger case. In thepresent study, we addressed these needs by

LeMare and Rubin 307

providing developmental data, both cross-sectional and longitudinal, for the sequenceproposed by Edelstein et al. We also exam-ined the universality criterion by testingCanadian children, a group culturally distinctfirom the Icelandic children in Edelstein etal.'s sample.

As aforementioned, the third criterion fora stage model is hierarchical integration. Evi-dence for hierarchical integration can comefrom two sources: (a) a conceptual analysisthat explains logically why preceding levelsare necessary for subsequent levels and whysubsequent levels build on preceding levelsand (b) an empirical analysis that establishesthe predicted invariant order. Although thelogic underlying Edelstein et al.'s (1984) con-ceptual analysis is credible, unequivocal em-pirical support for an invariant sequence re-mains to be established. Thus, the primarypurpose of the present study was to provide adevelopmentally stronger test of the scalecreated by Edelstein et al. (1984).

The second purpose of our study wasto examine the relation between peer-interactive experiences and children's per-spective-taking skills. In keeping with thePiagetian approach to social-cognitive devel-opment, Edelstein et al. (1984) hypothesizeda positive relation between peer-interactiveexperiences and 7-year-olds' performance onthe Six-Subtask Scale. To test this hypothesis,the Bystander Cartoons were administered toa group of urban-living children and a groupof rural-living children. Following the work ofHollos (1974; Hollos & Cowan, 1973) it wasassumed that the urban group had more op-portunities for peer interaction than the ruralgroup. Although this assumption may bevalid, unlike Hollos and Cowan, Edelstein etal. reported no attempt to actually establishthe amount of opportunity for peer interactionin either of the two environments. Thus, al-though, on average, the urban group per-formed at a higher level than the rural group,it is impossible to know if this performancedifference was attributable to differences inpeer interaction. In the present study, wemade a more direct assessment of peer-interactive experiences by observing chil-dren's free play and by gathering children'sassessments of their peers' social behavior.

Another problem with Edelstein et al.'sexamination of the relation between perform-ance on their scale and peer-interactive expe-riences concerns their assumption that eachsubtask measures some aspect of the perspec-tive-taking construct. We agree that the firstfour subtasks assess certain skills that are

308 Child Develo^nent

tapped by the Bystander Cartoon measureand that a lack of these skills may limit achild's ability to succeed on the fifth and sixthsubtasks; however, we find it difficult to seehow Subtasks 1-4 assess perspective-takingper se. Success on the first four subtasks isbased on decoding information clearly con-tained in the task stimuli (Subtasks 1,2, and 4)and on conventional social knowledge (Sub-task 3). Furthermore, it is unclear how peerinteraction is implicated in the acquisition ofthe skills that are necessary for success onthese four subtasks.

Subtasks 5 and 6, however, seem to con-tain a more obvious social-cognitive compo-nent. The ability to comprehend that a givenevent can elicit more than one emotionalreaction, depending on prior events (Subtask5) and the ability to understand that cognitiveperspectives depend on access to specific in-formation (Subtask 6) are both subcompo-nents of the perspective^aking construct andthus, if Piagetian tiieory is correct, should bepromoted by peer interaction. Therefore, inour test of die relation between perspectivetaking and peer interaction, we consideredonly Subtasks 5 and 6.

Another issue that we addressed in thepresent study concerned the extent to whichpeer interaction may be necessary to have animpact on perspective-taking skills. Piaget'stheory provides few guidelines for ascertain-ing the amount of experience with peers thatis necessary for social-cognitive development.Neo-Piagetian theorists have, however, con-sidered this issue. One view is the thresholdhypothesis offered by Hollos and Cowan(1973). These authors suggested tiiat someminimal level of peer-interactive experienceis sufficient for the development of perspec-tive taking, but, beyond this tiireshold, thesheer Mnount of peer interaction engaged inwill not affect perspective-taking develop-ment

In addition to the amount of peer experi-ence needed to promote perspective taking, afurther consideration is the age at which suchexperience is most beneficial. Although peercontact may, in fact, entail exposure to differ-ing views, according to Piaget, children youn-ger than about age 6 do not have the cognitivematurity to recognize perspectives other thantheir own and thus are not influenced bythem. For this reason, kindergarten-aged chil-dren lacking in experience with peers shouldnot deviate from their more socially experi-enced age-mates in terms of perspective-taking development. However, with die in-creased ability to decenter, children in the

early school years are thought to be betterable to appreciate points of view other thantheir own. Consequently, one m i ^ t expectthat children in grade 3 who are lacking inpeer experience would show delays in per-spective-taking skills relative to their moresociable age-mates.

In summary, the second purpose of thepresent study was to explore the relation be-tween performance on Subi^tsks 5 and 6 andpeer interaction. SpeciBcally, we aimed totest the threshold hypothesis concerning thisrelation. A final purpose was to examinewhether a lack of peer interaction is more det-rimental in terms of perspective-t^dng devel-opment to grade 3 children tiban to kindergar-ten children.

MethodSubjects

This study was conducted in kindergar-tens and elen^i^ary schools in southwesternOntario. Most children were Caucasian andmiddle class. Sixty-nine children (34 male, 35female; M age = 5-10) were tested in kinder-garten; 55 members of this original group (27male, 28 female) were tested 1 year later in^ade 1. An additional 14 (five male, nine fe-male) children who were not in the kindergar-ten sample were tested in j ^ d e 1. Ninety-three grade 3 children (48 male, 45 female; Mage = 8-10) were also tested.

Measures and ScoringPerspective taking.—Following the pro-

cedure of Edelstein et al. (1984), two ofCh£mdler and Greenspan's (1972) BystanderCartoon stories were presented. Order of pre-sent^on of die two stories was counterbal-anced, with ^jproximately half the childrenreceiving each of the two orders. The two pic-ture stories dealt with social situations involv-ing, respectively, aggression and sadness.Each child was tested individually by a fe-male research assistant.

Six questions, designed to assess the sixsubtasks identified by Edelstein et al. (1984)were asked of each child and were scoreddichotomously on a "pass/fiul" basis. Thesequestions are described in Edelstein et al.(1984). All protocols olirfmned during die in-terviews were scored by the first audior. Toolrtain an index of reliability, a subset of 80protocols was also scored by a second r^er.Interrater agreement was 93%.

Sociability.—For the kindergarten sub-jects, socidaility was determined from behav-ioral observations conducted over a 1-monthperiod. Basically, each child was observed for

LeMare and Rubin 309

six 10-sec intervals each day over a 30-dayperiod following a procedure outlined by Ru-bin (1982). Behaviors were coded on a check-list that included the cognitive play catego-ries of functional, constructive, and dramaticplay and games-with-rules (Smilansky, 1968)nested within the social participation catego-ries of solitary, parallel, and group activity(Parten, 1932). Other observational categoriesof relevance were onlooker behavior, unoc-cupied behavior, and active conversations.

The observational procedure just de-scribed yielded scores on two continuousvariables, nonsocial behavior (defined as thesum of unoccupied, onlooker, and solitaryplay) and social behavior (the sum of groupplay and peer conversation). Scores on thecontinuous variables were used to target chil-dren into one of three discrete groups; Isolate,Average, or Sociable. Children targeted asIsolates were 1 SD above the mean on nonso-cial and either within 1 SD or 1 SD below themean on social behavior. Children targeted asSociable were 1 SD above the mean on socialbehavior and either within 1 SD or 1 SD be-low the mean on nonsocial behavior. Chil-dren targeted as Average were within 1 SDof the means on both social and nonsocialbehavior. Children who were either 1 SDabove the means on both social and nonso-cial behavior or 1 SD below on both wereconsidered unclassifiable. This procedureyielded 11 Isolates, 31 Average children, and15 Sociable children. Ten children wereunclassiflable.

Unfortunately, due to a school cur-riculum that did not allow for free play pe-riods, observational data could not be ob-tained in grade 3. Instead, sociability wasdetermined via a peer-rating instrument, theMinnesota Revision of the Class Play (Mas-ten, Morrison, & Pellegrini, 1985). With thisprocednre, children were asked to nominateup to three classmates on the basis of a varietyof behavioral or character roles. The RevisedClass Play included a total of 30 items thatloaded on three factors, Sociability-Lead-ership, Aggression-Disruptiveness, and Sen-sitivity-Isolation. Of particnlar interest hereinwere the Sociability-Leadership and Sensitiv-ity-Isolation factors. Administration of theRevised Class Play followed the proceduresdescribed by Masten et al. (1985).

To determine children's factor scores,nominations received from same-sex peers,on each factor, were summed. All scores weretransformed to standard scores to allow formalcomparisons across subjects and classes.

Similar te the kindergarten sample, thegrade 3 children were also targeted into threegroups: Isolate, Average, and Sociable. Aswith the behavioral observation data, cutoffpoints were designated at 1 SD above andbelow the same-sex mean on the Sociability-Leadership and Sensitivity-Isolation factors.Children targeted as Isolated were thosewhose Sensitivity-Isolation score was 1 SD ormore above the mean and whose Sociability-Leadership score was either average (i.e.,within 1 SD of the mean) or 1 SD or morebelow the mean.

Children targeted as Sociable were thosewhose Sociability-Leadership score was 1 SDor more above the mean and whose Sensitiv-ity-Isolation score was either average or 1 SDor more below the mean. Children weretargeted as Average if both their Sensitivity-Isolation and Sociability-Leadership scoresfell within 1 SD of the means. Using this pro-cedure, 16 children were identified as Iso-lated, 65 were identified as Average, and 15were identified as Sociable. No childrenwere unclassifiable using this procedure, in-dicating that no children had high scores onboth the Sensitivity-Isolation and Sociability-Leadership factors.

In both the kindergarten and grade 3samples, the three sociability groups werecontrasted to enable a test of the thresholdhypothesis concerning the relation betweenperspective taking and social experience. Ifthe threshold hypothesis describes this rela-tion, one would expect no differences in per-spective taking between Average and Soci-able children; however. Isolate childrenwould he expected to be lagging relative tothe other two groups.

Concerning the age at which peer in-teraction is most beneficial in promoting per-spective-taking skills, if Piaget's theory is cor-rect, the relation between perspective takingand peer interaction should be stronger forgrade 3 children who should have attainedconcrete operations than for kindergartenchildren who are, most probably, still pre-dominantly preoperational thinkers.

ResultsScalogram Analyses

Scalogram analyses were computed onthe perspective-taking data for each of thethree age groups. The ordering of the sixitems was determined according to the per-centage of children who "passed" or "failed"each of the items. The percentages of chil-dren passing each subtask within each of the

310 Glnkl Development

Aggression and Sadness stories in the kinder-garten, grade 1, and grade 3 samples are re-ported in Table 1. Coefficients of reproduci-bility and scalability are also reported.Coefficients should be greater than .9 for re-producibihty and greater than .6 for scal^il-ity to indicate a valid Guttman Scale ^Nie,Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, & Brent, 1975).

As can be seen in Table 1, the data-analytic procedure produced valid scales forboth stories within all grades. Furtiiennore,the results were consistent across stories andacross grades, with the order from leastdifficult to most difficult being Subtasks 2, 4,1, 3, 5, and 6, respectively. As iodiratted inTable 1, in some insttmces sli^itly more chil-dren passed Subtask 3 than Subtask 1. Thisscaling procedure did not exactly replicatethe sequence of subtasks suggested by Edel-stein et al. (1^4), with die ras^or point of dif-ference being Subtask 4.

Although the same orderii^ was pro-duced for all stories, grades, and sexes, per-formance diflferences were su^g^stinstances. For example, a greaterof children tended to pass a given subtask onthe Aggression story ^ n Ae same subtask onthe Sadness story (see Table 1). Performancedifferences based on sex and order were alsosuggested.

in some

Story, Order, and Sex EffectsTo determine if mere were any sig-

nificant story, order, or sex efiecte, a numberof amJyses of vjuianoe were computed. Toobtain the necessary data for these analyses,each child was assigned a total score for ^ichstory, based on the number of subtaskspassed. Repeated-measures 2 (story, re-peated) X 2 (sex) X 2 (order) ANOVAs werecomputed. In the kindergarten andgroups, story effects, Idnder^srten, P )6.94, p < .01; grade 1, F(l,67) - 8.51, p <.(XK , and story X order interat^on effects,kinder^rten, F(l,50) = 4.03, p < .05; grade 1,F(l,67) = 4.51, p < .04, were found. Themain effects for story indi<^ted that, in gen-eral, the Aggression story was less difficultthan ilie Sadness story. Post hoc comparisonbetween the A^^ession story means for onler1 (Sadness, Aggression) and order 2sion, Sadness) revealed that themeans were h i ^ e r vi^ien the Ag^essionstory was administered second: kindergarten,t(28) = 3.75, p < .001; grade 1, t{36) = 3.57, p

In the grade 3 sample, there was asignificant effect for order, F(l,91) = 19.59, p< .001, wititi the children who received theSadness story followed by tiie A^^essionstory perfcaming better overall than the chil-

TABLE 1SCALOGRAM ANALYSES OF THE PEBSPECTI YE-TAKING TASKS

Kindergarten . . .Grade 1Grade 3

Kindergarten . . .Grade 1Grade 3

Kindergarten . . .Grade 1Grade 3

2

. 10010099

4

849397

PERGENTAGE OF CHILDREN PASSING EAGH SUBTASK

Sadness

1 3 5 6 2 4

42 43 19 3 100 8663 64 26 14 100 9678 75 44 21 100 90

Aggression

1 3

58 6288 8582 80

COEFPIGIENT OF REPRODUGIBILITY

Sadness

.96

.99

.97

COEFFIGIENT OF SGALABILITY

Sadness

.80

.74

.86

Aggression

.96

.99

.99

Aggression

.80

.94

.94

5

313144

6

11314

LeMare and Rubin 311

dren who received the opposite order. A storyX order interaction, F{1,91) = 7.59, p < .007,was also found. Again, post hoc comparisonsrevealed that the children who received theAggression story second performed signifi-candy better on this task, t(47) = 2.31, p < .03.

In summary, the Aggression story wasgenerally less difficult than the Sadness storyfor the kindergarten and grade 1 children.The grade 3 children, on average, found thetwo stories to be of equal difficulty. In allgrades, however, a practice efFect was appar-ent for the Aggression story, with the childrenwho received it second performing at asignificantly higher level than those who re-ceived it first. No significant sex differenceswere found.

Developmental AnalysesThe data in the present study were exam-

ined both cross-sectionally and longitudinallyto assess developmental changes in children'sperformance on the Six-Subtask Scale. Al-though the Guttman Scale analyses showedan overall developmental change in perform-ance, these analyses did not reveal if the pat-tern of change on the six subtasks was consis-tent with stage theory for individual children.To examine individual patterns of change,each subject's performance in kindergartenwas compared with his or her performance ingrade 1. The data were examined in threeways: (1) scores were assigned for each storybased on the number of subtasks passed re-gardhss of order, (2) scores were based onthe order produced by the present scalingprocedure and were determined by the high-est level passed before a failure, and (3)scores were based on the order produced bythe scaling procedure and were determinedby the highest level passed. Because earlieranalyses suggested that Subtasks 1 and 3 werehighly interdependent, the data were addi-tionally examined according to Methods 1and 2 with Subtasks 1 and 3 treated as equiva-lent. Thus, in the few cases in which only oneof these subtasks was passed, children weregiven credit for both.

All methods of analysis produced almostidentical results. Consequently, we will re-port the data from Method 1 only (the readermay obtain all other results from the first au-thor). For the Sadness story, 29 children im-proved, 19 remained at the same level, and 10children scored lower in grade 1 than in kin-dergarten. On the Aggression story, 28 chil-dren improved, 17 remained the same, and 13children's performance declined. Thus, for allscoring methods, roughly 20% of the children

showed a decline in performance betweenkindergarten and grade 1.

According to Piagetian theory, if a partic-ular sequence of skills is, in fact, representa-tive of a stage model, movement through thesequence will be unidirectional and thus theproportion of children who regress will bezero. To determine if the sampling propor-tions obtained were acceptable in terms ofstage theory (i.e., were not significantlygreater than .00), we calculated 99% con-fidence intervals around the obtained propor-tions of children who regressed (see Klugh,1974, p. 165). Number of regressions was de-termined using Method 1. For the Sadnessstory, on which there were 10 regressions(i.e., a sampling proportion of .17), the lowerand upper 99% confidence limits were .04and .30, respectively. For the Aggressionstory, on which there were 13 regressions(i.e., a sampling proportion of .22), the lowerand upper 99% confidence limits were .08and .36, respectively. Given that neither ofthese intervals contains the theoretically ex-pected value of .00, we might reject the hy-pothesis that this particular sequence of tasksconstitutes a stage model.

However, testing against the expectedproportion of zero involves the assumptionthat the assignment of scores on the Six-Subtask Scale was perfectly reliable and thatthe regressions observed were "true" regres-sions. Assuming that there was an equalchance for the two raters to give a subject an"incorrect" pass or fail, the expected propor-tion of regressions due to measurement errorwould be .035. This value still falls outsidethe limits of the confidence intervals; thuseven with this less stringent test we reject thehypothesis that the scale constitutes a stagemodel.

Social Experience and Perspective TakingTo test the threshold hypothesis outlined

above, the three sociability groups were com-pared on their responses to Subtasks 5 and 6.Given the categorical nature of the data, thelog-linear procedure, Iogit analysis, was used.The Iogit analysis procedure is analagous toanalysis of variance in that it allows one to testspecific models or hypotheses; however, it isdesigned explicitly for categorical data. Thestatistic yielded from Iogit analysis is thelikelihood-ratio chi-square (L^), which servesa similar frinction to the Pearsonian chi-square. However, in comparison with thePearsonian chi-square, I? possesses severalproperties that are more desirable in log-linear work (Kennedy, 1983, p. 60).

312 Chttd Develoimieiit

The analyses indicated that for Subtask 5,no significant differences existed between thethree kindei^arten groups. Because, at max-imum, only 2% of the kindergarten childrenpassed Subtask 6, logit analyses were not con-ducted for this sample.

For grade 3 children, no significant be-tween-group differences were found for Sub-task 5. However, for Subtask 6, a number ofsignificant differences emerged. The firstcomparison made was between the Isolateand Average groups. This comparisonyielded significant results for both stories; forthe Sadness story, L^(l) = 7.40, p < .007, andfor the Aggression story, L^(l) = 4.74, p <.03, indicating that the Isolate children dif-fered in perspective taking from the Averagechildren in a manner that is consistent withthe threshold hypotheses. The Average andSociable groups were then compared. Thethreshold hypothesis would predict no differ-ence between these groups. Consistent withthe threshold hypothesis, the results of theseanalyses revealed no significant differencesbetween the Average and Sociable groups oneither story, L^Cl) = .65, p < .42; L^l) = .18,p < .67, respectively.

To ensure that, in fact, the threshold hy-podiesis best described tiie data for Subtask 6,a final comparison between the Isolate andSociable groups was conducted. As expected,this analysis yielded significant results forboth stories; for the Sadness story, L^(l) =8.30, p < .004, and for the Aggression story,L^(l) = 4.70, p < .03. The differences be-tween the groups were consistent with thethreshold hypotfiesis.

DiscussionIn the present study, as in the study con-

ducted by Edelstein et al. (1984), Subtask 2was the easiest in the six-subtask sequence.Indeed, Ec^lstein et al. had no logical reasonfor expecting Subtask 2 to follow Subtask 1. Intheir words, "Logically, mastery of subtask 2does not imply the solution of subtask 1, sinceboth can be inferred independently from thecartoons" (p. 1516). Subtask 2 was postulatedto follow Subtask 1 based on the belief iJiat itis "easier to decode behavioral and physicalevents (subtask 1) than to infer psychologicalstates" (p. 1516).

There are a number of explanations forthe obtained ordering of Subtasks 1 and 2. Inthe first place, Subtask 2 probably does notassess the ability to infer psychological states,as Edelstein et al. originally assumed. Theemotional states of the cartoon characters are

clearly illustrated in their facial expressionsand need only to be "read" from the taskstimuli.

According to Edelstein et al.'s (1984)original formulation, Subtask 1 "requires theunderstanding of pictorial representation ofevents" (p. 1516). The "correct" answers inEdelstein et al.'s system are based on whatthe adult creators of the test (Chandler &Greenspan, 1972) intend^ to depict in thesequences. Tiius, Subtask 1 in Edelstein etal.'s scheme assesses children's ability to see,in the pictures, the particular event sequencetiiat the test creators hoped that they wouldsee.

There were few instances in the presentstudy where children were unable to con-struct a logical event sequence, though inmany cases it was not the "correct" one. It issuggested here that the reason that childrenin the present study and, possibly, in Edel-stein et al.'s study performed better on Sub-task 2 tlian Subtask 1 is that the depiction ofthe em<^onal states of the cartoon charactersis unambiguous, whereas the depiction of theevents leading to those emotional states isopen to more than one interpretation withonly one, however, being correct.

In the present study, we found the order-ing of Subtesks 1 and 3 to be the same as thatfound by Edelstein et al.; however, we founda much stronger association between thesetwo subtasks than was found in the originalstudy. In this study, Subtasks 1 and 3 werefound to be virtually identicsd with regard todifficulty. Those children who passed orfailed Subtask 1 also passed or failed Subtask3 and vice versa. This is not surprising ^venthat the "correct" answer to Suliask 3 lies inAe event sequence given in response to Sub-task 1; that is, the child must relate that acharacter feels a certain way because of theevents tfiat occur at the beginning of the story.As was Ae case with Subtask 1, very few chil-dren were unable to give a reason, consistentwith their telling of the events in Subiask 1, asto why the character felt a certain way. How-ever, if tl^ir telling of the events in Subtask 1was incorrect, dieir response to Subtask 3 wasalso incorrect.

Subtask 4 represents the major point ofdiscrepancy between the sequence found byEdelstein et al. (1984) and diat found herein.To succeed on this subtask, children mustdemonstrate an understanding Uiat die samecharacter is a(^ng in the first and second partsof the story. Unlike the c^er five subtasks, forwhich there are specific questions diat can be

LeMare and Rubin 313

answered either correctly or incorrectly, suc-cess on Subtask 4 is inferred from the child'sability to relate the two episodes as parts of asingle meaningful story. Given the absence ofwell-defined criteria for scoring Subtask 4,one possible explanation for the discrepancybetween our results and those of Edelstein etal. may be differences in judgment as to whatconstituted a eorrect response. A second ex-planation that applies to our results, at least, isthat Subtask 4 measures what was intended tobe measured by Snbtask 1, that is, the abilityto construct an event sequence. As such, it isa relatively simple skill with only Subtask 2found to be less difficult in this study.

Subtasks 5 and 6 held the same positionsin the six-subtask sequence in both the pres-ent study and the one conducted by Edelsteinet al. (1984). Successful performance on Sub-task 5 requires that the child identify the car-toon character's emotional reaction, link thatreaction with the contingent event, and logi-cally connect the contingent event with aprior event. Subtask 6 requires the under-standing diat cognitive perspectives dependon access to specific information. The criticalpoint is that the child recognizes that the by-stander has had access to less informationthan himself or herself.

In summary, the data reported hereinhave significant ramifications for the sequen-tial model of perspective taking suggested byEdelstein etal. (1984). Our failure to replicatethe original sequence suggests that it isneither universal nor invariant. The next is-sue we addressed concerned whether the se-quence determined in this study fulfills therequirements of a stage model.

The first criterion of a stage model is thatthere is qualitative change in cognitive struc-tures with age. The abilities underlying Sub-tasks 2, 4, 3, 5, and 6 in the new sequence,from a conceptual standpoint, appear to bequalitatively diflferent from one another. Sub-task 1, however (interpreting an event se-quence as an adult would), seems to be aquantitative extension of Subtask 4 (simplyconstructing an event sequence). Further-more, although Subtasks 3 and 1 appear toinvolve qualitatively different structures, theempirical evidence is that they are highly de-pendent skills that are not acquired sequen-tially.

To establish invariance, the second crite-rion of a stage model, every child must passthrough the stages in the same order—not juston average, but for every individual. Further-more, movement through the stages must be

unidirectional and irreversible (Kohlberg,1969). Although the Guttman Scale analysisestablished that, on average, the subtaskswere acquired by children in the same order,there were many individual cases that de-viated from the average pattern. Moreover,the longitudinal results showed that move-ment through the levels was clearly not uni-directional; reversals occurred in 14%-27% ofthe children, depending on the scoring crite-ria used. These percentages are much higherthan the levels normally considered accept-able for a structural-developmental stagemodel (see Golby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, &Leiberman, 1983) and, in fact, were statisti-cally unacceptable in terms of stage theory.

One potential limitation of the presentstudy that has implications for the interpreta-tion of the obtained reversals is that the stabil-ity of the children's responses on the scale, inthe short term, was not determined. However,acceptable test-retest correlations for the By-stander Gartoons (Ghandler & Greenspan,1972) have been reported in the literature.For example, Kurdek (1977) found a test-retest correlation of .68, and Chandler,Greenspan, and Barenboim (1974) reported acorrelation of .84. These correlations werebased on scores derived from the scoring sys-tem suggested by Ghandler and Greenspan(1972) that is not identical to the system usedherein. However, the scoring systems ofChandler and Greenspan (1972) and Edel-stein et al. (1984) are very similar at the upperlevels; thus these reliability data are relevantfor the present study.

Assuming that invariance was not estab-lished, the hierarchical criterion cannot bemet either. Further, on conceptual grounds itis difficult to see hierarchical relations be-tween Subtasks 2 and 4 and, on empiricalgrounds, between Subtasks 3 and 1. In con-clusion, neither the sequence proposed byEdelstein et al. (1984) nor the sequence foundin this study meets the criteria for a stagemodel. Indeed, the expectation of a stagelikerelation among Subtasks 1-4 and die ex-pected hierarchical relation between these"earlier" subtasks and Subtasks 5 and 6 mayhave been ill conceived in the first place. It isour belief that Subtasks 1-4 compose a set oftask demands or skills without which individ-uals cannot display the ability to perspectivetake (i.e., succeed on Subtasks 5 and 6). Thus,these first four tasks, while theoretically unre-lated to the perspective-taking construct, arepractically related to and necessary for per-formance on the task itself.

314 Development

Failure to find a hierarchical sequence inthe abilities measured by the Bystander Car-toons does not negate tiie value of a task anal-ysis £^proach to measures of social cognition.This approach demonstrates clearly that skillsother than those intended to be meastired areinvolved in pei^rmance on given tasks. De-spite our inability to provide empirksd sup-port for a stage model, it is, nevertheless, im-portant to £uJmowledge tiiat conceptualanalyses, such as the one conducted by EUiel-stein et al. (1984), can give an investigstorgreater understanding of the task of a t^ildwho is faced with a perspective-taking mea-sure.

A second major purpose of the presentstudy was to provide a more adequate test ofPia^t's position on perspective taking andsocial experience than was provi<ted byEdelstein et al. (1984). In so doing we ex-tended the study conducted by Edelstein etal. in several ways.

First, peer sociability was detennined di-rectly for each individual child, rallier thanassumed &om some other known factor suchas location of residence. Second, in the pres-ent study, the inclusion of two age groups, forwhich Piaget's (1926, 1932) Aeory predictsdifferent relations between persjwctive tak-ing and peer sociability, allowed for a test ofdie developmental aspect of the dieory.Third, in the present research, a specific hy-pothesis concerning the amount of interactionnecessary for perspective-taldag develi^nnentwas ad<h«ssed. Fourth, and finally, in thepresent study, only items that were conceptu-ally part of the perspective-taking constructwere used to derive perspective-taking scores.

In general, die results of this study weresupportive of Pii^et's position concerning thedevelopment of perspective Uddng. Peersociability was found to be related to pe«pec-tive-tfdcing ability. Furthermore, this relationwas stronger in grade 3 than in kindei^arten.

In grade 3, Isolate children were, on av-erage, significantly poorer perspective t^ersthan tiieir Average and Sociable peers, whilethe Average and Sociable children did notdiffer from eiu;h other. This pattern was foundfor the Aggression story and the Sadnessstory, and is entirely consistent wi& thethreshold hypc^hesis. These results suggestthat diere is some minimal threshold of peerinteraction below which children will sufiferin terms of social-a^paitive develo|Mnent butabove which no further gains are made.

It is important to note that the presentstudy has not identified, nor did it aim to

identify, the threshold point in social interac-tion for the promotion of social-cognitivesldUs. Isc^ation and Sociability, as measuredin this shtdy, are parts of amtinua and anycutoffs one msdces to classify chil«iren are, ofcoiurse, arl»teiry. In the present st i ;^, we re-lied on what is statistically "normd" to definethe three status grcHips. We do not claim &at 1SD above the mean on an isolation measuredefiles the threshold point of social int^ac-tion n»:»ss£uy for perspective-tf^ng develop-ment. NeverttieJess, Ae results (rf Ae studydo suggest that, on averc^, childbien targetedas Isolated were below the threshold point insocial experience for optimal devel(q>ment ofsocial-cognitive skills while, on average, chil-dren ^^e ted as Avenge and Sociable wereabove it.

Althmigh the results found herein areconsistent wi& the tiusshold hypothesis, tiieycannot be u s ^ to e^E^sh a causal re l^onbetween perspective t^dag and social ej^eri-enc«. It may be titwt a lack of social experi-ence impedes the development of perspec-tive-^king sl^Is; however, it is equally

thfU: poor perspective takers are^ d in tlwir e&arts to be sociable.

Indeed, both premises are coQcepbmllylegitimate. An isolated child nmy fail to de-velop persp^^ve-t»kiRg skills because of hisor her ladk of pe^r-interactive experiences;the inaMlity to perspective take may makefurther soicial encounters rather difficult.

The fact diat IsoliUad and SocU^le sta-tuses were assessed with diSbient measure-ment instruments in the kindergarten £uidgrade 3 samples must, of comise, be acknowl-edged. Had similar measures been used inbodi samples, our results m i ^ t have beendifferent However, &ere are data to st^gestthat peer n^ngs of soc^bility on the RevisedClass Hay are related sig^iBcfU^y to fre-quency of (^served sociable behaviors, dur-ir^ children's firee play (Rubin & Cohen,1986; Rubin & Hymel, 1986).

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